

Israel and American Jewry: Moving Beyond the Core

Owen Alterman

Many Israelis have a particular image of the American Jew.¹ In the public mind, s/he is an upper-middle class Ashkenazi suburbanite who picks his or her kids up from Hebrew school at the local Reform or Conservative synagogue. This American Jew loyally supports (and sends a check) for the latest “emergency campaign” for Israel. This is the Jew who sits in the audience when members of the Israeli establishment come to speak – and whose kids are often the subject of Israeli satire.²

These American Jews still exist in their millions, but their future is bleak. The landmark 2013 study by the Pew Research Center showed, once again, that numbers are dropping. The decline of this sector presents challenges for Israeli national security policy. This article outlines the challenges posed by the shrinking American Jewish core and suggests how Israel can meet them. Largely, this means mobilizing the emerging “Jewish Background” and “Jewish Affinity” sectors and reaching out to America’s Haredim. This article explains why – and how.

The Problem: A Shrinking Core

In October 2013, the Pew Research Center released its long-anticipated study of American Jewry,³ and the findings prompted much anguish in the Jewish world. That angst is not new, of course; demographic studies of American Jews have generated anguish for decades, charting the consistent decline of non-Orthodox American Jewry. Still, the 2013 Pew study showed no sign of the drumbeat of decline stopping, and even indicated signs of its acceleration. Fully 72 percent of non-Orthodox⁴ American Jews – the children and grandchildren of the legendary American Jew – now intermarry.⁵ The

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Conservative movement is aging and shrinking,⁶ with the ranks of those most loosely affiliated growing.⁷ The demographic consequences of that change are already visible in New York, as shown in figure 1.⁸




Figure 1. Changes in Affiliation, New York, 1991-2011

The New York numbers presage the future. “The drop in the number of Jews in the middle of the identity spectrum,” says leading demographer Steven M. Cohen, “is visible today only among children and young adults. But, in coming decades, the adverse impact of the small number of children in their households will become increasingly visible, clear and apparent. Put simply, the number of middle-aged non-Orthodox Jews who are engaged in Jewish life is poised to drop sharply in the next 20-40 years.”⁹ To the *New York Times*, Cohen added that numbers point to a “sharply declining non-Orthodox population in the second half of the 21st century.”¹⁰ Or, as he and scholar Jack Wertheimer put it, “American Jews now stand on the precipice of a demographic cliff.”¹¹

This demographic collapse has significant implications for Israeli national security policy. Strongly affiliated non-Orthodox American Jews have for decades been the natural partner for the Israeli establishment, the bedrock of support for the Israel-Diaspora relationship, and the linchpin for pro-Israel political activity in the United States. Other groups, especially evangelical Christians, have joined forces in pro-Israel lobbying in recent decades, but the foundation of support from the American Jewish world has provided the most comfortable of partners for Israel: economically

well-off, broadly secular, bound together by bonds of Jewish solidarity, deferential on policy matters, and connected to both American political parties. If this group sinks into decline, it could complicate Israel's ability to manage its relationship with the United States, a core strategic asset.

The convenience of this natural bond with non-Orthodox American Jews has led the Israeli establishment to redouble efforts to strengthen their flank. The investment in Taglit-Birthright Israel,¹² the reorientation of the Jewish Agency,¹³ and the creation – if not implementation – of the World Jewry Joint Initiative¹⁴ all testify to the basic strategy of shoring up non-Orthodox Jewish America. Here, the Israeli establishment is stepping into a well-trodden field that American Jewish organizations have sown for decades: investing in programs to strengthen the Jewish identity of non-Orthodox members of the tribe in hopes of a renaissance.

This strategy has become so dominant that nearly every prominent initiative in the American Jewish institutional world falls within it, including those relating to schools, synagogues, camps, community centers, Israel trips, youth movements, and campus centers. Even the most recent of initiatives do not stray from the conventional thinking.¹⁵ This dominance has blinded major players from thinking outside that strategic box and from seeing potential strategic alternatives.

The approach of shoring up the core, of course, has merit: given the importance of the non-Orthodox American Jewish sector, Israel wisely is not giving up on it. But the approach also has its limits. So far, three decades and billions of dollars of investments have failed to reverse the sector's decline in any strategically significant measure. Relying only on the strategy of outreach risks leaving Israel exposed to a "demographic cliff" that may, in large part, be sociologically inevitable, without an alternative strategy toward American Jewry.

