

Disarming Militant Groups from Within: Building Support for Peace among Combatants in Northern Ireland

Benedetta Berti, Ariel Heifetz Knobel, and Gary Mason

This study examines the internal process that led Northern Irish combatant groups, mainly the Loyalist camp, to relinquish armed struggle as a viable strategy to accomplish their political goals. Rather than looking at the content of the peace agreement or at the negotiation and reconciliation processes between Loyalists and Republicans, the authors focus on internal dynamics, i.e., intra-group negotiations and consensus building mechanisms that Loyalist militant organizations employed with their own members to switch from violence to nonviolence, and from confrontation to engagement with the enemy. The paper underlines how the consensus building process was multi-faceted and included a combination of carefully structured internal deliberations amongst combatants, together with the crafting and implementation of targeted programs to empower and transform militant organizations and their role within society. The paper also focuses on the specific roles ex-prisoners and key faith leaders played in shaping this monumental transformation. The paper emphasizes the importance of building widespread support for peace and of engaging, rather than alienating, potential opponents. In addition, by examining the policies used to deepen support for nonviolence throughout the past 17 years following the Good Friday Agreement, the paper underscores the importance of continuing peace efforts in the post-agreement phase. Finally, the authors examine the main lessons that can be learned from the consensus building process among Northern Irish Loyalist combatants and discuss its relevance to other intractable conflicts.

The Hidden History of Making Peace: The Importance of Intra-Group Consensus Building

Following a direct engagement with all the units and departments of our organization, the leadership of the Ulster Volunteer Force and Red Hand Commando today make public the outcome of our three year consultation process.... as of 12 midnight, Thursday 3 May 2007, the Ulster Volunteer Force and Red Hand Commando will assume a non-military, civilianized role... All recruitment has ceased; military training has ceased; targeting has ceased and all intelligence rendered obsolete; all active service units have been de-activated.... We encourage our volunteers to embrace the challenges which continue to face their communities and support their continued participation in non-military capacities.¹

In 2007, the three main Loyalist militant groups in Northern Ireland – the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Red Hand Commando (RHC), and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) – announced their transition from military to civilian/political organizations, and all have since handed over the vast majority of their weapons.

The issue of how militant organizations shed their violent ways and adopt a constructive civilian role within their communities is crucial and intimately related to the relatively under-explored topic of conducting internal negotiations within, rather than between, communities.

Indeed, whilst a large part of the negotiation and conflict resolution literature focuses on the content and process of negotiations between “warring parties,” less attention has been generally devoted to understanding the process of accommodation and negotiation occurring *within* a given side. Specifically, we know substantially less about how intra-group negotiations and consensus building for peace occur within violent groups.² Yet, these internal consultations and consensus building processes are just as vital as the official ones taking place between warring parties.³

The lack of solid backing from a leader’s constituency in general and in this case, from the combatant community, can jeopardize and ultimately hinder a peace process before, during, and after inter-party negotiations. Sitting at the negotiating table without coordination and support from

other allied factions, as well as well as from one's militant constituency, substantially increases the chances of these actors sabotaging the political process. Active opponents can sink ongoing inter-party negotiations as well as trigger an escalation of violence, effectively freezing a peace process.

Second, when militant members are alienated from their leadership, this can result in defection to more radical groups or in the creation of irredentist splinter groups. Such factionalism is extremely dangerous as internal disagreement is not at all synonymous with the decline in the use of violence as a strategy, and – as aptly explained by Martha Crenshaw – “splits and merger are a form of propagation of terrorism.”⁴

Third, when a given organization sits at the negotiating table against the wishes of its own constituency, it is more restricted in its capacity to make significant concessions, as the perception of “giving in” would risk igniting additional internal conflict and further weaken the group's cohesion and status.⁵ Finally, lack of intra-group consensus complicates efforts to implement any peace agreement, while also making such arrangements more fragile and less likely to endure.

Therefore, for broader inter-party peace negotiations to succeed, it is absolutely vital for the main actors involved, both at the state and non-state level, to look inward and invest in building consensus internally and within the broader communities that support them. Consensus building is by no means a one-time trick; it is instead a relational and dynamic process that requires constant interaction between the leadership and the supporting bases as well as a strategic and long-term approach.

