

The Misleading Reports of the UN Over Famine in Gaza

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Since the beginning of the war, the UN has been releasing reports and updates regarding the humanitarian situation in Gaza, showing a dire picture of a shortage of humanitarian aid, a severe nutritional crisis, and even the spread of famine in the area. A close examination of these reports, based on the UN's own clarifications, shows that they portray an inaccurate and partial picture of the aid entering the Gaza Strip. The reports are based on incomplete data from sources in Gaza and disregard significant portions of aid shipments entering the Strip as well as the complex situation on the ground. These reports have been used as a basis for allegations that Israel is preventing the entry of humanitarian aid in order to starve the population of the Gaza Strip, along with severe accusations of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even genocide.

Introduction

The humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is at the center of a campaign against Israel in the international arena. As part of this campaign, Israel is accused of blocking humanitarian aid and even following a policy of deliberate starvation of the Palestinian population. The basis of these accusations is the reports and regular updates on the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip published by the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The reports paint a harsh picture of insufficient humanitarian aid and a severe nutritional crisis. Another important source is the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) report that declared in March that "famine is imminent" in northern Gaza and was expected to spread in the Strip.

Israel publishes its own regular reports and updates through the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT). These reports include data on the extent of aid entering the Strip and Israel's humanitarian efforts. A comparison of the two sets of reports shows significant discrepancies between the figures provided by COGAT and the UN. An examination of the reason for these gaps reveals that the UN reports are based on incomplete data from sources within Gaza, without disclosing the source of the data and the fact that the figures do not

reflect all the aid entering the Strip. Thus, the UN reports have knowingly created a distorted picture of the situation and led to unfounded accusations against Israel of intentionally causing starvation. Consequently, the UN reports have inaccurately portrayed the situation leading to unjustified accusations against Israel of implementing a policy of starvation.

The Allegation That Israel Is Blocking Humanitarian Aid and Causing Famine

The main claim directed against Israel in the humanitarian context is that it prevents the population from receiving humanitarian aid as part of a policy of starvation through the restrictions Israel imposes on two levels—both on the entry of aid into the Gaza Strip and on its distribution to the population.

These accusations rely on reports prepared by the UN and other international organizations. Since the beginning of the war, the UN's OCHA has published [regular updates](#) on the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. The OCHA website's "reported impact snapshot" provides information such as casualty numbers, humanitarian mission access, nutrition, food security, and incoming truckloads. According to the figures published by the UN, insufficient aid is entering Gaza, and its distribution to the population is facing significant challenges. The UN reports present a harsh picture of shortages and a nutritional crisis that could lead to the spread of famine.

Another central source of these allegations is the March IPC report, which projected—using OCHA figures as its primary source—that famine would occur in the north by May and would spread to the rest of Gaza by July 2024.

The IPC is a joint initiative of countries, UN agencies, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) established in 2004 to assess and address worldwide nutritional insecurity and malnutrition crises. The IPC index classifies the severity of situations into one of five stages, the last three of which progress from "crisis" (Phase 3) to "emergency" (Phase 4) to "catastrophic" and "famine" (Phase 5)—the most severe stage on the IPC scale. To officially declare famine in a specific area, there must be evidence of at least 20% of households in Phase 5, 30% of children must be suffering from acute malnutrition, and two adult or four child deaths for every 10,000 (adult/children) per day from starvation or the interaction of malnutrition and disease.

In December 2023, the IPC published its first report [warning](#) that famine would occur by the end of May 2024 without an immediate ceasefire and sustained access for the provision of essential supplies and services. On March 18, 2024, the IPC published its second analysis, [confirming](#) that "famine is imminent"—classified

as Phase 5 (“famine”)—and would take place in the north of the Strip between March and May 2024 and then spread to the rest of Gaza. According to the report, the entire Gazan population (2.23 million people) is facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Between March and July, half the population (1.11 million people) is expected to face a “catastrophic condition” of famine (Phase 5), an increase of 530,000 people (92%) compared to the December report. During this period, around 400,000 more people are expected to move into Phase 5. The rest of the population faces “emergency” (Phase 4) (854,000 people or 38% of the population) or “crisis” (Phase 3) (265,000 people or 12% of the population).

