STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

A Multidisciplinary Journal on National Security

Volume 26 | No. 2 | July 2023

INSS
המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי
THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY אוניברסיטת תל אביב

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Strategic Assessment: A Multidisciplinary Journal on National Security is a journal published by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). It aims to challenge and to enrich the scholarly debate and public discourse on a range of subjects related to national security in the broadest sense of the term. Along with its focus on Israel and the Middle East, the journal includes articles on national security in the international arena. Academic and research-based articles are joined by policy papers, professional forums, academic surveys, and book reviews, and are written by INSS researchers and guest contributors. The views presented are those of the authors alone.

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Graphic Design:
Michal Semo-Kovetz, Tel Aviv University Graphic Design Studio

Logo Design: b-way digital

Printing: Orniv Ltd., Holon

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Strategic Assessment is published in English and Hebrew.

ISSN printed version: 0793-8950
ISSN online version: 2789-9519

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The Development of Hezbollah's Deterrence Strategy Toward Israel

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2022 marked 40 years since Hezbollah's establishment and 30 years since Nasrallah became the leader of the organization. Over the years Hezbollah has developed from a classic terrorist organization into a multifaceted and multi-identity organization that is a military force with conventional capabilities and the spearhead of the Shiite "axis of resistance." Throughout these years, and especially since the Second Lebanon War (2006), the organization has gained military strength but refrained from exercising its offensive capabilities against Israel; its activity is driven by the goal of maintaining and consolidating its balance of deterrence with Israel, in the interest of avoiding deterioration into another full-scale war. This article examines the elements that have shaped the "deterrence equation" between Hezbollah and Israel, which combines kinetic military activity and cognitive warfare, its gradual development over the course of the 40 years of conflict, and the nature of the current balance of deterrence; this is the background to assess how Israel might best deal with the challenge posed by the organization. The article contends that the balance of deterrence is rooted in Hezbollah's origins and evolution and constitutes a central component of the organization's current strategy. However, given Nasrallah's tendency to take risks and the changing regional reality, this does not guarantee the prevention of a future large-scale conflict between the organization and the IDF, which could develop into a multi-arena war.

Keywords: Hezbollah, Nasrallah, Iran, Shiite axis, Lebanon, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, convergence of arenas, northern front, missiles, deterrence equation

Introduction

Hezbollah has recently demonstrated increasing confidence and greater audacity vis-à-vis Israel. This is reflected primarily in the combined kinetic-cognitive campaign waged by the organization surrounding the natural gas agreement signed between Israel and Lebanon, the attempted attack at Megiddo Junction in March 2023, the license to Palestinian organizations to fire Katyushas from southern Lebanon (2021-2022), and the increasing friction with the IDF along the border. It seems that Hezbollah perceives an opportunity to change the balance of deterrence with Israel in its favor, and to create new rules of the game.

This article examines the sources of Hezbollah's current strategy toward Israel and its patterns of development, with an emphasis

on Hezbollah's balance of deterrence. First it examines the elements that have shaped the organization's action strategy, and then reviews the historical development of the balance of deterrence between Hezbollah and Israel. The combination of these two aspects lays the basis for understanding the current balance of deterrence between Hezbollah and Israel, examined in the final part of this article, which also discusses the significance for Israel and the risks entailed.

In the military sphere Hezbollah evolved into a guerrilla force and later into a military force, which thanks to an intensive buildup effort with the help of Iran, is the force with conventional military capabilities that poses the greatest threat to Israel today.

Hezbollah began as a classic terrorist organization, but since its establishment has become a multifaceted organization with multiple identities. In the military sphere it evolved into a guerrilla force and later into a military force, which thanks to an intensive buildup effort with the help of Iran, is the force with conventional military capabilities that poses the greatest threat to Israel today. Moreover, the organization is seen today as the spearhead of the wider "axis of resistance" (the Shiite axis led by Iran, along with Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad). The axis's capabilities could be used by Iran and others to create a reality in which the threat of convergent arenas materializes in the case of a violent conflict with Israel, which would lead to a situation where an outbreak on one front leads to an attack on Israel from other arenas as well. Since the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah has refrained from using all its military capabilities, especially the firepower that it possesses and in particular its precision firepower, which can reach the entire Israeli home front. However, given the organization's newly increased audacity, it is not clear if this restraint will hold. At the base of the organization's strategy for contending with Israel today is the so-called mutual deterrence equation, rooted in the organization's origins.

In order to understand this equation in depth, we first present the elements that influence the shaping of Hezbollah's combat strategy and deterrence doctrine. These elements are headed first and foremost by the organization's relations with Iran, alongside considerations relating to Lebanon, given its standing and its entrenchment in the Lebanese system. Additional elements affecting the organization's doctrine include its survival imperative, the balance of power with Israel, regional developments, and its need for international legitimacy. From there we examine the chronological development of the deterrence equation between the organization and Israel, concentrating on four main periods: the first decade of the organization's existence; from the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary General al-Musawi and the beginning of Nasrallah's leadership to Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon; from the withdrawal from Lebanon to the Second Lebanon War; and from the Second Lebanon War until today. Understanding the historical perspective of the development of the deterrence equation and the ways in which Hezbollah has acted to expand it lays the basis for the final section of the article, which presents the current balance of deterrence between Hezbollah and Israel and considers the advantages in maintaining it and the risk of one of the sides violating it.

The article presents three main arguments. First, the organization's current deterrence doctrine is firmly rooted in its strategy over the years. The second deals with Hezbollah's combined use of (kinetic) military means and cognitive warfare, and maintains that over the years the ratio between these two components has changed: at the outset, due to the organization's weakness, the cognitive aspect had greater weight alongside acts of terrorism, but as the organization gained

strength, its willingness to engage in military activity also increased, with the cognitive campaign becoming "combat support." Third, in the last few years, the process of Hezbollah's institutionalization and its integration in the Lebanese state have gained increasing importance relative to other elements that influence the organization's strategy. These processes have contributed to restraining the organization, which dedicates considerable attention to its survival and standing in Lebanon. This trend of restraint is also bolstered by additional factors that shape the organization's strategy, including its involvement in the civil war in Syria and its desire for international legitimacy.

These processes, of Hezbollah pushing the boundaries in order to improve the balance of deterrence in its favor on the one hand, and exercising restraint on the other hand, maintain the risk of short and limited conflicts that could develop into a full-scale war, contrary to the basic interest of Israel and Hezbollah at this time. Indeed, they undermine the certainty that the deterrence equation provided in the past and subvert the "strategic clarity" that has enabled each of the sides to anticipate the other's actions.

The article focuses on Hezbollah's balance of power with Israel and on the shaping of the deterrence equation between the sides. Consequently, it is not a comprehensive historical survey of the organization's development or of Nasrallah's personal contribution. In addition, the article does not seek to present strategic recommendations on how best to act vis-à-vis Hezbollah's conduct, but focuses on understanding the elements that help shape the organization's deterrence strategy toward Israel and the development of the strategy.

The Different Elements Affecting Hezbollah's Deterrence Strategy

Hezbollah's combat and deterrence approach toward Israel crystallized over the years, and over time became the organization's leading strategy toward Israel, as it is perceived today. Here it is important to understand the main elements that have influenced the evolution of this approach and the organization's policy on the utilization of force. Thus far most of the literature has focused on the Iranian influence on Hezbollah and/or the organization's Lebanese identity, excluding other factors that influence the decision making processes and the interactions between them. The following section surveys broadly the elements that influence Hezbollah's decision making processes under Nasrallah's leadership with respect to the conflict with Israel.

Hezbollah as a tool in the service of Iran: Hezbollah is deeply committed to Iran, which is a guide and a principal influence in all its considerations, in particular regarding Israel. The organization is inextricably linked to the regime of the ayatollahs, under whose auspices and with whose aid it was established in 1982 as a first step in the framework of the Iranian effort to export the Islamic revolution, while exploiting the chaotic situation following the civil war in Lebanon and the First Lebanon War with Israel (Kurz et al., 1993; Shay, 2001; Shapira, 2000, 2020, 2021). From the organization's beginnings, Iran, shaped by a Shiite religious identity and the political-religious ideology of clerical rule (*wilayat al-faqih*), has been a source of inspiration and a role model (Kanaaneh, 2021; Kizilkaya, 2019). Over the years Iran has been the organization's primary economic and military mainstay. Most of Hezbollah's official budget comes from Iran (in recent years it is estimated at around $700 million per year, out of an official budget of around $1 billion), along with the military aid that regularly flows to Hezbollah in every possible way. The aid continues even in times of internal difficulties and budgetary hardship in Iran. Tehran ensures that the organization is trained and armed with the most advanced weapons at its disposal (various missiles and rockets, including precision; unmanned aerial vehicles; and air defense systems) (Levitt, 2013, 2021).

Israel's efforts to stop these deliveries as part of the campaign between wars have been only partially successful and have not weakened the determination of the organization and Iran.

This ongoing Iranian effort has made Hezbollah not only Iran's principal military proxy in the Middle East but also the spearhead of the Shiite axis led by Tehran. The organization's military strength is based on Iranian aid, as are its combat doctrines, which are shaped with the help of Iranian commanders, experts, and advisors. The most noteworthy of these advisors, Qasem Soleimani—especially during the last two decades before his death (in January 2020)—was the commander of the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force (which is responsible for exporting the revolution outside of Iran). He played a central role in formulating Hezbollah's strategy against Israel, and its policy on the utilization of force can be attributed to him (Levitt, 2021). For example, Soleimani came to Lebanon during the Second Lebanon War in 2006 to help Hezbollah, alongside Nasrallah and Imad Mughniyeh, wage the war (Shapira, 2021). Over the years, and the more Nasrallah consolidated his standing in the organization, the personal connection between him and the senior leadership in Tehran deepened, especially with Supreme Leader Khamenei, with whom he is in regular contact. With the strengthening of Nasrallah's standing, this discourse among leaders evolved from dictated policy to coordination and consultation, with Nasrallah deemed by Iran as the foremost expert on Israel whose advice should be taken seriously, rather than as a functionary merely carrying out orders (al-Salhy, 2020).

In the past decade, figures in Israel and in the international system have become convinced that Iran is arming and cultivating Hezbollah's military force so that it will be at its service when the order is given, i.e., it sees Hezbollah's main role as responding if and when Israel decides to launch a large-scale military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. (Col. T. & Col. R., 2023). In the event of an Israeli attack on Iran, Hezbollah will respond with a large-scale attack on the Israeli home front in order to ignite a multi-arena war between Israel and the Shiite axis and even beyond: in recent years the expanded axis of resistance has come to clearly include Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (INSS Israel, 2021). In this scenario, the main role of Hezbollah, which has become the entity with the conventional capabilities that are most threatening to Israel, dictates—to the organization and to the leadership in Tehran alike—greater caution in using military capabilities until the order is given, in order to preserve them for when they are needed. In our assessment, this approach fits the logic underlying the organization's aspiration of consolidating the balance of deterrence with Israel, and creates a comfort zone vis-à-vis the Iranian leadership, which does not demand that Hezbollah respond with actions along the Lebanese border in response to the frequent Israeli strikes against it, as part of the ongoing campaign underway between them.

Hezbollah's dominant standing in Lebanon: Joining its commitment to Iran, the organization has consolidated its stature in the Lebanese state over the years, and today Hezbollah is a central and influential power center in Lebanon. The deepening connection and identity between the organization and Lebanon, with all its ethnic groups, influences the organization's set of considerations and commands an important place in its priorities the more it is established and institutionalized within Lebanon. This is a gradual process that takes place on two dimensions concomitantly. On the one hand, Hezbollah is a power center that is integrated in the Lebanese political system and overall is the one leading it (especially throughout the presidency of Michel Aoun, due to Hezbollah's alliance with his Christian party). On the other hand, it is an independent body with autonomous organizational interests that, beyond its independent military capabilities, makes a critical contribution to the socioeconomic whole, especially the

Shiite population, in the framework of its *daw'a* activity. Hezbollah provides the Shiite population with economic assistance and all necessary services (education, health, employment, electricity, water, sanitation), which from the organization's perspective strengthens its ability to maintain their support for the "resistance" and the continued struggle against Israel (Kanaaneh, 2021). The importance of this aid has increased as the economic situation in Lebanon has worsened. Thus, Hezbollah has become the sole reliable supplier of services for this population, and it also attempts to expand its socioeconomic support to additional populations in Lebanon, who depend on it greatly (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2021; Ghaddar, 2020; Norton, 2018).

Although Hezbollah first ran in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in 1992, its influence on the decision making process in Lebanon increased mainly following its success in uniting a political camp around it, the "March 8 camp," starting in 2006. This framework granted Hezbollah the ability to influence internal politics, all the more so since 2016, when it became a central partner in the election of Christian President Michel Aoun and established a majority government with his partners, while controlling the government's agenda (Ghaddar, 2016). Nevertheless, the severe economic crisis plaguing Lebanon since 2019—leading to the state's economic collapse and bankruptcy, with over 80 percent of the population under the poverty line—has also affected Hezbollah's standing in Lebanon. The economic collapse, and in particular the trauma in Lebanon after the explosion at the Beirut port in August 2020 (with 218 killed, thousands injured, and extensive damage to buildings and property), has led to increased public criticism of Hezbollah regarding its responsibility for the dire situation (Mizrahi & Schweitzer, 2020).

Results of the latest parliamentary elections in May 2022 testified to this sentiment, when the number of seats gained by the Hezbollah camp dropped from 71 to 60. In addition, there were more opponents demanding change, although not to a sufficient extent to remove Hezbollah from the center of decision making, and there was no clear leadership among the new opposition, beyond its familiar opponents from the Christian sector (Mizrahi & Schweitzer, 2022). In particular, cracks have apparently emerged in the past year between Hezbollah and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, which cooperated with it until now, and the organization is hard pressed to see the formation of a government to its liking and the election of its candidate for president, Suleiman Frangieh (Mizrahi, 2022a).

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Hezbollah's dominant standing in Lebanon, which was built gradually over the years, alongside its commitment to the population in general and the dependent Shiite sector in particular, has enhanced its level of responsibility for the Lebanese state and the population at large. This influences its considerations and dictates greater caution and restraint in its policy toward Israel. This is also reinforced by the prevailing conception in Israel expressed publicly by senior government and IDF officials, that the Lebanese state will be held responsible for any act against Israel by the organization, and that very serious damage to infrastructure and to the population in Lebanon is expected in any conflict between Israel and Hezbollah (in part due to the organization's use of the civilian population as a human shield) (Eichner, 2022; Eichner & Zeitun, 2020; Hacohen, 2022). Therefore, Hezbollah cannot but take these Israeli threats into account, especially today, when there are increasingly serious charges

among large populations in Lebanon, even among some Shiites, regarding the negative impact of Hezbollah's struggle with Israel on Lebanon's situation. On the other hand, in face of these claims, Nasrallah is compelled to consolidate the organization's standing as the "defender of Lebanon," which pushes him to ignite friction with Israel to the point of taking risks that could lead to results that are not desirable from his perspective. A major recent test case was Nasrallah's conduct on the maritime border agreement between Israel and Lebanon, signed in October 2022. The dire situation in Lebanon and the internal criticism of Hezbollah led to the organization's decision to advance the signing of the agreement, with the expectation that it would produce economic benefits for Lebanon in the future. Yet the organization accompanied the negotiations on the agreement with threats to use aggressive military force toward Israel, not only in order to pressure it to sign the agreement under conditions that are beneficial to Lebanon, but also implicitly to restore Hezbollah's controversial standing in the eyes of the Lebanese public as the "defender of Lebanon" (Schweitzer et al., 2022).

Organizational survival: In the past three decades, Hezbollah has succeeded in evolving from a militia into the only military force in Lebanon whose weapons are far stronger than the capabilities of the weak and limited Lebanese Army. Aside from the military force of the organization and its fighters, the movement has tens of thousands of members and workers who earn a living thanks to the organization in a political-social-economic state-like framework that it leads and funds as a "state" within Lebanon. At the same time, the organization's buildup and expansion have increased its degree of vulnerability and its level of responsibility toward its operatives in order to maintain their loyalty, in particular given Lebanon's dire situation in recent years. For example, since its involvement in the war in Syria, Hezbollah's expenses now include aid to the families of its combatants killed in the war and medical treatment needed by the thousands injured.

Consequently, the ramifications of any action by the organization for its survival are an important consideration, particularly given the internal and external threats it faces. Within Lebanon and as part of the increasing criticism toward the organization, recent contentions have been sounded, especially on the part of figures in the Christian camp and among the new change bloc in parliament, regarding the need to disarm Hezbollah (Mizrahi & Schweitzer, 2022; "Lebanon," 2022). They see this as a necessary step in the efforts toward Lebanon's economic, political, and social reconstruction, first and foremost given Israel's proven military capabilities and the intensity of the severe blow that Lebanon and its citizens are expected to suffer, beyond the harm to the organization's assets, in the scenario of a large-scale conflict. This is a leading consideration due to the bitter experience of Lebanon in general and Nasrallah in particular, who at the end of the Second Lebanon War admitted that had he foreseen its results, he would have refrained from initiating the action that prompted Israel's decision to go to war (Nahmias, 2006).

The balance of power with Israel: The developments in Israel and the IDF constitute a central and important component of Hezbollah's considerations in shaping its struggle against Israel. Hezbollah sees itself as an organization that is on the defensive against Israel, which it casts as aggressive, unpredictable, and aspiring to exert influence in Lebanon. Therefore, Nasrallah fears that if he does not respond to an Israeli violation of the deterrence equation, this will upset the equation and enable Israel to continue to undermine it, and consequently he responds to what he sees as a violation, in order to maintain this equation and prevent its erosion (Ish Maas, 2017).

As an avid consumer of the Israeli media, Nasrallah regularly examines Israel's strengths and weaknesses, and in his speeches refers

to Israel's military capabilities; its security concept; its economic situation; its relations with the United States and its standing in the international arena; its regional policy; and the level of resilience of Israeli society. As part of the cognitive campaign, Nasrallah dedicates extensive portions of his addresses to Israel's weaknesses, as was prominently expressed with his mockery of Israeli society with the spider web image, which he first used in his victory speech at Bint Jbeil (May 26, 2000) following the IDF withdrawal from the security zone. Nasrallah then compared Israel's strength to a cobweb and claimed that while Israel ostensibly has military strength and technological superiority, Israeli society, tired of wars, will not be able to withstand further terrorist attacks, is not capable of suffering casualties, and will ultimately implode.

In addition to bolstering the cognitive struggle, it seems that monitoring the situation in Israel is intended first and foremost for understanding the balance of power vis-à-vis Israel and identifying risks and opportunities for Hezbollah. A prominent recent example is Nasrallah's observing the ramifications of Israel's vehement internal dispute surrounding the proposed judicial overhaul and the large-scale protests; these have strengthened his false sense that the internal dispute impairs Israel's military capabilities to cope with external threats, and have encouraged him to take greater risks than in the past. In his speech on March 10, 2023, Nasrallah referred to the internal conflicts in Israel following the large-scale protests, claiming that these events will lead to Israel's disappearance and the country will not complete its eightieth year. His overconfidence was behind his unusual advancement of a terrorist attack inside Israeli territory (March 13, 2023), although here too, Hezbollah was careful not to claim official responsibility for the incident, fearing the Israeli response (Mizrahi & Schweitzer, 2023a).

Ofek Ish Maas explains that Hezbollah's behavior toward Israel is dynamic and responds to the context created by Israeli policy. In order to contend with Israeli policy, Hezbollah operates according to three principles: reactivism—carrying out actions in response to actions by Israel, whereas it is Israel that determines the specific context; proportionality—exacting a price from Israel that corresponds with the results of the Israeli action against it; and clarity—seeking to achieve strategic clarity with respect to its actions, in order to reach agreements that will prevent escalation. This pattern of behavior is true of both the tactical level and the strategic level, because actions that do not meet these requirements carry considerable risk of snowballing into escalation (Ish Maas, 2017).

Hezbollah's commitment to the axis of resistance: Hezbollah's central standing in the Shiite axis exposes it to consequences that stem from regional developments, especially internal events among its partners. These influence the design of the organization's strategy and its considerations in using its force against Israel. In the case of full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah, which could expand to include Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, which host the Shiite axis of resistance organizations, regional and possibly even global consequences are expected, and this likely influences Hezbollah's and Iran's considerations in critical ways (Levitt, 2021):

a. Hezbollah's assistance to its axis partners: The influence of Hezbollah's many years of involvement in the civil war in Syria to save the Assad regime is especially significant In this context with respect to the level of restraint that it adopted vis-à-vis Israel. Hezbollah's serious involvement in the Syrian civil war occurred in the first half of 2013, given Iran and Hezbollah's assessment that the threats to the survival of the Assad regime had increased, along with the threats to their ethnic-religious interests in Syria. Hezbollah sent several thousand operatives and paid a heavy price over the years: approximately 1,300

Hezbollah operatives were killed in Syria and several thousand were injured (Albo & Lt. Col. A., 2021; Daher, 2015; Caldwell, 2022; al-Aloosy, 2020). The organization's involvement in the civil war in Syria exacted a heavy toll not only in human resources, but also negatively affected its relations with members of the Sunni community in Lebanon (Daher, 2019). Hezbollah's willingness to pay these heavy prices signals the extent of its commitment to its partners in the axis. The organization's involvement in Iraq and on behalf of the Houthis in Yemen, apparently at Iran's request, should also be seen in this framework. This involvement drew its operatives into distant wars that do not serve the organization's direct interests at all, at the expense of attention to the struggle with Israel (although its involvement in Yemen and Iraq was more limited than its involvement in the fighting in Syria) (Levitt, 2021). Hezbollah's participation in the regional wars of its Shiite axis partners aroused resentment and criticism within Lebanon and it was forced, especially in the Syrian case, to find justifications for the importance of its participation in the fighting there as part of the struggle against the United States and Israel. In the case of Yemen, the organization tried to downplay the importance of its level of involvement. For example, following accusations against him due to the deaths of Lebanese in Yemen, Nasrallah claimed in a public speech (June 29, 2018): "I neither deny nor confirm that our personnel are in Yemen, but whether we have a presence there or not, the report on Hezbollah martyrs in Yemen is a lie."

b. The effort to demonstrate a contribution to the Palestinian struggle: Developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also affect the strategy of the organization, which since its beginnings has attempted to credit itself with a significant role in the struggle over Jerusalem and the liberation of Palestine by the Palestinian people. As early as the 1990s, Hezbollah established Unit 1800, which aimed to support the Palestinian terrorist organizations and to insert Hezbollah operatives into Israeli territory for the purpose of gathering information and carrying out attacks. The unit's personnel trained Palestinian terrorists in various tactics, including kidnapping, assassination, and intelligence gathering (Shay, 2017).

Recently, the importance the organization attributes to unity of ranks of the resistance front as a force multiplier in the struggle against Israel has become more prominent. Especially since Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021), there have been more and more public statements on the coordination and cooperation among members of the "expanded resistance front," which, in addition to the members of the Shiite axis, includes the Palestinian resistance groups, chiefly Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In this context, in the past two years Beirut has become the site of a joint war room of the members of the front, and leaders of Palestinian resistance groups and senior Iranian officials meet there for consultations and coordination, reflecting Hezbollah's special standing within the axis and its central role in creating a multi-arena campaign against Israel. For example, during the Ramadan incidents of April 2023, the commander of Iran's Quds Force and leaders of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were in Beirut together (Dekel, 2023).

This cooperation intensifies the threat to Israel due to the possible convergence of arenas, and serves Hezbollah's interests in its struggle against Israel, but it also creates a challenge for Hezbollah due to the need to prove its contribution to the Palestinian struggle. The attempts by Palestinian factions to open a front against Israel from southern Lebanon highlight the organization's dilemma in this context. Last Ramadan, the 34 rockets fired from southern Lebanon to Israel (April 6, 2023) posed a dilemma for the organization: on the one hand, this could help weaken Israel and deter it, as well as give an answer, even if only partial, to those

who demand that the organization resume proactive operations against Israel. On the other hand, it poses a threat to the organization's level of control in this area, which raises fears of escalation under circumstances and at a time that are not convenient for Hezbollah.

Hezbollah's standing in the international arena: Hezbollah's institutionalization in the Lebanese system has also heightened the importance that the organization attributes to its standing and its image in the international arena as a legitimate political movement, and not only as a terrorist organization. Although the organization is more sensitive to criticism toward it in the international arena and is interested in establishing the legitimacy of its activities, in recent years other major countries in the West (Germany, the UK) have joined the United States and defined the entire organization (and not only its military arm) as a terrorist organization. From the organization's perspective, its standing in the international arena also has economic ramifications. For example, its definition in the UK as a terrorist organization (January 2020) enabled the freezing of all its assets there. The relentless US effort to pursue Hezbollah operatives and put them on the sanctions list also has an economic price. In contrast, France's determination to maintain its relations with Hezbollah's representatives in the Lebanese political system helps preserve the organization's domestic standing and establish its legitimacy abroad. It therefore seems that the organization's international standing is also a consideration in its policy toward Israel, although its impact is undoubtedly much more limited than the other considerations (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2020).

Thus, Hezbollah's strategy and its force utilization policy are the product of thinking that includes relating to a wide range of considerations, and not only to its commitment to Tehran as an Iranian proxy. It would be a mistake to try to rank the importance of all the considerations presented, but it seems that in Nasrallah's decision making process, the top consideration is the Iranian interest, alongside weighty considerations that relate to Lebanon's situation and the organization's survival, as well as its balance of power with Israel.

In any case, our argument, in contrast with some of the prevailing beliefs among researchers, is that the weight of considerations related to the organization's interests in Lebanon in general and to the Shiite community in particular has increased in recent years. Over the years, and the more the organization has established itself in the Lebanese system and become a central actor there, the interest of not harming the Lebanese state—especially since 2019, against the backdrop of the deepest economic crisis in its history—has become a more significant consideration for Hezbollah. Today, Hezbollah's standing in Lebanon is at least as important to the organization as considerations related to Iran's interests and ideological doctrine, and in addition, the organization's future and its survival are increasingly connected to Lebanon's situation.

Alongside these dominant elements in shaping Hezbollah's strategy are other interests and influences on the organization's policy. All these together come into play in the decision making process of the organization's leadership. Nasrallah, a rational actor who over the years has become the organization's main and almost exclusive decision maker, is influenced by these formative elements, and they underlie the organization's deterrence strategy. On the operational level too, the influence of all these considerations is evident, despite Nasrallah's tendency sometimes to live on the edge and to take risks, and in our understanding, this is what shapes Hezbollah's more restrained approach toward Israel at the current time.

The Development of Hezbollah's Deterrence Doctrine

The deterrence equation between Israel and Hezbollah was built gradually, comprising two main components. First are the developments

in the organization's force buildup and the demonstration of its capabilities through terrorist and guerrilla activity (as part of the overall concept of kinetics), preparations for and responses to Israel's military activity, the two sides' buildup efforts, and Israel's actions to thwart these efforts by Hezbollah; the second is the ongoing and developing cognitive campaign. Over the years, the ratio between these two components, the kinetic-operational and the cognitive, has shifted: the more that Hezbollah, alongside its military buildup, has adhered to the deterrence equation, the more the cognitive component has developed into a role of "combat support" for the military strength against its adversaries, chiefly Israel, in order to establish deterrence through soft measures, mainly media-based.

Hezbollah's initial limited military capabilities dictated the need for enhancement via cognitive warfare, similar to other terrorist organizations, that is, using the "force magnifiers" of external media coverage to project an image of strength far beyond its actual capabilities.

Hezbollah's initial limited military capabilities dictated the need for enhancement via cognitive warfare, similar to other terrorist organizations, that is, using the "force magnifiers" of external media coverage to project an image of strength far beyond its actual capabilities. Over the years, its military capabilities improved and strengthened, and it developed its own media capabilities, used to consolidate an image of strength and wage an intensive cognitive campaign against Israel alongside military operations. This helped the organization formulate and establish a deterrence equation that maintained relative stability and limited the scope of the conflict with Israel, due to the strategic clarity of the relations of mutual harm.

The first decade (1982-1992): Hezbollah, as a relatively small terrorist organization, focused on launching acts of terrorism with an extensive cognitive impact, led by the first suicide attacks, which were innovative in nature and in the large numbers of victims and destruction that they caused, and therefore attracted large-scale global media attention for the perpetrating organization (Schweitzer, 2004). Series of suicide attacks were carried out against the Israeli security forces buildup in Tyre (1982 and 1983); against the US embassy in Beirut (1983 and 1984); and in a double suicide attack in Beirut on buildings housing US and French forces, part of the Multinational Force in Lebanon (1983). These actions allowed an organization that was then in its infancy—small, unknown, and with very limited operational capabilities—to achieve global media resonance in the context of the struggle against Israel, the United States, and European partners on the basis of the radical ideology that it absorbed from Iran, in order to export the ideas of the ayatollah regime and position itself as a more important, stronger, and more powerful organization than it actually was.

At the same time, the organization was involved in kidnapping citizens of Western countries and holding them hostage in order to extract concessions from their countries of origin, as well as to release the organization's personnel and Shiite operatives arrested due to involvement in terrorist activity. In 1984-1989, 55 citizens of foreign countries were kidnapped in Beirut by Hezbollah or organizations connected to it (Naveh, 2007). A considerable portion of these kidnappings were directed against the foreign powers that were active in Lebanon, as well as those that supported Iraq in its war against Iran, as part of the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran and its activity in the service of Iranian interests.

In 1985 Hezbollah began to cultivate guerrilla warfare against Israel, including suicide attacks against IDF vehicles and convoys and explosive charges against IDF forces in southern Lebanon and along the border. The objective was to inflict many Israeli casualties, with the aim of bringing about Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. Meanwhile, the organization

attempted to capture Israeli soldiers and attack outposts of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), which collaborated with the IDF, in order to defeat it and to encourage Israel's withdrawal. Hezbollah, alongside the Lebanese Shiite organization Amal, initially focused on attacking SLA outposts, but in 1987 the organizations started to focus on detonating explosives along the roads traveled regularly by IDF and SLA forces (Modrik-Evroni, 2020). Nevertheless, from 1985 to 1990, Hezbollah played a smaller role than Amal in the total number of attacks against the IDF, in part due to Hezbollah's limited capabilities, which made it difficult for it to operate and to generate significant deterrence.

A major element that contributed to the development of Hezbollah's independent capability was its defiance of the demand to disarm all the militias in Lebanon as stipulated by the Taif Agreement, which concluded Lebanon's second civil war (October 1989). Hezbollah retained its military force and exploited the disarming of the other militias to build its leading stature in the country and ensure its entrenchment in southern Lebanon. During these years, the organization did not attack civilians on the Israeli side of the border, but focused on an effort to remove the Israeli army from Lebanon, in contrast, for example, with the Palestinian organizations, which operated from Lebanon against Israeli territory and Israeli targets. In this sense, Hezbollah's action and response equations were focused inside Lebanese territory and remained within the military rules of the game (Naveh, 2007; Shapira, 2020).

In tandem, the organization began to pursue terrorist activity in the international arena. This included the hijacking of aircraft, including TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Rome, Iraqi Airways Flight 163, Air Afrique Flight 46 from Brazil to Paris, and Kuwait Airlines Flight 422 from Bangkok to Kuwait. The organization was also involved in terrorist attacks in Germany and France, and continued to kidnap foreigners in Lebanon, mainly attempting to influence these countries' conduct toward Hezbollah personnel detained by them (Levitt, 2013).

Thus, already in its first decade and despite its very limited power, it was evident that the organization sought to forge action and response equations vis-à-vis Israel and the various powers. These equations included both reprisal actions by the organization in response to what it perceived as threats or activity against its ranks, and kinetic actions that were leveraged for cognitive warfare in order to strengthen the organization's deterrent capability.

From 1992 until the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000: Following the killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Abbas al-Musawi, his wife, and his son in February 1992, the organization changed its conduct on the strategic level. Musawi was replaced by Nasrallah, and in the three decades he has led the organization, Nasrallah has transformed it. He has adapted its activity to changing circumstances and events in Lebanon and in the external environment, as well as attributing greater importance to the cognitive campaign while exploiting his own impressive rhetorical capabilities, which have enabled him to leverage Hezbollah's military actions, big and small, toward consolidating the organization's image of strength.

In parallel, there was also a change in the nature of the organization's military activity: guerrilla operations to force Israel's complete exit from Lebanon, fire at northern Israel, and terrorism outside of Israel. The immediate response to al-Musawi's killing was the first Katyusha attack on northern Israel, but the organization did not stop there. About a month later, Hezbollah launched a retaliatory attack against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in which 29 people were killed, four of them Israeli Foreign Ministry workers. This act of terrorism aimed to serve as a warning to Israel and create a tangible and cognitive deterrent effect that positions Hezbollah as an organization with high-level operational capabilities and significant ability to cause damage, and a proven willingness and ability to perpetrate

deadly terrorism via suicide attackers in the international arena too.

This message was reinforced two years later, in July 1994, when the organization carried out a suicide attack against the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, killing 86 people. This followed an attack by Israel on Hezbollah's police academy graduation ceremony in Ein Dardara in Lebanon, killing 26 cadets. In these reprisal actions, Hezbollah succeeded to a great extent in setting a high deterrence level vis-à-vis Israeli targets outside of Israel, and since then has forced Israel to take into account the possibility that following each lethal attack on Hezbollah leaders or large-scale strikes on targets in Lebanon, it could suffer a more lethal blow, not at the border or in Israel itself but rather abroad, including against senior Israeli officials. The seeds of the deterrence equation in general and on the international front in particular were planted in these actions (Naveh, 2007).

Within Lebanon between 1992 and May 2000, when Israel withdrew from the security zone, the organization focused on increased semi-military guerrilla warfare against the IDF and its collaborators, which included frequent attacks on SLA and IDF outposts, ambushes of IDF convoys that traveled between the outposts as well as shelling and frontal attacks to capture outposts, and efforts to harm the morale of SLA personnel and the Israeli public, given the high number of casualties among IDF soldiers (Naveh, 2007). In this period, the organization adopted the characteristics and modus operandi of a classic guerrilla organization, such as focusing on harming the enemy's soldiers instead of attempting to capture territory (Schleifer, 2014). Hezbollah's guerrilla warfare and the development of its combat capabilities led to an improvement in its casualty ratio during the 1990s. The number of actions that Hezbollah carried out also increased over the years, evidence of the considerable improvement in its operational capabilities (Gabrielsen, 2014).

Daniel Sobelman has argued that the organization's use of Katyusha rockets led to the gradual establishment of mutual deterrence in the conflict with Israel for the first time (Sobelman, 2018). By firing the Katyushas, Hezbollah established an equation in which it fired toward Israeli territory in response to Israeli actions that caused damage to infrastructure or civilian casualties in Lebanon. These rules of the game were violated twice during the 1990s—as part of Operation Accountability and Operation Grapes of Wrath. Both operations were Israeli initiatives in response to successful Hezbollah actions on the ground—many casualties among IDF soldiers and missile fire toward communities in northern Israel—and stemmed from the need to change the equation (Sobelman, 2009). In both operations Israel tried to exert pressure on the government of Lebanon to restrain Hezbollah by creating significant waves of migration of refugees from southern Lebanon northward. However, the Israeli effort did not succeed, and the Lebanese government was unable to restrain Hezbollah, partly due to Syria's support for the organization (Sobelman, 2022).

Between and after the operations, it was evident that Hezbollah was shaping and planning rules of the game against IDF activity in Lebanon and formulating a kind of deterrence equation, by firing Katyushas at the security zone and at Israel in response to what it saw as Israel's deviations from the status quo that Hezbollah wanted to maintain. As part of the rules of the game, the organization also tried to create a hierarchy of responses to Israel's deviations from this status quo, whereas at each point it escalated its response in order to expand the deterrence equation. For example, in 1993-1994, the organization fired Katyushas at communities in the security zone in response to harm to Lebanese civilians, except in multiple casualty incidents, when it responded by firing at communities in northern Israel. In 1995, Hezbollah escalated its response and decided to fire at Israel more frequently. Moreover, the

organization began to fire toward open areas in Israel or to launch Katyushas at the security zone in cases of the destruction of abandoned houses in Lebanon by the IDF, the injury of Lebanese civilians, or increases in the intensity of the conflict. The organization also fired at Israel in response to incidents in which the SLA acted to punish Hezbollah for actions by the organization against the SLA leaders in Lebanon. Later, Hezbollah fired Katyushas at northern Israel in response to the killing of its organizational leaders. Operation Grapes of Wrath (April 1996) led to a strengthening of Israeli deterrence and, in parallel, to fewer incidents of fire toward Israel. However, acquisition in 1996 from Iran and Syria of long-range Katyushas with a range of 40 km increased Hezbollah's ability to threaten the Israeli home front. These Katyushas were intended mainly for the purpose of deterrence, and the organization refrained from using them until the Second Lebanon War (Naveh, 2007).

During the 1990s, the deterrence equation between Hezbollah and Israel was maintained for several principal reasons: Israel's strategic limitations, since Israel identified a vital strategic security interest in maintaining its military presence in Lebanon; the Syrian presence in Lebanon; and above all, Hezbollah's ability to force Israel to operate according to the rules that it defined, and not to utilize its military superiority fully and defeat Hezbollah. Hezbollah's responses to Israel's actions, which aimed to maintain the rules of the game and at the same time help it consolidate its internal standing in Lebanon, were in most cases proportional, in its view, with respect to deviations on Israel's part, and it refrained from provocative and exceptional military actions, at least until recently.

A considerable portion of Hezbollah's success in establishing the deterrence equation against Israel, despite its clear military inferiority, stemmed from its understanding of the limitations of its force and the importance and effectiveness of the cognitive campaign against Israel. This is a lesson that the organization learned regarding the role of psychological warfare in other conflicts, such as Vietnam and Grenada, and was applied in the struggle with Israel (Harb, 2011). The organization places much emphasis on the visual medium, and some claim that its combat doctrine is subject to this medium, in the sense of "if you didn't photograph, you didn't fight" (Schleifer, 2002). One of Hezbollah's leaders even explained that "on the ground, we hit one Israeli soldier, but a video of him shouting for help affects thousands of Israelis" (el-Houri & Saber, 2010). Consequently, since then the organization has made sure to photograph its actions and broadcast them on its media, especially its television station, al-Manar, accompanied by narration, victory music, or supportive commentary.

A considerable portion of Hezbollah's success in establishing the deterrence equation against Israel, despite its clear military inferiority, stemmed from its understanding of the limitations of its force and the importance and effectiveness of the cognitive campaign against Israel.

The event of the planting of a Hezbollah flag at Delaat Outpost in 1994, which already reflected the cognitive-oriented kinetic pattern of activity that recurred later, is relevant in this context. The incident ended with Hezbollah fighters driven out of the outpost. At no stage could it be claimed that Hezbollah had "captured" the outpost, but the picture of the organization's flag flying over the outpost, which was broadcast many times on various channels, had greater cognitive importance than the "operational achievement." This was also the case with the May 2000 attack on the Rotem Outpost, in which the organization's fighters succeeded in placing the organization's flag on the roof of the outpost for a short time before they were repelled. The incident's importance was in the photographs of the flag on the outpost and not in a tenuous

military achievement, (Schleifer, 2002; 2014). The organization relied on the fact that the Israeli media would broadcast the videos that were screened on al-Manar in order to influence Israeli public opinion. Later the organization also operated close to the Israeli border so that the Israeli media would cover its activities (Gabrielsen, 2014).

From the withdrawal from the security zone until the Second Lebanon War (May 2000 to July 2006): Hezbollah made sure to present the withdrawal from Lebanon as a crowning achievement for the organization, the sole entity that succeeded in prompting an Israeli territorial withdrawal, ostensibly by force. After the withdrawal, the organization made sure to note that while various UN decisions did not succeed in forcing Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, it was Hezbollah's resistance that led to the achievement and in effect to the first Arab victory in the Arab-Israeli conflict (al-Aloosy, 2020). This claim is at the center of the organization's cognitive war against Israel (the "spider web" speech) and helped strengthen the narrative that crystallized in Israel, of a "withdrawal out of weakness" (Dekel & Kurz, 2020; Shapira, 2021). Israel, for its part, accompanied the withdrawal with forceful and severe threats against Hezbollah, and promised far-reaching responses in the event of Hezbollah actions against it, but did not carry out these threats. In October 2000, Hezbollah attacked an IDF patrol in the Shebaa Farms area and kidnapped three soldiers. Both Israel's unwillingness to act on its threats and its entanglement in the conflict with the Palestinians significantly undermined the credibility of its threats, and as a result also undermined Israel's deterrent capability (Sobelman, 2018).

On the other hand, the withdrawal and the demarcation of the Blue Line—the withdrawal line drafted under the auspices of the UN and recognized by it—created a challenge for Hezbollah. Once it could be claimed that the exclusive military services of the organization were no longer needed in Lebanon after the liberation from the Israeli presence, Hezbollah had to revamp the objectives of its war against Israel. Its concern for its survival as the only armed military organization in Lebanon and the need to justify maintenance of its weapons arsenal, alongside the desire to receive international legitimacy, compelled it to find pretexts for its continued military activity. The solution lay in the claim that Israel continued to occupy Lebanese territory and the demand to liberate Shebaa Farms, even though in actuality, before 1967 this territory was under Syrian control. Hezbollah also used the imprisonment of Lebanese prisoners by Israel as another pretext to justify its continued military activity against it, the preservation of its military force, and its standing as the only armed militia in Lebanon (Shapira, 2020; al-Aloosy, 2020).

In this period Hezbollah adopted two spheres of action: it changed the focus of its military activity and moved to a defensive, mainly reactive strategy, and at the same time it accelerated its acquisition of advanced weapons, with considerable aid from Iran. It did so alongside efforts to strengthen the deterrence equation with Israel, adopting the doctrine of an eye for an eye (Naveh, 2007). This modus operandi is evident, for example, in the way the organization used anti-aircraft fire against IDF aircraft, and in the attempt to kidnap IDF soldiers, with the organization presenting such actions as an attempt to correct the situation whereby Lebanese civilians are held by Israel while the organization lacks the ability to exchange them for Israeli citizens (Sobelman, 2003). In order to continue to consolidate the "occupation" of Shebaa Farms as a pretext for continuing its struggle against Israel, the organization focused its activities on this area, and between October 2000 and the Second Lebanon War carried out what Nasrallah later described as "reminder operations" once every few months, in particular in the Shebaa Farms area (Sobelman, 2018).

The deterrence equation between Hezbollah and Israel and the tacit agreement that emerged

between the two sides with respect to the range of "legitimate" actions were maintained during this period and did not deteriorate into full-scale war, mainly because they alleviated some of the uncertainty involved in the conflict between the sides. However, this equation also created the "deterrence trap" for Israel: the fact that the expected limited response from the Israeli side was clear to both sides undermined Israel's ability to deter Hezbollah (Sobelman, 2018).

Following the Second Lebanon War: The deterrence equation collapsed temporarily in 2006. The attempt to kidnap IDF soldiers led to the Israeli response that was "unexpected" in the eyes of Hezbollah, and to the Second Lebanon War. Before the war, Hezbollah's assessment was that Israel would respond in a limited manner, in accordance with the rules of the game that had developed until that time, but Israel's response deviated and led to considerable damage in Lebanon. The war caused the deaths of 1,191 Lebanese citizens, the injury of 4,054, the displacement of almost a million Lebanese, and massive physical damage (Daher, 2019; al-Aloosy, 2020). Several processes contributed to the collapse of mutual deterrence, some of which were related to the fewer constraints on Israel following the end of the second intifada, along with the internal changes in Israel (the Olmert government), as well as the changes in the balance of power in Lebanon and Hezbollah's internal standing following Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. Even though in Hezbollah's view the Second Lebanon War was a victory achieved with the help of divine intervention (Shapira, 2021), within Lebanon the situation was not necessarily perceived this way. Hezbollah suffered considerable criticism in Lebanon due to its independent military standing and its attempt to impose its resistance doctrine on the entire country, and therefore in response it tried to strengthen its standing as an important actor in the Lebanese arena by accelerating its actions against Israel (Sobelman, 2018).