Looking at the Northern Ireland conflict, the post-agreement consensus building process for nonviolence and disarmament was just as crucial (if not more) as the pre-1998 mobilization to support official peace negotiations, as its aim – to embed a permanent nonviolent strategy and to transform the role of combatants within society – was ambitious yet essential to shift from conflict to both engagement and coexistence in a shared society. The process did not end with the definitive decommissioning of weapons on both sides; rather, it evolved from embedding nonviolence to transforming societal and personal relations within Northern Ireland, moving a little farther down the long and winding road to reconciliation.

From Ceasefire to Peace Treaty to Disarming to Re-Integration: Loyalist Militant Groups in Northern Ireland

On Good Friday, April 10, 1998, after 800 years of conflict on the island of Ireland, 80 years of partition, and thirty years of the Northern Irish civil war known as the “Troubles,” costing the lives of over 3,600 people and resulting in over 35,000 casualties, with 16,000 charged with terrorist-related offenses, 34,000 shootings, and 14,000 bombings (all this in a relatively small population of 1.7 million people), the official negotiations finally culminated in the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement (GFA).

Since the late 1960s, Northern Ireland had become the stage of a bloody conflict between Republicans and Loyalists. At its core, the conflict saw two separate, non-integrated communities fight over radically different and mutually exclusive political ideals: the reunification of Ireland versus the permanent ratification of the 1921 partition of the island and integration into the United Kingdom. The Nationalist and Republican communities (mostly Catholic) identify as Irish and seek an all-island Republic of Ireland, while the Unionist and Loyalist communities (mostly Protestant) identify as British, loyal to the United Kingdom. In addition, the tensions were fueled by the deeply unequal nature of the political, social, and economic system which de facto placed the Catholic community in a state of structural discrimination, political underrepresentation, and economic marginalization.⁶

Reaching an agreement was no easy task: the process that led to the GFA was long and complex, and was preceded by deep internal changes within both sides, as well as years of back channel talks, two main ceasefires, increased international involvement, and a significant change in the UK’s approach towards the conflict. Approved by Northern Ireland’s main Nationalist/Republican (pro-Irish) political parties and most of the Unionist/Loyalist (pro-British) parties, and ratified in a popular referendum held in May 1998, the GFA recognized the right to self-determination for all people in Northern Ireland and established local political institutions on the basis of power sharing principles.

Implementing the GFA has been an accomplishment of monumental proportions, especially given the challenge of keeping opponents such as splinter groups, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (from disaffected UVF

members),⁷ as well as the Real IRA and Continuity IRA (from the IRA, the Provisional Irish Republican Army) at bay. Nevertheless, all the main militant organizations (IRA, INLA which joined after the referendum, UDA, UVF, and RHC) maintained their commitment to the peace process and, notably, did so while preserving cohesion and preventing mass-scale defections.

The Good Friday Agreement did not solve all of Northern Ireland's problems, and in the decade following the agreement, the main armed groups embarked on a long and difficult process towards disarmament, or "weapons decommissioning" (the phrase accepted by all parties involved). Although violent incidents did not subside completely, they became sporadic, instigated by fringe groups, and condemned by all major factions. In this context, the main task with respect to the combatant communities shifted from preventing spoilers to re-integrating former militants.

In parallel to the decommissioning process, the main political parties also began a complex engagement to learn how to govern through power sharing, while society slowly focused on the long journey of reconciliation.

The Challenge of Selling Peace to Combatants

Keeping the combatant community on board while committing to a ceasefire, peace negotiations, and finally to renunciation of armed struggle is vital to the success of any peace process. While some militants embrace armed struggle through peer pressure and others even come to regret their initial involvement, combatants can often be ideological hard-liners less likely to embrace the logic of moderation and reciprocity. Their experience as fighters has taught them resentment and distrust towards their "enemy"; thus, for them, the psychological leap from conflict to engagement is an especially hard one to make. More substantially, many combatants, especially if extensively involved, have direct incentives to continue fighting, as they may derive economic benefits along with a sense of identity, belonging, and social prestige.

