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The most recent crisis in southern Syria put before Israel several complex strategic dilemmas. Since Ahmed al-Sharaa’s rise to power, Syria has experienced violent clashes between Alawite and Druze minorities and the regime’s security forces, militias, and armed gangs. These events have underscored the enduring consequences of Syria’s civil war, which was marked by widespread killings, destruction, oppression, and abuse. Added to this are fears and suspicions among the minorities toward al-Sharaa’s new regime and its forces, which, until recently, were considered jihadist actors and have again been implicated in acts of violence. This crisis was extremely complex, involving various actors—some state-affiliated, others independent. As in previous episodes of violence in Syria, this confrontation occurred against a backdrop of widespread disinformation and fake news from all sides. Nevertheless, it is clear that violence and cruelty have become the norm in Syria. Photos and videos document executions, abuse, civilian kidnappings, and humiliation rituals carried out by all the warring factions—regime security forces deployed in al-Sharaa’s name, Bedouin tribes, Druze militias, and independent armed groups.

When reports appeared of mass killings of Druze in Sweida, Druze community leaders in Israel increased pressure on the Israeli government to act in defense of their kin across the border. Calls for assistance spread on social media; Druze soldiers and officers in the IDF demanded action, and over a thousand young Druze from the Galilee and Carmel regions crossed the border into Syria to support the Druze fighters in Sweida. These events, along with what Israel perceived as the Syrian regime’s violation of its demand to demilitarize southern Syria, led to a wave of Israeli attacks—initially symbolic warning strikes, and later targeting areas near the presidential palace and the Ministry of Defense in Damascus.

It would be a mistake to draw definitive conclusions at this stage, but the events of the past week raise critical questions with a number of implications for Israel’s strategy in Syria in both the short and long term:

1. The Syrian Regime—Clear Directive or Lack of Control?

Thus far, substantial evidence has emerged indicating the involvement of the regime’s security forces in the massacres. According to local reports, some of the forces sent to Sweida brutally attacked and killed Druze civilians, accompanied by looting and setting fire to homes in Druze villages. This pattern mirrors earlier clashes with the Alawite community in March 2025, when forces associated with al-Sharaa were accused of massacring hundreds of Alawite civilians in northwestern Syria—an act of sectarian revenge against supporters of the old regime. A similar pattern reappeared during clashes with the Druze community in late April.

At the heart of the discussion lies the question of the new Syrian regime’s responsibility for the Druze massacres. Two possibilities emerge: Either al-Sharaa gave explicit orders to his forces to carry out the massacres and “settle scores” with the Druze community, or his statements—claiming that he intervened in Sweida solely to prevent anarchy and that “the protection of the Druze and their rights is a top priority”—contain some degree of truth. In other words, al-Sharaa might not have directly ordered attacks against the Druze minority, but forces operating in his name exploited the clashes to settle old sectarian vendettas—perhaps with tacit approval from the command echelon amid widespread chaos fueled by a mix of armed and violent groups. It should be noted that the newly formed Syrian army includes jihadist fighters, some of them foreign, who do not necessarily adhere fully to the regime’s authority. In any case, al-Sharaa’s lack of control over his forces—including his own people—was manifested in these clashes.

Although, as in previous clashes, no directive from al-Sharaa has been proven in this most recent confrontation, several questions arise in seeking to understand the situation. Would al-Sharaa, for the sake of settling sectarian scores or asserting control over southern Syria, jeopardize all that he has achieved in the past seven months—regional recognition and support, the confidence placed in him by US President Trump, and the historic American decision to lift the sanctions that had crippled the Syrian economy? Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that al-Sharaa, drawing on past experience, is aware of the risks of a confrontation with the Druze community, especially given the potential for an Israeli response. Would he truly risk a reaction from Israel that could threaten not only his position of power but his own survival? These questions cast doubt on his direct involvement; nevertheless, it cannot be dismissed that the events occurred with al-Sharaa’s knowledge or, at the very least, his tacit consent.

