Publications

Operation Rising Lion, Israel’s war against Iran, began on June 13, 2025, on the 615th day of the Swords of Iron war against Hamas. At 3 a.m., sirens sent Israeli citizens into shelters, followed by the defense minister’s announcement that the IDF had struck deep inside Iran and that the home front was now under a state of emergency. Alongside fears and heightened tension, the first days of the operation were characterized, as expected, by the phenomenon known as “rally around the flag.” The perception that the operation was justified and necessary led to overwhelming public support for its launch. A survey conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) found that 73% of the general public and 88% of the Jewish public supported the campaign (see Figure 1).^[1] Satisfaction with the operation’s achievements also cut across different population groups (see Figure 2).

In contrast, only a small minority of the public believed that the decision to strike Iran was primarily politically motivated. This marked a significant shift from earlier in the Swords of Iron war when many Israelis questioned the political motivations behind key military decisions. For example, during the renewal of fighting in Gaza under Operation Gideon’s Chariots, 46% of the Jewish public believed the move was mainly politically motivated. The day before the strike on Iran was marked by political turbulence, with fears of the government’s collapse sparked by the ongoing conscription law crisis.

Accordingly, a significant rise was observed across all public trust indices—from trust in the IDF and the government (see Figure 3), to the chief of staff, prime minister, and defense minister (see Figure 4), and extending to the IDF spokesperson (see Figure 5).

Of particular note was IDF Spokesperson Brig. Gen. Effie Defrin, who began the campaign with low levels of public trust. During the Swords of Iron war, the public had grown accustomed to Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari in this role, and many perceived Defrin’s appointment as unjust and politically motivated. Defrin’s low-profile approach, favoring action over visibility and emphasizing the principle of “our deeds will speak for us,” did not initially meet public expectations for frequent and transparent communication. In the campaign’s opening hours, when only Home Front Command spokespeople appeared in news studios, criticism of Defrin surged on social media. However, public trust in his reporting grew steadily as the operation progressed, especially after he began appearing regularly to provide updates and answer reporters’ questions.

Likewise, the Home Front Command, initially criticized for activating sirens without confirmed missile launches and for causing confusion by issuing unclear instructions, ultimately received particularly high marks for its performance on the night of the strike on Iran (see Figures 6 and 7) and in the days that followed.

While broad public support and a noticeable rise in trust indices were evident, a full understanding of civil–military relations during Operation Rising Lion requires contextualizing them within the events of October 7 and the subsequent Swords of Iron war, as well as examining the social dynamics that shaped those relations during that period.

Exacerbating Tensions in the IDF

The IDF entered the Swords of Iron war already weakened by internal divisions triggered by the judicial overhaul protests. Senior leadership—including the chief of staff and the Air Force commander—was caught unprepared for the unprecedented wave of reservists, particularly among aircrew members, who announced they would stop volunteering for reserve duty if the judicial overhaul moved forward. The leadership’s response, seen by many as overly lenient, drew sharp public criticism and raised concerns about political bias seeping into the military.

The heated public debate and the narrative of the “first Israel” (typically referring to those perceived as privileged) versus the “second Israel” (often referring to those perceived as underprivileged), which reflects the country’s deep socioeconomic and cultural divides, also reverberated within the ranks of the IDF. This reinforced perceptions of unequal treatment between elite units such as the Air Force and ground units like the Golani Brigade, thereby posing a serious social challenge for the IDF’s senior command.

The Air Force also faced severe criticism for its performance on October 7, with some conspiracy theorists even accusing it of betrayal. In response, during the prolonged ground operation in Gaza, the IDF spokesperson emphasized the extraordinary cooperation between the Air Force and ground forces, which was reiterated by division commanders and soldiers alike, signaling an effort to repair the rift.

With the launch of Operation Rising Lion, these tensions reemerged in the social media discourse. Some sought to remind the public of the insults hurled at the pilots during the protests, while others claimed that “there are no Kaplanists in Iran” (in reference to the protesters against the judicial overhaul and the government on Kaplan Street in Tel Aviv), emphasizing that those same pilots were ultimately dismissed. Alongside this discourse about the pilots’ role, discussions around the state’s foundational values were revived. For example, Israeli journalist and news presenter Guy Lerer tweeted in a widely viewed post:

From the screens, we see the stunning consequences of the gap between a nation built on education, science, technology, sacrifice, personal excellence, and bearing the burden—versus a centralized messianic straw nation, based on divine worship and a singular leader, hostile to its own existence, rewriting reality, and hated by half its own people. In no other format will you find such a great victor who, the day after, will do everything in its power to resemble the loser.

