

The New Ideological Threat to the GCC: Implications for the Qatari-Saudi Rivalry

Alexey Khlebnikov

In his book *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf*, Frederic M. Wehrey argues that the Arab Gulf states are united by a shared threat perception and a shared discourse on security. Indeed, these states have much in common, including Sunni monarchical regimes, an abundance of oil and gas, similar socio-political conditions, and the US as a major ally. A constellation of these common characteristics makes the security challenges facing the Arab Gulf states almost identical. One major peculiarity of the security threats is that they have an ideological character more than a conventional military nature.¹ Throughout the modern history of the Gulf, these threats included Nasserism, Baathism, communism, and revolutionary Shiism from Iran.² However, since the Arab uprising began in late 2010, a new ideological threat to many of the GCC states has formed. This threat, in the perception of Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain, appears in the guise of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood not only poses an ideological challenge and threat to several Gulf Arab states; it also undermines the unity and functionality of the only cohesive Arab organization – the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This challenge, which the Muslim Brotherhood poses to some of the Gulf states, draws a divide between two major rivals for the leadership in the region, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Persian Gulf petro-powers, are engaged in a struggle for ideological and geopolitical supremacy in the Sunni Islamic world. Both nations have been actively involved in the so-called Arab Spring revolutionary movements that erupted throughout the Middle East

Alexey Khlebnikov holds an M.A. in public policy from the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, and is a doctoral candidate at the Institute of International Relations and World History at Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod.

since late 2010, but they have different sociopolitical views about how to weather the inevitable transition that is taking place in the region while maintaining the status quo within their respective monarchies.³ Among the main areas where the two states have different perceptions, beyond the ideological dispute regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, are aggressive Qatari construction of narratives through the al-Jazeera satellite channel and support of different radical Islamist groups in the region, in particular Syria and Egypt. These two issues are tightly interconnected and affect the functionality of the GCC, and therefore, regional security.

The recent rift in relations between the Gulf states is believed to be the biggest challenge to the GCC since its creation in 1981.⁴ The core dispute between the members centers on the ideological perception of regional threats. In early March 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE announced a withdrawal of their ambassadors from Qatar. The main reason for the disagreement was the financial and political support provided by Qatar's leadership to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere, and sermons by Yusuf al-Qardawi, the ideological leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. To Saudi Arabia, which blacklisted the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in Saudi Arabia in early March 2014,⁵ Qatar has been interfering in Saudi Arabia and the internal affairs of other Arab countries with its support of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Jazeera's critical anti-government reports about the Gulf countries and the Middle East.⁶

On April 17, 2014, soon after the crisis erupted, the GCC foreign ministers met in Riyadh at the GCC summit, which produced an announcement whereby policies of GCC member states will not interfere with the interests, security, and stability of other member states.⁷ This vague formulation was not a convincing resolution of the crisis between the GCC members, and not surprisingly, the path to reconciliation is bumpy. Only on November 16, 2014 did Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain agree to return their ambassadors to Doha after Qatar vowed not to meddle in the affairs of the member states and to cease media criticism through Qatari channels. That was an indication of some closure of an eight-month rift over Doha's position and support of Islamist groups in the region. There are many possible reasons for such a move; however, it seems that Islamic State advances in Iraq and Syria and the plummeting oil prices, which by mid-November were approximately \$70 per barrel, drove the need to be united in the face of hard times in order to cope with the challenge.

Another indication of the change is that two weeks after the rapprochement among the GCC members, Egypt and Qatar began to work toward a new chapter in their relations. On December 21, 2014 Qatar released a statement announcing its intention to normalize ties with Egypt's President Sisi, stressing how Egypt's security is crucial for the security of Qatar and the entire region. Two days earlier, on December 19, 2014, Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani called on Turkish President Erdogan to take steps to normalize Turkish-Egypt relations.⁸ This is a significant step, considering the close Qatari-Turkish relations and the Turkish negative attitude towards Egypt's ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that all friction was left behind, as the differences between both sides are still very significant.

