Publications

Israel’s attack on Iran surprised China as well. Alongside initial admiration on Chinese social media for Israel’s offensive and defensive capabilities, as well as for Iran’s failures, China’s official response was mixed. On one hand, relatively moderate statements were published, which included opposition to Israel’s use of force, claiming it violated international law; protests against the infringement of Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; and calls for de-escalation and a return to efforts to resolve problems through dialogue. On the other hand, more explicit and sharper condemnations were voiced, mainly in international forums such as the UN Security Council and during a conversation between the Chinese and Iranian foreign ministers. Although Beijing’s tone intensified after the US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, if Tehran expected stronger diplomatic support from its strategic partner, it was disappointed.

On a practical level, no significant Chinese support emerged. Even before the Israeli–Iranian campaign, there were several reports of Chinese ships carrying chemical materials used to produce missiles, which had either arrived in Iran or were en route from China. During the fighting, additional reports surfaced about Chinese cargo planes arriving in Iran with unknown cargo. However, these reports were unconfirmed, and some turned out to be inaccurate. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that some aspects of the Sino–Iranian cooperation during the war remain unknown, and we should refrain from excessively underestimating them. For example, it is unclear whether China provided intelligence support to Iran or played any behind-the-scenes role in lowering tensions at the war’s end. Still, even if some military cooperation took place under the radar, it appears to have been limited in scope.

A common argument holds that Iran is one of China’s closest and most important partners in the Middle East. Indeed, the two countries share a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” and China provides Iran with an economic lifeline by purchasing about 90% of Iranian oil (circumventing sanctions) and offering diplomatic cover in UN votes. As part of this argument, it is often mentioned that in 2021, the two sides signed a 25-year agreement, which reportedly includes Chinese investments worth hundreds of billions of dollars (although the agreement has not been officially disclosed and the figures vary by report), in exchange for discounted oil and increased trade and Chinese investments. The assumption that China is part of the so-called “axis of evil” alongside Iran, Russia, and North Korea also reinforces the perceived closeness between China and Iran. However, the reality of the relationship in recent years has been less rosy. While Iranian oil exports to China—via various channels—are significant, Chinese investments have been slow to materialize. Tehran resents the fact that China exploits Iran’s weakened economy to demand discounts on oil and export low-quality products to Iran.

In light of China’s rhetorical support for Iran, alongside its limited practical assistance and the characterization of the relationship between the two countries as “complex,” the question arises of how did China perceive the twelve-day war? In particular, what were its interests during the conflict, and what were the outcomes from its perspective?

China’s Interests in the Israel–Iran War

Exploiting the War Within the Context of the Great Power Competition

As in other conflicts around the world, China viewed the Israel–Iran war as an opportunity to present itself as a moderate and peace-seeking actor, in contrast to its rival, the United States, which it portrays as a warmonger and hegemon intent on setting the rules of the global game and imposing them on all nations. Additionally, China sought to strengthen the influence of the international community at the expense of American dominance. Accordingly, President Xi Jinping presented—during a conversation with President Putin on June 19—a general and vague initiative (very similar to previous initiatives in the context of other conflicts) consisting of four points: 1) ceasefire and an end to the war; 2) protection of civilians; 3) dialogue and negotiation; and 4) increased involvement of the international community, especially the Security Council, in the developments. The weakness of Chinese diplomacy and the fact that Beijing was not a significant and influential player in the Israel–Iran war did not prevent China from continuing to claim that it is a conciliatory and mediating power, working toward de-escalation through diplomatic means.

Since the beginning of the Swords of Iron war, the strengthening of the US military and economic presence in the Middle East contradicted the narrative that China had promoted in recent years, according to which the United States was withdrawing from the Middle East. Ostensibly, this was a blow to China’s regional policy. However, in light of the developments, the narrative quickly shifted: no longer an American withdrawal, but now—over-involvement. In fact, China benefits twice from this increased presence. First, because the American presence in the region ensures that the “security provider” continues to safeguard the supply chains in the Middle East, particularly the flow of energy crucial to China, without Beijing bearing the associated economic and diplomatic costs. Second, simultaneously, Washington is reducing its military presence in East and Southeast Asia, and its attention to China’s actions in its neighborhood diminishes.