For that reason, in addition to the strategy of non-Orthodox outreach, the Israeli establishment must look elsewhere. Efforts to develop support from evangelical Christians, from minority groups, and others are steps in that direction. Even this, though, ignores the imperative of developing ties within American Jewry itself and with those fellow travelers with a background or emotional affinity tying them with Judaism. Support from Jews provides something that other sectors may lack in depth and durability of commitment.¹⁶ Moreover, conscious policy moves by the Israeli and American Jewish establishments can materially help to maximize support

from American Jewry as a whole and not only maximize support from the non-Orthodox sector.

In this regard, data from the Pew study points in at least two promising directions. The “center” or “core” of the community may indeed be shrinking, as bemoaned by so many. But the two “extremes” are growing. Both the more diffuse sector of Americans with “Jewish background” or “Jewish affinity” and the more cohesive American Haredi sector are, according to the Pew study, experiencing fantastic growth. Both also potentially have strong pockets of support for Israel, ripe for the establishments in both Jerusalem and New York to target for marshaling support. This article makes the case for doing so, both conceptually and with policy recommendations.

Beyond the Core: “Jewish Background” and “Jewish Affinity”

While decades of intermarriage and assimilation have eroded the established core of American Jewry, they have also produced millions of Americans who do not self-identify as Jews but who have a familial or other affinity to Judaism. Intermarried couples have borne hundreds of thousands of children who are not Jewish but have a connection to Judaism through the Jewish heritage of their families. Non-Jewish spouses of Jews have a connection through their marriages and in-laws. More than a million other Americans tell pollsters that they, too, feel a special emotional attachment to Judaism even if they do not identify as Jews themselves. These groups have become a major presence in American life and show that just as Jews are assimilating into America, in some ways Americans are assimilating into the Jews.

The 2013 Pew study identifies and defines two distinct groups of Americans who themselves are not Jewish but who have a particular link to Judaism.¹⁷ The first is the “Jewish Background” group: Americans with a Jewish parent who do not (or no longer) identify as Jews. The second is the “Jewish Affinity” group: non-Jews without a Jewish parent who nonetheless see themselves as linked to Judaism in some way. The links to Judaism are varied, ranging from those citing that “Jesus was Jewish” to those citing their Jewish spouse or Jewish grandparents.¹⁸ Whereas the “Jewish Background” connection is a filial one, the “Jewish Affinity” connection is often one of choice and self-identification.

Taken together, these “Jewish Background” and “Jewish Affinity” sectors are enormous. Figures have grown so significantly that the 3.6 million American adults in this sector now nearly equal the total number

of adults in the core itself – some 3.7 million non-Orthodox American Jews by religion.¹⁹ A full 1.5 percent of the total adult US population is either “Jewish Background” (1 percent) or “Jewish Affinity” (0.5 percent).²⁰ The diverse sectors are also varied politically, split between Democrats and Republicans;²¹ and this is so even within the “Jewish Affinity” sector, whose seemingly substantial evangelical Christian contingent might have indicated a Republican tilt.

The “Jewish Background” and “Jewish Affinity” sectors show a reasonably strong connection to Judaism and Jewish institutions, which sets them apart from non-Jewish Americans. Over a quarter – some 972,000 people – donated to a Jewish organization in 2012, the year before the study.²² The sectors also show a strong emotional connection to Israel (figure 2).²³




Figure 2. Emotional Attachment to Israel, by Sector, 2013

A large proportion of the sectors believe that the United States is “not supportive enough” of Israel. Significantly, the proportion of “Jewish Background” and “Jewish Affinity” respondents seeing the United States as not sufficiently supportive is actually greater than among the communal core itself (figure 3).²⁴




Figure 3. US Approach toward Israel, by Sector, 2013

Despite the sectors' professed connection to Judaism and to Israel, neither Israel nor the American Jewish establishment has done much to mobilize and organize this substantial number of people. A significant share of those with "Jewish Affinity" may be evangelical Christians²⁵ and engaged on Israel-related issues through evangelical institutions. Otherwise, though, no organizational framework exists for identifying or mobilizing either the "Jewish Background" or "Jewish Affinity" shares of the population. This leaves significant mobilization value untapped. If a network existed to bring these sectors to demonstrations, have them lobby for pro-Israel policies, or donate in even greater numbers to Jewish organizations, the benefits could be substantial and, from Israel's perspective, strategically significant.

One could imagine, for example, an "Americans of Jewish Heritage" network that hosts seminars and courses on Judaism, raises money for Jewish causes, sponsors partially-subsidized trips to Israel, and includes an element of pro-Israel political recruitment. A network such as this one could show the sector to be greater than the sum of its parts, since an organization lowers the search and information costs for those wishing to become politically or philanthropically active and so might encourage the marginally interested to take part.

