

Different Reflections of the Motivation to Serve in the IDF

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Introduction

Compulsory service in the IDF is a topic that frequently finds its way into Israeli public discourse for cultural, social, and historical reasons, in part given the perception of the State of Israel as subject to an ongoing security threat.¹ Upon its establishment, the State of Israel decided on general compulsory conscription. This decision stemmed from two major factors: the need for a broadly structured force to face the armies of the neighboring hostile countries, and the desire for military service to serve as a unifying experience and a framework for shaping national identity in Israel as a Jewish and Zionist state.² The second reason was based on the fundamental analysis of Israel as a deeply divided society in the process of being established while absorbing waves of immigrants.³ This model of conscription, referred to in the literature as a “people’s army,” imbued military service with normative social meaning and made it a prominent component of the national experience and the shaping of the character of the nation. Military service became an entry ticket into Israeli society and a route to social mobility.⁴

All these factors positioned the IDF as a meaningful force shaping the socialization of the citizens of Israel.⁵ For this reason, military service, and the choice to refrain from serving, has a significant impact on Israelis and Israeliness, on the level of the individual and on the level of society as a whole, by virtue of its connection to the social, political, cultural, and economic attributes of Israeli society.

The academic discourse on the subject indicates that in the early 1990s, the high status enjoyed by the IDF and the concept of Israeli society as “a nation in uniform” or a “people’s army” began to weaken and change.⁶ Social

and economic trends in Israel and around the world, and internal trends within the Israeli military, caused a change in the concept of the IDF and its work among part of the Jewish Israeli population. Whereas in the past the public and the media had refrained from criticizing the actions of the army, over the past few decades, such discussions have become routine. In this context, we have grown accustomed to criticism of different aspects of IDF activity, from its conduct as a public organization (including the demand that it operate with transparency and economic efficiency),⁷ to its use of force, its training exercises and state of fitness, its budgetary management, and other realms.

Against this background, recent years have witnessed ongoing struggles over the identity and symbols of the state, as different groups in Israeli society view the essence of the army and the field of security in different ways.⁸ There are also those who believe that economic processes have displaced collective stability in favor of the welfare of the individual and have led to a decline in the status of the army.⁹ In addition, new geopolitical processes – such as changes in the features of warfare, peace treaties as an alternative to military activity, and changes in the operational strategy of the IDF – have reshaped the concept of the threat facing the Israeli population and have reinvigorated discussion of the concept of military expectations.¹⁰ These and other matters are at the base of the ongoing public discussion and reassessment of different subjects related to the essence of the IDF as a people's army, including the meaning and relevance of this longstanding definition. Part of the discussion also contains criticism of the IDF and the manner in which it operates.

Within this context, the issue of conscription and/or evasion of conscription into the IDF is extremely important. The issue is raised periodically in different contexts, and the media serves as the major arena of public discussion. As we understand it, the media discourse occurs on a variety of levels. It is sometimes cursory and sometimes in-depth, and at times takes the form of accusations that serve as a basis for the reflection or intensification of conflicts between different groups in Israeli society. These conflicts are also sometimes manifested in the political realm.¹¹

Tracing the media and academic discourse over the years suggests a lack of clarity regarding the issue of “the motivation to serve.” On the one hand, claims abound that “the motivation for military service is declining” or that “we are in the midst of a crisis in motivation.”¹² On the other hand,

academic scholars, IDF researchers, and various journalists argue persistently that this is not the case, and that the motivation to enlist and serve is stable, at the very least.

This article explores the disputes and its sources (at least from a research perspective) in an effort to illuminate the debate. It begins by presenting statements and findings from studies and publications that claim “a decline in motivation,” and then considers studies that argue that no such decline has taken place and studies advancing complex arguments on the subject. Focusing primarily on the methodology of measurement, it looks at explanations for the resulting lack of clarity.

