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#25Jan: Revolution Continues



Rana Allam

By the people, for the people

"We will revolt because the poor are getting poorer, and the sick are dying, and government's institutional corruption matches that of Mubarak's regime. We will protest because our country is being sold to the Qataris and because the Muslim Brotherhood is dealing with Egypt as though it is their own private farm. Without a leader, on 25 January 2011, millions of Egyptians took to the streets to protest against dictatorship, poverty, and oppression. They walked all over Mubarak and his people. On 25 January 2012, the same millions protested against SCAF, and on 25 January 2013, we will march against the Muslim Brotherhood and their president. ***Without a leader, without an arrogant activist, and without a shapeless political party, the revolution continues by the people and for the people****!"*

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Paul Sedra

The Revolution Continues

"While the president gives speeches to the Shura Council about how the country's economic fortunes are improving, talk of a "revolution of the hungry" continues to spread. And frankly, those who purport to lead the opposition seem oddly deaf to this talk, focused on questions of law and procedure, almost to the exclusion of the vital question of sheer survival that countless Egyptians face. As ever, I look to Egyptians themselves, rather than their leaders, to show the way. Perhaps 25 January 2013 will prove to be the day that Egyptians declare they have had enough of the neo-liberal economic policies that have left them without the staples of their existence. Perhaps that day remains two weeks, two months or, indeed, two years away"

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Bassem Sabry

Egypt's Revolution, Two Years On

While around this time last year many people were also quite angry and exasperated about how things stood in the country, the situation generally feels much bleaker this time around, and everyone is even more exhausted.

To begin, the economy is genuinely suffering, the central bank has recently warned of Egypt's reserves reaching critical levels (the governor and the deputy governor have also resigned) amid an influx of Qatari money in debate-stirring support, the pound has been losing value to the dollar, foreign investment and tourism continue to struggle and many locally are now abstaining from what they see as risky long-term investments. Egypt has been negotiating economic assistance with the IMF and international partners over roughly the same amount of time it takes to actually repay some loans" [.....] ***"I still see an incredible amount of hope in Egypt, and why I feel the historic momentum is still largely on the right side. There is a resilient private media, an increasingly aware and sophisticated society, more people getting deeply involved in politics, impossible courage and determination, a strong movement to grow civil society despite the hurdles, an opposition that is finally working together, an explosion of creativity and free expression and a growing realization by everyone that vacuous slogans and mere political positioning will not guarantee you political power****. Democracy, in many ways, is still showing signs of forcing itself — apparently against the will of some — to be born. A recent theory claimed that all revolutions go through a critical year-two point at which things look bleak, and indeed this is not where Egyptians hoped their country would be two years after their revolution. Still, it could all be saved, and I see many reasons to stay optimistic and resilient. I genuinely believe that"*

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15 Things Egypt Must Do To Get Back from the Brink

If the country's political forces wish to attempt what could be a last minute miracle to save the promise of the Egyptian revolution and somewhat unite a painfully divided country, there are several steps that need to be taken. Here are some of them: 1. ***Restructure the police; fix the public's relationship with them****: The relationship between Egyptians and the police is possibly at its all-time low. 2.* ***Restore confidence in the legal system****. 3.* ***Properly and transparently investigate recent violence****: Successive rounds of post revolution violence that have left scores dead or severely injured have been left without satisfying, transparent investigations. 4.* ***Address the divide on the constitution****. 5.* ***Appoint a better, consensus-building government****: The simple fact is the Qandil government has been unsuccessful. 6.* ***Establish a widely accepted electoral law and process****: The next electoral law needs wide national consensus, no matter how long it takes. 7.* ***Allow for a strong opposition****: A political balance-of-power in this phase of Egypt's history would do good for the country and in the establishment of a democratic culture in general,*

and especially within state institutions. 8. ***Ensure unbiased state institutions****. 9.* ***Diffuse radicalism and sectarianism.*** *10.* ***De-politicize Al-Azhar****. 11.* ***Temporarily avoid some of the most deeply divisive issues****: Both sides worry about controversial legislation, particularly of a social nature. 12.* ***Protect the media and freedom of opinion****. 13.* ***Address fears of social/political marginalization****: Most particularly, women and Christian groups are worried of what they see as increasing marginalization by the Islamists. 14.* ***Get more youthful, fresh faces into politics****: More and more fresh faces and youth should become a part of official political life, without totally neglecting the necessary role of youth groups (such as April 6th) as watchmen. 15.* ***Save the economy****: A national consensus plan on how to save the economy, including tourism, is urgently needed as economic indicators continue to show bleeding. Political problems remain the key challenge to the economy, and a genuine reconciliation in itself would go a long way to fixing things.* ***A consensus economic plan would be the second half of the puzzle****"*

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H.A. Hellyer

That is The Revolution: That is #Jan25

"There are those who simply couldn't bring themselves to believe that Egyptians could actually create a revolution, and preferred to hope for reform or eventual change, which is why they didn't support those 18 days. They even supported Shafiq in the first round of the presidential election, let alone the second, because they so feared that the revolution was a fraud. They were wrong – and that needs to be said. To pretend that it was not a mistake is to demean and insult the memories of the martyrs in that square – those who gave their lives so that all Egyptians might have a chance then, and now, to build a new future. Yet, if they are willing to join in the caravan, realize their error, and believe in the promise of those 18 days, no one ought to stand in their way. Indeed: most Egyptians in the square over the 18 days had previously made a mistake. They redeemed their tolerance, acceptance, and participation of Mubarak's regime by being in the Square"

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Sara Khorshid

Will History Repeat Itself or Will The Revolution Triumph?

