From Plowshares to Swords? UN Forces on Israel's Borders in the Second Decade of the Twenty-First Century

Chen Kertcher

> And they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. (Isaiah 2:4)

This article examines the contribution made by peacekeeping operations on Israel's borders to regional stability since Israel's establishment, especially in the face of the challenge posed by armed non-state actors in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The article is divided into three parts. The first part presents the main changes in the operating principles of peacekeeping missions from the Cold War to the present. The second provides a concise overview of the rationale for peacekeeping operations on Israel's borders. The third examines the ability of peacekeeping missions to confront the political and security challenges they face, first and foremost, from armed non-state actors.

Key words: UN, peacekeeping forces, non-state actors

Peacekeeping Operations During and After the Cold War

In discussing the topic of Israel and peacekeeping forces, we must explain the theoretical and historical context of the phenomenon. The legitimacy to carry out international operations is anchored in the powers defined in the United Nations Charter, which was signed on June 26, 1945. In his

Dr. Chen Kertcher is a researcher at the Herzl Institute for Research and Study of Zionism and History, Haifa University and the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya.

book *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, international relations scholar Inis L. Claude argues that the establishment of the UN was a second attempt by the nations of the world to establish a global system ensuring and strengthening collective security as an alternative to the system that regulated relations between the states of Europe starting in the second half of the seventeenth century, which was based on a balance of power.[1]

The UN's collective security system was intended to deter states from using force against each other by threatening that such use of force would lead to a collective response from the other members of the system. However, if these members undertook collective action on behalf of a state that had fallen victim to the use of force, they would pay a price for their intervention (economically or in the form of a security threat to their citizens) and endanger their system of interests and alliances because and in defense of the principle of collectivity, which is supposed to preserve their security.[2]

Consequently, the United Nations established an operational body responsible for issues of global security: the Security Council. The council has five permanent members—the United States, Russia (until 1992, the Soviet Union), Great Britain, China, and France—and another ten non-permanent members, which are elected for two-year terms. The UN Charter sets out two methods of dealing with conflicts: Chapter VI refers to peaceful settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII to methods of enforcement that can be used by the Security Council in an attempt to preserve international peace. During the Cold War, the Security Council was unable to reach resolutions to confront acts of aggression and wars on the basis of Chapter VII because of the conflict between the Western and Eastern blocs, and the UN as a whole failed at that time in its handling of most conflicts in the world.[3]

The collective security system's failure to provide protection led to the development of a new system involving the dispatch of military forces to areas of conflict or confrontation as part of the efforts to build trust among the parties to the conflict. These "peacekeeping forces" have been deployed along international borders or ceasefire lines. They even received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988 in recognition of their contribution to world peace.

In order to differentiate between peacekeeping missions and military operations intended to serve national security interests, a number of

peacekeeping principles have been established. Such operations would not take place unless agreement was obtained from the parties to the conflict to stop fighting and to allow multinational forces deployment. Usually, peacekeeping forces include soldiers from nations that do not have a direct interest in the conflict, and therefore, it has generally been agreed that they will not include representatives from the superpowers. Nevertheless, it has been necessary to obtain the superpowers' consent to their dispatch, generally by means of Security Council resolutions. One of the basic requirements of peacekeeping forces is neutrality– in UN terms– impartiality. In addition, they are prohibited from using force, other than in self-defense. In order to ensure this principle, operations have generally been limited in scope, and the soldiers who manned them have been armed only with light weapons.

These principles were intended to ensure that a peacekeeping operation would be part of a process to resolve the conflict. To this extent, the military forces that participate in such operations are part of this process. According to Brian Urquhart, who conducted peacekeeping operations from the early 1960s until his retirement from the UN in the mid-1980s, "The moment a peacekeeping force starts killing people it becomes a part of the conflict it is supposed to be controlling, and therefore, a part of the problem."[4] In such cases, the peacekeeping forces' impartiality is questioned, possibly leading at least one of the parties to the conflict to revoke its consent to their presence.

