

Alternatives for the Gaza Strip Following the Campaign Against Iran

Ofar Guterman and Udi Dekel | June 10, 2026

Key Takeaways

As the campaign against Iran winds down, attention is expected to return to the Gaza Strip. In the meantime, Hamas is exploiting the strategic vacuum to rehabilitate its governance and military capabilities. Simultaneously, the Trump framework remains stalled, and the “Board of Peace” faces professional, operational, and budgetary difficulties in advancing its declared objectives. The issue of demilitarization remains trapped between Israel's demand for the complete and immediate disarmament of Hamas and the organization's stalling tactics.

Israel faces three main alternatives: (1) Renewal of efforts to fully implement the Trump framework across the Strip, a course that carries the risk of “mock demilitarization” and depends on Hamas’s consent; (2) Gradual stabilization and reconstruction of areas cleared of Hamas while continuing to erode its control in areas still under its rule. This option is vulnerable to violent disruption and could entrench the Strip’s division; (3) A return to war and the reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, which would entail extremely heavy military, economic, and diplomatic costs for Israel.

The key recommendation is to avoid perpetuating the status quo, which establishes Hamas's rule, and instead adopt a proactive approach. Israel should allow the implementation of the Mladenov framework for gradual demilitarization, beginning with heavy weapons, while coordinating with the Trump administration regarding scenarios that would justify use of force. If Hamas obstructs the process, Israel should implement a differential alternative: the entry of a civilian committee and Palestinian police into “green zones” cleared of Hamas (alongside increasing Israeli security responsibility modeled on Judea and Samaria). Simultaneously, Hamas’s capabilities and governance in the “red zone” should be systematically degraded, including the gradual erosion of its territorial control. The alternative of returning to war and military occupation should remain a

last-resort alternative, contingent on the formulation of an exit strategy and a designated body to assume civilian responsibility.

The Gaza Strip After the Campaign in Iran

As the campaign against Iran ("Roaring Lion" / "Epic Fury") subsides, the diversion of regional and international focus has left a strategic vacuum in Gaza. Hamas has fully exploited this window to reject the Mladenov demilitarization framework, bypass the 60-day disarmament requirement, and rapidly restore its civil and military frameworks. A central pillar of its survival is the systematic takeover of humanitarian aid, funding its governance and maintaining population dependence.

Conversely, Israeli policy remains limited. While the IDF maintains operational freedom in the "green zone" and has slightly expanded its presence past the "Yellow Line" into the "Orange Line," it rarely targets Hamas infrastructure deep within the "red zone." This de-facto partition allows Hamas to retain its grip on the population without constant friction with Israel.

In the background, a severe humanitarian and infrastructural reality persists in the Strip, weighing heavily on any future governing arrangement even if conditions do not amount to a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe. According to an [April 2026 World Bank](#) report, direct infrastructure damage is estimated at \$35.2 billion, with over 60% of housing units damaged, 1.9 million Gazans displaced, and 68 million tons of debris contaminated with unexploded ordnance. Total rehabilitation needs are estimated at [more than \\$70 billion](#).

The Palestinian Authority has a designated role in advancing the Trump framework, yet it has adopted a deliberate strategy of waiting. Abu Mazen has refrained from jumping into the "sickbed" of civilian administration in the Gaza Strip at this stage, observing the implementation difficulties surrounding the Trump framework while setting stringent conditions for the Authority's return. In the background is the understanding that Israel has little interest in allowing the Palestinian Authority to regain a foothold in the Strip, alongside the Authority's own focus on preserving its standing in Judea and Samaria amid mounting pressure from Israel. The PA also fears that the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG)—a competing technocratic model—could eventually be applied to Judea and Samaria at its expense.

The lack of progress in the Trump plan also stems from the institutionalization difficulties facing the "Board of Peace" (BoP), which suffers from acute operational problems, funding gaps, and delays in establishing both the International Stabilization Force (ISF) and the Palestinian policing apparatus needed to enforce public order.