Claims of a Decline in Motivation to Serve in the IDF

As noted above, Israeli academics and the Israeli media have published studies, articles, reports, and analyses supporting claims that indicate an ongoing downward trend in the motivation of security service candidates to enlist in the IDF. Some of the information on which many of these studies and reports¹³ are based was provided either directly or indirectly by the IDF, typically by its Manpower Directorate. Most analyses are based on actual enlistment data and demographic trends, which ostensibly reflect a decline in the number of conscripts, or the percentage of conscripts, out of all Israeli youth, and an increase in the percentage of those not enlisting in the IDF, including those sometimes referred to as “evaders” of military service. In this framework, the evasion of military service is attributed to a variety of factors, led by religious reasons, e.g., “*torato omanuto*” – Torah study as a man’s full-time occupation, which exempts military service); “low draft thresholds” (i.e., those candidates the IDF is not interested in enlisting due to low selection data or unsatisfactory medical data); a variety of personal problems; and those residing abroad for extended periods of time. Most of these articles point to an ongoing decline in the number of conscripts, which is sometimes reported as a decline in the motivation of security service candidates to enlist in the IDF.

At the same time, data and analyses have been published on the related issue of trends in the enlistment for combat units. Here too the articles in the media rely principally on data originating from the IDF (primarily the Induction Administration within the Manpower Directorate), which point to a decline in the willingness to actually enlist in combat units.¹⁴ Data from surveys initiated and conducted by civilian researchers affiliated with

academic and research institutes have also identified a decline among Israeli teens in the motivation for military service in general and combat service in particular, primarily during the 1990s and the early 2000s.¹⁵

Other studies also consider surveys that provide data regarding the issues in question and examine general social trends within the broader Israeli population regarding military service – among youth in general and civilians who have served in the IDF. According to Yagil Levy,¹⁶ in a long term process of assessing ties to the IDF, the attitudes toward military service among secular middle class army retirees have gradually deteriorated.

In our view, these studies and data have fueled the public discourse and academic analyses that have frequently arrived at the general conclusion that due to a variety of social, cultural, and other factors (discussed in greater detail below), the prestige of service in the IDF has declined over the years, and that during the same period negative changes have occurred in the different kinds of motivation for service.¹⁷ It is also evident that concepts regarding the attributes of the decline in motivation are complex.

For example, some researchers argue that recent years have witnessed an intensification of the individualistic approach at the expense of the collectivist-state orientation, which revolves around the state and its institutions.¹⁸ Values that lay at the heart of the liberal approach stress themes such as individualism, competition, ambitiousness, efficiency, and an emphasis on the rights of the individual. These values create tension between the concept that views service in the IDF as a condition for civil rights and the concept of individual entitlement to universal rights, regardless of whether or not the individual in question has fulfilled his obligations to the state. Levy maintains that these changes in approach have resulted in a crisis in motivation that has found expression in contractual discourse (i.e., a give-and-take relationship) between soldiers and their families on the one hand, and the IDF on the other, and not necessarily in a decline in the percentage of those enlisting.

According to Levy, this change has developed primarily among Ashkenazi Jews, secular Jews, and members of the middle class. It has been manifested in two primary realms of bargaining: collective protest and personal. Levy suggests that this extended process of decline in motivation, which is anchored in social and cultural processes, has the potential to bring about a change in the current conscription model of the IDF, which is based on universal

conscription and compulsory service, to the model of a professional army, like that maintained by other Western countries.¹⁹

Reuven Gal examines the issue of motivation for military service from different angles,²⁰ and proposes a discussion of the issue of the motivation for military service based on a number of aspects: the motivation of survival; ideological motivation; normative motivation (that is, a sense of proper versus improper conduct); and individualistic motivation. After analyzing these different types of motivation, Gal concludes that there has in fact been a decline in young Israelis' motivation to serve in the IDF.

Claims of Stability or an Increased Motivation to Serve

Claims contradicting the above conclusions are advanced consistently in the findings of official surveys conducted by the IDF among security service candidates. The surveys are carried out by the IDF's Center for Behavioral Sciences, which, for a number of decades, has engaged in measuring the willingness (motivation) of Israeli teens (male and female alike) for military service and for different service tracks in the IDF.²¹

The measurement conducted by the Center for Behavioral Sciences is based on surveys of large samples of Israeli teens (including many hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of interviewees each year). It considers rich and diverse subject matter and explores the willingness to serve in general, the willingness to serve on different tracks, factors that impact on the willingness to serve, and other such issues. On this basis, the surveys of the Center for Behavioral Sciences can be regarded as having provided, for many years, the most consistent gauge in Israel regarding the motivation to serve among security service candidates.

