Publications
INSS Insight No. 2059, November 11, 2025
Israel may seem far removed from the Arctic, yet it does have interests in the region, spanning defense, diplomacy, and economics. While the defense dimension has generally been beneficial, the diplomatic aspect has, at times, posed major challenges. The economic interests, although notable, are less significant compared to the other two. How Israel manages each of these areas could ultimately determine whether its engagement with the Arctic helps or harms its broader national interests.
The Arctic is an arena for superpower competition, and it is warming at three to four times the rate of the subarctic, making it the most vulnerable region to climate change. Although Israel is geographically distant from the Arctic, it maintains a variety of interests in the region, which can broadly be categorized into security, economic, and diplomatic concerns. While Israel’s economic and security interests are relatively limited in scope, they are significant, and diplomatic considerations are often the most consequential. Diplomatic challenges arising from the Arctic sometimes directly impact Israel’s security and economic objectives, creating a complex interplay that Israeli policymakers must navigate carefully.
Defense Interests
Israel’s security interests in the Arctic are largely focused on weapons testing and ensuring that Israeli defense products perform reliably in cold-weather conditions. One of the most prominent examples is the testing of Israel’s Arrow missile defense system at Alaska’s Kodiak Island launch facility. The Arrow system, co-developed with the United States, serves as Israel’s primary long-range missile defense system, designed to intercept and neutralize ballistic missile threats. Its deployment has been critical to Israel’s national security, particularly in countering potential threats from Iran. Kodiak Island offers unique advantages for missile testing. In contrast to Israel’s limited geographic space, Kodiak Island’s high northern latitude, combined with relative isolation and sparse population, allows for ideal testing conditions. These tests are conducted in close cooperation with the United States, which provides logistical support, infrastructure, and technical expertise. Israeli personnel stationed on Kodiak Island have reportedly spent up to a year there during test cycles, and an IDF base was constructed there to accommodate them. While these efforts were militarily successful, the Israeli presence was not intended to foster local diplomatic engagement, and some local observers even described the Israelis as “paranoid” due to tight security measures.
Another aspect of Israel’s security interests relates to the export of defense systems to Arctic and northern nations. Although technologically advanced, Israel’s defense industry has a relatively small internal market and relies on export markets to maintain industrial capacity and support the modernization of the IDF. Countries such as Canada and Germany have purchased Israeli military technology for Arctic and northern applications. Canadian forces have acquired drones from Elbit Systems to monitor activity in the Arctic, while Germany has procured Arrow missile systems tested in Alaska. The Arctic’s extreme environment makes it a valuable proving ground for cold-weather operational reliability. Israel ensures that its defense equipment functions effectively in freezing conditions, thereby reinforcing its credibility as a high-quality supplier while maintaining a robust domestic defense industry. An example is the Hero-120 suicide UAS system, which was successfully tested in the Arctic. These exports not only support the IDF but also extend Israel’s influence with allied nations.
Diplomatic Interests
The most complex and consequential dimension of Israel’s Arctic interests is diplomatic. Many Arctic and Nordic countries emphasize human rights in foreign policy, which can create friction with Israel, especially concerning the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Historical antisemitism further complicates relations, often creating a perception among Israeli policymakers that diplomatic challenges are persistent and deeply rooted. Iceland, for example, has had a long history of antisemitism, banning Jews until the mid-19th century (although its parliament rejected an earlier attempt to permit Jews to reside in Iceland), and later deporting them to Nazi Germany during World War II. Similarly, Norway was complicit in the deportation of Jews during the Holocaust. Sweden, which remained neutral in the war, supplied vital materials to Nazi Germany. Although Finland’s Jewish population survived the war, the country fought alongside Germany against the Soviet Union, and its air force only removed the swastika from its flags in 2025. Despite being protective of its Jewish population and more philosemitic than antisemitic, Denmark only emancipated Jews in 1814, despite having a presence in the country since the 1600s. These historical patterns influence contemporary policy, particularly in the context of boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movements and symbolic political actions against Israel.