OCHA’s data and the IPC findings were echoed in statements and reports from UN personnel, who warned that thousands in Gaza would die of hunger unless an immediate ceasefire was achieved. They were widely spread on social media, in international news outlets, and at protests, taking over the international discourse. Moreover, they formed the basis for resolutions passed by the Security Council concerning Israel and directly impacted the legal steps taken against it in international courts.

On all three occasions when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued provisional measures against Israel in the [case](#) filed by South Africa concerning the application of the Genocide Convention, the majority of judges based their opinion on reports by the UN and its agencies, senior UN officials, as well as the IPC report’s famine prediction. This included quoting a [statement](#) by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres that the situation in Gaza was classified as “catastrophic” (stage 5) and that it had the highest number of people facing hunger ever recorded by the IPC; and a [statement](#) by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk who accused Israel of imposing extensive restrictions on the entry and distribution of humanitarian aid and commercial goods, leading to hunger, starvation, and famine.

The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Karim Khan, also focused his request for arrest warrants against Israel’s prime minister and minister of defense on suspicion of starving the population and [referred](#) to the words of the UN Secretary-General Guterres who cited the IPC findings that 1.1 million people in Gaza were facing “catastrophic hunger.”

Yet, upon reviewing these reports, it becomes evident that there are significant gaps between the data published by the UN and the figures shown by Israel in its own reports. Israeli reports indicate a much larger volume of aid entering Gaza, surpassing the minimum requirement. However, Israel’s reported figures are met with skepticism worldwide and even ignored by ICJ judges. An analysis of the

discrepancies in the data reveals that it is actually the UN figures that are inaccurate and misleading.

The Gaps in the Data

Israel publishes its own regular [reports and updates](#) through COGAT. These reports include aid data, broken down by type (food, water, medical equipment, shelter, miscellaneous), quantity, and route of entry into Gaza. They also provide a list of the countries and organizations that send aid, information about channels and corridors through which aid can be sent, medical response for the people in Gaza, and various humanitarian efforts made by Israel.

An analysis of the reports published by OCHA and COGAT reveals discrepancies and significant gaps in the data regarding the amount of aid entering the Strip. COGAT usually reports a larger quantity of aid trucks than OCHA, and the gaps between the two seem to be increasing each month.

In April, for example, the difference between OCHA and COGAT was 811 trucks. According to OCHA, 5,777 trucks entered that month, a daily average of 169 trucks bringing aid, while COGAT recorded 6,588 trucks, a daily average of 219 trucks. In May, the gap between the reports increased significantly, as OCHA reported 2,790 trucks while COGAT reported 6,359 trucks. This represents a gap of almost 4,000 trucks—the largest since the beginning of the war.

The total number of trucks that entered Gaza from the beginning of the war until the end of June is 28,818, according to OCHA, and 38,212, according to COGAT. This creates a discrepancy of almost 10,000 trucks for the entire period between OCHA's and COGAT's data.

It should be highlighted that, despite the monthly gaps, both OCHA and COGAT reported that the number of aid trucks nearly doubled between February and April 2024. These figures indicate a significant increase in the number of aid trucks since the beginning of the war. This is an important and relevant fact that counters the claims that Israel is deliberately withholding humanitarian aid, leading to starvation among the population.

In addition to the incoming truck data, discrepancies exist between OCHA's [reports](#) and COGAT's [reports](#) regarding access and movement of humanitarian missions and the distribution of aid throughout Gaza. However, the data on this subject presented by the two bodies is less comprehensive, especially regarding the exact characterization of the aid missions. Nonetheless, OCHA's data alone shows an increase in the number of aid missions in the Gaza Strip, which

contradicts the claim that Israel is working to prevent humanitarian aid from reaching the population.

The Source of the Gaps

An attempt to understand the reasons for the gaps and to locate the “missing” trucks from OCHA’s snapshots reveals that the UN reports are based on incomplete data from sources in Gaza.