During the Cold War, the UN undertook thirteen peacekeeping operations, which reflected the middle road between mediating conflicts on the one hand, and enforcement on the other. These operations can be seen as realization of the biblical vision of the Prophet Isaiah, "and they shall beat their swords into plowshares."

At the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were designated as means to resolve intrastate conflicts, based on the understanding that every violent conflict or humanitarian disaster has the potential to cause economic damage, undermine social order, and the political-security-economic equilibrium among countries near the locus of conflict.[5] Because the traditional system of peacekeeping missions was not suited for operations within states, and such operations were even explicitly banned, there was a need to define new objectives for peacekeeping operations in order to adapt them to new needs, such as monitoring democratic elections,

supervising the establishment of civilian institutions, monitoring human rights preservation, monitoring the disarming of soldiers, humanitarian assistance, and economic development.

In order to differentiate the new generation of peacekeeping initiatives from their predecessors, new names were suggested, including "second-generation peacekeeping operations," "broad peacekeeping operations," "humanitarian aid operations," "peace-support operations," "peace-enforcement operations," "peace-stabilization operations," and "peace-building operations."

In contrast to the traditional missions, which were undertaken after agreement was reached between the parties to the conflict, second-generation multi-purpose operations were, in many cases, undertaken during active conflict, with the intention to create the conditions for its resolution. The forces that took part in these operations were larger than their predecessors and were deployed throughout the country in which the conflict broke out, in accordance with the purposes for which the force was established.

The success of the traditional operations was dependent on the support of the parties to the conflict and the other nations of the world. The success or failure of the multi-purpose operations since the Cold War has been dependent on the size of the contribution from the various countries of the world (political support, manpower, and funding) and on the length of time these countries were prepared to continue to invest in them. The precondition for carrying out traditional operations was the consent of the parties to the conflict to UN involvement. This lost its importance when different objectives were set for UN forces, such as preventing a humanitarian disaster after the war in Bosnia, the famine in Somalia, or saving the Albanian population in Kosovo in 1999.

Beginning in 2001, an international norm developed called "responsibility to protect," whose main aspect includes providing the Security Council authority to decide on an enforcement operation in cases involving significant human rights violation. For this reason, enforcement operations were authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thus allowing the multinational troops to use force against local armed elements. In these cases, such as in Darfur in the Sudan or in eastern Congo, UN forces operating in the area were granted permission to use force in order to protect the local residents. To ensure that these forces could fight effectively against the local forces if necessary, UN peace-enforcement operations sometimes numbered tens of thousands of well-armed soldiers.[6]

Peacekeeping Operations on Israel's Borders

Israel and the United Nations have shared a complex relationship; in Israel's eyes, the UN has consistently condemned Israel while taking a lenient approach to other serious incidents around the world.[7] One such example includes the General Assembly resolution from 1975 equating Zionism with racism.[8] At the same time, Israel's hostility towards the UN was not concealed. As early as 1955, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion coined the expression "UM, SHMUM" [expressing contempt for the UN], noting that "it doesn't matter what the gentiles say; what matters is what the Jews do."[9] This Israeli attitude toward the UN had not changed over the years. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2011, stated that the UN was "a house of many lies."[10] These comments by Israeli officials emphasize Israel's fundamental approach over the years; it cannot trust the UN's principle of collective security and place its security in the hands of others.[11]

The tense relations between Israel and the UN deserve special examination, mainly in light of the role played by UN peacekeeping forces on Israel's borders. The history of the State of Israel and its wars and the history of UN peacekeeping operations are intertwined; in 1948, the first multinational mission was undertaken, involving the dispatch of military observers under the UN flag, intended to monitor implementation of the Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab countries. This mission, called the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), continues to operate to this day. It includes some 150 soldiers, and its headquarters are in the Government House in Jerusalem.[12]

Eight years later, a decision was made to launch another UN operation connected to Israel, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). This mission was intended to monitor the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt following the Suez Campaign in 1956 as well as to monitor the border between Israel and Egypt. The operation included some 6,000 soldiers from ten countries. When UNEF received a unilateral demand from Egypt in May 1967 to withdraw immediately from the Sinai Peninsula, the UN agreed, and to Israel's dismay, the force left the area. Shortly thereafter, Israel and Egypt (joined by Jordan and Syria) were involved in the Six Day War in 1967.[13]

At the end of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, two new operations were launched. The United Nations Emergency Force II included nearly 7,000 soldiers and was deployed on the ceasefire borders between Israel and

Egypt.[14] The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which was deployed in the Golan Heights starting in June 1974, numbered over 2,000 soldiers and civilians, with the main contributing nations being Austria, India, Japan, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Croatia.[15] In the wake of crises in the region and the internal conflict in Syria, the force currently includes a little over 1,000 soldiers.