In tandem, Islamist organizations in the region have suffered some setbacks that affect their overall stance and performance throughout the region. On December 5, 2014, Interpol issued an arrest warrant for Yusuf al-Qardawi. Over the past months, Egypt has cracked down on the Brotherhood and jailed thousands of its members and supporters and continues to pursue them throughout the country. Hamas experienced serious hardship within the last year, especially during Israel's Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip, which resulted in many casualties and extensive physical damage in Gaza. Tunisia also experienced a paradigm shift: during the recent presidential and parliamentary elections, the Islamic party, an-Nahda, failed to repeat its success of 2011 and lost the parliamentary elections to the secular party Nidaa Tounes, and Nidaa Tounes candidate Beji Caid Essebsi was victorious in the presidential elections.

Thus despite ideological frictions, it seems that GCC members are still able to find a way toward a common approach to withstand new challenges, even though this might – as in the past – be just a temporary rapprochement. Considering that the nature of the friction is connected to regional dynamics and the balance of power, any complete resolution of the issue is a long way off. In any event, the rift in the Gulf indicated that a new era in the relations between its members, namely, between Qatar and Saudi Arabia has already started.

The Threat of the Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood is a powerful 80-year old Islamist group with a strong history of popular support throughout the region. However, the most critical element that arouses the suspicion among the majority of

the GCC states is that the increased power of the Muslim Brotherhood can lead to the politicization of Islam, with unpredictable consequences for the entire Gulf region. This concern is of great importance to the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Brotherhood and their affiliates began to command a more serious presence in those countries in the 1960s and 1970s and are seen as a genuine threat to the regimes, especially since the onset of the Arab Spring.

The Muslim Brotherhood ideology contradicts the basis of the regimes of the Gulf states and can potentially undermine monarchial authoritarian systems of the Gulf. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has long favored Islamist groups that eschew political involvement, and this is why Riyadh sees the Brotherhood, which has embraced politics, as an ideological rival and a model that threatens its own governance, since some of the strongest domestic opposition (al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya)⁹ comes from Sunni Islamist groups.¹⁰ The legitimate rise to power by the Muslim Brotherhood through elections in Tunisia and Egypt relayed an alarming signal to the majority of the Gulf states. The dangerous trend posed by the Brotherhood and Qatari promotion of political involvement goes hand in hand with the fact that violent jihad has largely been replaced¹¹ by Islamic political action

across the Middle East and North Africa in demand of human, civil, and political rights.¹²

The problem for the Saudi leadership is rooted in the form of government. The state of Saudi Arabia was founded on the agreement between the ruling house of al-Saud and the clergy, which made religion a part of the politics in Saudi Arabia and sees the state as the model of Islamic rule. That is why the conservative ulama and Salafis in the kingdom are powerful and influence social and political life. In contrast, Qatar separated religion from politics, almost eliminating a risk of the ideological challenge. The fact is that the Saudi leadership has less control over its powerful clergy than Qatar, which does not have homegrown powerful clergy with broad public support. As such, Doha exercises much more control over its clergy and does not allow it to create an alternative to the ruling

The Saudi leadership has less control over its powerful clergy than Qatar, which does not have homegrown powerful clergy with broad public support. As such, Doha exercises much more control over its clergy and does not allow it to create an alternative to the ruling family.

family and its politics. Political scientists Birol Baskan and Steven Wright claim that on a political level, Qatar is closer to Turkey than to Saudi Arabia.¹³

As noted by Mehran Kamrava, director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University's campus in Qatar, "Religion doesn't play any role in articulating or forming oppositional sentiments, unlike in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, or the UAE...And the reason is that the state has patronized the Muslim Brotherhood, has presented itself domestically and regionally and internationally as the patron of the Muslim Brotherhood. And if the price of domestic tranquility in a very turbulent region is Saudi ire, it's a small price to pay."¹⁴

In this regard Qatar has used an approach that greatly contributed to its political and religious stability. In other words, it secured itself by allying with the Brotherhood. In the 21st century Qatar consistently pursues its goal – to become a regional power and leader – in part by providing a safe haven for the Muslim Brotherhood members and followers of other Islamist organizations.

Qatar's Approach to the Muslim Brotherhood

It is important to understand the roots of Qatar's approach toward the Muslim Brotherhood, which began more than 50 years ago and has cemented into a specific type of relationship between the movement and the state. The underlying controversy here is in the relations between Qatar and other Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are problematic and threaten Qatar and its commitment to the support of the Brotherhood.