After the Second Lebanon War, Imad Mughniyeh set up several teams that were responsible for analyzing the various stages of the war, drawing military lessons from them, and formulating forecasts with respect to the next war. These teams concluded that the organization must focus on exploiting what it sees as Israel's domestic weakness and on increasing its long-range missile arsenal (Shapira, 2021). As part of the conclusions reached and as a result of the serious military blow inflicted on all of the organization's systems, including in the organization's core in the Dahiyeh quarter of Beirut, Hezbollah and Iran began an intensive effort to restore and cultivate the organization's military capabilities, transforming Hezbollah from an organization that mainly used terrorism and guerrilla warfare into a terrorist army that in time became a fighting force with military frameworks, advanced and precision weapons, and a broad, diverse, and advanced order of battle. Nasrallah described this change and claimed that it was "a new, unique approach to combat—between a standing army and guerrilla warfare" (Albo & Lt. Col. A., 2021, p. 103). This was reflected in building military frameworks and arming them with weapons, with an emphasis on rockets and various types of missiles. The organization succeeded in establishing itself throughout Lebanon, despite the UNIFIL presence and contrary to the demand of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, including in southern Lebanon, which is expected to pose difficulties for an Israeli ground assault in the case of a future conflict (Byman, 2022).

The death of Imad Mughniyeh in Damascus from a car bomb in February 2008 marked a crisis point and another milestone in the organization's development. Mughniyeh, who led the organization's military activity from its beginning, evolved from a marginal terrorist into a military commander with senior standing in the organization, a kind of chief of staff and defense minister of the army-in-the-making, and with this, his standing and importance in the eyes of Iran also increased. His killing left Nasrallah—who until then had mainly been a

leader with political and religious authority in the organization and who relied to a large extent on Mughniyeh as the mainstay of the military-operational realm—as the supreme leader, but alone in the campaign and in shouldering the burden. This forced him to enter the military-strategic sphere, to follow the organization's operational activity more closely, and to supervise Mughniyeh's successors, who did not reach his level. In place of the vacuum that Mughniyeh left behind, Nasrallah relied more and more on Qasem Soleimani.

Soleimani, the commander of Quds Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, formulated a military strategy that came to be known as the "Soleimani vision," which was based on building an "armed resistance" led by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Hezbollah was a central actor, alongside trained militia forces armed with advanced weapons in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. According to Soleimani's vision, this axis, led by Hezbollah, was meant to surround and impose a "rocket siege" on Israel via thousands of rockets, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and trained commando units, along with attack tunnels that would penetrate into Israeli territory from Lebanon in order to carry out surprise attacks that would bring about a decisive military victory for the organization (Albo & Lt. Col. A., 2021; Melman, 2019).

After the targeted killing of Mughniyeh, which Hezbollah attributed to Israel, Hezbollah acted openly to avenge his death via attempts to attack Israeli targets abroad, while simultaneously maintaining quiet along the border in Lebanon. The organization carried out a long series of such attempts, especially in 2009-2016, against a variety of Israeli targets around the world, which included official representatives, diplomatic missions, and Israeli tourists. Another motivation for these attempts was the assassination of Iranian scientists that was attributed to Israel as part of the effort to prevent Iran's nuclear progress, which in turn led to attack attempts by Iran and Hezbollah, some of them with mutual assistance. However, Hezbollah's foreign operations apparatus failed in most of its attempts, except for the attack on Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria, in July 2012 (six people were killed, among them five Israelis and one Bulgarian citizen)—the last attack against Israelis abroad that has succeeded to date. Indeed, the capabilities demonstrated by Hezbollah's foreign attack apparatus were far from those that it demonstrated during the period when Mughniyeh commanded it (Shapira, 2020; Levitt, 2020). But despite the relative lack of success of these attempts, their very existence, as well as the extensive coverage they received in the Israeli media, enabled Hezbollah to continue to consolidate its deterrence equation with Israel, including via the threat of attacks in the international arena, and to herald it as a constant potential operational alternative for the purpose of consolidating its overall deterrence equation vis-à-vis Israel.

Hezbollah's participation in the civil war in Syria starting in 2013, on the level of full fighting formations with thousands of fighters, contributed substantially to strengthening the organization's fighting capabilities—a process that began after the Second Lebanon War and now gained momentum. The involvement in the war was the product of the close connection between Hezbollah and Iran as well as Syria, and it enabled Hezbollah to accumulate combat experience in fighting, operating battalion and brigade-level frameworks, engaging in fire support, and combining military units with special forces as part of the offensive effort, as well as in learning from the experience of the Russian army, which fought alongside it. This experience helped Hezbollah become a modern terrorist army in the conceptual, strategic, operational, and tactical spheres (Albo & Lt. Col. A, 2021). Furthermore, its involvement in the war contributed to the tightened relations with Russia, and Russia has emphasized that it does not relate to Hezbollah as a Lebanese organization, but rather, as an actor that has a presence in many countries in the region (Shapira, 2021).

On the other hand, the organization paid a heavy price for its participation in the war, both in its participation in the war with the ensuing loss of fighters and in the diversion of attention from the struggle with Israel. Moreover, criticism in Lebanon addressed its participation in the war, which did not contribute to the interests of the Lebanese people—criticism that increased the more Hezbollah became entangled in Syria and the internal situation in Lebanon worsened. The outbreak of the economic crisis in Lebanon (October 2019), the most severe in its history and which has plagued it since, has made it even harder for the organization to take an active part in the struggle against Israel.

The targeted killing of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 also left a vacuum. Soleimani, who had a close personal relationship with Nasrallah, played a central role in shaping Hezbollah's strategy, its force buildup, and its operational characteristics. However, there is no doubt that his killing, along with the exposure and destruction of the attack tunnels penetrating from Lebanon (late 2018), as well as the progress in building the Israeli barrier on the northern border, has slowed but has not curbed the increased and systematic pace of the preparations for a military conflict with Israel, which Soleimani pushed for. At the same time, following Soleimani's death, the organization's importance has grown, along with Nasrallah's personal standing among the Iranians as a leading actor in the axis and the "resistance front" that Iran seeks to shape, which, aside from the Shiite axis, includes the Palestinian groups that it supports: first and foremost Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas as well.

The Current Balance of Deterrence between Hezbollah and Israel

Since 2006 the Lebanese border has been relatively quiet. The basis of this balance of deterrence is that both sides lack an interest in re-engaging in a large-scale military campaign, whose results are expected to be far worse than in the past. From Hezbollah's perspective, this has been joined by a series of developments and constraints that limit its ability to participate actively in fighting with Israel, chiefly the involvement in the war in Syria over the course of a decade and the internal crisis in Lebanon. Therefore, the organization has settled for isolated response incidents, aimed in its view at preventing Israel from pushing the boundaries and eroding the elements of deterrence that the organization selected to signal to Israel the limitations of its responses. Israeli successes that the organization has not managed to appropriately avenge in practice (such as the killing of Mughniyeh and the destruction of the tunnels into northern Israel) have also contributed to this. But Hezbollah has not stood still, and in the years that have passed, has worked vigorously in two main fronts to consolidate its deterrence of Israel: the first and most important is the organization's ongoing military buildup with Iran's aid, to the point where today it is the main conventional military threat on Israel's borders; and the second is the heightened cognitive campaign, using new media and the organization's mouthpieces in Lebanon's traditional media.

Hezbollah's military buildup has contributed to the creation of a balance of terror with Israel. The organization has accumulated massive destructive power, including firepower that is based mainly on rockets and missiles of various types and ranges (about 150,000, according to general estimates) that can reach the entire Israeli home front, including precision missiles; thousands of drones; limited air defense capabilities; and cyber capabilities (Mizrahi et al., 2021; Shapira, 2021). In Hezbollah's view, this arsenal is sufficient for deterring Israel and causing it to hesitate to use force against it.

Furthermore, Hezbollah and Iran are also active on the Golan Heights front. Their purpose was and remains to build an operational infrastructure among the local population in the Syrian Golan and to use this infrastructure against Israel. Even though Israel has succeeded in striking Hezbollah officers responsible for

pursuing this goal, Iran and Hezbollah have not given up hope of making the Golan Heights part of the conflict with Israel (Shapira, 2021).

Meanwhile, since 2006 Hezbollah has managed to maintain its presence in southern Lebanon, blatantly violating Security Council Resolution 1701, which granted UNIFIL the mandate to act to prevent the organization's entrenchment near the Israeli border.

Meanwhile, recent years have seen Hezbollah increasingly involved in the development of land combat capabilities, in the form of the Radwan Unit (125) commando force, which has several thousand highly skilled fighters who were trained in Iran. Their declared purpose is to infiltrate into Israel's territory in order to capture territory in the Galilee or at least to attack communities in the Galilee, kill and kidnap Israeli civilians and soldiers and transfer them to Lebanese territory, or capture an Israeli outpost or community, even for a limited time, in order to shock and awe the Israeli public and produce a "victory image" of conquering sovereign Israeli territory. The unit comprises five battalions with a thousand people each, and each battalion is responsible for knowing the specific topographical conditions of the territory for which it is responsible and has been trained to capture (Levitt, 2023; Shapira, 2021).

Nasrallah repeatedly refers to these capabilities and amplifies them in his speeches as part of the cognitive campaign against the IDF, decision makers, and the public in Israel. The demonstration of Radwan Force's capabilities during what was defined as a "large maneuver" (May 21, 2023), to which, in unusual fashion, hundreds of journalists were invited, and during which Radwan operatives presented breaching the wall along the border in order to penetrate into Israel, should be seen in this context. It seems that this time, Hezbollah's cognitive effort was not especially successful, as it was an unimpressive presentation of old and limited weapons with questionable potential achievements (Halabi, 2023b).

Meanwhile, since 2006 Hezbollah has managed to maintain its presence in southern Lebanon, blatantly violating Security Council Resolution 1701, which granted UNIFIL the mandate to act to prevent the organization's entrenchment near the Israeli border. Hezbollah makes sure to deepen its presence in this region (partly in civilian disguise, in the form of building observation posts of the organization Green Without Borders), including by building infrastructure and hiding weapons among the civilian population, which creates an advantage for the organization in both routine times and in emergencies.

Israel, for its part, takes pains to maintain the large military-technological gap between the IDF and Hezbollah and to build up its strength, both offensively and defensively. Along with exposing and thwarting Hezbollah's tunnel project, it is working to complete the construction of a barrier, including in areas in dispute, in order to prevent the construction of future tunnels and make it difficult to cross the border; it also carries out special drills, including the scenario of fighting against the Radwan Force (Zeitun, 2023; Schweitzer & Riemer, 2018). In addition, the IDF works vigorously to harm the organization's buildup efforts with hundreds of strikes in Syria in the past decade that have been attributed to Israel, in the framework of the campaign between wars. This effort, even if it is partially successful (or mostly successful, as the IDF's commanders claim), has so far only managed to delay but not completely stop Hezbollah's buildup process (Valensi & Kaduri, 2022; Kaduri, 2023). At the same time, Israel makes sure to maintain the rules of the game that have developed since 2006 and became guidelines for the two sides and part of the deterrence equation between them, centered on Hezbollah maintaining quiet along the border in Lebanon, as long as Israel does not operate in the Lebanese realm. Consequently, the Lebanese sphere has become a "sphere of

immunity" where Israel refrains from operating, at least publicly.

Hezbollah is not satisfied with merely maintaining this equation, and in recent years has tried to expand it, similar to its previous attempts to expand the deterrence equation. Since 2019, the organization has warned that any Israeli harm to its operatives in Syria will lead to a response. This expansion of the equation is reflected in both kinetic actions, such as firing an anti-tank missile at an IDF vehicle in September 2019 in response to the strike on the precision missile project in Dahiyeh by drones and a strike in Syria on a Shiite axis squad that was about to launch attack drones toward Israel, and in the threats sounded in Nasrallah's speeches (Schweitzer & Mizrahi, 2019). Nevertheless, even though Nasrallah has boasted that he will harm an Israeli soldier for each incident of harm to a Hezbollah operative in the Israeli strikes in Syria, and even claimed in his May 25, 2020 speech that Israel is refraining from striking Hezbollah personnel in Syria and changing its action strategy due to his threats, in practice many times the organization has refrained from taking action and avenging the deaths of its operatives.

However, in the past two years several incidents have occurred that together have eroded the balance of deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah in the organization's favor, and undermined the strategic clarity that prevailed in the region. Aside from the incidents mentioned, the organization can also point to its claim that it is the cause of the reduction in the Israeli Air Force's activity in Lebanon, alongside the expanded presence of its operatives next to the border with Israel, while creating friction with IDF soldiers along the border.

A major reflection of the effort to expand the deterrence equation with Israel and Hezbollah's increasing audacity can be found in the combined kinetic-cognitive-diplomatic campaign on the eve of the signing of the agreement to demarcate the maritime border with Israel (October 2022). The campaign was waged against the backdrop of the severe political and economic crisis in Lebanon, and led to incisive public criticism of the organization as responsible for this crisis. As a result of this criticism, the organization had to reestablish its standing in Lebanon and justify its continued possession of its weapons arsenal.

While the campaign was waged mainly via speeches and interviews by Nasrallah and senior figures in the organization with sympathetic media outlets in Lebanon and on social media, kinetic measures were also integrated alongside the cognitive dimension. On two occasions, unarmed drones were launched toward the Karish gas field (June-July 2022), in a step that was meant to attest to Hezbollah's military capabilities and to underscore that the organization's precision weapons arsenal can harm Israel. Moreover, a symbolic flotilla was launched from the coast of Tripoli toward Israel's territorial waters, and Hezbollah's forces along the border were reinforced. At the same time, the organization conveyed threatening messages via diplomatic channels (Mizrahi, 2022a; Schweitzer et al., 2022; Sobelman, 2023).

It seems that Hezbollah's willingness to test the waters as part of this campaign, risking a possible Israeli response, is the product of its view that Lebanon's economic survival is at stake, as is the organization's survival. The organization also believes, and this was even expressed explicitly in Nasrallah's speeches, that the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis in Europe made the United States, Europe, and Israel more vulnerable to pressure, and therefore believes that the United States would use its restraining influence on Israel to prevent another war (Sobelman, 2023). On the other hand, Hezbollah was cautious and refrained from responding from the Lebanese border to the ongoing Israeli strikes on its assets and those of Iran in Syria, and likewise did not intervene on behalf of the Palestinian struggle in the recent conflicts between Hamas and Islamic Jihad and Israel, despite their expectation of

its involvement as part of the "convergence of arenas" doctrine.

Hezbollah's improved military capabilities have been exploited by Nasrallah to strengthen the deterrence equation with Israel. In his speeches, which are covered at length in the Israeli media, Nasrallah has frequently threatened the Israeli public while boasting, especially in the last few years, about Hezbollah's ability to produce precision weapons independently, joining the high-quality weapons that the organization receives from Iran. Nasrallah has used his possession of these weapons to frighten Israel's citizens about what awaits them and to deter the Israeli leadership from offensive action in Lebanese territory.

In his rhetoric since the Second Lebanon War, Nasrallah is careful to make clear that the organization is not interested in war, but if such a war breaks out, he is ready and can win it, because he has missiles that can strike every part of Israel and "100,000 fighters" (a number that is far from the reality). He even claimed recently that it is not Israel that is threatening Hezbollah with war, but rather it is the organization and the resistance front (the Shiite axis along with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) that are threatening Israel, and recommended that it avoid the mistake of getting drawn into a war that would lead to its annihilation (Halabi, 2023a). Thus, Hezbollah hopes to prove and to consolidate its standing as the main actor in the axis of resistance, as part of the conception that has taken hold among the members of the front led by Iran regarding the strategy of the convergence of arenas, meaning the advancement of an integrated multi-front campaign against Israel, as was first manifested in Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021).

The results of the November 2022 election in Israel, the rise of a right-wing government, and the large-scale protests against the government's proposed judicial overhaul were seen by Hezbollah as another opportunity to strengthen the deterrence equation in the organization's favor. In the first half of 2023, it was evident that the deep internal argument in Israel is perceived as Israeli weakness, and this has strengthened Nasrallah's deep belief in the realization of his spider web theory and in an opportunity for the organization, based on Nasrallah's false sense of security (Schweitzer & Mizrahi, 2023a). This false confidence, as well as the Iranian and Palestinian disappointment at the lack of direct Hezbollah involvement in the struggle against Israel in response to the harm to Iranian targets in Syria and in Iran itself, led to two acts that departed from the deterrence equation with Israel:

a. The first was the attack within Israeli territory (March 13, 2023) at Megiddo Junction on Route 65, in the form of an explosive charge that was planted by a terrorist who was trained and sent by the organization, infiltrated into Israel from Lebanon, and seriously injured an Israeli citizen. Apparently, the organization's intention was to kill many people. This attack was carried out by Hezbollah without any prior Israeli activity that in the past was seen as an Israeli "violation" of the rules of the game, but rather at Hezbollah's initiative, amounting to another "deviation" from these rules. While Hezbollah refrained from claiming explicit responsibility for the incident, the information published shows clearly that it was behind the management and implementation of the incident, possibly at Iran's urging.
b. The second was the firing of 34 rockets from Lebanese territory during Passover (April 6, 2023), following clashes on the Temple Mount. Hezbollah's knowledge of or prior involvement in permitting this rocket fire is disputed, and although according to firm statements by Israeli intelligence figures Hezbollah did not know in advance about the timing of this specific rocket fire, our assessment is that Hezbollah was familiar with the existing infrastructure and gave its principled consent to the rocket fire as part of the strategic coordination between

Hezbollah leaders and leaders of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Iran, who were in Beirut at the time.

In any case, it seems that in both cases Hezbollah operated in the service of its interests and those of its affiliates in the resistance front, chiefly Iran, while hiding behind Palestinian operatives to obscure its level of involvement, yet at the same time demonstrated willingness to seriously risk an Israeli response in the case of exposure, as part of the organization's policy of living on the edge. Presumably a prominent component of the organization's increased audacity and its pushing the boundaries of the deterrence equation with Israel recently stems from its underestimation of Israel's willingness to respond in an aggressive military manner to its violations, based on its perception that Israel is currently weak and hesitant due to its serious internal crisis, and therefore will refrain from responding to its active provocations (Mizrahi & Schweitzer, 2023b).

Conclusion

The balance of deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah along the Lebanese border follows the development of rules of the game formed and shaped over the course of many years through a dynamic of trial and error by both sides, with the influence of many formative elements. Today more than in the past, Hezbollah is challenging Israel and pushing the limits of the deterrence equation. Hezbollah's willingness to foment military tension with Israel increases, the more confident it is in its strength and its ability to cause destruction and strategic damage to Israel. This is due to the upgrading of its military capabilities, chiefly the precision missiles; the tightened coordination of the axis of resistance at its side; and what it identifies as Israel's internal weakness, which, in its eyes, prompts the unwillingness to risk a full-scale military campaign against the organization, despite its considerable military strength. This position is reinforced by its assessment that the United States is withdrawing from the Middle East and, like the other Western countries, is not interested in the eruption of war while its attention is focused on the war between Russia and Ukraine.

While Israel's deterrence has been challenged in recent years, both sides' interest in maintaining strategic clarity regarding the rules of the game and the mutual deterrence between them remains evident.

While Israel's deterrence has been challenged in recent years, both sides' interest in maintaining strategic clarity regarding the rules of the game and the mutual deterrence between them remains evident. These serve their common interest in preventing large-scale war, in which both sides are liable to suffer very serious blows. While in the past year Hezbollah's confidence has increased along with its willingness to take greater risks, which could cause the situation to deteriorate, it seems that the organization is still largely restrained and interested in avoiding a large frontal confrontation with Israel.

This restraint is partly the product of Hezbollah's integration and consolidation in Lebanon over the years, and of the rise in the importance of considerations related to Lebanon's situation and the organization's domestic standing (Michael & Dostri, 2018). In our assessment, Hezbollah's developing responsibility for Lebanon's situation and for the future of its residents is at least as important to the organization as the considerations related to Iran's interests and its ideological doctrine. As Hezbollah is more involved in and gains experience with political practices, it discovers that it has channels of influence other than the kinetic route. At the same time, the organization's responsibility for the future of Lebanon and its residents has grown, and its sensitivity to the increasing criticism among the Lebanese public is evident, against the backdrop of the serious economic-political

crisis in Lebanon since 2019, which has led to a decline in support for Hezbollah's camp, reflected in the results of the elections to the Lebanese parliament (May 2022).

Nevertheless, Nasrallah's tendency to take risks out of hope that Israel, given its current weakness in his view, will contain its response, and given the organization's increasing commitment to the axis of resistance in the service of Iranian and Palestinian interests, could lead to uncontrolled scenarios of short and limited conflicts that could develop into large-scale war, contrary to the interests of both sides. This requires that Israel study these scenarios and prepare for them.

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Army Aviation: Optimal Integration of Aerial Assets in Ground Combat

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The past decade has seen increased discussion about the future and value of ground maneuver in the IDF. Indeed, since the Second Lebanon War, Israel has hesitated to use its ground troops in operations and has harbored doubts—including within the IDF itself—over the achievements of maneuver warfare vis-à-vis enemies that circle Israel and the willingness of the political leadership to employ it. As part of the five-year plan for the IDF, then-Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi guided an approach centered on intelligence fusion that would be relayed from all the IDF sources to the maneuvering units; and an autonomous system, based on artificial intelligence, that would direct fire at identified targets and chart a path for the maneuvering units on the battlefield. Most of the firepower would be from the air. The current structure of the IDF, in which responsibility for the buildup and operation of aerial forces rests almost exclusively with the Air Force, would not change.

This study examines the viability of this approach and its impact on Ground Forces operations. It then presents an alternative option: an army aviation force made up primarily of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or RPVs), which would be built within the Ground Forces and operate directly under the command of the ground units. The ground units would operate within a "mission bubble," with maximal independence in intelligence gathering, launch of offensives, and defense of the force from advanced aerial threats posed by enemy drones. The Air Force will focus on its relative advantages: strikes in the operational level, operations deep within enemy territory and distant enemies, air and missile defense, and achievement of air superiority. The study examines the advantages and challenges that this approach presents for the Ground and Air Forces, the expected difficulties in implementation, and the changes that would be needed in the Air Force, Ground Forces, and the General Staff.

Keywords: IDF, Air Force, Ground Forces, maneuver, army aviation, air superiority, General Staff, multidimensional warfare

Introduction

Over the past decade, there has been increased discussion about the future and value of maneuver warfare in the IDF (Tzur, 2016), particularly in light of clear hesitation since the Second Lebanon War to use ground troops during military operations. This hesitation stems from doubts, including within the IDF, over the achievements of maneuver warfare vis-à-vis enemies that circle Israel and the willingness of the political leadership to resort to maneuver warfare, given their understanding of the sensitivity of the Israeli public to casualties.

This article addresses the IDF's proposed solutions to this problem, especially the "multi-dimensional" approach that guided force buildup under Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi, as detailed in his speech at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) before the end of his term of office (Kochavi, 2022). This approach is built on the "aerialization" of ground forces and a reliance on intelligence that is relayed to ground forces, coupled with fire primarily from the air—using aerial vehicles operated by the Air Force.

The lessons of the past, as well as careful examination of all possible points of failure, raise concerns that force buildup and application in this fashion could prevent the formation of ground units capable of fulfilling their missions, since they conflict both with the worldview of the commanders in the Ground Forces and the very nature of ground warfare, as well as with significant technological and organizational challenges. This article proposes an alternate approach, the "army aviation," where various aerial systems, most of them unmanned, would be put under the direct command of the army, be built by the Ground Forces, and be operated independently by the command on the ground during battle. This would allow the Air Force to focus on missions that no other branch of the military can conduct as part of the overall campaign.

In his address, Kochavi argued that the IDF's current capability for maneuver warfare is now totally different from what came before it. It is based on what he called "the industrialization of precision": a greater amount than ever before of real-time intelligence, relayed back by the intelligence room to every front-line unit in the brigade and certainly to larger forces, with all the IDF's intelligence gathering capabilities channeled into an integrated intelligence picture, which would allow Israel to expose its enemies; and all kinds of firepower, from the air and the ground, in a variety of intensities, which would destroy the exposed enemy and in effect pave the way for ground forces to maneuver on the battlefield.

All this, Kochavi continued, is possible thanks to the digital revolution, which

> has also revolutionized the battlefield, since it connects everyone. Anyone who is part of our advanced system can click on the tablet on a house that will be displayed in three dimensions; that target will appear on all the attack systems, which will decide who attacks—be it an F-15 or an attack helicopter—and the target will be attacked in a matter of minutes. It's a lot more than combined warfare; it's fused warfare. (Kochavi, 2022)

This is without doubt an ambitious vision that has the welcome pretension of addressing the main difficulty facing contemporary standing armies: the ability to defeat an "invisible enemy," which has very few strategic centers of power whose destruction would constitute victory, which hides among a civilian population and threatens not only the maneuver force but also the home front, since it has more advanced firepower than ever before—and all of this in a world where domestic and international legitimacy for an operation and public opinion decide the outcome of the campaign no less than the physical destruction of the enemy in battle.

Kochavi's comments suggest that the IDF's solution to the issue of maneuver warfare is the

"aerialization" of the land forces in two senses: first, the ground forces become a kind of "forward scout," and most of the physical destruction of the enemy is carried out by various aerial means. Second, and more important, Kochavi's vision is to do for the Ground Forces what the digital revolution, intelligence networks, and precision weapons did for the Air Force. Advanced technology is supposed to disperse the fog of war ("exposing the enemy to a massive extent, both in advance and in real time"); it will allow Israel to employ effective precision munitions against the enemy, even when there is minimal exposure time and it is in the heart of a civilian population center ("the target will be attacked in a matter of minutes"); and all of this will be fed by intelligence that has been analyzed far from the front lines (in intelligence cells) and be operated by a rear command (the attack cells that "will decide what attacks—be it an F-15 or an attack helicopter").

It is important to examine whether this is even possible, and if there is a more effective way to maximize Israel's air and land capabilities. To examine these questions, we need to go back to the beginning of the IDF's use of air support for the ground forces, identify the reasons for failings along the way, and critically examine the argument that technology can fix them.

Air Force Participation in IDF Ground Warfare: Much Effort and Controversial Results

From the Establishment of the IDF to the Revolution in Military Affairs

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, airpower was considered a very important element for decision in war. In a seminal documented presented to the government in October 1953, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion referred to airpower as the most important part of what he called the "strike force," saying that "our control in the air ensures us victory more than any other element, and the reverse [is also true]" (Ben Gurion, 1981, p. 7). Nonetheless, Ben Gurion also realized that the Air Force alone, even if it were to launch a preemptive strike (as in the Six Day War), would not be sufficient to achieve overall victory in the campaign. In 1950 he noted that "without an effective air force, we have no chance of victory, even if the victory is secured by the Ground Force. But the Ground Force has no chance of winning without an effective Air Force, especially if the Air Force is not effective at the moment that war erupts" (Brun, 2022, p. 37). It is possible, therefore, to say that from the very inception of the IDF, the Air Force was established as a force that was supposed to use highly important operational power, and at the same time, to help the Ground Force achieve decision in the war.

From the very inception of the IDF, the Air Force was established as a force that was supposed to use highly important operational power, and at the same time, to help the Ground Force achieve decision in the war.

In the Yom Kippur War, which began without a preemptive strike, the most important need during the conflict was the air support to ground forces. Still, there was a large and undoubted gulf between the investment in air support, as reflected by the number of aerial sorties, and the outcome—both in terms of the physical damage done to the enemy and in terms of the feeling of the Ground Forces, certainly as far it relates to decision in the campaign. This is despite a massive effort that involved much sacrifice.

Of the 11,223 sorties during the war, the Air Force conducted 5,142 sorties—almost half of the total—intended to support the ground forces (Sela, 2013). Yet in an internal Air Force document that examined the Golan Heights front, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yehezkel Somekh summed up the influence of aerial operations saying, "It is possible to say that the direct damage that the Israeli Air Force caused is far less than the IDF was used to from previous wars" (Gordon, 2008, p. 380). There is almost full agreement

that the Air Force's influence on the main ground maneuvers—holding battle, the failed counterattack on October 8, the incursion into Syrian territory, the massive artillery battle on the Egyptian front on October 14, and the crossing of the Suez Canal—was limited.

There were many factors contributing to this outcome. The IDF entered the Yom Kippur War without a clear concept of how to utilize the Air Force for these missions and without a suitable organizational structure. The outcome was also the result of insufficient and irrelevant intelligence (which led then-Air Force Commander Benny Peled to conclude that the Air Force needed its own intelligence arm), and the fact that the imprecise munitions available to aircraft at the time made it hard to strike relatively small targets, such as tanks or bridges. Manned aircraft, which can only remain in areas above the battlefield for a very short time and which depend on precise intelligence, are an ineffective tool in a chaotic ground battle, and commanders on the ground found it hard to utilize them effectively.

The IDF's solution was to invest heavily in personnel in its coordination and support mechanisms. After the war, units were set up to coordinate operations between the Air Force and the Ground Forces—coordination designed to allow for the more effective air support: a unit of forward air cells in the geographic commands and a headquarters for transport helicopters. However, during the First Lebanon War there was also a noticeable gulf between the success enjoyed in the air superiority mission against Syrian air defense in the Beqaa Valley and the minor contribution, certainly compared to the effort invested, in air support during the first week of the war to the maneuvering forces, which remained in "glorious isolation" (Har Even, 2018).

Here, too, there was no lack of effort: 56 percent of the sorties launched by the Air Force during the first week of the war (June 4-11, 1982) were air support to ground forces—an even higher proportion than during the Yom Kippur War (45 percent). Maj. Gen. (res.) Avraham Rotem summed up his research into the Air Force's contribution to the ground campaign during the first week of the Lebanon War by writing, "All we know is that sometimes these sorties were utilized highly effectively and sometimes there were simply wasted" (Rotem, 2007, p. 62). He went on to specify reasons that were also connected to intelligence coordination, adding an important conclusion:

> The relationship between Ground Forces and Air Forces is not, in a fundamental sense, a relationship between equals…Without engaging in cheap psychology, I argue that the classic emotional baggage between the supporting and supported parties taints this relationship. It starts with denying the need: one very senior officer said in his testimony that "he was not disappointed in the Air Force during the war because he had no expectations of it." (Rotem, 2007, p. 63)

In June 1982, the IDF, for the time in a significant battle, used attack helicopters—aircraft designed in essence to support the Ground Forces' combat. At the outset of the fighting, the Air Force had around 27 usable attack helicopters; most of these were relatively small McDonnell Douglas MD 500 Defender helicopters, while a minority were Bell AH-1 Cobras. They were operated by the Air Force, but the pilots felt on more than one occasion that the attention to them by commanders in the Air Force, which were responsible for the command cells, was incomplete and that there was a lack of understanding of their potential contribution to the battle. The coordination with the Ground Forces was also lacking.

The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Campaigns of the Past Decades

From the late 1970s, a new military doctrine began to develop in the United States, based

on both analysis of battlefields and the implications of technological developments—the computer revolution (followed by network-centric warfare), the development of precision guided munitions, and the onset of unmanned vehicles, especially aerial vehicles. Much has been written about what came to be known as "active defense" (an approach that first appeared in US documents in 1976), AirLand Battle (1982), and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA, a doctrine that became prevalent in the 1990s). All these are concepts developed by and integrated into the US military, partly following the lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War, and also manifested in the IDF's force buildup starting in the 1990s.

The precision munitions revolution created a situation in which it was possible to launch an airstrike against any target, from a building to a mobile vehicle such as a tank, with an unprecedented level of accuracy. General Tommy Franks, a former head of US Central Command (CENTCOM), said that it only took 200 sorties a day during the campaign in Afghanistan to attack the same number of targets that it took 3,000 sorties to attack just a decade earlier in the Gulf War, when the vast majority were not precision munitions (Erwin, 2002).

When Ehud Barak served as chief of staff, the IDF's top echelons held a long series of meetings, following which then-Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin launched what was known as the "Central Project." It was only 30 years later that the project was revealed to be the development and procurement of the Elbit Hermes 450 UAVs (Benn, 2022). The Hermes 450 was not just an aircraft; it was at the very center of an active defense doctrine based on long-range precision munitions. According to this doctrine, the IDF would block Syrian armored divisions long before they reached the frontline, thereby saving the need for a protracted and bloody ground battle, as happened during the Yom Kippur War. A large proportion of these munitions would be deployed by a variety of aircraft.

All this had a significant ramification: the aerial platforms were transformed from a support tool that was powerful and psychologically influential—albeit inaccurate, not readily available, and only capable of brief presence in the battlefield—into the main weapon of destruction. Aerial vehicles capable of striking with great precision from a distance that puts them out of range of the enemy and with a variety of munitions, from bombs that will only kill people to bombs weighing ton—weapons that remain within striking distance of the target for hours and are available to the ground force almost on demand—have gradually replaced artillery, tanks, and infantry in both planning and execution, in the wide variety of operations that the IDF carries out as part of its routine and in campaigns. The use of aerial vehicles, remote and often unmanned, dovetails with the increasing reluctance to use ground forces due to concern over casualties, what Edward Luttwak terms "post-heroic warfare" (Luttwak, 2002). The outcome of all this was a revealed preference to limit the use of ground forces and "give increasing priority to the Air Force" (Brun, 2022, p. 190).

The share of aerial assets in force buildup and military doctrine has grown consistently. The changed enemy—from regular armies that move in large formations and are easily identifiable to hybrid organizations embedded within the civilian population—has intensified the emphasis on precision strikes from the air, aided by excellent intelligence. The doctrine based on air operations was implemented in the war on terror (targeted killings), in the campaign against Hezbollah, against Hamas bases, and in the campaign between wars. Aerial operations have replaced the ground raid in the IDF's routine security operations, as well as decisive maneuvers in war planning.

Inevitably, the attention of commanders, investment of resources, and willingness to operate moved to the Air Force and Military Intelligence, which were perceived as more advanced, more suited to what was needed

in the modern age, and no less important, were controlled optimally and precisely by the senior command level. Air vehicles, with the command's tradition of Air Force control centers, suited the desire for greater precision and the desire to resolve dilemmas using technology.

In the Second Lebanon War (2006), the same problems with air support missions arose, and there were "serious shortcomings in preparedness, fitness, and training" (Winograd Commission, 2008, p. 330). Joining this was the severe concern that a fighter jet would be downed—essentially intolerable in a campaign against an enemy that does not have an air force of its own—which meant that in offensive operations, the Air Force preferred to reduce risks "from an aerial perspective" at the expense of providing an answer for the needs of the Ground Forces. In contrast to the difficulty in launching air support attacks from fighter jets, the Air Force contributed greatly to evacuation missions and combat logistics (Ben-Israel, 2007; Winograd Commission, 2008).

Over the course of several campaigns in the Gaza Strip, the Air Force's ability to support ground battles became more sophisticated and, in effect, replaced them. The operation of UAVs to collect intelligence and to strike has expanded the ability to target and strike quickly and accurately; bombing buildings with heavy munitions as a precursor to a land incursion into Gazan neighborhoods reduced the danger confronting ground troops, and bombing tunnels from the air allowed Israel to destroy them without risking soldiers' lives by sending them into the tunnels.

But a word of caution on drawing any conclusions about the capabilities of Israel's airpower from the fighting in Gaza. Fighting on another front or a multi-front conflict would not replicate the balance of power between a very large Air Force, which is called upon to carry out few missions other than air support, and a relatively small number of ground troops operating in a small area for a limited purpose. The absence of significant air defense in Gaza and the ability to operate effectively outside the range of limited threat gave Israel broad freedom to fly with minimal risk. As a result, the nature of the fighting made support missions extremely accessible, and this could be misleading if we were to deduce anything about broader combat scenarios.

New Challenges and the Limitations of Airpower in Support Missions

One of the conditions necessary for the effective use of airpower in ground combat is air superiority, and over the past decade, this has become increasingly difficult to obtain. It is harder to neutralize modern air defense systems, which include advanced SAMs (especially in regular armies) that threaten aircraft, portable SHORAD, and modern anti-tank missiles that can also threaten helicopters, in addition to various sensors and a computerized air picture. Without achieving sufficient freedom of operation, the Air Force's ability to be available for the needs of the ground forces is severely harmed—in surveillance missions, attack missions, transportation of troops, evacuation, and logistics.

Notwithstanding all the technological improvements, the limitations on availability and the central control over airpower that is operated by the Air Force's command and control centers reduce its effectiveness in hitting enemy combatants, which, in the absence of a mission to take territory, has become the key measurement of success, especially with regard to combat in Gaza. According to Maj. Gen. Kobi Barak, "we improved our attack precision from coordinates of eight digits to coordinates of 10, 12, 14, and even 15 digits (z-dimension). The enemy, in contrast, manages to flee from these targets before they are attacked. We hit a coordinate, but we find it hard to hit the enemy" (Barak, 2017, p. 54).

The Air Force is also responsible for defending ground forces from threats in the air domain—using fighter jets, and, from the

1970s, also ground tactical air defense, including anti-aircraft artillery and portable SHORAD that were assigned to the Ground Forces. Over the years, the tactical air defense dwindled until it was finally eliminated a decade ago, and currently air defense for the Ground Forces is provided as part of the theater's air defense by fighter jets and SAM batteries (Winter, 2022).

The aerial threats to ground forces are changing and the Air Force's ability to provide the requisite level of defense has ebbed. As long as the aerial threat consisted primarily of fighter jets and helicopters, the Air Force was able to provide a solution by attacking enemy air bases and landing strips and by intercepting aircraft. The aerial threat to ground troops in the modern battlefield comprises small drones and quadcopters, which are harder to identify and intercept and do not require complex ground assets for operating. Ground Forces operate their own small drones and quadcopters, and the increasing number of UAVs in the battlefield makes it very hard to create precise air picture and down enemy drones.

Thus the lessons learned from the history of the Air Force's role in ground combat suggest that it contributed to logistics and evacuation missions, as well as defending Ground Forces from aerial attack by enemy planes or helicopters. In contrast, on air support missions there were significant shortcomings in most of the wars of the past decades, even though much was invested in force buildup and great effort was put into its application. The difficulties remained unsolved despite the technological advances and even though the IDF established organizational structures to handle them.

Above all, historical analysis shows that the most important reasons for the poor effectiveness of air support were linked to cultural factors, primarily the decentralized and chaotic nature of ground combat—something that even advanced technology would probably be unable to alter. Attempts to impose the Air Force's doctrine on the Ground Forces and the promises to dispel the fog of war using intelligence relayed to the rear and to limit clashes with the enemy by means of firepower that is also controlled by headquarters could have the opposite effect: ground forces lacking in independence, which find it hard to operate when the promise of "fused combat" is not realized.

Historical analysis shows that the most important reasons for the poor effectiveness of air support were linked to cultural factors, primarily the decentralized and chaotic nature of ground combat.

Lessons from Other Armies: Multi-Domain Battlefield and Network-Centric Warfare

The need to incorporate aerial capabilities in ground combat is not limited to the IDF, and it is therefore worthwhile to learn from other armies that examined innovative doctrines involving network-centric warfare. The US Army developed the Multi-Domain Battlefield (MBD) in a far-reaching study that did not manage to create a doctrine to replace the "air-ground combat" doctrine. This doctrine is supposed to serve the US Army for several generations, in an attempt to unify the various doctrines under one umbrella that provides a full, readily available, and suitable answer for all branches of the military in terms of jointness.

The basic document published by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) states that this doctrine addresses the need to "defeat 'hybrid war' and deter adversaries' 'fait accompli' campaigns, employing resilient formations that can operate semi-independently in the expanded operational area while projecting power into or accessing all domains, and converging capabilities to create windows of advantage to enable maneuver" (US Army, 2017, p. 2). If so, it seems that despite the very different nature of IDF operations and those of the US

Army (especially in the operating distance from command centers and air support bases), the MDB doctrine was developed to respond to a number of needs, including some that are similar to what the IDF was expected to experience in future campaigns.

To implement the MDB doctrine the tactical combat formations must be capable of conducting combined arms operations, be semi-independent, decentralized, provide mutual support with their embedded capabilities or those available to the lowest feasible tactical rank, and must maneuver semi-autonomously, without secure flanks, constant communication with the headquarters directly above them, or contiguous lines of communication (US Army, 2017). The conclusion reached by those formulating MDB is that independence of operation and the sense of capability by the ground forces are critical to winning the battle.

Research that examines the French army's experience with network-centric warfare in relatively extensive operations in Afghanistan, Africa, and Lebanon also mainly addresses the cultural elements, which, according to French officers, make it hard to get the most out of technology under combat conditions: "French officers have high regard for the benefits of Blue Force tracking [a system that digitally identifies friendly units] and are impressed by the potential benefits for logistics and sustainment. By no means, however, do they believe that the technology changes how they operate in any fundamental way…Some also worry that the technology will lead to greater centralization and micromanagement, which are contrary to the French Army's current emphasis on autonomous action by lower echelon commanders" (Shurkin et al., 2022, pp. x-xi).

The IDF is fundamentally different from the US Army, which is one of the services and is focused exclusively on ground combat, and from the French army, which is primarily an expeditionary force, dispatched to various regions. The doctrine of "army aviation," as explained below, also does not suggest that fighter jets for close air support become an organic part of the ground forces and be operated directly by them.

Nonetheless, the lessons learned by these armies invite relevant conclusions for the IDF. The most important is that the fundamental question, which still has not been resolved, is the different perspective of the ground commander, whose image of the battle, even with the most advanced technology, will never be as clear as that of an Air Force commander. There is concern, therefore, that if the maneuvering force is dependent on intelligence resources and firepower, provided to it from the rear and under centralized control, this could paralyze the forces in the middle of combat, under the strain of a large battle and with the enemy trying to sabotage the lines of communications. Even the best technology, and even on the as yet unproven assumption that it would indeed work under combat conditions, will not resolve this problem.

The Challenges of Technology

Computer networking technology and the automation of the decision making process play a central role in the current doctrine of jointness. For many in the IDF, it is a basic assumption that it will be possible to use these technologies successfully in the next war. Some explain that any reluctance to adopt this assumption stems from a fear of technological innovation and of technology-based doctrines.

It is doubtful that this argument holds much water. Any complex and groundbreaking technology that depends on communication between many different systems is liable to have flaws, which will take many long stages of trial and error to fix. The integration of any technological systems, even those that have already been tried successfully in their isolated components, will entail similar difficulties. It is doubtful whether one can rely as completely as necessary on these technologies during

wartime, where, in addition to technological difficulties, there are also issues of distance, material damage, and an active and agitating enemy. This is even more the case when it comes to artificial intelligence, a field that is still in its infancy even in the civilian sphere.

The first notable difficulty is in the ability to ensure that the computer systems and the network that connects them operate properly, not only between the headquarters, but also between the tactical units. The usage demands of such a network are increasing, as is the capacity that the network must provide. The result is the potential for a gulf between the vision of networking capabilities and its assurance at tactical levels. The IDF's new doctrine creates a dependency on continuous communication between units on various levels, and the difficulty in ensuring that there is adequate infrastructure before the next war may undermine operational capability.

Another difficulty is in the difficulty in developing artificial intelligence applications for decision making, especially for complex situations. The difficulty for military decision making applications stems from the potential for malfunctions, the severity of such malfunctions when they occur, and the gaps in confidence using the systems (Deuer, 2022).

"War is the realm of uncertainty," which makes it harder to teach decision making to systems in this situation. The gulfs between the assumptions made by the person developing the application and the reality of war could be massive, since changes are not only random, but also the result of the action of an enemy that operates under conditions that are different from those that the application "learned," and is constantly trying to deceive and surprise. These conditions of uncertainty require flexibility and the ability to improvise, which are human capabilities that artificial intelligence systems are hard pressed to create in real time. Most of the civilian artificial intelligence systems are not equipped to deal with "enemies," and those that are (such as antifraud systems) operate in defined and limited conditions (Akavia & Yehuda, 2021).

Artificial intelligence systems embody great potential when it comes to combat procedures and combat management, but the problems that have arisen with similar systems in a civilian setting and the unique characteristics of a battlefield, which make it particularly hard to predict what will happen, require us to tread very cautiously in the development of such systems. The development and deployment process must include comprehensive simulative testing and in-depth critical analysis. In light of all this, relying on artificial intelligence technology as the foundation for the operation of a multi-service force of airpower in a ground battle is too great a risk for the next war—and for the foreseeable future.