In the case of Northern Ireland, building consensus for the peace process was a continuous, dynamic process that began nearly ten years before the peace agreement, when combatants began challenging their organization's use of force as an effective strategy.

Internal Agents of Change: The Role of Ex-Prisoners

Former Loyalist prisoners played, and continue to play, a key role in this process. Indeed when the first life-sentenced prisoners were released in Northern Ireland in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they brought with them deep questions that challenged the ideology of working class Loyalism and its use of force. Loyalist ex-prisoners re-entered their communities saying, “I served 15 years to preserve the British state, and it was the British state that put me in prison. What does that say about our battle? About our political ideology?”⁸ Their status as prisoners gave them enough credibility and legitimacy as loyal patriots “to ask questions and be heard” when they began both to publicly criticize the British government and to reflect upon the personal and community price paid to sustain armed struggle. They were “fed up,”⁹ with the toll the conflict had taken on working class Loyalist communities, and this “began to influence change.”¹⁰

In the immediate years preceding the GFA, intra-group discussions within Loyalism focused increasingly on building support for engagement with the enemy, while enforcing a ceasefire and policy of “restraint.” On this front, ex-prisoners continued questioning the use of violence *after* the 1994 ceasefires, asking whether it was “really helping to transform Loyalist communities.” Whilst becoming “agents of change” by stressing the dire local impact of violence, such discussions gradually eroded “the old-school” ethos of other combatants in the community.¹¹

In the decade that followed the agreement, Loyalist militant organizations embarked on a transformative process that led to the relinquishment of armed struggle in favor of an unarmed, nonviolent political strategy, while surrendering their weapons along the way.

All throughout this period, Loyalist leaders employed multiple strategies to gain buy-in from their members. Some of the most prominent ones are reviewed in the remaining sections of the paper.

Tools for Building Support for Ceasefires and Official Peace Negotiations (1992-1998): Explanation, Reframing, and Consultation

Throughout the 1990s, Loyalist leaders were able to convince their members to observe a ceasefire and then to favor peace negotiations with the IRA by

first explaining and reframing the enemy's behavior. This was possible due to the increased understanding of the Republicans among senior Loyalists, particularly ex-prisoners, having been exposed to them in prison. Loyalist ex-prisoners were able to think analytically about the IRA and Sinn Fein, whereas most members on the outside viewed them as monolithic.¹² Additionally, in the early and mid-1990s, clergy-facilitated back channels, as well as NGO-facilitated workshops and dialogues, gave senior militants further insight into the internal dynamics of their enemies. Such knowledge convinced leaders to remain committed to the ceasefire and later to the peace talks, despite setbacks. They understood (or felt they understood) how the other side was functioning, using this information to keep their members on board.

For example, in 1993, Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, who had been pushing to start peace talks, was photographed at a funeral carrying the coffin of a notorious IRA bomber following a deadly attack. Despite public outcry and raw anger particularly among Unionists and Loyalists, behind closed doors Loyalist leaders knew that if Adams was to lead the IRA away from violence (which he did one year later), such gestures were required.

Five years later, following commencement of official Track I talks, several violent incidents threatened to derail the whole process. However, thanks to back channel conversations (both militant-to-militant and militant-to-government), militant leaders stayed on board and did not allow ongoing tit-for-tat terrorist attacks to spoil the larger process.

Following the 1998 peace agreement, the ability of these leaders to explain and reframe actions and words of the "other side" was essential. For instance, when Loyalists heard Adams' Republican rhetoric flare up in the post-agreement phase, UVF leaders explained that such comments were only meant "to keep their own people on board," stressing that people "shouldn't pay much attention because he probably doesn't mean it literally."¹³

While getting to a more nuanced view of their Republican enemy, Loyalist leaders also began to reframe positive steps taken by Republicans to sell the transition towards peace internally: for example, when the IRA finally declared its "cessation" of armed activities in August 1994, the Loyalist organizations framed it as "surrender" in order to justify their own subsequent ceasefire.¹⁴ The sense of victory served to convince those Loyalists who

were more pessimistic about the IRA's intentions, as well as to maintain internal legitimacy.