The Status of Negotiations on Phase II of the Trump Plan

Despite the diversion of attention toward the campaign against Iran, the Trump administration remains committed to advancing its 20-point plan ([UNSC Resolution 2803](#)) for stabilizing the Gaza Strip. At the center of the negotiations stands a five-stage plan formulated by the head of

the executive committee of the "Board of Peace" for Gaza, Nickolay Mladenov, addressing Phase II of Trump's plan and including the following principles:

- **Deployment and transfer of responsibility.** Shifting civil and security authority to the NCAG and Palestinian police, alongside the deployment of the International Stabilization Force (ISF).
- **Phased disarmament.** Beginning with heavy weaponry (rockets and explosive devices), tunnels, and weapons production and assembly facilities; addressing small arms at a later stage.
- **Alignment between the pace of demilitarization and the pace of IDF withdrawal.**
- **Defined steps for verifying disarmament** through the ISF. Establishment of a security committee responsible for the registration and collection of small arms.
- **Amnesty tracks.** Reintegration of former militants into civilian life.
- Other clauses stipulate that the entry of rehabilitation materials into the Gaza Strip, including dual-use materials, will be permitted only in areas controlled by the NCAG and where disarmament has been verified.

At the core of the framework is the pursuit of a "one authority – one law – one weapon" model: removing Hamas and the factions from any direct or indirect control over the Gaza Strip, halting their military activity, collecting and registering weapons, integrating operatives into the police force following background checks, and providing others with compensation or civilian roles. The logic underlying the plan is that demilitarization will eliminate the security rationale for restrictions on Gaza, opening the way for rehabilitation, freer movement, crossings, housing, and infrastructure.

While refraining from outright rejection, Hamas insists that implementation of Phase I commitments—including halting attacks, withdrawing west of the "Yellow Line," allowing humanitarian access, dismantling Israeli-backed clans, and initiating reconstruction—must precede any disarmament process. At the same time, it seeks to preserve a role in future governance, policing, and reconstruction mechanisms, and strongly opposes relinquishing its operatives' personal weapons.

Israel, for its part, opposes the initial focus on heavy weapons alone, rejects the idea of "flexibility in timelines," which from its perspective contradicts the demand for rapid and complete demilitarization, and refuses to withdraw its forces as long as the demilitarization process is not tangible and effective.

The gap between Hamas's expectation of integrating into governing mechanisms while retaining small arms and Israel's demand for full demilitarization renders the implementation of the framework in its current form unfeasible and necessitates the examination of alternatives. In response, according to open media reports, Mladenov, acting on behalf of the BoP, has begun considering a "Plan B"—a differential alternative based on

Article 17 of the Twenty-Point Plan that would allow partial implementation in areas cleared of Hamas, even without the organization's consent.

Actor Analysis: Interests and Positions Based on Insights from Simulations

The primary obstacle to implementing the Trump framework is a fundamental BATNA problem (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), shared by Israel and Hamas. A recent simulation conducted at the **Institute for National Security Studies** demonstrated that Israel, Hamas, and the PA all prefer the status quo to the risks associated with full implementation of the framework. Given the mutual distrust and rigid demands, Israel prefers maintaining an enhanced security presence in the "green zone," while Hamas prefers retaining control in the "red zone" rather than disarming. At the same time, the campaigns in Iran and Lebanon have altered the broader regional context and affected the constraints of the principal actors:

Israel: The conclusion of the northern and eastern campaigns reinforces Israel's insistence on complete demilitarization before reconstruction, and operational freedom to prevent renewed military buildup.

Hamas: Organizational survival remains Hamas's primary objective. It is prepared to show "tactical flexibility" on heavy weapons, but continues to resist conditioning reconstruction on disarmament and seeks to embed itself within any future governing mechanism in Gaza.

United States: The Trump administration requires visible and tangible progress and is likely to become increasingly impatient with prolonged deadlock. It may also tighten timelines, legitimize Israeli operational freedom in response to non-compliance, and show openness to regional initiatives that do not necessarily align with Israel's security interests.

Palestinian Authority: Abu Mazen continues to pursue a strategy of waiting, and is likely to demand a formally anchored role in any future governing structure in Gaza to safeguard its long-term political relevance.