An effort to organize and mobilize support from the "Jewish Background" and "Jewish Affinity" sectors could adopt elements from the organizational success of the Israeli-American Council, where a centralized effort managed

to organize what had been a loosely organized sector.²⁶ Even at a relatively early stage, the Israeli-American Council has shown its strength and potential.²⁷ So too could a “Jewish Affinity” organization become a relevant and even significant player on the American Jewish scene and in generating support for Israel in the United States.

It may be that among the “Jewish Background” and “Jewish Affinity” sectors, the yield would be relatively low. An individual “Jewish Background-er” or “Jewish Affinity-er” might well be less likely than an individual Israeli-American, or even an individual loosely-affiliated American Jew, to donate to Jewish organizations or become involved in pro-Israel activism. Still, because the numbers are so large, so too is the potential. A low yield from a huge pool could produce a significant benefit.

Outreach to such a large, diffuse sector poses several key challenges, not least of which is finding the target audience. Because the “Jewish Background” and “Jewish Affinity” publics are not organized, it may be difficult to find them. A useful first step would be to approach those who have already come forward: the 972,000 from the sectors who have donated to Jewish organizations, whose contact information is on file, and who have already shown some interest in engagement.

Beyond that, an outreach strategy to these sectors would benefit from deeper polling and research designed to identify what media these sectors read and in what institutions they can be found. At that point, outreach could target those media (whether traditional media or social media) and those institutions. Because of the potential expense, a gradual approach or localized pilot project might be the optimal strategy. Still, the potential benefits to Israel and American Jewry justify the costs.

Beyond the Core: Into the Haredi Sector

While the non-Orthodox core of American Jewry has shrunk, the numbers of Haredim (ultra-Orthodox) have grown exponentially. In the Orthodox sector generally, intermarriage rates are far lower than among the non-Orthodox, and birthrates are far higher (figure 4).²⁸




Figure 4. Intermarriage and Fertility Rates, by Affiliation, 2013

For the Haredi portion of the Orthodox sector, birthrates climb still higher.²⁹ Gaps in intermarriage rates and birthrates have, over time, led to a dramatic increase in the proportion of Haredim among American Jewry as a whole, particularly among younger generations.³⁰ In New York, nearly half of all Jewish children are now Haredi³¹ (figure 5).




Figure 5. Jewish Adults and Children, New York, 2011

Despite this phenomenal growth, the Israeli and American Jewish establishments have not materially invested in leveraging the growing

Haredi numbers for participation in wider political activism and in pro-Israel work in particular. For the November 2013 planning summit of the World Jewry Joint Initiative, for example, the Prime Minister's Office invited 120 "Jewish leaders and senior Israeli government officials" that included "representatives of Jewish communities, organizations, and foundations, academics, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, both men and women, young people and veteran leaders from around the world."³² From the Haredi sector, though, the initiative's organizers invited only Chabad, leaving the masses of America's Haredim outside the tent.³³ Instead, the focus seems to have remained only on shoring up the non-Orthodox core and on engaging the Modern Orthodox sector.

The sidelining of Haredi groups might be the result of homophily. The institutional partners coordinating Israel's relationship with American Jewry are the traditional ones from the non-Orthodox American Jewish core, and the networks of these groups' leaders and members are likely oriented toward non-Orthodox American Jews similar to them. The Israeli and American Jewish establishments might also believe that Haredim are less willing and less able to engage in pro-Israel political activism: less willing because of the perception that Haredim are less connected to the political project of the State of Israel than are other segments of the American Jewish population, and less able because Haredim are perceived to be less well off and having lower levels of secular education.

These perceptions may be inaccurate, at least in part. The Pew study did not break down the Haredi sector into parts, but the 2011 survey of New York Jews, which did so, produced intriguing findings that call into question prevailing views of some American Haredim. Among "Lithuanian" (or "Yeshivish") Haredim,³⁴ for example, some 82 percent said they were "very attached" to Israel, higher than any other denominational group, including the Modern Orthodox (whose figure was 75 percent).³⁵ Even among many New York Hasidic groups, numbers of "very attached" were strong: 85 percent among Hasidim in Flatbush and 61 percent in Borough Park.³⁶ Only in Williamsburg, home of the staunchly anti-Zionist Satmar sect, were numbers weak, at 31 percent (figure 6).³⁷




Figure 6. Attachment to Israel, New York, 2011

These figures may not represent only the traditional Haredi attachment to the Land of Israel, but also a connection to the Israeli political enterprise. For example, data analyzed by Pew shows that 48 percent of Haredim say that the United States is “not supportive enough” of Israel, a figure higher than for any cohort other than the Modern Orthodox.³⁸ The Pew numbers include both Lithuanian and Hasidic Haredim, so the Lithuanian numbers may well be higher.

