Leading from Behind:  
The “Obama Doctrine” and US Policy in the Middle East  
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Under the United States constitution, Congress is empowered to make laws, raise revenue, declare war, and accept treaties. The president is authorized only to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” conduct diplomacy, and serve as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In the modern era, however, the chief executive has come to be expected to set the national agenda, especially in foreign policy, even to the extent that Congress’s war-making power is honored more in the breach than the observance.1 Some presidents have announced their policies by promulgating strategic “doctrines” – the precedent having been set by James Monroe in 1823 and revived in recent times by Truman, Eisenhower, Carter, Reagan, and George W. Bush.2

Barack Obama has yet to follow their example: no “Obama Doctrine” has been articulated by the President or authoritatively attributed to him. But something that could pass for one is now emerging early in his second term.3 No longer hampered by fears of being attacked by Republicans for retreating from America’s role of global leadership or of losing support from Democratic constituencies needed for his reelection (including Jewish voters and campaign contributors), he is freer now to put his own stamp on foreign policy, and his intentions are becoming clear. They portend a distinctly lowered posture for the United States in world affairs, except when its security is directly threatened, in contrast to the neo-conservative view of America as the global champion of freedom.

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and democracy that embroiled the previous administration in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Instead of trying to impose a *pax Americana*, this administration is content to “lead from behind,” as one advisor reportedly described the American role in NATO’s Libyan intervention. The means with which this unstated doctrine is being implemented are twofold, combining formal or informal alliances referred to as “strategic partnerships” with “coercive diplomacy” toward hostile states.

The partnerships entail forward basing of military assets, economic and military assistance, joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and policy coordination. Military assistance includes the gift or sale of advanced weapons and unarmed drones and the deployment of several types of anti-ballistic missiles: the Patriot batteries provided openly to Turkey and secretly to Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain; the ship-based Aegis stationed in the Persian Gulf and adopted by Japan; and the ground-based Arrow developed jointly with Israel. Coercive diplomacy takes the form of economic sanctions coupled with offers to negotiate; promotion and support for Security Council resolutions (such as those adopted to constrain Iran and North Korea); logistical support for allies; and covert activities like cyber warfare.

When American security is deemed to require the use of force, or when humanitarian intervention is supported by international consensus, direct military engagement will be limited to the use of missiles and air warfare. Full scale military action with “boots on the ground” is to be avoided at virtually all cost, lest it lead to more quagmires like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Direct combat missions will be undertaken against terrorists, but by drone attacks and special forces. Military resources no longer necessary to this change of strategy, such as nuclear weapons and launch platforms, large contingents of military manpower, domestic and overseas bases, and weapons designed for conventional naval and ground warfare, will be slated for reduced support.

While other regions will also feel the effects of this effort to follow a more consistent foreign policy – the administration’s announced “pivot to Asia” will make it especially relevant there – the Middle East will be significantly affected, if only by being treated with “benign neglect.” To be sure, Obama may yet discover, as have American presidents before him, that the best-laid plans of a global superpower are sometimes upset by the need to respond to unanticipated crises, or that “mission creep” is
hard to avoid once even limited force is committed. But at least the new design is moving from the background of the first term to the foreground of the second.

**From the First Term to the Second**
The contrast between the mixed messages sent on foreign policy in Obama’s first term and the more coherent approach now emerging is evident in the appointments the President has made to key positions. On taking office, Obama named Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, even though she had voted as a senator to authorize the use of force in Iraq that he had opposed. He retained Robert Gates, a holdover from the previous administration and another supporter of the Iraq wars, as Secretary of Defense, and drew John O. Brennan from the CIA to serve as his counterterrorism advisor. General David H. Petraeus, the architect of Bush’s surge policy, was kept on in Iraq and then sent to Afghanistan in 2010 before being named director of the CIA. There may well have been political calculations behind several of these appointments – the nominees were sure to attract strong bi-partisan support in Congress and the Clinton appointment healed the wounded feelings of her primary supporters – but collectively they sent a strong signal of continuity.