"Despite all the challenges, I am still clinging to the hope that the revolution provided. And my hope is in the youth that proved that they will tirelessly

pursue their goals will outshine the sophisticated ways of politicians who work behind closed doors. Unattached to the business or the political elite, the youth are determined to achieve our rights, and ensure that the revolution continues until justice is served. Those youth who work with the people on the ground to alleviate Egyptians' day-to-day sufferings through creative and revolutionary methods. Those youth that are perhaps more reckless, versus the wiser ones. Those youth whom many of the Muslim Brotherhood often label as 'thugs', and who are disparaged as being incapable of adopting 'the law' and recognizing 'legitimacy'. That happens as the new ruling elite jumps between revolutionary legitimacy and the legitimacy that derives from elections, always in accordance with one interest: staying in power"

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Hani Shukrallah

Egypt's Revolution: As It Might Have Been; As It Could Be

*"**I would suggest three more vital actions that might have been undertaken in this imagined revolutionary transformation. The first might well have been the issuance of a "Declaration of Rights**", enshrining the fundamental principles and values of the Egyptian revolution" [....] "The real point here, irrespective of details, is that today, two years after the revolution, we are yet to have in our hands a document that sets out clearly and succinctly the principles and overall aims that had been so glaringly and so potently expressed in Tahrir and throughout the country during those glorious 18 days of January and February 2011. As for precedents, we need only refer to the two seminal revolutions of the modern world, the American and the French revolutions. No less important would have been **to draw up and declare a concise action plan outlining the most urgent tasks of the revolution, and its provisional government**. These might have included such vital house-cleaning as purging the legal code of the tons of repressive and anti-democratic legislation, some of which was actually drawn up during the times of British colonial domination of the country" [....] "The third urgent action would have been to **initiate a genuine "transitional justice" process, making use of the wealth of international experience in this regard, to ensure that the murderers and torturers of the people are made to pay for their crimes, and to bring some sense of retribution and solace to the families and friends of the martyrs**"*

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Sarah Carr

Back to The Squares, Without The Brothers!

The violence of yesterday's protests, especially in Suez, is an articulation of a genuine seething, anger at this incompetent regime whose leader sees fit to address a nation in flux on Twitter at 2 am. But acts of civil disobedience - traffic blocking and Metro stoppages - are unlikely to go down well with the majority of Cairenes, who like general publics everywhere, only want a quiet life. This is particularly true given that there has been an aimlessness about some protests such as the largely ignored sit-in in Tahrir Square, a lack of vision, which if it hasn't lost protesters support certainly hasn't gained them new followers. Reactionary or apathetic general publics aren't essential in the great scheme of things, since it is always a minority that initiates change, but questions have to be asked about the effectiveness of these unchanging tactics, which are beautiful when they work but risk becoming staid, like coursing water that manages to wear an indent in a rock but then becomes trapped in a path of its own creation"

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Ibrahim El-Houdaiby

Two Years After The Revolution

"The biggest challenge that still faces the revolution is the challenge of transition. ***Battling parties agree there is concern about the return of Mubarak's regime, whether by reproducing its policies or if some of its figures re-emerge in the political arena and influence events****. This concern is mainly based on the fact that Mubarak's regime was not entirely terminated or dismantled, and is still being dealt with in an ambiguous manner — for example, the "flexible" use of the word "remnants," that expands and contracts depending on political necessity by each party, exempting allies and including opponents. To overcome this fear, there must be a more methodical and disciplined approach in dealing with the legacy of the former regime in a way that guarantees institutional transition, preventing the repetition of past crimes. This requires, first and foremost, full disclosure of the crimes that were committed, how they occurred, and the reasons behind them. This includes rights violations of various degrees or those relating to corrupting political life, or economic corruption (including widespread bribery and influence peddling to squander state resources), or negligence at various state institutions that took the lives of Egyptians"*

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Nervana Mahmoud

Will Egypt Reach a Consensus?

"What about the future? Thus far, ***there are three scenarios being put forth: consensus, coup or collapse. All of these are plausible, but I doubt that any of them will happen in the near future.*** *Despite the frantic efforts to reach a consensus, it is unlikely that any possible deal will last, as while all players are keen to avoid the dangerous point of no return, they still view compromise as failure and pluralism as blasphemous" [....]* ***"Judging from the responses of the different political parties, there is potential for a different outcome through a mixture of the three options: a semi, rather than complete, consensus with the army "leading from behind," without resorting to a complete coup, in order to prevent a state collapse****. Aware that the army is watching from a distance, the Muslim Brotherhood may compromise to keep the officers behind their barracks"*

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The Economy: Behind the Headline Numbers & The Frightening Food Divide



Rebel Economy

Egypt's Real Reserve Level - Behind the Headline Numbers

"With no sign of a final agreement on the IMF loan, the Bank's decision to launch dollar auctions (which many regarded as a late reaction) to effectively depreciate the pound makes a lot of sense. Even more intriguing is the IMF's own breakdown of Egypt's reserve level. ***The IMF figures suggest that the bulk of Egypt's liquid reserves, excluding gold and other non-convertible assets, stand at about $7.1 billion.*** *That's in stark contrast to the Central Bank, which says foreign currency reserves are $10 billion. That $7.1 billion figure may not represent the only liquid reserves but economists say they are unsure of what this level could be at the moment. The Central Bank's late decision to allow the pound to fall has cost the country and the Morsi administration. Now Egypt has little choice but to rely on immediate, easy aid from the Gulf, and a long-term (and very contentious) loan from the IMF before it can recover to its original reserves level"*

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Egypt's Frightening Food Divide

"Egypt's most vulnerable households don't have enough money to buy food, clothes and shelter. That's the frightening conclusion of the Egyptian Food Observatory's latest government survey. Of the 1680 households surveyed (and 7532 household members) in September 2012, 86% said their income was insufficient for covering total monthly needs including for food, clothes and shelter, up from 74% in June 2012. As food prices have steadily increased over the year, income levels have remained static as the country's fragile economic climate impacts salaries. The knock-on affect of this has left many families adopting increasingly extreme coping strategies, the report says, the most common of which has prompted families to consumer cheaper foods and borrow food or money"



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Nader Bakkar

Egypt's Economic Policy: More Transparency Please

All this can be resolved by applying a "transparency policy" to each step taken by the government. This should be applied according to the relative seriousness of the challenges faced by the government – from a presidential advisor's mysterious visit to the UAE at a time when dozens of Egyptians remain detained without charge in Saudi Arabia, and ending with the real reasons for the dismissal of several government ministers while retaining others. Another option for this proposed 'transparency policy' would be to fully open the doors to all questions on the part of the opposition – questions which, if left unanswered, might further poison Egypt's political environment and increase the current trust deficit" [.....] "As for the nation's more long-term, chronic problems, these must be dealt with via long-term planning that should be pursued by respective ministries – regardless of changes of individual ministers. We cannot expect our vision – or methods of management – to change every four months, especially those pertaining to Egypt's sensitive economy-related ministries"

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Chaos: The Ultras, The Green Eagles The Black Bloc… & The Angry Donkey Brigades