But most problematic could be the impact of such a failure on a commander in battle, who has been trained to rely on technology and to view it as the magic solution that dispels the fog of war and nullifies the physical and conscious distance between him and the hierarchy above him. He could experience a loss of faith and have difficulty functioning under conditions that demand that he make independent decisions despite the uncertainty, when most of his pre-war training was dedicated to integrating the new technology that has just failed, rather than learning how to get along without it. Based on the experience of the IDF and other militaries, technological solutions and centralized control may engender trust in theory, but in practice, do not pass the test.

Contemporary Force Buildup, Controlled by the Air Force

Even today, the IDF adheres to the doctrine whereby aerial assets are built up and operated under the full control of the Air Force. Although the Ground Forces do acquire small intelligence gathering aircraft (such as Skylark UAVs and quadcopters), most of the needs of divisions are supposed to come from assets operated by the Air Force—manned aircraft and unmanned

vehicles such as the MALE UAVs and the smaller Spark UAVs. This differs from other militaries, such as the US, British, German, and French, where the Ground Forces have broader responsibility for developing and using of army aviation and air defense.

The IDF's response to improve air support is through manpower and technology. Massive manpower and resource intensive efforts were made on two fronts: more manpower at the headquarters and command and control centers, coupled with advanced technology designed to create joint networking even under combat conditions.

On the organizational level, the coordination systems between the Air Force and the Ground Forces were bolstered at headquarters and within the maneuver units, with the creation of manpower-intense command and control centers: "fire centers" were set up in the regional commands, in conjunction with the Air Force and under the command of officers from the Air Force, which replaced similar organizations that focused in the past on planning the use of artillery fire (Melamed, 2019). In addition, the Air Force expanded the organizations that are responsible for air support to Ground Forces, the Cooperation unit, and the air support department, under the command of a specially appointed brigadier general (Gonen, 2014). The number of Air Force liaison officers in the maneuvering units is increasing, as Kochavi stated in his speech.

However, manpower intensive mechanisms, as well as reliance on highly advanced technology, have limitations and weaknesses. Coordination systems do not necessarily offer a solution to the question of prioritizing the allocation of available resources between many real-time demands. At most, they handle the implementation of the priorities once they have been determined. A series of decisions by humans is still needed to address the allocation of resources, especially when there are shortages or there is a risk to the aircraft. Therefore, only a limited reduction in the time taken by human coordination mechanisms can be expected, since decision making takes time.

Moreover, the challenge of maintaining proficiency levels becomes even harder the more that these mechanisms include more people, and the more these people must be trained to make more sophisticated use of resources under complex conditions. The difficulty in maintaining the proficiency levels of many more people could lead to a drop in proficiency levels, which would reduce willingness to give them operational authorities, thereby canceling the very result that decentralization was supposed to achieve.

Several IDF officers have written articles in which they proposed various ways of expanding the army aviation by deploying a large number of small UAVs for intelligence gathering operations, which would provide the intelligence that allows for a rapid offensive closure, especially against targets in an urban area; in addition, UAVs would provide radio communication relay, which is considered a critical gap on the ground. According to some of these proposals, such as that submitted by Kobi Barak (2017), a fleet of autonomous aircraft must also perform transport missions, replacing helicopters that are under heavy threat in the modern field of combat. Other proposals for implementing a ground fleet include relying on a broad infrastructure of internet communications (Ortal, 2016), as well as decentralizing the operation of UAVs to the level of battalion, brigade, and division, as is the case in the US Army (Rich, 2022).

In practice, it is the Air Force that is responsible for the force buildup and operation of aerial platforms within the IDF, above the lowest tactical level. According to the prevalent approach, the Air Force should not only be responsible for the deployment of fighter jets and helicopters, but also the IDF's key UAV capabilities: MALE UAVs with air-ground attack capability are operated by the Air Force's squadrons, as well as the new Spark array, designed "to create a fusion of data and rapid

and effective operational closure" (IDF website, 2022).

An Alternative Proposal: Independence for the Maneuvering Force, with the Establishment of Army Aviation

We propose examining a different alternative—bolstering the independence of the Ground Forces during combat, including with aerial assets under the structural authority of the ground commander. This proposal is an adaption of the accepted approach in Ground Forces across the world, including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany. In these militaries, the army aviation includes attack, utility, and transport helicopters; in some militaries, it also includes UAVs and even cargo planes. Ground forces are likewise responsible for their air defense in the battlefield, from tactical SHORAD to regional air defense for the divisions and the armies. The US Army operates UAVs, from small drones on the battalion level to larger UAVs (Gray Eagle) on the division level, and tactical air defense systems such as the Avenger systems to PATRIOT and THAAD systems for regional defense (FM 3-04 Army Aviation, 2020; FM 3-10 U.S. Army Air, 2020).

The implementation of army aviation in the IDF must suit its unique characteristics. Not all uses of airpower in ground combat obligate the use of an army aviation framework. Fighter jets, for example, are operated by units in the Air Force, even when they are assets that are used to support ground combat, as the A-10 planes in the US Air Force.

The proposal for the establishment of an army aviation unit also relies on technological opportunities, like the current approach in the IDF to bolster jointness, as described by Kochavi. However, those required for army aviation are more proven and estabblished, and they are especially more suited to the worldview of a ground commander and the real capabilities of the ground force to make the most of aerial assets.

What Should be in the Ground Forces' Domain?

Deciding which authorities and responsibilities should be given to the Ground Forces regarding force buildup and application involve the following considerations:

a. Which capabilities provide maximum benefit, especially in terms of the relevance and availability needed for immediate use in combat.
b. What is the maximum number of platforms that allow for effective centralized command of the Air Force.
c. What capabilities can be contained by the Ground Forces, both in terms of force buildup and application, under the complex conditions and uncertainty that characterize ground combat.

In accordance with these criteria, the division of responsibility should be as follows:

Intelligence collection and attack in maneuver warfare are two central needs where most responsibility and authority should be given to the Ground Forces. According to this approach, the immediate airpower for collection and attack—primarily UAVs, but also attack helicopters (as long as they are in use)—is an integral part of the Ground Forces and operated independently, without reliance on fire support teams under the command of a rear headquarters. The low- and medium-altitude aerial assets used will be an organic part of the force, in the framework of a battalion tactical group or brigade tactical group, similar to the current organic nature of tanks, artillery, infantry, and engineering in combat units. This structure maintains the ability to receive intelligence from central sources and allocate firepower, although this is not a precondition for the actual deployment of the maneuvering force. The ground commander can, therefore, overcome the limitations created by combat conditions or technological limitations, and act according to its best judgment even without a full picture of the combat zone or full and immediate access to firepower from the rear.

The evident advantages of this are the ability to synergize the operation of aerial intelligence collection and attack assets with the ground assets in the hands of the Ground Forces; rapid response time against an agile and low-signature enemy; and the total understanding of the location and the immediate needs of the ground troops.

The relative simplicity of the logistics and operational deployment of UAVs allows them to be operated by the Ground Forces independently and with operational autonomy. This does not apply only to quadcopter, which can fly for half an hour at a low altitude, but also UAVs that can remain in medium altitude over a broad area in order to identify targets and warn about threats. In the current IDF array, this includes the Hermes 450 for intelligence collection and attack UAVs, and the Spark array, whereby swarms of UAVs will "control" a certain area for intelligence collection and attack needs. These assets will be used optimally in battlefield when the independently maneuvering ground unit can control the aerial assets it needs.

In the medium and long term, attack helicopters will likely be replaced by UAVs, which can be controlled entirely by ground units. When unmanned alternatives for evacuation missions (such as an unmanned transportation helicopter, which is already being tested in the United States) or logistics missions (by large drones) are developed, they can be suited to the proposed approach and will also be deployed under the command of the Ground Forces, while gradually replacing the assets operated by the Air Force for these missions.

A solution to the logistical complexity of operating fleets of UAVs could be provided by Air Force support, which would provide take-off, landing, and maintenance services to the large UAVs in the Air Force bases, just as it gets important logistics services from the Army. In the short term, both force buildup and maintenance of fleet of attack helicopters will remain with the Air Force, due to the complexity of force buildup and maintenance.

Air defense for ground units can be an additional area of responsibility for the Ground Forces. This is to provide an immediate answer, using close coordination, to a new threat posed by the enemy: quadcopters, UAVs, and loitering munitions, most of which are small, slow, and fly at low altitude, and are operated widely and in the same areas in which the IDF deploys assets with similar characteristics. These characteristics make the primary air defense assets of the Air Force a lot less relevant when it comes to protecting ground troops. It is possible that in order to fully implement this approach, the IDF will have to develop and acquire additional resources, but this does not change the guiding principle behind the approach proposed here: maximum independence for the Ground Forces, putting all of the assets that are not manned aircraft or heavy UAVs under its control and creating decision making and operative capabilities that are not dependent on officials who are stationed in the rear or on technology that would probably not work effectively in combat conditions.

Some capabilities and missions should remain within the Air Force as part of the General Staff's airpower and not be given to the Ground Forces. First are capabilities that need manned aircraft, because of the great complexity of establishing and operating manned airpower, and the need to consider elements of freedom of aerial operation as part of aerial missions. The main capabilities of an aerial force in combat, which currently require manned aircraft, are attacks on infrastructure with heavy munitions using fighter planes, raids in attack helicopters, medical evacuation from combat zones, and forward aerial logistics.

Second are missions characterized by long lead time for planning (several hours) that do not need an immediate picture of the ground forces and their needs, such as interdiction and isolation of the combat zone, attacks on logistic sites and logistic convoys, and attacks on fortifications and buildings ahead of the ground maneuver. The long lead time that is

required for these missions allows for complex inter-service planning coordination, without impinging on the quality of the answer provided to the needs of the ground combat.

Third, missions where ground forces are just one of the consumers, such as extended range intelligence areas beyond the ground combat zone, should be left with the General Staff.

Moreover, it is clear that the change will allow the Air Force to focus on those missions in the campaign that it should lead and in which it will be the main force in the IDF, primarily attacks on distant enemies, attacks on strategic targets deep in enemy territory, and attacks on the long-range missiles, air superiority, and logistic arrays, as well as preparation for a preemptive strike at the start of the campaign.

Effects on Ground Force Capabilities

According to the proposed approach, the ground unit will engage in operations in a kind of three-dimensional "bubble," which will be defined by the assigned mission and the organic assets at its disposal, and in which it will control the aerial assets required. The regional command and the General Staff, including the airpower at their disposal, will play a support role in this arrangement, in part according to a support missions plan that will be drawn up in advance—attacking targets before the beginning of the ground battle, air interdiction to prevent enemy troops entering the "bubble," destroying fortified targets, and large scale logistic and evacuation missions.

This operational approach suits the worldview of the Ground Force command and its ability to use the assets at its disposal in the heat of combat. Instead of a "support force" operated by the "invisible hand" of technology, whose performance or availability in battle cannot be controlled by the commander, the Ground Force will have an integrated and organic aerial force that in its view is no different from the assets that are already under its command. It will be able to operate the aerial assets with a high level of urgency, with a profound understanding of what they can contribute, and not sit around waiting until intelligence or firepower arrives from the rear.

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Risks, Costs, and Challenges

Potential Diminished Ability to Carry Out Missions

A key component of the proposal is reducing the role that the Air Force plays in attack missions in ground combat, especially with combat helicopters, and increasing the role of assets controlled by the Ground Forces—mainly UAVs and precision ground munitions for these missions. One of the risks involved in this proposal is a significant reduction in the number of air support strikes using heavy munitions, whose main damage effect helps neutralize threats from large structures, e.g., buildings, and to create shock in the attack zone.

However, in support missions, the growing inventory of precision ground munitions provides a sufficient answer to the need for attacking those buildings. For this, the array of ground firepower, especially precision missiles, should be enlarged and strengthened and equipped with heavier warheads, which will bridge the existing gap between the 20-kilogram warhead 122mm accurate rockets and the light munitions deployed from aircraft. The US Army's ground force is currently equipped with a variety of missiles that can reach distances of dozens if not hundreds of kilometers with warheads of hundreds of kilograms, and the EXTRA (Extended Range Artillery) artillery rocket system manufactured by Israel has a warhead of 120 kilograms. This variety of firepower, all of which is under the direct command of the Ground Forces commander, could have the desired

effect during combat—rapid neutralization of fire from within structures during combat in a built-up area. The precision missiles that the Ground Forces possess have an advantage over an attack from a helicopter in that the firepower is more accessible and quicker, thanks to the simplicity of coordination between the support force and the units it supports. The range of the missiles allows for precision strikes across the maneuver area.

Giving Ground Forces responsibility for a defined geographical area near the border may affect the Air Force's ability to carry out its missions in and adjacent to that area: primarily, the air defense of the State of Israel; strikes on surface-to-surface missile and rockets; and achievement of air superiority, which allows freedom of operation for the Air Force. These missions cannot be broken down into geographical area "pieces."

Air defense and missile defense include detection and interception of aircraft and missiles as they fly through the airspace above the ground combat, as well as location and attack of launchers even when they are located within the ground combat zone. Attacks on missiles and rockets launchers in the combat zone can be launched by the Ground Forces, but the planning and execution of the entire mission demand a much broader perspective, which understands the enemy's arrays and the elements of Israel's offensive and defensive response. Dealing with surface-to-surface missiles and rockets is more than attacks on launchers that pop up suddenly; full attention must also be given to the command-and-control elements, logistics, launch units, and the missiles themselves, using intelligence, attack, and interception.

Ensuring freedom of aerial operation against enemy air defense systems will also entail dealing with those systems that are located in the area for which the Ground Forces are responsible; in these cases too, critical are an overview of the enemy's air defense systems and the various responses Israel has to these threats—confronting the enemy's detection and command and control systems and its surface-to-air missiles and electronic warfare systems, while integrating intelligence means, attack, and electronic warfare, and planning how the force will be deployed. Those components of air defense that are under the geographical responsibility of the Ground Forces are just a small part of the overall picture. For the Air Force to execute its missions, it requires a response that will allow it to operate effectively in the area of the ground troops, while minimizing as much as possible the risk that ground units will be attacked from the air, and the risk of shooting down the UAVs of army aviation by the Air Force's air defense.

Another threat to freedom of aerial operation is the danger that the Ground Forces' local air defense poses to the Air Force's aircraft: first, because of the Ground Forces' responsibility and authority to defend themselves from aerial threats by intercepting and downing them; second, given the fact that the two services operate aerial assets in the same area, and the difficulty in managing an "aerial picture" of so many vehicles, some of which are operated by small ground units deployed across the area.

These risks can be addressed with a response based on three principles:

a. Air Force responsibility for specific missions within the divisional space (achieving air superiority and attacking the enemy's medium and long-range missile and rocket systems), given that it can carry out most of its operation while operating above the divisional airspace.
b. A shared picture between the Ground Forces and the Air Force (a picture of our troops and an aerial picture), which will also be shared with the lower levels, allowing the use of aerial assets in the same area with a low risk: low risk of collision between Air Force's and Ground Forces' aerial assets, and low risk of friendly fire incidents. The vast majority of the aircraft will be operated in the divisional area with UAVs, which, if downed,

would not be a serious loss, and therefore computerized solutions to a common picture may be sufficient.

c. Reducing the need for Air Force vehicles to enter the divisional area, thanks to the independent use of aerial assets by the division. The use of helicopters during combat—assault helicopters for rescue and evacuation or attack helicopters for offensive missions—will still demand a solution based on coordination. The joint air picture will help to reduce the risks.

Force Buildup Costs

Decentralizing UAVs among the Ground Forces also has the potential to incur a high cost. First, a centralized system allows for more efficient use of resources in force buildup, while avoiding duplication. Decentralization naturally leads to superfluous acquisition, since each service needs to develop a full response for its needs. Second, decentralization of UAV capability entails overhead necessary for operation—personnel, infrastructure, and maintenance—which would be reduced under a centralized system. Third, all UAV fleets make use of the electromagnetic spectrum as a shared and limited resource for communications, and decentralization could make it hard to use this resource flexibly and efficiently and could create general difficulties by reducing operational flexibility.

Finally, effective aerial force buildup, including UAVs, requires the development and maintenance over time of a large variety of know-how and expertise that at the moment exist only in the Air Force. This includes characterizing particular weapons, engineering knowledge, operational know-how needed to formulate doctrines, and more. The development and maintenance of aerial force buildup capability require resources to set up the organizations that will have the knowledge for aerial force buildup for the Ground Forces—experts and processes. Even before the Ground Forces can build their aerial force, investment will have to be made in the organization and in creating organization duplication with the Air Force.

These costs can be reduced by adhering to the following principles:

a. Direction from the General Staff for UAV fleets that are joint systems for the Air Force and the Ground Forces.
b. Regulation from the General Staff governing the use of the electromagnetic spectrum and joint communication infrastructure, similar to the operational internet doctrine.
c. Preference for a ground force fleet that requires little infrastructure.
d. Use of Air Force bases as providers of logistical support services for the larger UAVs in the army aviation.

The concept of army aviation should also be viewed as a springboard for promoting an organizational culture and a sense of capability in the Ground Forces, which will bring it closer to the expected standards in the Air Force.

The Change from the Air Force Perspective

Likely vehement opposition from within the Air Force will not allow for the transfer of responsibility for aerial force buildup and application to the Ground Forces. The challenge is not just that there is a potential threat to the Air Force's ability to carry out its missions, but also that the Air Force could perceive the change as a threat to its relevance (which would be reduced if the Air Force were called on for Ground Force support missions) and to the resources it is currently allocated (primarily the acquisition of UAVs and helicopters, as well as the personnel needed to operate the complex coordination mechanisms).

To allow the change to happen, it is important that the Air Force see it more as a catalyst for growth rather than a source of threat. More than 20 years ago, then-Air Force Commander Dan Halutz wanted the Air Force "to become an architect of the campaign rather than a contractor for bombing," but his vision was never realized. Within the Air Force, the attention of commanders and the organization as a whole

is currently focused on the precise execution of the numerous missions it is tasked with, but in many of those missions, the systemic vision, the formulation of an operational plan, and the intelligence assessment for the mission are carried out outside the Air Force.

Reducing some of the Air Force's air support missions in frontline combat will allow it to dedicate more organizational and command-level attention and more personnel to the operational-level planning and to formulation of new doctrines and operations concepts for its missions. As such, it could return to the direction envisaged by Halutz, strengthen its influence within the operational level, and focus on those missions for which it is the State of Israel's primary force: operations deep in the territories of close enemies, operations against enemies without mutual borders, air defense of all aspects, and achievement of air superiority.

The Change from the General Staff Perspective

In recent years, the General Staff has concentrated much authority in its hands that in the past was distributed between IDF services and regional commands. There were many reasons for this, including the focus on routine security and the campaign between wars, the desire to integrate innovation from the top to the bottom, and the search for efficiency in firepower and force buildup through centralized management.

In routine times and in the campaign between wars, the General Staff manages operational planning closely and in minute detail, and it adopts a similar pattern for operations in war too, by expanding its planning and supervision mechanisms over operational plans and their execution. An example of this is the establishment of a powerful "firepower cell" in its Operations Directorate.

A doctrine that grants greater independence to the Ground Forces in using firepower and force buildup will reduce the need for the General Staff to be involved at a high resolution, both for the use of firepower and force buildup. It will allow the General Staff to serve as an example of willingness to accept a more decentralized command, which increases the independence and authority of the units under it, to create the kind of command that will be needed in the case of a multi-front war. The more the General Staff centralizes power when it comes to using firepower and force buildup, the more the services and regional commands will find it difficult to develop their own firepower and force buildup capabilities.

The Role of the Political Leadership vis-à-vis the Required Change

None of the alternatives presented—the current force buildup of the IDF or the proposal for army aviation—are significant without an entire process spearheaded by the political leadership, which sets the goal of a strategy for the IDF. The strategy is the cornerstone for coherent operational doctrines and trust among the ranks that there is indeed every intention to use this alternative when needed. These conditions do not currently exist in Israel. This manifests itself in all of the campaigns since the Second Lebanon War and has exacerbated the sense within the IDF in general and the Ground Forces in particular that there is no real intention to execute a ground maneuver during a large campaign (Tzur, 2017).

The Subcommittee for Security Doctrine and Force Buildup, which is part of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, in a report about the Gideon five-year plan, detailed the preferred process for weighty decisions such as force buildup (Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 2017). According to the report, the political echelon, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, must formulate and approve the national security doctrine, from which the role of each body in the security establishment will be derived; the Defense Minister must lead a process that leads to the formulation of an operational doctrine for the IDF, from which operational plans and force buildup will be derived.

This process must occur for such an important decision as the one discussed here, not only in terms of Ground Force buildup but also to relay to all ranks that there is a plan to build a ground array capable of carrying out significant maneuvers during combat and to use it when the time comes. The Defense Minister must oversee implementation of the decision by the General Staff and approve acquisitions and the resulting integration plans. There is a precedent for this in the IDF, when in 1983, then-Defense Minister Moshe Arens spearheaded the decision to establish the Ground Forces Command, which would eventually become the Israeli Ground Forces.

Similar Changes in Other Militaries: The Howze Board

In the early 1960s, as involvement in Vietnam intensified, the US defense leadership was worried that its ground forces were hard pressed to deploy the capabilities provided by aerial systems, primarily helicopters, and that it would be preferable to rely on familiar ground systems for logistics and combat. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara demanded that the army examine "a plan for implementing fresh and perhaps unorthodox concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobility" (Bonin, 2006, p. 53).

General Hamilton Howze was appointed to head the committee that examined the aerial needs of the army. He himself was from the Ground Forces and not the Air Force, and he served in the Armored Division during World War II. Therefore, he had a profound knowledge of the needs and character of the ground force, as well as original thinking and experience in combining aerial resources, which he gained during his previous position as the first director of Army Aviation in 1955. Howze was given just 90 days to submit his report and under his command were placed many parachute units and a significant quantity of helicopters and transport planes for training, as well as civilian research institutes such the RAND Corporation and Stanford University, which helped analyze the data and prepare exercises and war games.

The Howze Board recommended the establishment of an Air Assault Division, equipped with no fewer than 459 planes and transport helicopters, firepower, and logistical support, which would be capable of penetrating quickly deep into enemy territory and engage in independent combat. The committee recommended the close air support force should be organic within the ground force framework. Howze explained his recommendation thus:

> There are many missions…which absolutely require for effectiveness the most intimate coordination with ground combat elements—infantry, tanks, and armor…and the responsiveness also necessary can only be achieved if the pilots are part of and under command of the ground elements, live with them, and operate their aircraft from fields close to the headquarters they serve. (Bonin, 2006, p. 65)

Then-Commander of the US Air Force, General Curtis LeMay, came out strongly against the report, arguing that the model proposed was only suitable for combat in Vietnam. LeMay added, "I cannot agree with the Army designing forces and establishing mission requirements for aircraft which duplicate an already existing and proven force, and one which can be expanded to meet any valid Army requirements" (Bonin, 2006, p. 66).

McNamara ordered the creation of a special unit to test the board's main recommendation. The United States Senate Committee on Armed Services held a comprehensive hearing on the subject and the trials lasted for more than two years, ending with the establishment of two airborne divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne Division.

The process behind the Howze Board suggests that in order to bring about a successful

process of change, which challenges preexisting doctrine and the organic independence of existing bodies, all of the participating bodies must rally round the vision—the political leaders, the General Staff, and the respective branches. The doctrinal development should be entrusted into the hands of the main "client" of the project, in this case, the Ground Forces, which will, of course, be assisted by people from the Air Force. External experts should be involved in the process as much as possible since they will provide perspectives and analytical tools that will challenge the decision makers and help them sharpen their conclusions.

The current IDF doctrine contains risks, because it relies in its entirety on unproven or theoretical technological capabilities, but above all, because it denies the independence of the Ground Forces and clashes with its needs and view of reality under the special conditions of the battlefield.

The conclusions should be examined as broadly as possible and not just by setting up small, experimental units that, by their very nature, will not be able to examine how the new doctrine would perform on a significant scale, faithfully replicating what will be needed during actual conflict. In the end, the decision makers among the higher ranks must give their unequivocal support, since they have the ability to overcome the inherent objections of people seeking to maintain the status quo, while taking responsibility for the outcomes.

Conclusion

The jointness doctrine reflects the IDF's approach to aerial operations in the framework of ground combat. Following the transformation of battlefield and technological opportunities, the IDF chose to keep the jointness doctrine and realize it using other means—multiple aircraft, broad connectivity between all of the forces in the battlefield, and the use of artificial intelligence for decision making in the deployment of these assets.

The current IDF doctrine contains risks, because it relies in its entirety on unproven or theoretical technological capabilities, but above all, because it denies the independence of the Ground Forces and clashes with its needs and view of reality under the special conditions of the battlefield. These factors have already led to failures in jointness between the aerial and ground forces within the IDF. The currently existing and emerging technologies cannot satisfactorily resolve these issues with any degree of certainty, and the price of possible failure could be catastrophic.

Our proposal is to adopt a different approach, designed to bolster the independence of the Ground Forces and reduce its reliance on the Air Force. Implementing this approach will occur by means of a ground fleet, operated under the authority of the Ground Forces during combat and built under the authority of the Ground Forces during non-war times. An army aviation force of this sort must afford independent and maximal freedom of operation to the Ground Forces on the battlefield, and accordingly, include UAVs, including the types and sizes for which the IDF currently places responsibility on the Air Force for development and combat deployment.

Manned airpower will be operated by the Air Force in the future too, and it will still have important combat missions. However, already today technology allows the IDF to provide ground units with a wide range of solutions in the two realms that it struggles to get a solution from the rear headquarters—real time intelligence and attack capabilities against most of the relevant targets, and self air defense capabilities against aerial threats in the modern battlefield. Expanding the responsibility of the Ground Forces allows the examination of a balanced response between ground assets and unmanned aerial assets, and manned assets, which given the operational complexity must remain under the responsibility of the Air

Force, and with their effectiveness limited by the threats of the modern battlefield.

Strengthening the independence of the Ground Forces in combat and increasing their responsibility for force buildup will generate additional important achievements: it will bolster the Ground Force's confidence in its capabilities on the future battlefield, including ground maneuvers; the Air Force will be able to focus on its exclusive missions, while increasing its dominance in doctrine formulation, force buildup, and system-wide planning; and it will allow the General Staff to free itself from the micromanagement of intra-service force buildup and intra-service jointness in combat.

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This article is based on research that was published by Tel Aviv University's Elrom Center.

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Demographic Changes in Israel's Urban Space and National Security

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Like elsewhere throughout the world, Israel has experienced waves of internal and external migration, and these phenomena have exerted a strong influence on the country's development, as well as on the phenomenon of acculturation and relations between the majority and minority groups. In the case of Israel, Arab and ultra-Orthodox citizens migrate in an ongoing process into the living spaces of the majority and create mixed spaces. This article examines the influence of these processes of acculturation on social resilience and national security, and explores whether Israel is sufficiently aware of the challenge that these demographic changes create and is prepared to address them.

The article surveys acculturation models for absorption of both foreign immigrants and internal migrants from minority groups among the majority group in Western countries, exploring which could be implemented in Israel on a national and municipal level. The assumption is that the rapid growth of minority groups in Israel—including those that do not identify with the national ethos, feel they are outsiders, are alienated from the state, and oppose its national institutions—could lead to friction between the majority group and the minority and could even deteriorate into violence, which would undermine social resilience and Israel's national security. Adopting a suitable policy to counter this challenge is vital if Israel is to ensure a diverse society with high levels of identity and resilience. The article proposes ways to develop a municipal model to integrate minority groups and help them connect to the majority, in order to minimize these risks and pave the way for a more cohesive society.

Keywords: acculturation, multiculturalism, mixed cities, ultra-Orthodox, Arabs, demography, social resilience

Introduction: Models of Acculturation and Minority Absorption

Ever-intensifying processes of globalization, as well as internal and international migration, mean that in more and more countries, people from different societies, different nations, and even different continents live in the same geographical space (Segal, 2019). By their very nature, multicultural encounters are charged, especially when dealing with shared lives created in the framework of close urban proximity. This encounter creates a process known as acculturation, in which cultures influence each other in terms of their values and their way of life, and can also lead to confrontations and challenges (Sam et al., 2013).

The field of acculturation was first described more than 130 years ago (Roibin & Nurhayati, 2021) and was studied by various researchers using different theoretical conceptualizations over the past 50 years (Ward & Geeraert, 2016). At first, the acculturation theory sought to describe how "primitive tribes" should adapt themselves to the dominant cultural majority (Rudmin et al., 2017). In those first years, the acculturation model was displayed through one-dimensional lenses, whereby it was expected and preferred that members of the minority group abandon their values, norms, and behavior and adopt those of the majority (Gordon, 1964). Over the years, with greater general sensitivity to the phenomenon of racism, the academic world also began to recognize the virtues of minority groups, and far more inclusive and exact models and theories were developed (Rudmin et al., 2017). One of the models most commonly accepted today was drawn up by John Berry (1990), which enables conceptualization of the processes occurring in the world and in Israel.

According to Berry (1990), members of minority groups have four coping strategies when they come into contact with the majority. Sometimes, the minority will opt to maintain its original culture and differentiate itself from the majority, creating geographic, moral, and ideological "walls" between themselves and the majority (segregation). Sometime, members of the minority group want to be absorbed into the majority or are forced to do so (assimilation). Between these options are two intermediate options, namely, integrating into the majority culture while maintaining the original culture (integration), or abandoning both the minority and majority cultures (marginalization).

Beyond the influence of sociological and psychological variables on the acculturation strategy of the minority group (Trachtengot, 2021), the position of the majority group is a significant factor when it comes to the strategy that the minority group will adopt (Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Giles et al., 2012; Lefringhausen et al., 2022). The dominant approach is that the positions of the majority group with regard to an optimal policy for creating harmony between the groups are the most important factor when it comes to the type of acculturation that the minority group adopts (Vorauer et al., 2009; Whitley & Webster, 2019; Wolsko et al., 2007).

Three Potential Approaches of the Majority Group

Assimilation: This policy proposes the creation of a homogenous society, which expects members of minority groups to abandon their traditional values and lifestyles and adopt the behavior of the majority group (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Guimond et al., 2013). This approach is similar to the "melting pot" approach prevalent in the first years after Israel's establishment, which aspired to create a uniform Israeli model, whereby all population groups would come together to create a new Israeli culture that did not previously exist. In the assimilation model, however, the majority group expects that overall, the smaller groups will adopt its culture and abandon other beliefs and lifestyles.

Multiculturalism: This approach supports recognizing and protecting the singular characteristics of each group, while encouraging harmonious coexistence between the groups (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). This

approach recognizes that there are "different tribes" in a shared space, and advocates that each continue to adhere to its particular lifestyle. At the same time, this approach urges collaborative and positive relations between the groups, from a stance of mutual acceptance. Policies of this sort are implemented in countries like the Netherlands and Germany, where the state represents a cooperative and equitable framework for members of all groups, allowing each to embrace a singular way of life while cooperating with the other groups in the population. The United States ostensibly also has a multicultural policy, which allows minorities to protect their respective lifestyles, although it is possible that assimilation is so conspicuous there that it does not fear allowing minority groups to retain their singularity while they assimilate into the majority culture.

"Colorblindness": This approach is driven by a concern over prejudices and discrimination against the minority group, so it seeks equal treatment for each individual, ignoring any cultural or other affiliation (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010; Wolsko et al., 2000). This approach supersedes the differences and unique qualities of each group and argues that all individuals should be treated equally.

Which Approach Prevents Prejudice and Encourages Acceptance and Equality?

In order to identify how different policies affect prejudices, Whitely and Webster (2019) surveyed 99 different studies (42 from the United States and 57 from various European countries). Their comparative study found that a policy of assimilation tends to lead to a rise in the rate of prejudice, while colorblindness leads to a very slight drop. Multiculturalism also tends to lead to a drop in the rate of prejudice. Studies have shown that these approaches can only exert a positive influence when members of the majority group recognize the lifestyle and values of the minority group, while at the same time aspire to create a society—homogeneous or heterogeneous—that can contain their shared existence as one society. In contrast, when the minority group experiences the majority as objecting to its unique traditions or customs, or not recognizing its legitimacy, it could reject a policy of integration, while adopting insular and isolationist tendencies in order to safeguard its uniqueness (Black, 2021; Bastug & Akca, 2019; Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Zagefka et al., 2012). These cases can spur a phenomenon known as reactive ethnicity. Efforts by the majority group to integrate the minority could be experienced by the latter as efforts to assimilate them and could increase opposition to integration (Rumbaut, 2008).

In the State of Israel, there are two large minority sectors—Arab and ultra-Orthodox. Beyond the obvious differences between them, both tend to perceive the behavior of the majority group toward them as an attempt to implement a policy that leads to their assimilation into Israeli society.

In the State of Israel, there are two large minority sectors—Arab and ultra-Orthodox. Beyond the obvious differences between them, both tend to perceive in a similar way the behavior of the majority group toward them as an attempt to implement a policy that leads to their assimilation into Israeli society. Notwithstanding the state's efforts to afford these groups a certain degree of autonomy—in terms of their separate education systems, their exemption from the Israeli "melting pot," namely, mandatory military service, and relative freedom to maintain their respective cultural lifestyles, especially in homogenous communities—they sense that overall the majority group is not willing to recognize their values and their lifestyles fully or to accept them as legitimate and, in so doing, actually wants to assimilate them. The nature and the perceptions of these groups stem from different catalysts and objectives, but in practice they are similar.

Arab society, which comprises around 20 percent of the Israeli population, experiences an ongoing sense of discrimination within Israeli society (Okun & Friedlander, 2007)— manifested in efforts to minimize the presence of the Arabic language and culture (Wattad, 2021), inequitable distribution of cultural and economic resources (Zussman, 2013), and the state's failure to recognize the sector's narrative regarding their national and historic past as part of the Palestinian people (Kimmerling & Migdal, 2003). The Arab minority feels that despite its efforts to connect and integrate while maintaining its lifestyle and its historic affiliation, and despite the state's significant efforts to integrate Arab society and the cultural, linguistic, educational, and religious autonomy that the Arab minority enjoys, which is among the most extensive in the world, Israeli society as a whole is trying to erase its identity and its heritage within the greater society. Consequently, there is a tendency within Arab society toward isolationism and Palestinianization (Khaizran, 2020). While the Arab sector openly declares its drive to integrate into Israeli society, it seems that it harbors a fear of assimilation.

Similarly, ultra-Orthodox society, which comprises around 13 percent of Israel's total population, is undergoing a similar if not identical process. Concerned lest it be assimilated into the majority population and its unique way of life erased, ultra-Orthodoxy has for many years adhered to a policy of separation and built ever-higher walls between itself and the rest of the population (Brown, 2017). Although this trend has been dominant in ultra-Orthodox society for many years, in the past 20 years, in tandem with and in response to growing efforts to integrate parts of ultra-Orthodox society into the general population, the ultra-Orthodox have been inclined to build even higher walls, to ensure their cognitive sense of being a minority, and to reject any trend toward integration—even if, in the end, it could benefit them. Thus, for example, ultra-Orthodox society refrains from encouraging integration into the workforce or higher education, and anything that might lead to a connection between the ultra-Orthodox population and the general population. Ostensibly, connections would boost the social mobility of ultra-Orthodox society, enhance its socio-economic position, and prompt a more positive attitude among the rest of the population (Trachtengot, 2021). However, it seems that the ultra-Orthodox community's fear of assimilation, like that of the Arab population, is so great that they prefer to segregate themselves, even at the cost of economic and social resources (Friedman, 2021). As a result, a vicious circle is created, whereby the higher walls create a backlash among the Israeli public, which loses patience with the Arab and ultra-Orthodox narratives and finds it hard to accept them. This, in turn, leads to greater seclusion, increases anxiety among the rest of the population, and so on.

According to the acculturation approach, it appears that the Arab and ultra-Orthodox minorities, despite their differences, share an increasing sense of alienation from the rest of the population. This disconnect stems from similar sources and motives, and is due in part to the policy of integration that the majority group implements toward them. This policy does not stop at its desire to integrate them into Israeli society but is accompanied by a lack of acknowledgment of the values of the minority groups and concomitant efforts to erase their cultures and values. The two groups aspire to safeguard their uniqueness and their way of life at any price, so they build walls of separation. This decreases their identification with the Israeli collective and leads to their being more distanced from the majority.

In these circumstances, demographic changes that reduce the geographic distance between these groups and the rest of the population create an emotional distance, which is a source of difficulty and tension. This occurs when the acculturation is not mediated or not managed properly by the authorities. The following section examines various models of

acculturation that have been implemented in some other countries.

Models from Countries with Mixed Populations

Canada: Multicultural Model

Canada, where people from different cultures live in close proximity, is a model of a country where there is a strict policy to safeguard the rights of the minority groups that comprise the population (Guo & Wong, 2015). This massive country, the second largest in the world after Russia, covers an area of 10 million sq km, with most of its territory uninhabited. The population of Canada is around 40 million people (about 12 percent of the population of the United States, its southern neighbor), living for the most part in a small swath of land in the south of the country, stretching over a mere 500 kilometers north of the US-Canada border. These figures, coupled with the fact that Canada's population has comprised diverse cultural groups since Europeans first began settling there (Berry & Hou, 2021), have encouraged immigration, which, in turn, shaped the character of the country and its population. Around half of the Canadians are Christian (53 percent) and only 40 percent belong to the indigenous populations, English or French. This balance continues to change as Canada absorbs more and more migrants from throughout the world. Canada currently absorbs more than 1 percent of its population in immigrants every year, mainly academics and professionals (Bragg & Wong, 2016). Thus, Canada's population comprises significant minority groups of immigrants from all over the world—from Japan and China to South America. There are more than 200 ethnics groups in Canada, including 13 large groups that number more than 1 million people each.

In 1971, Canada become the first country in the world to adopt multiculturalism as official government policy. The goal was to unite the various groups in Canadian society, in order to relieve tensions between the English and French populations as well as to strengthen other ethnic groups' sense of belonging to the country (Knowles, 2016). To strengthen the move, in 1982 a new constitution came into effect that included the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which legally enshrines human rights in the country. These two decisions were possible because Canadian culture is characterized by a multicultural approach and open to the existence of different cultures side by side, with the common denominator of a national framework that unifies them all (Brosseau & Dewing, 2018).

These and other points mean that from the outset—and not retroactively—Canada absorbs immigrants as citizens with equal rights and not as guests. As such, the traditional conflicts that arise between the majority that absorbs the newcomers and the incoming minority barely exist. While the Canadian province of Quebec has been home to separatist movements, this in fact illustrates well the effectiveness of the Canadian model, since Quebec previously sought to split from Canada and implement a non-multicultural policy. In general, while Great Britain, France, and other European countries experience problems integrating minority communities into their societies, including Muslim communities, the Canadian example provides a successful model that promotes national unity and social cohesion, while its starting point is equal treatment for all cultures. This is a laudable policy that nurtures shared values, recognizes the different narratives of the cultures that comprise society as a whole, is based on mutual respect, and is supported by legislation that can be endorsed by all the ethnic and religious minorities in Canadian society. One could define Canadian multiculturalism as an approach that seeks to help immigrants and minorities integrate into Canadian society, which the goal of breaching the obstructing barriers. The goal is to facilitate their acceptance into Canadian society and strengthen their Canadian identity.

The institutionalization of multiculturalism means that all the cultures in Canadian society

are treated equally, and there is no concern that the integration of different cultures will undermine Canadian law, its institutions, or the character of the country. A survey conducted in 2016 showed that in comparison with other countries, Canada was less affected by the outbreak of anti-Muslim sentiment that is wont to polarize ethnic relations. The survey showed that 83 percent of Canadians agree that Muslims make a positive contribution to the country—findings that are a world apart from similar studies in European countries. The survey also showed that Canadian Muslims report less hostility from their compatriots than Muslims in other countries. As such, the identification of Canada's Muslim community with the country grows stronger and stronger over time (Beyer & Ramji, 2013).

Unlike Canada, many European countries, particularly France, which follows a policy of colorblindness, experience periods of violent protest by Muslims against the authorities.

it is impossible to ignore the fact that many of the Muslim immigrants in France who came from former French colonies, primarily in North Africa, still bear the scars in terms of their relationship to French culture; part of their goal in migrating there is to change France's character, rather than become integrated into general society.

France: A Colorblind Model

Under France's liberal immigration policy, the Muslim population of the country has grown over the past century and now numbers some 7 million people—more than 10 percent of the total population. In recent years, Islam became the second largest religion in France, after Catholicism and far head of Protestantism.

As far back as the 1960s, French President Charles de Gaulle said that integrating Muslim immigrants in France was like trying to join oil and water, since even if they were to live side by side for years, they would not mix. Over the years the government permitted the immigrants to live in religious-cultural ghettos, which developed entirely differently from the state's objective. France sought economic progress while safeguarding individual rights but saw in these ghettos the good of the group before the good of the individual, which thereby perpetuated the low socio-economic standing of the people living there. This in turn reinforced the stereotypes of the general population toward immigrants and led to their entrenchment as members of the lower classes, alongside the development of negative phenomena such as unemployment, poverty, and crime. It was only a matter of time until the situation boiled over, as occurred in the October 2005 riots (Filiu, 2020).

In terms of their approach to immigrants and migrant populations, Canada and France thus represent different models: multiculturalism versus colorblindness. Immigrants to Canada are integrated in the very center of the experience, the society, and the culture. Their cultural and social development runs parallel to the development of Canadian cities, Canadian society, and the Canadian mainstream, so fewer gaps and reasons for conflict are created. This integration aims from the outset at the center of the Canadian experience and Canadian culture. In contrast, in Europe and especially France, integration is retroactive and occurs out of a sense that the immigrants are guests, so immigrants and especially Muslims are absorbed into social, economic, and cultural ghettos, which exist separately from the state and its development. The gap between the majority group and the discriminated minority groups engenders frustration, which leads to violence and aggression.

In this context, it is impossible to ignore the fact that many of the Muslim immigrants in France who came from former French colonies, primarily in North Africa, still bear the scars in terms of their relationship to French culture; part of their goal in migrating there is to change France's character, rather than become integrated into general society. In contrast, immigrants to Canada are, for the

most part, middle-class professionals who want to integrate into the local population. It is our contention that a country's attitude toward immigrants has a major influence on the way they are integrated. Even among an immigrant population that displays separatist tendencies, the multicultural model approach may reduce these tendencies and help build bridges to the general population.

The Israeli Case

Cognizant of the intensity of inter-group tension in Israel, this article does not presume to propose a model that erases the existing conflicts. Rather, the current comparison aims to identify and propose ways of minimizing the intensity of existing conflicts. Like Canada, France, and many other countries with positive net immigration, Israel is a society that absorbs immigrants—as long as they are Jewish—and views their immigration as a paramount national value, vital to the state and society. But while migration in Canada is linked to a socio-economic ethos, which views immigrants as making an important contribution to economic and social prosperity, nationalist and security elements are part of the Israeli ethos, which sees migration, both internal and external, as another vital part of the Jewish people's grip on different parts of the land (Aharonovich, 2007). The opposite is true when it comes to the Arab minority.

The issue of Israel as a society comprising groups with little harmony between them has occupied sociologists for many years. Sammy Smooha, for example, said that Israeli society is not uniform and comprises three sub-groups: Hebrew, ultra-Orthodox, and Arab. Smooha argued that Israel exhibits a model of descriptive multiculturalism, but normative multiculturalism—like that which exists in various Western countries—has not developed, in part because Israel is "tricultural in essence, but not multicultural in its ethos," and therefore it is not influenced significantly by post-nationalist and multicultural trends in the West (Smooha, 2007, p. 227). In contrast, others argue that in practice Israel is a binational state, since the Arabs who reside between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River are a very large minority (40 percent) and could be a nation with equal standing (DellaPergola, 2010). Moreover, a survey of Jews of various ages found that members of the millennial generation tend to define their Judaism more as a religion and less as a culture or an ethnic race (Keysar & DellaPergola, 2019), so it is not clear what unites the Jewish population of Israel and whether it is more a collection of minorities that is not necessarily a unified majority society.

Our goal is to analyze the issue from an acculturation viewpoint, examining the experiences of minorities in Israel and the integration policy implemented as outlined by the authorities.