With the second term underway, Clinton has been replaced in Foggy Bottom by John Kerry; Chuck Hagel heads the Pentagon; and Brennan has returned to the CIA as its director. Kerry and Hagel, who both served in Vietnam before becoming outspoken critics of that war, are well known for agreeing with Obama that military engagement should be avoided if at all possible. Hagel was nominated by Obama despite opposition aroused by his previous criticisms of Israel and the “Jewish lobby” and his objections to the “surge” in Iraq and sanctions on Iran. Brennan has championed the “light footprint” strategy of limiting America interventions wherever possible. These appointments show, as the *New York Times* Washington correspondent reported, that Obama “has sided, without quite saying so, with Vice President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s view – argued, for the most part in the confines of the White House – that caution, covert action and a modest American military footprint around the world fit the geopolitical moment.”

Obama’s second term will likely better express his original intention to reframe America’s role in the world from neo-Wilsonian champion of liberty and democracy to superpower-of-last-resort.
To a considerable extent, this change of perspective arises more out of the change in circumstances between the first term and the second than out of an evolution in Obama’s thinking. During the first term, Obama gave voice to views that are now evident in his appointments, but proceeded much more cautiously in foreign policy than on the domestic front. He had taken office in 2009 with no experience in foreign relations or prior study of world affairs. He had taught constitutional law, worked as a community organizer, and served briefly in a state legislature and as a senator. He did not have an advisor on foreign policy to rely on comparable to Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Henry Kissinger, or Zbigniew Brzezinski, or a school of foreign policy “wonks” like the neo-Conservative “Vulcans” of the previous administration. In the primary campaign Hillary Clinton warned that in foreign policy he would have to learn on the job, and the first term was rife with chastening experience. Instead of redirecting American foreign policy, Obama usually found himself sustaining inherited commitments. In Iraq, he reluctantly agreed to maintain the counterinsurgency approach begun under his predecessor. In Afghanistan, he overrode the recommendation of Vice President Biden that American operations in Afghanistan be restricted to the border area with Pakistan where al-Qaeda was continuing to operate, accepting his generals’ recommendation instead for another surge. While he ordered an end to “enhanced interrogation,” a euphemism for the use of harsh measures including water-boarding, he broke a promise to close the detention facility at Guantanamo.

A major reason Obama opted for continuity in foreign policy is that he was compelled to deal with a domestic crisis. He came into office calling for a “politics of hope” – hope not only for a better domestic America but a more peaceful and cooperative world. But because he was confronted by a recession far more serious than anticipated, he had to stabilize the financial sector by injecting federal funds into the major banks, bail out two of the big three automobile manufacturers, and persuade Congress to pass an $800 billion stimulus bill. Unwilling to sacrifice his reform agenda, he pressed to obtain passage of the Affordable Care Act, and paid a high price as it dragged out in the legislature. In 2010 the voters blamed him for failing to reverse the recession and elected a Republican-dominated House that stymied his agenda for the next two years. He had to deal with two wars, one of which, in Iraq, he had opposed, and the other, in Afghanistan, he had approved of as a “war of choice” but which
had become a war for control of the country rather than only against al-Qaeda.

At the same time, he sought to define a new approach in foreign policy reflecting his own liberal outlook, emphasizing conciliation rather than confrontation. It was as if in foreign policy he was recapitulating his role as a community organizer in Chicago, now on a world stage. As the son of a Muslim father who bears his father’s middle name of Hussein and attended a mainly Muslim primary school in Indonesia, he saw himself as uniquely qualified to improve America’s relations with the Islamic world. Thus the 2009 Cairo speech in which he admitted that the United States had made mistakes in the region extended an “open hand” to Iran and acknowledged the plight of the Palestinians. He appointed an ambassador to Damascus – the first sent there since his predecessor was withdrawn in 2005 when Syria was accused of complicity in the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri – and followed through on a campaign pledge to reopen a dialogue with Bashar al-Assad.