Ziad Akl

The Ultras, the Trial and Violence

"The other dimension in this situation is the Ultras movement, a very controversial group. It is indeed admirable and respectable what the Ultras Ahlawy movement has done over the past year. *The movement showed a commitment to its cause and devotion to the principles the movement believes in. What the movement did over the past year was politically, socially and culturally enriching. The Ultras taught all social movements in Egypt a lesson in innovative tactics, in effective response to threats and challenges, in understanding how to apply pressure on authorities and in how to remain dedicated to your cause without diversions"[.....]*



"We're in is violence. We became consumed over the past year with analyzing the political aspects of this case, but we forgot in the process the hatred building up against Port Said*. The media, blind fanaticism and radicalization have managed to create this false image where the city of Port Said is held responsible for the massacre. This verdict is not a triumph for Cairo or a defeat for Port Said, this foolish parochial fanaticism has to end. The violence in Port Said is not because it is a city of thugs; it is because we have confused what's legal with what's political and we became unable to fulfill both, the same way we do with confusing what's civil and what's religious. Violence erupts and will keep on erupting whenever the system fails to deliver justice, and what this verdict has done so far was deliver partial, politicized and inept justice"*

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Ashraf Khalil

Blood in Egypt's Streets: Anger in Tahrir then Soccer Violence in Port Said

"Given the bitterly polarized state of the country, it's no surprise that Friday's two-year anniversary of the revolution's beginning was hardly an occasion for celebration. The mood started out angry and escalated from there. One indication of the spirit of the day: none of the participating groups and parties even bothered to erect a stage. *Previous large Tahrir protests had often featured multiple elaborate stages, mixing crowd-pleasing revolutionary songs in with the speeches. This time the most you could find was individual speakers shouting into bullhorns and microphones. Another telling indication of the angry and confrontational mood of Egypt's anti-Brotherhood forces: Friday's protests marked the public debut of a new and openly militant faction of the opposition. The "Black Bloc"–a self-styled anarchist militia modeled on European predecessors–came into the day with the announced intent of battling police and damaging both government buildings and offices connected to the Brotherhood" [....] "However,* ***the Black Bloc's emergence speaks volumes about the mood among the anti-Brotherhood forces–which has seen the country's Islamist forces repeatedly defeat them at the ballot box and ram through a divisive constitution despite their opposition.*** *Going forward, the group seems likely to serves a rallying point for the Egyptian revolutionaries who have abandoned all hope of change through negotiation or peaceful means"*



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Zeinobia

#BlackBloc in Egypt

Suddenly this week we found out that Egypt has got its own Black Bloc group. The group declared its existence officially with a clip filmed in Alexandria. Now on twitter and Facebook the group "Black Bloc" announced that it will have a meeting down town Cairo at Talaat Harb where the members



come wearing black masks. Already the group announced that their Zero hero will be 2 PM Thursday!!

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Sandmonkey

Blockheads

"In 2013, an anarchist group called the Black Bloc appeared on the Egyptian revolutionary scene and got incredible media attention. Despite their very low numbers (maximum 100 combined in all incidents all over Egypt), the media went into a state of utter frenzy over this new group and the circus started in earnest, culminating in the appearance of one Black Bloc member on a TV show with a sock on his face. The fun thing about this absurdity is that everyone seems to be taking them seriously, but the dangerous thing is that it might continue. Every regime's purpose is to find a segment of its population to vilify, and thus appear to be fighting the good fight for the good and decent majority. Traditionally in Egypt you always needed an illegal and forbidden group, which has been the Muslim Brotherhood over the past 60 years. However, ever since the deal between the Military and the Brotherhood back in early 2011, to form the new regime, the need to manufacture a new forbidden group has been in constant demand. Given that it couldn't be an Islamist group for obvious reasons, 6 of April was originally the target they had in mind, hence that SCAF statement against them back in the day"

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The NSF: "Noslamists" & The Leaderless Revolution



Robert Becker

NSF met with Salafis… And accomplished what exactly?

*"**Meet voters. After you spend three hours raising money, drive to Assuit and hold a town meeting about rail safety**. Console. Listen, Engage. Or tour a factory in the Delta. Shake hands. Listen. Talk about dignity in the workplace. Make working class Egyptians a priority. Or try meeting with nurses (mostly women – they vote too) in Giza. See the horrific conditions of our hospitals. Listen to the indignities they suffer and how pitiful their wages are. Do this every day starting tomorrow, and you will visually be something the president is not: accessible and compassionate"*

*[.....] "**Get a message. Stop boring the electorate with your infighting over party lists... Nobody cares. Start talking about the only thing that matters to tens of millions of poor and working class Egyptians: Jobs. Hire professionals, especially media trainers and political consultants, and listen to them.** Practice never completing a sentence without coming back to jobs and the economy. And then give interviews every day contrasting your vision of economic recovery and dignity in the workplace and job creation against that of the Muslim Brotherhood's "100 days of nothing, six months of instability and power-grabs and a future of economic ruin."*

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Karl Sharro

Egypt's opposition: The sultan's slackers

"The problem is that the NSF is a lowest-common-denominator outfit whose members happen to be temporarily unified against the Muslim Brotherhood. I refer to them as the "Noslamists"; for all intents and purposes that's their only common characteristic. These internal contradictions are translating into ineffective leadership and inability to come up with a coherent and unified political narrative. This is happening at a time when Egypt is undergoing a crisis that requires an agile political opposition that can galvanize on the Muslim Brotherhood's mounting mistakes in power"[....] "If the NSF does boycott the elections, it would consign itself to irrelevance in the coming period. Fighting a "culture war" against Islamism would only aid the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists in mobilizing their core support, and move the debate away from political and economic issues where they can challenge Morsi more effectively. Yet the NSF is stuck with its "Noslamist" label, and it remains unable and unwilling to expand its support base through political programs. The paradox of the NSF is that it is trying to suppress its internal political contradictions, which should be the very substance of political debate and contestation"

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Salama Moussa

What Morsi Should Do

*"**President Morsi needs to ask himself if he really wishes to be the President of Egypt or remain a follower of the Muslim Brotherhood**. The current turmoil will not allow him to be both. The*

President must rise above his party, assert authority, seduce or charm critics, establish order and turn potential opponents into a loyal opposition. To do so is to assert the power of law and process in a country reeling from the chaotic after effects of revolution. ***To be a leader is to assume the mantle of the office, its duties, chores, anxieties and majesty. If his heart is not in it, he should bow out and return to being an enforcer for the Brotherhood****"*

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Ashraf Khalil

Groundhog Day in Cairo: A Brutal Video Raises the Political Stakes in Egypt

"It's too little and too late," for a political solution, says Mohammed Sherdy, a veteran opposition politician and a native of Port Said—the Suez canal city that served as the epicenter of this latest week-long outbreak of violence*. "Political solutions should have happened a month ago or two months ago."[....] "****Three of Egypt's top 10 largest cities have now turned against the Brotherhood, Sherdy said. In the last parliamentary election last year, Brotherhood and other Islamist politicians dominated the 20 combined seats from the three cities****. Now Sherdy said he expects them to claim maybe three parliamentary seats. "Politically it will reflect in the elections for sure," he says. "****None of the Islamist politicians will be able to show their faces in the streets****"*

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Challenges: Media & Secularism



Bassem Sabry

Egypt State TV Under Tight Control?

