A Proposal for the Resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations for a Two-State Solution | INSS
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Home Publications INSS Insight A Proposal for the Resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations for a Two-State Solution

A Proposal for the Resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations for a Two-State Solution

INSS Insight No. 162, February 10, 2010

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Oded Eran

The U.S. is currently engaged in the attempt to revive final status negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and the government of Israel. While Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared his wish to open negotiations without prior conditions, Palestinian President Abbas (Abu Mazen) has repeatedly asked for a complete settlement freeze for at least several months. He also wants “clarifications” on the American proposal to resume negotiations in proximity talks, i.e., no face-to-face negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, but with the U.S. serving as an intermediary.


The U.S. is currently engaged in the attempt to revive final status negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and the government of Israel. While Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared his wish to open negotiations without prior conditions, Palestinian President Abbas (Abu Mazen) has repeatedly asked for a complete settlement freeze for at least several months. He also wants "clarifications" on the American proposal to resume negotiations in proximity talks, i.e., no face-to-face negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, but with the U.S. serving as an intermediary.

It is not clear whether either Netanyahu or Abu Mazen has a genuine desire to resume talks. Both face serious domestic political constraints that will no doubt be exacerbated once talks resume. It probably would have been better to start the process with a step-by-step approach that would give support to the Palestinian Authority's efforts to continue state institutions building and strengthen the local security forces. Israel's indirect assistance could come in the form of transferring more territory to the authority of the Palestinian government and increasing Palestinian economic activity by removing restrictions on movement of people and goods.

This approach is still unacceptable to the Palestinian side, which insists on resuming the talks for the endgame, that is to say, the establishment of the two-state solution. While the Israeli and Palestinian leaders are agreed on the ultimate goal of two states, they most probably differ in their views on how to get there and what the attributes of the Palestinian state are to be.

The one document that binds the two sides and combines the partial approach with the attainment of the two-state solution is the Roadmap of 30 April 2003. The Roadmap is composed of three phases, which lead to the comprehensive solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the time of its launching, the Israeli government added 14 reservations to its acceptance. Assuming that the current Israeli government is bound by a resolution adopted by previous governments, the Roadmap should serve as Terms of Reference (T.O.R.). It can also bridge between the Palestinian position, which maintains that they have already honored their commitments in Phase I of the Roadmap and therefore the two sides should move directly to Phase III, and the Israeli position that there is progress, albeit insufficient, in implementation of the Palestinian commitments. The Palestinian side is raising the issue of the settlement freeze which is an Israeli commitment for Phase I, but is also the subject of one of the 14 Israeli reservations.

The Roadmap of 2003 called for the immediate removal of the "unauthorized outposts" built after 2001. These were also addressed in the letter of April 2004 from the government of Israel to the U.S. administration. A way of dealing with this issue, in order to allow President Abbas to enter negotiations, is to shift the issue of Israel's compliance with the commitment to a bilateral Israeli-U.S. committee or have a reiteration of this commitment by the current Israeli government, with a date certain for implementation.

What follows is the proposal to adopt the Roadmap as T.O.R. for resumed talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

The Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government will resume their negotiations for the implementation of the shared goal of attaining a two-state solution as a way of ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Both sides agree on the following:

T.O.R

1) The Roadmap to Middle East peace of 30 April 2003 will provide the basis in these negotiations. Note has been taken of the views of the two sides that were submitted at the time of the Roadmap's publication.

2) The two sides take note of their commitments in accordance with Phase I of the Roadmap. They agree that within 30 days of the formal acceptance of this document by the two sides, the U.S. will prepare a status report on implementation of Phase I.

The two sides will agree to add the problems relating to the Gaza Strip to their negotiations.

The two sides may agree to add other matters to this phase of the negotiations. These may include the expansion of the Palestinian economic activity into Area C and the review of their existing agreements, such as the Paris Protocol.

3) The two sides agree to simultaneously conduct negotiations on the implementation of Phases II & III of the Roadmap.

Roadmap Mechanism and Timetable

1) The two sides will inform the U.S. within 14 days whether they accept the T.O.R.

2) Not later than 14 days following agreement on the T.O.R, the two sides agree to open their negotiations in two committees.

a. A committee dealing with the issues relating to Phase I of the Roadmap and other issues agreed between them.

b. A committee dealing with implementation of Phases II & III of the Roadmap.

c. The two sides may agree on creating subcommittees as required.

3) Negotiations of the completion of Phase I will end by 31 May 2010. Implementation of the existing commitments in the Roadmap (Phase I) and other agreements that the two sides may reach will be carried out not later than 30 September 2010.

4) The negotiations for the implementation of Phases II & III will be concluded not later than 30 April 2011. The two sides will agree on a timetable for the implementation of their agreements, relating to Phases II & III of the Roadmap.

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Publication Series INSS Insight
TopicsIsrael-United States RelationsIsraeli-Palestinian Relations
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