Lithuanian Haredim in New York are also wealthier than many think. Some 11 percent of households have an annual income of \$250,000 or more, a higher proportion than Modern Orthodox New Yorkers or non-Orthodox New York Jews.³⁹ Data analyzed by Pew in August 2015 seems to corroborate that finding, noting that 24 percent of Haredi households earn more than \$150,000, a number nearly as high as that for non-Orthodox Jews.⁴⁰ Some of this added income might be needed to cover the expenses of larger families, but resources might well remain that could be solicited for pro-Israeli political causes⁴¹ or for Israeli or general Jewish philanthropy.

Findings from the Pew study, and even more so from the 2011 New York study, suggest that at least segments of the Haredi community could be ripe for increased pro-Israel political activity. That hypothesis should be tested. The establishment should reach out to relevant Haredi organizations, such as Agudath Israel of America, for an open discussion of how and whether Haredi involvement in general Jewish political activity could or should be

cultivated. The Agudah has some experience with pro-Israel political work, and it responded favorably⁴² to the conference presentation that preceded this article. Ideas could include briefings by Israeli politicians and security officials both in the United States and in Israel, special political-oriented trips to Israel tailored to Haredim, and political engagement with Haredim already in Israel for purposes of visiting and religious study. Even if some Haredi groups reject such overtures, the Israeli and American Jewish establishments could work with those parts of the heterogeneous Haredi sector that prove more receptive.

Collaboration with Haredi spiritual and institutional leaders could be important. On the one hand, given the decline of the American Jewish core, stepped-up Haredi involvement could contribute significantly to the sustained status of American Jewry and the security of Israel. On the other hand, the Haredi sector must want to be involved and must be comfortable with the ways in which that involvement is managed. One relevant question is structural: Should the establishment American Jewish organizations seek to integrate Haredim further into their own boards and committees? Or should Haredi activism be channeled separately through Haredi-focused organizations? These and other key questions must be addressed.

Another question surrounds the potential role of Modern Orthodox organizations and leaders in Haredi outreach. The Modern Orthodox themselves comprise a growing sector, important in American Jewry's future. Their numbers are much smaller than those of Haredim, and data indicate that Modern Orthodox are already highly mobilized and engaged in Jewish causes.⁴³ For these reasons, this article focuses on American Jewry's Haredi sector and not its Modern Orthodox one. Still, the Modern Orthodox may have a particular role to play in Haredi outreach, serving, potentially, as a bridge between the traditional American Jewish core and the Haredi sector.

Over time, the American Jewish establishment will on its own inevitably discover and seek to unlock the Haredi potential. As demographic changes continue apace, the organizations will eventually seek potential avenues of growth, and the Haredi sector will become a natural focus. Decision makers, though, should not wait for that natural process to unfold. Rather, they should be more farsighted: seeing the reality wrought by changing demography and moving actively to direct history. Haredi political involvement could reap significant benefits for American Jewry, and those benefits would be even greater the earlier they accrue.

Conclusion: The Core and Beyond

For the past generation, the demographic changes sweeping American Jewry have spurred an impassioned race to bring non-Orthodox Jews back to the fold. The billion-dollar investment in schools, summer camps, youth groups, campus centers, and trips to Israel has swallowed community resources and attention. This shoring up of the core is a worthwhile strategy and should continue.

The core, though, must not be the only target for mobilizing American Jewry or the only corridor for maintaining relations between Israel and America's Jews. "Right now," as Steven M. Cohen has said, "we speak of four streams of Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Reconstructionist. In forty years, will Jews speak instead of four other streams: Haredi Orthodox, Yeshivish Orthodox, Modern Orthodox, and 'liberal' Jews?"⁴⁴ To these might be added the emerging sectors of "Jewish Background" and "Jewish Affinity," so loosely assembled as to have escaped notice from even renowned experts.

The "Jewish Background"-"Jewish Affinity" and Haredi sectors have much to contribute. Current policies risk leaving untapped those contributions and the benefits that could accrue from engaging and mobilizing these sectors in earnest. Both Israel and the American Jewish establishment can do much more to realize this potential. The time has come to move beyond the core.