"More and more reports as of late that Egypt state TV has been under tighter control by the MB. Well, we know that the information minister (a position the revolution was meant to abolish) is an MB member. I can make the following observations as I watch those channels: 1. I can't see big-name opposition members calling or showing up in any of the programs. Many claim that certain names are banned from being allowed inside the building. Here is one sample of some names.2. All opposition figures that actually do

make it to the programming are either second or third tier kind of names. Their influence on the programming is often usually weak due to lack of name power or personal capabilities. 3. I have not seen a single programme that had opposition-only guests. But I have seen shows that have MB/Islamist only guests, as well as MB/Islamists and opposition together. Again: never opposition only. 4. A lot of effort is going into pumping up Morsi's image"

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Sara Ɣbib

Challenges for Secularism in Egypt

*"**In a country where religion or at least the appearance or mention thereof play a big role in public life, can Egyptians have a meaningful political dialogue while completely shunning the subject?** It is important that secular and/or liberals first know what it is exactly they are striving for and that they let go of slogans and/or methods which have proven unhelpful. As a political stream, they must reconcile with the idea that religion does play a big role in public life. **Instead of calling for 'no religion in politics', it might be time to highlight the dangers of having religious rules forced on citizens by the state through legislation and the potential of abuse this has; while making clear that religion and religious freedom are respected.** [.....] " It is not enough to highlight the dangers of what the Islamist parties in Egypt are striving for, **what is needed is an alternative. One that doesn't alienate the citizen nor patronize him or her and certainly one that respects that in Egypt,** religion holds an important spot in many people's hearts. Egyptians don't need the government to teach them how to pray, instead, they require someone to create a legal environment where they can freely live and work, where economic growth can be achieved in a way that benefits all citizens, seculars should strive to be that someone"*

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A Twilight Without A New Dawn & The Point of No Return



Wael Nawara

Egypt's 'Post-Democracy' Nears Point of No Return

*"**Egypt is commemorating the second anniversary of its "Peaceful" Revolution with the shedding of yet more blood.***

Violent clashes in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Damanhour and Port Said left almost 60 dead and hundreds injured and the numbers are rising*" [.....] "Once this point of "no return" is reached, additional chaos would bring "loss of control" to an irreversible state when even a military intervention would not be able to fix things or restore order. On the other hand, a military coup will bring Egypt's transition to square one or even a step below, as short-term measures which the army would use to regain order may become long term deductions of newly acquired freedoms****. Time will tell if the Egyptian political forces in government and opposition are able to grasp the risks involved as they push things ever closer to the brink, approaching the dangerous "point of no return****."*

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Nervana Mahmoud

Egypt: A Twilight Without a New Dawn

*"**The rise of the angry youth is new game changer in Egypt's already-murky political stage.** It has cast doubt on the potential success of any political deal between the ruling brotherhood and the opposition. The leaderless revolution that many considered a blessing could easily become the leaderless chaos that no one can afford. Egypt is currently a dysfunctional state that is edging toward failure. **It is facing the biggest test of its contemporary history, as its elite is losing legitimacy and ability to contro**l. The bridge between weakness and complete failure may take a while, but in a heavily populated country like Egypt, full of unlicensed weapons, a fast decline can easily happen. **It's time for Egypt ruling Islamists and opposition forces to swallow some humble pie, admit mistakes, and stop treating fire with fire, otherwise the lava from the current volcanic eruption will burn what is left of our country****"*

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Women Empowerment & The Great Male Crisis



Sandmonkey

The Great Male Crisis

"Families in lower social classes depend for their survival on women working, sometimes entirely. In upper classes, you are more likely to find

more unemployed men than women, and even there the notion of the man being the sole bread-winner has eroded, and the women are noticing. Highly successful women in Egyptian society are openly talking and lamenting the disappearance of "the golden standard male". Many are now supporting their husbands and those are the ones who have found husbands to marry. Talk to the single ones and you will hear lamentations to no end. It's happening, and some will tell you that it has been the case for years. And the men refuse to acknowledge the situation, insisting on being the decision-makers despite not being the providers, with their authority now entirely founded and dependent on spirituality and religion. In actuality, violence and religion have become their only weapon left. Hence the sexual assaults taking place on the street, where men are trying to assert their dominance and strength. Hence the constitution, where Islamists insist that women obey them in the household. Hence the Salafi preachers who are promoting younger female marriages all the time, just so that they can get the girls out of school and out of competition" [.....] "Dear men, women are taking over. Either step up your game in education and work or get out of their way. You have led this world and this country since forever, and look around you: It's all falling apart. It's time to give someone else a chance"

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Nahla Samaha

Two Years On Fearless Women March for Freedom

"The role of women in the political unrest has gained more momentum since they stood side by side with men in violent confrontations with the police or Muslim Brotherhood supporters over the past two years, facing the added threat of sexual assault.