2. Support for the Druze in Syria—Moral Duty or Risk?

The Druze community in Israel has long been an integral part of Israeli society. In response to reports of massacres targeting their kin in Sweida, Israel’s mobilization and involvement in the crisis—even if limited—were driven by a sense of national responsibility and shared destiny. During the events, Israeli officials repeatedly expressed their commitment to safeguarding Druze rights. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referred to the Druze as “brothers” and declared that Israel would not accept a scenario in which the Syrian army massacred Druze civilians in an area that was supposed to remain demilitarized. In addition to the moral imperative, Israel has strategic considerations: The establishment of a new regime in Damascus—comprising former members of jihadist groups—remains a concern for Israel, especially if this regime attempts to reassert military control over southern Syria. The Druze, who form the overwhelming majority in the Sweida province, could serve as a buffer against the encroachment of hostile actors near the Israeli border.

However, as in previous events in Syria, Israel’s support for the Druze—manifested in military strikes, including in Damascus—sparked debate in Israel due to the inherent risks. First, there is the fear of a “Gordian knot”—overreliance on Israeli protection, which could damage the legitimacy of the Druze community in Syria. Allegations surfaced, accusing the Druze of acting as a “fifth column” on behalf of Israel. Moreover, the Druze community in Syria is not a homogeneous bloc and includes militant factions, such as the group led by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and the “Military Council” operating under his command. Some Druze leaders, who seek to integrate into the reconstituted Syrian state, avoided making public appeals to Israel, wary of being perceived as collaborators. Additionally, the Israeli strikes—intended to protect the Druze—placed Israel at the center of criticism in Syria and the region, with accusations of causing division and inciting violence within Syria.

3. The Israeli Strikes—Projection of Power or a Shot in the Foot?

The Israeli strikes in Syria served as a clear show of force, reflecting a determination to act in the face of threats to Israel’s national interests and building on the powerful image Israel has cultivated over the past year. Once again, Israel demonstrated its complete air superiority in Syria. The strike near the Syrian Ministry of Defense headquarters and the shelling of targets near the presidential palace signaled to President al-Sharaa that Israel is prepared to escalate if its interests are threatened. Specifically, harm to the Druze minority in the south will not be tolerated, and the demand to keep southern Syria demilitarized must be upheld. In this context, Syrian sources noted that they believed that the United States gave Israel a “green light” to act militarily and did not anticipate Israel’s response.

Following the withdrawal of regime forces from Sweida, it initially appeared that the Israeli operation had achieved a positive result—curbing the violence and accelerating a ceasefire. However, shortly thereafter, clashes between the Bedouins and Druze intensified. This escalation prompted a sharp reversal in Israel’s position (reportedly due to American pressure), when a political source announced that Israel had agreed to allow limited entry of Syrian internal security forces into the province for the next 48 hours.

The regime’s level of responsibility is not merely a matter of theoretical debate—it is central to the rationale behind the Israeli action. If it is ultimately proven that the new regime directed its forces to target the Druze population, then Israel’s response may be viewed as a justified humanitarian move—a warning that war crimes against minorities will not go unanswered. As many in Israel have argued, when faced with a regime resembling a jihadist organization—one that espouses moderate rhetoric while allowing sectarian massacres—military intervention becomes a moral necessity. In doing so, Israel also firmly upheld its demand to keep the area free of heavy weaponry. However, if al-Sharaa genuinely sought to prevent bloodshed and was dragged into a crisis that rapidly escalated—or, alternatively, if he lost control of his forces on the ground—then the Israeli strike could be seen not only as interference in Syria’s internal affairs during a fragile period of recovery but also as an act that undermines and weakens the legitimacy of the central regime and contributes to further instability.

In that spirit, criticism of Israel has begun to mount. Al-Sharaa accused Israel of destabilizing his country and claimed it was exploiting sectarian violence as a pretext to dismantle national unity. From the perspective of Damascus and its allies, Israel’s intervention affirmed a familiar narrative that it seeks to sow division among sects and fragment Arab countries to weaken them. Similar statements came from Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, all of which condemned the foreign intervention in Syria’s domestic affairs and expressed support for its territorial integrity and security. A spokesperson for the US State Department declared that Washington “did not support” the Israeli action and emphasized that the United States was pursuing diplomatic engagement with both Israel and Syria to de-escalate the crisis. At the UN Security Council, Russia and other countries called for respecting Syria’s sovereignty and implicitly criticized “external actors” for taking advantage of a fragile situation to inflame sectarian tensions.