Fear of Widespread Regional Escalation

While a limited-scale conflict in the Middle East serves China’s geo-strategic interests, primarily by tying down its rival the United States in the region, as the discourse about a potential American offensive against Iran intensified, Beijing feared that such a move would lead to an escalation and a regional conflagration. Such a wider regional war could threaten Beijing’s economic interests, especially its numerous trade and investment ties with key countries—Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—which are much more important to it than its relations with Iran. These concerns were reflected in Chinese statements, which were also leveraged to bolster Beijing’s positions. First, as evidence of the new narrative mentioned above; second, by echoing the message that such an offensive is essentially a rerun of the American invasion of Iraq, and thus doomed to failure; and third, that this failure will lead to the decline of the United States as a global power. When the American attack materialized, accordingly, China condemned it sharply and emphasized that it constituted a severe violation of the UN Charter and international law.

The Iranian Nuclear Program

For many years, and despite its general support for Iran, China has opposed an Iranian military nuclear program. In its view, there is no contradiction between supporting a nuclear program for civilian purposes and opposing a military program, and it repeatedly emphasizes that Iran’s program lacks a military component. If Iran were to pursue a military nuclear capability, not only would China’s declarations lose their validity, but China might find itself required to oppose Iran. This point is related to the previous issue: the security of China’s other partners, the Arab states of the Gulf, and the need for China to emphasize that it also protects their interests.

Stability of the Iranian regime

The collapse of the regime in Iran, or even a significant undermining of its stability, would not serve Beijing’s interests. First, because the relations between the two countries, anchored in quiet understandings and economic agreements, are beneficial to China. Second, regime destabilization by foreign actors would be perceived as contrary to the core principles of China’s foreign policy, primarily the principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.” Third, at the geo-strategic level, an anti-American regime that opposes the “hegemonic” world order aids China in the great power competition. Fourth, chaos in Iran, which could lead to the rise of extremist elements, including terrorist actors who are particularly opposed to China’s policies regarding the Uyghur issue, is also a concern for Beijing. In addition to the Uyghurs and other Sunni groups, the Baluchis—another Sunni group in Iran, residing near Pakistan and Afghanistan—could also be strengthened, bringing the threat of terrorism closer to China’s border. A similar concern exists in China regarding Syria, in the aftermath of the fall of the Assad regime. Finally, intra-regional rivalries, such as between Iran and Saudi Arabia, provide China with maneuvering space and a certain degree of influence in the Middle East, whether as a mediator or as a beneficiary of conflicts, as long as they do not spiral out of control. Therefore, from a Chinese perspective, the fall of the regime in Iran could diminish these levers of influence and additionally cause uncertainty, loss of control, and a challenge to existing relations.

China’s Balance Sheet at the End of the War

At first glance, in the context of global geopolitics, the inter-power struggle, and the fact that the United States positioned itself as directly involved in the campaign against Iran—both militarily (the attack on nuclear sites) and politically (bringing the war to an end, at least for now)—it appears that China suffered a loss. China did not stand decisively and visibly alongside Iran, its supposed strong ally and partner in the “axis,” through concrete, assertive actions—apart from rhetorical support. President Xi’s “Four-Point Plan” did not even serve as a basis for discussion, and attempts to promote resolutions regarding the war in the UN Security Council also failed. Even if China acted behind the scenes to prevent Iran from blocking the Strait of Hormuz, its role in this regard remains obscure. Therefore, it can be argued that China lost points—primarily political ones—in the Middle East.

That said, one must ask: Did China have much to lose in the eyes of the Middle Eastern states to begin with? Especially since March 2023, when the Iran–Saudi Arabia reconciliation agreement was signed, China has repeatedly tried to bolster its status as a mediator and a significant geopolitical player in the region. During the Swords of Iron war in July 2024, China convened the Palestinian factions in Beijing for a reconciliation summit, where the Beijing Declaration was signed, calling for the formation of a Palestinian government including all factions. China claimed this as further proof of its regional importance. However, China preferred not to address critical questions—such as its actual role in the Iran–Saudi reconciliation or whether the Beijing Declaration had any real significance. Image-building took precedence. Likewise, regarding the Houthi issue, China preferred to keep a safe distance, primarily seeking to protect its military and civilian vessels. In other words, for the region’s countries, even taking into account the Middle Eastern positioning China has crafted in recent years, it became clear since October 7, 2023, that China is not a central player in the core issues of the region.

Indeed, regional states distinguish between China’s genuine importance in economic and infrastructure matters and political-military issues, in which they clearly rely on the United States. Therefore, one could argue that the region’s countries never expected more than rhetoric from China in the first place—and so, China did not lose points but rather reinforced existing perceptions about its role.

What about China’s broader interests in the context of inter-power competition? The increased American presence in the Middle East, heightened attention from Washington to the region, and the redeployment of forces from East Asia to the Middle East—all these developments can be seen as positive from China’s perspective. In the short to medium term, it benefits China that the United States remains the region’s “security provider,” continuing to ensure supply chain security and energy flow to China, without Beijing having to bear the economic and diplomatic costs of maintaining stability.