Someone taking the issue of sexual assault on women into her own hands is 29 year-old Soraya Bahgat. Bahgat, who works in real estate, was on her way to Tahrir Square one November day for an anti-Morsi demonstration. "I remember it was noon on a Tuesday, and I began to experience a panic attack," she recalls. Bahgat panicked because she was going into Tahrir Square alone where just a week earlier two girls had reportedly been assaulted by a large group of men. "I immediately went on Twitter and started Tahrir Bodyguard as a collective effort to ensure the safety of women in Tahrir," and in a span of a couple of

hours Bahgat had garnered 600 followers. This led to the creation of the Facebook group Tahrir Bodyguard where people can share their experiences, offer their volunteer services, or stay updated on sexual assault hotspots in and around Tahrir Square. Tahrir Bodyguard differs from other similar initiatives in the fact that volunteers wear fluorescent yellow vests as well as protective helmets, and so are easily visible in the crowd. "We have both female and male volunteers who protect women, and intervene if is something happens," explains Bahgat, who has funded the entire initiative, including the vests and helmets from her own pocket. ***On the second year anniversary of the January 25th Revolution, Tahrir Bodyguard volunteers intervened in several incidents, rescued women from mobs of men, and suffered injuries and beatings in the process****"*

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Syria

Jabhat al-Nusra's True Color



Hussain Jummo

Jabhat al-Nusra's Goals Extend Beyond Syria

*"**At the end of December, in an unprecedented move, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, addressed "the people of Syria and the mujahedeen**." [.....] "The speech came in response to the United States designation of Jabhat al-Nusra as a foreign terrorist organization. But it seemed obvious that Julani was speaking from a strong position, warning that "those who sowed the seeds of the revolution will be the ones to reap its fruits." He also warned his supporters and the people of Syria against attempts to replace the Syrian regime with a Western one.* ***The speech indicates that the FSA is being subsumed. After having been the leading military entity in the Syrian revolution, the FSA has been pushed to the sidelines compared to Jabhat al-Nusra****. The militant praised those parties that have condemned the US decision to designate it as a terrorist group.During my visit to Aleppo, I got the impression that Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamist factions were still on the sidelines of the conflict in Aleppo's countryside. However, inside the city the situation was different, as expected" [....] "During the first half of 2012, members of Jabhat al-Nusra — who had come from different countries — lived as guests in Aleppo suburbs, and fought without having permanent residence in the city. Today, a small community*

is expanding to reach the scale of "al-Qaeda," or at least what al-Qaeda's leaders aspire to. ***They see Syria as merely a single step in a journey taking them from Aleppo and Idlib to the Alawite Mountains in Latakia, and eventually extending to regions beyond Syria****"*

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Hassan Hassan

Radical Elements are True Winners in Syria's Stalemate

These "sectarian jihadists" are particularly worrying because of the sectarian diversity of Syrian society*. Yet, this sectarianism has not been duly addressed by religious and political leaders. According to a Syrian researcher who has recently met with numerous religious leaders, these leaders shy away from speaking out against sectarianism to avoid criticism from the public.* ***There is an increasing tendency among opposition figures and activists to say what is popular rather than what is right. The role of moderate religious leaders is essential to counter this trend.*** *These religious leaders, however, find it difficult to criticize popular forces. Supporters of the Syrian uprising need to show that there can be an alternative.* ***Instead of reminiscing over the demise of dictatorial, pseudo-secular rulers, it is imperative to face this threat head on and look for a solution through democratic means, awareness and public appeal****. After all, Islamists are part of the new political reality across the Middle East. Once the regime falls, many will find little reason to fight, while moderate religious and local leaders will have to join hands to speak out or act against extremism. But as long as Mr Al Assad remains in power, these moderate voices will remain outliers.* ***The bottom line is this: the longer this crisis goes on, the more time radical forces from all sides will have to dig in****"*

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Sam Heller

The Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front

"Most immediately evident is that the Front is essentially fighting a two-front war: it's looking to topple the Assad regime, but it's also aiming for the establishment and reform of Islamic morals in Syria. In that sense, the Front is fighting with one eye on what will follow the collapse of regime authority. Among (many) other noteworthy points is the Front's envisioned place for religious minorities. Non-Muslims are nominally accorded equal rights, but

those rights are strictly circumscribed by Islamic shari'a. By my reading, the status of Shi'ites and Alawites is ambiguous. The document makes clear (largely through omission) that the scope of acceptable diversity in Islamic thought and practice is limited to variations on Sunnism. As non-Sunnis perceived as heretics, then, Shi'ites and Alawites exist outside that Sunni consensus. It is unclear if they would be accorded the same baseline protections as Christians or if they would instead be dealt with more harshly"

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Lebanon



The Orthodox Law: Sectarian Tensions & The Great Escapism

Ramez Dagher

A Closer Look At The Orthodox Gathering Law- Part I: Why It's Unconstitutional

"One of the problems of the law is that it gives the Christians, 38%, the right to vote for 50% of the MPs. Under the 1960 law, the Christian and Muslim votes are equal in their influence. Now of course, the districts make it harder for Christians to choose their MPs, because a big number of them are in districts where Muslims are the majority *(Akkar 3, Chouf 4, Tripoli 2, Beirut II and III 5 are few examples). Nevertheless, 1 Christian Vote = 1 Muslim Vote. In every district, each Lebanese votes once, and his vote is equal to the vote of the other Lebanese in that district. In the OG law, however, it's not the same. The power of the Christian vote will be more important than that of the Muslim vote. 1 Christian Vote = 1.65 Muslim Vote (because the 62 Muslims have the same influence the 38 Christians have , considered that Muslims and Christians each vote for 50% and have equal voting power). In a nutshell, under the current law, the Lebanese votes are equal, but under the OG law, it's the sect votes that are equal, not the Lebanese. And If Lebanese don't equally enjoy political rights (the right of equal votes), the OG electoral law is by far an unconstitutional one"*

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A Closer Look At The Orthodox Gathering Law- Part II: Why It's Frightful

The most important detail of an electoral law, especially in the Lebanese context is the influence of the law on the long run. On the short run, the Orthodox Gathering law can be a positive one (See Qifa Nabki's post here and Karl reMarks's post here). It can make it easier for secular candidates to make it to the parliament. Excessive sectarianism and PR can eventually result in the destruction of the "Other-sect boogeyman". Proportional representation will create an opposition in each sect and even give it some sectarian legitimacy in a de-facto sectarian system. On the long run, the Orthodox Gathering law might be one of the worst ones Lebanon has ever known. Even the electoral law for the executive administrative council of the Mutasarrif is to some extent better than the OG law"

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A Closer Look At The Orthodox Gathering Law- Part III: A Political Maneuver

*"**Michel Aoun's strategy. The OG law is the perfect electoral change for him. It gives him the chance to compete on 64 seats, and to win up to 40 of them. It makes him less dependent on his Shia allies, and permits an emergence of a Sunni opposition**. Michel Aoun has two goals before the elections: To separate whatever is left of M14 parties, but also to make sure the Free Patriotic Movement stays more powerful than the other parties on the Christian scene. There is no doubt that the FPM was losing popularity on the Christian side for the past few years. **The easiest plan for any sectarian leader to gain popularity is by pushing for sectarian plans.** By asking for "Christian rights", Michel Aoun is playing on the sectarian card. Why it's a win-win situation for Aoun. Michel Aoun was the first one to heavily back the OG law. The Lebanese Forces and the Phalanges, after quickly noticing his plan to attract Christian voters, made sure they go public and support the law too. However, the FPM had the approval of Hezbollah and Amal on the law, while Hariri vetoed it" [....] "But he did put M14 leaders in an awkward position. Even though Geagea's response to back the OG law was fast, Michel Aoun's move was a success. He forced Geagea to enter in a confrontation with Hariri, managed to split M14 in their attitude towards the law and showed a "Sunni party that's opposing Christian rights"*

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Elias Muhanna

Lebanon: Federal or Unitary Republic?

