Publications
Memorandum No. 211, March 7, 2021
In recent years, the northern arena has emerged as Israel’s primary military challenge. The entrenchment of the Iranian-led Shi’ite axis in Syria and Lebanon, attempts by Iran and its proxies to make inroads toward Israel’s border with Syria, and Hezbollah’s growing strength in Lebanon are all factors contributing to increased friction and cause for concern regarding the next war in the north. One thing is certain: a war on the northern front will be unlike all previous wars. as the conflict is likely to include the Lebanese arena, Syria, and possibly even western Iraq.
This memorandum presents the findings of a project conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies with the participation of INSS researchers, military and intelligence experts, and former high-ranking IDF commanders who analyzed the gamut of issues that require consideration in advance of the next war in northern Israel. Taking a long-term perspective, it looks at how threats may emerge and outlines the dilemmas, possible alternatives, and opportunities that exist for Israel in the different scenarios, with the aim of assisting the defense establishment and decision makers in Israel in their strategic and operational planning.
The authors do not proclaim that war is nigh, nor do they suggest that war is inevitable. Indeed, the common assumption today is that Iran and Hezbollah do not have an interest in war with Israel in the near future. Nonetheless, it is essential that Israel prepare for the possibility of an escalation of the conflict, whether triggered by a change of circumstances, as the result of a deterioration, or due to an erroneous assessment by any side.
Table of Contents:
In this memorandum we present a summary of a long process of strategic planning (beginning in early 2019) conducted at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) to examine and analyze the gamut of issues that require consideration in advance of the next war in northern Israel. The aim of the project was to assist the defense establishment and decision makers in Israel to prepare for such a war, and to examine developing threats. It should be emphasized that in this study the reference is to threats against Israel and the overall need to prepare for those threats, without addressing the likelihood of war erupting, or when...
May 2020 marked 20 years since the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from southern Lebanon after an 18-year presence in the country. The unilateral withdrawal did not lead to the intended calm, but instead to the entrenchment of Hezbollah along the Israeli-Lebanese border, which eventually led to the Second Lebanon War (2006). Following the war, Israel pulled out of Lebanon and on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployed along the two countries’ shared border and a border regime was established together with the LAF and UN forces, which has managed to maintain a stable security reality. Nevertheless, in the same period, Hezbollah continued to shore up its capabilities and activities in southern Lebanon, including creeping expansion near the border, in contravention of the UN Security Council resolution...
The underlying assumption of this memorandum is that the next campaign in the northern arena will present Israel with new and tougher challenges than those it has known in the past. This view is based on the emergence in recent years of new types of threats against Israel that will impact the nature of the war – if and when it erupts...
The project examines a wide range of scenarios, and in particular the following three scenarios were discussed: A Third Lebanon War, The Northern War, A general war against Iran...
In light of the evolving threat in the northern arena, decision makers should periodically reassess the strategy for dealing with it, with consideration given to the following options...
We now present the strategic alternatives available to Israeli decision makers to attain the war goals and strategic objective outlined in chapter 3. Our analysis is based on the following key assumptions: there is a grave and developing threat against Israel in the northern arena; efforts to prevent war have been exhausted; and the campaign-between-the-wars strategy has not provided the required response. Therefore, Israel can no longer avoid a military operation in order to diminish or remove the threat against it and maintain the IDF’s military superiority. Three main courses of action that may advance these goals were examined. They are differentiated from each other in their concrete objectives and the scope of the conflict required to achieve them. The alternatives are presented in a graded scale, from limited confrontation to a broad campaign. The duration of hostilities also differs between each alternative, from a short campaign (a few days) to a longer one (several weeks)...
This chapter is based on the assumption that the conflict will take place on two parallel fronts, the military front and the civilian front. Compared to previous conflicts, the civilian front is expected to sustain heavy and repeated fire, including some precision strikes, especially in the initial stages of the war. At the same time, as in previous conflicts, non-guided rockets can be expected at numerous civilian targets in Israel, though at a higher rate than in past conflicts with Hezbollah and Hamas. The extent of damage – human casualties and property damages – could be far greater than what we have seen before, since the number of incidents per day will be much higher – and this will present a huge challenge to the first-response system. In other words, it is anticipated that the civilian front will face threats from a number of directions that may shake Israelis’ sense of security...
The role of a cognitive campaign in a war has long been recognized, and its place has grown with the increasing reach of new media. Leaders of the Shi’ite axis know well how to exploit the media to influence public opinion. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah spends a lot of time and effort trying to influence the consciousness of the Israeli, Lebanese, and international publics. And this pattern is expected to continue during the next war, when he will likely claim victory over Israel – whether or not that reflects reality on the ground. Nasrallah can be expected to apply scare and deterrence tactics against the Israeli public and IDF soldiers via all types of media, including social networks, in an attempt to sow fear and amplify Hezbollah’s successes regardless of the actual outcomes of the war...
Any discussion on an exit strategy from the next war in the north must center on the following issues: the optimal time for an end to hostilities in order to maximize the achievements gained up to that point and to reduce the costs of continued fighting; endgame mechanisms that may help end the war; boundary lines – the scale of the depth of penetration of Israeli forces into Lebanese and Syrian territory to ensure that the results of the war are clear and less susceptible to manipulation by the enemy; and security and stability arrangements after the war, with the intent of creating an improved reality in comparison to that achieved following the Second Lebanon War, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701. This resolution did not achieve the desired result for Israel, i.e., dismantling Hezbollah as an independent military militia, closing the border crossings between Syria and Lebanon to prevent the transfer of weapons, and the imposition of Lebanese sovereignty in southern Lebanon. Instead it enabled Hezbollah’s continued control over southern Lebanon and its military buildup, despite the presence of UNIFIL forces in the area...
The underlying premise of this project was the assumption that the threat to Israel from the Iran-led Shi’ite axis is likely to persist in the decade to come. The coronavirus pandemic has not stopped Iran and Hezbollah’s longtime efforts to invest in their military buildup: Iran continues to entrench itself in Syria and transfer advanced weapons to Syria and Hezbollah, which in turn continues to move goods and people from Iran into Lebanon, ignoring the risk of infecting the Lebanese population with Covid-19. Despite the damage to Iran and Hezbollah’s capabilities and means following both internal and external pressures of late, notably the August 2020 blast at Beirut Port, they remain motivated by a Shi’ite religious ideology and view Israel and the US as the source of evil, and will continue their efforts to harm and weaken Israel. They are also likely to act against American forces in Iraq and eastern Syria in order to accelerate their departure and establish Iranian control over the land bridge that connects Iran, via Iraq and Syria, to Lebanon. Recently, Iran has even launched precedent-setting attacks on vital Israeli infrastructure, such as a cyber attack attributed to it against water facilities in Israel (May 2020) and it vows to respond to incidents attributed in the media to Israel aimed at facilities and infrastructures in Iran...
The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Publication Series
Memoranda
TopicsLebanon and Hezbollah