In 1978, after an Israeli military operation in southern Lebanon in response to Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) infiltrations into Israeli territory, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In the wake of the Second Lebanon War (July-August 2006), the Security Council passed resolution 1701, which increased UNIFIL forces from 2,400 to 15,000 soldiers and civilians. The main purpose of these forces was to facilitate the Lebanese deployment along the "Blue Line" (the international border between Israel and Lebanon) and help transport humanitarian aid to residents of the region. In 2014, some 10,000 soldiers and civilians have served in UNIFIL.[16]

Following the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979, the Soviet Union used its veto power to prevent the Security Council from extending UNEF II's mandate in the Sinai, thus terminating the mission. In the wake of the Soviet veto, the governments of Israel and Egypt, which were interested in peacekeeping forces' aid in the implementation of the peace treaty, formulated a special protocol, signed in 1981, calling for the establishment of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), based on the principles of peacekeeping operations. The force operates to this day in the Sinai Peninsula.[17]

The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (known as the Oslo Accords), signed in September 1993 between the government of Israel and PLO representatives, was supposed to lay the groundwork for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Over the years it has given rise to small peacekeeping operations intended to aid the parties in implementing certain articles in the agreements between them.[18] Following the events in the Cave of the Patriarchs in February 1994, the Security Council decided to establish the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). Initially receiving a mandate for three months, it became permanent in 1997. Today TIPH consists of between 50 to 200 civilian observers, monitoring and reporting on incidents in Hebron to the parties

involved in the conflict along with the six nations that contribute to its operations.[19]

The European Union adopted a different model for the Israeli-Palestinian arena, and from November 2005 to June 2007, it operated a force including customs and police officers on the Rafah border crossing with the Gaza Strip: the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Rafah.[20] The UN has never decided to establish a peacekeeping force for Israel and the Palestinians.

The above overview demonstrates that most peacekeeping missions on Israel's borders were undertaken during the Cold War, and as such, were heavily influenced and shaped by that period. Five of the thirteen UN missions during the Cold War took place on Israel's borders. An additional three operations took place in the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. While these missions were not undertaken under a UN mandate, they adopted the traditional operating principles of UN missions. Their main objective was to observe and report to the opposing parties, the Security Council, and the contributing nations.

Aside from UNIFIL, UN Missions deployed on Israel's borders were limited in number and scope. They operated according to political agreements reached between the two opposing sides, which represent sovereign entities, and enjoyed broad international consensus and support. Despite the limitations of these forces, Israel and its neighbors have preferred the Cold War model of peacekeeping forces under international auspices as part of confidence-building measures, believing that these forces will assist in creating dialogue between them.

First-Generation Peacekeeping Missions under Second-Generation Conditions

The main difficulties plaguing peacekeeping missions along Israel's borders in the past decade stem from the fact that they operate according to first generation rationale, while their environment is more suited to second-generation missions. The main reason being the ongoing process of weakening of governance capability in Middle Eastern countries as a result of the Arab Spring, which began in 2010, and the strengthening of armed non-state actors. These include Hizbollah, Hamas, and other armed political Islamic organizations, like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (IS). These non-state actors are not bound by any ceasefire, armistice, or peace

agreements and in some cases, they even undermine them. Furthermore, the areas in which peacekeeping forces operate are limited while the forces themselves are armed with light weapons, making them an easy target for terrorist operations by non-state actors.

