Publications

Read more on The INSS Plan

The framework was formulated and prepared by a team of researchers from INSS, most with many years of expertise on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; some of these experts participated actively in the various rounds of negotiations with the Palestinians in recent decades. The INSS team includes: Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin, Brig. Gen. (res). Udi Dekel, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom, Ambassador Dr. Oded Eran, Dr. Zipi Israeli, Dr. Anat Kurz, Kim Lavi, Dr. Kobi Michael, Brig. Gen. (res.) Assaf Orion, Col. (res.) Adv. Pnina Sharvit Baruch, Col. (res.) Adv. Gilead Sher, Sima Shine, and Prof. Eran Yashiv.

In light of the current obstacles to a comprehensive permanent status agreement with the Palestinians built on parameters that are critical for Israel, the framework presented here proposes measures that serve Israel’s interests and offers a variety of options for the future – even in the absence of a Palestinian partner to a permanent status agreement – in order to progress toward political, territorial, and demographic separation from the Palestinians, and to create long range strategic stability. From that point, Israel will be able to pursue additional political alternatives carefully and gradually, as it deems appropriate. The proposed framework hopes to recruit domestic support among the Israeli public, and allow Israel to reach understandings with the international community, the pragmatic Arab countries, and the Palestinians themselves. Above all, it reflects Israel’s resolve to shape its own future. In light of the current obstacles to a comprehensive permanent status agreement with the Palestinians built on parameters that are critical for Israel, the framework presented here proposes measures that serve Israel’s interests and offers a variety of options for the future – even in the absence of a Palestinian partner to a permanent status agreement – in order to progress toward political, territorial, and demographic separation from the Palestinians, and to create long range strategic stability. From that point, Israel will be able to pursue additional political alternatives carefully and gradually, as it deems appropriate. The proposed framework hopes to recruit domestic support among the Israeli public, and allow Israel to reach understandings with the international community, the pragmatic Arab countries, and the Palestinians themselves. Above all, it reflects Israel’s resolve to shape its own future.

Highlights of the Framework

The main advantage of the framework is the modularity that facilitates considerable flexibility: it enables Israel to choose continually among the alternative modes of action, but also allows it to pull back, depending upon the changing conditions in its strategic environment. What follows are the framework’s driving principles:

a. Strengthen security elements while minimizing the friction with the Palestinian population, maintaining the IDF’s freedom of action throughout the West Bank, from the Jordan River westward, and cooperating with the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) security apparatuses – the more they do, the more the IDF can reduce its operational activities in Palestinian territory.

b. Anchor Israel’s political, security, and territorial interests in the West Bank in preparation for future agreements, and in order to improve Israel’s strategic position in the absence of political progress. The framework demonstrates Israel’s intentions to advance political, demographic, and territorial separation from the Palestinians and thereby create the conditions for a two-state reality.

c. Strengthen Israel’s regional standing and international legitimacy through regional-security, political, and economic-infrastructural cooperation.

d. Strengthen Palestinian governance, economy, and infrastructure. To this end, gradual action – taken with international assistance – will improve the PA’s performance and expand its powers. Inter alia, areas will be allocated for economic and infrastructure development and for building a foundation for a future functional independent Palestinian state.

e. Adopt a policy of differential construction in the West Bank. Construction will continue in the settlement blocs – west of the security fence – that are within the broad public consensus as a permanent part of Israel and in accordance with Israel’s positions in previous negotiations. At the same time, construction will be frozen in isolated settlements deep in the territory, and government support for their expansion will end. The issue of evacuating settlements will be raised only within the context of a permanent arrangement with the Palestinians.

f. Demonstrate a clear preference for agreed courses of action (or at the very least, coordinated courses of action) between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. However, even without Palestinian consent, Israel will be able to take steps toward separation by taking independent actions according to its interests, thereby neutralizing the Palestinian veto, which is one of the main reasons for the political deadlock.

Framework Stages

Israel will declare its commitment in principle to a two-state solution, and will be willing at any time to enter direct negotiations toward a comprehensive status agreement. Concurrently, Israel will begin implementing the principles of the framework on the ground in order to progress in separating from the PA and ending Israeli rule over the majority of the Palestinian population in the West Bank. In order to achieve international support for the framework –including Arab support – Israel will not only express willingness to enter negotiations, but will be required to present parameters for a permanent status agreement. If the negotiations hit a dead end or fail, Israel will be able to proceed with implementing the framework and designing a stable political, security, and civil reality that is better for Israel over time.

Israel will take action to complete the security barrier, which will also demarcate the separation line and Israel’s territorial interests for the future, and will declare that it is freezing construction in the isolated Israeli settlements located in Palestinian territory east of the barrier. In addition, Israel will declare that up to 20 percent of the territory of the West Bank is of security interest (most of which is in the Jordan Valley, including strategic sites and transportation routes), and will remain under Israeli control until agreement is reached about security arrangements that satisfy Israel and until an effective and responsible Palestinian entity is established.