Notes

- 1 This article is based largely on a presentation by the author and Cameron S. Brown for the 2014 annual conference of the Institute for National Security Studies and delivered on January 28, 2014. The presentation can be found at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jiWzJweSA2I>. Any updates, deviations, or additions to the content of the presentation are the product of the author alone.
- 2 For an example with English-language subtitles, see the clip from television series *Eretz Nehederet* ("A Wonderful Country"), <http://vimeo.com/35660324> (aired January 23, 2012). The above paragraph, in substantially the same form, appeared in Owen Alterman and Cameron S. Brown, "Support for Israel in a Changing America," *Strategic Assessment* 15, no. 4 (2013): 15, http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/adkan15_4ENGe_Alterman%20and%20Brown.pdf.
- 3 *A Portrait of Jewish Americans*, Pew Research Center, October 1, 2013, <http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/10/jewish-american-full-report-for-web.pdf> (hereafter "Pew Study").
- 4 Traditionally, lay leaders and the media have divided American Jewry into three segments: Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. In the wake

of the Pew study, a different triad is more descriptive: Orthodox, non-Orthodox “Jews by religion,” and “Jews of no religion.” The third category is an outgrowth of the Pew study, which found substantial numbers of respondents who said they have no religion but identify as Jewish nonetheless. In the text, the 72 percent statistic cited is for the second and third categories combined. In describing the traditional American Jewish core, though, a better shorthand is the second category: only non-Orthodox “Jews by religion,” who have higher rates of affiliation and form the traditional backbone of the American Jewish establishment.

- 5 Among non-Orthodox American Jews who have married since 2000, some 72 percent have wed a non-Jewish spouse. Gregory A. Smith and Alan Cooperman, “What Happens When Jews Inter marry?” Fact Tank, Pew Research Center, Nov. 12, 2013, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/11/12/what-happens-when-jews-intermarry/>.
- 6 Daniel Gordis, “Conservative Judaism: A Requiem,” *Jewish Review of Books*, Winter 2014, <http://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/566/requiem-for-a-movement/>.
- 7 Pew Study, pp. 32-33, 60 (showing growth in “Jews of no religion” and then their lower levels of membership in Jewish organizations other than synagogues, and lower levels of donating to Jewish organizations).
- 8 Steven M. Cohen, Jacob B. Ukeles, and Ron Miller, *Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011*, UJA-Federation of New York, pp. 121, 122, <http://d4ovttrzyow8g.cloudfront.net/494344.pdf>. The authors of the study recalibrated the 1991 figures in order to reflect households and not individuals, and so make a comparison with 2002 and 2011 figures more reliable.
- 9 Steven M. Cohen, “What Is To Be Done? Policy Responses to the Shrinking Jewish Middle,” May 22, 2014, p. 1, http://iengage.org.il/Fck_Uploads/file/What%20Is%20To%20Be%20Done.pdf. The original marks part of the text in bold.
- 10 Laurie Goodstein, “Poll Shows Major Shift in Identity of U.S. Jews,” *New York Times*, October 1, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/us/poll-shows-major-shift-in-identity-of-us-jews.html>.
- 11 Jack Wertheimer and Steven M. Cohen, “The Pew Survey Reanalyzed: More Bad News, But a Glimmer of Hope,” *Mosaic*, November 2, 2014, <http://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/2014/11/the-pew-survey-reanalyzed/>.
- 12 Partner, The Government of Israel, <http://www.birthrightisrael.com/TaglitBirthrightIsraelStory/Partners/Pages/The-Government-of-Israel.aspx>. In 2011, the Israeli government announced a substantial increase in funding, with \$100 million to be allocated for the trips. Josh Nathan-Kazis, “Government of Israel to Give More to Birthright Program,” *The Forward*, January 12, 2011, <http://forward.com/news/134636/government-of-israel-to-give-more-to-birthright-pr/#ixzz3t9rDqADu>.