Regional actors:

- **Turkey & Qatar:** Both nations remain committed to preserving Hamas as a legitimate political actor and oppose conditioning reconstruction on full disarmament. They are expected to leverage their direct diplomatic access to the Trump administration to pressure the BoP into accepting arrangements more favorable to Hamas.
- **The United Arab Emirates:** Though its attention is currently directed toward developments in the Gulf, the UAE is positioned to counter negative Turkish/Qatari influence and assume a leading role in reconstruction efforts. However, it conditions its involvement on verifiable demilitarization and a clear political horizon.
- **Egypt:** Due to direct border security concerns, Egypt remains highly committed to advancing the Trump framework yet seeks to maintain its regional influence, insisting on its role as the primary mediation channel and its control over the Rafah crossing.

Systemic Dynamics and Broad Insights

Beyond the individual interests of each actor, the simulations revealed several structural points of tension that are likely to shape the prospects for implementation:

- **Asymmetry in the time dimension.** Disarmament processes typically require 8–10 years, whereas the U.S. administration demands rapid, visible results. At the same time, Israel is unlikely to soften its demands, at least until elections, and will not tolerate a long-term reality in which Hamas remains involved in governing the Strip. This gap plays directly into Hamas's stalling strategy and risks pressuring the BoP into premature reconstruction before effective demilitarization has been achieved.
- **Paradoxes of governance.** The NCAG lacks a legitimate monopoly on political and military power. Yet its very weakness may make it a viable consensus framework, provided it is granted authority over aid distribution, utilities, education, and public order. However, the PA remains caught between supporting the model and viewing its success as a potential long-term threat to its rule in Judea and Samaria.
- **The scale of destruction in Gaza.** Extensive damage to housing, health, infrastructure, agriculture, and employment constitutes a significant source of leverage. If rehabilitation is conditioned on local demilitarization benchmarks and creates a visible contrast between progressing "green zones" and stagnant "red zones," it is likely to spark tangible political pressure against Hamas.
- **The absence of a crisis-management mechanism.** The BoP lacks a built-in mechanism for managing crises and violations. The challenge is to apply diplomatic and economic pressure without triggering renewed violence. Success will depend on creating incentives for compliance and mechanisms for de-escalation when tensions inevitably arise.
- **Regional counterweights.** Neutralizing the disruptive influence of Qatar and Turkey requires deeper involvement from Egypt and the UAE. Egypt is uniquely positioned to offset Turkish encroachment on the ground, as Cairo views a growing Turkish presence in its Gaza backyard unfavorably—though its membership in the Muslim Quartet may limit its diplomatic maneuvering. Meanwhile, the UAE could serve as an effective counterweight to Qatari influence in Washington, leveraging the Emirati royal family's deep ties with the Trump administration and its stabilizing conduct during the campaign against Iran. Activating this axis, however, remains contingent on Israel presenting a credible political horizon.
- **The financial campaign.** Hamas's ability to capture revenue from humanitarian aid, local taxation, black-market activity, and reconstruction funds remains a critical source of organizational resilience. Without a systemic effort to ensure that funding reaches its intended projects, the organization is likely to continue siphoning resources through extortion and "protection" networks, including in rehabilitated "green zones."

Alternatives to Continuing the Implementation of Phase II

The deep barriers, the difficulties surrounding the negotiations, and the shared preference of both Israel and Hamas to preserve the new status quo are contributing to the entrenchment of Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip and to the erosion of the legitimacy of the American plan as a whole. Therefore, for Israel and Hamas, this currently represents the more convenient alternative. However, Israel must examine alternative strategies for advancing Phase II, in order to take the initiative into its own hands in alignment with the political timeline of the Trump administration (and of Israel's own government during an election year), which may demand rapid achievements after the campaign against Iran. The following is an analysis of the available alternatives—their advantages, their inherent risks, and the conditions required for their implementation—with the aim of creating a political-stabilization horizon that would make the continued entrenchment of Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip more difficult.