The Center for Behavioral Sciences conducts its surveys among security service candidates it defines as "teens who reported for their first [draft] notice." In other words, their assessment does not include teens who are known to the military system as being of conscription age but have been designated by the IDF as not viable candidates for service for a variety of reasons, such as teens with health problems that preclude service; teens who fail to meet the minimum conscription requirements according to the selection data ascertained by the IDF; teens who are not subject to conscription due to factors such as religious lifestyle, i.e., ultra-Orthodox; and non-Jewish teens who are not subject to conscription.

The IDF Center for Behavioral Sciences presents a consistent account whereby the “level of motivation for enlistment” among security service candidates has remained stable in recent decades, with the exception of minor fluctuations in the willingness to enlist resulting from specific, passing current events. Indeed, recent years have even witnessed an upward trend in the willingness to serve among the teens surveyed. In all the surveys conducted since the year 2000, the level of willingness to serve was extremely high (80-90 percent of men and 70-90 percent of women) and usually stable. The surveys also reflect differences in the assessment of the motivation for different tracks of service (willingness for combat service, officer positions, and specific service tracks) between different populations (based on gender, socio-demographic background data, etc.). Here, too, the data is typically stable, with changes that can be attributed to the impact of current events.

The Center for Behavioral Sciences specifies a wide variety of issues that influence motivation: the obligation to serve; the “desire to contribute to the country and to society” as an expression of membership in the collective; understanding of military service as a formative experience; and responses reflecting that combat positions and officer positions enjoy “high social prestige” in comparison to other positions.

Support for these findings, based directly or indirectly on the above-mentioned surveys of the Center for Behavioral Sciences, has been presented over the years by a number of academic researchers.²² A few argue that “the decline in motivation” referred to in the media discourse is not “real,” and that such statements are biased and aimed at securing political gain. Other researchers²³ regard such statements as cyclical discourse and “rituals of those responsible for enlistment,” aimed ultimately at increasing the motivation of teens to enlist in the IDF (in other words, the creation of “moral panic”). Another interpretation,²⁴ containing reverberations of the arguments above regarding the impact of the interface between collectivism and individualism, maintains that the individualistic and collectivist discourses exist side by side and actually serve to increase the willingness to serve. In addition, two other studies present a complex analysis of the motivation to serve.

Blumenfeld’s study maintains that the period 2007-2010 witnessed an increase in the rate of Israeli teens not enlisting, and that “although there is an indisputable decline in the rates of service among the general population, it appears the motivation to join combat units for those who do serve in the military is rising steadily.”²⁵ According to a similar claim²⁶ based on

“official information” and a survey, although the rate of enlistment is sharply declining, the motivation to enlist has not undergone dramatic change among non-ultra-Orthodox teens.

Who is Right? Is “Motivation” Declining or Increasing?

The question, then, is who is right, and what is the “real” state of affairs? Are we, or are we not, witnessing a decline in motivation, as argued by some researchers?

The following interpretation serves to clarify the picture. It can be argued that the lack of clarity in assessing the motivation for enlistment stems from three major factors. The first is a media discourse shaped by elements with an interest in the matter. The second is the non-systematic and imprecise measurement of the willingness to serve. And the third is the use of different tools of measurement and the differential definitions of motivation, willingness to serve, and other related terms – most prominently the evasion of military service or the evasion of meaningful military service, in the sense of the opposite of the motivation to serve.

In what follows I explore only the third reason for this lack of clarity and discuss the methodology of measuring Israeli teens’ motivation for military service in the IDF in an effort to illuminate better the foundation of the data.²⁷ I am aware that this is a “basic” discussion as far as the research thought process is concerned and that researchers will easily understand its significance. Still, as will be explained below, the context – that is, the population in question, the importance of the subject, and the disputes on the issue – makes its discussion meaningful.

To this end, this article will not consider important related topics such as the motivation of reserve soldiers and issues related to the conscription and service of standing army personnel, which also stem from a variety of factors (such as economic and professional factors, and factors related to the conscription and service model). Nor will it propose sociological or other kinds of explanations for the state of the motivation to serve. Instead, it will demonstrate how, quite frequently, it is our “view” – that is, the tools of measurement and the definitions employed by the researchers – that determines whether or not we observe a change in the motivation for military service among Israeli youth and the ostensible direction of this change, and that this element must therefore be considered as playing a major role in the existing lack of clarity.