In terms of acculturation, notwithstanding the differences in foreignness experienced by the various minority groups in Israel, common to them is that paradoxically the outcome of the policy is exactly the opposite of its desired goal. On the one hand, the state invests significant resources in absorbing these groups, be they immigrants from Ethiopia, France, or the former Soviet Union, or be they are ultra-Orthodox; the same is true, to a different extent and in a different manner, especially in recent years, with regard to Arab society. At the same time, the integration policy that the state tries to implement has led to those groups remaining on the margins of society (Shafferman, 2008). Even when the government invests in these group in various areas and helps them obtain professional training and employment, provides them with preferred education opportunities, and helps them with transportation and more, these groups still experience the Israeli mainstream as trying to erase and eclipse them, which, in turn, makes them keep to themselves and remain on the fringes—sometimes even on the militant fringes (Shtoppler, 2012). In practice, despite the heavy investment, the state has not succeeded in finding a place for

immigrants who do not have a Jewish, Zionist, and Western narrative in their culture. Although the state does much to aid their absorption, there is a sense that they have to set aside the narratives of their culture and toe the line with the dominant Israeli culture—and that influences their tendency to remain separate.

In general, Canadian authorities do not interfere in immigrants' decisions on where to settle, giving them the sense that they are part of the core of the Canadian people. In contrast, in Israel, like in Europe, immigrants from overseas and domestic migrants are absorbed in the peripheries. Immigrants who do not come from an established background or who have migrated for demographic reasons are channeled to the (geographical, cultural, economic, and demographic) peripheries, in order to disperse them in places where a Jewish presence is required. This leads them to become weaker in the peripheries and increases their dependency on the state and on national resources (Sever, 2020).

It is easy to understand why Israeli governments try to implement this kind of integration policy. The Jewish state, though it has already existed for 75 years, is still worried about its very survival, for geopolitical and domestic reasons. The country's leaders jealously guard the narrative that they believe allowed for the establishment of the state in its current format: a Zionist, Jewish, and democratic state that in terms of its values, economy, and society behaves like Western cultures.

This narrative worked well when the majority culture was Ashkenazi-secular (non-religious) and the other groups were small and marginal (Kimmerling, 2001). Over time, that narrative grew foreign and alienating among many groups in the Israeli population, which were growing due to demographic changes. The Arab sector finds it hard to accept the narrative of a Jewish state, especially under the umbrella of the nation-state law. The ultra-Orthodox find it hard to accept the narrative of a democratic state (or, in its earlier incarnations, a liberal democracy) that does not give precedence to stringent religious law. Immigrants from the former Soviet Union found it hard to accept the feeling that Israeli society expected them to abandon their culture and the Soviet lifestyles that were traditional in their countries of origin (Horenczyk, 1996). Immigrants from Ethiopia found it hard to accept a white and European culture that saw them as black and, as such, second-class citizens, with questionable Judaism. Among these groups, identification with the original values of the state—as expressed in its national anthem, messages, and even commemoration of the Holocaust—do not speak to all (Ilani, 2006; Brown, 2017).

It appears that the majority in Israel, especially in relation to its resources, has failed to see this. The fear over losing the Zionist, Jewish, and democratic nature of the State of Israel has led it to cling too staunchly to the founding narrative and to limit even more its own ability to speak directly to the minorities. This increases the sense among these minorities that the state wants to erase their identity and absorb them within the narrative of the dominant group; this, in turn, causes them to become more insular, to distance themselves from society, to identify less with the State of Israel, and to feel a smaller sense of belonging (Omer, 2019; Friedman, 2021). Unlike the Canadian ethos and narrative, which expanded to include as many immigrants and groups as possible, the Israeli narrative is exceptionally narrow and thus alienates significant groups in the country. Although the goal is to safeguard as much as possible the Jewish-Zionist hegemony, paradoxically it appears that the minorities self-segregate and perpetuate the ethos of difference and isolationism. This ethos leads them to educate the next generation not to see itself as a partner to the Israeli narrative. Instead, they behave in such a way to express the values and lifestyles of the minority group to which they belong.

A narrow national narrative is a challenge for minority groups, especially when they

are sizable and have an expanding physical presence in various parts of the country. In the absence of a shared national ethos that minorities can or want to embrace, some do not find their frame of reference in the state and do not identify with its goals and values. This could represent a threat to the resilience and security of Israel and even damage its long-term ability to deal with domestic and external challenges.

It appears that Israel's attempts to build a shared narrative and absorb minority groups in the social center is not particularly successful and the trend toward isolationism is expanding. The state must view this as a national challenge. It is possible that change will come from the local authorities, which could spearhead the activities necessary to generate the kind of socialization needed for the integration and prosperity of minority groups in Israel. The more they adopt appropriate models for cities with mixed populations that offer frameworks to absorb minority groups equitably in the societal center and build a shared fabric of life, the more they will become models for the central government.

Absorbing Minority Groups in Israeli Cities with Mixed Populations

Israel's population is concentrated in a densely populated and rapidly developing area in the center of the country. Demographic growth leads to evident changes, which in turn have ramifications on the urban space on the local and national levels. Inter alia, there is an increasingly prevalent phenomenon of mixed-population cities in an ongoing and intensifying trend of citizens from different communities living in close proximity to each other, notwithstanding polarization in terms of values, religion, culture, and socio-economic standing. Demographic growth and changes can be an opportunity for positive renewal, but they also incur the danger of social decay, chasms, friction, and mutual violence. More than 20 central Israeli cities and towns, including the capital, Jerusalem, are already deep into a process of significant and rapid demographic change. The housing crisis and other socio-economic processes have led to specific sectors, like the ultra-Orthodox and the Arabs, to move in significant numbers to cities with mixed populations, which increases their proportion in these mixed cities, including those that were largely homogenous in the past.

The violent confrontations in May 2021 between Jews and Arabs in mixed cities, like the conflicts in other spaces and cities where the minority is growing, focus public attention on the negative phenomena that also relate to national security. These phenomena, which presumably will continue, perhaps even intensify, require both forceful responses from enforcement agencies and softer socio-economic responses. Only thoughtful, long-range, and systemic socio-economic handling of the challenges posed by these phenomena will lead to a positive model of "absorption in the center," which would reduce dangerous friction. To ensure that the expected trend of integrating populations with specific cultural characteristics is successful and becomes an engine of renewal and growth, the state and the local authority must intervene in the phenomenon at many stages and on many levels. At the same time, correct groundwork in cities could presumably allow for the implementation of a sound model for coexistence on the national level as well. Currently, Israel is not doing what it should to address the issue, and the absence of a systemic policy could turn Israel into a country in which day-to-day life is primarily characterized by violent domestic polarization. Moreover, Israel's public systems are not built in any way to deal successfully with this threat.

The following are some examples of models of integrating minority groups in mixed Israeli cities. These can serve as a source for what is needed for positive and effective socialization.

Beit Shemesh: A Victim of Poor Planning

For many years, Beit Shemesh was a small town of people with a traditional-Mizrahi

orientation. Despite its central geographical location between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Beit Shemesh was only a hub for smaller adjacent communities, limited to the area. In the 1980s, the community's growth potential was evident, and two neighborhoods were erected in its eastern portion for an ultra-Orthodox population. Within a decade, the population of Beit Shemesh doubled and it was declared a city in 1991, while the number of residents exceeded 20,000 (Busso, 2017). At the same time, the Housing Ministry announced the start of work on Ramat Beit Shemesh, a huge series of neighborhoods, each with more residents than the parent city (Vardi, 2017).

At the time no one thought about a comprehensive plan to deal with the demographic change. The likely assumption was that the ultra-Orthodox population would "get along" with the local, traditional population and that social harmony would prevail of its own accord. Also missing was a considered discussion about planning workplaces tailored for the hundreds of thousands of ultra-Orthodox people who would be moving to the city. Similarly, there were no preparations for the ramifications of Beit Shemesh becoming one of the largest cities in Israel, expected in the coming decade (Regev et al., 2021). In the absence of any infrastructural, social, or economic preparation, within a number of years the city found itself in a culture war between the population groups (Stern, 2018) and in ever-increasing economic distress (Tzur, 2019).

The current population of Beit Shemesh is more than 150,000 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023). In the coming years, the population will likely double as people start to move into the huge neighborhoods on the outskirts of the city that are currently under construction. Although there is now greater awareness of the importance of the socio-economic development of the city, and the government recently approved a resolution allocating huge sums of money for development projects in the city through various ministries, it seems that this is a case of too little, too late. The city is still plagued by many social rifts, and it seems that it will take many years to rectify the situation (Haimovich, 2011). There are tensions, even confrontations, between the various groups that share the city: conflicts between more radical ultra-Orthodox factions, which want to change the character of the city, and more moderate members of the ultra-Orthodox community (Sever, 2022); between the ultra-Orthodox community and the other communities for control of the city and its resources (Gal, 2022); ongoing conflicts between the authorities and groups of residents (Cohen et al., 2021), which peaked during the COVID-19 pandemic (Cohen, 2020); and even racial tensions between veteran Mizrahi residents of the city and the recently arrived Ashkenazi residents (Ben-Simon, 2004). Moreover, there are increasing shortages of employment opportunities tailored to the specific population of the city and of economic stimuli to aid the growth of the city.

As of 2013, there were more than 20 important Israeli cities undergoing significant demographic changes, some just as rapidly as the change experienced by Beit Shemesh. Cities like Ashdod, Safed, Tiberius, Kiryat Malachi, Kiryat Gat, Ofakim, Netivot, and Arad have seen a rapid intake of an ultra-Orthodox population, and cities like Harish, Ma'alot-Tarshiha, Carmiel, Acre, Ramle, and Nof Galil have seen a rapid intake of an Arab population (Even, 2021). These migratory groups grow both because of a high birth rate and because the consolidation in new locations lays the infrastructure for many others to follow them. Within a relatively short period, they are likely to become the largest and most prominent groups in most of these cities.

The Current Situation in Cities with a Large Ultra-Orthodox and Arab Populations

There are differences between the dynamics of the demographic changes of the ultra-Orthodox and the Arab populations (Tables 1 and 2). Arab society is undergoing a process of rapid natural

population growth. The growth rate in ultra-Orthodox society stands at 4.2 percent, while for the general population it is just 1.8 percent (Figure 1). This means that every 17 years the ultra-Orthodox population will double in size (Cahaner & Malach, 2021). While it is true that there has not been a significant natural rise in the population of the Arab community, where the birth rate has actually dropped in recent years and is now similar to that of the non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish population, the Arab population migrating to mixed cities is much younger, which means that the proportion of Arabs in these cities is expected to grow in the coming years (Knesset Research and Information Center, 2021).

Table 1: Total population and the proportion of ultra-Orthodox in selected cities

City	Total population	Ultra-Orthodox population	Ultra-Orthodox population rate
Beit Shemesh	152,781	96,400	63%
Safed	38,033	20,370	53.5%
Netivot	45,530	21,895	48%
Givat Ze'ev	21,026	9,550	45%
Ofakim	35,258	12,420	35%
Arad	27,986	8,080	29%
Ashdod	226,798	56,150	25%
Haztor Haglilit	9,986	2,390	24%
Kiryat Malachi	25,500	6,100	24%
Tiberias	48,202	10,320	21.5%
Kiryat Gat	63,559	12,850	20%

Source: Combined analysis of December 2022 data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Haredi Institute for Public Affairs, and reports from the local authorities

Table 2: The total population and the proportion of Arabs in selected cities

City	Total population	Arab population	Arab population rate
Nof Galil	43,890	12,680	28.9%
Acre	50,846	14,084	27.7%
Ramle	78,479	21,267	27.1%
Lod	85,141	20,093	23.6%
Ma'alot-Tarshiha	22,399	4,636	20.7%
Carmiel	46,884	9798	20.1%
Harish	32,770	4587	14%

Source: Combined analysis of December 2022 data from the Central Bureau of Statistics and reports from the local authorities

Figure 1: Projected growth for various populations in Israel



Source: The Yearbook of Ultra-Orthodox Society 2021, Israel Democracy Institute

Two important phenomena also have a significant influence on these demographic processes: the housing crisis in ultra-Orthodox society and the decrease in the sense of personal security in the Arab sector, because of the sharp increase in violence and crime. These are reflected in the demographic trends of the two communities: until recently, 85 percent of the ultra-Orthodox population lived in the center of the country. Now, however, with the shortage in housing for young couples, many are moving to the northern and southern peripheries and to cities that thus far did not have an ultra-Orthodox population (Regev & Gordon, 2020). At the same time, among the Arab population, which is suffering from an extreme crisis linked to a decline in personal security, there is a marked trend of migration to Jewish cities, in an attempt to move away from places perceived as dangerous (Abraham Initiatives and the Neaman Institute for National Policy, 2021). Among the other factors influencing this trend is presumably the housing crisis in Arab communities, resulting from a shortage of land (State Comptroller, 2019). In addition, the improved economic situation of Arab society allows many more to move to cities that in the past were characterized as Jewish cities (Ron et al., 2022).

How will these changes influence the populations of the cities absorbing the Arab and ultra-Orthodox newcomers? Will the cities be able to leverage the opportunity and the diversity for growth and prosperity? Below are three models for mixed Jewish-Arab cities: the Lod model, where the integration approach was tried, but merely increased segregation between the two populations, as well as violence and aggression; the Ma'alot-Tarshiha model, which was a multicultural model that respected the Arab minority and its traditions; and the Carmiel model, a successful multicultural model in which a strong Jewish minority lives among an Arab majority in the region.

Mixed Cities in Israel: Three Models

The Lod Model: A Negative Model of Attempted Integration

The city of Lod can be described as a negative case study of the outcome of the policy of

integration, which led to a rapid demographic change and ramifications that pose a major challenge for the city. In 1946, two years before the establishment of the State of Israel, there was an overwhelming Arab majority in the city (99.7 percent). When Israel was established, certain measures, some controversial, were taken to remove Arabs from the city and it became almost exclusively Jewish. Since 1972, when the Jewish community made up around 90 percent of the population (Yaacobi, 2003), the Arab population in the city climbed steadily, in part after Arab families were moved to the city—some of them the families of collaborators for whom no other residence could be found. So, for example, after the Six Day Way, the families of Arabs who had helped Israel were relocated from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. After the peace treaty with Egypt and the evacuation of the Sinai Peninsula, groups of Bedouins whose lands in the Negev were appropriated by the state were also moved to Lod (Research, 2014). In the early 1990s, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, more families of collaborators were moved to the city (Hofnung, 2010). Moreover, according to the 2012 State Comptroller's Report, many Arabs moved illegally to the city from the West Bank, although it is not clear what proportion of the city's population they comprise. These trends mean that of the city's current population of around 85,000, 30 percent are Arabs (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023).

The arrival of a large Arab population in Lod in the 1970s and 1980s was the result of a desire to create a model of multiculturalism in which Jews and Arabs could live harmoniously. The veteran Arab population of Lod, which made up around 10 percent of the city's population, and its old neighborhoods, which were in the Oriental style, prompted policymakers to believe that the new Arab population that would be moved to the city would be integrated into the local fabric of life and would be a positive model for other cities.

In practice, exactly the opposite happened. The desire to integrate Arab residents, who came from different backgrounds and different cultures, without giving their culture and their traditions any respectful presence or expression in the public space, increased their antipathy toward the authorities and friction with the Jewish community. In turn, this led to increased socio-economic gaps between Jews and Arabs. The poverty rate among the Arab population continued to grow, and with it, so too did phenomena of delinquency, crime, and violence. For several decades, municipal leaders "fell asleep at the wheel," failing to address the demographic ramifications of the city's development. By the time of the second intifada, which began in 2000 and saw a marked increase in the amount of nationalist violence in the city, they finally recognized that the integration policy was leading to a dire crisis.

The desire to integrate Arab residents, who came from different backgrounds and different cultures, without giving their culture and their traditions any respectful presence or expression in the public space, increased their antipathy toward the authorities and friction with the Jewish community. In turn, this led to increased socio-economic gaps between Jews and Arabs.

A new nadir came in May 2021, during Operation Guardian of the Walls. For several days, the city was rocked by violence and vandalism, including gun battles in the streets and mob attacks on residents (Blumental & Grinberg, 2021). A civil state of emergency was declared in the city and, for the first time ever, a night curfew was imposed. Armed gangs of Jews and Arabs roamed the streets, and the city was paralyzed for several days (Senyor, 2021). These events exposed the deep national and religious chasm into which the city had fallen.

Currently, Arab residents of Lod feel that the authorities are trying to push them out, both culturally and physically, by encouraging their departure from the city (Gazit, 2022; Haj Yahya, 2023; Shimoni, 2022). These residents report

that there is a basic shortage of fundamental amenities in the city. This is in addition to neglect, a sense of discrimination, frustration, insecurity, and despair, all of which contribute to a reluctance to organize and stand up for their rights in the face of the authorities (Shelah, 2022). Although there has been some development momentum in recent years, it is primarily geared toward the Jewish sector. This includes encouraging the expansion of the garin Torani (core group of families from the religious Zionist community) that the current mayor helped found—but this in turn only exacerbates the frustrations of the Arab residents of the city. It seems that the desire to integrate the Arab residents in the Jewish life of the city, without giving any room to their culture and traditions, and was replaced in 2000 by efforts to reject them and limit their involvement in various aspects of municipal life, has deepened the chasm and turned the city into a negative case study and an explosive situation.

The Ma'alot-Tarshiha Model: A Positive Model of Multiculturalism

There is no doubt that preparation and early planning can be the key to the successful migration of minority groups to a city. An example is the city of Ma'alot-Tarshiha, where Jews and Arabs coexist harmoniously, the national conflict notwithstanding (Falah Saab & Abu Laban, 2021). The city is home to secular, religious, and ultra-Orthodox Jews, immigrants with no defined religion, Muslim Arabs, and Christian Arabs (Table 3), and the city functions well, with mutual respect and cooperation between the communities.

Ma'alot and Tarshiha were originally two adjacent communities, until it was decided in 1963 to unify them into one municipal authority. Since the 1950s, Jews and Arabs lived side by side in Tarshiha, while Ma'alot was a Jewish community. The unification of the two communities left an Arab center in Tarshiha and a Jewish center in Ma'alot, but it also attracted diverse communities to all parts of the city. Not only does the Ma'alot-Tarshiha authority not try to exclude any part of the population, as happens in other cities; it provides a municipal framework to balance between the lifestyles of the different populations and safeguard the economic and social prosperity of the city. The council also encourages joint conferences to enhance and empower the communal lives of the various populations. Since 1994, when Ma'alot-Tarshiha was recognized as a city, it has been led by equal and shared management, which manages to safeguard the distinctions and qualities of each community (Abraham Initiatives, 2020).

Table 3: Population distribution in Ma'alot-Tarshiha by religion and nationality

Group	Percentage of the population
Secular Jews	37%
National religious	26.2%
Ultra-Orthodox	3.5%
Muslim Arab	10.3%
Christian Arab	10.1%
Druze	0.3%
Others	12.6%

Source: Combined analysis of October 2022 data from the Central Bureau of Statistics and reports from the local authority

An intercity highway connects the center of the city, which is mainly populated by Jews, and Tarshiha, where the majority of the population is Arab. There are separate education systems, community centers, and even the budget for the different parts of the city appears in separate chapters of the authority's reports (Galili & Nir, 2001). Nonetheless, Ma'alot-Tarshiha residents participate in joint events, have a common commercial existence, and share entertainment venues (Knesset Research and Information Center, 2021). They are proud of their coexistence, have a very positive attitude toward their city, and even recommend it as a model for coexistence that has proven itself (Falah Saab & Abu Laban, 2021). The large wave

of immigrants that came to the city in the 1990s from the former Soviet Union, which tilted the demographic balance in the city in favor of the Jewish population, did not upset the harmony and the desire of residents to progress and develop side by side (Arshid-Shehadeh, 2022). In the past few years, new neighborhoods have sprung up on the outskirts of the city, where Jews and Arabs live in close proximity, and the overall atmosphere in the city influences the quiet and tranquil life there. For example, in the Zeitim neighborhood in the north of the city, there is a large community of newly religious ultra-Orthodox living alongside the 30 percent of the neighborhood that is Arabs (Knesset Research and Information Center, 2021; Rath, 2022).

The Carmiel Region Model: When the Majority becomes the Minority

Although just 20 percent of the population of Carmiel is Arab, in the geographical space surrounding the city Jews are a minority. The city is a commuter hub for many Arabs from the surrounding villages and Carmiel's municipal infrastructure serves more Arabic speakers than Hebrew speakers.

Although the city was established as a secular Jewish community in order to Judaize the Galilee and interrupt a contiguous Arab presence from Acre to Safed, the families of soldiers from the South Lebanese Army who were relocated there after Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, along with slow but incessant migration of local Arab residents, turned it into a mixed population city with an ever-growing Arab population. The Jewish population too is not homogenous. From the start of this century, more ultra-Orthodox people moved to the city and now make up 10 percent of the population.

Nonetheless, life continues harmoniously in the city, and even when the rest of the country is beset with Jewish-Arab tensions, Carmiel has remained relatively calm, largely because the city opened its doors to Arabs almost without any restrictions. Arabs live in every part of the city, side-by-side with Jews, and they can be seen together in the city's commercial, entertainment, and leisure centers (Nardi, 2017). The housing crisis in adjacent Arab communities, coupled with a growing number of educated young Arabs looking for quality housing in a city, has led to a rise in the Arab population in Carmiel (Oraby, 2020).

However, Carmiel still does not have an Arab education system or religious services for the Muslim population (Rosen Haberman, 2016). This means that there is movement in both directions between the city and the adjacent communities: people flock to the city for housing, employment, and leisure, and from the city to educational and religious institutions in the villages (Blatman-Thomas, 2018). Similarly, it is impossible to ignore certain elements within the city's population who object to the arrival of Arabs; for the time being, these are marginal elements, however, and the need for functional coexistence gains over these voices (Nardi, 2017).

The more Arabs live in Carmiel and the longer the people running the city insist on a policy of integration without making the Arab lifestyle and culture more present in various public spaces, the more chance there is of conflict and confrontation ending the coexistence that residents enjoy today.

Recommendations for Municipal Preparedness for Integrating Minority Groups

While the proposed model does not presume to resolve Israel's existing conflicts in ideal fashion, we believe that it can significantly reduce the volatility of the current situation between the various groups in Israel. Moreover, it can help groups ostracize radical fringes that seek to spark conflict. Again, this is not a perfect model that can resolve all issues when minority and majority populations live side by side; rather, it is a suggestion for reducing conflict in those places where it can be implemented. This article, therefore, does not address the issue

of Jerusalem as a mixed city, which is a national, cultural, societal, and economic challenge that must tackle not only sectorial conflicts but also multinational and other disputes. The question, rather, is how the Ma'alot-Tarshiha model can be replicated in additional communities, in which tensions are high between the various communities.

a. Can advance preparedness by the government and the local authorities significantly promote coexistence?
b. How can we ensure that the changes in these cities bring growth and innovation, rather than greater social division—as happened in Beit Shemesh and Lod?
c. What economic and social preparations are needed to deal with far-reaching urban demographic changes?

It appears that without proper preparations that take into account all the populations and combine them in a municipal multicultural model, societal conflicts will intensify until they reach the point of widespread violence. What follows, therefore, are some points relating to the local authorities' preparations for absorbing minority groups, both due to demographic changes and migration, and for a situation in which the population of the city is heterogenous and includes groups that are in states of conflict with each other.

A multicultural policy views migrants who move to the city as a welcome part of the fabric of life, who will contribute to its prosperity and advantages. This is a liberal policy that expands the urban ethos and vision and includes all the groups living in the city. This creates a strong sense of belonging for each group in the city, urban identification becomes stronger, and members of all the groups work together for the development of the city.

Indeed, from the survey above, it seems that the multicultural policy would be best for the absorption of immigrants and minority groups in Israel. The gulfs that exist today, be it the religious divide when it comes to the ultra-Orthodox population or the nationalist divide when it comes to the Arab population, as well as the vague Israeli identity among various minority groups that seeks to stand apart, obligate adopting a multicultural policy that affords space for all these groups and enables them to express their specific identities as part of Israeli society. To this end, Israel must integrate the minority groups to make them part of the urban ethos and vision, and urban planning must take their presence into account. Similarly, their integration must be at the very heart of the urban experience, and not the margins. Their lifestyles and their worldviews must be present in the public and central space from the outset and not retrospectively, even when these worldviews are not comfortable for the dominant Israeli narrative, which is Jewish-Zionist-Western in nature. Municipal leaders must adopt a lateral approach rather than a hierarchical one, so that all the groups that make up the population of the city, including activists on the ground, can make their voices heard in the leadership of the city and its plans for the future.

Empowering the leadership of groups integrating in the city: We tend to see groups as one entity, in accordance with prevalent stereotypes, but every group has segments that assume responsibility and want to play an active role in the prosperity and development of the city, while there are those who participate less. In every group, there are those who make up a solid economic base and contribute more to the city, and there are those who contribute less. The authorities should chart the various groups to understand with which parts of the population it is possible to work for the advancement of the city. The local authority must be able to work with those groups on assuming responsibility and leadership, and it must give them the tools to help lead the city to growth and prosperity. Empowering these groups and giving them leadership tools, in order to allow the activists among them to spearhead a process of integration and a greater sense of commonality, could turn the

demographic changes these cities are facing into a constructive and empowering reality.

Employment tailored to the population: The more diverse the population, the more employment must be tailored to the target audience. For example, in ultra-Orthodox society there are some people who are interested in working in white collar academic professions, and there are those who want to obtain an education that will allow them to gain employment in simpler, blue collar professions (Employment: Key Indices, Employment Bureau, n.d.). There are some communities in which women go out to work and have careers as managers or executives, and there are some communities where it is more acceptable for the men to work and provide for the family (Ashkenazi, 2022). There are groups that prefer employment within their own community, while others are willing to work in heterogenous environments. There are groups that prefer to work in innovative environments that are rich in technology, while others are less inclined to innovative technology and prefer to work in simpler, technical occupations (Peleg-Gabai, 2022).

In Arab society too, there are different classes and specific branches of employment preferred among the population. In an era in which the proportion of Arabs with academic qualifications is increasing and many obtain training in hi-tech professions, it is noticeable that many fail to find suitable places of employment in their communities (Jabareen, 2010). The need to adapt training and employment for the target audience must be of concern to the government and the local authority the moment that significant demographic change is identified. Municipal leaders must identify the preferred branches of employment among the populations and bring suitable employees and training to the city (Regev, 2017). Similarly, they must identify the employment strong points of each group and divert employment resources in the city to these strong points, which might be different from the existing ones (Jabareen, 2010). They must work closely with employees to ensure that they employ these populations and understand the advantage of integrating them and the diversity that this brings to their business (Stein et al., 2022). Clearly, this process must be done with cooperation of the public and the community leadership so that they belong to and lead this process, rather than its being an imposition on them.

Early mapping and distribution of public, educational, cultural, and leisure facilities: A demographic change to the population of a city brings new needs in the fields of education, culture, and leisure. This could lead to a situation in which the use of certain public buildings is limited, while at the same time, there is an increasing shortage of buildings serving other populations and purposes (State Comptroller's Report, 2022). Various local authorities have put the need to deal with this difficulty at the bottom of their agendas and prefer to find simple solutions like using mobile homes, which leads to social divisions and to an ongoing sense of discrimination among parts of the population (Ben Zikri, 2016). Early mapping of these needs and reaching agreements with groups and communities about the exchange of buildings and compensations, which must be done as an advance process and with mutual agreement, is vital for continued harmony in the city. Thus, for example, groups that find that the educational facilities are empty would be happy to turn those buildings over to younger populations, if and when they are given in exchange access to leisure and culture facilities that suit the age group of their members. The leisure activities of groups that depend on specific hours or seasons can share those buildings with other groups, who have needs at different times. In these cases, the authority will convey that no one group is served at the expense of others, rather, that each of the populations receives and gives in exchange, when the division is in accordance with the needs and the common good of the whole population (Shaked, 2021). This can reduce potential fear of one group's

growth and help the various groups see the local authority's leadership as objective, which puts the good of the city as a whole first and acts accordingly.

In order for the conclusions presented in this article to be adopted, the government and local authorities must first recognize the importance of the matter and understand the dangers that lie in the lack of a comprehensive policy that deals successfully with the challenges that exist in a city with mixed populations.

Equal treatment for each population group: Leaders of city in which the population is changing tend to become anxious about the growing population, and try to limit the arrival to the city by negating the legitimacy of the group, stressing its negative characteristics and barring its members from certain parts of the city. Under these conditions, the growing population develops a reaction toward the city's leadership, which widens the gaps and halts the city's development (Perez-Vaisvidovsky, 2013). An authority that broadcasts openness and positivity toward groups in the city that are interested in coexistence (rather than doing so to extremist and isolationist groups that do not recognize the symbols and institutions of the state, since that would come at the expense of others), and is capable of highlighting the strong points of each of the groups, while insisting on clear criteria to help the city's development, will reap the benefits of a diverse population and continue to prosper, demographic changes notwithstanding.

In order for the conclusions presented in this article to be adopted, the government and local authorities must first recognize the importance of the matter and understand the dangers that lie in the lack of a comprehensive policy that deals successfully with the challenges that exist in a city with mixed populations. Against the backdrop, they must prepare in advance for the needs of the changing demographic situation in their city, as the basis for building coexistence even in circumstance of local heterogeneity—thereby improving the lot of such cities. Early preparations will help transform from centers of conflict and chaos to spaces of cooperation, empowerment, and prosperity. This would have a positive influence not only on mixed cities, but on the state as a whole, which is gradually becoming a mixed space. Alternatively, failure to prepare properly will lead to the deterioration of the mixed cities into violence on all fronts and socio-economic regression, including in the mixed national sphere.

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Social, Political, and Economic Trends in East Jerusalem, 2010-2022: Informing Israel's Approach to Security

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East Jerusalem Palestinians contend that Israeli policy in the city over the course of the last two to three decades has had the dual aim of cutting off this population from the West Bank and destroying any sense of their Palestinian national identity. They claim that this policy has not only been largely successful in achieving these aims, but has also led to economic underdevelopment, pessimism about the future, and political apathy. In turn, and in effort to fill the void developed by these feelings, they argue that many East Jerusalem Palestinians have become more religiously extreme, and in some cases, more violent. This paper seeks to examine these claims with an empirical approach. It first outlines the Israeli policies that are said to have encouraged this situation and then analyzes public opinion data. While the study supports many of the claims by these East Jerusalem Palestinians, it also reveals some positive trends. The paper proposes policy recommendations to improve socioeconomic conditions in East Jerusalem, reduce religious extremism, and thereby reduce terrorist attacks against Israelis.

Keywords: Palestinians, East Jerusalem, religiosity, terrorism, Plan 3790, citizenship

Introduction

A sample of East Jerusalem Palestinians interviewed for this study contend that Israeli policy in the city over the course of the last 20 to 30 years has had two primary objectives: one, to cut off East Jerusalem Palestinians from Palestinians in the West Bank; and two, to destroy any sense of Palestinian national identity among this population.[1] And while they refer to "Israeli policy" in general terms, literature produced by the Palestinian third sector in East Jerusalem, in addition to work by Israeli organizations positioned on the political left in the country, including but not limited to Ir Amim and Peace Now, suggests that four specific policies underlie their sentiments:[2]

a. Construction of the post-1967 neighborhoods in East Jerusalem
b. The separation barrier
c. The portion of the municipal budget allocated to Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem
d. Israeli policies regarding education in East Jerusalem

They further argue that these policies have been largely effective in achieving the two primary objectives outlined above. But they also claim that in East Jerusalem, these policies

have led to economic underdevelopment, political apathy, and pessimism about the future, particularly among the youth in the city.

The result, according to these East Jerusalem Palestinians, has been a growing number of young individuals in East Jerusalem without a clear direction in their lives, seeking some kind of meaning. They argue that many of these individuals have found meaning through religion and the al-Aqsa Mosque in particular, which they claim has come to symbolize the Palestinian national movement. They argue that al-Aqsa is so significant for these East Jerusalem Palestinians because it not only represents the national movement, but also a religious site and symbol that no Israeli policy has been able to take from them. As such, when Israel, prompted by security circumstances, does take actions at al-Aqsa—such as imposing restrictions on prayer or interrupting worshipers there—East Jerusalem Palestinians are provoked, fearful of Israel destroying the last remaining vestiges of their national identity.

This story that these East Jerusalem Palestinians tell is logical, but is based on their sense of the situation in East Jerusalem and is not empirically validated—which would require, at a minimum, answering the following five questions:

1. Do the residents of East Jerusalem suffer from economic underdevelopment?
2. Do the residents of East Jerusalem demonstrate a lack of trust in government and authority figures?
3. Are the residents of East Jerusalem politically apathetic?
4. Has there been an increase of individual religiosity and the importance of al-Aqsa among East Jerusalemites over the last 20-30 years?
5. Has there been an increase in terrorist attacks emanating specifically from East Jerusalem?

The primary purpose of this article is to answer these questions. It first describes the four policies referenced above that may well have contributed to the socioeconomic outcomes in East Jerusalem implicated by these five questions. It then provides public opinion data related to the first four of these five questions, followed by longitudinal data about terrorist attacks in Jerusalem from 2000 to 2023, with a focus on the years 2010-2023. The evidence indicates that largely, the answer to the five questions referenced above is "yes." In short, most, if not all, of the elements of the story told by East Jerusalem Palestinians are validated. And as such, a secondary purpose of this article is to offer two specific policy recommendations that the Israeli government can undertake to counteract the economic underdevelopment, social and political apathy, and increased religious extremism in East Jerusalem—with the goal of reducing terror attacks against Israelis and improving the country's security.

Policies and Outcomes

This section focuses on four Israeli policies regarding East Jerusalem, and then describes the conditions of the Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem.

New Israeli Neighborhoods and Expansion

Since 1968, Israel has built 13 new neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, with the last of them, Har Homa, completed in 2002.[3] If so, why would these neighborhoods have a more recent impact on today's East Jerusalem's Palestinians, different from when they were built? The answer is twofold. First, these neighborhoods have come to be known as the "ring neighborhoods" of the city because they form a ring around West Jerusalem and isolate the Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. For example, the Palestinian neighborhoods of Shuafat and Beit Safafa, located to the north and the south of the city, respectively, have been effectively cut off from the West Bank by the Israeli neighborhoods of Gilo and Givat HaMatos. Figure 1 provides a map of these "ring neighborhoods," compiled by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The dark brown area represents West

Jerusalem, the beige represents Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, and the blue represents the "ring neighborhoods." Some minor additional areas appear in blue in this map (e.g., "Government Offices"), but the key point is that these neighborhoods form a ring around West Jerusalem.

Second, and more important, while Israeli building in these neighborhoods has continued over the years, Palestinian expansion has not matched that pace. Specifically, of the 57,737 housing units approved in construction permits in Jerusalem from 1991-2018, 16.5 percent (9,536) were approved for construction in Palestinian neighborhoods, while 37.8 percent (21,834) were approved for construction in Israeli neighborhoods over the Green Line and 45.7 percent (26,367) were approved for construction in West Jerusalem (Peace Now, 2019). These trends have continued more recently as well, with 23,097 settlement plans and tenders approved for Israeli neighborhoods over the Green Line in 2022,[4] representing a 58.19 percent year-over-year increase, and almost 300 percent increase since 2017. However, many of the plans advanced in 2022 were for urban renewal,[5] and therefore may not actually expand the neighborhoods territorially (European Union, 2023).

The Security Barrier

During the height of the second intifada, and with the stated goal of curbing the wave of terror emerging from the West Bank, Israel began constructing the security barrier. The erection of the barrier contributed to a decrease in the number and frequency of terror attacks against Israelis (Dumper, 2014). However, by virtue of the route there was a lack of congruence between the Jerusalem municipal boundary and the barrier itself (Figure 2).

This resulted in two types of enclaves: areas outside the security barrier but within the municipal boundary of the city; and those areas within the security barrier but not included in the city's jurisdiction.

Figure 1: West and East Jerusalem, and "ring neighborhoods"



Source: Library of Congress, 2006

Prominent enclaves outside the barrier and within the city's municipal jurisdiction, with a population of between 120,000 and 140,000 (Koren, 2019) include:

1. The vicinity of Walaja in southern Jerusalem—500 dunams (125 acres), including residences.
2. A 900 dunam area (225 acre) that contains the entire Shuafat refugee camp and the neighborhoods of Ras Khamis, Ras Shahada, and Hashalom. Construction in this area is very dense, with many buildings.

Figure 2: Separation barrier in the Greater Jerusalem area

Source: Ir Amim, 2017

3. A 1,300 dunam area (325 acres) in northern Jerusalem that includes all of Kufr Aqab, al-Matar, Za'ir, and Qalandia.

Those areas inside the barrier but outside the municipal boundary amount to 9,690 dunams and are home to approximately 7,000 residents, and include the areas of Har Gilo, Wadi Hummus, and the area east of the Neve Yaakov neighborhood (Koren, 2019).

Budget Allocation to Palestinian Neighborhoods of East Jerusalem

Both Israelis and Palestinians alike recognize that relative to neighborhoods of similar size in Israel, Palestinian East Jerusalem neighborhoods have consistently been allocated minimal budgets (Asmar, 2018). For example, in 2013, the NGO Ir Amim estimated that between 10.1-13.6 percent of the municipal budget was invested in East Jerusalem, despite that part of the city representing approximately 36.9 percent of the population of the city (Ir Amim, 2014). In 2018, largely based on the understanding that maintaining sovereignty in East Jerusalem would mean taking responsibility for the locals' quality of life, Israeli policymakers aimed to address these disparities in the municipal budget. They adopted Plan 3790, which allocated NIS 2.2 billion (approximately $630 million) over the course of five years to ten different sectors, led by education and higher education; economy and employment; transportation; civil services and quality of life; healthcare; and land registration in East Jerusalem (Dagoni, 2022). Since its inception, Plan 3790 has produced tangible improvements in East Jerusalem such as: the so-called American Road that connects the neighborhoods in the city's southeast with an extensive transportation infrastructure that until now was present only in West Jerusalem; the well-equipped Alpha School in Beit Hanina; and a new public park behind Herod's Gate (Hasson, 2019). Plan 3790 expires at the end of 2023, and as of May 22, 2023, a new, bigger plan with similar goals and a budget of NIS 4 billion had been removed from the cabinet's agenda, largely due to opposition from Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. Professionals familiar with

the plan, however, predict that there will be a new, better plan that will be adopted and that "this [removal] will prove to be a small pothole in the road" (Hasson & Freidson, 2023).

Education in East Jerusalem

There are five kinds of schools in East Jerusalem, two of which—Manchi (municipal) schools and informal recognized schools—receive financial support from the Israeli Ministry of Education. Manchi schools are fully funded and managed by the Jerusalem Municipality and the Israeli Ministry of Education, while informal recognized schools receive up to 75 percent of their budgets. Awqaf schools, private schools, and UNRWA schools do not receive any support from the Israeli government (Alayan, 2019; Alian, 2016; Nuseibeh, 2015). As of 2022, of the 143,221 school-age children (ages 3-18) in East Jerusalem (Education Authority, 2022), 102,921 were enrolled in either Manchi schools or informal recognized schools (Ir Amim, 2022).

As of 2013, of those Jerusalem schools that were funded by the Israeli Ministry of Education, students in state religious schools received the highest annual budget (NIS 25,500 per student), followed by Jewish students in public schools (NIS 24,500), followed by ultra-Orthodox (haredi) (NIS 19,600), and finally, East Jerusalem Palestinian students (NIS 12,000) (Alayan, 2019). Recognizing these vast disparities, over the last 15 years, Israel has demonstrated a greater commitment to increase funding to East Jerusalem schools, culminating with Plan 3790 in 2018, of which NIS 445 million were allocated to the East Jerusalem education system over the course of five years. This funding was allocated according to the following breakdown: NIS 18.3 million for pedagogic guidance, oversight, and enforcement; NIS 68.7 million designated for special programs in institutions teaching the Israeli curriculum; NIS 57.4 million for physical development of institutions teaching the Israeli curriculum; NIS 206 million for technology education; and NIS 67 million for rental of buildings for educational institutions teaching the Israeli curriculum (Abu Alhlaweh, 2018). In addition to this NIS 445 million allocated to the East Jerusalem education system, Plan 3790 allocated NIS 275 million to higher education for East Jerusalem Palestinians (Dagoni, 2022).

Recognizing the vast disparities, over the last 15 years, Israel has demonstrated a greater commitment to increase funding to East Jerusalem schools, culminating with Plan 3790 in 2018, of which NIS 445 million were allocated to the East Jerusalem education system over the course of five years.

Conditions in Palestinian Neighborhoods in East Jerusalem

What outcomes have these four policies generated in East Jerusalem? Four main themes that emerge on the socioeconomic conditions in these neighborhoods are a lack of space; a lack of effective infrastructure; a lack of public services; and uncertainty about the future of some recent positive developments in education for East Jerusalem Palestinians.

First, Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem suffer from a lack of space, the result of two of the policies outlined above: the expansion of Israeli neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and the construction of the separation barrier. As the expansion of Israeli neighborhoods greatly outpaces that of Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, it compromises the available space for the city's Palestinians. In addition, many of the residents who live in neighborhoods beyond the separation barrier but within the municipal boundaries of the city have jobs that are inside the city. According to Michael Dumper, the result is that many[6] have moved to neighborhoods within the separation barrier. Further, the combination of a lack of space and increased population density in these neighborhoods has decreased the supply of available housing and increased the demand, resulting in a drastic

increase in housing prices—by as much as 45 percent in some neighborhoods (Dumper, 2014).

East Jerusalem Palestinians are acutely aware of these trends. Fuad Abu Hamed, an East Jerusalem Palestinian who is a social activist and lecturer at the Jerusalem Business School at Hebrew University, and director of an HMO in East Jerusalem, has said that "there is tremendous housing distress, and people are constantly talking about how they have to move out" (Hasson, 2021). And while the lack of space in East Jerusalem neighborhoods is most acutely felt within the sphere of housing, it also limits the availability of public spaces such as parks, playgrounds, sports facilities, and most importantly, schools (Jerusalem Institute, 2019b). As of 2021-2022, for example, the Municipality estimated that there were 2,000 missing classrooms in East Jerusalem, while Ir Amim claimed that 3,517 were missing (Ir Amim, 2022).

In addition, Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem lack effective infrastructure and public services. Both of these shortcomings stem from the lack of sufficient funds from the municipal budget invested in East Jerusalem. In terms of infrastructure, residents complain of a lack of curbsides and sidewalks, and that many homes are not connected to the sewage system or water supply. With regard to public services, family care centers, post offices, and banks are singled out (Jerusalem Institute, 2019b). These lapses could be corrected significantly by investing more money in East Jerusalem—for example, by the Municipality hiring more sanitation workers to help with sewage. Plan 3790, with its investment of NIS 2.2 billion in East Jerusalem, made that clear, with one East Jerusalem Palestinian claiming that "anyone with eyes in his head can see that there is a change in terms of infrastructures, a situation that didn't exist before" (Hasson, 2019). The progress made by Plan 3790, however, is threatened by Minister Smotrich's decision to remove the larger plan slated to begin in 2024 from the cabinet's agenda.

In contrast, while not a physical condition, recent, positive outcomes with regard to education in East Jerusalem have emerged in the last few years. Prior to 2018 and the implementation of Plan 3790, two main issues plagued the successful integration of East Jerusalem Palestinian students into Israeli universities, and in turn, the Israeli economy. First, Palestinians and Israelis alike recognized that Hebrew instruction in East Jerusalem was "seriously deficient," with many students barely learning the alphabet despite multiple years of instruction (Khader, 2021). Second, Israeli universities did not recognize the *tawjihi*, the Palestinian Authority's matriculation exam. The result was that East Jerusalem Palestinian students chose to study either at universities in the West Bank such as Birzeit University, or for those with the means, universities in other Arab countries. In either case, the result was a wider gap between East Jerusalem and Israeli society due to decreased interaction in higher education, and subsequently, in the labor market.