Among the members of the Muslim Brotherhood who began to arrive in Qatar en masse in the 1960s were clerics and Islamic scholars who helped design the Qatari education system. The main goal of that strategy was to create an independent education system to fill the emerging Qatari bureaucracy with necessary cadres, which could be independent from Saudi Arabia.¹⁵ This approach allowed Qatar to avoid relying on Saudi clerics and scholars, which otherwise could lead to the creation of the similar system in Qatar, automatically making it oriented toward Saudi Arabia and putting it under the Saudi influence. In 1961 Yusuf Qardawi arrived in Qatar from Egypt. He initially ran a newly formed institute of religions, and later founded the College of Sharia at Qatar University and became its dean. Now Qardawi is considered to be one of the most influential and well-known Brotherhood clerics. On the whole, the Brotherhood secured a niche for itself in Qatar through establishing its education system and educating its bureaucrats, with the result that there are many Brotherhood sympathizers in the Qatari establishment.

However, despite the influx of Muslim Brotherhood intellectuals and clerics to Qatar and their involvement and prevalence in its various bureaucracies, for several reasons Brotherhood ideology did not become dominant. First, Qatar is a country where the Wahhabi creed of Salafi, Hanbali Islam, prevails. The Qatari ruling family originates from the same tribal group, the Banu Tamim tribe, as Wahhabism's founder, Muhammad bin abd al-Wahhab. It served as a tool to legitimize the rule of the Tamim family, while simultaneously it was seen as an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to play a dominant role over Qatar. As a result, given its adherence to Wahhabism, Qatar was not highly fertile ground for proselytization, although overall the Brotherhood ideology balanced the religious climate to a certain degree. However, at the same time, by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood ideology and allowing Brotherhood scholars to be based in Qatar, Doha enhanced its regional status with the Brotherhood ideology, which is more widespread and popular in the region than Wahhabi ideology. This gave Qatar a reputation of the state with an "open door" policy toward different ideologies that has fashioned it in a better way than Saudi Arabia. This approach has contributed to protection of the Qatari leadership from the Brotherhood's involvement in politics and has thus far proved to be function well.

Second, as Dr. Ahmed Jamil Azem noticed, "the Brotherhood is barely involved in Qatari domestic affairs."¹⁶ This sort of relationship guarantees that the Brotherhood does not criticize the Qatari government or try to create active opposition to it. In return the Brotherhood secured a safe haven

Despite its being a Wahhabi country with historical ties to Saudi Arabia, Qatar saw the Brotherhood as a tool to compete with Riyadh for regional leadership.

for its members in Qatar and a stable ground for launching its activity in the region to disseminate its ideas. In effect, despite its being a Wahhabi country with historical ties to Saudi Arabia, Qatar saw the Brotherhood as a tool to compete with Riyadh for regional leadership. Moreover, Qatar conducts a policy that limits the institutional opportunities for clergy to gain and exercise any influence domestically. Thus on a political level, the Qatari model is much more secular than the Saudi. It excludes religious influence of clergy on politics and positions Qatar

far better than its rival Saudi Arabia, with a class of indigenous Muslim legal scholars. Institutionally, religious influence in Qatar is much lower than in Saudi Arabia: Qatari rulers' legitimacy is not based on the clerical

class, Qatar does not have special religious police, and Qatari religious schools are run by the Ministry of Education, not by the religious affairs authority.¹⁷ That is why the confrontation between Doha and Riyadh can be characterized as a struggle between pragmatic Wahhabi Qatar and conservative Wahhabi Saudi Arabia. Abdel Hameed al-Ansari, the former dean of Qatar University's College of Sharia and professor of Islamic Studies, told the *Wall Street Journal* in 2002: "I consider myself a good Wahhabi and can still be modern, understanding Islam in an open way. We take into account the changes in the world and do not have the closed-minded mentality as they do in Saudi Arabia."¹⁸

Another important reason for the lack of the Brotherhood penetration into Qatari politics is the governmental control over the social organizations (such as charity societies, food banks, sport clubs, and others).¹⁹ Generally the Brotherhood and its affiliates run many social and charity activities throughout the region, attracting quite broad popular support in the home societies (e.g., in Egypt and Tunisia), which is not the case in Qatar where the government took full control over the social sphere, consequently undercutting an ability of the Brotherhood to use their powerful grassroots practices and acquire broad public support. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood presence in Qatar does not bother its leaders and allowed Doha to create a symbiotic relation with the Brotherhood. This mutually beneficial relationship between the two has succeeded thus far. Qatari leadership keeps the Brotherhood activity in the country in check and maintains its ideological expansion outward-oriented. Especially having given the Brotherhood use of such an influential tool as the al-Jazeera satellite channel, Qatar developed quite a powerful "weapon" with which to maintain the relationship.