Below, I will discuss examples of the issues that may impact on the definitions of motivation in the studies – that is, how differential definitions and differential measurement may change the manner in which motivation is reflected in the surveys. Although the issues presented below do not contradict each other and are not necessarily interconnected, I will argue that their separate observation may explain the complexity characterizing this subject.

“Security Service Candidate” or Teenager?

The central, fundamental issue that must be considered here is the basic definition of the term “security service candidate” (known in Hebrew by the acronym “*malshab*”) or, in other words, who is supposed to serve in the IDF and when?

First, we must consider the criteria defining security service candidates. One critical and fundamental claim is that whether or not an individual who belongs to a specific community is officially obligated to enlist in the IDF has a significant impact on his or her attitude toward service. On this basis, we can assume that a teenager who is obligated to serve in the IDF will have a more positive attitude toward enlistment than one who is not obligated to enlist at all. In other words, we assume that the decision whether or not to include a teenager who, according to the definition of the system, is not supposed to enlist for service will influence the overall understanding of the desire to serve.

A security service candidate should be understood as an individual who meets the legal and administrative criteria of the IDF. According to this concept, most non-Jewish Israeli citizens and all ultra-Orthodox Jews who are students of the independent educational institutions are not defined by the IDF as viable security service candidates from the outset. On this basis, we can conclude that such individuals will not be included in the security service candidate population surveyed.

An alternative approach could be to conduct position surveys regarding the motivation for military service among the overall teen population in Israel (or among the overall Jewish teen population in Israel). Such surveys would be based on a very different definition than that described above in that they may include ultra-Orthodox Jews or non-Jewish adolescents. Such a study would be extremely sensitive to demographic changes stemming

from population growth rates, which vary significantly among these groups in comparison to those characterizing the overall Israeli population.

For a variety of reasons, researchers choose to use other, partial population definitions (at times for reasons pertaining to the accessibility of the sample), such as adolescents from state schools, adolescents from schools in a specific region or city, etc.

In addition, knowledge pertaining to issues related to conscription (both on the individual level and the systemic level) develops over time and with increased encounters with the military system. Therefore, the age at which the security service candidate is defined as such by the military is a major factor in defining the candidate. When is it decided that an adolescent is a security service candidate? When is the definition relevant? Some maintain that Israeli youth are security service candidates beginning at childhood and for this reason the IDF maintains a presence in the Israeli education system beginning at a relatively young age. Another option is to define a security service candidate from a specific age; for example, one year prior to conscription, with the first encounter with the military system taking place when the adolescent is in eleventh grade (after the individual receives his or her first draft notice) and initial actions are taken for enlistment in the IDF, and so forth.²⁸

It is also important to pay attention to gender. Does the study in question encompass security service candidates of both genders, or only males? Due to the major differences in the service tracks for men and women, the gender distinction is important.

Who is an “Evader”?

It is also interesting to consider the common definition in public discourse as to the evasion of service in the IDF. Or, in more colloquial terms, who exactly who is this “draft dodger”?

Discussion of this issue in the media attributes the phenomenon of evasion to a number of groups, including: “north Tel Avivians,”²⁹ yeshiva students, ultra-Orthodox, religious women (young women proclaiming their intention to live a religious lifestyle), the non-Jewish population, and, in some cases, even populations that enlist for desk jobs and who do not complete their military service. However, we know that for legal reasons from the outset some of these populations are not at all meant to be conscripted. Therefore, any definition that includes one or more of these groups, or, alternatively,

that excludes them from the discussion on the “motivation to serve” affects the manner in which this quantity is assessed by the surveys.

Conscription Policy and Human Resource Management

Over the years, the State of Israel and the IDF have periodically changed the policy regarding conscription and, in doing so, have changed the policy regarding who will and will not be included in the population of adolescent Israelis designated for military conscription. This is done through legislative changes on the political level or by internal IDF changes in policy stemming from various considerations.