As the campaign progressed, this discourse somewhat subsided. However, given its broader relevance to the issue of IDF cohesion and the possibility of renewed protests and upcoming elections, it is likely that the IDF will once again become entangled in the socio-political struggle.

“High-Tech Army” and “Cavalry Army”—Air Force vs. Ground Forces

Beyond criticism of the Air Force’s role in both the judicial reform protests and its performance on October 7, the failure of the “the barrier will protect” concept, and the realization that even optimal Air Force performance likely would not have prevented the catastrophe prompted calls for a reassessment. The protracted ground maneuver in Gaza, with its heavy reliance on the ground forces and their core fighting ethos, further reinforced this shift. While special forces and intelligence units played crucial roles, public recognition centered primarily on the ground forces, which bore the brunt of the casualties.

Operation Rising Lion—and the prior successful campaign against Hezbollah—led to a reassessment of how quickly the “high-tech army” had been written off. Despite reports of commando forces participating in the mission, public perception focused on the Air Force, the Mossad, and Military Intelligence. The gap between the Air Force and the ground forces, which the IDF sought to blur during the Swords of Iron war, reemerged. Social media reflected this sentiment with posts like: “This morning, we say thank you to our pilots, to Unit 8200, and to Israeli intelligence. You are the tip of the spear of the State of Israel. Thank you.”

Between Gaza and Iran—A War Within a War

The fact that Operation Rising Lion took place alongside ongoing fighting in Gaza, where soldiers continued to fall, intensified the contrast between the glamorous, long-range strike in distant Iran and the grinding, day-to-day combat in Gaza’s metaphorical mud. On social media, users criticized the glory bestowed upon the pilots, who have benefited from more favorable service conditions, in contrast to the public’s lack of appreciation for the ground forces who have been fighting for over 600 days. One user wrote on X: “I am simply disgusted by the worship of pilots. My brother is a tank crewman, on his fifth deployment, nearly 400 days in three different sectors: Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. He didn’t leave the tank for a month, was shot at with Kornets and RPGs, and lost many friends (one of whom we rescued together in Gaza).”

This discourse intensified following the chief of staff’s statement on June 20 about the unique timing of the strike and its immediate achievements. His declaration that “preparation for a prolonged campaign is required” was met with skepticism from an exhausted and wary public. The gap widened between the perception of Operation Rising Lion as a distinct, high-adrenaline mission marked by significant achievements and the reality that, for the home front, this was part of an ongoing, bloody war that exacts a heavy toll.

War Against and of the Home Front

Despite the risks to pilots, Operation Rising Lion was widely perceived as placing Israeli civilians in the greatest danger. Most survey respondents correctly estimated that the campaign would last between one to four weeks, and a large number believed the home front was prepared to endure a month of warfare. Interestingly, public perception of home front preparedness improved during the operation (see Figure 8), perhaps because the public had braced for a far worse scenario.

Assessing the Achievements

Before the strike, Iran’s nuclear threat dominated concerns. Following the successful operation, a majority of the Jewish public believed the nuclear threat had been greatly diminished (see Figure 9). Initially, the prime minister declared that the operation aimed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program; this goal was later revised to disrupting Iran’s nuclear project and its ballistic missile capabilities.

Regardless of the perceived success, concerns remained about whether Israel alone could achieve its goals without US assistance. Public discourse speculated that, without President Trump’s approval, success was unlikely.

Public expectations for significant achievements were also evident in the questions directed at the IDF spokesperson during the various statements and press conferences he gave throughout the campaign (see Figure 10). The central theme in these questions was a request for information assessing the campaign’s accomplishments and whether Iran had been pushed back from its nuclear project.

Alongside public expectations for significant achievements and amid numerous statements by senior military and political officials seeking to justify the operation by highlighting the magnitude of the Iranian threat, public discourse was also characterized by concern that Israel could not achieve its objectives alone and would require American support. Many commentators in both traditional and social media argued that without President Trump’s authorization for the strike, the operation’s goals were unlikely to be met, and anxiety about the campaign’s potential escalation grew.

Turning Point—US Involvement

On the ninth day of Operation Rising Lion, public tension peaked due to uncertainty over whether the United States would join the fight against Iran. The United States’ decision to join the campaign and deploy B-52 bombers to strike Iranian nuclear facilities alleviated public fears somewhat, although concerns about escalation persisted. According to a survey by INSS, conducted shortly after the campaign began, about 67% of the Jewish public said they were concerned or very concerned about the development of the campaign between Israel and Iran. In a flash survey conducted immediately after the American strike, only 61% of Jewish respondents expressed such concern (see Figure 11).