Alternative A: Full Implementation of the Trump Plan

The Strategy

The strategy envisions pushing the technocratic committee (NCAG) to enter and assume responsibility for the entire Gaza Strip, backed by Palestinian police and security forces (estimated at approximately 15,000 personnel, including forces transferred from Judea and Samaria), alongside the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), all on the basis of intra-Palestinian agreement. The demilitarization process would proceed in parallel with the rehabilitation of vital infrastructure and would rely on an agreed framework, centered on the voluntary handover of offensive weaponry to the NCAG. The Palestinian policing forces would be granted full enforcement authority, while the ISF would be tasked with operational mentoring, supervision, and verification.

Logic and Advantages

This model would likely enjoy broad legitimacy among the Palestinian public as well as among regional and international actors, prevent a governing vacuum, and potentially reduce local resistance within Gaza. Should the model fail — primarily due to Hamas's refusal to disarm — Israel would gain greater legitimacy to transition to more forceful alternatives. Operationally, local Palestinian forces possess a clear tactical and intelligence advantage: their familiarity with the terrain, the social and clan-based structure, and the operational patterns of the armed organizations could enable a more effective disarmament process. Beyond this, the establishment of a stable and moderate governing authority would likely encourage broad regional and international financial support for reconstruction efforts.

Preconditions

Launching this alternative would require coordinated and substantial regional pressure on Hamas, offering the organization a path to political survival in exchange for a tangible concession of its military capabilities. A dedicated international-regional fund must be

established to channel funding for the rehabilitation of vital infrastructure, conditioned on compliance with demilitarization benchmarks. For Israel, the critical prerequisite would be a willingness to make a conceptual compromise: removing its veto on the involvement of Palestinian Authority institutions and acquiescing to Hamas's survival as a social-political movement, though not as a terrorist/military organization. In addition, extensive security vetting and training for the Palestinian police forces would be required, alongside the establishment of a tightly supervised mechanism governing the entry of reconstruction and dual-use materials into the Strip.

Risks and Costs

The central weakness of this alternative lies in its political complexity and its complete dependence on Hamas agreeing to disarm, alongside Israeli flexibility that would include IDF withdrawal from areas currently held as security zones in the Strip and would allow the start of rehabilitation prior to full demilitarization. This creates a tangible risk of a "mock demilitarization" similar to the Hezbollah model — a situation in which Hamas tactically agrees to relieve pressure and buy time, while preserving indirect control, infiltrating the new governing mechanisms, concealing military infrastructure, and avoiding any genuine dismantlement of its capabilities. In addition, both the NCAG and the Palestinian Authority suffer from structural weakness, which could undermine their ability to withstand internal pressure from terrorist organizations on the one hand and from the Gazan population and armed clans on the other. Alongside these, Israel's political circumstances on the eve of elections render this alternative unrealistic in the short term.

Risk Mitigation

To neutralize the danger of mock demilitarization, effective monitoring and verification by the ISF must be established, alongside coordinated economic and political pressure levers from the international and regional community, backed by firm guarantees from regional states. The rehabilitation fund should be structured in such a way that the flow of funds is conditioned on meeting demilitarization milestones, ISF verification, and American oversight. Above all, Israel must ensure the preservation of its security freedom of action to conduct preventive operations in response to the identification of concrete threats, violations, or renewed Hamas military buildup disguised under civilian cover.

Alternative B: Differential (Rehabilitation in the "Green Zone" and Erosion of Hamas in the "Red Zone")

The Strategy

This alternative envisions implementing Phase II of the Trump framework gradually and only in areas where the IDF has completed the clearing of terrorist infrastructure ("the green zone"), while simultaneously degrading Hamas's capabilities and eroding its governance in the "red zone" through raid operations, attrition by fire, and the gradual chipping away of territory under Hamas control. In the "green zones," civilian authorities and internal security responsibilities would be transferred to the NCAG and the Palestinian police. The IDF would then withdraw to

a reduced security perimeter from the Yellow Line while retaining expanded security responsibility. As these areas are rehabilitated, efforts could be made to encourage the movement of the Palestinian population from the Hamas-controlled "red zone" into the rehabilitated areas.