This changed significantly with the implementation of Plan 3790 in 2018. First, 3790 put a strong emphasis on boosting the study of Hebrew in East Jerusalem schools both in terms of instruction and results. Some Palestinian parents have objected to this effort, arguing that the objective is to encourage the "Israelization" of the eastern part of the city. Yet nationalist feelings aside, the current economic reality is that Jerusalem is a bi-national city, with a more thriving Western, Israeli area. If individuals want to be competitive in that labor market, they must be able to communicate in the dominant language—Hebrew. Second, the implementation of Plan 3790 coincided with two major policy changes that eased funding and admission restrictions to Israeli universities in Jerusalem, most prominently, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HUJI). First, funding from the Council for Higher Education enabled Israeli universities to offer stipends to nearly every Palestinian who met the requirements for

entrance to these schools, allowing many more to study there. Fuad Abu Hamed underscored the importance of these stipends, explaining that "there's no doubt that funding and attention paid by Israeli institutions were major factors [since] now any child, even if he or she is poor, can get in as long as his/her grades are good" (Hasson, 2019). Second, HUJI began to recognize the *tawjihi*, eliminating the need for qualified Palestinian students to complete a year-long preparatory program for admission.

At HUJI in particular, these policies yielded immediate benefits, with 278 East Jerusalem Palestinians completing the pre-matriculation preparatory program in 2019—corresponding to approximately 54.4 percent year-over-year growth. The statistics for those studying at HUJI during the same period were similarly impressive, with 161 students and a 54.8 percent year-over-year growth rate. These numbers have continued to balloon since then, with 710 Palestinian students studying at HUJI in 2022 (Cidor, 2022). These positive developments in education for East Jerusalem Palestinians face an imminent and major threat from Finance Minister Smotrich, whose opposition to 3790 stems largely from the provisions encouraging higher education for East Jerusalem Palestinians (Hasson & Freidson, 2023).

Taken together, the current picture that emerges from Israeli policies in East Jerusalem is largely bleak. These policies seem to have contributed to at least four socioeconomic outcomes in East Jerusalem: a lack of space, a lack of effective infrastructure; a lack of public services; and uncertainty about labor market outcomes and improved educational opportunities for East Jerusalem Palestinians. On an individual level, these outcomes have presumably created economic stress among many Palestinians in East Jerusalem related to the housing crisis, a poor quality of life stemming from the lack of public space and services, and a potential roadblock to improved educational and future economic opportunities.

Public Opinion in East Jerusalem

Following the survey of the economic distress and challenging life conditions in East Jerusalem, and the four Israeli policies that may have contributed to these outcomes, this section looks at East Jerusalem public opinion, based on four sources.

The first, the *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem*, released annually by the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research since 1982, is a respected database compiling statistical data about Jerusalem. It relies primarily on data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and the Jerusalem Municipality.[7] The second is Arab Barometer, which describes itself as a "nonpartisan research network that provides insight into the social, political and economic attitudes of ordinary citizens across the Arab world" (Arab Barometer). Arab Barometer data are from Palestinian and Arab sources and include additional data not contained in the *Statistical Yearbooks*, such as individual religiosity. The local partner responsible for data collection in East Jerusalem and the West Bank for the Arab Barometer is the Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), headed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki (Arab Barometer Technical Reports from Wave II- Wave VII). Third are the results of a "A Special East Jerusalem Poll" conducted in November 2022 by Dr. Shikaki. While the Arab Barometer data are collected by PCPSR, this survey is not in the Arab Barometer data; it focuses specifically on East Jerusalem; and it is based on a random sample of 1000 respondents—a much greater number of respondents than the average of 158.4 from East Jerusalem in the Arab Barometer from 2010-2021. Fourth are the results of a June 2022 survey commissioned by Dr. David Pollock of the Washington Institute and conducted by the Palestine Center for Public Opinion. This poll was conducted from June 6-21, 2022, with a sample of 300 Palestinian adult legal residents of East Jerusalem within its official municipal boundaries (Pollock, 2022).

In consolidating the data from these four sources to present the results most relevant to the research questions posed in this article, the data are organized around three central themes: economic trends; political and social trends; and religiosity.

Economic Trends

Suggested above is that the poor economic situation in East Jerusalem is related to two primary factors: one, the housing crisis stemming from the expansion of Israeli neighborhoods in the area and the separation barrier, and two, the inability of East Jerusalem Palestinians to turn educational gains into better labor market outcomes taken together with the specter of the reduction of educational funding for them. PCPSR's East Jerusalem poll provides further support for the first conclusion, indicating that the percent of respondents claiming that among what they like least about living in East Jerusalem, "the economic situation and the high cost of living," increased from 3.9 percent in 2010 to 6.1 percent in 2023, or a 56.41 percent increase (PCPSR, 2022). It also provides some support for the second conclusion, with the proportion of respondents claiming that they are "very concerned" about "losing access to adequate education [for] my children," increasing from 31.6 percent in 2010 to 34.0 percent in 2022 (PCPSR, 2022).

The *Statistical Yearbooks*, published by the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, provide data on employment and poverty in East Jerusalem, adding to the assessment of the economic situation there. At first glance, the data from the *Statistical Yearbooks* suggest that employment in East Jerusalem is improving. The data show that early in the previous decade, the unemployment rate among the Palestinians in Jerusalem was 10-12 percent (Jerusalem Institute, 2014, 2015). Since then, however, the unemployment rate in Jerusalem among both Jews and Palestinians has declined steadily—apart from the increase that occurred in 2019-2020, among both Jews and Palestinians, likely as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The general positive trends described above associated with the unemployment rate in Jerusalem, and particularly among the East Jerusalem Palestinians are illustrated in Figure 3.

This improving unemployment rate, however, masks other problematic trends in the data. Consider the definition of "employed" used in the underlying data from CBS's Labor Force Surveys (Jerusalem Institute, 2022):[8]

> *Employed*—Persons who worked during the determinant week at any job for at least one hour, for pay, profit or any other renumeration; family members who worked unpaid in a family business; persons in institutions who worked for 15 hours or more per week; and persons who were temporarily absent from their usual work.

This means that if someone worked for one hour per week and was not looking for work, he would be considered "employed" and not "unemployed." This may at least partially explain that despite the significant improvements in the unemployment rate among East Jerusalem

Figure 3: Unemployment rate in Jerusalem

Source: Jerusalem Institute, 2014-2023

Palestinians in 2012-2020, the population experienced very high poverty rates.

The countries with the highest poverty rates in the world as of 2023 were led by South Sudan at 82.30 percent, with Guatemala in tenth place, at 59.30 percent (World Bank, 2023a). In the United States, approximately 11.6 percent of the population lives in poverty (Lee, 2023). In comparison, among Palestinian children in Jerusalem during the period 2011-2020, approximately 79.9 percent were living in poverty. Among adults, which are distinguished from children and the elderly population in the data, that same figure was 72.8 percent. Finally, among families, the figure was 70.0 percent. Each of these categories demonstrated significant declines during the period, with the poverty rate among children declining from 86 percent in 2011 to 70.3 percent in 2020, among adults from 81 to 61.4 percent, and among families from 75 to 57.3 percent (Jerusalem Institute, 2014-2023). Yet the improved rates among East Jerusalem Palestinians would still place them among the most impoverished nations in the world.

The poor economic situation of the Palestinians in Jerusalem from the *Statistical Yearbooks*/CBS data is corroborated by Arab Barometer data and mirrors the results presented by the PCPSR poll, with respondents very concerned about the economic situation. Specifically, during the period 2010-2021, when asked, "What is the most important challenge facing Palestine today," in four out of the five rounds of surveys, the greatest portion of East Jerusalem Palestinians said that it was the economic situation (in 2022, they said it was security and stability), with an average proportion of 34.33 percent citing this challenge over the period (Arab Barometer, 2009-2022).

In the context of the economic concerns of East Jerusalem Palestinians—likely in part due to their not working enough hours—the nature of their employment presumably does not pay them enough, despite a relatively high rate of higher education among this population. Specifically, during the period 2012-2021, according to the *Statistical Yearbooks*/CBS data, some 63.3 percent of the workforce held a Bachelor's degree, with 72.9 percent holding a Master's degree. The corresponding percentages for the Jewish population of Jerusalem were 88.9 percent and 90.9 percent, respectively (Jerusalem Institute, 2014-2023). Given these figures, we would expect the Jewish population of Jerusalem to have more prestigious and higher paying jobs—and they do. However, given the relatively high rate of higher education among East Jerusalem Palestinians, the gap between East Jerusalem Palestinians and Israeli Jews in these high paying and prestigious jobs should not be as large as it is. For example, during the period 2017-2021,[9] the average proportion of Jewish residents of Jerusalem working in hi-tech was 8.0 percent, while among Arabs it was 0.9 percent. In addition, among the Jewish population, there was approximately a 12 percent year-over-year growth in employment in the hi-tech sector during this period, while among the East Jerusalem Palestinians, there was evidence of decline. Similarly, the average proportion of Jews employed in academia during the period from 2012-2021 was 37.2 percent, while East Jerusalem Palestinians were employed at a rate of 15.8 percent. Yet for the same period, the proportion of East Jerusalem Palestinians employed in unskilled labor had an average of 18.0 percent, while for Jews, the average was 7.1 percent (Jerusalem Institute, 2014-2023). In short, the figures suggest that among those East Jerusalem Palestinians who are working, despite being highly educated, many of them may be settling for less prestigious, poorer paying jobs.

It would be wrong to say that these data offer an entirely depressing picture of the economic situation in East Jerusalem. They clearly show a declining unemployment rate, and reductions in the high rate of poverty in that part of the city.

It would be wrong to say that these data offer an entirely depressing picture of the economic situation in East Jerusalem. They clearly show a declining unemployment rate, and reductions in the high rate of poverty in that part of the city. Nonetheless, people are still very concerned about their economic situation and poverty rates remain high, largely as a result of two primary factors. First, the housing crisis in East Jerusalem Palestinian neighborhoods stemming from the expansion of Israeli neighborhoods there and the separation barrier continues to take a toll in terms of rising prices and limited space. Second, despite some progress in education in East Jerusalem, there is evidence that the population has not successfully translated their educational advancement into economic gains in the labor market. Also significant is the specter of a reduction of funds for this educational advancement among East Jerusalem Palestinians on account of Finance Minister Smotrich's opposition to what amounts to the continuation and expansion of Plan 3790. Further, the possibility of this funding cut exists despite the promising gains made specifically within higher education among East Jerusalem Palestinians during 2018-2023 and associated with the funding from Plan 3790.

Political and Social Trends

Given the Israeli policies and conditions in East Jerusalem neighborhoods, coupled with the economic trends described, one would expect to see either political apathy or mass political mobilization, distrust, and social frustration. Indeed, politically, the data tend to demonstrate greater political apathy. Beginning in the *Statistical Yearbook* of 2022, the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research began to provide survey data on public views related to the performance of public institutions including the government, healthcare system, education system, and police. Table 1 provides the public function followed by the percentage of respondents that answered "not so much" or "not at all." In other words, high percentages here are bad.

Table 1 underscores that during the period 2018–2020, East Jerusalem Palestinians had little faith in the three main Israeli political institutions meant to serve them: the government, the Knesset, and the municipality. The East Jerusalem Palestinians' dissatisfaction with these political institutions was particularly high relative to the "Jews and others" category, with the exception of trust in the Knesset.

Table 1: Jerusalem Arabs and "Jews and others": Trust in particular public authority—"not so much" or "not at all"

Public Function	Arabs	Jews and others
Trust in the government	80.0%	55.0%
Trust in the justice system	54.0%	57.0%
Trust in the health system	9.0%	24.0%
Health system functioning	10.0%	37.0%
Education system functioning	37.0%	53.0%
Knesset functioning	88.0%	82.0%
Municipality Functioning	76.0%	45.0%
Police Functioning	64.0%	54.0%

Source: Jerusalem Institute, 2022

This lack of trust in Israeli political institutions among East Jerusalem Palestinians gains greater weight with the results of PCPSR's East Jerusalem Poll. The findings of this survey focus on the Jerusalem municipality and demonstrate a "total absence of trust in [its] intentions" (PCPSR, 2022). More precisely, when asked about the "goals" of "the municipality of Jerusalem…for [the] next few years,"[10] from 2010 to 2022, the proportion of respondents claiming that their goals were to "build new residential neighborhoods for the Arabs and improve the level of municipal service delivery

to them" increased 0.1 percentage points from 1.3 to 1.4 percent. Also on the positive side, for the same period, the percentage of respondents claiming that their goals were to "introduce some improvements in the level of municipal service delivery to the Arabs" increased 1.1 percentage points, from 2.5 to 3.6 percent (PCPSR, 2022).

These positive developments, however, were greatly overshadowed by the negative responses in the survey, with an increase of 3.3 percentage points of respondents, from 6.2 to 9.5 percent, who claimed that the Municipality's goal was to "reduce the level of municipal service delivery or the Arab residents." And most telling was that an overwhelming 64.3 percent of respondents in 2022 believed that the goal of the Municipality was to "demolish Arab homes and neighborhoods, evict Arab residents, and reduce the level of municipal services" (PCPSR, 2022). The proportion of respondents selecting this choice dropped 1.6 percentage points from 65.9 percent in 2010; however, this decrease holds far less weight, considering that the overwhelming majority of respondents selecting this answer in both 2010 and 2022.

In addition to a lack of trust in Israeli political institutions, both the PCPSR poll and Arab Barometer point to "distrust in the PA and its institutions" (PCPSR, 2022). Distrust in the PA among Palestinians is certainly not a new phenomenon; however, Palestinians argue that this distrust among East Jerusalemites peaked in 2021 when Israel decided to prevent their participation in Palestinian general elections that year and the PA acquiesced by canceling them. As support for this claim, PCPSR points to two results. First is the high proportion (53.9 percent) of East Jerusalem Palestinians claiming that the level of corruption among PA officials is a "very big problem." Second is the decrease in proportion of East Jerusalemites preferring Palestinian sovereignty in East Jerusalem (from 51.8 percent in 2010 to 38.0 percent in 2022) in the event of a negotiated settlement and the increase in those preferring Israeli sovereignty (from 6.1 percent in 2010 to 19.2 percent in 2022) (PCPSR, 2022).

Figure 4: Belief there is corruption in government



Source: Arab Barometer, 2009-2022

While Arab Barometer does not examine preferences among East Jerusalemites in the event of a negotiated settlement, it does ask about corruption in the PA. In addition, unique to the Arab Barometer data is the ability to compare the responses of East Jerusalemites to those Palestinians in the West Bank—a population demographically similar but living under different condition (Figure 4).

The most significant trend in Figure 4 is that despite the demographic similarities between East Jerusalem and West Bank Palestinians, since 2016, the proportion of East Jerusalemites claiming that there is corruption in the PA has increased, while the proportion in the West Bank has remained steady. Furthermore, these results support those from the PCPSR data and the claims made there, namely, that belief about corruption in the PA among East Jerusalemites peaked in 2021 with its decision to cancel elections.

The key point here is that whether it is the Israeli government or the PA, East Jerusalem Palestinians do not appear to trust government or its institutions. Perhaps predictably, this distrust has been accompanied by general political apathy, hopelessness, and alienation among East Jerusalem Palestinians. For

example, the proportion of East Jerusalem Palestinians that did not participate in the last Palestinian parliamentary or presidential elections (in which they had a chance to vote) increased drastically from 78.3 percent in 2010 to 93.2 percent in 2022. And among those from the 2022 poll that answered that they did not participate, 41.3 percent claimed it was because they were "not convinced with the candidates," 24.2 percent claimed that it was because "participation was pointless," and 13.7 percent because the "winners, no matter who they were, could not possibly serve East Jerusalem" (PCPSR, 2022). This political apathy, hopelessness, and alienation is also demonstrated in the Arab Barometer data, which explicitly asked respondents, "In general, to what extent are you interested in politics?" (Figure 5). Note that this question did not focus on any one particular political body, but "politics" in general.

The PCPSR survey makes clear that East Jerusalem Palestinians were satisfied with many municipal services in 2022, including: water (82 percent), electricity (75 percent), the sewage system (73 percent), the speed with which fire rescue services arrive (70 percent), and the speed with which ambulance services arrive (69 percent).

Figure 5: Interest in Politics, East Jerusalem



Source: Arab Barometer, 2009-2022

Figure 5 demonstrates that East Jerusalem Palestinians have become more politically "uninterested" and "very uninterested," specifically in the years 2018 and 2021, which correspond to the longitudinal trends presented in the data above.

While these data are indicative of greater political frustration and apathy among East Jerusalem Palestinians, the data on social trends offer a more complex story. First, in 2010-2022, there was an 11-percentage point increase among East Jerusalem Palestinians who claim to perceive threats and intimidation from Israeli police and Border Police. And there has been a similar 10-percentage point increase among East Jerusalem Palestinians who claim to have perceived a threat from Jewish settlers (PCPSR, 2022). Given the Israeli policy of expanding Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, these percentage point increases are not surprising.

At the same time, there have also been strong improvements in the percentage of East Jerusalem Palestinians claiming that they are satisfied with the services provided to them in their neighborhoods. These trends are clear from the data in the *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook* of 2022 presented above and with regard to healthcare in particular, in which only 9.0 percent express distrust in the health system and 10 percent are not satisfied with its functioning (far more positive figures than from among the Jewish population, at 24.0 percent and 37.0 percent, respectively) (Jerusalem Institute, 2022). These figures are corroborated by those from the PCPSR survey in which 83 percent of East Jerusalem Palestinians claimed that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the delivery of healthcare services in their neighborhood. Further, the PCPSR survey makes clear that East Jerusalem Palestinians were satisfied with many municipal services in 2022, including: water (82 percent), electricity (75 percent), the sewage system (73 percent), the speed with which fire rescue services arrive (70 percent), and the speed with which ambulance services arrive (69 percent),

among others. Relative to 2010, East Jerusalem Palestinians demonstrated greater satisfaction with 21 municipal services, in comparison to a decline in satisfaction with just 5, with the most significant decline being the supply of electricity, which is in fact not the responsibility of the Jerusalem Municipality (PCPSR, 2022). Yet while these 21 improvements are encouraging, they are relative to the opinions expressed in 2010, and many of them—while better—are still far from satisfying a majority of East Jerusalem Palestinians.[11]

Third, and most surprising, both the PCPSR data and the June 2022 survey commissioned by the Washington Institute suggest that a greater number of East Jerusalem Palestinians are open to Israeli citizenship. The PCPSR survey demonstrates that 19 percent of the respondents prefer Israeli sovereignty in East Jerusalem, while 38 percent prefer Palestinian sovereignty—a 13 percentage point increase in favor of Israel and a 14-percentage point decrease against Palestinian sovereignty. Then, when asked whether they would prefer Palestinian or Israeli citizenship in a permanent settlement, 58 percent (compared to 63 percent in 2010) said they would want Palestinian citizenship, while 37 percent (compared to 24 percent in 2010) said they would want Israeli citizenship (PCPSR, 2022). The results from Pollock's data are even more pronounced, with 48 percent of respondents saying that they would prefer to become citizens of Israel, versus 43 percent choosing Palestine. According to Dr. Pollock, this is a new development, since the percent that chose Israeli citizenship in 2017-2020 "hovered around just 20%" (Pollock, 2022).

Three political and social trends emerge from the data surveyed. First, East Jerusalem Palestinians are politically frustrated and apathetic. Second, while there have been significant improvements in quality of life and public services recently, there is still much work to do. Third, an increasing number of East Jerusalem Palestinians are open to the idea of accepting Israeli citizenship.

Religiosity and al-Aqsa

Neither the PCPSR survey nor the Washington Institute survey contains any questions about religiosity. The data from the *Statistical Yearbooks* from the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research do provide the number of individuals belonging to a certain religion in Jerusalem, but do not provide ways to identify any measure of individual religiosity. Arab Barometer, however, includes a question worded as follows: "In general, would you describe yourself as religious, somewhat religious, or not religious?" (Arab Barometer, 2009-2022). Answers to this question suggest that there has been a sharp increase in the level of religiosity among East Jerusalem Palestinians during 2010-2021.

As with the issue of governmental corruption, the data on religiosity from East Jerusalem is presented with data from the West Bank, on the assumption that this group should be similar demographically to those individuals living in East Jerusalem, albeit living under different conditions. In the case of individual religiosity, this comparison group is particularly informative since the data suggest that while there has been a sharp increase in the level of individual religiosity among East Jerusalem Palestinians in 2010-2021, the level of individual religiosity among those living in the West Bank has remained relatively constant. This suggests that there may be something underway in East Jerusalem that is not occurring in the West Bank that may influence the levels of individual religiosity in different ways.

The increase in individual religiosity among East Jerusalem Palestinians is empirically verified from the data from the Arab Barometer from two of the responses to the question listed above. First, and somewhat counterintuitively given the claims of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the data from Arab Barometer demonstrate that the number of respondents self-identifying as "somewhat religious" during the period from 2010-2021 has decreased sharply, as is clear in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Religious self-identification: "somewhat religious"



Source: Arab Barometer, 2009-2022

Figure 7: Religious self-identification: "religious"



Source: Arab Barometer, 2009-2022

By itself, Figure 6 suggests that the claims of East Jerusalem Palestinians that religiosity is increasing in the city is wrong. Put simply, this graph seems to show that the number of people who are religious in East Jerusalem is decreasing. Meantime, the proportion of Palestinians in the West Bank self-identifying as "somewhat religious" has stayed relatively constant, if not slightly higher during the same period. However, these figures must be analyzed together with the Arab Barometer data about Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank self-identifying as "religious," which demonstrate that the proportion of respondents in East Jerusalem who identify as "religious" in 2010-2021 increased sharply, while the proportion in the West Bank stayed relatively constant, if not decreasing somewhat (Figure 7).

Taken together, three clear trends emerge. First, the level of religiosity in the comparison group (the West Bank) during the period was relatively constant. Second, the proportion of respondents self-identifying as "somewhat religious" in East Jerusalem declined noticeably during the period. And finally, the proportion of respondents self-identifying as "religious" in East Jerusalem increased significantly during the period. Further, the data suggest that while there were no material changes to religiosity during the period in the West Bank, in East Jerusalem, it may be the case that those who had self-identified as somewhat religious, are now identifying as firmly religious.

The data from the PCPSR survey further underscore the Arab Barometer results. In particular, in both 2010 and 2022, the PCPSR survey asked respondents, "What are the things that you like most about living in East Jerusalem?" In both years, most important to respondents in East Jerusalem was the al-Aqsa Mosque. In 2010, however, 44.8 percent of respondents said it was most important to them, whereas in 2022, that number had increased to 55.3 percent, or a 23.4 percent increase. During the same period, the importance of other holy places to respondents decreased approximately by 68.51 percent (PCPSR, 2022). These trends, taken together, suggest that along with increased individual religiosity in East Jerusalem in 2010-2022, al-Aqsa became more important for residents living there.

Terrorism in Jerusalem

The last question to be addressed is: has there been an increase in terrorist attacks emanating from East Jerusalem? The source of the data

is the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has tracked victims of terror since September 27, 2000, with a particular focus in this paper on 2010-2023, since most of the data on public opinion discussed above come from that period.

When an attack occurs in the city, the terrorist executing the attack is presumably from Jerusalem and its environs. This assumption is based on the claim made by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs that most terror attacks concentrated in greater Jerusalem are carried out by "young lone terrorists, most of them from East Jerusalem, and some from Judea and Samaria" (this claim focuses specifically on the wave of terror in 2015-2023) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023a). With the research question above and this assumption in mind, I focus on attacks carried out in Jerusalem. Figure 8 presents the total number of attacks carried out in Jerusalem by year, while Figure 9 presents the total number of people injured and killed by terrorist attacks in Jerusalem by year. Years with no attacks in Jerusalem are omitted.

These statistics show that since 2010, there has been an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in Jerusalem. However, that statement masks three trends that emerge from the data. First, there was a spike in terrorist attacks in Jerusalem in 2015-2017 (the "knife intifada"). Second, there was a decrease in terrorist activity in Jerusalem from 2018-2020. And finally, while at the time of this writing the data from 2023 is incomplete, it does appear that there has been a spike of terrorist attacks in Jerusalem from 2021 to the present.

There is one other significant trend in terrorist attacks carried out in Jerusalem since 2000 that is contained in the data but not shown in Figures 8 or 9: Of the terrorist attacks that occurred in Jerusalem from October 2, 2000 to January 24, 2008, terrorist organizations including Fatah, Fatah's al-Aqsa Brigade, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or Tanzim claimed responsibility for 60.71 percent of them. In contrast, after January 24, 2008, the data from the Ministry

Figure 8: Number of terror attacks in Jerusalem



Source: Johnston, 2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023b

Figure 9: Killed and injured in Jerusalem terror attacks



Source: Johnston, 2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023b

of Foreign Affairs does not list one terrorist group claiming responsibility for an attack in Jerusalem ("Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism," 2000; Johnston, 2023). This suggests that currently, "lone-wolf" attacks are by far the most common form of terrorism in Jerusalem—which is corroborated by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs analysis (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023b).

In response to the question posed above, Figure 8 and Figure 9 show that there has been

an increase in terrorist attacks in Jerusalem over the last thirteen years, albeit with fluctuations within that period. Significantly, compared to the terrorist attacks in Jerusalem in the early to mid 2000s, those carried out in the city today are apparently overwhelmingly individual actors with no formal connection to an organization like Hamas or Islamic Jihad.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This article emerged from a series of in-depth discussions with East Jerusalem Palestinians conducted by the author during the fall of 2022. During the course of those discussions, a common claim emerged, namely, that Israeli policy in East Jerusalem has caused economic underdevelopment and political and social isolation. Stemming from those outcomes and searching for some kind of purpose and effective representation of national identity, East Jerusalem Palestinians have turned to religion, and al-Aqsa in particular. Finally, they argued that this heightened religiosity, taken together with a lack of personal direction, led to more East Jerusalem Palestinians willing to become so-called martyrs, and sacrifice themselves in terror attacks against Israel. In addition, they contended that the key link between religious extremism and terror was Israel's activity at al-Aqsa. They claimed that al-Aqsa represented the last vestige of any form of national identity—and one that Israel has yet to take from them. As a result, and in an effort to defend this identity, some of these East Jerusalem Palestinians are willing to turn to violence and terrorism.

Much of Israeli policy in East Jerusalem over the course of the last 20-30 years has actively worked against Palestinian interests there.

My goal in this article was to study these claims more precisely by identifying the specific policies to which these East Jerusalem Palestinians may have been referring, researching the socioeconomic conditions in the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, examining public opinion data to understand how these policies and conditions have actually affected the residents of East Jerusalem, and checking to see whether there actually has been an increase of Palestinian terror in Jerusalem. In large part, while not establishing a causal connection, the data presented in this paper provide support for the claims of the East Jerusalem Palestinians. In particular, much of Israeli policy in East Jerusalem over the course of the last 20-30 years has actively worked against Palestinian interests there. Socioeconomic conditions are bad; the residents have become more distrustful of the government, more politically apathetic, and more religious, and there has been an increase in terrorist attacks against Israelis in the city. Again, while the relationships I have demonstrated in this paper are not causal, they do demonstrate these broader trends that appear to support the claims of the East Jerusalem Palestinians outlined at the beginning of this paper.

The situation in East Jerusalem, however, is not all bad. Consequently, the data presented in this article invite two specific policies that Israel could implement in East Jerusalem to achieve the dual aim of improving socioeconomic conditions for Palestinians there and in turn, perhaps, reducing terror attacks against Israelis in the city.

The first policy recommendation is for Israel to extend and expand Plan 3790. Not expanding this plan would be a grave policy mistake for Israel for four primary reasons. First, if Israel truly does envision a united Jerusalem as the capital of the state and wants to maintain sovereignty there, it must take responsibility for the city's entire population. Even more right-wing members of the Israeli government have started to recognize this logic, with one senior official under Prime Minister Netanyahu expressing that "if Israel were serious about Jerusalem, it needed to give people full and equal rights, and that called for allocating resources at all

levels and not just making cosmetic efforts to prettify the city, but rather [recognizing] that there was something deeper needed there" (Hasson, 2021). Second, and relatedly, Plan 3790 has improved both the socioeconomic conditions in East Jerusalem and local opinions about municipal services there. This is clear from the tangible improvements, in addition to the PCPSR public opinion data showing that relative to 2010, East Jerusalem Palestinians expressed greater satisfaction with 21 municipal services, in comparison to less satisfaction with just five.

Third, in the sphere of education, Plan 3790 has been what approaches a sea change for the residents of East Jerusalem. Perhaps most importantly, it has extended funding to allow qualified East Jerusalem students to study at Israeli universities, many of whom would otherwise be unable to do so. In addition, the plan dedicated resources to improved instruction of Hebrew in East Jerusalem. These resources were used to improve the quality of the instructors, pedagogical methods, and in turn the students' educational results. In terms of educational development, 3790 also contributed to improved physical learning environments, such as the well-equipped Alpha School in Beit Hanina. The dedication of these resources to education in East Jerusalem has resulted in tangible gains. Perhaps the most dramatic of these results is that in 2018, there were just 36 East Jerusalem Palestinian students enrolled at HUJI, but as of 2022, there were 710. More East Jerusalem students at HUJI not only increases their engagement with Israelis on an educational level, but they are more likely later to find a higher paying job in West Jerusalem or other parts of the country. The combination of more formal and informal interaction with Israelis, together with the likelihood of greater economic returns from a better education is likely to yield a dampened desire to act violently against these same Israelis or against the system that has provided the opportunity for economic advancement. Indeed (and fourth), the data provide at least some suggestive evidence that this may be the case. In particular, the implementation of Plan 3790 coincided with three years of decreased terrorist attacks in Jerusalem (2018-2020). In sum the decision to not extend and expand Plan 3790 would not only contradict the explicit policy outlined by Israel's Basic Law establishing a "united Jerusalem [as] the capital of Israel" and "pursu[ing] the development and prosperity of Jerusalem, and the welfare of its inhabitants" ("Basic Law," 1980), but also possibly incite more terrorism in the city on account of poor socioeconomic conditions and fewer personal educational and economic opportunities.

The second policy recommendation is for Israel to unilaterally extend citizenship to all East Jerusalem Palestinians. First, both PCPSR's East Jerusalem Survey and the June 2022 survey commissioned by Dr. Pollock make clear that an increasing number of East Jerusalem Palestinians want Israeli citizenship. Second, both the PCPSR survey and the results of a recent qualitative study that included 10 male and 5 female East Jerusalem Palestinians on the psychological effects of accepting (or not accepting) an Israeli passport suggest there are three main reasons for doing so: the economic (employment) benefits; freedom of movement (in Israel, the West Bank, and abroad); and easier maintenance of Jerusalem as one's center of life (Nager-Abud & Eran, 2023). It would not be a stretch to generalize these three reasons as "belonging and its benefits." Third, Israeli citizenship would give East Jerusalem Palestinians the opportunity to vote in national elections, and at least some say in selecting the coalition that makes decisions about the municipal services allocated to them. As made explicit by the PCPSR survey, the vast majority of East Jerusalem Palestinians would likely not vote, but again, this decision would at least give them the right to do so, and the ability to oppose governments (like the current one) that work actively against their interests. Finally, in 2019, a record high number of Palestinians received

Israeli citizenship (1,200) ("Unprecedented 1,200 East Jerusalem Palestinians," 2020). Moreover, 2019 and 2020 represented a low point in the number of terrorist attacks in Jerusalem for the period from 2010-2023. To be sure, I am not claiming causality here since other factors—like the implementation of Plan 3790—seem to have contributed to this dip. There was likely, however, a correlation between the two.

I recognize that this policy recommendation is one that is extremely controversial (Baskin, 2021). More right-wing Israeli Jews in Jerusalem adamantly oppose such a recommendation for three main reasons. First, they fear that the influx of 361,700 Palestinians will dilute the Jewish character of the state. Second, they are fearful of the high birthrate among the Palestinians. And finally, they fear that more Palestinians in Israel would result in more terror attacks. The first two fears are unfounded for three reasons. First, if all 361,700 East Jerusalem Palestinians accepted Israeli citizenship, that percentage of Arabs citizens of Israel would increase from 17.20 to 20.27 percent (Haj-Yahya et al., 2022; Yaniv, Haddad, & Assaf-Shapira, 2022)—in other words, a percentage point increase of 3.07 percentage points. While this is a not insignificant increase, it is also not one that will dilute the Jewish character of the state.

Second, this percentage point increase is based on the assumption that every single East Jerusalem Palestinian would accept Israeli citizenship if it were offered, which is not the case. This stems largely from the social taboo in Palestinian culture of taking Israeli citizenship (even though this taboo has eroded in recent years). Although there is not reliable data on how many East Jerusalem Palestinians would accept Israeli citizenship if offered, one indicative statistic that it would not be all of them is that between 2018-2022, an average of just 1,400 applications for Israeli citizenship were submitted by East Jerusalem Palestinians (Hasson, 2022). Third, while it is true that the Arab birth rate is usually higher than the Jewish birth rate in Israel (Haj-Yahya et al., 2022), those rates have narrowed in recent years, with the fertility rate among Jews even surpassing that of Arabs in 2018 (Aderet, 2019). In any case, an increase of less than 3 percentage points of Arabs in Israel would not significantly impact these trends.

The final fear expressed above, that more Palestinians in Israel would result in more terror attacks, is a fear that is not empirically based and works against one of the main goals of this recommendation. Two fundamental claims of this paper are that East Jerusalem Palestinians are economically despondent and without a firm identity. The East Jerusalem Palestinians with whom I spoke claim that this economic despondency and lack of identity contributes to increased religiosity in East Jerusalem, and in turn, more terror attacks. Again, their logic for linking greater religiosity and commitment to al-Aqsa to terrorism stemmed from their claim that this religiosity and al-Aqsa represent the last remaining fringes of many East Jerusalem Palestinians' identity. Denied so many other elements of personal as well as national identity, be they economic, academic, or professional, when this remaining pillar of identity is threatened, some East Jerusalem Palestinians are spurred to react violently. Further, East Jerusalem Palestinians explicitly expressed that when they seek Israeli citizenship, they do so for economic reasons and for ways to ensure that they can remain in Jerusalem—which in effect are two elements of their restored identity, namely, a professional identity that allows them to be economically independent and a locational identity that affords them the opportunity to clearly define a home. As such, by offering East Jerusalem Palestinians citizenship, and in theory dealing with the two core issues in this chain (economic despondency and a lack of identity), the hope would be that subsequent links of terror attacks would be eliminated.

Implementing these two policies faces stiff challenges, especially with the current government. However, the qualitative and quantitative data presented in this paper

inform us as to some possible implications of acting without them; namely, more religious extremism and Palestinian terror in Jerusalem. And with regards to the first recommendation, we already have concrete evidence that it will not only improve the quality of life for East Jerusalem Palestinians, but also suggestive evidence that it will decrease terrorism in the city. In the end, these two policies contribute to Israel's goal of preserving Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel and minimizing terrorism in the city. The outstanding question is whether Israel has the leaders brave enough to pursue this coherent strategy in the face of what will undoubtedly be political backlash from the more extremist elements of Israeli society. If it does not, the likely result will be an increasingly divided and terrorized Jerusalem.

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Notes

1 This claim emerged from research conducted by the author of this article in the fall of 2022. The author conducted 5 in-depth interviews, 25 surveys, and attended one two-day conference at the Legacy Hotel in East Jerusalem from November 1-2, 2022 entitled "Protecting, Preserving, and Investing Waqf Properties in Jerusalem." Two of the individuals interviewed were also among the 25 surveyed. The interviews and surveys were conducted primarily with small business owners in East Jerusalem, but also included members from the third sector in East Jerusalem, among them the Executive Director of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA).

2 The link between these four policies and these two sentiments among East Jerusalem Palestinians is my deduction from these sources, and is not explicitly expressed in these sources.

3 There is some dispute about the exact number. For example, Peace Now identifies 14 Israeli neighborhoods in East Jerusalem (Jerusalem Peace Now), but others have documented between 8 and 15 (Jerusalem Story, 2022).
4 Greater Jerusalem advancements of E1 and Har Gilo West are not included in these data.
5 Urban renewal consists of tearing down the existing buildings and constructing new buildings with a larger number of housing units.
6 As many as 47,200 during the period 2003-2009 (*Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook*, 2011).
7 "The Yearbook is a concentration of data about Jerusalem from a variety of sources, first and foremost among them from the CBS and the Jerusalem Municipality" (Jerusalem Institute, 1982).
8 For the specific definitions, see the Introduction in the "Employment" section.
9 Data on hi-tech employment only began in 2017.
10 The wording of the question in "Appendix 3: Table of Findings" that compares the findings from the 2010 and 2022 polls is as follows: "And what about the mayor of the municipality of Jerusalem Nir Barakat? What do you think his goals are for East Jerusalem for next few years?" (PCPSR, 2022). Presumably PCPSR simply made the mistake of not changing the wording of the question in the Appendix and not in the surveys themselves because as of December 2018, Nir Barkat was no longer the mayor of Jerusalem and in the body of the report on the survey, PCPSR references "the goals of the municipality" and not Mayor Barkat himself.
11 Such as the quality of teachers in your children's school (41.8 percent); your personal interactions with officials from the Jerusalem municipality (35.6 percent). For a full list, see PCPSR, 2022, Appendix 3, 8:1-8:35.

Economic Maneuvering: How States Evade Economic Sanctions

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Recent years have seen a noticeable increase in the recourse by states and international organizations to level economic sanctions on various countries, commercial entities, financial bodies, and individuals. This trend, however, does not reflect the success rate of these sanctions, and research indicates that their chances of success are slim. The reasons for the poor success rate of sanctions regimes depend on the specific cases and the importance of the interests of the involved parties. Nonetheless, certain patterns of behavior repeat themselves in each of the countries targeted by sanctions, such as adapting the local economy to the sanctions, resisting the sanctions in the international system, and taking practical steps to bypass them. This article surveys the patterns of behavior that countries employ in dealing with sanctions, focusing primarily on tools to evade them. Looking at North Korea, Russia, and Iran as case studies, it describes the tools that help nations bypass comprehensive sanctions. These modes of behavior also illuminate how various actors perceive sanctions and how countries that impose sanctions implement and enforce them.

Keywords: economic sanctions, sanctions evasion, Russia-Ukraine war, financial sanctions, trade sanctions, sanctions circumvention, North Korea, Russia, Iran, China

Introduction

Economic sanctions are not a new tool in a nation's toolbox. The first recorded mention of sanctions is from the fourth century BCE, when Athens imposed sanctions on the city-state of Megara, which was allied with Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. At the end of World War I, the League of Nations stressed the potential of sanctions as a nonviolent means of solving conflicts between nations (Hufbauer et al., 1985). However, the tool was used infrequently, and only expanded significantly in the past few decades. Since the 1990s, many countries, either independently or within the framework of international organizations, have tended to make widespread use of sanctions (Figure 1). Behind the greater popularity of sanctions are geopolitical changes in the aftermath of the Cold War, the increasing importance to the international community of issues such as human rights and processes of democratization, and the reluctance to use military tools to achieve political goals, which necessarily exact a heavy price (Jones, 2015).

Figure 1: Upward trends in the imposition of sanctions, 1950-2019



Source: Yotov et al., 2021

Sanctions, however, have many disadvantages. Economic sanctions can be a burden for the country imposing them, and not just the country subjected to them (the target country) (Elliott, 1997). Comprehensive sanctions can harm underprivileged populations that have no influence in the target country, and could lead to a severe humanitarian crisis in that country, as in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, following many years under a sanctions regime (Halliday, 1999). However, one of the main drawbacks of sanctions is their lack of effectiveness; according to the accepted figure, sanctions achieve their goal only around one third of the time (Hufbauer et al., 2009). In other words, in most cases sanctions fail to achieve the goals for which they were imposed, since the target countries managed to survive despite the limitations imposed on them. Note, however, that there are differences of opinion when it comes to defining and measuring the effectiveness of sanctions. While most research defines the effectiveness of sanctions as their ability to engender partial or total change in the policies of the target countries, some experts argue that the sanctions' success should be measured in their ability to cause significant economic damage to the target country (Baldwin & Pape, 1998; Jones et al., 2020).

The ability of target countries to contend with the sanctions imposed and contain the economic damage is one of the main reasons that sanctions often fail.

The ability of target countries to contend with the sanctions imposed and contain the economic damage is one of the main reasons that sanctions often fail. Astute confrontation with the sanctions by the target country reduces the pressure to cede to the demands of the countries imposing sanctions. There are various ways of overcoming the burden of sanctions, and how to deal with them depends in part on the types of sanctions imposed, but the state is not the only actor involved. Individual sanctions, imposed on the political or economic elite of the target country, force these elites to take various measures to safeguard their fortunes. Similarly, there are individual actors in the target country who will try to limit the harm caused by sanctions—and perhaps even profit from them—in part by using gray market systems. However, the state still has a central role to play in dealing with economic sanctions. This article focuses on coping with sanctions on a state level and examines the phenomenon of sanctions evasion, which is one of the most

important tools available to target countries, and maps the various methods used by target countries to bypass economic sanctions.

The first section of the article considers the use of sanctions (not all of which are economic) by states and international bodies, and examines how target states deal with them, both domestically and internationally. The second part looks at three case studies and surveys the methods used in each to bypass sanctions: North Korea, which has struggled under a sanctions regime for many years, due to its nuclear weapons program; Russia, which seeks in a number of ways to bypass sanctions imposed following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, having prepared for these sanctions since it invaded the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, and over the next eight years, working to develop mechanisms that would allow it to bypass sanctions; and Iran, a country that has sought to adapt to various sanction regimes for the past four decades and has developed different means to evade them. The article concludes with an analysis of the issue.

The Use of Sanctions

Sanctions are an intermediate option on the spectrum of tools to induce change, between persuasion-based diplomacy and a military operation that uses physical force to establish facts on the ground. The idea of sanctions is the use of coercion for political ends.

Imposition of sanctions serves several goals. The first goal is the desire to influence the policy of the country on which sanctions are imposed—to convey that its behavior is not acceptable and to limit its ability to continue enacting an unwanted policy. The objectives of the actor imposing sanctions can be varied, from pushing the target country to engage in negotiations to seeing it either moderate or completely end a certain policy. The reasons for sanctions imposition also vary. On occasion, sanctions are imposed in response to violent and belligerent activities by the target country, and sometimes for domestic reasons. In the paradigmatic case of South Africa, sanctions were imposed not to change an aggressive foreign policy that attacked the international community, but rather, the racist domestic policy of apartheid. However, there are other goals beyond the goal of influencing the target country. One is to placate one's own domestic population, which may have called for measures to counter the behavior of the target country. In this case, sanctions can be a relatively easy tool to show the public that the state is taking the measures expected of it. Another goal is to show the international community that the state has responded to the undesirable policy of the target state and aims to deter additional countries from taking unwanted measures. The latter is more relevant to strong countries that are dominant on the international stage. Sanctions can be imposed for one or more of these reasons and, in this sense, are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, in some cases, sanctions are little more than a symbolic or punitive act, when it is understood that the sanctions themselves will not stop the target country and will not alter its behavior, but are nonetheless important to intimate to that country that its actions are unacceptable (Barber, 1979; Daoudi & Dajani, 1983; Galtung, 1967; Jones, 2018; Jones et al., 2020).

Sanctions can be divided into a number of categories that differ from each other based on their scope and identity of the actor(s) imposing the sanctions. Unilateral sanctions are imposed by a single country or by a number of countries individually, while multilateral sanctions are imposed by an international or regional organization. Thus a unilateral sanction imposed solely by the United States only obligates American companies and US citizens, while sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council are multilateral, and by power of Article 25 and 103 of the UN charter, obligate all members of the international community (Happold, 2016).

Unilateral sanctions are imposed by countries based on the rules of countermeasures as

defined in international law, which are detailed in the Articles on State Responsibility,[1] whereby any state harmed by the action of another can take countermeasures. When it comes to countries that are not harmed directly, the legal basis for imposing sanctions is less clear (Asada, 2020). Since World War II, no country has imposed more unilateral sanctions than the United States (Barnes, 2016).

Sanctions imposed by the United Nations are the most common example of multilateral sanctions. Sanctions are imposed based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which relates to activity that threatens peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. According to the chapter, sanctions are a political measure taken against violations of world peace; their goal is to strengthen resolutions passed by the Security Council designed to restore peace by changing the behavior of the target country, which has taken measures that threaten peace. Article 41 of the UN Charter allows the imposition of various kinds of sanctions. The Security Council can impose sanctions based on Chapter 14, Article 94, Paragraph 2, whereby the International Court of Justice (ICJ) can authorize the Security Council to take measures that allow it to enforce its decision. The decision making process in the Security Council, where each of the five permanent members has the right to veto any resolution, in essence prevents sanctions being imposed on them and their closest allies (Achilleas, 2020). For its part, the General Assembly has the power to recommend that sanctions be imposed. In addition to multilateral sanctions imposed by the UN, since the late 1990s the European Union has greatly expanded its use of sanctions and has imposed them dozens of times on various countries (Giumelli et al., 2021).