Perhaps the most prominent example of legislative changes that stand to impact on conscription policy and the definition of “who is a security service candidate” relate to the issue of ultra-Orthodox conscription (the Tal Law³⁰ and subsequent related legislation). Additional examples may be found in differential changes in the duration of service or changes in the salary policy vis-à-vis soldiers, which also currently emerge in the public discourse. Such changes may impact on the manner in which the motivation to serve is reflected among different population groups. Moreover, they also have the potential to influence our overall understanding of the willingness to serve and must therefore be taken into consideration when examining future surveys.

Changes in internal IDF policy can be achieved by decisions regarding changes to the definition of the “conscription threshold” and IDF exemption policy.³¹ One example is the policy of lowering the drop-out rate followed during the tenure of Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi which, in practice, served to increase the number of conscripts and include weak (from a sociodemographic perspective) populations. A second example is the changes made to the policy of integrating women into the IDF in general, and into different service tracks in particular, that stand to impact on the willingness of women to enter different service tracks, with an emphasis on combat service.

A third example lies in the fact that based on operational, budgetary, and other considerations, the IDF can decide to reduce or expand conscription to specific units or service tracks and thereby affect the supply and demand for enlistment for these units or tracks. Such measures can result in the presentation of an excessive or deficient desire to enlist for one type of service or another.

What is Being Measured?

Terms such as “motivation” and “evasion” are sometimes all encompassing terms incorporating a wide variety of issues and questions, and it is therefore extremely important to define precisely the subject being studied and the tool of research. For example, the term “motivation to serve” can, in practice, be used to depict conscription or non-conscription. The measure, in this case, is numerical, as described in some of the sources above. How many people enlisted? What percentage of the overall population do they constitute? This measure is not comparable to reported motivation for military service measured by the questions in position surveys. In other words, a survey response indicating a desire to enlist is not the same as actual enlistment for service, which may be the product of a desire to serve, but also of the decisions of the military system and/or the policy of the authorities.

Another issue in this context is the type of service for which motivation exists, which has a significant impact on the responses of adolescents. Based on the surveys of the IDF Department of Behavioral Sciences and the implications of the studies of Reuven Gal,³² we can conclude that there are different reasons for security service candidates to declare their motivation for military service in general, as well as their motivation for combat service. The former is based primarily on the legal obligation of every security service candidate as well as on its current conception as a “condition of good citizenship.” The latter requires volunteering and greater efforts from the perspective of the individual and his family. For this reason, the motivating factors for enlistment in the army and enlistment in different tracks of service may be distinct and influenced by different considerations.³³

The Date of Measurement

In the attitude surveys, the date of each survey and the events occurring in close proximity have a significant effect on the attitudes they chart. This is even more accentuated when it comes to measuring the motivation to serve.

The status of male and female adolescents as security service candidates is not static, as the criteria for security service is frequently updated. During the 12-18 months preceding their conscription, security service candidates undergo a meaningful process of preparation for the IDF, during which they learn about military service, receive draft notices, report for service, participate in activities aimed at preparing them for the IDF, take tests, and are introduced to the different tracks of service open to them. Some are

also invited to take part in selection processes to assess their candidacy for specific service tracks.

Together, these elements draw security service candidates into a process through which they learn more and more about military service in general and their ability to be assigned one position or another. In other words, at any stage of the process, attitudes regarding the chosen service track can change to some extent as a result of the information acquired about the service and the personal abilities of the security service candidate. This being the case, the measurement of attitudes conducted among teens at different stages of the enlistment process results in different reflections of motivation, in accordance with and based on an understanding of these influences. The monitoring of the attitudes of security service candidates, therefore, involves a significant “seasonal” element that must be understood and taken into consideration when analyzing the findings of surveys assessing the “motivation” for military service.

Conclusion

Due to the importance of compulsory conscription in the IDF to Israeli society in general and to the service track of young Israelis in particular, and in light of Israel’s unique security situation, public debate in Israel over the years has displayed extensive interest in teens’ “motivation to serve.” This interest has been characterized by divided opinion and a lack of clarity regarding the trends and changes in the motivation to serve over the years and in accordance with social changes. The major argument of this paper is that, despite its seemingly simple appearance, the motivation for military service is a complex, multifaceted issue that is extremely sensitive to measurement.