Lebanese sects have constitutional jurisdiction on certain fields of competency, be it in: 1. Education (while all following general guidelines of the state, each sect has its own federation of schools, curriculum, books, practices, days off, etc.). 2. Personal civil rights and rights of the person (in no other place is the citizen subject to a personal right LEGISLATED by his or her sect and not the state). 3. Property rights (as to trusts, rights and mostly restriction as to accession to property), as well as wills and estates. 4. Religious sects run and operate their health system, hospitals, guidelines, procedures. Again, while under the rule of the central state they have much of their own jurisdiction to establish norms, procedures, funding, etc. 5.Marriage, divorce, parenthood (legal rights and obligations of parents, adoption, legal guardianship), culture (de facto control of certain geographical areas and imposing bans on sale of alcohol, allegiance to a certain way of living, etc.)

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Civil Marriage



Elias Muhanna

Will Civil Marriage End Confessionalism in Lebanon?

"In tying the matrimonial knot last week, Kholoud Succariyeh and Nidal Darwish sliced through a cultural, legal, sectarian knot of Gordian proportions. The pair became the first couple in history to be wed in a civil marriage on Lebanese soil. ***Until last week, Lebanese citizens (or, only those who can afford it) have generally traveled to Cyprus to get hitched. The only way to do the deed inside Lebanon requires a contract issued by religious personal status authorities, with all the legal implications and bureaucratic entanglements that such a requirement presents****" [....] "****The civil marriage law, however, threatens to turn this symbolic operation into a highly pragmatic one.*** *If all it takes to avoid the trip to Cyprus and have a civil marriage in Lebanon is to strike off one's confessional identity–which does not amount to renouncing one's sect, as activists hasten to add–then we may see more and more people doing it in the near future" [....] "****The current civil marriage debate brings all of these important questions to the fore, even if the status of Kholoud and Nidal's marriage has been rejected by***

an advisory panel at the Ministry of Justice *(Hay'at al-tashri' wa-al-istisharat). Marwan Charbel, who is the interior minister–and, by the way, claims to be a supporter of enacting civil marriage in Lebanon–announced the decision, citing the fact that no Lebanese law exists to legislate this marriage as the basis of that rejection. While it may take a while to sort out the details of this particular marriage, there is no doubt that the Lebanese secularist movement has won a major, even if only symbolic, victory towards achieving its stated objectives"*

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Abdallah Salam

Approve That Marriage, Mr. Charbel

"By approving the request to register the contract in the appropriate state records, "sijilat al-nufus," you will be remembered as a public servant who enforced the law in a country in which it all too often goes unenforced, as a defender of personal liberties and of human rights, and as a wise statesman who by the single stroke of a pen helped reclaim state sovereignty and extinguish the flames of sectarian strife. Moreover, by approving the request to register the contract, you will be translating the bold position taken by the President of the republic Michel Sleiman on his Twitter feed: "We must work on legalizing the civil marriage contract for it is one step toward abolishing sectarianism and consolidating coexistence." A great many in my generation, the postwar generation, yearn for a Lebanon that is truly pluralistic, democratic and governed by the rule of law. A Lebanon in which all rights, individual rights and community rights, are recognized and enforced"

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Beirut Spring

Decoding the Sunni Position on Civil Marriage

"At the moment, the Sunni roadblock is too serious an obstacle in the face of this cause. To try to take the topic heads on, to somehow force the issue through, would be both naive and foolish. The solution can only come through a long-term "facts on the ground" strategy, ie doing little things like allowing people to strike off their sects from their ID cards (God bless you Ziad Baroud), the individual efforts like those of Nidal and Kulud to get married, with the public debates they encourage, the gentle pushing of the Lebanese president of this issue, all this will lead to a situation where it will

become very obvious that some parties are just sticking their heads in the sand. And the good news is, despite all evidence to the contrary, this strategy seems to be working. Why else do you think the Mufti was so angry?"

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Joumana Haddad

The Real Predator Is You

"As I heard the shameful, threatening statement of Lebanon's Grand Mufti, Mohammad Rashid Qabbani, about his stance on civil marriage, I couldn't help but be intrigued by the word "predator" that the sheikh used to describe those who are trying to promote civil unions in Lebanon and move this paralyzed country one step forward on the road of democracy and human dignit" [.....] "The religious bullies insist that marriage is a union that needs to be "consecrated by God": another ingenious way to be in command of the masses and to organize sexuality, male-female relations, and the political, social and economic rights of people. The same God monitors reproduction and any related sexual activities (invisible men can be very busy, you know). Dear Sheikh Qabbani, the real predator in this country is you, and those who think and speak and act like you. I am saying "predator," but I am thinking blood-sucking lice. Maybe we don't need a civil status law, after all. Maybe we just need a pest control organization"



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Firas Maksad

The Grand Mufti, My Wife and Me

"With a statement labeling all those who support civil marriage as apostates, Lebanon's grand mufti, Mohammad Rashid Qabbani, struck a nerve in me, my Muslim wife, and in thousands of Lebanese hoping to get married under a civil law. The grand mufti said that Muslims who believe in civil marriage should "not be washed, shrouded, prayed on, or buried in Muslim cemeteries." [....] "As a people, the Lebanese must make a historic choice: Will they continue to live and die as separate communities fighting against each other, or will they one day become equal citizens of a unified and sovereign state? In almost 70 years of independence, the former path has led only to

strife and foreign domination. It is time for the Lebanese to try something new. Lebanese citizens, stand up to those insulting your intelligence, those depriving you of your freedom to choose, because those claiming to speak in the name of religion only sow divisions and hate"