As of October 7, 2023, UNRWA has taken over the responsibility of collecting data on humanitarian aid entering Gaza on behalf of the UN, after the OCHA data collection mechanism stopped operating. **UNRWA collects data only on aid entering Gaza via trucks through land crossings** at the southern border **at Kerem Shalom and Rafah**, where its representatives are stationed, **and only on trucks that they observed and registered** while present at the two locations. These facts emerge from a [disclaimer](#) that was added to OCHA’s snapshot in late April, stating that the figures only include “supplies observed or registered by the UN at Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings,” while “other incoming supplies are not currently captured.” This is critical information that should have been stated from the outset, especially when these figures are relied upon to blame Israel for trying to starve the population in Gaza.

By referring only to the aid observed by its representatives at specific crossings, the data submitted by UNRWA to the UN does not include aid that was air-dropped into the Gaza Strip nor aid arriving by sea through the US floating pier (JLOTS). It also does not include aid received through the Erez crossing in the north where UNRWA representatives are not stationed. Additionally, it ignores aid received at Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings collected by other aid organizations when UNRWA representatives are not present at the crossings. In this way, the data omits a significant amount of aid, including aid supplied by UN agencies, NGOs, and countries, as well as goods from the private sector, deliveries by the World Food Program (WFP), and flour deliveries to bakeries in northern Gaza. Supplies of gas and fuel are also not included in UNRWA figures.

As a result of this method, 1,000 aid trucks from UN agencies alone were missing from the OCHA reports in May compared to the reports of COGAT.

In contrast, **COGAT collects data and reports on all aid that enters the Gaza Strip, from all sources and through all crossings**, including aid from other countries, UN agencies, and other aid organizations, goods from the private sector, and aid arriving from the air, sea, and land crossings in the north of the Gaza Strip. One does not have to believe Israel to reach these figures.

The UN's heavy reliance on UNRWA data results in an inaccurate and biased representation of the aid flow into Gaza. This misrepresentation of the situation explains the significant gap of thousands of trucks between the UN and Israel reports documented in May. That month, the Rafah crossing was closed, and most aid entered the Strip through the Erez crossing in the north, which, as stated above, is not included in UNRWA data. UNRWA representatives were also absent from Kerem Shalom to receive aid. Furthermore, in May there was a larger volume of goods from the private sector. These goods are included in the COGAT data but not in the UNRWA data, which only includes aid received by UN agencies and aid organizations that use its services.

Moreover, according to COGAT, humanitarian aid agencies within the Strip are struggling to manage the growing volume of goods piling up on the Gaza side of the border crossings each day. On June 25, COGAT [reported](#) 1,500 trucks waiting for collection from Kerem Shalom and the floating pier. While COGAT counted these trucks, UNRWA did not. At times of high aid buildup at Kerem Shalom, the gaps in the numbers increase.

Over time, as the quantity of goods and aid entering the Strip has grown, the gap in the figures has become more significant. The extent of the difference apparently made it impossible for the UN to continue ignoring the additional trucks entering the Strip, obliging it to amend its data. At the end of May, the OCHA [reports](#) began to show figures from all land crossings, including from the private sector. The UN did not explain the reason for the change in data, apparently wishing to avoid clarifying the partial nature of its previous data.

The Problems with the UN Reports

More broadly, an in-depth analysis of the UN reports reveals a number of failures and defects:

Reliance on incomplete UNRWA data. The UN relies on UNRWA data without referring to the COGAT data and without attempting to resolve the discrepancy between the figures or acknowledging their existence. This was the case even as the gap grew wider with the entry of more goods and aid into the Strip. For many months, the UN has given the false impression that its reports were showing the total number of aid trucks entering the Strip.

This can be demonstrated in the UN's figures presented in May. OCHA initially [reported](#) a total of slightly over 200 trucks by May 21. However, on May 24, OCHA abruptly [revised](#) its report, revealing that the actual number was closer to 2000 trucks.