The extent of the sanctions is determined by the various categories: primary sanctions limit economic interactions between citizens and companies from the state imposing sanctions and the target state; secondary sanctions are imposed on citizens and companies in a third country engaged in economic activity with the target country (Sossai, 2020); smart or targeted sanctions, unlike comprehensive sanctions, are imposed on specific individuals—primarily decision makers and the political or economic elite in the target country, sanctioned by freezing assets or restricting travel—and on certain products, such as an arms embargo. The devastating ramifications on civilian society as a result of sanctions imposed in the 1990s, especially the humanitarian crisis created in Iraq, have led to a change in the nature of sanctions imposed, with a clear preference today for targeted sanctions (Happold, 2016).

Notwithstanding their widespread use, sanctions are not necessarily an effective tool for changing the behavior of the target country (Yotov et al., 2021). Sanctions are only successful in around a third of cases, while more pessimistic estimates state that sanctions succeed in altering the policies of the target country in only a small percent of all cases (Pape, 1997; Hufbauer et al., 2009; Morgan et al., 2014). Yet despite this poor success rate, studies show that in the vast majority of cases, countries subjected to sanctions suffer economic contraction and a decline in the quality of life. In other words, economic hardship is almost a constant outcome of sanctions, even if the desired political results are not achieved.

Many studies have highlighted the factors that influence the effectiveness of sanctions. These include: the type and duration of the sanctions; the relationship between the target country and the actor imposing sanctions; the importance of the issue that is the object of the sanctions; the type of regime in the target country; the political and economic stability of the target country; and the desire of third-party countries to help the target country. The chances of sanctions being effective rise when they are imposed against a country that has good relations with the country imposing them and when they have highly developed economic and political ties; when the controversial subject is not particularly important to the target country;

and when that country is a democracy, or has a non-democratic but stable regime (Allen, 2005, 2008a, 2008b; Ang & Peksen, 2007; Bapat et al., 2013; Bonetti, 1998; Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997; Drezner, 1999; Drury, 1998; Lam, 1990; Lektzian & Souva, 2007; Van Bergeijk, 1989). At the same time, the response of the target country and how it copes with the burden of sanctions also influence the effectiveness of the sanctions. The ability of the target country to limit the impact of the sanctions, or at least to ease the hardships that sanctions cause its economy, has a direct influence on its desire and willingness to cede to the demands of the authority imposing sanctions (Connolly, 2018).

Coping with Sanctions

Measures that states employ to deal with sanctions can be divided into four main categories: a) steps to adapt the economy to the impact of sanctions b) political steps designed to safeguard the existing regime despite the imposition of sanctions c) measures to oppose the sanctions in the international arena, and d) measures to bypass the sanctions. The latter are a focus of this article.

Adapting the Economy to the Impact of Sanctions

As part of the effort to adapt the economy to the impact of sanctions, countries encourage the development of alternative imports, while promoting the local production of all industrial and agricultural products to replace those products whose import is either banned or limited because of the sanctions. The guiding principle is to reduce dependency on certain countries for imports and significantly increase domestic production capabilities, in order to create self-reliance. As part of this policy, countries can offer various incentives, such as financial help and research and development support to bolster local industry. Moreover, a government can enact a policy of stockpiling vital products and raw materials, allocating them to industry under state supervision, in order to limit, as far as possible, the future shortage of these products and raw materials. Likewise, a state can implement import controls and a system of caps, alongside bans or limits on the import of nonessential goods (like luxury items) if the sanctions include limits on foreign exchange reserves. While adapting its commercial policy, a target country can take fiscal and monetary measures, such as limiting capital flow and altering the exchange and tax rates (Doxey, 1980).

Safeguarding the Existing Regime despite the Sanctions

The regime in the target country can also take nonpolitical measures to safeguard its rule, including with mechanisms to compensate those hit hardest by sanctions, or groups that enjoy political dominance and whose support is vital for the authorities. Within this framework the regime can reduce the economic burden of the sanctions and transfer it from the elites and the groups that support the government to more underprivileged populations in society, who can have no impact on government policy (Doxey, 1980). Moreover, states use propaganda to create public support for their policies and against the sanctions and those imposing them, in order to ensure that the people rally round the flag—in other words, bolstering support for the government and its policies, which would increase the public's willingness to suffer economic hardship and allow the state to enact unpopular measures to overcome the sanctions. Certain countries can even repress domestic opposition and anyone who opposed the policies for which sanctions were imposed in the first place (Galtung, 1967).

Opposing the Sanctions in the International Arena

Any state that is subjected to sanctions may respond with countermeasures that can include retaliatory sanctions, or it can nationalize assets of citizens of the country or countries responsible for imposing sanctions. The

purpose is to harm the other side and exact a price in response to any attempt to harm the economy of the target country (Peksen & Jeong, 2022). A state can also use propaganda directed against the international community, in order to try to convince it that it is the victim of unjustified action on the part of the countries imposing sanctions and thereby gain public sympathy. Moreover, a country can portray itself as willing to negotiate and compromise with the countries imposing sanctions, but in practice, drag its feet and not let those talks progress (Doxey, 1980).

Bypassing the Sanctions

In addition to adapting their economies to sanctions, target countries can take additional measures to enable them to continue to trade and conduct financial transactions with international markets. Measures to bypass sanctions can be divided into measures designed to counter comprehensive or smart/targeted trade sanctions and measures designed to bypass financial sanctions.

In order to bypass trade sanctions, the target country can take steps to diversify its import and export markets. This can be done by developing economic relations with countries that are not only not party to the sanctions regime but are also willing to increase their trade with the target country. Sometimes this trade is conducted under conditions that are less favorable to the target country, since it is forced to offer better terms to these new partners to increase its own attractiveness as a trading partner, and, to a certain extent, to compensate them for the risks involved in trading with a country subjected to sanctions (Doxey, 1980).

In addition to developing trade relations with countries that are not involved in the sanctions, the target country often manages to import goods from countries that are sanctioning it by transporting these goods through third countries, often those in close geographic proximity. In that case, a third country that has not imposed sanctions imports goods from the country imposing the sanctions and then transports them to the target country. This allows goods that cannot be imported because of the sanctions to reach the target country's market. Another way of evading sanctions is to allow private actors on the target country's soil to smuggle certain goods. In some cases, the target country can even contact criminal organizations to ensure the steady supply of these goods (Andreas, 2005). Other practices that are common in international trade to bypass sanctions are linked to maritime transport, and involve concealing the country of origin of the goods, camouflaging the identity of the vessel, forging the inventory and documents of a vessel, interfering with the automatic identification system of the vessel, and using a merchant navy sailing under another country's flag (Feldman, 2022).

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In recent years, these has been an increase in the use of financial sanctions limiting the ability of institutions, businesses, and individuals in the target state to trade in financial products—including preventing a target country's access to foreign currency, its foreign currency reserves, and financial systems. (Cipriani et al., 2023). Consequently, countries under sanctions have also been forced to learn how to bypass restrictions in these areas. One of the measures that a state can take is to create an alternative to the financial systems that have excluded it due to sanctions. One of the most important systems in the financial world is SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, which lets financial institutions exchange messages and sets

standards. Countries whose financial systems are disconnected from SWIFT can create an alternative system that works in exactly the same way. For example, in 2015 China launched its own financial messaging system, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), which is supervised by the Chinese central bank and uses the same standards as SWIFT. Although this alternative system was not set up as part of the Chinese battle against sanctions and currently operates in a relatively limited manner compared to SWIFT, when needed, the system can help bypass financial sanctions since it lessens dependence of Western institutions (Cipriani et al., 2023).

With the rise in the use of cryptocurrency, target countries have identified this new technology as a potential tool for evading sanctions. Cryptocurrencies are not subject to the kind of strict regulation imposed on traditional currencies and they provide either partial or full anonymity for users and their transactions, which makes it very hard for regulatory bodies to identify problematic transactions and allows any element under sanctions to bypass the limits on the traditional financial system, including the use of the US dollar. One prime example of a target country expressing an interest in cryptocurrency is Venezuela, when President Nicolás Maduro announced the launch of the petro, the state-issued cryptocurrency, which was backed by the country's energy reserves (Wronka, 2022).

There are various ways that a target country can use cryptocurrency to limit the impact of financial sanctions and bypass the restrictions imposed on it by creating capital outside of the financial system or reducing its use of foreign currencies. One way is to steal cryptocurrency by means of government-backed cyberattacks; another way is to mine cryptocurrency. The third way is to create a national cryptocurrency that is subject to the regulations of that country's central bank and is backed by gold or other commodities, as in the case of Venezuela. Another possible way is to create one cryptocurrency for a number of countries, backed by the currencies of those countries. This idea has been floated by the BRICS group—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (Magas, 2019). Finally, a target country can encourage its citizens to use cryptocurrency (Konowicz, 2018).

There are several ways that cryptocurrency can be used. The simplest way is the direct transfer of cryptocurrency assets from one electronic wallet to another, which accommodates simple transactions. Another system, suitable for large institutions, is the use of intermediaries: banks in the target country transfer assets to banks in a third country, which convert those assets from the local currency into international currencies like the US dollar or the euro, and then transfer them to intermediaries in a different third country. There, the assets are converted into cryptocurrency and are distributed among many different electronic wallets to conceal their source. Subsequently, these assets can be used by simply converting them into traditional currencies or other cryptocurrencies for use in various business deals (Ahari et al., 2022; Macfarlane, 2021). It is hard to gauge to what extent the use of cryptocurrency can replace the use of traditional currencies, especially when dealing with larger-scale deals that are easier to follow and identify (Ahari et al., 2022). However, this is one of the methods available for states, combined with other measures used by them.

Another method of evading sanctions is to reduce the use of foreign currencies, especially the US dollar. The target country can promote the use of its local currency, especially when dealing with countries with which it has close economic and political ties. It can move part of its trade over to the currency of its trade partner. In certain cases, trade can also be conducted using the barter system (McDowell, 2021).

Case Studies on Sanctions Evasion

In order to demonstrate how sanction evasion works, focus now turns to three case studies.

The first is North Korea, which has been under the yoke of sanctions for the past 17 years. The second is Russia, which has tried for over a year to bypass Western sanctions in a number of ways. Finally, there is Iran, which has been subject to a range of changing Western sanctions for over four decades. These three case studies were chosen because of the material differences between them. Russia is the most current case and involves a large global economy (the 11th largest in the world in terms of GDP); it is an important energy exporter and figures prominently in the global economy. North Korea is a small country that has confronted sanctions for a long period; it is highly dependent on energy imports and has never integrated to a large extent in the international financial system. In contrast, Iran is a special case of a country dealing with a sanctions regime that ebbs and flows. Over the course of the past 40 years, Iran has taken advantage of suspensions of the sanctions to develop an economy capable of dealing with fresh sanctions, and it is evident how its methods have changed over time and in accordance with conditions and the lessons learned. Like North Korea, sanctions have been imposed on Iran in recent years because of its nuclear program. Like Russia, Iran is an energy exporter, but over the years it has tried to lessen its reliance on these exports, and just as the Iranian economy has become more diverse, so too have its methods of evading sanctions. Similarly, all three of these countries face more sanctions than any other target country. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has been at the top of the list of countries with imposed sanctions, followed by Iran; North Korea is in fourth place (Zandt, 2023).

The North Korean case

Since 2006, when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, the country has been under a sanctions regime imposed by various international bodies and countries. These sanctions include trade embargoes and restrictions, especially in arms and military equipment; financial restrictions and limits on investment; assets freeze; and travel bans ("Fact Sheet," 2022). Despite these sanctions, North Korea has continued to export coal, one of most important parts of its economy, most of it to the Chinese market. Similarly, it also exports oil and trades various goods, including weapons and other military equipment (Kim, 2021). Although North Korea is perceived as isolated and disconnected from the global economy, in practice it has managed to run its economic and financial systems, notwithstanding the limits imposed by sanctions, thanks to several methods it has developed over the years.

Methods of Bypassing Sanctions

The first method is the use of third-party countries as export markets, import markets, and transit states. North Korea's primary trading partner is China (Figure 2). Data show an asymmetrical dependency between the two countries, since two-thirds of North Korea's exports are sent to China and more than 90 percent of its imports come from China ("Korea, North," 2023). China helps North Korea bypass sanctions in a number of ways, in part because of the countries' geographic proximity. A shared border also allows China to act as a third-party country, through which, using straw companies and mediators, North Korea can import from countries that have joined the boycott against it. These companies ostensibly import goods from China for personal or local use, but in practice, they transport them to North Korea. The shared border allows for smuggling of goods and gray trade, which has the blessing of officials on both sides of the border. North Korea also sells China fishing rights in its territorial waters (Watts, 2020).

Moreover, North Korea smuggles various types of weapons and military equipment to more than 30 nations, territories, and armed groups, in violation of various sanctions. Among the countries that receive North Korean weapons are Iran, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Myanmar, and Libya. African nations are among

Figure 2: Trade between North Korea and China, out of total North Korean international trade (in percent)



Source: Jobst, 2023

the most important of North Korea's export markets, some of which are themselves subject to sanctions and have neither the desire not the ability to enforce sanctions imposed by the UN (Young, 2021). North Korea also has extensive and long-term ties with some of these countries in the development of ballistic missiles. This trade allows North Korea to obtain foreign currency and thereby mitigate the impact of the sanctions—one of whose stated goals is to prevent it from obtaining foreign currency (Griffiths & Schroeder, 2020).

Another measure by North Korea in recent years is cyberattacks against financial institutions. There is evidence that North Korea has tried of late to attack banks and cryptocurrency exchanges, in an effort to steal foreign currency and virtual assets in other countries. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, in the past three years alone, North Korean hackers have stolen around $3 billion of cryptocurrency (McMillan & Volz, 2023). At the same time, using this fortune requires the assistance of intermediaries from other countries, so the total that North Korea actually earns from such activity could be far less (Rosenberg & Bhatiya, 2020).

A third method is to obscure the source of the money, transfer it physically, and use barter. To facilitate payment and money transfers, North Korea employs a number of methods. First, some of its trade is conducted in barter. Second, in some cases, money is transferred using couriers (who could also be diplomats representing the country). To transfer money via international financial systems, North Korea transfers money to the bank accounts of its embassies and diplomats, and sometimes their families; transfers money to front companies or to small banks that do not have the resources to fully investigate the source of the money; or transfers the money several times between banks in different countries to make it harder to track the source (Mallory, 2021).

In addition, North Korea takes advantage of the mobility and immunity of its diplomatic representatives to facilitate smuggling. Arms and other goods are smuggled with the significant help of North Korean diplomats wherever they might be stationed, and they act as intermediaries and sometimes even as smugglers. They play a key role in North Korea's smuggling operations, from the first approach to a potential client up to the relay of the goods, using their diplomatic immunity, which allows them far greater freedom of movement. To transport banned goods to Syria, for example—a country that it itself is under a sanctions regime and therefore is subject to far tighter supervision—documents needed to claim goods that were sent to the Syrian port of Latakia were sent to the North Korea embassy in Damascus, which sent its diplomats to the port to collect the goods. These same diplomats can also help smuggle the material for manufacturing weapons and the money from arms deals on civilian flights (Griffiths & Schroeder, 2020).

A fifth method used by North Korea to bypass sanctions is maritime smuggling, using various tactics to obscure information about the cargo and identity of the parties involved. These tactics include transferring cargo from one vessel to another in open seas (mainly with Russia and China) to conceal the origin of the goods. This

is the primary method used to smuggle oil into North Korea, alongside the use of flags of convenience, including the flags of Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Belize (Ministry of Defense, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, & Gavin Williamson, 2019). Another tactic is to deactivate or interfere with the vessel's automatic identification system (AIS) which transmits the identity, location, destination, and other information about the ship. Deactivating the AIS is a violation of the rules of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). While this tactic has been prevalent for arms smuggling for years, its use has expanded recently to other goods, including coal and oil to North Korea, and from there to other countries. Moreover, the North Korea Maritime Administration helps anyone under sanctions forge documents and maritime mobile service identities (MMSIs) (Trainer, 2019).

When North Korea uses its fleet of ships to smuggle weapons and other banned goods, it conceals these goods under large quantities of other goods. This technique helps hide contraband during inspections that take place outside the port, since it is impossible to examine the entire cargo. Similarly, North Korea does all it can to limit such inspections, by not allowing them on vessels carrying its flag. Without this permission, inspections cannot take place in international waters (Griffiths & Schroeder, 2020).

A sixth method is to establish shell companies or fronts and cooperative projects. In order to have access to the international financial system and allow maritime and aerial trade and commerce while using international cargo and logistics companies, especially when trading in arms and military equipment, North Korea uses fronts and shell companies in other countries (Mallory, 2021). Fronts are genuine companies and in some cases portions of their activity are totally legal, but they are also used as fronts for illegal activity and money laundering since they are not subject to sanctions and are not suspected of illegal activity. Straw companies are not engaged in any genuine business and exist only on paper (Kharon, 2022). North Korea has made widespread use of both these methods, sometimes camouflaging the activity using a number of such companies simultaneously. Similarly, North Korean companies establish joint ventures with foreign banks and companies based in China, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Panama, Russia, Singapore, and many other countries, and they are usually established with the help of private foreign actors. This is how the country manages to conceal its involvement in the supply chain and pay for goods. The assistance of foreign nationals is especially important in countries where the law stipulates that a local citizen must be a majority shareholder in a company (Hastings, 2022).

Finally, North Korea uses forged documents, concealment, and misinformation**.** It uses fake export licenses, consignment notes with inaccurate, vague, or partial descriptions of the goods—a particularly effective method when combined with maritime shipping of sealed containers (Griffiths & Schroeder, 2020)—as well as fake identities of businesspeople involved in the fronts and straw companies. Moreover, North Korea launders vessels that are under sanctions by changing the name, the IMO-registered number, and owner, thereby allowing the vessel to continue operating despite sanctions (O'Carroll et al., 2021). It also tries to conceal the trademarks and other identifying features of weapons that it smuggles, rebranding them with fake tags and painted parts, to make them harder to identify (Griffiths & Schroeder, 2020).

The Russian Case

Russia has been under sanctions since its 2014 invasion and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted another, unprecedented wave of sanctions against Moscow (Congressional Research Service, 2022), imposed by Western nations, under the leadership of the United States and European Union. These sanctions can be divided into several categories: trade and

investment limitations, financial restrictions, personal sanctions, sanctions against Russian institutions, and travel restrictions (Nikoladze & Donovan, 2023).

Since sanctions were imposed in 2014, and even more so since February 2022, Russia has adopted a variety of measures to lessen their impact, including advancing preparations for the possibility that sanctions would be imposed, studying the lessons from other target countries, like Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea, which have been under sanctions regimes for many years, and even imposing counter-sanctions.

Since sanctions were imposed in 2014, and even more so since February 2022, Russia has adopted a variety of measures to lessen their impact, including advancing preparations for the possibility that sanctions would be imposed, studying the lessons from other target countries, like Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea, which have been under sanctions regimes for many years, and even imposing counter-sanctions ("Factbox," 2022; Ridgwell, 2023). Some of the methods Russia uses to bypass sanctions are trade related and some are financial.

Methods of Bypassing Sanctions

In the area of commerce, three main methods are used to bypass sanctions: parallel imports; concealed origins of goods; and mitigated import and export regulations for alternative markets. The first two came as an immediate response to the unprecedented sanctions that were leveled on Russia after it invaded Ukraine in February 2022, while the final method developed gradually following the sanctions imposed after the 2014 invasion of Crimea and ripened during the current round of sanctions. From the start of the campaign in Ukraine, Russia has allowed what it calls "parallel imports," namely, the import of goods without the manufacturer's permission ("Russia and Sanctions Evasion," 2022). These imports usually arrive from a country that shares a border with the target country or via countries that serve as large commercial hubs (Lukaszuk, 2021). One of the primary methods of importing goods to Russia is via members of the Eurasian Economic Union—a regional economic organization of several post-Soviet states, including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. They act as third-party countries via which goods that are under sanctions can still be imported to Russia. For its exports, Russia uses, inter alia, the International North-South Transport Corridor, a multi-mode transport network that runs via Iran and Azerbaijan to India (Okumura, 2023). Any product that cannot be imported in one piece is imported as component parts, which are then assembled inside Russia (IntegrityRisk, 2022).

Similarly, concealing the origin of the goods and easing import laws are vital for maintaining Russia's economic power, given its massive reliance on energy exports. Oil is a critical component in the Russian economy, and before the war in Ukraine, more than one third of Russia's total exports were oil and oil-related products (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 2022). Given the huge importance of these exports for the Russian economy, Moscow examined several methods to circumvent the restrictions. When it comes to exports, there are more specific ways of evading sanctions on certain goods—and oil is among those products whose origins can be concealed. One way Russia uses is to mix its oil with oil produced elsewhere, creating a hybrid commonly referred to as "Lithuanian" or "Turkmen" blends, as long as the proportion of Russian oil in the blend is less than 50 percent. This ensures that the product is not technically Russian oil (IntegrityRisk, 2022). In order to facilitate parallel imports from a third-party country, Russia has relaxed the law banning the import of certain goods without the permission of the trademark holder (IntegrityRisk, 2022). In other cases, Russia has used fake certificates of origin to import goods that are under sanctions (Lukaszuk, 2021).

Russia also developed tactics of sanctions circumvention in a field of marine transportation. A key element in evading sanctions is learning from the experience of countries subject to sanctions. North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela have struggled for many years with sanctions that harm their international trade, which is usually transported by sea. Therefore, over the years, they developed tactics for camouflaging information about their vessels and their destination—tactics that have been adopted by Russia ("Russia and Sanctions Evasion," 2022). After the outbreak of the Ukraine war, there was an increase in the number of Russian ships that sailed without reporting their destination and disappeared from the maritime tracking system. For example, the Russian state-owned shipping company Sovcomflot, which is the subject of international sanctions, failed to provide destination information regarding around one third of the tankers in its fleet. In addition, there is also a practice whereby oil is transferred from one vessel to another in the open sea, to conceal the origin of the product (IntegrityRisk, 2022). Another method of covering traces is to fly a flag of convenience—the flags of countries like Panama, the Marshall Islands, and Liberia—which charge a small fee to register a vessel in their country and, more important, have far laxer standards than many other countries when it comes to inspections. In some cases, vessels have been known to fly the flag of such countries without any registration at all (MI News Network, 2023).

Another problem that Russia faces is its inability to insure the vessels transporting Russian oil that does not adhere to the price range dictated by the sanctions, which was designed to prevent their evasion. To deal with this problem, Russia set up a government-backed company of its own, and the country's central bank was forced to contribute around $4 billion toward the company (Braw, 2023; "Russia and Sanctions Evasion," 2022).

The three main Russian methods of evading sanctions were developed following the imposition of sanctions in response to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and were designed to prepare Russia for the day when it would have to deal with a wide-ranging wave of sanctions. The understanding that the 2014 sanctions were primarily imposed by Western states led Russia to the conclusion that its main preparations must focus on dealing with Western sanctions. Therefore, for the next eight years, Russia tried to build its "siege economy," which would be impervious to Western sanctions. First, Russia realized that in terms of international trade, it would have to find alternative markets to the Western nations that were liable to impose sanctions. Russia succeeded in finding export markets for what it considered strategic products, especially energy, and increase the scope of its exports to actors that it believed would not impose sanctions in case of armed conflict—countries like China and India. Russian exports to China, India, and Turkey grew significantly from the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and mitigated the impact of Western sanctions. The Turkish example is the most extreme since, within a single year, Turkish imports of Russian goods doubled—from $29 billion in 2021 to around $60 billion during the first year of the war (Kenez, 2023). The bulk of Russia's exports to Turkey is fuels, but it is joined by steel, iron, and grain.

The main goals of both the other tools that were developed after sanctions were imposed in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea are to ease the Russia's financial situation: reducing its use of the US dollar, since it is the currency that can be controlled by the United States; and developing alternatives to the SWIFT clearing system, which is under the control of Western states.

Reducing the use of the US dollar: Following the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, and even more so after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia tried to scale back the use of the US dollar in its international transactions and to increase the use of the ruble and the national currencies of the nations

with which it trades: India, China, and Iran. For example, the transaction for the sale of coal to an Indian company was made in Chinese yuan ("Russia and Sanctions Evasion," 2022). Indeed, in the year since the outbreak of the war, the Chinese yuan has become the most-used foreign currency in Russia (Bloomberg, 2023). However, the use of the ruble in transactions with other countries does not apply only to those countries that are not part of the sanctions regime. Even Western companies based in places like Germany and Italy, which purchase Russian gas, are forced to use the ruble to complete the transaction (Okumura, 2023). In some cases, the transaction is completed using the barter system. For example, in its trade with Syria, Russia was happy to barter grain for olive oil and vegetables ("Russia and Sanctions Evasion," 2022).

Similarly, since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, there has been a dramatic change in the attitude of Russian political and financial institutions to the use of cryptocurrency: efforts to limit its use yielded to regulations to govern the issue, due to the understanding that these currencies could be the answer to a variety of problems causes by financial sanctions, especially when it comes to individual sanctions (Ahari et al., 2022).

Alternatives to the SWIFT payment system: SWIFT plays a key role in the international financial system. It is the system used to relay information between various bodies, which facilitates financial transactions and is responsible for most of the international financial communication in the world. It is used by more than 11,000 banks and other financial institutions (Jones, 2022). After the imposition of sanctions in 2014, Russia created the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS), its own SWIFT alternative. Even though it has not garnered much popularity in other countries, Russia has tried to encourage its use, and especially since February 2022. Moreover, Russia also developed the National Payment Card System (NSPK), which provides payment services to anyone with an MIR card inside Russia. Therefore, this system provides a partial alternative to credit cards like Visa and Mastercard, whose use in Russia has been limited by the companies. Like with SPFS, Russia is trying to expand use of this system to other countries, especially countries that are popular destinations for Russian tourists (Mahmoudian, 2023). This element in sanctions evasion is highly important to Russia, both operationally and conceptually, since the West believes that denying a country access to SWIFT is a doomsday weapons that should not be used lightly. Indeed, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire described SWIFT as "the financial nuclear weapon" (Leali, 2022). Therefore, the establishment of mechanisms that allow a country to survive without access to SWIFT would go a long way to determining whether Russia would withstand the pressure of sanctions.

These sanction-evading tools have done much to mitigate the impact of economic sanctions against Russia. In the first few months of the sanctions, important international financial organizations, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the OECD, all believed that Russia's economy would shrink by up to 10 percent in 2022 and that 2023 would see GDP drop by another 3 percent. As shown in Figure 3, which is based on data from the International Monetary Fund in the second quarter of 2023, the economic shrinkage was far more moderate than predicted, and it now seems likely that 2023 will see GDP grow slightly, rather than shrink further. It appears that evading sanctions is a significant tool in Russia's toolbox for dealing with the unprecedented wave of sanctions imposed after its invasion of Ukraine.

The Iranian Case

Iran has been subject to a variety of sanctions since the late 1970s, and until sanctions were imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine, Iran was the target state with the largest

Figure 3: Fluctuation of Russian GDP (in percent)



Source: International Monetary Fund, 2023; GDP growth for 2023 is based on IMF forecast

number of sanctions imposed on it (Zandt, 2023). Over the course of the past few decades, and especially since the mid-1990s, different types of sanctions have been leveled on Iran by various states, including the United States, Canada, and Australia, as well as multilateral sanctions by international organizations like the United Nations and the European Union. These sanctions include restrictions on foreign trade, especially in the fields of energy and technology, financial services, a ban on insurance services, and travel restrictions (Laub, 2015; "Sanctions against Iran," n.d.). Iran represents an interesting case of an actor for whom sanctions are a recurring game. It takes advantage of the intervals between the waves of sanctions to prepare for the next sanction wave. This refers not only to how Iran has used these pauses to attract foreign investment and increase its foreign trade but also to the way it learns from one sanction campaign to the next how to reduce the ability of future sanctions to harm its economy. Moreover, it uses the breaks between sanctions to improve its various methods of evading sanctions.

Methods of Bypassing Sanctions

Over the years, Iran has developed a variety of methods to evade sanctions, and it continues to improve them in order to overcome the challenges sanctions pose to its economy.

Iran takes advantage of the intervals between the waves of sanctions to prepare for the next sanction wave. Moreover, it uses the breaks between sanctions to improve its various methods of evading sanctions.

The current sanctions campaign, imposed when the United States withdrew from the Iranian nuclear agreement in May 2018, is especially challenging, given that it also includes secondary sanctions. The US withdrew from the JCPOA unilaterally but imposed sanctions that barred American companies and citizens from engaging in commercial ties with Iran. However, these sanctions also apply indirectly to non-American companies, which are then forced to choose between trading with Iran and trading with the United States; those choosing the former will find it hard to conduct trade relations with the US. Therefore, the first measure that Iran undertook to evade sanctions of this kind is allowing businesspeople to obtain a second citizenship. Officially, Iran does not recognize dual citizenships, but in order to make it easier for businesspeople trying to evade sanctions by registering their companies in other countries, it unofficially allows them to obtain citizenship from tiny countries like St. Kitts and Nevis. Thereafter, they are entitled to open bank accounts and register companies

in these countries—that will subsequently serve as fronts for Iranian companies (Ajiri, 2018; Sharafedin & Lewis, 2018). This activity also enables Iranian businesspeople to work with companies that do business with the United States and who are concerned about American sanctions.

The second method is the sale of oil. The sanctions on Iran's energy sector harmed its ability to produce and sell oil. First, the lack of advanced technology and investment in infrastructure damaged its production capabilities. Second, the concern over American sanctions prevents Iran from exporting large quantities of oil when sanctions are in effect, something it has been able to do between waves of sanctions. Therefore, over the years Iran has lessened its dependence on oil and started to develop other areas to contribute to its economy and diversify its sources of income during periods of no sanctions, and particularly when sanctions are in effect. However, Iran has not given up on oil revenues, which still account for a significant share of its income. Thus in order to promote oil sales, affected by the sanctions, Iran offers improved terms for potential customers, including discounts on the oil itself and on maritime transportation. In addition, since international insurance companies refuse to insure Iranian oil cargo due to the sanctions, the Islamic Republic insures its own cargo (Dawi, 2023; "Iran Offers," 2018; Verma, 2013, 2018). China is the chief beneficiary of the generous terms that Iran offers and helps it to evade sanctions. In the first months of 2023, Iran exported around 1,000,000 barrels of oil to China every day (Bloomberg News, 2023). According to various estimates, China enjoys a 25-percent discount on the oil it imports from Iran.

Another method used by Iran, connected to oil but relevant to other goods as well, involves maritime transportation. Iran uses a number of methods in order to enable oil trade and its sea transportation. It uses its own vessels to transport purchased oil to the buyer since foreign maritime companies are reluctant to trade with Iran over fear of sanctions (Dagres & Slavin, 2018). These vessels use various means to disguise their identities, including deactivating location systems, changing the color of the vessel, and even altering its name. Iran also uses the technique of oil transfer from one vessel to another in the open sea (Karagyozova, 2021). This technique enabled Iran to make use of another way of smuggling oil: mixing Iranian oil with oil from Iraq. This way, Iran can conceal the origin of the oil and make it hard for governmental bodies to correctly identify Iranian oil (Lipin, 2022).

In one incident that came to light in March 2020, the Iranian-owned *Polaris 1* tanker transported Iranian refined oil to another tanker that was carrying Iraqi oil. The second tanker, the *Babel*, was operated at the time by Rhine Shipping DMCC, which is owned by a businessman from the United Arab Emirates—an Iraqi-born British citizen. However, the prevalent assumption is that Iran no longer uses this method in any significant manner since it is not profitable enough and has attracted too much attention (Lipin, 2022).

Another method that may be gaining greater use of late is forging AIS data. Iran has equipped its tankers with devices that falsify AIS signals, sending out inaccurate data regarding the location of the vessel, to make it harder to track. Some argue that currently, this method is used to export most of Iran's oil (Lipin, 2022). Forged AIS signals, accompanied by false cargo documents, allows Iran to claim that the oil is actually from Iraq, freeing it of the need to actually transfer the oil from one vessel to another in the open sea (Lipin, 2022). In this context, Iran makes widespread use of forged documents to conceal the origin of the product in question (Office of Foreign Assets Control, 2020).

A fourth method used to evade sanctions is front companies, banks, and investments. Iran makes widespread use of a network of front companies—located, inter alia, in China, Iraq,

Lichtenstein, and the United Arab Emirates—to facilitate the import and export of various goods and to transfer money. In some cases, this also involves the assistance of nations from these countries, who act as business partners and allow to open companies in their names. This network is used to open bank accounts for Iranian companies, which enables them to sell their products to foreign companies. In addition, Iranian importers use these funds to pay for goods. For example, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) opened many companies in Georgia under the name of local Georgian business partners ("NEWS," 2023; Dagres & Slavin, 2018; Hamad, 2022).

Another method is investing in foreign companies in order to influence their activity. For instance, Iran's Foreign Investment Company invests in companies in various countries to ensure access to vital products like medical equipment and medicine, technology, and services. For example, the company invested $3 million in the purchase of a bankrupt pharmaceutical factory in France, to secure the access to medicine against infectious diseases (Dagres & Slavin, 2018). In other cases, to import goods, Iran relies on the assistance of intermediaries with citizenship in the United Arab Emirates and Iraq. The intermediaries buy products in those countries and then smuggle them into Iran (Dagres & Slavin, 2018).

The final method, which has become very relevant of late, is the increasing use of cryptocurrency. The current sanctions regime has impinged severely on Iran's ability to use the US dollar, which is the primary currency in the international economic system. The financial sanctions imposed on Iran also severely impact the value of the rial, and the current wave of sanctions sent the Iranian currency tumbling to a historic low versus the US dollar ("Iran's Currency," 2023). As a result, , several months after the imposition of the current round of sanctions in 2018, the Iranian regime officially recognized the mining of cryptocurrency in 2019. All Iranians involved in this activity were required to identify and register themselves, pay for electricity used for mining, which uses a lot of energy, and sell their reserves of Bitcoin to the Iranian central bank. In addition, in August 2022, the Iranian government approved the use of cryptocurrency to pay for imports (Iddon, 2022). The global rise in the use of these currencies has been highly beneficial for Iran and came at the perfect time to help it evade secondary sanctions, since the difficulty in identifying the parties to this exchange helps private individuals engage in trade with Iran without fear.

in an age when information flows freely and easily from one place to another, states have been increasingly capable of dealing with sanctions. The ability of various actors to learn from experience, and even to consult in real time with other states, has enhanced these sanction-evading methods even more.

Conclusions

Since nations started to use the sanctions weapon with greater frequency in the 20th century, there has been more recourse to various ways and means to evade them. Moreover, in an age when information flows freely and easily from one place to another, states have been increasingly capable of dealing with sanctions. The ability of various actors to learn from experience, and even to consult in real time with other states, has enhanced these sanction-evading methods even more. There are, therefore, three main insights that can be drawn for any actors interested in using economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool to achieve political goals:

Insight 1: Attempt to harm the key trade partners of countries trying to evade sanctions. One pattern of behavior that repeats itself, as can be seen from the case studies, is the use of trade alternatives to evade sanctions. Whether these alternatives are in the form of countries that had extensive commercial ties with the target country before sanctions were imposed

but did not join the campaign, or whether they were countries that became an alternative only because of the sanctions, efforts to neutralize these alternatives should be one of the focuses of the campaign. Diplomatic outreach to the relevant actors is vital in order to ensure that the target country suffers significant economic contraction, which could limit its ability to survive the sanctions. These efforts could be the classic carrot-and-stick approach: on the one hand, promising economic incentives to those countries that trade with the target country and, at the same time, imposing economic sanctions on any company from a country that is being used as a trade alternative. The stick, in this case, is known in professional jargon as secondary sanctions. In the case of Russia, for example, this could mean that any Turkish or Indian company doing business with Russia would be susceptible to European or American sanctions and would not, therefore, be able to do business with the West. Note that in all three of the case studies discussed above, it is clear that the economic ties that were forged with China represented a lifeline for those target countries. China is not just another country helping evade sanctions; it is the second largest economy in the world and its contribution to sanctions evasion cannot be understated. Therefore, having China join sanctions campaigns is vital if they are to succeed.

Insight 2: Develop mechanisms to help thwart sanctions evasion. Evading sanctions by trading with other countries is an important weapon; however, the arsenal target states possess is very varied. Therefore, countries imposing sanctions should coordinate closely to identify the possible loopholes in their sanctions. These mechanisms must focus on the cybersphere, which would facilitate the enforcement of sanctions by identifying forgeries, such as false certificates of origin, tracking transportation of goods, use of cryptocurrency, and creation of mechanisms that can severely restrict the target country's ability to engage in the financial markets.

Insight 3: Countries imposing sanctions must recognize the many limitations of this tool. Even if they manage to recruit the main trading partners of the target country and even if they develop methods of thwarting efforts to evade sanctions, the target country will always prefer to find new ways of evading sanctions than to give in to them. Recognizing the limitations of sanctions as a tool is vital both for decision makers, who must see things as they are, and for the public in those countries imposing sanctions, which could erroneously expect immediate results.

There is nothing unique about the way that North Korea, Iran, and Russia evade sanctions. The methods that they use have become the modus operandi for any country that has been subjected to sanctions, but this does not mean that sanctions evasion is a huge success that prevents any damage to the target country's economy. In the cases of Russia and Iran, and even more so in the case of North Korea, sanctions have had a dire economic effect. At the same time, recourse to methods of evasion helps to mitigate the economic impact. It seems that the more sophisticated the methods of evading sanctions become, the more they provide a corresponding explanation of the relatively low success rate of sanctions in achieving their goals.

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Notes

1 Articles on State Responsibility (ASR) is a document that details international law regarding a state's responsibility when it comes to violating international obligations, which was adopted by the UN'S International Law Commission.

Israel and the Palestinian Dilemma: Strengthening the Palestinian Authority or Containing Hamas

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In the reality of the zero-sum game between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA), a strong Hamas and a strong PA cannot coexist. The weakness of the PA alongside a strengthened Hamas, compounded by the erosion of deterrence against Hezbollah and Iran and the increased likelihood of a multi-front conflict, poses a strategic dilemma for Israel. Israel must define its strategic goal vis-à-vis the Palestinian arena, and consider whether there is any value to a formative military move against Hamas that is not part of a broader political plan. Weakened military capabilities would significantly reduce the challenge Hamas poses to the PA that accelerates its weakening, and remove an obstacle to effective moves to strengthen the PA. A weakened Hamas would also loosen the Gordian knot between the various arenas that Hamas seeks to tighten, and presumably also strengthen Israeli deterrence in the region. Under the existing political conditions, the current Israeli government is unlikely to agree on the need to strengthen the PA, or at least stop weakening it. Therefore, the government does not face a strategic dilemma on taking proactive steps to strengthen the PA, even though the PA's weakness harms Israeli interests: a move of this magnitude can only be led by a national unity government with broad public backing. At the same time, the status of the Palestinian Authority is so shaky and problematic that it is doubtful it can be restored under the existing conditions.

Keywords: Palestinian Authority, Hamas, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, national security, IDF, Gaza Strip, strategy

Background

Over the last three decades, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has posed a political and security challenge to the State of Israel. In Israeli eyes, the establishment of the PA, pursuant to the Oslo Accords, was intended to ensure a political separation between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

in order to curb the threat of a binational state, improve the security reality, eliminate the burden of managing the daily life of the Palestinian population, and enhance Israel's regional positioning as a platform for additional peace and normalization agreements. While the Israeli mainstream has seen the PA as an autonomous entity that is less than a state, for the Palestinians, the PA was another step en route to an independent state.

Thus, while Israel hoped that the PA would improve Israel's security and advance its future as a Jewish and democratic state within recognized, defensible borders, and concomitantly fulfill Palestinian national aspirations, even if partially, the Palestinians saw the PA as an interim stage. This, they believed, would be followed by the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, with the Palestinian leadership presenting the move as a historic concession by the Palestinians that settled for 22 percent of Palestine's territory. However, the rhetoric from Yasir Arafat, Faisal Husseini, and others that insisted on the historical narrative, institutional incitement, and the delegitimization of the existence of a Jewish nation state challenged the genuineness of intended historical concession.

The Weakness of the Palestinian Authority

Despite the hopes of many, almost three decades after the establishment of the PA and after a series of failed negotiations and policy initiatives, the Israeli-Palestinian political process has reached an impasse. Each side believes that time is working in its favor, lacks serious incentives to "go the extra mile" toward a permanent agreement, and does not have the political ability to lead significant moves based on historical compromises. At the same time, and for reasons stemming inter alia from the political impasse, the split between Hamas and Fatah, along with Israel's policy of differentiation between the two Palestinian entities while containing Hamas, the PA, which is charged with managing the daily lives of the Palestinian population in the West Bank, is losing its power, public status, and public legitimacy. Furthermore, the PA is challenged by Hamas, which has established its control over the Gaza Strip and strives to undermine security stability in and from the West Bank, and is working to wrest control from the PA and push Fatah out of positions of influence. Thus beyond the historical reasons behind the current reality, which must be Israel's starting point for recalculating its route, It seems that the PA, under the leadership of Abu Mazen, is in the most severe situation since the days of the second intifada and on a path of ongoing decline that may end in its collapse.

It seems that the PA, under the leadership of Abu Mazen, is in the most severe situation since the days of the second intifada and on a path of ongoing decline that may end in its collapse.

First, from a security point of view, the PA and its security apparatuses do not control parts of the territory under their responsibility, as local organizations, alongside the known terrorist organizations, manage to expand their ranks and terrorist infrastructures for the purpose of launching terrorist attacks against the IDF and Israeli civilians in the West Bank and in Israel. Any attempt to pin the reasons for this on the Israeli military operations in Area A or on the composition of the current Israeli government falls short, because the PA's weakness in the northern districts, particularly the Jenin district, is in fact a reality that has evolved over at least two years. Rather, the reasons stem from the makeup of the Palestinian security apparatuses, which continue to be based on regional and tribal loyalties. This situation impairs the functional ability of many of the PA security personnel, who are forced to act against family members and neighbors. In addition, experience shows that Palestinian terrorism does not

erupt only due to economic circumstances, as it is characterized by national and religious reasons and those related to a loss of trust in the existing leadership. Thus, the administrative and security vacuum created by the PA in the northern districts of the West Bank, with an emphasis on the Jenin area, has allowed the terrorist organizations and local armed groups to continue operating. All these underscore that the reality in the PA points to clear symptoms of state failure, as evident in failing Middle East states after the Arab upheaval.

Second, the legitimacy of the PA under the leadership of Abu Mazen is at a low point in Palestinian public opinion. His continued resistance to terrorism and support for security cooperation is seen as irrelevant, not serving or promoting the Palestinian interest, and therefore illegitimate. A June 2023 PCPSR poll indicates that the majority of the Palestinian public believe that the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people (63 percent vs. 33 percent), and is dissatisfied with Abu Mazen's performance (80 percent vs. 17 percent), yet no popular or political act to depose him from power is evident. Furthermore, the majority of the Palestinian public believe that the PA's dissolution is in the interest of the Palestinian people (50 percent vs. 46 percent), and that its survival is in Israel's interest (63 percent vs. 34 percent). In addition, the Palestinian public supports the establishment of groups such as Lion's Den that are not under the control of the PA (71 percent vs. 23 percent) and opposes the PA's call for their disarmament (80 percent vs. 16 percent). These results illustrate that the Palestinian public spurns the PA and sees it as an Israeli instrument to perpetuate the occupation. In turn, it perceives the armed organizations and the armed struggle, and not the PA and the process of negotiations, as an instrument to continue the struggle against the occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state. (The mirror effect can also be identified on the Israeli side, with the majority of the public believing that the PA is no longer a partner and that if a Palestinian state is established, it will become a terrorist state hostile to Israel.) In fact, the lack of trust in the PA runs deep, and most of the Palestinian public estimate that a third intifada will break out (51 percent vs. 46 percent), even though the majority believe that the PA's security forces will not participate (62 percent vs. 33 percent). The Palestinian public does not put its trust in external aid and believes that salvation will not come from the PA, nor from Arab countries, and certainly not from the Biden administration. Therefore, it seems that the Palestinian public understands that its fate is in its hands.