An analysis of the documents used to write this article indicates that on the one hand, and based on a crude observation that fails to take specific effects into consideration, the motivation for military service and significant service on the part of the young men and women whom the IDF regards as (at least) potential conscripts has not declined over the past two decades. At the same time, the number or percentage of Israeli teens who do not, from the perspective of the IDF, constitute a potential for military service may have increased, primarily due to demographic developments, the administrative decisions of the IDF, legislation, and other factors. We can also say that an examination of the attitudes among other population groups (such as Israeli teens under the age of 17 and teens from other sectors) is

likely to generate an understanding that is more complex in comparison to the two described above.

Therefore, when we discuss measurement of the “motivation to serve,” we must first consider the basis of the research, as it is impossible to discuss the motivation for military service without discussing the way in which it is measured, and thoroughly clarifying the definitions of the relevant terms. Those engaged with, or interested in this subject, are encouraged to consider a number of main issues when approaching the issue:

1. *Whose motivation?* When we refer to security service candidates, to whom exactly are we referring? Within this framework, we must take into account a range of variables, such as age, educational stream, official IDF definitions, and other factors. We must also take into consideration that these are fluid definitions that may change in accordance with legislative and policy changes.
2. *The question under examination.* When considering the issue, it is essential to define whether we are concerned with the individual’s attitude toward enlistment or with an analysis of all those enlisting for military service and their sociodemographic attributes.
3. *Reported motivation – yes, but why?* In the event that we are dealing with the motivation of the individual, it is worthwhile to clarify the exact issue under discussion: military service in general, combat service, or some other track of service.
4. *The motivation to serve – when?* The date of conscription has a major impact on the reflection of motivation in the attitude of those serving. When was the study data collected – before or after the candidates’ receipt of their first draft notice? To what extent were the respondents aware of their options for military service when they completed the questionnaire?
5. *Who is an evader?* It is important to keep in mind that this is a term with ethical aspects regarding which there is no social consensus.

Notes

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- 1 See, for example, Asher Arian, *Security in the Shadow of Threat: Israeli Public Opinion on Questions of Peace and War* (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1999); Ofra Meizels and Reuven Gal, *The Motivation of Boys to Serve in the IDF – Israeli Adolescents during the Intifada* (ZichronYaakov: Israeli Institute for Military Studies, 1990); Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Policy*

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- 2 Stuart A. Cohen, "The Social Meaning of Military Service in Israel: A Reassessment," *Democratic Culture: Army and Society in Israel* 4-5 (2001): 131-50.
 - 3 Udi Shani and Yossi Kucik, *The Changes Underway in the State of Israel and their Implications for the Model of Military Service and the Social Role of the IDF* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2007).
 - 4 Moshe Lissak, "The Security Ethos and the Myth of Israel as a Militaristic Society," *Culture and Democracy: Army and Society in Israel* 4-5 (2001): 187-211.
 - 5 *Social and Cultural Processes in Israeli Society*, Army and Society Project (IDF Department of Behavioral Sciences, 2002).
 - 6 Gad Barzilai, *Democracy in War* (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Hapoalim, 1992); Efraim Inbar, *War and Peace in Israeli Politics: Labor Party Positions on National Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991).
 - 7 Shani and Kucik, *The Changes Underway in the State of Israel*.
 - 8 Baruch Kimmerling, *The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony* (Jerusalem: Keter, 2001).
 - 9 Orna Sasson-Levy, *Identities in Uniform* (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2006); Yagil Levy, *From the People's Army to the Army of Peripheries* (Jerusalem: Carmel Publishing House, 2007).
 - 10 The occurrence of major security events and operational failures has resulted in the emergence of a discussion regarding the vitality and benefit of patterns of IDF activity in the war against terrorism. See, for example, Yael Hadar and Anna Knafelman, *Between Economics and Security: Public Opinion in Israel, 1969-2009* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2009); Ofra Meizels, Reuven Gal, and Eli Fishoff, "Worldviews and Positions of Israeli High School Students regarding Issues of the Army and Security," research report for the Israeli Institute of Military Studies, 1989; Helena Syna-Desivilya and Reuven Gal, "Cumulative Impacts of the Experience of War," research report for the Israeli Institute for Military Studies, 1992.
 - 11 Udi Spiegel, "Youth Motivation to Serve in the IDF," submitted to the Knesset Education and Culture Committee, Research and Information Center, June 2001.
 - 12 L. Pomerantz and Y. Sher, "No One Wants to Serve Anymore," in *Sociology of the People's Army: A Look from Within* (Society for Military Sociology, 2009).
 - 13 Jaclyn Blumenfeld, "Conscription and the Marginalization of Military Values in Modern Israeli Society (1982-2010)," Master's Thesis, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Emory University, 2010. For another example, see Yoav Zeitoun, "Embarrassment in the IDF: A Decline in the Motivation for Combat Service," *Ynet*, November 7, 2013.