These developments underscore a fundamental Israeli dilemma tied to the structure of the Syrian state. It is clear that Israel has yet to determine under what framework in Syria—unified or fragmented—its security interests would be better safeguarded. In theory, a centralized, stable, and strong regime could enforce control in Syria, including along the border with Israel. But at present, this is not the case, and al-Sharaa once again appears to have only limited control on the ground. Moreover, despite recent diplomatic engagement with him, Israeli suspicions about his character and intentions persist. Conversely, a weak regime and a fragmented state dominated by numerous extreme and violent factions could lead to chaos and violence spilling over into Israel’s territory, without a clear actor with whom Israel can engage. While the dynamics on the ground and the roles of regional states and the United States were critical in de-escalating tensions and resolving the crisis, Israeli actions also significantly influenced their direction.

4. Collapse of Negotiations or Return to the Table?

The confrontation presents Israel and Syria with several future scenarios—ranging from continued stagnation and hostility to a renewed process of a negotiated agreement and reconciliation. In the short term, the current shock may result in a prolonged freeze of any dialogue or negotiation channels between Jerusalem and Damascus. The deepening mistrust, alongside the harsh rhetoric on both sides, could return the countries to a familiar pattern of hostility. In such a situation, even an isolated incident—a border skirmish, a militia attack, or provocation—could escalate into a broader conflict in the absence of a coordination mechanism to prevent it.

Conversely, it is also possible that from this point—and with American support—the process of negotiated agreement could return to course, perhaps even with renewed vigor, out of recognition of the importance of preventing another round of violence. The United States has already clarified that it views this as an opportunity to “reach a lasting agreement between the two sovereign states”—Israel and Syria—and that it intends to promote that outcome. Al-Sharaa’s interest is clear: stability, international aid for Syria’s reconstruction, and preventing sectarian anarchy, goals that cannot be achieved without an agreement with Israel. Israel, for its part, now will come to the negotiating table from a position of strength (even more so than in the past) and is therefore in a position to redefine its terms. These may include maintaining a demilitarized zone in southern Syria, agreeing on the composition of forces securing the buffer zone, a Syrian commitment to protect the Druze minority, and conditioning any withdrawal of Israeli forces on the regime’s fulfillment of those terms. Israel seeks to avoid a prolonged military entanglement in Syria and recognizes its shared interest with the regime in preventing renewed Iranian entrenchment in Syrian territory. As a result, both sides may pursue quiet or overt understandings to help stabilize the situation.

Recommendations

In light of the recent developments, Israel must formulate a cautious and well-calibrated policy—one that upholds its commitment to the safety of the Druze community and its broader security interests in the region while avoiding a military escalation that could be seen as deepening its involvement in Syria’s internal crisis and provoking backlash. Following Israel’s strong response against the regime, it would be wise where possible, to refrain from striking central government targets in Damascus—unless an extreme incident occurs that necessitates a direct response. Close coordination with the United States is particularly important. Washington can leverage its influence over al-Sharaa’s regime to curb violence against minorities, insofar as it is able. A key message that Israel should convey in coordination with Washington is that continued international aid for Syria’s reconstruction—as well as recognition of the new regime—will be contingent on its conduct, particularly its treatment of minorities. Within this framework, Israel should demand that al-Sharaa enforce immediate disciplinary action against any fighter who harmed Druze civilians in defiance of regime directives.

Although Israel is not a formal party to Syria’s internal reconciliation process, it should support mediation efforts aimed at securing an agreement between the Syrian regime and the Druze leadership—especially in cooperation with the United States and Jordan, which hosted the trilateral meeting to promote the ceasefire that was reached. The Israeli government should continue to embrace its Druze citizens, integrate them into the state, and ensure their safety—while clearly delineating clear boundaries. The unprecedented border crossing by hundreds of young Druze risked drawing the IDF into direct confrontation on Syrian soil. Additionally, Israel should continue cooperating with regional states and international organizations to deliver humanitarian aid to the Druze in Sweida and continue to admit wounded Druze for treatment in Israeli hospitals.

Looking ahead, the future of Israeli–Syrian dialogue will largely depend on the actions taken by the main players—Israel, Syria, the United States, and regional stakeholders—in the coming weeks. Their decisions will determine whether the events of Sweida are remembered as a tragic incident that nonetheless pushed the sides toward a long-term solution or as a turning point that shattered fragile trust and reignited hostilities.