Among other gains that Qatar receives from its alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood is an opportunity to expect preferable economic and political ties in the countries where the Brotherhood and its affiliates are in the race for power (including Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria). It seeks the role of mediator between Islamists and their opponents in those countries, as well as between them and the West. This is to Qatar's advantage in its bid for regional leadership.

Institutionally, religious influence in Qatar is much lower than in Saudi Arabia: Qatari rulers' legitimacy is not based on the clerical class, Qatar does not have special religious police, and Qatari religious schools are run by the Ministry of Education, not by the religious affairs authority.

The Arab Spring and Rivalry Escalation

Since the onset of the Arab uprising, Qatar has supported the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the region. Generous Qatari financial aid has flowed to Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere. Moreover, Doha has actively used one of its most powerful resources, al-Jazeera, to construct media narratives that promote its interests.

Al-Jazeera introduces another ideological challenge for Saudi Arabia. Like many elements, particularly those in power, Arab leaders do not take well to criticism, and they treat the broadcasts as a threat to the stability of their regimes. Saudi Arabia, already on bad terms with Qatar, never favored al-Jazeera, whose criticism of Saudi Arabia and its “friends” rose significantly over the last years. Trying to create a counterbalance to Qatari al-Jazeera, Saudi Arabia launched its own satellite channel in 2003, al-Arabiya, but it failed to compete with its rival. According to independent media research, al-Jazeera’s daily viewership across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was 34 percent higher than all the other pan-Arab channels combined.²⁰ Thus al-Jazeera possesses all the necessary tools to promote certain narratives that are unacceptable for some actors in the region. Moreover, religion is central to the channel with a prominent weekly program called “Sharia and Life” presented by Yusuf al-Qardawi, the leading theologian of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qardawi, considered today one of the most authoritative voices of Sunni Islam, has aroused much anger in Saudi Arabia and the UAE through his sermons. Commenting on al-Jazeera, the Egyptian liberal thinker Maamun Fendi wrote in *a-Sharq al-Awsat* that some 50 percent of the network’s personnel belong to the Muslim Brotherhood. He believes that Qatar, by embracing the Brotherhood while hosting American bases, has found the perfect formula against retaliation by the Arab leaders and attacks by Islamic extremists.²¹ In contrast, Saudi Arabia failed to secure itself to the same degree.

Another aspect of Saudi fear lies in the Qatari policy of providing support to radical Islamists throughout the region. Riyadh fears that various terrorist groups that are now active in neighboring Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon might sooner or later return to Saudi territory. According to the Saudi Interior Ministry, at least 1,000 Saudi militants have gone to Syria, and according to Western sources, the number is much larger.²² Moreover, these rebels will have good combat experience and will be ideologically prepared to return home and undertake terror attacks against the House

of Saud. There were precedents for this in Saudi Arabia, when in 2003 and 2006 al-Qaeda carried out terrorist attacks in the territory of the kingdom.²³

Indeed, although the kingdom has supported the Sunni-led rebels fighting to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, it has long feared a backlash from radical jihadist groups. Concerned about this phenomenon, the Saudi authorities took some serious measures. In February 2014, King Abdullah decreed jail terms of up to 20 years for anyone belonging to “terrorist groups” or fighting abroad.²⁴ On March 7, 2014 the Interior Ministry blacklisted the Muslim Brotherhood, along with two other groups fighting with the Syrian rebels – the Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – as terrorist organizations.²⁵ The statement gave Saudis fighting in Syria 15 days to return. This evidence validates the Saudi fear of Sunni radical Islamists who can return to the kingdom and threaten domestic stability. Finally, there is a succession issue that has made the Saudi royal family more cautious about any threats that can destabilize the kingdom if it experiences a succession crisis.