He also sought to “push a reset button” on relations with Russia by withdrawing ABM deployments planned for central Europe in deference to President Vladimir Putin’s claim that they would diminish the credibility of Russian deterrence. He made friendly overtures to China, resisting calls to criticize Beijing’s repression of domestic dissent or to demand a crackdown on industrial espionage and piracy. During the 2008 campaign he criticized China for artificially depressing the value of its currency to boost exports at the expense of American jobs, but once in office he held back from formally branding the country a currency manipulator, so as not to have to endorse Congressional demands for retaliation. In exchange for China’s continued purchase of American treasury notes, Obama maintained economic ties that made the United States the largest single market for Chinese exports. He launched an effort to address the problem of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation and the export of nuclear and ballistic missile technology by enlisting Chinese cooperation, but when he found that Beijing would not risk causing the collapse of the Pyongyang regime by withholding aid critical to its survival, he chose not to threaten unilateral action but instead opted for “strategic patience.”

Continuity was evident as well in his approach to the problem of terrorism, except for his order that no further reference be made to the “war on terror,” George W. Bush’s rubric. Obama continued the
emphasize on Homeland Security, combining it with an effort to close the southern border to illegal immigration. He pursued efforts against the al-Qaeda leadership begun under the previous administration, initiating new measures to interfere with its fundraising and communications operations, and ordered the brilliantly planned and executed mission that killed Bin Laden in 2011. But the use of special forces and of drone aircraft for surveillance and targeted assassination was begun earlier and was only accelerated by Obama.

In the Middle East, the main focus of Obama’s first term was on the unfinished business of Iraq. Once the surge seemed to succeed in blunting threats to the survival of Iraq’s elected government, Obama pressed for disengagement, even to the extent of not pressuring the Iraqi government to accept the large residual force his field commanders thought would be needed to assure stability. Caution was also the watchword when the Arab Spring broke out. The White House took no moves to protect the regime in Tunisia or that of Husni Mubarak in Egypt, a close American ally, and expressed support for the protestors. When the call for reform spread to Bahrain, where the US Fifth Fleet is headquartered, the administration ignored requests for intervention. With respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Obama continued the policy begun under previous administrations of encouraging a two-state solution by appointing Senator George Mitchell as a mediator. He had previously come to believe in the need to assure security for Israel and statehood for the Palestinians. As his biographer David Remnick pointed out, “Obama’s views are not mysterious. His political home is Hyde Park, on the South Side of Chicago, where he came to know liberal Zionists and Palestinian academics, and to understand both the necessity of a Jewish state after the Second World War and the tragedy and the depths of Palestinian suffering.”

Perhaps not surprisingly, the politics of hope suffered one rebuff after another virtually everywhere, most blatantly from Khamenei in Iran, but also from Mahmoud Abbas, Benjamin Netanyahu, Assad, Putin, the military in Pakistan, and the cartoonish dynasts of North Korea. Even the rebellious youth of the Arab Spring praised by Obama found fault with Washington for its previous support of
the tyrants they were overthrowing. Apart from effects of the spectacular success of the killing of Bin Laden, none of the efforts to improve America’s image or promote cooperation bore fruit. Most Muslims were less favorable toward the United States in the closing months of Obama’s first term than they had been when he took office. The Russians remained unwilling to cooperate in pressuring Iran to give up its effort to develop nuclear weapons or in imposing UN sanctions on the Assad regime in Syria. The North Koreans defied the United States by continuing to test missiles and nuclear explosives. The Chinese government, pandering to nationalist sentiment, has pressed territorial claims in the South China and East China Seas, much to the consternation of neighboring American allies, and is developing power-projection capabilities at sea and in space, provoking countermoves by the United States.