It is evident that the weakening of governance capability in various countries in the region threatens the peacekeeping forces along Israel's borders. Since the revolution in Egypt in 2011, terrorist attacks in the Sinai Peninsula have undermined stability in the region. The Egyptian military coup in July 2013 led to an increase in the number of Egyptian military forces in the Sinai and to frequent operations against Islamic terror operatives (in addition to action against the Muslim Brotherhood). However, they were not able to stabilize the situation. Altercations with terrorist groups have cost the lives of numerous Egyptian soldiers and members of the multinational force. In fact, the latter are completely dependent upon Egypt for safety. Consequently, their current activities are limited to serving as liaisons between Israel and Egypt.[21]

The tension between Hizbollah and Israel on the border with Lebanon, reflected in Israeli operations to prevent the transfer of advanced weaponry from the Syrian army to Hizbollah,[22] affects UNIFIL's ability to function effectively. Its reports to the Security Council clearly indicate that it cannot promote the disarming of Hizbollah, nor can it implement the weapons embargo Cooperation between UNIFIL forces and the Lebanese government and army has not succeeded in preventing the formation and arming of military organizations in southern Lebanon, in violation of Security Council resolution 1701.[23] The European governments' inclusion of Hizbollah's military wing in a list of terrorist organizations may entail implications for UNIFIL's functioning: the Italian government—whose representative is the UNIFIL commander—objected to this move because it feared negative effects on the functioning of forces from European countries that are part of UNIFIL.

The ongoing civil war in Syria endangers the multinational forces that are part of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights. Following incidents in which UN soldiers were wounded or taken prisoner, Cambodia, Japan, and Croatia withdrew their forces from Syria. In addition, in early June 2013, as fighting escalated, the government of Austria, which had provided about one-third of the soldiers remaining in the force, announced that it would not continue to contribute

forces to the UN in the Golan Heights. In the summer of 2013, Russia, allied with Syrian president Bashar Assad, offered to replace these forces. The offer was categorically rejected by the UN Secretariat, which emphasized that according to the agreement between Israel and Syria, none of the five permanent members of the Security Council would have a presence in the Golan Heights.[24] The UN Secretariat ultimately succeeded in overcoming UNDOF's manpower crisis by persuading other countries to send troops to Syria. The escalation between rebel forces and the Syrian army in the summer of 2014 created new crises; during the fighting, UN soldiers were killed or wounded, and dozens of other UN soldiers were taken prisoner by the rebels. As a result, the force's command decided to evacuate many observation posts on the Golan Heights. However, UNDOF forces continue to enjoy the support of the IDF and the Syrian army, cooperating with it partly for fear that escalation in the fighting between Syria and the rebels could push them to intervene.[25] The main contributors to UNDOF manpower, as of September 2014, are Fiji (445 soldiers), the Philippines (344), India (191), Nepal (155), and Ireland (134).

The continuing instability in the Middle East may force the parties involved in UN peacekeeping operations to choose between several alternative courses of action. Since most of the discussion today focuses on the possible dissolution of the UN mission in the Golan Heights, the following are possible courses of action.

The first possibility is to continue the mission in the Golan Heights in its current form while ignoring the changes on the ground. This choice is dependent upon Israel and Syria's continued agreement to the force's presence as well as contributing nations' agreement to send forces despite the dangers. In the past, when the Security Council decided to extend UNIFIL's mandate, it was forced to operate in the security zone Israel created in southern Lebanon between 1985 and 2000 without the consent of the Lebanese government.[26] In the Lebanese case, Israel was able to protect the UN forces. In the event of a similar scenario in Syria, it is reasonable to assume that the nations contributing to UNDOF will demand guarantees to protect their forces, but that the provision of such guarantees is beyond the ability of the Syrian government. The course of events in the last two years constitutes proof of Syria's inability to protect UN forces on its territory, and therefore, it should be assumed that the danger they face in the Golan Heights will increase. This will require a fundamental change in mandate.