- 13 eJP, "Securing the Future: The Jewish Agency's New Plan," June 18, 2010, <http://www.bjpa.org/Publications/downloadFile.cfm?FileID=7247>.
- 14 Ben Sales, "Israeli Ministry Plows Ahead with 'World Jewry' Project, Even as Funding and Future Remain Uncertain," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, September 24, 2015, <http://www.jta.org/2015/09/24/news-opinion/israel-middle-east/israeli-ministry-plows-ahead-with-world-jewry-project-even-as-funding-and-future-remain-uncertain>.
- 15 See, for example, "Strategic Directions for Jewish Life: A Call to Action" ("Statement on Jewish Vitality"), eJewish Philanthropy, October 1, 2015, <http://ejewishphilanthropy.com/strategic-directions-for-jewish-life-a-call-to-action/>.
- 16 Some, even within the evangelical Christian community, have questioned the durability of the sector's attachment to Israel. See, for example, David Brog, "The End of Evangelical Support for Israel?" *Middle East Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (2014), http://www.meforum.org/3769/israel-evangelical-support#_ftnref1. That said, these claims are not necessarily supported by polling data; see Alterman and Brown, "Support for Israel in a Changing America," pp. 10-11.
- 17 Pew Study, p. 107.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 110.
- 19 *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 48 (calculating the number of American Jews by religion who are non-Orthodox by subtracting the 12 percent of that cohort who are Orthodox from the total figure of 4.2 million Jews by religion).
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 23.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 117.
- 22 *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 112 (multiplying the total number of adults in each sector by the respective percentage donating to a Jewish organization).
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 116.
- 24 *Ibid.*
- 25 Within the "Jewish Affinity" sector, some 31 percent say they have an affinity toward Judaism because "Jesus was Jewish," *Ibid.*, p. 110.
- 26 Orli Santo, "In U.S., Israelis Claim a Foothold," *Jewish Week*, May 26, 2015, <http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/new-york/us-israelis-claim-foothold>.
- 27 *Ibid.*
- 28 Pew Report, pp. 37, 40.
- 29 Pew Research Center, "A Portrait of American Orthodox Jews," August 26, 2015, <http://goo.gl/uxBTJa>. Although the Pew analysis does not break down fertility rates for Haredim and Modern Orthodox Jews, one of its tables indicates Haredi households are far more likely than Modern Orthodox ones to have four or more children currently living at home, supplying strong circumstantial evidence for higher fertility rates. Moreover, the New York study found evidence of considerably higher fertility rates among Haredim than among Modern Orthodox. See *Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011*, pp. 214-15.

- 30 Josh Nathan-Kazis, "Orthodox Population Grows Faster than First Figures in Pew #JewishAmerica Study," *The Forward*, November 12, 2013, <http://forward.com/news/187429/orthodox-population-grows-faster-than-first-figure/>.
- 31 *Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011*, p. 216.
- 32 Prime Minister's Office, Press Release, "Strategic Planning Summit for Unprecedented Joint Initiative between Government of Israel and Jewish World Launches in Jerusalem," November 6, 2013, <http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Spokesman/Pages/spokestrategic061113.aspx>.
- 33 Sam Sokol, "Pew Studying Israeli Jewry," *Jerusalem Post*, January 28, 2014, <http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-Features/Pew-to-issue-study-on-Israeli-Judaism-339664>.
- 34 "Lithuanian" (also called "Yeshivish") and "Hasidic" denote the two streams within the Haredi world. The divide dates to the eighteenth century and the rise of Hasidism, a mysticism-oriented movement centered on dynastic rabbinic courts. The new movement challenged the establishment of the time, which coalesced around a sage known as the Vilna Gaon. Because the core of opposition to Hasidism was in the Vilna Gaon's native Lithuania, non-Hasidic Haredim are known to this day as "Lithuanian." For further explanation, see David Assaf, "Hasidism, Historical Overview," *The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe*, http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Hasidism/Historical_Overview (referring to the "Lithuanian" Haredim as "Misnagdim," yet another synonym for the subsector).
- 35 *Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011*, p. 223.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Pew Research Center, "A Portrait of American Orthodox Jews."
- 39 *Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011*, p. 220.
- 40 Pew Research Center, "A Portrait of American Orthodox Jews." Unlike the New York study, though, the Pew analysis does not distinguish between Hasidic and Lithuanian Haredim, so a more precise corroboration is not possible.
- 41 For pro-Israel activism in particular, the Haredi sector's impact may be limited somewhat by geographical concentration. Some 89 percent of Haredim live in the Northeast (and, within the Northeast, may be concentrated in smaller enclaves). This may limit the Haredi sector's capacity to influence more far-flung legislators. For statistics on the sector's regional distribution, see Pew Research Center, "A Portrait of American Orthodox Jews."
- 42 Sokol, "Pew Studying Israeli Jewry."
- 43 See, for example, *Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011*, p. 221.
- 44 Cohen, "What Is To Be Done? Policy Responses to the Shrinking Jewish Middle," p. 2.