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Ramez Dagher

A President, a Prime Minister, a Mufti and Civil Marriage

"Same veto, different people. This time, it was not the Prime Minister that opposed the law, but Lebanon's Mufti. True, Mikati was reluctant to the law but it was nothing compared to the Mufti's response. What should be noted here is that the Lebanese parliament is the only institution that can adopt laws, that the MP has judicial immunity so that he can support whatever law he wants without getting blackmailed, and that the Mufti is after all a civil servant that gets paid by the Lebanese Government. What the Mufti did was simply interfering in parliamentary politics and threatening MPs with religious a measure, which goes against the Lebanese constitution that guarantees them protection. Why was the response that violent? Because it seems that there's a majority in the parliament that's with a civil marriage law. The president's tweets for the past week are almost exclusively about the civil marriage law. Here's one of the President – Who's doing a great job by opposing the Orthodox Gathering law and supporting civil marriage. That's why the Mufti's response had to be that aggressive and that sectarian (It's a Fatwa, after all). Nothing is more powerful to halt laws than a sectarian veto, especially if it only comes from one sect, and its religious leader. What's even more interesting is that if you read between the lines of Fatfat and Mikati's statements on the civil marriage, you can feel that they go against it because they're afraid of the Sunni clerics' reactions, and not because of the law in itself (Here's a nice post on that)"

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Hariri's Civil Marriage Stance: More Than An Approval

"The fatwa made any Muslim official voting for the law an apostate. Hariri, after making sure for the past two years that he was the representative of the Sunnis by his sectarian speeches, is now making sure that he takes down any official religious influence (like the one coming from the Grand Mufti) by opposing it since the very beginning. Also by saying no to the Mufti, It's going to be harder from now on for M8 to call him a sectarian or a salafi supporter. Meet the newest Sunni moderate, Saad Hariri"[.....] "Hariri

understood what Hezbollah did during the electoral debate. Hezbollah knew from the beginning that Future Movement would go against the Orthodox Gathering law, so he supported it. Now Hariri is doing the same thing. ***He knows that Hezbollah wouldn't accept civil marriage as a religious party, so he makes sure he's the first to support civil marriage putting Michel Aoun's Muslim allies in an embarrassing situation. It's all about the timing. Notice Hezbollah's silence****"*

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Jordan

#ElectionsJo: The Loyalties Stayed in Charge & The MB's Failure

Impatient Bedouin

Vote Buying and the Role of MPs in a Democracy

"We must recognize that the regime itself has engaged in "vote-buying" activities through its manipulation of the electoral process, which continues to this day in the form of malapportioned electoral districts that frequently vary greatly in population size*. During the campaign, the allegations against Khushman (who was, it should be noted, running on a national list rather than in a local district) were that he pledged that voters in Salt would receive financial assistance if he were elected, and that a local club would be renovated. In making these promises, he is pledging that as an MP his supporters will receive benefits for being connected to him. This is not uncommon in Jordan historically, as MPs have frequently been selected based on affinities and connections that can include tribal, family, or personal ties. Voters support these candidates due to their ability to most effectively provide patronage. In*



a parliament with relatively little power, this was seen as the most effective role that an MP could play. When the regime created malapportioned electoral districts, it was doing the same thing, providing the residents of the smaller districts privileged access to the resources of the state, and thus engaging in a form of vote buying on its own. It is worth noting that the present electoral law does nothing to change this, as it merely increases the number of MPs and adds 27 seats that will be elected via a national list"

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Jordan's 2013 Parliamentary Elections

"Approximately 2.3 million registered Jordanian voters (out of approximately 3.3 million eligible voters and a total population of about 6.2 million) will begin voting in parliamentary elections to elect 150 MPs to the House of Deputies. There are a total of 1475 candidates competing for these seats, including 191 women. Of these, 606 are competing for the local district seats (including 105 women) and 819 are competing for the party list seats (including 86 women)" [.....] "There are a total of 150 seats in the House of Deputies. Of these, there are 108 elected from 45 districts, 27 elected from party lists nationwide and 15 reserved for female candidates under a quota system. There are also 12 seats reserved for minority groups (9 for Christians and 3 for Circassians and Chechens), and 9 seats reserved for Bedouin. These are included in the district seats. While this may seem very complicated, the summaries below will make it easy to understand"

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Jordan's Parliamentary Election Results at a Glance

"The 2013 Parliamentary Election was held under an electoral law passed in 2012 which increased the number of seats from 120 to 150. In this election, Jordanians cast two votes – one for the candidate in their district and one for a party list. The seats are distributed as follows: 1. 27 seats are elected nationwide via proportional representation from party lists. 2. 108 of the seats are elected from district seats, including 9 district seats reserved for Christian candidates, and 3 for Circassian and Chechen candidates. 3. There are also 9 seats reserved for Bedouin candidates. 4. 15 seats are reserved for women under a quota system"

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How Jordan's Loyalists Stayed in Charge

"Political power is still centralized among a small clique of insiders with ties to the regime. The new Chief of the Royal Court is former Prime Minister

Fayez Tarawneh, who was appointed as PM following the King's dismissal of Awn Khasawneh. The new PM has not been announced yet, but it should be noted that the King has said he will consult with parliamentary blocs, and one of the largest blocs is the National Current Party, which is headed by former Speaker Abdul Hadi al-Majali, who a few years ago spoke against electoral reform, although he appears to have changed his position during the most recent election campaign. Still, if someone was on record opposing even the modest electoral reforms during the most recent parliament, then it is unlikely that they will be supportive of further reform in the future, except perhaps to the degree that they consider it to be a necessity" [....] "Right now, it seems as though many loyalists have examined the results exactly the wrong way. 56 percent of registered voters did not turn out to vote because they wanted the way that Jordan is governed to remain the same. They did so, I think, in the hope that this time would be the start on the process of change. However, with many of those who opposed even modest reforms in a strong position, it is easy to be skeptical of whether the new parliament will produce meaningful reforms"