The second possibility is to terminate the mission on the Golan Heights. In May 1967, when the Egyptian government demanded the immediate withdrawal of UN forces from its territory, then-UN Secretary General U Thant determined that there was no point in their continued presence if the condition of "consent" was not fulfilled. Current conditions indicate a similar lack of consent and therefore some argue that the mission in its current form should be ended. Nevertheless, the members of the Security Council are reluctant to bring it to an end because of its contribution to maintaining dialogue between the governments of Israel and Syria, and thus helping to manage and contain the conflict.[27]

If the Security Council and the contributing nations view the end of the mission in the Golan Heights or its continuation in its current form as impracticable, there is a third option: they can demand a change in UNDOF's mandate from "plowshares into swords," or in other words, allow it to make more extensive use of force. In this context, initiatives have been introduced in the past two years by Western and Arab representatives, which have included the possibility of an enforcement operation by a large multinational military force that would take control of certain areas in Syria on the basis of the principle of "responsibility to protect," which has been promoted in the international arena in the past decade. Alternatively, there have been proposals to launch an air operation that would create a safe zone in Syria, like the model used in Libya during 2011. These initiatives have thus far been rejected by the Chinese and Russian governments.[28] As long as the great powers who have a vested interest in Syria refuse to act unilaterally and without a mandate from the Security Council, this option is not feasible either.

The last option for leaving the UN force on the Golan Heights intact would require the Security Council to adopt a complex model resembling those adopted in the civil wars in the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Mali, and the Congo in the past decade. This model would require approval for extending the forces operating in the area and for using force and providing appropriate means to enable UN forces to deter attacks in areas for which they are responsible. Such a model, which could include forces from a wide variety of countries, could fulfill the main purpose of the mission on the Golan Heights: to serve as a buffer force in a demilitarized zone that enjoys the support of governments that are interested in an agreement. Such a model could also address a variety of challenges in a way that could serve the interests

of all the parties involved: first, it would allow the contributing nations to protect their forces. Second, it would encourage Israel to perceive the force as a stabilizing factor that could maintain the demilitarized zone. Third, it would assure the Syrian government that the rebel forces fighting against it would not use areas under the UN force's supervision for operations against the Syrian army. Fourth, Security Council members could find in such a model a solution to the disputes among them. Additional advantages that could stem from a peacekeeping operation that is based on this model are providing humanitarian aid to civilians in the area, similar to UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, and perhaps even encouraging the warring parties in Syria to shift their operations to other arenas in the country. The success of such a UN operation in the Golan Heights could strengthen the trust of all stakeholders in the area in other UN missions there as well. On the other hand, if the mission fails, could deteriorate to a total dissolution of the UN force on the Golan Heights. Such a situation could encourage non-state actors to attack other UN forces in the area under the assumption that they can exploit their weakness in order to entrench themselves in their areas of operation.

In conclusion, UN forces on Israel's borders operate according to traditional principles. The rise in the influence of armed non-state actors is undermining their ability to contribute to regional stability and could even bring UN operations in the area to an end. Such a development has the potential to lead to a clash between Israel and its neighbors.

From Israel's point of view, UN peacekeeping operations based on second-generation models, which will be more complex than those of the first generation but will not necessarily have enforcement powers, could aid in preventing or reducing violent incidents between Israel's military forces and those of Syria or other countries in the region. A change in the mandate of UN forces and the way in which they are used could also have a positive and cumulative effect on overall security stability in the region, as well as on the level of trust between Israel and the United Nations.

Peacekeeping Missions on Israel's Borders

Acronym	Mission Name	Start Date	Closing Date
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	May 1948	Present
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force	November 1956	June 1967
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force	October 1973	July 1979
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	June 1974	Present
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	March 1978	Present
MFO	Multinational Force & Observers	January 1982	Present
TIPH	Temporary International Presence in Hebron	1997	Present
EUBAM Rafah	The European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point	November 2005	June 2007

Notes

1 Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 250-94; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 17-28; Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), pp. 21-27, 38-44.

2 Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, pp. 250-94; Alan C. Lamborn, "Theoretical and Historical Perspectives on Collective Security: The Intellectual Roots of Contemporary Debates about Collective Conflict Management," in *Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics,* eds. J. Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 31-56; Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss, "Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics: An Overview," in *Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics*, pp. 3-21.

3 Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Yoram Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 85-328;

Malcolm N. Shaw, *International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 914-50, 1119-47.