Failure to verify the figures. The UN has not attempted to verify or obtain third-party verification of the UNRWA figures. As stated above, the UN figures presented by OCHA are collected and submitted by various sources in Gaza. These sources are largely in close contact with Hamas, and some are even under its control. Apart from UNRWA, they include the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the Government Media Office (GMO). The credibility of the figures they submit to the UN is open to doubt, as demonstrated by the “inflated” casualty figures quoted by the UN from these two Gazan ministries. Thus, in May, OCHA amended the estimate of the number of women and children killed that it had published based on figures from the Hamas ministries and cut it by half. However, this has not stopped the UN from continuing to rely on these sources and to present the data they provide as reflecting the true situation.

Disregard of the figures presented by Israel. The UN consistently ignores the data published by Israel without providing any reasons for dismissing them. If the UN believes Israeli data is incorrect, it should provide justification for this stance. The UN's disregard for Israeli figures is especially troubling when compared to its absolute reliance on data received from sources within Gaza, namely Hamas sources. In other words, the UN prefers to rely on a terrorist organization that rules through autocratic means and oppression, rather than rely on figures supplied by a government of a vibrant democracy, where the public, civil society, and the media can openly criticize the government and where courts scrutinize government actions.

Absence of transparency. The UN presents its data with no transparency regarding the process of collecting data or its incomplete nature. It does not refer to UNRWA as its main source of information. It was only at the end of April that OCHA first added a [clarification](#) to its snapshot, noting that the figures only show supplies observed or registered by the UN entering through Kerem Shalom and Rafah. At the beginning of May, for the first time, they [referenced](#) UNRWA as the source of the data. Interestingly, at the end of May, the reference to UNRWA was removed, and the UN began to [include](#) figures of trucks entering Gaza from the north and from the pier, and also included supplies from the private sector. But again, there was still no reference to the sources of the figures quoted by the UN, and they remain unclear.

The manner of presenting the data. From October 2023 to the end of May 2024, OCHA presented the daily average of trucks entering the Strip since the beginning of the war instead of presenting the weekly average. The use of an average makes it possible to neutralize the leap in numbers and to blur the considerable rise in the number of trucks over the course of the war, which is extremely prominent in

a monthly display. Moreover, unlike COGAT reports, the UN figures are shown with no breakdown of the quantity or types of aid arriving through each of the crossings. Following the change at the end of May, the UN began to [show](#) the monthly total of trucks entering the Strip for each month of the war, but here, too, each month was split into two parts, with no clear explanation, making the numbers seem lower than they actually are.

In addition, the figure regarding the average of 500 trucks that entered the Gaza Strip before October 2023, alongside the daily average of the aid trucks that entered since the outbreak of the war, is presented without reference and transparency in a misleading manner, portraying a steep drop in the entry of aid since the beginning of the war. In fact, the daily prewar average of 500 [refers](#) to all the trucks entering Gaza up to October 2023, and not just aid trucks. The UN does not indicate that most of those trucks were bringing construction materials, agricultural products, paper and wrapping products, textiles, and goods for commerce, and [only](#) about 100 trucks carried humanitarian aid, of which 45 contained fuel.

Incomplete presentation of the distribution of aid in the Strip. The presentation of facts and figures relating to the distribution of aid in Gaza is also incomplete and inaccurate. The UN [presents](#) cases of cancellation, delay, and denial of entry of aid as being the sole responsibility of Israel. It constantly ignores the complexity of transferring aid to a war zone, or the effect of Hamas's hostile actions on the distribution of aid to the population.

The UN reports neglect to mention important facts regarding Hamas's control of the convoy routes and distribution points, which aid organizations have to coordinate with Hamas, as well as cases of looting by Hamas and criminal gangs of aid trucks, storage facilities, and distribution points. The UN reports also do not mention attacks on civilian humanitarian infrastructure by Hamas, including aid convoys and their routes; or Hamas's [firing of rockets](#) at border crossings, forcing them to close; nor the closure of the Rafah crossing ordered by Egypt. These last two facts, which are extremely significant, were not mentioned in the [statement](#) by UN Secretary-General António Guterres about the closure of the crossings. It took another week and ongoing shooting by Hamas at Kerem Shalom before the UN secretary-general published another vague [statement](#) about indiscriminate Hamas fire. This statement did not even indicate that the firing had targeted Kerem Shalom, which is a central route for the transfer of aid, thereby forcing its closure.

