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Although the formal map of the MiddleEast has not changed since the onset of the so-called Arab Spring (with theexception of Sudan), the old borders do not reflect the reality on the ground.As a result of the regional upheavals, tribal, sectarian, and ethnic identitieshave become more pronounced than ever, which may well lead to a change in theborders drawn by the colonial powers a century ago that have since been preservedby Arab autocrats. The iron-fisted Arab rulers were an artificial glue ofsorts, holding together different, sometimes hostile sects in an attempt toform a single nation state. Now, the de facto changes in the Middle East mapcould cause far-reaching geopolitical shifts affecting alliance formations andeven the global energy market.

Syria, for example, encompasses differentcommunal groups and is currently divided into atleast three political entities, each with its own armed forces: (a) a corridorgoing from the south, through Damascus, Homs, and Hama to the northern coast ofthe Mediterranean, controlled by the Assad regime and the Alawites; (b) northernareas of the country and major cities such as Idlib and Dir a-Zor controlled byvarious Sunni opposition forces, with the battle over other cities – includingAleppo and Damascus – not yet decided; and (c) the areas under Kurdish control.Sunni opposition forces are split among those who advocate the establishment ofa democratic, liberal state in Syria, and those interested in the establishmentof an Islamic emirate. Several of these groups, including elements from outsideof Syria, are already caught in a violent struggle.

The Kurds in Syria are likely to try toestablish an independent political entity in the areas under their control.Unlike other minorities in Syria, the Kurds (numbering about 3 million and in controlof most of Syria’s oil reserves) have suffered much persecution. The Kurdishmilitias have exploited the chaos in the country and seized control of areas inthe northeast abandoned by the Syrian army. Senior Kurdish officials havedeclared that the Kurds are interested in establishing an independent zone, andthe Kurdish National Council, a representative body comprised of most of theKurdish political parties, signed an agreement with the Syrian National Councilwhereby the Kurds would enjoy some type of autonomy in the future united Syrianstate. But until Syria unites again it may be that Kurdish autonomy will be afait accompli. At the same time, this possibility is overshadowed by divisionsamong the Kurdish organizations, some of which are supported by elementsoutside of Syria.

The possible model of independent Kurdishautonomy in Syria is anchored in the successful model of Kurdish autonomy onthe other side of the border, in Iraq. While the Kurds in Iraq continue to takean active part in the country’s political process, Kurdistan is enjoyingself-government in almost every aspect of life. The district is run by anindependent parliament, and the Kurdish armed forces are separate from Iraq’ssecurity establishment. In recent months, and to Baghdad’s chagrin, Kurdistanhas even started to sign independent oil and gas discovery and productioncontracts with foreign energy companies. The Kurdish zone enjoys the highestlevels of security and economic growth in Iraq and provides training and arms supportto the Kurds in Syria.

Other parts of Iraq are also sufferingfrom uncertainty. Since the withdrawal of the US forces, the violent sectarianstruggle has intensified. The ongoing frustration of the Sunnis, who were cutout of the country’s leadership, has been manifested in deadly attacks on Iraqicities at a frequency and intensity not seen since 2008. Islamist elements fromSyria and Iraq that have joined forces have increased the risk of a destructivecivil war. Iraqi nationalism is still dominant in Iraq and significantseparatist movements are not prevalent, but the notion of a federalized entityhas gained acceptance in recent years. In fact, the Iraqi constitution allowsfor provinces to assume a certain amount of self-government. As early as 2011,four Sunni provinces decided to begin a process that would culminate in theirautonomy, despite Baghdad’s disapproval. In recent years, many Sunni andShiites politicians have called for separation from the Iraqi state, followingthe Kurdish model. Continued sectarian violence could result in a divided Iraq,and ultimately in the dissolution of the Iraqi state, leading to a de factoSunni state, with the south of Iraq becoming a Shiite state under Iranianpatronage.

Libya too is disintegrating. The Libyanuprising was primarily aimed at Qaddafi’s regime, but it also reflectedBenghazi’s desire to end to the dominance of the central government in Tripoli.Historically, the borders of the Libyan state encompass three different ethnicgroups in three distinct regions: Tripolitania in the country’s northwest;Cyrenaica in the east, which sees Benghazi as its capital and is home to mostof the nation’s oil reserves; and Fezzan in the southwest. Cyrenaicans feelthat, similar to the situation under Qaddafi, the current government in Tripoliis hoarding most of the income from oil exports, even though some 80 percent ofthe country’s energy resources are located in the east. Indeed, Cyrenaica hasalready started its separation from the Libyan state and maintain anindependent parliament, and this past June, it declared its independence.Cyrenaicans have also shut down activity in the oil fields and the Benghaziairport to protest government policy; Libya’s three important seaports havebeen seized by armed militias that obstruct operations, and militia fightershave taken control of several oil and gas complexes. In October, Cyrenaicaappointed a commander-in-chief for its 20,000-strong defense forces, whose jobwill be to restore order to a region suffering from extreme instability. Forits part, Fezzan encompasses many different tribal and geographical identities.The district, whose culture, tribes, and identity are more Sahel than NorthAfrican, declared independence in September. The central government in Tripolidoes not recognize the autonomy of the different districts but lacks the powerto impose its sovereignty.

Other nations lacking cohesive identityare similarly vulnerable. In March 2013, Yemen embarked on a national dialoguein order to arrive at an agreement over a new political order, but thesituation in practice does not allow for Sana’a to regain full control over allparts of the state, and thus current ideas speak of a federal constellation. Somein South Yemen insist on severing ties fully with the Yemeni state; in fact,the status of the south is the biggest obstacle to the success of the nationaldialogue. In the north, the Houthis, an insurgent Shiite group, have seizedSa’da Province on the Saudi border, and are working to expand their control ofneighboring provinces while fighting Sunni salafis from Yemen and abroad.Yemeni security forces are still fighting al-Qaeda for control of parts of thesouth. Even if the national dialogue succeeds and Yemen embarks on a new courseas a united or federal state, there are enclaves that remain beyond Sana’a’seffective control.

The disintegration of states representsat least a temporary deterioration in Israel’s strategic situation because itis attended by instability liable to trickle over into neighboring states.Terrorism, crime, refugees, and weapons proliferation are only some of theimplications of failed states in Israel’s vicinity. But the changes also meandissolution of the regular armies that posed a threat in the past and presentopportunities for Israel to build relations with different minorities with thepotential to seize the reins of government in the future.

The changes to date have occurred inside theexisting borders, but this may not last. States are liable to disintegrate bygoing through stages of federalization, agreed-upon separation, or autonomy.Independent political entities that are not recognized either internationallyor by the central government may arise. There are also elements capable ofpreventing the dissolution of states, e.g., assistance by external statesinterested in stability, like in Yemen, or a shared interest, such as the oilenergy sources in Iraq. In general, the international community is opposed toany changes in borders and the dissolution of states, believing thatany change of the status quo is liable to destabilize the region and even theworld. However, in the context of the regional turmoil, the Arab peoples areseeking the freedom to live in political settings that suit their respectiveidentities.