In the years preceding the 1994 ceasefire, inclusive internal negotiations also helped minimize the chance of Loyalist spoilers. A key tool to get to consensus was to focus on ensuring prisoners' endorsement for steps towards peace. The Combined Loyalist Military Command (representing the UVF, UDA, and RHC) insisted on gaining access to prisons "to persuade and explain" to their inmate counterparts.¹⁵ This meant that security authorities allowed wanted "terrorists" to pass through their doors.

The UVF held a systematic internal "consultation process" that included multiple briefings to its prison population. Similarly, the CLMC stressed that "before any decision would be taken, the UDA leadership insisted that it would first have to consult with its prisoners." With the help of Reverend Roy Magee, Loyalist politicians from the Ulster Democratic Party and Progressive Unionist Party (political proxies of the UDA and UVF, some of whom overlapped as senior decision makers in these militant groups) visited Long Kesh to meet their leaders in prison.¹⁶

This particular meeting resulted in a UDA letter from prisoners to the outside leadership on Oct. 10, 1994: "We the UDA/UFF LPOW [Loyalist POWs]... feel we must be seen to be giving this fragile peace process every opportunity to succeed and that our permanent cessation of violence should last as long as the republican complete cessation of violence."¹⁷ By the time the CLMC held its final meeting to approve the decision to implement a ceasefire "all segments of Loyalism were present: prisoners, combatants on the outside, wailers in the community, and nobody dissented."¹⁸

Tools for Building Support for A Permanent Unarmed Strategy (1990s – present): Reframing, Consultation, Political Empowerment, and Community Development

Throughout the peace process, and especially following the GFA, Loyalist (as well as Republican) leaders focused not only on ensuring support for a ceasefire, but also on reframing nonviolence as a continuation of their struggle, a key face-saving mechanism.

The 1994 prisoners' letter mentioned above emphasized the strategic nature of their attempt at peace: "To continue our military campaign under

the present circumstances could be counterproductive and in the long term detrimental to our cause.”¹⁹ A decade after the peace agreement, this rationale continues, as exemplified in the 2007 endgame statements of the UVF, RHC, and UDA, in which they explained that violence was no longer relevant to their cause, while never denouncing its past role. The UDA stated: “the battle flags of the UFF will be furled in a hope that they may never have to see light of day again, but stand in readiness.”²⁰ For the UVF and RHC, nonviolence was justified because “the mainstream Republican offensive has ended...the Union remains safe.”²¹ This new framing of violence and its role allowed combatants to preserve the legitimacy of the armed struggle while effectively shelving it in favor of an unarmed strategy.

Finally, the practice of internal strategy discussions and consultation with the wider membership of Loyalist organizations continued well beyond the 1994 ceasefire and the 1997-8 peace process. Nearly a decade later, the UVF conducted 3 years of so-called “roadshows” leading up to disarmament. This systematic approach fanned out leaders across Northern Ireland and Britain to meet with local branches in order to explain the reasoning and importance of decommissioning the organization’s weapons and to ensure support for the act. Finally in 2009, the organization handed over the vast majority of its weapons to the satisfaction of the International Commission on Decommissioning.

At the same time, moving towards permanent nonviolence required a deep investment to reintegrate former combatants and empower their own working class Loyalist communities. After the ceasefires, EU peace funding came to Northern Ireland, and ex-prisoners initiatives grew,²² with ex-combatants setting up non-profits to improve socio-economic conditions and to lobby state institutions. Consensus was reached regarding “accountability of politicians” via lobby groups.²³ Loyalist combatants began coordinated efforts with IRA leaders to prevent violence and to stop unauthorized incidents from escalating.²⁴ These volunteers, who were members or affiliates of paramilitaries, called themselves “community workers” or “community activists,”²⁵ an independent role that allowed them to meet with their counterparts from the IRA as well as with government officials and traditional politicians.²⁶ The impetus to transition to institutional politics, public service, and community

activism was described by CLMC leader Plum Smith: “Loyalists saw political empowerment as the only way out.”²⁷

