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Saudi Arabia’s refusal to becomea temporary member of the UN Security Council is the latest in an exchange ofdiplomatic blows, most behind the scenes, intended to signal to the UnitedStates that the kingdom is dissatisfied with US policy in the Middle East. Theunwritten alliance that connects these two very different countries, one aliberal democracy and one an absolutist monarchy, has been based on theprinciple that the United States receives access to the Gulf’s economy (whileignoring the lack of political freedom and human rights in the kingdom), and inexchange provides the kingdom with a defense umbrella against external threats.However, the events of the Arab Spring continue to test the relationshipbetween the two.

Saudi confidence in thepartnership was punctured when the US administration turned its back on theHouse of Khalifa in Bahrain. and in the Saudi view, abandoned its long timeallies, Egyptian president Husni Mubarak and Tunisian president Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, preferring to support “processes of democratization” in thesecountries – although ironically it was the Muslim Brotherhood that emerged victoriousin this process. While the United States attempted to maintain good relationswith Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood government, Saudi Arabia, which seesthe movement as an ideological rival and an element that undermines stability,cooled its relations with Egypt while the Brotherhood was in power.

The Saudis found it difficult tohide their satisfaction when President Morsi was ousted in a military coup.King Abdullah hastened to congratulate acting president Adly Mansour for the army’shaving “removed Egypt from the dark tunnel,” and the Saudis even announced thatthey would stand behind the military government if the West did not transferaid to Egypt. The kingdom, together with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates,put together a generous aid package in order to help the new Egyptian regime standon its feet. For its part, the United States expressed its reservations aboutthe coup, which it viewed as contrary to its interests, and decided on apartial freeze of military aid to Egypt in response to the violent suppressionof the Muslim Brotherhood protests.

The US-Russian agreement to disarmSyria of its chemical weapons – which for now, has removed from the agenda theoption of military action against the Assad regime – also angered the Saudis.Dismantling the chemical weapons was not a top priority for Saudi Arabia, whichsaw the conflict as an opportunity to land a blow against the Assad regime thatcould tip the scales in the fighting in the rebels’ favor, remove Syria fromthe Iranian sphere of influence, and further weaken Hizbollah’s standing in Lebanon.Saudi Arabia sees the US-Russian agreement as a cop-out that will prolong thesurvival of the regime, or at the very least delay a decision in the battle forSyria. Prince Turki al-Faisal, former Saudi ambassador to the United States,expressed the frustration in Riyadh with his comment that “the current charade of international control over Bashar’s chemicalarsenal would be funny if it were not so blatantly perfidious, and designed notonly to give Mr. Obama an opportunity to back down but also to help Assad tobutcher his people.” Saudi anger is not limited to rhetoric,and the Saudis have reportedly announced a reduction in cooperation with theUnited States in arming the Syrian opposition. In other words, it is possiblethat Riyadh will provide weaponry that until now it has not provided, or thatit will hold contacts with rebels they had hitherto shunned.

Saudi Arabia also fears a US-Iranianrapprochement. The Iranian charm offensive is seen in the Gulf states as an exercisein deception. The Saudis fear the possibility of an Iranian-Western deal that wouldallow Iran to escape its isolation, and at the same time advance towardmilitary nuclear capability. Above all, Saudi Arabia fears reconciliationbetween Iran and the West that would be at Saudi expense, restore Iranianlegitimacy in the eyes of the world, and allow it to increase its influence inthe region. A deal with Iran, and certainly a possible detente in US-Iranianrelations, would deal a huge blow to US-Saudi relations. Thus it is precisely regardingnegotiations that the United States can work to keep the Saudis in the picture.

According to reports,Bandar bin Sultan, head of Saudi intelligence and former Saudi ambassador tothe United States, stated in response to recent developments that a “majorshift” could be expected in relations between Saudi Arabia and the UnitedStates. The dispute between the two is not only about US policy in the contextof the turmoil in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia fears a change of US strategicdirection, which has already removed its troops from Iraq and is expected towithdraw most of its forces from Afghanistan during 2014. The US administrationhas announced that in the future, East Asia will be the top priority for theUnited States. Furthermore, in recent years the United States has stepped upthe pace of oil and gas production in US territory, and according to forecastswill become energy independent by the end of the current decade. The Saudisfear that if and when the United States achieves full energy independence, itwill no longer need its Arab allies and will largely reduce its involvement inthe Middle East.

The next few yearsare thus expected to be a test period for US-Saudi relations, but it is tooearly to eulogize the historic alliance between the two. Relations between theUnited States and Saudi Arabia are based on deep common interests and havesurvived previous crises, from the 1973 oil embargo to the serious crisis inthe wake of September 11, 2001. Even when the United States achieves energyindependence, Gulf stability will continue to be a clear American interest, andeven if most of the oil and gas are already designated for sale to Asia, theprice of oil will continue to be set in the Gulf. The lack of securitystability in the Gulf has dramatic implications for global oil prices and forthe world economic situation, which is critical for the United States.

Moreover, the regional turmoil has also strengthened US-Saudicooperation. The United States and Saudi Arabia together achieved an agreement allowingYemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down. The Saudis cooperated withthe sanctions regime against Iran and even stepped up the pace of oilproduction in order to make up for shortages caused by the removal of Iranianoil from the markets. The two countries are also continuing to cooperate in thewar against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has taken control overareas of southern Yemen and which both countries view as a security threat. Inaddition, the United States continues to supply Saudi Arabia with largequantities of advanced weapon systems, which constitute an importantcontribution to the US economy (in mid October 2013, the Pentagon announcedanother weapons deal with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates worth over10 billion dollars).

Overall, Saudi Arabia’s options are limited. In spiteof its great wealth, the kingdom is not able to confront significant threats inits strategic environment alone: its long borders can be breached, itsstrategic facilities are vulnerable, and its army is small and untrained.Furthermore, no other major power is currently interested in or capable offilling the role played by the United States in maintaining stability andsecurity in the Gulf, or in other words, deterrence and protection of the Gulfstates from Iran. However, because of the erosion in Saudi confidence in theUnited States, the kingdom might seek to diversify risks and formulate aparallel web of relations, which even if not perfect will improve its securitysituation, including an attempt to obtain an independent, off-the-shelf nucleardeterrent in the future.

Perhaps a seat on the Security Council is not that importantto Riyadh, both because the Russian and Chinese veto makes it difficult to passresolutions, and because the Saudis prefer to operate far from the spotlight.Even without the Security Council, the Saudis have significant influence in theinternational community, including in the Muslim world. This latest step,intended as pressure on the United States, is unusual because it gives publicexpression to the Saudis’ dissatisfaction and growing frustration with whatthey perceive as mistaken American policy. The current US administration isseen by Riyadh as weak, naive, and willing to shun the use of military power atalmost any price. However, this step, atypical as it may be, doesnot necessarily bespeak a change in the world order and a severing of strategicrelations between the two countries, which have taken shape over the course ofseventy years. The Saudis would be the first to be hurt by this.

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Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at INSS. Erez Striem is an intern at INSS.