Contrasting Saudi and Qatari Policies on the Syrian Crisis

The Syrian crisis has become a barometer of the relations among the regional actors, especially those who would be expected to be in one camp. Ideological rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia can be easily tracked through the prism of the Syrian conflict.

Since the start of the turmoil in Syria in the spring of 2011, Saudi Arabia has used this opportunity to enhance its leadership within the GCC and, in particular, restrain the growing confidence of Qatari foreign policy in the region. Another underlying reason for Saudi involvement is a desire to establish a new regional order by winning the Levantine front of struggle between Sunnis and Shiites, i.e., Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is especially important in light of the partial diminution of the US involvement in the region. Since the eruption of uprising in Syria, the Saudis were involved, eager to topple the Assad regime. They supported moderate groups as well as more radical groups such as Jabhat an-Nusra and Ahrar ash-Sham brigades that were the most successful,²⁶ until March 2014, when Riyadh, perceiving a threat to the unity of the Kingdom, banned support of al-Qaeda, Jabhat an-Nusra, ISIS, Hizbollah of Saudi Arabia, Houthis,

The new ideological threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council posed by political Islam and radical Islamists is substantial, and affects not only the GCC but the broader region as well.

Ansar Allah, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia grew increasingly fearful of the risk of returning jihadists, who pose a certain threat to the Saudi leadership and domestic stability.

Qatar's interests in Syria involve a mix of strategic, economic, political, and ideological concerns. Interestingly, before the rebellion began in Syria, Doha had enjoyed relatively good relations with Syrian government, as Doha also tried to maintain correct relations with Iran, Syria's closest ally. In fact Qatar shares with Iran its primary source of wealth – the South Pars gas field, which helps to understand the “special” rhetoric towards Tehran. When the conflict in Syria erupted, Qatar intervened, aiming to secure its influence in the region by backing the Muslim Brotherhood, a major instrument of its foreign policy. In the course of the Arab Spring, Qatar bet on the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, which brought Doha some positive results. Being almost immune to the Islamist movements' ideologies, Doha exercised its influence through the Brotherhood elsewhere in the region. As for Syria, Qatar started to arm Syrian rebels almost from the first days of the uprising, hoping that Muslim Brotherhood would be able to topple the Assad regime and seize control of the country. This policy contributed to the transformation of the Syrian uprising into the full-scale civil war, with thousands of jihadists fighting there. However, while Qatar has secured itself from the ideological and religious challenges, Saudi Arabia has failed to do so and begun to experience hard times.

Conclusion

The Syrian civil war demonstrates how ideological differences between two major powers in the Gulf affect the conflict and the behavior of respective actors. It is evidence that the ideological challenge that the GCC countries face has already impacted heavily on current developments in the region.

The new ideological challenge to the GCC and the threat of political Islam to some of the GCC members represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates in the region mark a watershed in regional dynamics. Following the weakening of traditional Middle East powers (Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad) over the last decade, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are consistently pursuing their own road to regional leadership. However, systemic changes in the Middle East produced a new ideological challenge that threatens the security and stability of the GCC and sharpens the contest between two major Council powers, Riyadh and Doha. The rise of political Islam in the MENA region and its growing appeal to the region's population, especially

during the last three years; the war in Syria; and Islamic State advances in Iraq – all of these contribute to the division within the GCC, which coincides with other regional dynamics (exacerbation of the Sunni-Shia confrontation and the changing US role in the region) that further deepen security and stability concerns. Therefore, the new ideological threat to the GCC posed by political Islam and radical Islamists is substantial, and affects not only the GCC but the broader region. Although the possibility of open military conflict in the GCC is close to naught, this new ideological threat might change this assessment in the mid to long terms.