As more ex-prisoners moved into community development roles, the prospects for socio-economic growth seemed promising, especially with the rise of government economic packages. In turn, this helped strengthen the transition and decommissioning process: as one UVF ex-prisoner recalls: “We were told that the lack of investment in these areas was a result of the conflict, and people thought things would get better: inward investment, job creation, etc.”²⁸ Thus, making peace “was a political process as much as it was an economic process.”²⁹

An example of the use of community and political development in demobilization of combatants is a program called Action for Community Transformation (ACT), which was founded by UVF and RHC ex-combatants in 2008 following the organizations’ endgame declarations, and was intended to be a “model of politicization which supports the reintegration of former combatants in partnership with critical friends and the wider community.”³⁰ It was initially presented in small-scale consultations to senior militants, offering an alternative to the armed struggle and a model of conflict transformation through “positive active citizenship,” and “collaboration with all elements of civic society.”³¹ Throughout six years of internal discussions, ACT achieved endorsement by the entire UVF and RHC leadership, which has “actively directed volunteers to engage in this process.”³²

The ACT program consists of three phases. First, a “transitional” phase sets up learning processes targeting former combatants, with the objective of preparing volunteers to engage their communities more constructively. A 12-week training program takes volunteers on a “journey of exploring their personal and social history and connecting this to their present-day experience and role within the community.”³³ They also partake in workshops on a wide range of topics, from adaptive leadership, mediation, and transitional justice to suicide prevention, community safety, media training, and employment preparation and placement.³⁴ By 2012, 1,647 UVF and RHC members had been “trained, engaged or consulted.” ACT’s second phase, the “operational” stage, connects UVF and RHC volunteers and their local communities with organizations and networks for community development. The third “political” phase moves volunteers more deeply into civic engagement, encouraging

participation in local elections, “residents’ groups, forums, cultural and historic societies, or whatever is relevant to their communities.”³⁵

The impact of ACT is visible, among other things, in the formation of Area Action Groups throughout Northern Ireland of about 1000 people actively organizing at a given time, which address issues that had traditionally been handled outside of the law, such as grievances regarding policing and justice (including unsolved cases), and defending cultural expression and parades. ACT has also increased the level of engagement with the Police Service of Northern Ireland through consultation, training, and liaison roles with hundreds of ex-combatants, including one district in which over 200 ACT graduates became qualified as Parade Marshalls (to help contain the violence around sectarian parades).³⁶ ACT’s impact can also be seen in the 2012-13 “flag protests,” in which hundreds of youth (mostly Protestant) were arrested. In the past, these youth “may have been easily recruited” into the militant organizations, but instead, ACT ex-combatants developed outreach workshops to represent their violent pasts “as a deterrent.”³⁷

External Agents of Change: Key Faith Leaders as Combatants’ “Critical Friends”

Most of the 1,200 Protestant and Catholic clergy on the island of Ireland were not directly involved in peacemaking, though many helped to foster better inter-community relations in their local communities. There was only a small core – about a dozen – who greatly aided the peace process, engaging those committed to violence in achieving their goals.³⁸ Their contributions took the form of transferring messages as intermediaries, facilitating private meetings, and assisting “political groups to evaluate their strategies and goals.”³⁹ These roles continue to this day.

The third function is most closely tied to the process of consensus building within militant groups. Beginning in the early 1990s, a few local Protestant clergy assisted Loyalist organizations’ transition to nonviolence by serving as same-side proponents. For example, Reverends Roy Magee and Harold Good “took part in a loyalist commission to support leading peacemaking loyalists in their questioning of the philosophy and morality of loyalist violence.”⁴⁰

Methodist Reverend Gary Mason, whom the UVF and RHC call a “critical friend,” sits on the board of ACT and is chairperson of Northern Ireland Alternatives, ACT’s Restorative Justice program. For 27 years he has worked in the inner city of Belfast and promoted urban, social, and economic development as a way to serve Loyalism by arguing that “we can do it better” (unlike most Protestant clergy who chastised Loyalist combatants and former combatants).⁴¹ Mason listened to combatants and ex-combatants, affirmed their humanity and their pain, and accompanied them in unfamiliar contexts including invitations to share their stories and listen to others. They discussed accountability, forgiveness, and new beginnings, among other issues. Mason facilitated difficult, meaningful engagement both among Loyalists and with their traditional adversaries, such as other combatant groups, politicians, victims groups, and security services.