Third, while a political process is not on the horizon, the Palestinian public has radicalized its positions, and moved away from concepts related to the two-state solution and a political process with Israel (and here, too, a mirror effect can be identified among the Israeli public). The June PCPSR poll indicates that the majority of the Palestinian public oppose the two-state solution (70 percent vs. 28 percent) and believe it is not achievable (71 percent vs. 28 percent). Moreover, 52 percent of the Palestinian public believe that armed resistance is the preferred course of action to fulfill Palestinian national aspirations, compared to only 21 percent that assert that action should be taken through political negotiations. The corollary is that the majority of the Palestinian public support terrorist attacks inside Israel against civilians (57 percent vs. 38 percent). The narrative of the armed resistance is also fed by indoctrination and socialization processes led by the PA within the educational curriculum, in the systematic incitement by Palestinian leaders through the media, in mosque sermons, and in payment to security prisoners and the families of terrorists who became "martyrs" and Palestinian national symbols.

At the same time, the terrorist campaign in Israel since March 2022 and the continuation of Operation Break the Wave, which began in May 2022, also feed the narrative of the armed resistance and create a reality of ongoing and increasing friction, which in turn leads to a

high number of casualties on the Palestinian side. This terror campaign spurs more activity, and expands with the addition of many young people, who have long since lost their faith in the PA, reject the existing order, and seek to change it through armed resistance based on local organizations, which are not necessarily associated with the recognized Palestinian terrorist organizations but are certainly supported by them. The daily friction produces new Palestinian heroes every day who become national symbols, fueling the level of motivation of more young people to join the circle of terror and resistance. As a result, after a year in which Israel has been subject to the terror campaign, the number of Palestinians who take part in it has only increased, their motivation level has risen, the scope of terrorism has expanded, and the scope of activity of the Israeli security forces has grown. Thus, the security reality becomes more complex and dangerous, and the chance of widespread escalation is higher.

Significance of PA Weakness

The emergent picture, including the growing sense among Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran that Israel is weak and at a breaking point, and that it is possible to act against it from several fronts simultaneously, is that the likelihood of a multi-arena and large-scale violent outbreak that poses a significant challenge to Israel's national security has increased.

The ongoing weakening of the PA and its limited ability to control the escalation on the ground invite the question as to the degree of influence that a stronger PA could have, with the common assumption in the Israeli security establishment that a stronger and functioning PA serves the Israeli interest and contributes to calm and security stability. Assuming that a strong PA can help reduce the violence and curb the deterioration, the question is, how can the PA be strengthened, and how can or should Israel contribute to such a move? Alternatively, if strengthening the PA is not a viable option in the current reality, both for Israeli internal political reasons and for those related to the Palestinian arena and its leadership, and on the assumption that the continued weakening of the PA will accelerate the security deterioration, Israel must examine ways to prevent further weakening of the PA or choose to make a unilateral move with the support of the US.

In order to prevent the collapse of the PA, it is often said that Israel must act to strengthen it and take steps that help restore its security apparatuses and cultivate the Palestinian economy.

To the security echelon as well as the mainstream of the political echelon under the leadership of the Prime Minister Netanyahu, Israel has a clear interest in a strong and functioning PA, which can govern effectively, meet the needs of the local population, work to eradicate terrorism, deepen security cooperation, and adhere to dialogue and the pursuit of a political settlement. On the other hand, in the current Israeli right-wing government there are elements that do not see a functioning and strong PA as a strategic need for Israel. Rather, they act and exert political pressure while encouraging initiatives on the ground to deepen Israel's hold on Area C and change the status quo in Jerusalem; in tandem, they demand more vigorous and forceful activity against Palestinian terrorism and the PA, which in their eyes is a supporter of terrorism. They believe the escalation and exacerbated tension will heighten the chaos in the territories and the process of the PA's weakening, in a way that will establish the justification for the expansion of Israeli settlement and lead to and even require an Israeli takeover of the West Bank that will obviate any chance of a political agreement.

In order to prevent the collapse of the PA, it is often said that Israel must act to strengthen it and take steps that help restore its security apparatuses and cultivate the Palestinian economy. However, Israel and the Palestinian leadership do not see eye to eye on the meaning

of a strong PA. While the Israeli emphasis is on the functioning of the PA and its adherence to a political process based on direct negotiations with Israel, the Palestinian leadership seeks a strong PA not only for the purposes of improved performance, but for the purpose of tightening political and civil control under conditions of lack of legitimacy. In other words, the goal is to preserve the existing power structure with a clear preference for the current leaders and their associates, and to improve capabilities and influence in the international arena to maximize the effectiveness of the internationalization strategy. This, in complete contrast to Israel's perception, is defined in their eyes as a legitimate and preferred strategy that is not violent or interpreted as support for terrorism. Currently, as Hamas, backed by Hezbollah and Iran, challenges the PA and Israel, improves its terrorist capabilities, tightens its grip on the PA territories, and encourages using the Temple Mount as a time bomb that foments multi-arena escalation, the question of strengthening the PA becomes more complex and necessarily caught up in Israel's policy toward Hamas. That is, any Israeli move to strengthen the PA must begin with a significant weakening of Hamas, because the idea of strengthening the PA, which in turn will lead to the weakening of Hamas, is no longer valid under the existing difficult circumstances. Weakening Hamas entails a tailored military move that must serve a broader political purpose and lead to the return of the PA to effective control in all its districts, inter alia, through the strengthening of PA's security forces in training processes in Jordan in the spirit of the agreements at the Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh conferences; the return of the PA to the Gaza Strip; reconstruction of the Gaza Strip as an expansion and additional component of the Abraham Accords, while mobilizing the leading partners in the Arab world; reconnection of the Gaza Strip to the West Bank; and amendment of the Paris Protocol to improve the PA's financial capabilities. All this should occur within the framework of renewing the political process with the Palestinians.

Hamas's political strength does not rest only on its ideology, nor only on the negative sentiment toward the PA. The source of Hamas's strength is its military capabilities, its full control of the Gaza Strip thanks to its military power, and its cooperation infrastructure with Iran and Hezbollah, which allows it to advance its military buildup in the West Bank, launch and operate the terrorist infrastructures, undermine the security reality, and undermine the stature of the PA. The leadership of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and beyond demonstrates self-confidence bordering on arrogance, and works to implement the organizational strategy without substantive Israeli interference. Israel, for its part, continues to act against the Gaza Strip under the logic of containment and refrains from overly harsh moves and responses in order not to undermine the security reality vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip, and avoids targeting Hamas leaders abroad, with an emphasis on Saleh al-Arouri. Overall, its moves against Hamas are characterized by a contained and moderate reactivity.

The Israeli Dilemma

The weakness of the PA as Hamas is strengthened—and given a certain erosion of deterrence against Hezbollah and Iran and an increased likelihood of a multi-front conflict—confronts Israel with a strategic dilemma. The existing reality between Hamas and the PA, which is controlled by Fatah, is that of a zero-sum game, i.e., it is not possible to have a strong PA along with a strong Hamas. Weakening Hamas means damaging its military assets and infrastructure. In order to realize this goal, Israel must redefine its strategic purpose vis-à-vis the Palestinian arena and, as such, the strategy of action vis-à-vis Hamas, namely, to inflict severe and continuous damage to Hamas's military capabilities and obstruct reconstruction and re-intensification efforts. This means a military confrontation against Hamas in the form of extensive activity in the

Gaza Strip and against the Hamas leadership abroad, which must be led to feel insecure and pursued. Such a strategic choice has a price, and early preparation is required for the Israeli home front and for other arenas in the event of escalation and participation by other actors who seek to demonstrate solidarity with Hamas or take advantage of the opportunity, as well as for the regional and international arenas. Above all, however, it is imperative that there be a decision regarding the strategic goal that Israel seeks to reach vis-à-vis the Palestinian arena, and it must be examined whether there is any significance to a formative military move against Hamas that is not part of a broader and more comprehensive political plan. In any case, harming Hamas's military capabilities will significantly reduce the challenge posed to the PA and the process of its weakening, remove an obstacle to moves to strengthen it, and loosen the Gordian knot between the various arenas that Hamas seeks to tighten around Israel, and it is likely that this will also strengthen Israeli deterrence in the region.

Moreover, even if Prime Minister Netanyahu succeeds in suppressing the opposition by the more extreme elements and convinces the Israeli government that realizing the Israeli interest of a strong and functioning PA requires proactive moves, Israel will be required to address the following questions:

a. How can the PA be restored by force to have full control of the Gaza Strip?
b. How can the framework of the Abraham Accords be expanded and a partnership established with important Arab countries to lead a significant reconstruction project for the Gaza Strip?
c. Is it correct to make the operation conditional on agreement ahead of time for postoperative construction that is not conditional on a prisoner deal (if Hamas will not agree to release prisoners and bodies of fallen soldiers without a significant release of prisoners)?
d. Will strengthening the PA make it a more dangerous adversary due to Israeli, Arab, and international support, which will bolster the Palestinian internationalization strategy and deepen the political impasse, with the responsibility placed on Israel?
e. How can the risk be reduced that strengthening the PA will be interpreted as the work of "political engineering" (interference in Palestinian internal politics and succession struggles), which will lead to its weakening when perceived by the Palestinian public as cooperating with Israel and perpetuating the occupation?
f. Assuming that in exchange for the effort to strengthen it Israel succeeds in influencing the PA to return to the political process, what is Israel's strategic objective and the goal defined for the political process, and what will be the implications in case of another failure? In addition, will Israel be able to mobilize regional and international support (mainly United States) for the Israeli goals of the political process?
g. In the absence of a chance for a breakthrough that would advance Israel's strategic goals, and given the slim chances of significantly improving the PA's situation, is it more appropriate for Israel to invest effort in an independent/unilateral move in the spirit of the Trump peace plan?

Under the existing political conditions, it is unlikely that the Israeli government will come to an internal agreement regarding the need to strengthen the PA, or at least stop working to weaken it. Hence, the current government is not standing on the horns of a strategic dilemma when it comes to proactive steps to strengthen the PA, even though PA weakness harms Israeli interests. Practically, a move of this magnitude can only be led by a national unity government with broad public backing. However, the PA's current position is so shaky and problematic that it is doubtful it can be restored under the existing conditions.

Any move to strengthen the PA as part of a broad strategic purpose, which is to renew the political process, must begin by weakening Hamas and changing the deterrence equation against it.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Under the conditions of the developing multi-arena conflict, even if currently it is essentially Palestinian and Iran only provides the inspiration and authorization, and while it is clear that Hamas is getting stronger while the Israeli deterrence toward it is weakening, any move to strengthen the PA as part of a broad strategic purpose, which is to renew the political process, must begin by weakening Hamas and changing the deterrence equation against it. Moreover, in order to guarantee the success of the moves to strengthen the PA, Israel must return the Palestinian arena to the reality of before Operation Break the Wave, suppress the terror campaign, and dismantle its infrastructure. For this purpose, rethinking the action strategy is required, as the strategy that Israel has adhered to since May 2022 has not been able to effect the desired strategic impact. In practice, the terror campaign against Israel has not weakened, the circles of terror have expanded both in terms of the scope of activity and the number of active participants, the level of motivation has not declined, and the narrative of armed resistance has gained increasing support from the Palestinian public.

The possibility of a multi-arena conflict, set in motion by Iran, underscores Israel's need for a calm Palestinian arena that is less enthusiastic about joining such a conflict. A stronger PA can certainly be an important and helpful factor for this purpose. However, when the uncertainty is high, Israel cannot design an effective strategy to strengthen the PA on its own, without a defined political objective that shapes a military move to the same end, and without producing a relevant response to strengthen deterrence against Hezbollah and to weaken Iranian inspiration and support. In order to minimize risks, Israel must find a way to mobilize and engage the support of the important Arab countries and the international community, with an emphasis on the United States. In practice, only a national unity government can make a comprehensive move of this kind. If Israel cannot successfully implement such an effort, it would do well to consider a unilateral move that requires a broad public consensus, which can only be achieved through a government of national unity. Only an Israeli national unity government will be able to make difficult, effective decisions and implement them successfully.

In conclusion, a strong and functioning PA is in Israel's interest. However, strengthening the PA cannot comprise free handouts or hollow rhetoric. It must include the weakening of Hamas and the launch of a political process. Terrorism should be fought in every way, with Hamas weakened on a large-scale platform. Yet these operational achievements must not be realized without a broader strategic framework, which includes the political effort to prevent the slide into a one-state reality.

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Nationalism and Turkish Foreign Policy Following the May 2023 Elections

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An analysis of the results of Turkey's May 2023 elections reveals that alongside President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's victory in the second round of the presidential elections, nationalist forces earned greater representation in the Turkish parliament. Since 2015 Erdogan and his party have been in a coalition with the party that represents Turkish ultranationalism—the National Movement Party. In parallel, there has been a general rise in nationalist sentiment in Turkish political discourse, in part due to the renewal of the armed conflict with the Kurds and the increased weight of the Syrian refugee issue in Turkey. In light of the close race before the latest elections, an effort was made among both the governing coalition and the opposition to pursue every vote, which led to the political strengthening of figures with ultranationalist positions. After the elections, Erdogan established a government that comprises primarily technocrats, and this serves as a moderating factor. Nevertheless, at any stage he will be able to appoint other figures who reflect the strengthening of the ultranationalist element of Turkish foreign policy.

Keywords: Turkey, Erdogan, Kurds, nationalism, ultranationalism, Turkey 2023—centenary

Introduction

On May 28, 2023, the incumbent Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, won the presidential elections, earning another five-year term in office. Erdogan will enjoy a relatively large amount of leeway, not only because much power is concentrated in the Turkish presidency, but also because the coalition that supports him enjoys a majority in the parliament. Aside from the personal victory of the incumbent, the elections in Turkey illustrated the power of national sentiment in Turkish society and its political influence. This is despite the fact that most commentators presumed that the decisive factor in the elections would be the serious economic crisis in Turkey, which in October 2022 led to an annual inflation rate of 85 percent in Turkey (unofficial estimates mentioned an inflation rate twice as high) and a devaluation of the Turkish lira, which dropped by 77 percent against the dollar over the five preceding years.

The results of the parliamentary and presidential elections indicated the strength of Turkish nationalism in several ways. First, the National Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP), which represents Turkish ultranationalism in the political system, received more votes than expected. The MHP, which made an alliance with Erdogan in 2015

and since then has supported him, was seen in the months preceding the elections as a party with weakening power. Polls predicted the party would suffer an electoral blow, and many experts assumed that the decision by the Turkish parliament in March 2022 to lower the electoral threshold from 10 percent to 7 percent stemmed from Erdogan's desire to ensure that his weakened ultranationalist ally would get into parliament. Ultimately, the MHP received more than 10 percent of the vote, and maintained its strength in parliament. The Good Party (İyi parti), which was established by MHP supporters who objected to the changes that Erdogan made to the system of government in Turkey in 2017 and is also identified with the Turkish nationalist movement, received almost 10 percent of the vote. In addition, many politicians who put nationalism at the core of their political activities are members of the various parties in parliament. Thus, nationalist voices will receive broad representation in the Turkish parliament in the next five years.

When Erdogan came to power in 2003, he presented himself as a leader who aspired to amend Turkish politics and limit the power of the security establishment in the political system.

Another sign of the growing influence of nationalist Turkish sentiments in the political system was the success of ultranationalist candidate Sinan Ogan in the first round of the presidential elections, in which he received 5 percent of the vote—much more than expected. This result for a candidate who had adopted an extreme nationalist stance proved the strength of nationalist sentiment among Turkish voters. In the two weeks between the two rounds of the elections, Erdogan and the opposition candidate in the presidential elections, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, invested great effort to persuade Ogan and his voters to support them. Prior to the second round, Ogan declared his support for Erdogan.

The change in Kilicdaroglu's tone in the lead-up to the second round of the presidential elections can also be considered evidence of the growing power of Turkish ultranationalists in these elections. The opposition candidate, who until the first round tried to mobilize supporters through a unifying narrative, identified the need to take into greater consideration the nationalist sentiments of the Turkish population, in light of the results of the first round. He changed his campaign tactic and emphasized his desire to take action against the Syrian refugees located in Turkey. Thus, the campaign between the two rounds of the elections appeared to be a competition between the two candidates over who was more nationalist. Clearly, then, the Turkish political reality following the May elections is an opportunity for ultranationalist elements in Turkey.

The Roots of Turkish Nationalism and its Manifestation since Erdogan's Rise to Power

Turkish nationalism has been a central phenomenon in the country's political life since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Republic, aspired to build a nation-state out of the ruins of the multinational Ottoman Empire, and defined nationalism as one of the six principles of the revolution that he headed. Repeated praise in the public discourse of the Turkish nation and a denial of any identity competing with Turkish national identity—both religious identities and ethnic identities, especially Kurdish identity—underscored the principle. Since then, Turkish nationalism has become an integral part of the political system in Turkey. Over the years, Turkish politicians have made efforts to prove their loyalty to the nationalist idea, and frequently leveraged national sentiment among the population to mobilize support. Following the military coup in 1980, Turkish nationalism was also strengthened by the Turkish military, which emphasized it to unify Turkish society

around a shared identity, at a time when intra-Turkish conflicts created internal chaos.

When Erdogan came to power in 2003, he presented himself as a leader who aspired to amend Turkish politics and limit the power of the security establishment in the political system. In part this involved adopting a more flexible version of Turkish nationalism. Erdogan placed a greater emphasis on Islam as identity, which enabled him, inter alia, to back away from the rigid approach toward the Kurdish minority that had characterized the previous decades. In the first few years of Erdogan's rule, the Kurds received a series of symbolic rights that enabled greater visibility of Kurdish culture in Turkish society. Erdogan also launched a process of negotiation with the Kurdish underground, at first covertly and later openly, which was presented as a way to end the ethnic conflict in Turkey.

But in 2015 the Turkish President changed his approach regarding the utility of talks with the Kurdish minority, after he did not receive a majority in the parliamentary elections, in part because Kurdish voters preferred to vote for the pro-Kurdish party and not for Erdogan's party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP). Following his failure to mobilize the Kurdish population in his favor, the Turkish President turned his back on these sections of society and looked to ultranationalist voters. He adopted a rigid nationalist line and renewed the war on Kurdish terrorism, and the Turkish authorities began to persecute Kurdish politicians. This new stance also enabled Erdogan to form an alliance with the MHP and to ensure a parliamentary majority. Erdogan made Turkish nationalism in its rigid form the heart of his narrative. This posture also influenced the Turkish government and the apparatuses connected with it, including the education system and the media, which is controlled primarily by the state or by figures associated with the regime. The war on the Kurdish underground, which spilled over into northern Iraq and northern Syria, and the ensuing losses suffered by the Turkish military, have also restored a militaristic version of Turkish nationalism in the public discourse.

Also contributing to the strengthened nationalist forces in Turkey in recent years is the issue of the Syrian refugees. In the first few years of the civil war in Syria, Erdogan and his government opened Turkey's gates to Syrian refugees, presenting it as an act that demonstrated the Turkish nation's Muslim solidarity. Since then, according to official numbers, Turkey has hosted 3.6 million Syrian refugees on its soil. The Turkish military entry into northern Syria and the economic crisis in Turkey, which has intensified since 2018, have negatively affected attitudes toward these refugees in Turkey. While Turkish soldiers are fighting on Syrian soil, many in Turkey accuse the Syrians of cowardice for having fled their country instead of fighting for it. Furthermore, the patience of many Turkish citizens toward the Syrian refugees has declined in parallel with the deterioration of economic conditions in Turkey. The Syrian refugees are blamed for enabling the development of a black economy that harms Turkish workers, and many deplore the benefits that the Syrians receive from the government while Turkish citizens are suffering.

Sentiments against the Syrian refugees have been expressed in various ways. First, the change in attitude toward the Syrians has strengthened Turkish nationalism. The refugees have stopped being seen as fellow Muslim brethren and have been presented more and more as "foreigners." Demonstrations against the refugees, sometimes violent, have been held throughout Turkey, and opposition to their presence on Turkish soil has also influenced the political system in the country. In the 2019 municipal elections, Erdogan and his coalition suffered defeats in the big cities, where the numbers of Syrian refugees are highest. This caused the opposition to harden its tone on the issue; some of the new mayors took determined action against the refugees, and Turkish leaders also changed their narrative,

with new promises that the refugees would be returned to Syria. In addition, in 2021 a new ultranationalist party, the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi—ZP) was established and boosted by the continued attacks against the Syrian refugees, which in turn exerted pressure on the entire Turkish political system.

In the background of the 2023 election campaign, therefore, Turkish nationalism, an important phenomenon throughout the history of Turkey, was even stronger than in other periods. This situation posed different challenges to the candidates. On the one hand, Erdogan suffered harsh criticism from the opposition, which presented him as liable for the unwanted presence of the Syrian refugees. On the other hand, he and his allies based their campaign on identity politics, with an ultranationalist tone and accusations against the opposition that it is supported by foreign forces and by Kurdish terrorism; Erdogan tried to position himself as safeguarding the Turkish nation.

Kemal Kilicdaroglu faced a different dilemma. The opposition's candidate was aware that he had to appeal to the country's conservative-nationalist population in order to win, especially after the results of the first round illustrated the power of national sentiment. However, the opposition's victory was unattainable without the support of Kurdish voters, particularly at a time when Kurdish national sentiment in Turkey had also strengthened in response to political developments in recent years. Kilicdaroglu did his best to find a way to cope with these conflicting developments. He relied on his alliance with the Good Party in order to persuade nationalists who opposed Erdogan, and benefited from the fact that the pro-Kurdish party did not put forward a candidate of its own and supported him, without forming an official alliance. Between the two rounds of elections he focused his nationalist narrative against the Syrian refugees in order to win the support of the conservative population without alienating the Kurdish population. This tactic, however, failed, evidenced by the defeat at the ballot box and a decline in support for the opposition's candidate in Kurdish regions between the first and second rounds, and decreased mobilization of Kurdish voters. Furthermore, the elections proved that the economic promises or the more positive discourse that Kilicdaroglu tried to promote had less of an impact on voters than Erdogan's ultranationalist speeches.

In the reality following the May elections, the awakening of nationalist sentiment in Turkey will continue to influence the entire Turkish political system. With a record presence of ultranationalist representatives in parliament, the government will find it easier to pass laws based on an nationalist line. In addition, despite his victory, Erdogan is aware of the need to take into consideration nationalist sentiments among the Turkish population, including on the issue of the Syrian refugees. The results of the elections also emphasized the political profit obtained from leveraging these sentiments. Therefore, the new government in Turkey will presumably continue its rigid policy against the pro-Kurdish party in Turkey and against its leaders.

Within the opposition, the defeat could lead to a change regarding nationalism in the position of the various parties. After the quiet attempt to rely on Kurdish voters to oust Erdogan proved to be insufficient for achieving victory, some members of the opposition might also adopt a new line regarding minorities in Turkey. This would likely occur in the Good Party, which is rooted in uncompromising Turkish nationalism. In the largest opposition party, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—CHP), which presents itself as the successor to Ataturk and also includes more nationalist streams, some will demand a return to a more traditional nationalist line.

Consequently, with a government that will consolidate its power by enlisting nationalist sentiment among the conservative population in Turkey and an opposition that is more reticent on the Kurdish issue, the chances of returning to

negotiations with the Kurdish underground are slim. In addition, the hardening of Turkish policy toward the Syrian refugees seems more than likely. Moreover, the Turkish system is already preparing for the municipal elections that are scheduled for 2024, which creates another incentive for all the political actors to continue their rhetoric against the Syrian refugees as well as anti-Kurdish rhetoric—proven to be effective in mobilizing voters whose support will be needed again in the coming year.

Nationalism and Turkish Foreign Policy

There is a seeming contradiction between Erdogan's decision to establish a government of technocrats, some of whom have more dovish stances than their predecessors, and the strengthening of ultranationalist voices in the Turkish parliament. The choice of officials who are primarily technocrats suggests that at least in the short term, and especially because of the precarious economic situation, Erdogan will opt to continue the line that he pursued before the elections, attempting to achieve calm in some of the political arenas. At the same time, the decision to choose a government of technocrats will make it easier for Erdogan if he subsequently decides to shift his foreign policy in an ultranationalist direction, because it will be easier for him to fire people who lack a political support base.

One of the most prominent doctrines that symbolize the rise of the ultranationalist element in Turkey is the Blue Homeland doctrine (Mavi Vatan), whereby the defense of Turkey's maritime borders—as Ankara sees them (in contrast with the Greek and Cypriot view according to the Convention on the Law of the Sea)—is no less important than defending the land borders. The doctrine was first presented in 2006 but was developed further as part of Erdogan's efforts to improve ties with ultranationalist groups in Turkey. It led to a proactive Turkish foreign policy, especially in 2019-2020, in a way that its neighbors saw as provocative. The policy included, inter alia, a controversial agreement to demarcate the exclusive economic zone with the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, as well as the dispatch of research ships accompanied by battleships to areas that the Greeks or Greek-Cypriots see as their exclusive economic zone.

One of the most prominent doctrines that symbolize the rise of the ultranationalist element in Turkey is the Blue Homeland doctrine whereby the defense of Turkey's maritime borders—as Ankara sees them—is no less important than defending the land borders.

One of the factors that led Turkey to sign the agreement with the GNA was the plan to build the EastMed pipeline, which was supposed to transport natural gas from Israel to Europe via Cyprus and Greece. Although the Trump administration supported the plan, the Biden administration voiced its opposition, and today other plans are advanced that have not yet aroused the same antagonism from Ankara as the EastMed pipeline, but could draw Turkish criticism in the future. Among them is a proposal to construct a pipeline between Israel and Cyprus to export natural gas and to establish liquefaction facilities in Cyprus, as well as an underwater electric cable that would connect the power grids of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, and from there hook up to the power grids of other European countries. Turkey could renew its plans to send research and drilling ships to areas in dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean, even though it has had greater success so far in discovering natural gas sources in the Black Sea, where its economic borders are defined.

The issue of the exclusive economic zone is also related to the continuation of the dispute regarding the future of Cyprus—a central issue in Turkish foreign policy that has aroused strong feelings in Turkish society since the 1960s with a distinct nationalist tone. While international mediation efforts since 1974 have

advanced attempts to reunite the island, since 2020 Erdogan has spoken explicitly of a two-state solution to the Cyprus issue. In light of the rapprochement to some extent between Turkey and Greece following the earthquake in Turkey and the aid that Athens offered to Turkey, greater goodwill might be displayed by the sides in the Cypriot context, or at least a continuation of the status quo on the island, but it is unclear how long this positive momentum might last.

The increase in the use of anti-American rhetoric, which in itself is not a new phenomenon, is also part of the nationalist sentiment in Turkey. The view that the United States is trying to sabotage the success of Turkey in general, and of Erdogan in particular, is a recurring motif in statements, albeit sometimes only implicit, by the government in Ankara. In this context, the removal from the new government of former Minister of the Interior Suleyman Soylu, who was a hawkish figure who expressed anti-American sentiment in the most public manner, is encouraging news for Turkey's relations with the United States. Nevertheless, even his dismissal does not mean that Turkey's approach toward Washington has changed significantly, or that the issues in dispute between the countries have been resolved, such as the Turkish insistence on continuing the deployment of the Russian S-400 air defense system acquired in 2017, or the dispute surrounding US support for the Syrian branch of the Kurdish underground.

Furthermore, the war in Ukraine, which on the one hand again clearly demonstrates Turkey's geostrategic importance for NATO, also creates new tensions between Ankara and Washington. Especially prominent has been the dispute surrounding the addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO (an issue that has been resolved in the meantime). There was a direct connection between the Turkish opposition to these countries joining NATO and Turkish nationalism, especially as a main point of friction between the countries, and in particular between Turkey and Sweden, regarding the latitude enjoyed by Kurdish exiles in the Scandinavian countries. Indeed, Turkey has raised demands that the government of Sweden extradite Kurdish activists to Turkey.

Some ultranationalists are also skeptical about the European Union. While Erdogan's continued rule and his autocratic tendencies will in any case likely stymie progress in the negotiations surrounding Turkey's acceptance into the European Union, if this issue does reach a point of decision, and Turkey becomes the first country whose process of joining the EU begins but ends in failure, then this will serve as confirmation of the skepticism of ultranationalists. The hardening of the Turkish stance toward the Syrian refugees could also lead to the renewal of tensions between Ankara and its European neighbors, who have clashed over this issue in recent years, at times when it seemed that Ankara was trying to send the refugees further into Europe.

The rigid positions expected regarding the Kurdish arena and the Syrian refugees also highlight the difficulty that Turkey will have in reaching an agreement with the Assad regime about the future of northern Syria. Following four military operations in Syria since 2016, Turkey controls territories in northern Syria that are home to about four million people. Turkey hopes to obtain external funding that will enable the construction of housing for the Syrian refugees in the areas under Turkish control in northern Syria. So far, aside from Qatar, it does not seem that Ankara has succeeded in convincing international actors to help it in this respect, but according to authorities, about 550,000 Syrian refugees have already returned from Turkey to Syria. From Assad's perspective, a basic condition for normalization with Turkey is a Turkish withdrawal from the territories that it controls in northern Syria. Although before the elections in Turkey Russia pushed for progress in the talks between Ankara and Damascus, these talks did not yield significant results. At the same time, the person who stood behind these

talks was Hakan Fidan, who is now Minister of Foreign Affairs, and beforehand was director of the Turkish intelligence agency. No senior public figure in Turkey understands the complexity of the Syrian arena better than Fidan, which could contribute to progress on this issue. The refugee issue is expected to gain new prominence in the 2024 municipal elections, and therefore it is likely that Fidan, with Erdogan's backing, will try to make progress in the talks with Syria.

Another issue influenced by nationalist positions are Turkey's relations with Armenia and Turkish support for Azerbaijan regarding the conflict over control of the Karabakh region. Since Azerbaijan gained independence in the early 1990s, a narrative has developed in Turkey and in Azerbaijan in which they are two states but one nation. This narrative directly connected Azerbaijan to Turkish nationalism, and therefore Ankara's position toward its Azerbaijani neighbor is also affected by the strength of nationalist sentiment in Turkey. Azerbaijan's military success in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 significantly weakened Armenia and led Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, more than his predecessors, to express conciliatory positions toward Ankara and Baku. This could encourage progress in the negotiations between Baku and Yerevan and between Ankara and Yerevan, and will perhaps lead to the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which could have significant formative effects on the Caucasus. Nonetheless, both in Azerbaijan and in Turkey there are those who think it is possible to exploit Armenia's weakness for even more serious concessions than those that Pashinyan currently offers. Furthermore, given that no change is expected in the continuing Turkish policy of denying the Armenian genocide (a policy that Azerbaijan also supports), there is no expectation of a solution on this central issue in the Turkish-Armenian conflict.

Finally, even though nationalist sentiments do not necessarily oppose Turkey's efforts at normalization with Middle East countries, Turkey's increased economic dependence on loans from the Gulf states could arouse indignation among nationalist elements, given that Turkey is selling its assets and undermining its sovereignty to make independent decisions in order to obtain economic benefits. Two prominent examples: in November 2021 the United Arab Emirates decided to set up a $10 billion investment fund to invest in Turkey, and before the elections Saudi Arabia deposited about $5 billion in the Turkish central bank in order to contribute to the stabilization of Turkey's currency. In this context, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to Ankara in June 2022 was described by the Turkish opposition as a series of humiliations for the Turkish nation. It also seems that Erdogan prefers to rely on aid from the Arab Gulf countries, as was manifested in his July visit to three Arab Gulf states, rather than submitting a request to the International Monetary Fund's aid program, which would be seen as humiliating. This highlights the dilemma for nationalist elements.

The normalization with Israel in 2022 is part of Turkey's other normalization efforts in the Middle East. At the same time, Israel's image remains negative almost throughout the spectrum of Turkish public opinion. The National Movement Party, Erdogan's main coalition partner, is no different in this respect, and its leader, Devlet Bahceli, has made derisive statements against Israel. On the other hand among opposition figures, including Kilicdaroglu, even more harsh criticism of Israel has been voiced, including a statement that the *Marmara* case (regarding the flotilla to Gaza) is not closed. In this respect, Erdogan himself did not approach normalization with Israel out of a basic change in attitude, but out of pragmatic motivations that related to the results of the 2020 elections in the United States, Turkey's regional isolation, and the deterioration of its economic situation.

The rise of ultranationalists in the Turkish parliament should concern Israel because some of them, especially those who are also anti-American, see Israel in a negative light.

Conclusion

The growing power of ultranationalists in the Turkish parliament will remain with Erdogan in his current term. However, their large-scale entry into the Turkish parliament should not necessarily be seen as a new phenomenon but as an expression of political needs—integrating them in existing and new parties due to motivations of attempting to strengthen the competing blocs, given the narrowing gap between them. Moreover, one of the factors contributing to the rise of Turkish ultranationalism is the dire economic situation. The position holders that Erdogan has appointed in the new government, both the minister of finance and the governor of the Central Bank, indicate a certain pragmatism and a willingness to return, if only partially, to a more orthodox economic policy, which signals the beginning of an exit path from the economic crisis plaguing Turkey.

A middle way for Erdogan to cope with nationalist sentiments while retaining diplomatic leeway is emphasizing the independent dimension of Turkish foreign policy—meaning that Turkey's support cannot be seen as taken for granted by one of the blocs, in particular the Western bloc. This policy, while often perceived as defiance by the West, enables Erdogan to cooperate with the West at important junctures, if he deems this necessary for advancing Turkish foreign policy. In the past, when he needed to, Erdogan also came out against former allies—whether these were members of the Gulen movement, who had helped him weaken the political power of the Turkish military in his first two terms in office, or the Kurds, with whom he tried to cooperate in his third term. Thus, there is no certainty that Erdogan will necessarily remain in an alliance with the ultranationalists, even though since 2015 this has proven to be relatively convenient. The Turkish President's control over the public discourse in Turkey also allows him to frame policy changes in his favor relatively easily, which increases his leeway and gives him greater flexibility, including in foreign policy.

The rise of ultranationalists in the Turkish parliament should concern Israel because some of them, especially those who are also anti-American, see Israel in a negative light. Moreover, an aggressive foreign policy on Ankara's part, even if it is not aimed directly at Israel, could be directed at actors with whom Jerusalem has a close relationship. In the short term it seems that Turkey still has the motivation to adhere to its normalization with Israel and with other countries in the region. Yet in the longer term, in particular once Turkey succeeds in emerging from its economic crisis, it could return to a more proactive and assertive foreign policy, which, as occurred in 2019-2020, could also pose challenges for Israel.

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Electricity or Powerful Weapons: The Significance of Dual Use Applications

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This article addresses the capability to develop weapon systems based on processes of nuclear fusion. This is a dual activity that has the potential to cause great destruction while proceeding under the guise of purely scientific research or practical applications for various uses, such as the economy, clean energy, or environmental protection. The increased concern over dual activity stems from the fact that the raw materials used to manufacture these weapon systems are not prohibited by international treaties. This article examines the special nature of these weapons, the technological challenges involved in their development, operational elements, and their damage potential. Likewise, it highlights a range of different possibilities available to any element that seeks to develop nonconventional capabilities, while veering dangerously close to various restrictions and supervision regimes. It also examines the potential dangers involved in weapons based on processes of nuclear fusion for various countries, including Israel, and measures that must be taken to deal with this danger. A short glossary of scientific and technological terms appears at the end of the article.

Keywords: nuclear fusion, isotopes, deuterium, tritium, plasma, inertial confinement, magnetic confinement, fourth generation weapons, technology, military

Introduction

Reports of a successful nuclear fusion experiment using high energy lasers conducted as part of a project at the National Ignition Facility in Livermore, California, created a lot of buzz in the scientific community and among the public. In particular, hopes were raised of using thermonuclear energy to produce green and pollutant-free energy. As with nuclear energy, however, there is always the possibility that the controlled fusion process will be used to create effective weapon systems that would be infinitely more destructive than conventional weapons. One example is the hydrogen bomb, which is based on a process of uncontrolled fusion.

The options that currently exist in the field of manufacturing a weapon with massive destruction capabilities, based either on fissile material or nuclear fusion, combined with the increase in the level of technological education and freely available information, have upgraded the research and development capabilities of rogue states and present a major dilemma for peace-loving nations. Moreover, the destructive potential of these weapons could lead to an uncontrolled arms race for self-defense purposes between countries that feel threatened. The

technological knowhow and capabilities, combined with a lack of moral, political, or legal impediments, could be an incentive for the clandestine development of weapons of mass destruction or their development under the guise of legitimate activity, when, in fact, they are engaged in dual activity. In other words, under the semblance of purely scientific research or applied development for various legitimate purposes, such as economics, clean energy, or environmental protection, it is possible to manufacture weapons of mass destruction based on purportedly "civilian" technology. The goal of this article is to highlight the various possibilities currently available to anyone who seeks to develop nonconventional capabilities, while veering dangerously close to various restrictions and supervision regimes; it will also examine the potential dangers involved in weapons based on processes of nuclear fusion for various countries, including Israel, and the measures that must be taken to address this danger.

Regarding nuclear weapons, it is important to differentiate between the different generations of nuclear device development, based on levels of effectiveness, destructive power, and the technology used for the device.

Technological Background

Given its complexity, developing nuclear technologies for military purposes demands an understanding of the various processes involved. In some of the processes linked to nuclear technology, the technologies are dual, i.e., they can be used for military or civilian purposes. Therefore, analyzing these systems requires a broad understanding of a variety of scientific and technological disciplines. A detailed analysis of the issue can be found in several articles about fourth generation weapons and the sources referenced in this article.

Regarding nuclear weapons, it is important to differentiate between the different generations of nuclear device development, based on levels of effectiveness, destructive power, and the technology used for the device. These are known vectors of action in the fields of science and technology that are difficult to conceal; therefore, any activity along these tracks clearly indicates the intentions of the operator.

The first generation of nuclear weapons is a nuclear bomb based on the process of fission in a basic device with a high level of destructive force (about the same level as the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki), but with a low level of effectiveness. In other words, the amount of energy produced is around 10 percent of the energy one would expect from such a process. To detonate this device, an initial quantity of neutrons is needed to spark the process.

The second generation of nuclear weapons is an upgraded device that contains an effective source of neutrons to increase the initial quantity of neutrons needed to start the process, in order to intensify the nuclear fission process and thereby accelerate the effectiveness at the cost of a minimal amount of extra weight. Another device in the second-generation category is the thermonuclear device, also known as the hydrogen bomb, which works by using a process of nuclear fusion, similar to the energy-producing process on the sun, for example.

Third generation nuclear weapons include various types of systems for defined tactical and strategic purposes. This includes several types of weapons, based on their destructive power or their ability to produce various kinds of radioactivity. For example:

a. Systems with limited destruction capability but the ability to produce increased quantities of neutrons or X-rays (also known as Röntgen radiation)
b. Systems for the production of strong electromagnetic radiation pulses, which disrupt systems based on electromagnetic radiation

c. Systems with increased explosive and destructive capabilities
d. Tactical nuclear weapons used to attack fortified positions with bunker-busting bombs

Third general nuclear weapons have a number of inherent limitations, primarily in the technological aspects (complexity of systems), tactical aspects (powerful weapons that are not always suitable for combat), and environmental pollution with radioactive materials.

Fourth generation nuclear weapons are defined as "weapons based on a nuclear device in which atomic or nuclear processes that are not banned by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) take place." Another, more detailed definition, defines fourth generation nuclear weapons as "nuclear explosives based on initiating a thermonuclear process at a low level of effectiveness, using materials or processes that do not require nuclear fission." Fourth generation nuclear weapons have a number of distinctive characteristics, which set them apart from devices from previous generations.

Singular Features

A Paradigm Shift

By its very use, the system represents a change to the existing paradigm, whereby any use of a process linked in any way to nuclear power is seen as a challenge to the world. The system is based on a process of nuclear fusion—the merging of light atoms, like deuterium (D) and tritium (T), to create new compounds, similar to the thermonuclear process that occurs on the sun, when massive quantities of energy are released. This kind of weapon is massively destructive, which is the reason for some of the innate advantages of these weapons, and could make them highly attractive to rogue states:

a. Removed suspicion that the country in question is developing a nuclear weapon: the trigger for the operation of the system is planned to include the use of non-fissile materials, so there is no use of the typical nuclear materials.
b. Civilians uses: The trigger for the process is via dual use technologies—those technologies that can be used for civilian application, especially in the fields of clean energy and the development of controlled thermonuclear reactions.
c. Compact tactical weapon system: A weapon that is ostensibly not nuclear, but has considerable destructive power, comparable to dropping a bomb with 1-100 tons of TNT. A simple calculation shows that the combination of 0.001 gram of the raw material necessary for the fusion process can create as much energy as a device containing 50 kilograms of TNT.
d. Technical deterrence, deterrence by competence: The very knowledge that a certain country has obtained fusion technology for civilian purposes (peaceful nuclear energy) leads to the highly likely possibility that it will allow that country to obtain the knowhow for military applications as well. A country of this kind, even if it does not possess an operational system, could be considered a virtual nuclear weapon state, with all the strategic and diplomatic implications this entails.

A weapon of this kind, unlike a fission bomb, does not require a critical mass; all it takes is a small quantity of material—around a milligram—to produce an effective fusion process of some kind in suitable conditions of compression. The fusion process, even at a very low level of efficiency, is extremely energetic. One kilogram of coal, for example, produces enough energy to illuminate a 100-watt household lightbulb for eight hours. The energy produced from the complete fusion of one kilogram of deuterium would provide enough power to keep the bulb lit for 30,000 years.

Military Features

Fourth generation nuclear weapons are weapon systems with singular military characteristics, which make them extremely dangerous. They represent a weapon system with the capability

to launch precise and direct strikes against well-defined targets with minimal collateral damage—integral to modern warfare, where precise strikes against quality targets are preferred to what is known as carpet bombing. The strike is conducted by transferring energy to the targets using non-elastic collision and penetrating deep within the target, like a powerful kinetic energy weapon. As a result, these weapons have the ability to destroy quality targets with impressive precision—including annihilation and weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

This kind of weapon can be used by countries that are not nuclear states but have a high level of technological knowhow. The fact that the fuel used for this kind of weapon is not on the list of materials banned under the CTBT makes it very easy to obtain and use, especially when dealing with rogue states that seek legal loopholes to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Technological Features

The technology needed for the development of a fusion process creates many challenges in a wide range of fields, such as optics, lasers, materials science, nuclear science, nanotechnology, micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS), development of singular calculating capabilities, and simulations. This technology is of a dual nature, with civilian and military applications, so any move toward developing these capabilities can easily be camouflaged as purely scientific activity with civilian uses.

Moreover, this technology interfaces with other challenging scientific areas, such as the technology used to create antimatter (when antimatter comes into contact with matter, the mass of the particle and its antiparticle are converted into pure energy) or to produce tritium. This occurs using extremely powerful particle accelerators that produce the energy particles needed for the creation of antimatter like antiprotons, as well as the manufacture of tritium. Although the field of antimatter is still in the laboratory stage, calculations appear to show that it is possible, by combining a few milligrams of matter and antimatter, to produce the same amount of energy as 21 tons of TNT, which highlights the technological potential. Finally, powerful accelerator technology could also have a dual purpose, both in terms of pure scientific research and in terms of finding an energy source that can be used to manufacture components in powerful weapons, such as for the manufacture of tritium or antiprotons.

One of the arguments against the development of fusion technology is that it takes a long time to develop. From the perspective of the military planner, this is actually an advantage, since it allows for prolonged research and development and for in-depth study of the operational elements of the system. On the other hand, the long development creates a lack of faith in the capabilities of the system, which leads to a general lack of interest, and could lull enforcement agencies into inactivity, thereby allowing rogue states to continue their own development programs.

An additional technological feature is connected to measurement of nuclear and thermonuclear phenomena and processes. In order to measure dynamic processes that occur during experiments simulating fusion or fission under pressurized conditions and extreme conditions, one needs precise and quick diagnostic equipment. The ability to develop and manufacture this equipment, under the pretext of developing fusion capabilities for ostensibly civilian purposes, would allow a rogue state to develop the diagnostic equipment used for measuring and assessing the critical parameters involved in developing nuclear weapons, as well as developing and studying nuclear processes.