Current diplomatic challenges for Israel manifest in various ways. Iceland has banned male circumcision, passed BDS resolutions, and launched symbolic boycotts of Israeli companies. Several Norwegian universities have formally suspended ties with Israel, and the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund has divested from Israeli firms, citing human rights concerns. Prominent figures, including Greta Thunberg, have publicly criticized Israeli policies in ways perceived as antisemitic, particularly regarding the Gaza blockade. Russia presents a distinct set of challenges: It protects Iran at the UN Security Council and has a long record of antisemitism, with modern-day Russian officials sometimes making antisemitic remarks that further strain relations with Israel, especially regarding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Despite these challenges, certain Arctic territories offer diplomatic opportunities. The Faroe Islands and Greenland, both Danish territories, are devoutly Christian; many are Christian Zionists and have expressed interest in engaging with Israel, including proposals for representative offices. Alaska, as part of the United States, maintains a pro-Israel stance, having enacted anti-BDS legislation. Finland has largely remained relatively neutral on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and has yet to recognize Palestine, while Iceland, despite its historical antisemitism, has had a Jewish-Israeli-born first lady, reflecting the nuanced nature of regional diplomatic dynamics. Israel’s primary diplomatic objective in the Arctic is thus to manage and contain these complexities, mitigating the potential impact of hostile policies while capital-izing on opportunities where support exists.
Economic Interests
Economic interests in the Arctic are relatively limited but multifaceted. Because the Arctic Circle is not defined by complete state structures, it is difficult to form a complete picture of Israel’s trade with it. Tourism and people-to-people exchanges also constitute Israeli economic interests in the Arctic. For example, around 1,500 Israelis visited Iceland in 2008, compared to over 5,000 Israelis by the end of the 2010s. Israeli tourists have increasingly sought unique experiences in the Arctic. In 2024, an Israeli tourism company decided to start a hotel in Finland for Israelis to see the northern lights. Israeli cruise operators have organized Arctic excursions catering to Russian-Israeli tourists, while high-profile wildlife photographers have undertaken projects in Canada and other Arctic regions, documenting polar bears and other fauna. These initiatives not only generate commercial revenue but also promote cultural engagement and international awareness of Israel’s activities in the region.
Israel’s high-tech sector also seeks opportunities in Arctic markets, particularly in Iceland. Israeli fintech firms have attempted to capture portions of the Icelandic market, while drone companies have explored Arctic delivery and logistics applications. Israeli high-tech investments have also taken advantage of the Norwegian Arctic’s favorable climate for building data centers. However, these initiatives have faced obstacles, including local opposition influenced by historical antisemitism and broader geopolitical tensions. The October 7 attacks in Israel reportedly disrupted some commercial projects and have limited opportunities for Israeli firms in Iceland and other Nordic nations. For example, the Israeli fintech company, Rapyd, lost some contracts in Iceland over its CEO’s LinkedIn posts regarding the war in Gaza. In contrast, as of mid-2025, Norway’s pension fund had over 2 billion dollars invested in Israeli companies, although this number has since shrunk due to BDS pressure. Lastly, Israel has economic interests related to climate in the Arctic, as Israel’s weather is influenced by Arctic climate change, and weather extremes or changes likely mean economic havoc for any country.
Conclusions
The interplay between security, economic, and diplomatic interests is evident throughout Israel’s Arctic engagement. Security and economic priorities, while specialized and technical, have tangible benefits for Israel’s strategic posture and industrial sustainability. Diplomatic challenges, however, can influence both economic and security outcomes. Conversely, successful engagement in Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Alaska illustrates the potential for Israel to cultivate positive diplomatic relationships in regions that are geographically distant but strategically significant.
Ultimately, Israel’s Arctic interests are defined by pragmatism and strategic necessity. While the region may not be central to Israeli foreign policy, its significance in Israel’s defense, economic engagement, and diplomacy cannot be dismissed. Security initiatives, such as missile testing and the export of cold-weather-ready defense systems, have delivered disproportionately large benefits. Economic initiatives, including defense exports, tourism, and high-tech ventures, provide opportunities for revenue generation. Diplomatic challenges dominate the landscape, particularly in Iceland and Russia, but can be mitigated through careful strategy and engagement in supportive territories.
The long-term improvement of Israel’s standing in the Arctic is likely contingent upon either resolving the Palestinian issue or increasing Israel’s indispensability to global society through technological, medical, or scientific innovation. Israel’s record of scientific achievement, including breakthroughs in medicine and high technology, suggests that the latter may be the most viable path forward. By maintaining excellence in defense and technological exports, promoting people-to-people engagement, and skillfully navigating diplomatic challenges, Israel can gradually enhance its influence and stability in the Arctic. Even minor economic or security interests can be strategically leveraged. In the complex Arctic geopolitical environment, Israel’s interests, although geographically distant, remain intertwined with global strategic calculations. This requires careful planning, sustained engagement, and the end of globally unpopular policies. The recent end of the Gaza war could help improve Israel’s position in the Arctic.