“Critical friends” like Mason and others often come under scrutiny for “talking to men of violence.” As Mason explains: “I am well aware of the risks that one can be seen to be endorsing violence or at least giving violence credibility. But my role is one of engagement, not endorsement. I firmly believe that the person of faith in any religious tradition should be taking risks for peace that politicians simply can’t take because of their political support base.”

In addition to independence, this role requires humility, understanding that even a reverend or a priest could have taken the path that these men took. It is important for these leaders not to turn their backs on the community that shaped them.

Loyalist communities continue to struggle with internecine feuding and conflict, deindustrialization, cultural unease and ambiguity, and a continuing decline in educational standards. In this fragmented context, the positive contribution of former combatants may go unnoticed. The media’s thorough coverage of their participation in violence has left a “tough man” stereotype that does not allow for the kind of journey to peace that many of these men have taken. Moreover, given that what they do may be considered politically covert, their involvement has not been included as part of the official story, which makes the work of critical friendship even more essential for affirming their dramatic journeys to peace.

The Internal Road to Nonviolent Engagement: Lessons Learned

The consensus building process towards embracing disarmament in Northern Irish Loyalist communities was complex and multi-faceted. Tools to build internal support for peace negotiations and subsequent implementation of a political agreement are varied: at the top-down level, leaders invested in direct and indirect communication to their supporting bases to reframe the understanding of both the conflict as well as the advantages of pursuing a political, rather than armed, strategy. In doing so, prominent, trusted and credible figures, especially well-known combatants and ex-prisoners, effectively promoted the strategic shift from violence to nonviolence. In addition, consensus building also focused on internal discussions and consultations to improve the level of grassroots ownership in the process and the commitment to its outcome. Moreover, engaging combatant communities required crafting short and long-term political and ideational alternatives to convince militants to relinquish their weapons.

Looking at the experience of Northern Ireland and its applicability to other intractable conflicts, the consensus building process underlines the following directives:

- a. Engage: integrate, rather than alienate, opponents and potential spoilers. The process of dialogue between communities and within communities requires a strategy of engagement with, and acknowledgement of, both opponents and their narratives.
- b. Reframe: understand that the enemy may reframe your actions to look victorious. This allows him flexibility to move towards peace. Reframing can also be used as a face-saving tool to convince your own constituency that you are not abandoning your cause. In turn, this may allow both sides to frame the compromise as a “victory” while also shifting strategy without having to denounce the past.
- c. Promote grassroots ownership: invest in direct communication and consultation with bases of support; actively seek to prepare people for peace.
- d. Rely on internal “agents of change”: involve credible trustworthy supporters like community leaders or former prisoners where relevant.

- e. Involve external “critical friends” to support militant groups in sustaining their transition to “civilianization” and to facilitate communication with other actors.
- f. Develop the community around combatants: offer alternative roles and ways to demonstrate loyalty. Accordingly, the process should focus on creating viable and sustainable re-integration programs that address former combatants’ financial needs, political identity, and psychological well-being; as Mason has coined it, “decommission people’s minds, not only their weapons” by providing combatants with nonviolent community management approaches.
- g. Recognize that consensus building for every step takes time. Consensus building must be seen as continuous and dynamic processes (even 17 years post-agreement), for implementation and beyond. The question should not just be how to reach a deal, but also how to create conditions for negotiations and how to keep that initial consensus for a peace agreement after the peace is signed. Thus, a long-term consensus building strategy is needed.

While each of these points needs to be further developed and put into context, it is clear that Northern Irish Loyalists’ transformation to peace represents an important and powerful legacy, as well as cautious tale of hope with respect to managing and potentially resolving long-standing, embedded, and bitter internal conflicts.

Notes

- 1 “UVF Statement in full,” *BBC News*, May 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/6618365.stm.
- 2 Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee J. M. Seymour, “A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars,” *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 2 (2012): 266.
- 3 See Jannie Lilja, “Outbidding and the Decision to Negotiate,” in *The Slippery Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder*, eds. I. Zartman, M. Anstey, and P. Meerts (Oxford Scholarship Online, DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199791743.001.0001, January 2012).
- 4 Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” in *Terrorism Research and Public Policy*, ed. Clark McCauley (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 80-81.