Obama made two striking departures from his policy of continuity. One came late in his first term when he decided to order intervention in Libya based upon a UN Security Council resolution. The effort was made in cooperation with NATO allies and friendly Arab states and stopped short of the use of ground troops. Compared to the estimated trillion-dollar cost of the war in Iraq and the $500 billion cost of Afghanistan, it cost comparatively little ($11 billion) as military spending goes. At the time, this initiative seemed as though it might be a harbinger of a new policy of humanitarian engagement, comparable to Bill Clinton’s intervention to stop “ethnic cleansing” in Yugoslavia, and reflecting a similar willingness to use American force to prevent butchery by authoritarian regimes.

The other notable change was his decision to declare unambiguously that the United States would not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons. This decision was implemented, in keeping with the reliance on coercive diplomacy, by a carrot and stick approach involving both an offer to negotiate and the imposition of stiff economic sanctions, along with covert operations. The administration took the lead in creating a coalition of nations willing to impose tight economic sanctions and reportedly cooperated with Israel in “Olympic Games,” the cyber attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Although China, Russia, Turkey, and others were allowed to evade complete adherence to sanctions, the administration’s efforts succeeded well enough to do considerable damage to the Iranian economy. This decision is in keeping with what may be emerging as the Obama Doctrine, because at the same time that it threatens the ultimate use of force – presumably in the form of surgical strikes at Iran’s nuclear
installations – it does not require invasion or a strategy calling for regime change and “nation-building” under occupation.

The Syrian Conundrum
Much to the consternation of both liberals and conservatives who have called for American intervention in Syria as a way of helping to bring down a brutal dictatorship, weaken Iran, and isolate Hizbollah, Libya has so far not proven to be a precedent for Syria. The initial rationale given by the administration for the decision not to engage in Syria was that this time there was no Security Council authorization, due to vetoes by Russia and China. Spokesmen added other considerations: The opposition was fragmented; some elements in it were al-Qaeda volunteers; even more were supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. The council formed to serve as a government in exile was highly fractious and had only tenuous links to the groups actually fighting against the regime. The Syrian military was a far more formidable force than Qaddafi’s mercenaries. No “light footprint” or stealth campaign was possible, and Syria’s air defenses would complicate any effort to impose no fly zones. And what would happen once the regime fell? Would an anti-Western Islamist regime come to power? Would the country become sharply divided among sectarian or ethnic enclaves? Would there be a bloodbath against the Alawites that would compel an occupation?

In view of these inhibiting factors, Obama opted to provide humanitarian aid and encourage the formation of a unified opposition, but has not taken any actions, apart from economic sanctions, to stop the slaughter. In response to Israeli intelligence reports showing that the regime was using chemical weapons, the United States and its allies, along with the Russians, warned Assad that any resort to chemical weapons would trigger intervention. But when the military chiefs and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, with the support of Secretary Clinton, proposed a plan for supplying arms to carefully vetted rebel forces, the White House demurred. The lesson of this failure to do more in Syria may well be that Libya was a kind of black swan – an unusual instance where humanitarian intervention could be accomplished by airpower in a multilateral effort with UN backing in which the United States could “lead from behind” and not become inextricably entangled.
Toward the New Strategy

The administration’s most immediate concerns overseas involve accelerating the drawdown of troops from Afghanistan and pursuing the carrot and stick approach toward Iran. Longer term, the issue for the executive and Congress is how to cut the military budget to help address the national debt. Already large at $16 trillion, the projected debt increase is becoming a central preoccupation of American politics and government. Admiral Mike Mullen, the former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has called it the most serious national security problem the nation faces. In 2007 it was 36 percent of GDP; the Congressional Budget Office now projects that it will rise to at least 77 percent by 2023—far more than the average of 39 percent experienced between 1973 and 2012. The largest contributors to the projected rise are from welfare (or entitlement) programs, which are projected to rise with the aging of the population. But cutting “discretionary spending” on Social Security and Medicare is a highly unpopular option. In one poll, Americans opposed any cuts to Medicare by a margin of 70 percent to 25 percent. The defense budget is therefore a high value target, even though the savings now contemplated will not solve the debt problem. This budget, at its 2012 level of $700 billion, is “equivalent to the combined spending of the next twenty largest military powers.” Even apart from the draconian cuts that would ensue if the looming budgetary sequester is allowed to take effect, Obama is proposing to cut Pentagon spending by $350 billion over the next decade, reducing it to about $550 billion annually, or about 3-4 percent of GDP, well below Cold War peaks but close to recent levels. The size of the active-duty military would be cut from 1.5 million to 1.4 million. The plan would “defer, but not appreciably scale back, various procurement programs . . . eliminate some ships and airlifters; reduce Air Force combat aircraft units by roughly 10 percent; bring home two of the four Army brigades in Europe,” and make modest changes in military pay and benefits. If Congress approves, there would be more rounds of base closures. The Congressional Budget Office has recently