Despite the slight decline in concern over the campaign’s escalation, a significant share of the Jewish public (approximately 50%) supported further intensification of the fighting, including continued strikes on Iran’s nuclear project and military capabilities. In contrast, only a minority (22%) of the Jewish public believed that Israel should pursue a swift end to the campaign against Iran (see Figure 12). This support likely stemmed from both a sense of momentum and confidence in US backing, as well as from messages conveyed by the IDF’s senior command, which emphasized that the military still possessed a broad “target bank” and that more time was needed to achieve the operation’s objectives.

Ceasefire

The ceasefire took effect approximately 48 hours after the US strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and survey results indicated that a majority of the Israeli public supported it at 61%, according to a survey conducted by i24. This finding contrasted with an earlier flash survey by INSS, which showed that only a minority of the public believed Israel should seek a quick end to the campaign (see Figure 13). Furthermore, most of those surveyed did not cite a ceasefire as the desired endgame scenario for the operation.

Despite the apparent support for the ceasefire, there may be long-term concerns that the campaign ended before achieving its objectives. It is worth recalling that, at the outset of the operation, a large majority of the Jewish public believed the Iranian nuclear threat would be entirely or largely eliminated.

The Day After—Returning to the Larger War

On the first day after the ceasefire, reports emerged that seven soldiers had been killed in battle in Gaza. This painful news served as a stark reminder of the ongoing, grueling war still being waged in the Gaza Strip. It also reinforced the sentiment already expressed before Operation Rising Lion that the war in Gaza must end. Even during the first week of the campaign against Iran, a majority of the public believed it was time to end the war in Gaza (see Figure 14). For the first time since the conflict began, this majority was evident among the Jewish public.

Conclusion

Operation Rising Lion marked a significant turning point in the relationship between the IDF and Israeli society during a prolonged war of attrition. While the campaign was accompanied by broad public consensus and a sense of military superiority, it also exposed deeper, long-term challenges undermining public trust in both the IDF and the senior military and political leadership.

First, the public perceived a gap between the intense combat in Gaza and the more prestigious operation conducted thousands of kilometers away in Iran. Although military and political leaders had sought to blur this distinction, the public discourse at the start of the operation in Iran revived the narrative of the “upper and lower IDF.” This theme may intensify in the future, particularly given the growing discussion around the image and social divide between the Air Force and ground units. This gap, which the military tried to obscure during the Swords of Iron war, was once again highlighted following the campaign in the north, restoring the reputation of the “high-tech army” that many had hastily declared obsolete after the October 7th attack.

Second, the heavy toll on the home front within a short period raised questions about its level of preparedness, its willingness to endure another front, and its capacity to sustain yet another prolonged conflict—especially while already engaged in an extended war. Although the operation in Iran was generally perceived as highly successful, there remains a lack of clarity and consensus in assessing its achievements within the defense establishment, the political leadership, and, consequently, the public. This is a critical issue that the responsible authorities must address in order to effectively rebuild public trust in the various bodies—both the political and military leadership.

It should be noted that the perceived military and security achievements of Operation Rising Lion, although undeniably significant, primarily serve to restore public trust that has been undermined by operational or professional shortcomings within the system. However, they do not necessarily mend the breach of trust at the values level. In fact, this harm may worsen if the public perceives that the defense establishment is once again succumbing to arrogance in the wake of its successes. Attention should also be paid to the gap between public expectations and the actual results of the operation. Although the public largely supported a ceasefire with Iran, the initial expectation was that the Iranian nuclear threat would be entirely or largely eliminated. Moreover, shortly before the ceasefire, senior military officials emphasized that the IDF still had a broad “target bank” and needed more time to meet its goals. This statement, along with reports in both Israeli and international media about the resilience of Iran’s nuclear project, suggests that the war’s achievements may not be as far-reaching as initially presented. As a result, this ambiguity regarding the scope of the achievements has fueled speculation about a possible new round of fighting with Iran in the near future, leaving the Israeli public on edge.

Although it is still too early to assess the long-term implications of the campaign in Iran on civil-military relations in Israel, it is already apparent that Operation Rising Lion represents a critical test of that relationship. The operation’s impressive success in Iran does not obscure the ongoing painful reality on the Gaza front—50 hostages have yet to be returned home, and a heavy toll in lives persists without a clear military or political strategy. Israel, therefore, should leverage its current positive momentum and realize the strategic potential of Operation Rising Lion through a parallel diplomatic process—one that addresses the public’s desire for an end to the war in Gaza and the return of the hostages.

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[1] The surveys presented in this article were conducted under the direction of the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Fieldwork was carried out by iPanel, which interviewed approximately 800 Jewish participants and around 150 Arab participants (the number varies between the two surveys) online. The sample is representative of the adult population in Israel aged 18 and older. The data was weighted by population sector. The maximum sampling error for the total sample is ±3.2%, with a 95% confidence level.