- 5 See Gavin Moore, Neophytos Loizides, Nukhet A. Sandal, and Alexandros Lordos, "Winning Peace Frames: Intra-Ethnic Outbidding in Northern Ireland and Cyprus," *West European Politics* 37, no. 1 (2014): 159-81.
- 6 Benedetta Berti, *Armed Political Organization: From Conflict to Integration* (Washington: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), pp. 131-33.
- 7 David McKittrick and David McVea, *Making Sense of the Troubles* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 331.
- 8 Debbie Watters, co-founder of Northern Ireland Alternatives and member of Northern Ireland Policing Board, Interview with Ariel Heifetz Knobel, Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 2010.
- 9 Paul Hoey, former UVF Interlocutor to the International Commission on Decommissioning; Ulster Volunteer Force ex-prisoner, Interview with Ariel Heifetz Knobel, Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 2010.
- 10 Watters interview with Ariel Heifetz Knobel.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Ed Moloney, *Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland* (New York: PublicAffairs™ Perseus Books Group, 2010), p. 408.
- 13 Tom Roberts, Director of Ex-Prisoners Interpretative Center; Ulster Volunteer Force ex-prisoner, Interview with Ariel Heifetz Knobel, Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 2010.
- 14 Jim Wilson, former peace talks negotiator for Progressive Unionist Party; Red Hand Commando ex-prisoner, Interview with Ariel Heifetz Knobel, Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 2010.
- 15 Brian Rowan, *Behind the Lines: the Story of the IRA and Loyalist Ceasefires* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1995), pp. 134-35.
- 16 Ibid., pp. 119-20.
- 17 Ibid., p. 121.
- 18 Plum Smith, co-founder of Red Hand Commando and ex-prisoner, Remarks made on community panel, *Feile an Phobail*, attended by Ariel Heifetz Knobel, Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 2010.
- 19 Rowan, *Behind the Lines*, p. 120.
- 20 Brian Rowan, *How the Peace Was Won* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan Press, 2008), p. 223.
- 21 Ulster Volunteer Force / Red Hand Commando Endgame Statement on May 3, 2007, reprinted in Rowan, *How the Peace Was Won*, p. 221.
- 22 Unnamed Loyalist, Interview with Ariel Heifetz Knobel, Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 2010.

- 23 Paul Hoey, former UVF Interlocutor to the International Commission on Decommissioning; Ulster Volunteer Force ex-prisoner, Interview with Ariel Heifetz Knobel, Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 2010.
- 24 Unnamed Loyalist, Interview with Ariel Heifetz Knobel, Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 2010.
- 25 Gary Mason, Public lectures attended by Ariel Heifetz Knobel, Boston, Massachusetts, November 2011.
- 26 Clem McCartney, “The Role of Civil Society,” *Accord*, Conciliation Resources, 1999, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-ireland/civil-society.php>.
- 27 Smith, Remarks made on community panel, *Feile an Phobail*.
- 28 Unnamed Loyalist, Interview with Ariel Heifetz Knobel, Belfast, Northern Ireland, August 2010.
- 29 Mason, Public lectures.
- 30 “Action for Community Transformation: The ACT Initiative Policy Document,” in “Bone of our Bone. Flesh of our Flesh”: A Forum for Former UVF/RHC Political Prisoners! http://www.longkeshinsideout.co.uk/?page_id=12.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 “Action for Community Transformation: The Demobilisation and Reintegration of the Ulster Volunteer Force & Red Hand Commando,” Position Paper, Belfast, 2015.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Gary Mason, Methodist Reverend of East Belfast Mission and intermediary to Loyalist paramilitaries, Interview with Ariel Heifetz Knobel, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 2010.
- 39 McCartney, “The Role of Civil Society.”
- 40 Geoffrey Corry, “Overview of Peace Process Concepts from the Perspective of a Practitioner,” unpublished paper, 2007, revised with Patrick Hynes, Dublin, 2009, p. 9.
- 41 Mason interview with Ariel Heifetz Knobel.