In the Humanitarian Access Snapshot [published](#) by OCHA for May 2024, there is no mention of Hamas, although, in that month alone there were several Hamas attacks on the Kerem Shalom crossing. There is also no mention of the Hamas attack on the [floating pier](#). In contrast, Israel is mentioned 16 times and is portrayed as the responsible party for the issues related to the entry of aid and deliveries, attributed to the IDF ground maneuvers. A reading of the report creates the impression that Israel has full control over the Gaza Strip and is acting freely and deliberately to harm the local population. It fails to acknowledge that Israel is actually engaged in war against a well-armed terrorist organization that has been the de facto government of Gaza for many years and initiated the current conflict with Israel.

Moreover, the OCHA report presents only negative aspects of Israel's activity. For example, it accuses Israel of closing land crossings without mentioning that Israel opened three other land crossings to help the entry of aid to the northern and central Strip. Likewise, the report does not mention aid arriving via the US-supported floating pier and the aid dropped into Gaza by parachute, all fully coordinated with Israel.

In addition, there is no mention of the [steps](#) that Israel has taken to help aid agencies in collecting and transferring aid within the Strip. Apart from opening additional crossings in the north after the closure of Kerem Shalom, these steps include establishing humanitarian routes within the Strip, improving and expanding existing routes, granting priority to the transfer and movement of aid trucks over commercial trucks, allowing the entry of equipment to support humanitarian activity, enabling humanitarian pauses in the fighting for defined windows of time to facilitate the movement of medical organizations and teams and the delivery of medical equipment and aid, and making it easier to collect and store supplies for residents.

Selective presentation of statements from Israel. While the UN disregards Israel's efforts to extend the scope of aid into Gaza and to improve its entry and distribution, it does refer extensively to every statement by Israeli individuals that could be interpreted as an intent to limit humanitarian aid. For example, UN officials did not hesitate to accuse Israel of the intention to cause famine based on statements by Israeli officials, including the minister of defense, about imposing a blockade on the Strip a few days after the horrific attack against Israel on October 7. This is despite Israel's repeated declarations since then of the importance it attaches to the free flow of aid into the Strip, and in spite of the fact that these declarations have been backed by actions and data indicating a considerable rise in the extent of aid entering Gaza.

The analysis thus far shows that during most months of the war, from October to the end of May, the UN has consciously presented a partial picture of the aid entering Gaza. It has relied entirely on UNRWA data, without verification and in the absence of transparency, in addition to a manipulative and partial presentation of the figures and the facts regarding the distribution of aid in the Strip. The UN has done all this while ignoring Hamas's responsibility for the situation in Gaza, and overlooking Israel's humanitarian efforts.

In this way, the UN created a distorted picture, which has become the basis for allegations against Israel that it is preventing the entry of humanitarian aid, leading to serious accusations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even genocide by means of deliberate starvation.

Regrettably, the conduct of the UN in this context is further evidence of its clear bias against Israel and of its agenda to damage Israel's international standing, even at the expense of discarding professional standards and maintaining an objective and impartial approach. As a result, it would be a mistake to rely on the UN as a reliable source for assessing and determining the real situation in the Gaza Strip.

Baseless Allegations of Famine

Apart from OCHA's distortions in its presentation of the extent and distribution of aid in Gaza, the IPC's assessments of the risk of famine in the Strip also give a misleading and false picture of the situation.