It remains to be seen whether and how a strategy of “leading from behind” can succeed against Iran, and whether, if all other means fail, Obama will carry out his pledge, either by ordering a surgical strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities or giving the “green light” to an Israeli strike.
warned, however, that the Pentagon will need $500 billion more over the next decade than it estimates. Given the administration’s stated objectives, the key personnel appointments, and the budgetary pressures, it seems predictable that Obama’s second term will better express his original intention to reframe America’s role in the world from neo-Wilsonian champion of liberty and democracy to superpower-of-last-resort. The days when American intervention in global hot spots could be either hoped for or feared may well be past. As the conservative columnist Ross Douthat has observed, “Like the once-hawkish Hagel, Obama has largely rejected Bush’s strategic vision of America as the agent of a sweeping transformation of the Middle East, and retreated from the military commitments that this revolutionary vision required. And with this retreat has come a willingness to make substantial cuts in the Pentagon’s budget – cuts that Hagel will be expected to oversee.”

Access to Middle Eastern oil remains a concern, but one that is diminishing in importance. The United States currently imports about 23 percent of its oil from the Arab Middle East (including 1.2 millions of barrels a day from Saudi Arabia in August 2012), but is taking big strides to reduce oil dependency by exploiting domestic and other continental oil and natural gas resources. One aircraft carrier group will continue to be stationed in the Persian Gulf, down from the two that have been there for the past two years.

What the putative Obama Doctrine means for the Middle East (and by extension for Afghanistan and Pakistan) is that people in regions where instability is the rule will have to fend for themselves unless that instability poses a direct threat to the United States. Terrorists whose targets do not extend to the United States will not be directly engaged. If Afghanistan’s central government loses control of parts of the country once NATO forces are almost all withdrawn, the United States will not return in force, unless those uncontrolled areas should become sanctuaries for al-Qaeda. Military aid will be provided to Pakistan even if it does not act aggressively against its own Taliban. The United States would intervene directly only if Pakistan was threatened with loss of control of its nuclear weapons.

If Iraq breaks apart, Obama is hardly likely to want to return American forces to restore unity. If Syria disintegrates into a weakened state with sectarian enclaves like Iraq and Lebanon, American Marines will not
ride to the rescue, unless there is a risk that Syria’s chemical weapons could fall into the wrong hands. In Yemen, the United States will rely on drone attacks against al-Qaeda forces but will not use military forces to reestablish the central government. Where, as in the case of French intervention in Mali this year, American allies are willing to send in troops to fight against Islamist terrorists, the United States will provide air support and either donate or sell war materiel. If Egypt, Libya, or Tunisia falters in making a transition from authoritarianism to incipient democracy, the United States will express concern but resist calls to intervene. Nor will Washington withdraw support from the cooperative authoritarian regimes threatened by the spread of the Arab Spring, lest they be replaced by anti-American governments or anarchic conditions that can allow anti-Western terrorists to find new havens.