Logic and Advantages

This alternative is designed to break the deadlock and create a competing civilian model to Hamas in the "green zone," while increasing the likelihood of the NCAG's success in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. At the same time, sustained military pressure would continue in order to gradually erode Hamas's demographic, territorial, and military hold over the "red zone." In parallel, under NCAG leadership and with Israeli approval, the transfer of populations not identified with Hamas into the "green zone" would be permitted. Accelerated reconstruction and the development of sustainable living solutions in these areas would create a demographic incentive for the voluntary relocation of screened and approved populations, under NCAG responsibility, from the "red zone." To the extent that the "red zone" offers fewer opportunities for recovery and rehabilitation for Gaza's population, Hamas's bargaining power would erode. Gazans would be presented with an alternative and more effective path for improving their living conditions, while enabling the gradual encroachment upon the "red zones," their clearance, and their eventual transformation into "green zones."

Preconditions

This alternative would require full American support and backing; Israeli willingness to transfer civilian authorities in the cleared areas to the NCAG and to grant operational space to the Palestinian police force; guaranteed and reliable funding for reconstruction projects in the "green zone" without waiting for the disarmament of the entire Gaza Strip; and the establishment of security-screening mechanisms that would enable the controlled transfer of populations (including workers and their families) from the "red zone" to the "green zone."

Risks and Costs

The critical risk inherent in this alternative is the perpetuation of the status quo and the transformation of Hamas into a permanent de facto sovereign in the "red zone," alongside the continuous spillover of terrorism into reconstruction areas in a deliberate attempt to sabotage them. This intermediate state would make it difficult to mobilize the resources and aid required from regional and international systems. Furthermore, the move carries the danger of a worsening humanitarian situation in the "red zone," which could trigger international pressure to halt military operations there and demands to initiate reconstruction, even in the absence of disarmament.

Risk Mitigation

The central risk in the differential alternative is that Hamas would adopt a strategy of violent disruption against the green zone: rocket fire, the planting of explosive devices, infiltrations, attacks on reconstruction workers, extortion of contractors, and attempts to portray the model as unworkable. For this reason, it will not be sufficient merely to establish a civilian

reconstruction zone. Instead, efforts should be made to integrate Arab states, particularly Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, into the administration of the zone, making it more difficult for Hamas to operate against it for fear of harming those states' interests.

Israel should reach prior understandings with the United States and with the ISF mechanism regarding a defined list of "fundamental violations" that would grant it immediate freedom of action against sources of the threat, while ensuring continuity of reconstruction efforts even after attacks occur. The guiding principle should be that Hamas must be denied any veto power through the use of violence: every attempt at disruption should result not in the suspension of the project, but rather in deeper security measures, accelerated reconstruction, and precise strikes against Hamas assets.

Because the threat to the "green zone" would stem not only from physical terrorism but also from indirect Hamas infiltration into the reconstruction economy, an integrated economic-intelligence effort would be required to prevent Hamas operatives from penetrating the ranks of contractors, suppliers, distribution mechanisms, and funding channels.

Alternative C: Return to Fighting — Hamas' Military Defeat and Forced Demilitarization

The Strategy

The strategy involves a return to a broad military campaign and the full occupation of the Gaza Strip in order to disarm Hamas and dismantle its military wing, while temporarily assuming civilian responsibility for the Palestinian population. The goal would be the physical and complete dismantlement of Hamas's capabilities and the destruction of manufacturing infrastructure, weapons laboratories, and tunnel networks throughout the Strip. There is a risk that, once the territory has been cleared, no viable Palestinian entity will be available to assume responsibility and prevent Hamas's resurgence.

Logic and Advantages

This alternative rests on a lack of confidence in the ability of any non-military option to bring about effective demilitarization of the Gaza Strip and prevent Hamas from surviving and rebuilding its power after October 7. The move would restore the IDF's full operational freedom, as there are no longer hostages held in the Strip.