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Daoud Kuttab

Islamists Boycott Fails in Jordan's Elections

"The biggest winner in the Jordanian legislative elections was the state. It bargained on the public and the international community ignoring the absence of the Islamists in the elections. Conversely, ***the Islamic Action Front and some of the small secular parties that joined the boycotters are the biggest losers****" [.....] "* ***Naturally, most MPs will not be too quick in changing the Elections Law that brought them to power, knowing that the approval of an amended law might shorten the life of their parliamentary life****.* ***The elections exposed a number of problems, most prominently the absence of a tradition of political parties****. The exaggerated number of lists that ran for a small number of seats showed that* ***the country needs to work harder on developing unique programs and ideologies****. One idea might be to limit the voting on national lists to registered parties, rather than have lists created on the eve of the elections. Some argued that a political party tradition requires a few rounds like this one in order for citizens to freely choose the groups they feel comfortable with, and then a party system will start taking root. These elections also brought attention to a number of issues that are keeping Jordan from moving ahead on the issue of reform. Changes should not be limited to the legislative and administrative powers, but also to cultural issues.* ***The vote-buying scandals continued even on election day despite the arrest of a number of prominent candidates,***

which reflects a cultural problem that cannot be dealt with only by law, but must include deeper societal changes"

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Tamer Smadi

Riots Erupt as Jordan Elections Show Tribal, Conservative Gains

"Mass riots broke out in the southern, central and northern cities of Jordan yesterday [Jan.24], and were tackled by security forces. The riots broke out after preliminary results of the parliamentary elections were announced, which showed the victory of the tribal and conservative forces (which are close to the government), along with scores of figures from the previous parliament, which Jordanian King Abdullah II dissolved late last year in the face of mounting popular protests demanding reform and a fight against corruption" [....] "In unprecedented developments, owners of local TV stations won three parliamentary seats. The well-known liberal Mustafa Hamarneh was able to win the Christian seat in the city of Madaba. For the first time, two brothers won — Khamis Attieh, and Khalil Attieh who received 19,399 votes, the highest number of votes in the kingdom. Remarkably, four candidates on trial for charges of buying votes won in the elections, hours before they were released without clarification about their membership in parliament and if they were to be convicted"

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The Blame Game is Over



Deema Alam Farraj

The Blame Game is Over

"In the past two years, while observing the Jordanian political scene with its combination of protesters, cheerleaders, new youth movement and some politicians, one thing really stood out as strange; if you watch the interviews, read the articles and listen to the speeches and rhetoric of the voices of what I call "the sudden opposition"; those who were considered the political figures and decision makers in a previous era and are now using their fame and clout to create an opposition bubble around each of them. Those politicians that had disappeared for the public eye for a while and have now suddenly started proclaiming their visions and strategies for a better Jordan, free of corruption and nepotism. As if they hold a magic wand to all the problems in Jordan. Well, here comes the one-million-dollar question: "Why didn't you guys do all those things when you were in power?"

The answer is invariably a blame of the system or others who were around them. So we ask them why didn't you resign if you could not get these changes done? And again we go back to the blame game and we never get real answers. No effort was shown to take any responsibility whatsoever for their shortcomings"

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Malik Al-Abdeh

The King is Listening

"While acts of royal magnanimity alone may not be enough to stave off future internal instability, they do underscore a number of key lessons that Jordan watchers will be wise to take on board. The first is that whatever mistakes agents of the state commit in their dealings with ordinary people, in Jordan the king is still seen as the ultimate guarantor of justice. That, in a clan-based society, is hugely important in affirming his legitimacy to rule over the kingdom. The second is that the government has grown accustomed to handling outbursts of popular anger. Because Jordan is not a repressive state, and because the security forces there tend to tread lightly when compared to their neighboring counterparts, demonstrations and calls for reform are nothing new. At times, disturbances have resulted in real and immediate reforms, such as during the April 1989 food riots that led to the resumption of parliamentary politics. Most of the time, protests do not end in fatalities and local grievances are settled within the community through civil society networks. The moderation of the Jordanian political system helps to prevent sparks turning into fires"[.....] "King Abdullah II can take heart from the fact that the demands of recent protests have been mainly economic, and that the Islamist-dominated opposition remains weak and splintered. Despite high fuel prices, the Jordanian middle class does not object to subsidy reform as long as it is offset by greater inward investment. There is still some ground to cover in the war against high-level corruption, but with the conviction last year of the former head of the intelligence directorate, it appears that a serious start has been made. The impression in Amman is that the king will deliver reform at a pace congruous with wider developments in the region, but at least he is listening"

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The GCC & The MB's: A Sharp Decline Of Popularity



Hassan Hassan

In the Gulf, allegiance is the issue for Muslim Brotherhood

*"**Despite alliances with powerful individuals in Gulf countries, alliances that survived the crackdown since the 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood has not established an unfettered presence in the region**. Experience has created a deep distrust between the Gulf states and the organization. In Kuwait, where the group has a relatively strong presence, Sheikh Soud Al Nasser Al Sabah accused it of conspiring with Saddam Hussein after the Iraqi invasion. In 2004, Saudi Arabia's Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz (now the crown prince) described the organization as the "source of all problems". Many Gulf intellectuals have also been critical of the organization for its shifting relations with countries in the region. **The organization is witnessing a sharp decline in the Gulf as countries follow more systematic regulations to prevent its spread and to monitor financial flows**. But its political presence in Egypt may lead the Brotherhood to seek better relations for pragmatic reasons rather than attempting to spread its ideology"*

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Sultan Al Qassemi

Qatar's Brotherhood Ties Alienate Fellow Gulf States

*"**Qatar, after all, presents the Brotherhood with two major assets. First, the country's Al Jazeera satellite channel** which — although no longer popular in Egypt following the advent of numerous local channels — still enjoys substantial regional viewership from which the network can continue to propagate the Brotherhood's message. **Second, Qatar is today the Muslim Brotherhood's banker and personal financier, bankrolling its budget and investing heavily in the group's projects.** However, Qatar's vast per-capita wealth pales in comparison to Islamic heavyweight Saudi Arabia's several hundred billion dollars in assets and investable funds. Whatever diplomatic and regional*



weight Qatar and Al Jazeera can offer the Brotherhood could easily be matched by Saudi Arabia's much larger media and diplomatic network. Meanwhile, the UAE and Saudi will continue to wonder what exactly Qatar wants from the Brotherhood as they see their smaller Gulf neighbor fully immerse itself in the Brotherhood's challenges, hopes and ambitions. ***It would indeed be ironic if the Brotherhood, having been nurtured and supported by Qatar so carefully, turns its back on the state in the coming few years. Ironic perhaps, but not unlikely****"*

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