Obama has strongly reiterated his call for a two-state solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, but if the parties cannot come to terms, the administration will likely adopt a fallback position aimed at preventing the current situation from deteriorating. The United States will continue to provide military aid to Israel and economic and humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. Secretary Hagel’s earlier proposal that Hamas be engaged is unlikely to be taken seriously, inasmuch as the President has made very clear that he considers Hamas a terrorist group and holds it responsible for provoking armed conflicts with Israel. Any effort by Israel to annex territory on the West Bank will meet with strong disapproval, quite possibly with a refusal to veto a Security Council condemnation.

The largest unknown concerns Iran. In March of 2012 Obama stated flatly in a speech at the AIPAC conference that the United States would not permit Iran to develop a nuclear weapon and that he would be prepared to use force as a last resort: “As I’ve made clear time and time again during the course of my presidency, I will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary to defend the United States and its interests.” Shimon Peres has expressed confidence that “in the end, if none of this works, then President Obama will use military power against Iran. I am sure of it.” But leading members of the American military and foreign policy establishment (including the new Defense Secretary) have expressed grave reservations about any use of American military force against Iran. It remains to be seen whether and how a strategy of “leading from behind” can succeed against an adversary capable of resisting non-
military pressures and whether, if all other means fail, Obama will carry out his pledge, either by ordering a surgical strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities or giving the “green light” to an Israeli strike. If Iran can be persuaded by a combination of sanctions and diplomacy to step back from the nuclear bomb threshold and accept unimpeded inspections, Obama will gain considerable political capital among both Arabs and Israelis, which he could conceivably use to promote pacification and reform throughout the region.

With the potential exception of Iran, however, the “Obama Doctrine” calls for America to focus on nation-building at home rather than adventures abroad, the Middle East included. If major change is to come to the region, it will presumably have to come from within — unless internal turmoil is deemed to pose a grave and imminent threat to a vital American national interest. The challenges of civil war in Syria and Iran’s nuclear ambitions will pose especially acute tests of whether and how the doctrine will be applied.

Notes
1 Congress last issued a Declaration of War in 1942. All subsequent American military engagements have been initiated by the president either with Congressional authorization in the form of resolutions or in pursuance of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, passed by a supermajority in both Houses over a presidential veto, requires that the president notify Congress within 48 hours of any dispatch of American forces into action abroad, and that such forces be withdrawn within 60 days (with a further 30 days allowed for full withdrawal) unless their mission is authorized by a resolution or a declaration of war. In launching an air war against the Libyan regime in 2011 in cooperation with NATO allies, President Barack Obama relied on Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing “all necessary measures” (short of the use of foreign ground troops) to end attacks on civilians in Libya, bypassing Congress to keep American air forces in action beyond the 60-day limit.

2 The functional virtues of such doctrines were well explained by Henry Kissinger: “In the American system of government, in which the president is the only nationally elected official, coherence in foreign policy emerges — if at all — from presidential pronouncements. These serve as the most effective directive to the sprawling and self-willed bureaucracy and supply the criteria for public or Congressional debates.” Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 765.

3 “Perhaps the most striking feature of three and a half enormously consequential years in the redirection of American power has been the slow

4 The record is strewn with examples of diversions from strategic templates, from the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950 – a region famously declared outside the US “defense perimeter” – to the supposedly “peripheral” conflict in Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 that drew the Cold War out of the European framework in which it was originally cast.


7 At the outset of the new administration’s term, instructions were issued to all government departments that they were not to refer to a “war on terror” or to “the long war” but to “overseas contingency operations.” The new head of Homeland Security used another even shorter-lived euphemism: “man- caused disasters.”


10 Commentary by Doug Elmendorf, Congressional Budget Office, February 6, 2013.


15 The Obama administration’s attitude reflects “a broad consensus in Western capitals,” *Time* magazine reported, apropos the French intervention in Mali in 2013, about how terrorism should be fought around the world: “Assist, yes; pay, sure; send in drones, planes and even small amounts of troops if you have to. But over the long term, let the locals sort it out.” Alex Perry/Bamako, “In and Out of Africa,” February 4, 2013, p. 22.