Following the campaign against Iran, Israel would frame the Gaza Strip as an "Iranian front" that must be dismantled, and seek to prevent the emergence of an ambiguous "Lebanese model" on its southern border. The objective would be to create a "blank slate" that would allow implementation of the Trump framework under more favorable conditions.

Preconditions

Initiating such a move would require a proven and well-documented failure of the demilitarization process under the Trump framework, alongside regional and international recognition that Hamas sabotaged the plan and is rapidly rebuilding its capabilities, combined with the demonstrated helplessness of the ISF and the Palestinian police. A critical prerequisite

would be obtaining legitimacy, or at least a quiet “green light,” from the Trump administration. Following the campaign against Iran, Trump’s diminishing patience with Hamas’s stalling tactics could provide Israel with the necessary legitimacy to employ force. In addition, the IDF would require a high degree of operational readiness and preparedness for a prolonged campaign (contingent on the situation in Lebanon and Judea and Samaria).

Risks and Costs

The most severe strategic risk is becoming “mired in the Gazan quagmire,” bearing the cumulative costs of a prolonged wartime reality across multiple arenas and the continued attrition of IDF forces. Full control over the Gaza Strip would impose an unbearable economic and humanitarian burden on Israel through the assumption of civilian responsibility for more than two million residents, without a clear future address to which authority could later be transferred.

Furthermore, such a move could deepen the internal rift within Israel, lead to international isolation and a continued erosion of global public opinion against Israel, cause further deterioration in relations with regional states, freeze prospects for expanding the 'Abraham Accords,' and create dangerous strategic friction with the Trump administration as well as any future U.S. administration.

Risk Mitigation

This alternative should be preserved strictly as a Plan B and activated only after all other options have been exhausted. In order to reduce diplomatic friction, the campaign should be framed as a “temporary demilitarization operation” coordinated with the United States, rather than as a permanent occupation, and certainly not as a settlement project.

The key to mitigating the risk of the “Gazan quagmire” lies in preparing an orderly exit strategy: advance coordination for the rapid transfer of authority to the NCAG and the Palestinian policing force (backed by the ISF), in stages corresponding to the completion of military clearing operations in each sector of the Strip.

Implications and Recommendations

Following the campaign against Iran, Israel will find itself at a strategic crossroads regarding the future of the Gaza Strip. Avoiding decisive choices will leave Gaza as an active arena of terrorism and combat, while risking the loss of American legitimacy for continued military operations. An analysis of the alternatives and the realities on the ground points to four central insights regarding Israel’s strategic room for maneuver:

- **Preserving the current situation is tantamount to perpetuating Hamas rule.** The passive choice to continue managing the conflict in its current form—without creating a governing alternative—serves Hamas’s interests. It will allow the organization to continue rebuilding itself under the guise of the humanitarian crisis, seize control of resources, rebuild its strength, and entrench itself as a *fait accompli* and a *de facto* sovereign on the ground.

- **Full implementation of the Trump framework in a single sweeping move is futile.** The expectation for a simultaneous, full implementation of the Trump plan across the entire Strip, based on the belief that Hamas will voluntarily disarm and permit a smooth transfer of power to the NCAG, is detached from reality. In the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism, such an approach will lead to a “mock demilitarization.”
- **The military alternative will exact heavy and unnecessary costs.** A return to intensive warfare and the reoccupation of the Gaza Strip would risk drawing Israel into a “Gazan quagmire” and impose an enormous economic and civilian burden associated with governing a population of more than two million people in a devastated environment. This alternative could generate severe diplomatic friction with the United States, regional states, and the broader international community, and should therefore be avoided as much as possible.
- **The weakness of the "Board of Peace" architecture.** Currently, the "Board of Peace" (BoP) suffers from institutional, operational, financial, and human-resource deficiencies. The Board lacks the necessary financial resources (against [reconstruction needs exceeding \\$70 billion](#)), as well as sustained political attention and operational expertise on the ground. Difficulties are also emerging in recruiting and training operational forces (including the ISF and the Palestinian police force). Under current conditions, these bodies are incapable of carrying out the far-reaching ambitions of the Trump framework.

What Might Convince Hamas to Agree to Demilitarization?