4 Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 178-79.

5 Chen Kertcher, "From Cold War to a System of Peacekeeping Operations: The Discussions on Peacekeeping Operations in the UN during the 1980s up to 1992," *Journal of Contemporary History* 47, no. 3 (2012): 611-37.

6 Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 52-84; Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 139-284; Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012).

7 Avi Beker, *The United Nations and Israel–From Recognition to Reprehension* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988); S. D. Bailey and M .J. Peterson, *The UN General Assembly* (London: Routledge, 2005).

8 A/RES/69/19, November 29, 2012.

9 Attributed to David Ben Gurion's speech at the IDF's Independence Day parade, Ramat Gan, April 27, 1955.

10 Speech by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the UN General Assembly, September 23, 2011, http://mfa.gov.il.

11 Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2005); *The UN and Israel: Can they Cooperate?* Eli Fried, ed. (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2004-5).

12 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, UN website, http://untso.unmissions.org/.

13 First United Nations Emergency Force, UN website, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unefi.htm

14 Second United Nations Emergency Force, UN website, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unefii.htm

15 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, UN website, http://www.undof.unmissions.org/.

16 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UN website, http://unifil.unmissions.org.

17 Multinational Force and Observers, MFO website, http://mfo.org/.

18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements*, September 13, 1993, http://www.mfa.gov.il.

19 Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), http://www.tiph.org/.

20 European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah, EUBAM website, http://www.eubam-rafah.eu. In addition, various Western advisory forces operating in the West Bank are intended to promote the development of civil and security institutions. This article does not refer to these forces because as a rule, they do not operate in accordance with the principles of peacekeeping operations and are primarily bilateral operations agreed upon between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and international bodies.

21 Nikola Kovač and Trista Guertin, "Armed Groups in the Sinai Peninsula," Civil-Military Fusion Center, February 2013, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20130228%20Armed%20Groups%20in%20the%20Sinai%20Peninsula.pdf; Inna Lazareva, "Sinai Peacekeepers under Siege as Egypt Battles Islamists," *Telegraph*, September 17, 2013.

22 "Report: Israel Warns Syria to Stop Sending Arms to Hizbollah," *al-Arabiya*, May 16, 2013.

23 S/2013/381, June 26, 2013; S/S/2013/650, November 13, 2013; S/2014/130, February 26, 2014; S/2014/438, June 26, 2014; Nicholas Blanford, "UNIFIL Increasingly Frustrated with Hizbollah," *Daily Star*, Lebanon, May 1, 2013; Gavriel Fiske, "EU Threatens Pullout of South Lebanon Peacekeepers," *Times of Israel*, May 12, 2013; Jean-Loup Samaan, "UNIFIL's Uncertain Future," *al-Monitor*, June 14, 2013; Justyna Pawlak, "Britain Fails to Get EU Backing for Hizbollah Blacklisting," *Reuters*, June 19, 2013; Soeren Kern, "Hizbollah Rearmed under EU Monitors: Is Hamas Next?" The Clarion Project, September 2, 2014.

24 Martin Nesirky, Spokesperson for Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, *Highlights of the Noon Briefing*, June 10, 2013, http://www.un.org/sg/spokesperson/highlights/?HighD=6/10/2013&d_month=6&d_year=2013.

25 S/2014/401, June 10, 2014; S/2014/665, September 12, 2014; S/PRST/2014/19, September 19, 2014.

26 The security zone is the name given by the government of Israel to the area in southern Lebanon to which the IDF withdrew in June of 1985 in order to prevent terrorist infiltration into Israeli territory. The IDF maintained control over this area, which was about 10 percent of the entire area of Lebanon, until its withdrawal to the international border on May 24, 2000.

27 UN, SC/10962, March 27, 2013; UN, SC/10999, May 7, 2013; UN, SC/11011, May 16, 2013; UN, SC/11027, June 6, 2013.

28 The most the Security Council can manage is to express concern over the continuation of the conflict in Syria. See, for example, the council's declaration after the heavy fighting in the Syrian city or al-Qusayr, UN, SC/11028, June 7, 2013.