- 14 This data is based on the number of actual requests to serve in combat units as received by the Enlistment Administration, and not on attitude surveys, for example, on the August 2007 Induction Cycle, Hanan Greenberg, "Less Combat Motivation," *Ynet*, July 16, 2007.
- 15 Avi Degani and Rina Degani, "Attitudes and Behaviors among Youth in Israel," Geocartography Institute, February 2000; Y. Katz, "Attitudes of Youth and their Parents regarding Service in the IDF," School of Education, Bar-Ilan University, 2000. In *"Post-Oslo" Youth: A Profile* (Zichron Yaakov: Carmel Institute, 1996), Reuven Gal points to a decline in the motivation of youth from state schools between 1988 and 1994.
- 16 Yagil Levy, "Is There a Motivation Crisis in Military Recruitment in Israel?" *Israel Affairs* 15, no. 2 (2009): 135.
- 17 Cohen, "The Social Meaning of Military Service in Israel"; Levy, "Is There a Motivation Crisis in Military Recruitment in Israel?"
- 18 Levy, "Is There a Motivation Crisis in Military Recruitment in Israel?"
- 19 Levy, "Is There a Motivation Crisis in Military Recruitment in Israel?"
- 20 Reuven Gal, "The Motivation for Serving in the IDF: In the Mirror of Time," *Strategic Assessment* 2, no. 3 (1999): 11-16.
- 21 Surveys of security service candidates conducted by the IDF Center for Behavioral Sciences from the 1970s to the present, as presented, for example, by Captain Medad Avidar in his lecture "The Motivation for Service over the Years" at the joint conference of the Association of Civil-Military Studies and the Institute for National Security Studies, 2013.
- 22 Stuart Cohen, "The False 'Crisis' in Military Recruitment: An IDF Red Herring," *Perspectives*, Paper No. 33, July 23, 2007, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies; Baruch Nevo and Yael Shur, "The Contract between the IDF and Israeli Society: Focus on Compulsory Service," in *The Contract between the IDF and Israeli Society: Compulsory Service* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2002), pp. 15-24.
- 23 Pomerantz and Sher, "No One Wants to Serve Anymore."
- 24 S. Bahir and M. Avidar, "Between the State and Me: The Complexity of the Discourse of Service among Youth in an Era of Ethical Changes," *Bein Hazirot* 12 (2014): 28-41.
- 25 Blumenfeld, *Conscription and the Marginalization of Military Values*, p. 54.
- 26 Dan Soen, "All Able-Bodies, to Arms! – Attitudes of Israeli High School Students," *American Journal of Social Issues & Humanities* 2, no. 3 (2012).
- 27 Cohen, "The False Crisis in Military Recruitment"; Pomerantz and Sher, "No One Wants to Serve Anymore."
- 28 In "When I Grow Up I Will be a Soldier," Z. Englander (2001) analyzes the difference between the trends of the findings of the Center for Behavioral Sciences' security service candidate surveys and the February 2000 Geocartography surveys of Avi

Degani and Rina Degani, and shows, inter alia, that the definition of the latter population encompasses adolescents age 15 and above, unlike in the IDF.

- 29 This refers to an Israeli stereotype of a north Tel Aviv, generally secular population, of high socioeconomic standing, who are more individualistically minded and thus removed from the collective sense of Israeli purpose.
- 30 A controversial law, subsequently repealed, regulating the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men.
- 31 Motti Spry, "Routes of Exemption," Department of Behavioral Sciences, IDF Manpower Directorate, 2002.
- 32 Gal, "The Motivation for Service in the IDF over the Years."
- 33 The picture is, of course, more complex, and some also regard the willingness for combat service as a "condition for good citizenship."