Hamas is unlikely to accept rapid and comprehensive disarmament under the conditions currently demanded by Israel. However, its position could become more flexible if the process is phased, linked to tangible improvements on the ground, and accompanied by credible guarantees regarding the future status of its personnel and institutions. The most plausible scenario for shifting Hamas’s position includes five components: (1) tangible implementation of Phase I before any demand for irreversible disarmament, including a halt to attacks, expanded humanitarian aid, the opening of crossings, defined IDF withdrawals, and the entry of the NCAG into the Gaza Strip; (2) immediate humanitarian stabilization measures, such as operating the power plant, bringing in trailers and caravans, and enabling broad humanitarian assistance; (3) a phased approach beginning with heavy weapons rather than small arms; (4) a survival mechanism for Hamas personnel, including amnesty tracks, civilian integration, positions within public services, and vetted integration into policing structures. Without a solution for thousands of operatives, Hamas would fear a self-dismantling that leads to persecution, assassinations, internal revenge, or loss of livelihood; and (5) external guarantees that do not depend solely on Israel, meaning Hamas will require Egyptian, Qatari, Turkish, and American assurances.

In order to halt Hamas's military buildup and create an improved security and civilian reality, a paradigm shift in Israeli policy is required, based on the following recommendations:

- **Commit to the renewal of the Trump framework's implementation.** Allow Mladenov to advance his plan while persuading Hamas to accept the entry of the NCAG and the dismantling of heavy and offensive weapons in the initial stage. This would require three conditions: reducing Israeli strikes except where necessary to prevent concrete terrorist threats; beginning the process with heavy weapons rather than small arms; and presenting the NCAG not as a mechanism for replacing Hamas, but as a Palestinian technocratic framework for reconstruction. In parallel, a pathway for the civilian integration of some Hamas operatives should be established. By contrast, a demand for complete disarmament before withdrawals, reconstruction, and guarantees are provided would likely be perceived by Hamas as a trap and encourage continued stalling, enabling it to infiltrate the emerging mechanisms without relinquishing its real power.
- **Actively advance the differential alternative.** Israel should adopt a policy shift and demonstrate proactive support for implementing the Trump framework through a differential model. This should begin with the establishment of a governing model in the "green zones" (for example, in Rafah and the northern perimeter) through the NCAG, while accelerating targeted reconstruction efforts and drawing the population away from Hamas-controlled areas, alongside hermetic security for the rehabilitated zones and the continued degradation of Hamas's capabilities.
- **Define effective demilitarization.** Israel must give clear and stringent substance to the concept of effective disarmament and reach prior understandings with the Trump administration regarding which Hamas actions would constitute a "fundamental violation" of the agreement. Such a list (which would include, for instance, weapons manufacturing or the reconstruction of tunnels) would grant Israel automatic legitimacy to employ force without being perceived as having sabotaged the framework or having exploited an opportunity to take control of "red zones" and transform them into "green zones" cleared of terrorist infrastructure.
- **Strengthen the economic campaign.** Physical demilitarization must be backed by financial strangulation. Israel and the international community must establish strict funding mechanisms for Trump framework projects and the NCAG, while simultaneously blocking Hamas's funding channels, particularly its ability to humanitarian aid and impose taxes and protection fees on humanitarian assistance and the local economy.
- **Provide a political horizon as a foundation for regional support.** The success of reconstruction—and particularly the willingness of moderate Arab states, specifically the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, to assume responsibility instead of Qatar and Turkey—requires Israel to present an official commitment to a political horizon and to cease rejecting the Palestinian Authority as a partner in establishing post-Hamas governance in the Gaza Strip (as no better alternative exists). Without such a horizon, Israel will bear the burden of managing the Strip entirely on its own.

- **Reserve the military alternative as a last resort.** The option of returning to full-scale war should be preserved solely as a final fallback alternative. It should be activated only following careful strategic planning that includes a clear exit strategy and a practical, effective address for transferring civilian responsibility, and only if it becomes evident that all civilian and international alternatives for clearing the Gaza Strip of Hamas and other armed actors have completely failed.