As stated before, back in March, the IPC [predicted](#) that a famine would occur in the northern region of Gaza between March and May 2024. This area was classified as Phase 5 ("famine"), the most serious stage on the scale, which requires three outcomes, one of them being two deaths per day for every 10,000 people. Additionally, 50% of the population in Gaza (1,107,000 people) was classified in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), and famine was expected to spread to the rest of the Gaza Strip by July. According to this forecast, there should have been over 20,000 deaths from hunger in Gaza by now. However, as of the beginning of June, the UN World Health Organization (WHO) [reported](#) 32 such cases, including 28 children. While every death is tragic, it is important to recognize the significant gap between the estimates and the actual reported death rate from acute malnutrition and starvation. In this context, it should be noted that since its establishment in 2004, the IPC has produced evidence to support famine classification in only [two cases](#), Somalia in 2011 and in South Sudan in 2017, and only for limited populations in those countries. In Somalia, mortality rates from starvation were measured even before famine was projected in 2011, and the

incidence of acute malnutrition was higher than that attributed to northern Gaza in April. However, the IPC did not hesitate to determine, based on the erroneous OCHA data and despite the clear inaccuracies and omissions, that the evidence indicated that famine was expected to spread in Gaza. The report completely ignored data published by Israel, without explaining its absence.

Moreover, the IPC report itself was partial and biased. It does not reveal the composition of its team of experts nor the identity of the government agencies involved in its preparation. In its “Background to the Conflict,” the report misleadingly describes an “escalation in hostile actions within the Gaza Strip that began with heavy shelling on October 7, 2023,” without mentioning the brutal attack carried out by Hamas. But above all, there are several flaws in the report, which deviates from the usual IPC standard. Primarily, there is the widespread use of assumptions and analogies regarding the availability of and access to food in the northern Strip, the nutritional situation, and mortality, far more than in other IPC analyses and done in an unprofessional way that makes it impossible to reach conclusions about nutrition and hunger in Gaza.

The deficiencies in the IPC report were addressed by Israel in its [response](#). Israel also tackled transparency and methodology issues in a separate [report](#), noting that most of the recommendations in the report had already been implemented.

None of this received any response or reference from the IPC or from the IPC’s Famine Review Committee (FRC)—a group of experts responsible for reviewing IPC reports to ensure their quality and impartiality—that endorsed the IPC’s March report.

However, prior to the publication of the new IPC report in June, the FRC reviewed its findings. In its [report](#), the FRC acknowledges that the “evidence on acute malnutrition and mortality does not indicate that famine thresholds have been passed” for both northern and southern Gaza. According to the FRC, some of the assumptions about food intake and acute malnutrition may “have evolved in different directions,” also noting that “the extreme levels of malnutrition have not yet led to a 2/10,000/day Crude Death Rate” and the non-trauma deaths were below famine thresholds during the current analysis period. The FRC found that “in contrast with the assumptions made for the projection period (March–July 2024), the amount of food and non-food commodities allowed into the northern governorates increased. Additionally, the response in the nutrition, water sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and health sectors was scaled up. Accordingly, the FRC concluded that “the available evidence does not indicate that famine is currently occurring.”

Following the findings of the FRC, the IPC [published](#) a report for "1 May-15 June, and projection for 16 June-30 September 2024", with several adjustments. Once again, a UN-related body was forced to correct its initial assessment. In its June report, the IPC included data from sources such as COGAT, in addition to OCHA and UNRWA, leading to a more comprehensive report and to the conclusion that "the available evidence does not indicate that famine is currently occurring." The report indicates that there is still a "high risk of famine" across the entire Gaza Strip, with the forecasts moving from the north to Rafah in the south. However, it is important to note that there is no classification of famine in this report and that the IPC defines 'risk of Famine' as the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine (IPC Phase 5) - when Famine is not the most likely scenario. All the forecasts of "reasonable evidence" for famine were removed from the report, while even the forecast for Rafah is not as serious as the previous forecasts for the north. In addition, the IPC forecast in March, which classified 50% of the population (1.11 million people) as being in a "catastrophic situation" or stage 5 of food insecurity and famine, was reduced by over half to 22% (495,000 people).