Notes

- 1 Frederic M. Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 4.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Salman Rafi Sheikh, "Saudi Arabia and Qatar: The Crisis Rages On," *New Eastern Outlook*, <http://journal-neo.org/2014/03/31/deepening-division-in-the-sunni-arab-world/>.
- 4 Kamal Fayyad, "US Can Help Heal GCC Rifts," *al-Monitor*, April 25, 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/future-gcc-gulf-crisis.html>.
- 5 Elad Benari, "Saudi Arabia Blacklists Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian Jihadists," *Israel National News*, March 7, 2014, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/178237#.VKLPf_8BA.
- 6 Ian Black, "Arab States Withdraw Ambassadors from Qatar in Protest at 'Interference,'" *The Guardian*, March 5, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/arab-states-qatar-withdraw-ambassadors-protest>.
- 7 Viktor Mikhin, "Persian Gulf: Is the Crisis Over?" *New Eastern Outlook*, April 24, 2014, <http://journal-neo.org/2014/04/24/rus-persidskij-zaliv-preodolyon-li-krizis/>.
- 8 "Qatar Calls on Turkey to Normalize Ties with Egypt," *Today's Zaman*, December 23, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_qatar-calls-on-turkey-to-normalize-ties-with-egypt_367809.html.
- 9 Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Awakening, is an Islamist group in Saudi Arabia whose ideology is based on a mix of Wahhabi religious ideology and Muslim Brotherhood political ideology.
- 10 Christa Case Bryant, "Behind Qatar's Bet on the Muslim Brotherhood," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 18, 2014, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0418/Behind-Qatar-s-bet-on-the-Muslim-Brotherhood>.
- 11 Clearly with the exception of Islamic State activity in Iraq and Syria and al-Qaeda in North Africa.
- 12 James Dorsey, "Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia," RSR Working Paper Series, No. 262, September 6, 2013.

- 13 Birol Baskan and Steven Wright, "Seeds of Change: Comparing State-Religion Relations in Qatar and Saudi Arabia," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (2011): 96-111.
- 14 Bryant, "Behind Qatar's Bet on the Muslim Brotherhood."
- 15 David Roberts, "Qatar, the Ikhwan, and Transnational Relations in the Gulf," *Project on Middle East Political Science*, March 18, 2014, <http://pomeps.org/2014/03/18/qatar-the-ikhwan-and-transnational-relations-in-the-gulf/>.
- 16 Ahmed Azem, "Qatar's Ties with the Muslim Brotherhood Affect Entire Region," *The National*, May 18, 2012, <http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/qatars-ties-with-the-muslim-brotherhood-affect-entire-region>.
- 17 Dorsey, "Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia."
- 18 Yaroslav Trofimov, "In Quiet Revolt, Qatar Snubs Saudis with Women's Rights," *Wall Street Journal*, October 24, 2002, <http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1035412141534780791>.
- 19 Roberts, "Qatar, the Ikhwan, and Transnational Relations in the Gulf."
- 20 "Al Jazeera Arabic Tops Viewing Figures," *al-Jazeera*, May 22, 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/pressoffice/2013/05/201352291421900835.html>.
- 21 Zvi Mazel, "Al Jazeera and Qatar: The Muslim Brother's Dark Empire?" *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs* 8, no. 29, May 14, 2009, <http://jcpa.org/article/al-jazeera-and-qatar-the-muslim-brothers%E2%80%99-dark-empire/>.
- 22 Roula Khalaf, "Saudi Arabia: A Kingdom on Guard," *Financial Times*, March 26, 2014, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/8a965110-b4c0-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.html#axzz30WU6Xkb9>.
- 23 Viktor Mikhin, "Saudi Arabia: Cosmetic Measures or a Change of Course?" *New Eastern Outlook*, March 15, 2014, <http://journal-neo.org/2014/03/15/rus-saudovskaya-araviya-kosmeticheskie-mery-ili-peremena-kursa/>; "Saudi Arabia Declares Muslim Brotherhood 'Terrorist Group,'" *BBC*, March 7, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26487092>.
- 24 "Saudi Arabia Declares Muslim Brotherhood 'Terrorist Group.'"
- 25 Mustapha Ajbaili, "Saudi: Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist group," *al-Arabiya*, March 7, 2014, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/03/07/Saudi-Arabia-declares-Muslim-Brotherhood-terrorist-group.html>.
- 26 Fehim Tastekin, "Saudi Arabia and Qatar Vie for Influence in Syria," *al-Monitor*, April 17, 2013, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/politics/2013/04/saudi-arabia-qatar-vie-influence-syria.html#>.