Furthermore, the diversion of US attention and forces from East and Southeast Asia serves China’s strategic interests. The argument that the US offensive against Iran was meant as a warning signal to China regarding Taiwan seems to be an exaggerated overestimation. The Taiwan issue differs fundamentally from the Iran case across nearly all dimensions: the nature of the relationships and power structures between Iran–Israel and China–Taiwan are entirely different; there is no comparison between a pinpoint strike—under total air superiority and following an Israeli offensive—by a stealth US strike package in Iran, and a full-scale campaign around Taiwan facing the Chinese military. The two differ in weaponry and force composition, in the duration of combat, in global context, and likely in American public opinion as well. These are completely different theaters.

The fact that the war did not escalate into a broader regional conflict, and even resulted in a ceasefire and a degree of stability, is also a positive development from Beijing’s perspective as long as it lasts. This situation enables China to continue leveraging economic opportunities, with the potential to offer its services in the formulation of a future nuclear agreement with Iran. While Iran’s military nuclear program, which China opposed, suffered a significant blow, its civilian nuclear ambitions still persist. This situation allows Beijing to position itself as a mediator in the formation of a new nuclear deal, just as it played a role in facilitating the previous one, and also to assist in rebuilding Iran’s civilian nuclear program.

If a new nuclear agreement is indeed signed following the war—which would potentially include the partial or complete lifting of sanctions on Iran—China sees itself as a major beneficiary. This is because it could revive its bilateral agreements with Iran, many of which have not yet been meaningfully implemented, and also because it seeks to profit from Iran’s extensive reconstruction. In this context, the survival of the Iranian regime, despite its greatly weakened internal and regional standing, also serves Beijing’s interests. The existing economic and strategic arrangements between the two countries have not collapsed, and as long as no internal changes occur in Iran to topple the regime, the situation from China’s point of view has even improved.

This point is also connected to China’s oil imports from Iran: a weakened Iran is more dependent on China, at least until sanctions are lifted as part of a nuclear agreement. Thus, China is able to import Iranian oil at lower prices. Even before the Israeli strike in Iran, the country succeeded in exporting record quantities of oil, most of it destined for China—again, a positive development from Beijing’s perspective. In fact, even if Iran were to temporarily block the Strait of Hormuz, Beijing’s energy balance would not be at significant risk: In recent years, it has equipped itself with emergency reserves and even surplus capacity for exports (following domestic refining), provided the blockade is short-term.

It is also worth noting the issue of Chinese global arms exports. Iran’s military failure is often portrayed not as a failure of Chinese weaponry, but rather of Russian systems. China is trying to capitalize on what is described (perhaps exaggeratedly) as the stunning success of Chinese weapons systems just a month and a half earlier in the brief conflict between Pakistan and India. Now, as Iran undoubtedly seeks to rebuild its military, China is portrayed as a near-natural supplier. However, it is doubtful that China would want to supply Iran with relatively advanced weaponry—certainly not before a nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions. Even after an agreement, the situation remains unclear: Depending on the terms related to Iran’s rearmament, China may hesitate to sell to Iran, as this could position Beijing in a problematic stance vis-à-vis its Arab partners in the Gulf. In the event of another military conflict, Chinese arms sales to Iran could even directly harm these partners, contrary to China’s primary interests in the region. Nonetheless, China is expected to use the situation to boost its arms sales to other countries, while the United States will also aim to maintain its significant lead in selling what it claims to be “the world's best weapons.” Chinese arms exports are generally focused on countries to which the United States does not sell weapons, making this an opportunity for China.

Conclusion

Although China did not play a central role in the events surrounding the Israel–Iran war, it emerged from the conflict in a position it had sought: outside the direct line of fire, yet close enough to the key centers of influence and profit. In this way, Beijing managed to preserve its status as a global economic power without bearing the costs of security leadership—minimizing risks while reaping benefits. China’s conduct once again illustrates its clear strategic choice: cautious action, influence without direct involvement, and profit without commitment.

This very approach by China could be beneficial for Israel. If Israel succeeds in cooperating with the Arab Gulf states and nudging China into a cautious stance—one that prevents Iran from rapidly rearming or advancing its military nuclear program—this could work in Israel’s favor. It would also be possible, through joint efforts with the United States, to promote a new nuclear agreement. The more Beijing cooperates with Washington—and despite their differing rhetoric, they share similar interests on the Iranian issue—the greater the potential for a deal that would address Israel’s security concerns.