In its own way, the report aligns with the FRC findings. However, the updated report does not acknowledge the misleading nature of previous reports. It continues to warn of a high risk of famine throughout the Gaza Strip as long as the war persists and humanitarian aid is restricted, despite the fact that humanitarian aid surpasses the minimum requirement and that effective measures have been implemented that have managed to avert the famine forecast even without a ceasefire.

This has not prevented the UN from [publishing](#) on June 25 an executive summary of the findings of the FRC and the latest IPC report, alleging that the situation in Gaza continues to be "catastrophic" and that there is an ongoing high risk of famine all over the Strip. This is misleading since it is clear to the UN that the term "catastrophic" reflects the most serious level of the IPC scale, and hence the use of this term does not correspond to the findings of the FRC, nor to the most recent findings of the IPC, which, as stated above, defined the situation in Gaza as "high risk" for famine. Moreover, in July, a group of UN experts, part of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, released [a statement](#) declaring that "famine has spread throughout the Gaza strip," accusing Israel of an "intentional and targeted starvation" of the Palestinian people. These UN experts, who are presented by the UN as non-UN staff independent volunteers in the UN Human Rights system, have repeatedly used their status and the UN's reputation to spread false allegations against Israel. This time, they have made baseless accusations about the spread of famine in Gaza, despite being refuted in recent

IPC as well as FRC June reports, aimed at falsely accusing Israel of starvation and genocide.

Conclusion

The UN, generally perceived as a reliable and objective body, relies on incomplete data from sources in Gaza, providing a partial presentation of facts and events. These are presented as factual truth and quoted in its reports without acknowledging their limitations nor referencing figures and facts published by Israel. The UN has already had to revise and update its figures on deaths and aid trucks, as well as their presentation in its reports. The IPC has also had to amend its assessment regarding the famine classification and reduce by over half the percentage of the population classified as being in a catastrophic state of famine.

In this way, the UN plays a central role in the false accusations that Israel is conducting a policy of starvation. These accusations then serve the campaign of the demonization of Israel. Furthermore, placing all responsibility for the humanitarian crisis on Israel and initiating moves against it in the international arena create an incentive for Hamas to deepen the crisis and further distance the end of the war.

While it is undeniable that the people in Gaza are facing significant hardship due to the ongoing war and resulting dire humanitarian situation, the fact that there are hungry people in Gaza does not indicate a state of famine in the area, and certainly not intentional starvation of the population by Israel. Contrary to the UN reports and the IPC forecast from March, the data showing that more than the minimum required aid is entering Gaza aligns with the situation on the ground, of images of full markets coming from Gaza, the drop in food prices, as well as with the FRC and IPC latest reports from June rejecting famine forecast in Gaza. Nonetheless, the UN and its experts continue to make unfounded claims of famine in Gaza and intentional starvation of the population.

It is difficult to understate the immense harm caused to Israel by the biased UN reports and unfounded IPC forecasts. The campaign to delegitimize Israel, in which the UN is playing a prominent role, is strengthening Israel's enemies, particularly Hamas and Iran. This is happening while Israel is defending itself on multiple fronts, facing attacks from Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Yemen, in addition to its war against the Hamas terror organization, who still hold dozens of Israeli hostages captive in Gaza. The distorted picture portrayed by the UN reports has played a significant role in the widespread accusations against Israel for

intentionally causing starvation and genocide in Gaza, leading to legal action against Israel, including rulings against it by the ICJ, as well as the request for arrest warrants against Israeli officials from the ICC, for allegedly committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Professional legal officials, such as the Prosecutor of the ICC and the judges of the ICJ, wishing to draw conclusions about allegations of Israel's culpability in creating a situation of hunger in the Gaza Strip, are expected to examine all the relevant evidence. This includes referring to the data in Israel's reports, verifying it, and addressing any discrepancies between these figures and those presented by UN bodies. The analysis shows that it is dangerous to base an evaluation of the true humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip solely on UN data or IPC findings. These bodies have clearly demonstrated their bias against Israel leading them to manipulate facts in order to weaken Israel's stance. It is especially ill-advised to base serious accusations against Israel on such deliberately disingenuous sources of information.