Israel has an interest in the establishment of an effective, stable Palestinian Authority that cooperates with it in progressing toward a political solution. Therefore, Israel will take the following measures in order to support and strengthen the PA:

a. Israel will transfer security authorities in Area B to the PA, similar to the authorities it now has in Area A, so that a uniform Palestinian region will be created (A + B) that will be the foundation for the future Palestinian state, and in the meantime might serve as a Palestinian state with provisional borders. This territory extends over nearly 40 percent of the territory of the West Bank, and is home to more than 95 percent of the Palestinian population in the territories.

b. To encourage the Palestinian economy and expand the area for Palestinian communities, Israel will allocate up to 25 percent of Area C for the development of infrastructure and economic projects, and will transfer Palestinian-populated areas that extend beyond Areas A and B to Area C to Palestinian control. Combined efforts with the international community will be made for the establishment of industrial and green energy enterprises, tourism and hi-tech ventures, residential construction, and other projects. At the initial stage, Israel will not transfer security and planning authorities to the Palestinians in these development regions, but they will be “ready and waiting” and gradually transferred to the Palestinian Authority if it cooperates with the development.

c. The Palestinian territory will be contiguous; a contiguous transportation system will be established in the West Bank from north to south, thus reducing the daily friction between the IDF, the Jewish residents, and the Palestinian population; and the obstacles to Palestinian economic development will be removed.

d. An economic program will be launched with the short-term objective of improving the Palestinians’ standard of living and the long-term objective of encouraging Palestinian economic independence, which will enable economic separation from Israel. Establishing an ad hoc international mechanism to promote this objective is necessary.

These measures will enable infrastructures to be built for an independent Palestinian entity on a significant portion of the West Bank (up to 65 percent of the territory). During this stage, Israel will continue controlling the remaining territory; of this, approximately 10 percent will be defined as settlement blocs that Israel aspires to retain as part of Israel in any future agreement with the Palestinians.

Israel will strive to achieve international recognition of its efforts and will demand international quid pro quo, primarily a commitment to support the framework even in the event of a failure in the bilateral negotiations track. In addition, Israel will demand: a renewal of the US commitments as worded in the letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Sharon (2004 (the establishment of an ad hoc international mechanism for Palestinian economic development, which will ensure its effectiveness and prevent corruption; PA commitment to prevent terrorist activities and violence; and recognition of the security arrangements that Israel requires.

A solution for the Gaza Strip problem is not a precondition to the advancement of this framework. It is crucial to mobilize international efforts in every way possible to improve the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and to rehabilitate infrastructures in exchange for the establishment of an international mechanism that will take action to stop the military buildup of Hamas and other terrorist groups. Israel should advance this issue in parallel to its implementation of the framework in the West Bank, as well as independently of it.2 Israel should act to create the conditions that will enable the return of PA control in the Gaza Strip through an international aid package that would be granted only to it and not to Hamas. The reality emerging on the ground will create a more convenient political and international basis for Israel to proceed along additional tracks in the future according to its security and political considerations. Transitional arrangements with the Palestinians can be established, under the principle that “everything that is agreed upon is implemented,” while abandoning the “all or nothing” approach. If the PA plays a positive role, and in order to advance political arrangements, Israel can agree to discuss establishing a Palestinian state with provisional borders; this would change the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a battle for national liberation to an interstate conflict based on direct negotiations to achieve a political agreement of two states. In the event of a complete lack of Palestinian cooperation, Israel can proceed with independent separation measures according to its interests.

The long and in-depth research study of the range of possibilities available to Israel led to the conclusion that the proposed framework is viable today. It preserves Israel’s security interests and national values, and enables the recruitment of regional and international support. It does not call for evacuating Israeli settlements in the near future, and affords Israel room to maneuver politically. At the very least, the proposed framework substantially improves the current reality: it stops the trends that are dangerous for Israel that have been erroneously dubbed “the status quo,” but in essence comprise a slow slide toward the major national risk of a one-state reality, without any ability to separate from the Palestinians.

===================================

Contents

Foreword: A New Paradigm for Israel on the Palestinian Issue 7

Executive Summary 11

The Research Methodology 19

The Current Political Space: Between a Crossroads and a Dead End 25

The Paradigm that Failed: Negotiating a Permanent Status Agreement 26

The Palestinian Refugees and Recognition of Israel as the National Homeland of the Jewish People 28

Continuing the Status Quo (“Managing the Conflict:(" A Dangerous Trend for Israel 32

Political and Territorial Separation from the Palestinians: Israel’s Preferred Strategic Horizon 37

A New Political Framework for Israel 41

Strategic Purpose: Preserving a Two-State Option and Building Options for the Future 41

Principal Components of the Framework 43

The Framework: Advantages and Opportunities 60

Weaknesses of the Framework 65

Implementation of the Framework 67

Creating a Political Infrastructure to Advance the Framework 67

Engaging the Regional and International Arenas 70

Launching the Framework 75

Conclusion 77

Appendixes

Appendix A: Mapping the Political Alternatives 83

Appendix B: The Legal Implications of the Framework, Given the Interim Agreement and the Quartet Report (July 2016) 109

Appendix C: Hamas and Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip 113

Appendix D: A Plan for Palestinian Economic Development and Growth 119

Appendix E: Israel, the Arab States, and the Illusions of Normalization 125

Appendix F: The National Security Index: Public Opinion Survey 2017-2018 135