Strategic Features

Fourth generation weapons have characteristics that make them attractive to industrially developed countries, since obtaining nuclear fusion technology is a technology force

multiplier that acts as a political-technological catalyst for developed countries seeking to be at the forefront of the techno-military sphere. Consequently, an arms race is likely between countries with strong economic and industrial capabilities that do not want to lag behind, especially on the military front. In addition, there could well be an arms race between less developed countries, which are worried about their own fate, and that would lead to focusing on more easily obtainable nuclear weapons than weapons of previous generations.

Technological Challenges

In order to develop a fourth generation device based on the fusion of particular source materials, in a process similar to the thermonuclear reaction that occurs on the sun, several major technological challenges must be met. More specifically, nuclear fusion is a challenging technological process, which demands expertise in many scientific and technological fields, as well as a well-trained scientific and technological workforce and the establishment of an extensive scientific infrastructure. This kind of multidisciplinary activity will sharpen the scientific and technological expertise of any country involved.

The main challenge when it comes to fusion is to achieve the highest levels of compression and temperature possible (hundreds of millions of degrees) for the fusion process to occur. Under these conditions, the starting materials needed for the process are in a special state of matter called plasma. Optimal time is needed to allow a sufficient amount of material to go through the fusion process. In other words, the gases that undergo the fusion process need to be confined for a certain length of time, to create the conditions needed for the fusion process, in terms of pressure and temperature. Because we are dealing with gas at very high pressure and temperature, the plasma must be confined in a special device capable of withstanding those conditions. Currently, two potential methods are under examination in laboratory conditions: magnetic confinement fusion and inertial confinement fusion (ICF).

A secondary challenge involves the manufacture of the hydrogen isotope tritium (T), since naturally occurring tritium is extremely rare on earth (0.015 percent relative abundance) and to obtain significant amounts of the isotope one needs specific costly technology that is not readily available. The very act of obtaining them represents a technology force multiplier.

One of the greatest challenges when it comes to acquiring the knowledge for the fusion process for civilian or military purposes is measuring the various physical parameters, such as pressure, temperature, and density, as an alternative to nuclear or thermonuclear experiments. Accurate knowledge of these parameters is important in terms of the physical understanding of the conditions needed for nuclear processes and their increased efficiency. Techniques such as ICF and magnetic confinement are a catalyst for the development of highly significant technologies.

Operational Elements: Gauging the Damage Effectiveness of Fourth Generation Weapons

General Damage

In order to gauge the damage effectiveness of fourth generation weapons, the extent to which the weapon "couples" with the target is measured. The definition of coupling here is the efficiency of how the weapon's energy is transferred to a given target in order to damage or destroy it. The main product of fourth generation fusion-based weapons is very powerful radiation, which contains X-ray radiation (20 percent of the total radiation) and high-energy neutrons (80 percent of the total radiation). High-energy neutrons have a high penetration capacity, so they would penetrate deep within the target, causing extensive internal damage, due to the target heating up after the neutrons penetrate it. The combination of the neutrons' high capacity to penetrate the target and the absence of reflected

radiation or shockwaves on the surface close to the target means that there is much value in terms of weapon-target coupling.

Experts believe that the coupling effectiveness of fourth generation nuclear weapons is around 50 percent, compared to between 5 and 10 percent for regular conventional weapons—depending, of course, on the type of target and the distance of the detonation from the target.

Experts believe that the coupling effectiveness of fourth generation nuclear weapons is around 50 percent, compared to between 5 and 10 percent for regular conventional weapons—depending, of course, on the type of target and the distance of the detonation from the target. To illustrate the damage, a conventional bomb with one ton of TNT detonated one meter from a 10-centimeter-thick steel plate will not cause significant damage to the plate, while under similar conditions, a fourth generation nuclear weapon would cause significant damage, including a fire and a hole in the steel, up to a radius of one meter.

Another effect of fourth generation nuclear weapons is the ability of the products of the radiation process to transfer energy to the target by using momentum or the impetus from the X-rays or the high-energy neutrons that hit certain targets (known as the rocket effect). As a result of the strike and the dispersion of some of the X-rays and neutrons, high-energy plasma jets are also created, which, under specific conditions, can send targets or parts of targets flying in the opposite direction to the direction of the strike, and this could cause total devastation and secondary damage. This plasma jet is sometimes accompanied by strong electromagnetic radiation, which can disrupt the operation of critical electronic installations, such as wireless telecommunications networks and GPS operation.

It is possible to make dual use of the neutrons that are expelled during the thermonuclear process: on the one hand, one can use the impulse force of the neutrons and the X-rays that are emitted from the rear to accelerate the missile aimed at the target. On the other hand, it is also possible to use the high-energy neutrons to heat the target and destroy it, instead of the conventional explosives that are found in a warhead. This issue has still not been fully researched and is certainly not ripe in technological terms. Numerical and experimental simulations are needed to evaluate the efficiency of the processes and the possibility of integrating these processes into an effective weapon.

Electromagnetic Damage

The goal of the current generation of arms in ongoing and future conflicts—such as GPS-guided missiles or lasers—is to maximize the strike and destruction of the target, while minimizing collateral damage close to the selected target.

Because of the precise nature of fourth generation nuclear weapons, the electromagnetic damage caused by their deployment is relatively limited. Additional factors for the limited electromagnetic damage stem from the relatively low intensity of the detonation, the focused detonation on the target, and the type of radiation emitted. Any detonation, chemical or nuclear (fission), is accompanied by the creation of powerful electromagnetic waves. One of the known effects of a nuclear bomb is the creation of a powerful electromagnetic pulse in the atmosphere—EMP. This leads to disruptions in vital electronic systems, especially as a result of the combination of the products of the nuclear radiation and the components of the atmosphere, which creates electric disruptions that can lead to the collapse of communications and electricity systems.

Radiation Damage

Radiation damage can be divided into two categories: immediate damage and long-

term damage. Immediate biological damage is caused by exposure to strong radiation following a direct hit or a detonation at various distances between 100 and 300 meters. The neutrons that are expelled exert a dual impact: they heat up the body to extremely high temperatures, causing immediate death, and they cause biological damage by attacking various human organs. Longer term damage is primarily the radiation damage caused following contamination by radiological byproducts, such as remnants of tritium, or radioactive byproducts created by waves of very powerful neutrons. While there is no well-based research into radiation damage, one can assume, given the relatively short half-life of tritium compared to uranium, that the damage and the environmental limitations stem from the presence of a relatively limited quantity of radioactive material in the case of a fusion weapon based, for example, on deuterium and tritium, is limited compared to the damage caused by a weapon based on a nuclear process.

Mechanical Damage

The main product of fourth generation nuclear weapons is extremely powerful radiation that is absorbed by the target, leading primarily to its localized heating. This heating, unlike a fission bomb, does not create shockwaves, blast waves, or heat waves. As such, thermal and mechanical damage are presumably localized, with limited environmental damage. Moreover, the overall kinetic energy of the detonation products is not great, since most of the directed energy is converted into heat, and thus the danger from shockwaves of detonation products and shrapnel is limited. All this means that the great advantage of fourth generation nuclear weapons is that the damage is directed precisely at the target, with limited environmental damage. This allows for the rapid and effective destruction of hostile targets, including biological weapons and weapons based on advanced technology, such as nanotechnology, communications, and electronics.

Thus, fourth generation nuclear weapons have far greater destructive capabilities thanks to the highly efficient way that they transfer the detonation energy to the target. The damage and destruction that these weapons cause to the target is focused, with minimal environmental damage. The damage is thermal and mechanical and, in certain cases, there is also electromagnetic damage to electronic components and communications installations. Just a few milligrams of the raw materials needed for fusion would cause severe damage during a detonation above a specific target. Because devices of this kind can be miniaturized, there is great concern that as the technology involved in fourth generation nuclear weapons advances, they could be used as "dirty bombs."

In terms of the technology, it is possible to obtain localized fusion for short periods of time without ignition, which leads to a powerful energetic process, by using various methods to compress deuterium and tritium. In this case, the full fusion process does not occur, and it is extinguished because of the plasma's instability. However, the process still produces high-energy neutrons for short periods of time, which are capable of causing a certain amount of damage.

Development of Laboratory Techniques for Initiating Fusion Processes

In order to study the vital parameters necessary for nuclear or thermonuclear processes, experiments must be conducted in the laboratory. The main problem with conducting these experiments, however, is the extreme work conditions needed for fusion. Plasma must be confined under extreme conditions, with temperatures of hundreds of millions of degrees Celsius and pressure of millions of atmospheres. Moreover, plasma must be contained for long enough for the fusion process to occur effectively. In practice, there is no container capable of holding material under such extreme conditions, so researchers use sophisticated methods to confine the plasma.

Inertial confinement: The principle behind this system is the creation of energy through fusion, by pressurizing and heating the nuclear fuel to temperatures of tens of millions of degrees using high-intensity lasers. The National Ignition Facility's laser at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California has produced the most impressive results. Figure 1 shows the laser concentration area in the NIF's target chamber.

Magnetic confinement: This system creates a kind of "magnetic wall" using a powerful, external magnetic field, after which the nuclear fuel matter is compressed and heated, and a controlled process of fusion occurs.

Figure 1: Part of the high-energy laser system at the National Ignition Facility



Source: https://tinyurl.com/2atvrytc

Significance

Researchers have been reluctant to deal with nuclear fusion since it is of huge security and scientific significance. The aspect of dual use is an issue that accompanies many technological developments and there are already tools available to deal with it. Nonetheless, the dual use of this technology is highly dangerous, since there is a tendency to interpret such activity in a lenient manner, which could allow rogue states to develop hugely powerful destructive weapons.

Security aspects: Understanding the fusion process on a laboratory level allows us to understand nuclear and thermonuclear processes, to understand and measure precisely the specific parameters needed for situation equations that describe the process—which would allow improvement of the efficiency of the process and the weapon-target coupling process, without having to conduct an overt nuclear test. Moreover, researching the fusion process under the guise of scientific research allows a state to produce tritium, a vital component in the development of thermonuclear devices, which occurs by radiating a lithium casing with the neutrons produced during the fusion process. Moreover, the study of the fusion process makes it possible to simulate the damage caused by radioactive neutron fluxes, as well as their biological effects and their targeted destructive ability, which is achieved by momentarily heating the target to extremely high temperatures, when the highly energetic neutrons penetrate the target.

Scientific and technological aspects: The overall goal of the main projects that address this issue is the creation of clean electricity by developing alternatives to fossil fuels, in the hope of reducing the pollution caused by burning fuel or coal in the production of electricity. Research into fusion processes can teach us a lot about how plasma behaves when heated to temperatures of millions of degrees, as well as in the construction of effective and relatively cheap facilities to improve the efficiency of the

fusion process, with the goal of sometime in the future implementing that knowledge in the construction of a thermonuclear power plant for the production of green electricity.

Potential access: The geostrategic implications of a rogue state obtaining the raw materials needed to produce complex processes of nuclear fusion (including an ineffective process with low energy output) are extremely worrying, politically and strategically. Currently, the only countries conducting research into fusion processes are economic superpowers like the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan, as well as Russia, to a certain extent, with the cooperation of the European Union. This is a prestigious "club" that represents a very high level of scientific, technological, and economic development, related to the astronomical cost of constructing a facility for inertial confinement fusion ($3.5 billion in the years 2013-2023) or a magnetic confinement fusion facility (22 billion euros), and the fact that it is a multidisciplinary technological field with the highest levels of technological and scientific knowhow and infrastructure. This expertise can be channeled into other areas, such as the development of advanced weapon systems, including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons—and all of this under the guise of developing clean energy sources or purely scientific research into, for example, controlled thermonuclear processes. Activity on this front does not raise suspicions and in any case is hard to supervise, since it is executed using non-fissile materials and materials and atomic/nuclear processes that are not prohibited by the CTBT.

Nuclear fusion technology is undergoing a similar process to that of nuclear technology. At first, it was reserved exclusively for superpowers with abundant resources and knowledge, but over a few decades, it spread to determined countries with the ability to obtain and implement nuclear technology. The move from theory to practical and attainable implementation was relatively quick. Something similar is happening in the field of fusion technology, which is being transferred from resource- and funding-rich governments to civilian organizations. For example, the US Department of Energy (DOE) recently allocated $46 million to eight private companies working in the field. The German government also provides private bodies working in the field with huge budgets, which led to the development of a system that is much smaller and more efficient in terms of its performance. This trend of transferring development to private, civilian organizations is especially pronounced in recent years and has expanded the accessibility of such technologies to a variety of actors.

The widespread connections that superpowers like Russia and China have with rogue states like North Korea and Iran obligate the international community to pay special attention to the proliferation of such technology to these states. The fact that certain states (including hostile states in the closest or more distant circles) have the expertise necessary to obtain nuclear fusion capabilities for civilian purposes creates the highly likely possibility that they could obtain the same technology for military purposes—which creates a kind of "technical deterrence" because of the uncertainty over where this knowledge has reached. Although a country that has technical deterrence is not a nuclear threshold state in the usual sense, it can be considered a "virtual nuclear state," which has many political ramifications:

a. Terrorist activity against various countries, on the understanding that technical deterrence will protect them from any response.
b. Expansionist policies, such as those of Iran, on the understanding that certain other countries would seek the military and perhaps economic protection of a state with thermonuclear capabilities.
c. Provocative acts between neighboring countries, such as North and South Korea, with the confidence that thermonuclear deterrence provides immunity.

d. The development of fourth generation nuclear weapons, with consequent implications.
e. Technological seepage to non-state actors: even though non-state actors lack the scientific and technological ability to develop such weapons, there is the possibility that the knowledge—or even a finished device—could be transferred to a non-state actor by a rogue state. Terrorist organizations and non-state actors have all the motivation for attacks of this kind. This motivation, coupled with the capability, could be an incentive with devastating consequences.
f. An arms race: Beyond all this, the destructive potential of this kind of weapon could lead to a global and unrestrained arms race for defensive purposes between countries that feel threatened, which would disrupt the world order. The knowledge and technological capabilities, without moral, political, or legal impediments, could be an incentive for the clandestine development of hugely destructive weapons—or with the semblance of legitimate activity, when, in fact, it is a dual activity. The significance is that under the guise of purely scientific research or the development of applications for use in areas such as the economy, green energy, or the environment, it will be possible to develop massively destructive weapons using ostensibly civilian technology.

Israel's Approach to the Threat

The introduction of fourth generation nuclear weapons in the Middle East confronts Israel with several dilemmas. Israel's approach to the threat of fourth generation nuclear weapons should operate on several levels, once those responsible have defined the matter as a national priority that should be addressed with utmost urgency. First, Israel must define the goals and targets of its intelligence and research efforts to track open and clandestine activity in the field, including defining suspicious targets and monitoring scientific or technological activity, including the procurement of special equipment.

The preemptive-offensive front: Israel must act to damage, thwart, and destroy manufacturing and installation facilities and research and development centers—including attacking knowledge centers, infrastructure, and national laboratories used to research the relevant processes. Similarly, it must initiate activity and deploy the necessary surveillance mechanisms to deal with dual use activity. This entails deploying surveillance mechanisms to monitor technological developments, such as monitoring the activity of scientists in research centers and academia, following top scientists or sources of knowledge, and keeping close watch on procurement chains and scientific collaborations.

The defensive front: Israel must invest heavily in developing sophisticated interception means to neutralize the platforms that carry fourth-generation nuclear warheads, as defined in this article. This must also include the development of sophisticated defense systems against the fourth generation weapons platforms far from the borders of the State of Israel.

The deterrence front: It is recommended that Israel start with a public diplomacy approach, to deter the enemy from conducting any of the activities that can lead to fourth generation nuclear weapons. This would include, inter alia, publications and demonstrations of various weapon systems—offensive or defensive—to display their capabilities and to deter their use.

The political front: Given that any activity on this issue has a dual use nature, it does not raise suspicion and is hard to detect or incriminate, since it makes use of non-fissile materials and materials or atomic processes that are not banned by the CTBT. Israel must try to push for the raw materials used in these processes to be outlawed by international convention.

Conclusion

This article presents the characteristics of fourth generation nuclear weapons, which have massive destructive capabilities and are highly efficient at weapon-target coupling. This

means that the detonation energy is transferred to the target at a rate of around 50 percent, compared to the coupling efficiency rate of a conventional weapon of an equivalent size, which is around 5-10 percent.

Fourth generation nuclear weapons have a unique advantage over conventional weapons deployed under similar circumstances: a fourth generation weapon has the ability to strike a target with great precision, causing only minimal environmental damage, while destroying quality targets, such as stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons, control and command centers, and communications and electronic installations, as well as frontline or support soldiers. This is because of the nature of the process, in which most of the damage is caused by powerful neutron radiation, which causes localized heating and thermal and mechanical damage. Nonetheless, when using a weapon based on nuclear fusion, the environmental damage and limitations due to the presence of radioactive material and radiation damage to noncombatants is minimal compared to the damage caused by a nuclear fission detonation.

Under certain conditions, a fourth generation nuclear weapon that strikes a target can cause strong electromagnetic radiation, which can disrupt the operation of vital electronic installations, such as wireless communication systems and GPS. Therefore, the recommendation for Israel's approach to the threat of fourth generation nuclear weapons must operate on two levels: on the preemptive-offensive front, Israel must act to damage, thwart, and destroy manufacturing and installation facilities; on the defensive front, it must develop advanced interception capabilities, to take out the platforms that carry any kind of warhead (conventional, nuclear, or fourth generation). Additionally, it must also undertake public diplomacy to deter the enemy from realizing the threat that fourth generation nuclear weapons pose.

Under certain conditions, a fourth generation nuclear weapon that strikes a target can cause strong electromagnetic radiation, which can disrupt the operation of vital electronic installations, such as wireless communication systems and GPS.

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Glossary

Antimatter – matter composed of the antiparticles of the corresponding particles in ordinary matter. When antimatter comes into contact with matter, the mass of the particle and its antiparticle are converted into pure energy.

Deuterium – an isotope of hydrogen which contains one proton and one neutron

Energy – the ability to perform a certain activity

Fission – the process of splitting a heavy atom into lighter atomic particles, accompanied by the release of the remaining energy in the heavy atom

Fusion – merging two atomic particles to a new atomic particle with a mass that is smaller than that of the two particles, with the remaining mass being converted into energy

Inertial confinement – the confinement of fuel used for fusion in a solid state, in pellets, and its irradiation symmetrically, using powerful lasers

Isotopes – atoms with the same number of protons but a different number of neutrons

Laser – an electro-optic device based on light amplification of stimulated emission of radiation

Magnetic confinement – confinement of the fusion material inside a strong magnetic field

Plasma – a fourth state of matter, which contains ionized gas and free electrons

Power – the ability to perform a certain activity (work) in a unit of time

Tritium – another hydrogen isotope, which contains one proton and two neutrons

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The Formative Socio-Political Crisis in Israel: Implications for National Security

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Six months after the outbreak of the severe socio-political crisis in Israel, a group of experts and researchers from a variety of fields met at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) to discuss the root causes of the crisis, its characteristics, and likely ramifications from a forward-looking, system-wide perspective, with special emphasis on ramifications for national security. Naturally, the questions addressed have no absolute or unequivocal answers, and analysis of the crisis draws from the various interpretations of the respective observers. One important element regarding the roots of the crisis is the very different—and at times polarized—way in which reality is perceived, which necessarily dictates profound disagreements over the significance of what unfolds. This article seeks to paint a picture that reflects both differences of opinion and points of agreement vis-à-vis the means and conditions that might allow Israel to extricate itself, at some point, from the current severe crisis and return to normal functioning. A key springboard here is broad discussion, which may enable identification of common denominators that still exist among the Israeli public and within the country's political and social sectors.

Keywords: judicial overhaul, protest movement, social resilience, unity, national security, IDF, police

The Roots of the Crisis

Participants in the professional forum generally agreed that the current crisis—which erupted with full force when Israel's coalition launched its judicial overhaul on January 4, 2023, just days after it was sworn in—is fueled by a combination of profound social and political factors and processes that have been active in Israel for many years. Israel is a heterogeneous and divided country, characterized by profound rifts

that are nurtured by the diverse composition of its population. The result is a multicultural society in which the existing common denominators have not succeeded in realizing the attempt, which was launched in the 1950s but now looks forced or artificial, to create a unique and unified Jewish society in Israel, by means of a social "melting pot." The failure of this approach has led, over the course of the generations, to the creation of diverse mosaics of connections and divisions, which ostensibly created a certain degree of pseudo-solidarity that in turn enabled the supposedly reasonable conduct of the establishment.

Like the "melting pot" and "tribal campfire" ethos, the story of Israelis uniting round the definition of their country as "Jewish and democratic" seems to be far from the reality among certain parts of the public.

Even this very assertion is disputed. There are those who propose the counterargument that Israeli society contains a strong common denominator at its core that was accepted almost naturally over the years by the vast majority of Jewish Israelis. In recent years, however, while the rifts themselves have widened, efforts to give public expression to these rifts and portray them as unbridgeable have become more intense. Therefore, according to this approach, a gulf has opened between the public discourse in academia and the media, and life itself. This is underway at a time when the disputes are fueled and formulated by ideological "extremes," which do not represent a large part of the Israeli public, which finds itself lost in the chaos that surrounds it—on the streets, on the television screen, on social media, and in the Knesset. At the same time, it is also important to differentiate between the rifts that exist within Jewish society and the gulfs between Israel's Jewish and Arab societies.

In any case, Israel is in fact a divided country. Former President Reuven Rivlin asserted already back in 2015 that "demographic and social processes have reshaped Israeli society over the past few decades: from a society comprising a clear majority (national Zionist) and clear minorities, to a society based on four key sectors or 'tribes': secular Israelis, national-religious Israelis, ultra-Orthodox, and Arabs." Rivlin's proposition on Israeli society might have been overly generous, as the society is in fact divided into many more than four "tribes." Each such "tribe" is divided into many sub-sections, with large cultural and political gaps between them and characterized more by disagreements than by consent. Therefore, Rivlin's assertions that "the vision of a Jewish and democratic state [is] our life's dream and our heart's desire" and that it is incumbent on all of us, "together, out of a deep commitment to find the answers to these questions, out of a readiness to draw together all the tribes of Israel, with a shared vision of Israeli hope," raise serious questions and must be examined more profoundly.

Like the "melting pot" and "tribal campfire" ethos, the story of Israelis uniting round the definition of their country as "Jewish and democratic" seems to be far from the reality among certain parts of the public. Even on this central ideological issue, which is supposed to define the identity and character of the State of Israel, there is dispute over the meaning of the seminal phrase. The dispute centers, inter alia, on the place of Jewish existence in the Land of Israel in contemporary times. Some people ask themselves: How does this imperative correspond with the gap between the centrality of Jewishness and the broad endorsement of universal values and identities? Is Israel in fact Jewish and democratic, as it portrays itself? What is the real meaning of a Jewish state, and what makes Israel a democratic country? And beyond this, do the Arab citizens of Israel, who comprise a sizable portion of the population fit into this ethos?

In recent years Israel has also experienced a severe political crisis, manifested by five election campaigns between 2019 and 2022.

Political crises are not unfamiliar in other Western democracies, especially the United States. The Israeli crisis reflects the weakness of the Israeli political system, given the lack of a founding constitution that serves as a binding framework. This greatly undermines the public's faith in political institutions and in the government. The personal and populist nature of politics in Israel has exacerbated public tension, made the divisions in Israeli society even more extreme, and injected them with their current level of high emotional charge. The wave of toxic personality politics that has swept over the country in recent years, against the backdrop of support for or opposition to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that was fueled aggressively by social media, contributed to a sharp increase in hostility between and within the political camps. To a large degree it has overlapped with polarization of social groups and exacerbated hatred between them—to the extent that walls have been erected that prevent dialogue and possible agreement.

Both sides understand that the current crisis is first and foremost a profound identity crisis on many fronts. At its root it is a struggle over power and influence in Israeli society. It reflects an aggressive battle that is being waged—primarily, though not exclusively—between the new elite, which leans to the right, and the old elite, which leans to the center-left. The new elite is gradually gaining political power and now aspires to utilize its electoral strength fully and actively supplant the old elite, which it perceives as Ashkenazi, condescending, and coercive. At the same time, the old elite is losing its political power and is therefore, according to supporters of the coalition, trying to maintain its strength and its control using extra-parliamentary means. In other words, the coalition camp believes that the political minority is trying to use public protest to force its worldview on the government.

The current crisis is even more complex because it is also driven by polarization on issues relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between the ideological right, whose radical elements are striving for a one-state solution, and the center-left, which is searching for compromise on the basis of separation from the Palestinians. Similarly, the crisis is exacerbated by the profound disagreements between the conservative and religious sectors of Israeli society and the liberal public.

The prolonged political crisis has created a serious challenge for Israel's political leadership. Political circumstances have increased the power of small, extremist parties, which in turn has strengthened their expectations for clear, quick, and sustainable accomplishments. Under these conditions, governance and mutual trust between the rival camps and parties have been undermined still further—which limits political leaders' room to maneuver and contributes to a crisis of leadership. Non-state considerations, sometimes even personal interests, have become a predominant guiding principle, contributing to the evolution of a dysfunctional governing culture, and adding to the public's lack of trust in politics and the establishment.

The Nature of the Crisis

The current crisis erupted when the government launched its initiative to reform the judicial system, by addressing the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches (the political majority) and the judicial branch. From the perspective of critics of the judicial system, at least, criticism has been leveled for many years but has been either ignored or met with opposition by the judicial establishment and the state prosecution, despite an ongoing drop in the public's trust in the judiciary and despite its structural defects.

Yet it has quickly become apparent that the government initiative was a far broader and more profound attempt for a socio-political change. It started with disagreement over a judicial issue, whose details and significance are understood by only a few, and quickly took on the character of a widespread public struggle

over the identity and values, as well as nature and centrality of Israeli democracy. This exposed the full extent of the disputes between those who advocate a liberal, egalitarian democracy, which prioritizes human and minority rights, and those who prefer to empower majority rule and who prioritize the mechanisms of governance and law enforcement, based on conservative religious and nationalistic values. For them, this is the very essence of democracy, which relies on the will of the people, as determined by Knesset elections. Some contend that this is an exaggerated dichotomy that does not represent many in both camps, who prioritize personal security and an effective law enforcement system. According to them, a perspective that pits the values of democracy, liberalism, and equality against nationalism and Judaism is a narrow approach, which by itself has contributed to the current crisis.

There are large portions of the Israeli public, on the right and the left alike, who are not active participants in this tumultuous struggle, and for various reasons, do not consider it to be of interest or importance for them. Prominent among them is the Arab population of Israel, which represents around 20 percent of the overall citizenry, which is presently focused primarily on the ever-swelling tide of crime and violence in its ranks and sees the public protest as belonging exclusively to the Jewish community. To them should be added the ultra-Orthodox community, which makes up around 13 percent of the population. Although the ultra-Orthodox are part of the coalition and, for the most part, have strong reservations about the role of the Supreme Court, they have refrained from taking an active part in (or against) the public protest. Together, these two sectors represent around one third of the Israeli public who see themselves excluded from the socio-political struggle. There are also many others who place themselves on the sidelines, whether because they are apathetic or lack any clear political affiliation with either side. Some believe that they are the silent majority, frustrated and confused by a struggle in which they find less interest, hoping for peace and quiet and for the rival factions to reach an understanding. Nonetheless, it appears that the scale of active public involvement in the struggle has been very broad, testifying to the strength and importance of the struggle.

It is important to frame the clear differences in behavior of the two rival camps: for the most part, supporters of the coalition leave the stage to the political parties (with the exception of one large demonstration on April 27, 2023, which was attended by an estimated 150,000 people) and to the parliamentary arena; in contrast, in what has become a broad public protest movement, most of the activities of those who oppose the government are taking place in the extra-parliamentary arena, while also seeping into the military, particularly among reservists. This is despite the fact that the ideological unity and political consensus within the rival camps is far from absolute. It also manifests itself in clear differences regarding modus operandi, especially in terms of how extreme the protest should allow itself to become. What is interesting and important to note, in terms of the differences between the camps, is that supporters of the coalition have, for the time being, put their faith mainly in political and coalitionary activity within the parliamentary framework; the protest movement, meanwhile, has developed into a spontaneous extra-parliamentary aggregate of various civil society organizations and committed ad hoc groups. Between these two camps there is an absolute gulf of competing truths. Each side lives, breathes, and believes in a patently polarized narrative, which directly contradicts the other side's narrative and is nourished by—and in turn nourishes—the mainstream and social media, which, to varying degrees, support one side or the other. Therefore, the one side's position is seen by the opposing side as baseless or a deliberate lie, and vice versa. Each achievement for one side is seen as a defeat for the other. This is a purely zero-sum game.

Within this framework, a new balance of power has been created, in which the protest movement (thanks to impressive and effective organization, successful fundraising, and support from the United States) managed to gain momentum, power, and self-confidence and to earn a considerable amount of deterrence vis-à-vis the government and public influence. It has recorded a series of significant successes, primarily the hiatus forced on the government in its efforts to drive through all the elements of the judicial change in one fell swoop. This success does not indicate that the multidimensional struggle between the camps is over. On the contrary. The energies that have been created over the last months have empowered the competing camps that are spreading to areas that are more challenging and more fundamental. In tandem with the great difficulty encountered by President Isaac Herzog in his efforts to reach an agreement over the judicial overhaul, a broader and more challenging agenda is developing, which addresses additional crucial social and political issues, with a dual essence: in the short term, the ability of the government to advance its controversial policies; and, in the long term, the future character of the State of Israel from a political, social, and macroeconomic perspective. Beyond the fierce identity struggle underway, there is also a sharp contest over the character and values of the state. This struggle clearly contains destructive components in spurring talk about separation, federation, and "cantonization." This reflects the desire of the more liberal parts of the Israeli public to forge a new reality, in which liberal values are enshrined in a legally binding constitutional and structural framework. The very existence of separate agendas is interesting and important, but it is also divisive to the extent of being toxic. It reflects the deepening rifts and hatred, the accelerated negation of the normative political system and its mechanisms; it fuels the continuation of the crisis and increases the obstacles to (even partial) public and political consent and a return to "normality."

The President's efforts to foster dialogue are noteworthy, particularly his attempts to create procedural alternatives for a constructive dialogue over the government's judicial agenda, given the infeasibility of negotiations within the normative parliamentary framework. In so doing, he ostensibly attempted to create a chance of reaching an agreement on some of the issues raised by the judicial reform. These were important to both sides of the political divide, but it is doubtful that they had or could resolve the crisis—which would entail the kinds of reconciliation mechanisms that do not currently exist.

This formative socio-political crisis has many layers of long-term and short-term implications for national security.

The most prominent ray of hope in this crisis is the fact that despite its severity, the struggle has not yet become violent. This is in part thanks to the protest organizers' restraint, coordination, and ability to control the protesters. In addition, supporters of the government have opted so far to refrain from physical violence. Beyond that, the Police has so far demonstrated relative restraint. As long as the protest does not take on violent characteristics, it demonstrates the strength of Israeli society, in which intimidation, violence, and crime have skyrocketed in recent years, and not just in the Arab community. The potential for organized ideological violence also exists in the Jewish community. Having said that, and as has happened in other democracies, this positive element can change for the worse quickly and unexpectedly, if the crisis becomes more acute in the future.

Implications for National Security

This formative socio-political crisis has many layers of long-term and short-term implications for national security, led by:

a. Israel's being an extremely polarized society has a direct negative influence on solidarity and, therefore, on societal resilience, in which solidarity, identity, and a cohesive national identification are the most important cornerstones; this necessarily influences national security. National resilience allows a society to function in states of emergency and crisis, and to recover quickly from them. A prolonged internal crisis seriously undermines those capacities. This is especially true in the current crisis in Israel, which has weakened the state and its mechanisms and harmed its ability to deal with the current challenges successfully, to extricate itself from the crisis and enjoy systemic recovery and growth. There is a clear sense of danger among the leading groups in society and the economy; some of them are reexamining their willingness to bear the burden and contribute their skills and resources to the state. Concerns have also been expressed that the stronger groups will, in the long term, decide to leave the country. On the other hand, there are those who see these attitudes as hampering solidarity, causing an abandonment of the identity with the state, and even questioning the foundations that unify the Jewish nation.
b. The profound political crisis has seeped into the state institutions and affects their performance. This is the case in government ministries, the IDF, and other security bodies. The military's reserve forces have undergone a major upheaval that has long-term negative ramifications. The issue of widespread reservists' refusal to serve in the IDF has become disturbing. The law on ultra-Orthodox exemption from conscription raised a public outcry, and has negatively impacted motivation to serve among the secular public. The Israel Police has undergone a prolonged crisis, which has weakened its ability to function. Mechanisms and processes designed to advance the annexation of the West Bank are gaining momentum and garnering public opposition in center-left circles. At the same time, there is increased politicization in Israel's institutions, which is impacting the decision making process on critical issues that have long-term implications for national security. Considerations based on the good of the country cede to narrow political and sectorial considerations and pressures.
c. There is also fundamental disagreement between the two camps as to the impact of this formative crisis on Israel's economy. While the government highlights the relative stability of the economy and its relative achievements in an unstable world, the other side focuses on the correlation between the crisis and weakness of the Israeli economy. After years of impressive growth, the current crisis has led to a clear change in direction. In the first quarter of 2023, the Tel Aviv 125 Index fell by around 9 percent, while its counterparts in the United States and Europe saw gains of 6 and 7 percent, respectively. The shekel has also depreciated in the context of the crisis, as the Governor of the Bank of Israel himself noted at the Hurwitz Economic Conference in early June. In the period between the election in November 2022 and the end of May 2023, the shekel dropped by around 5 percent compared to the US dollar, which also depreciated in comparison to the currencies of OECD members. Economists propose that one of the main reasons for the strength of the shekel in recent years was the large foreign investment, especially in Israeli hi-tech, which has the tendency to dry up during the political crisis. This could have far-reaching, long-term ramifications for the "national engine," which fuels the entire economy. The weakening of the shekel also makes imports to Israel more expensive, which in turn contributes to the increased cost of living. The crisis is also preventing Israel from focusing effectively on the vital battle against the high cost of

living and bolstering employment among the weaker sectors of society. This is evident in the lack of economic stimuli in the state budget, which limits the ability of the state to divert resources to vital sectors. Note that the positive economic figures for the first quarter of 2023 are the result of processes that occurred in 2022 and even earlier. The problematic figures, according to economic experts, will emerge in the second and subsequent quarters, unless there is a very tangible change of direction.

d. On the regional front, the ongoing crisis has harmed Israel's status and security, and has a negative influence on the perception of the country's strength. There are signs of possible erosion of Israel´s deterrence vis-à-vis its enemies, which are keeping close tabs on local developments. Although during Operation Shield and Arrow in May 2023 the major terrorist organizations, for their own reasons, refrained from challenging Israel, concerns over a multi-front military confrontation remain. There is also concern that the Israeli public's resilience will be undermined in case of a broad conflict. On the political front, there have been setbacks in Israel's relations with moderate Arab states and in the furthering of the Abraham Accords.
e. On the international stage, there has been a clear blow to Israel's standing. The most challenging aspect is to relations with the United States, Israel's chief ally. On the one hand, the United States continues to support Israel on practical matters, especially when it comes to security, but, on the other hand, it has made it clear that its support depends on Israel maintaining its democratic character. Among American Jews too, there is concern, and profound criticism of developments in Israel, accompanied by an increasing tendency to distance themselves from events in the country. This might have serious implications for the Jewish Diaspora's support for Israel.

The unfolding domestic crisis is a singular, disturbing, and destructive event, the likes of which Israel has never known—in terms of its severity, scale, and implications.

Conclusions and Expectations

The unfolding domestic crisis is a singular, disturbing, and destructive event, the likes of which Israel has never known—in terms of its severity, scale, and implications. It is very hard to determine how it will evolve. The assumption is that over the past few months an unstable "balance of terror" has been created between the government and the protest movement, with both camps experiencing and representing conflicting "realities." It is doubtful whether they are interested in or capable of identifying the opportunity to bridge the profound gaps between them. This is true of the very specific issues that make up the government's original proposed overhaul of the judicial system, and even more true when it comes to the profound issues that are at the core of the social schism. The lagging talks at the President's residence were important, in the absence of any other avenue for effective dialogue; they allowed the sides to play for time and created at the time a sense of hope and sanity.

Even if the rival sides manage to reach some kind of compromise over the judicial issues, it is doubtful that this would be enough to end the profound crisis. There are very powerful forces on both sides that would use multiple means to oppose any compromise. In any case, a limited compromise of any kind would not be enough to narrow the fundamental rifts that exist in Israeli society, which are based on a deep sense of suspicion and hostility and on fundamental polarized ideologies over the identity, nature, and behavior of Israel, both domestically and externally. The coalition camp is unlikely to cede its growing political power, based on the fact that it represents a majority in the country; the protest camp—

which is based mainly on the old elites, which are still the strongest sectors in Israeli society in terms of education and finances—is unlikely to agree to a process that would scale back the liberal and democratic character of Israel at the expense of more powerful Jewish nationalism. The gulf between the two camps will only grow wider. In the absence of accepted mechanisms of dialogue and agreement, and in an atmosphere of toxic rhetoric, it does not appear possible to prevent, moderate, or contain the evolution of this profound crisis. The nature of the crisis might change from day to day, and there may be brief or prolonged hiatuses along the way. It is doubtful, however, that it will be possible to return to the limited normalcy that existed in Israel before the crisis erupted. It is also impossible to rule out the possibility that the confrontation between the camps will deteriorate, including sporadic or even widespread violence. The Israel Police would find it hard to maintain public order under these conditions, certainly considering its current dire situation.

In this complex and dangerous situation, various scenarios have been proposed as possible ways of extricating Israel from the impasse it is facing:

a. Some people believe that the crisis will dissolve the moment that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu leaves the public arena, which might pave the way for a national unity government comprising all the large parties. This convoluted scenario, which does not appear to be likely in the short term, might calm the crisis temporarily, but it is doubtful that it would heal the deep rifts in the Israeli society or contribute to long-term normalization.
b. Others expect that a significant military multi-front confrontation will cool the domestic rift, hopefully unify the ranks, and force Israelis to rally round the flag—and possibly end the crisis. This is an unlikely scenario, however, and at best it would afford a brief hiatus; it would not create the kind of bonding needed for long-term healing.
c. There are still others who believe that there is no alternative but to dismantle the apparatus of the state and establish a separate and divided political system (transformation to a federative structure, with the State of Israel and the State of Judea as a metaphor). This scenario, which is highly doubtful, certainly not by a consensus decision, would represent the willful negation and destruction of the defining Zionist vision. In any case, it would lead to the establishment of weak entities that might fight each other for resources and power, in a hostile regional neighborhood.
d. Finally, there are those who call for Israel to introduce a constitution, to set rules for the democratic game, or, at the very least, to ensure that the state's political identity is based on the Declaration of Independence (1948). The chances of accomplishing this under current circumstances are slim, since it would entail agreement between the rival camps over matters of deep principle. The schisms are wider than ever, including during the first years after Israel gained its independence, when it was impossible to formulate a constitution given the profound internal differences.

Given the complexity of the situation, it seems that the most likely scenario is that the crisis will continue at varying degrees of intensity. An ongoing and corrosive process of this kind is a nightmare that might gradually diminish the State of Israel's strength. Only if the general public and the national leadership understand the extent of the cumulative danger to the very existence of the State of Israel as a democratic country will they join forces to take a stand and end the madness—together. Searching for the necessary mechanisms for this highly challenging endeavor must now be at the forefront of the agenda of Israeli society and the political establishment.

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US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on the Yom Kippur War:
Meeting of Leading Figures in the State Department, October 23, 1973

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On October 23, 1973, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called a meeting of senior State Department figures to discuss the still ongoing Yom Kippur War and its ramifications. At that time, it seemed clear that Israel had the upper hand. It had succeeded—albeit with many fatalities—in overcoming the initial shock of the surprise outbreak of the war and the collapse of its security approach, which to a large extent was based on the ability of the front line troops in strongholds along the Suez Canal to block any Egyptian invasion.

The atmosphere at that meeting, as far as can be assessed from the minutes, was fairly relaxed, occasionally even lighthearted. Israel was considered an ally of the United States, and the sense of Israel's success, with its soldiers controlling large areas of the western side of the Canal and imposing a blockade on the Third Army, pleased the Nixon administration. It gave it good reason to estimate that the war would strengthen the regional and international status of the United States and promote the chances of an Arab-Israeli settlement.

This was a closed meeting for senior administration figures, with the participation of Secretary of State (and former National Security Advisor) Henry Kissinger, who presented his views with much candor, as befitting a discussion at such a senior level among people who know each other well, and hence its importance. Indeed, Kissinger took control of the discussion and gave others limited time to express themselves. The minutes of this closed meeting give a fascinating glimpse into the administration's positions regarding one of Israel's most traumatic events. However, it is important to stress that these positions represent the opinions of Kissinger in just one discussion—important in itself—out of many that took place during the war. Therefore, these views do not necessarily represent the "final" positions throughout the entire war and its aftermath.

What follows are the main points from this fascinating document.

The Surprise and the US Involvement

Kissinger opened by relating how he learned of the outbreak of the war. In New York for a meeting of the UN General Assembly, Kissinger was awakened by his deputy, Joseph Sisco, on Saturday, October 6, 1973, at 6 am (12 noon, Israel time), who told him that Israel was reporting that the outbreak of war was "imminent," and was asking leaders in the administration "to use our influence to get it stopped" (Kissinger, 2004, p. 14).[1]

Kissinger repeated this story several times in different forums. It was impossible not to form the impression that the repetition was intended, inter alia, to stress that not only Israel but the administration, too, was surprised by the outbreak of war. It is very possible that beyond the factual description, embellished with a touch of piquancy, Kissinger used this story to dispel the stubborn rumors, circulating in Israel as well as in the United States, that Kissinger himself was actually involved in the war initiative.

According to this theory, Kissinger understood that it was not possible to break the impasse in the Middle East following Israel's crushing victory in the Six Day War and move forward toward a peace process without a military conflict that would exact a heavy price from Israel and oblige it to soften its negotiating position. Kissinger himself hinted at this in a conversation with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on January 20, 1974, when he said:

> If you had not started the war, I would have started a diplomatic offensive in November. I said it to the Arab diplomats at the UN in September. But it would have failed. Without the war it would have failed. So I would have to say that military actions were necessary….I do not think the Arabs could have settled without restoring their dignity. And the Israelis could not have settled [as they are now] without a military setback. (Memorandum of Conversation, 1974)

At the State Department meeting of October 23, 1973, examined in this article, Kissinger, relying on his extensive historical knowledge, also underscored that in a good settlement between the parties, each can feel it has gained something from the arrangement. In a remark that was almost certainly related to the circumstances created in the Middle East following the decisive defeat of the Arab armies in the Six Day War, Kissinger noted that a good settlement cannot survive for long if it is based on "unconditional surrender" by the other side (Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting [hereafter Minutes], 1973).

Later in the meeting, Kissinger explained that in any case, the administration's policy in the Middle East was drafted in forums with the participation of senior administration personnel; the present forum, which meets almost on a daily basis, was the most important. Kissinger named the following members of the staff: Kenneth Rush, Joseph Sisco, David Popper, Tom Pickering, and Larry Eagleburger.[2] This system, Kissinger appeared to imply, does not allow one individual, however senior, to initiate a strategic move like the one attributed to Kissinger. The significance is that decisions regarding the Middle East in the period prior to the war were made in a broad forum and did not express purely personal positions (Minutes, 1973).

During the meeting, there was an effort to make Israel responsible for the failure of US intelligence agencies to assess the imminence of the war. Even during the war, Ray Cline, the State Department's Intelligence chief, claimed that "we were brainwashed by the Israelis, who brainwashed themselves" (Minutes, 1973). Kissinger, it should be noted, did not contradict this harsh statement.

In fact, this stance began already on the morning of October 6, 1973. In his meeting with Prime Minister Golda Meir, United States

Ambassador to Israel Kenneth Keating referred unambiguously to Israel's responsibility for the fact that the administration was also taken by surprise when war broke out: "There were exchanges of telegrams between embassies and Washington [the United States Embassy in Israel and the security establishment in Israel] over troop concentrations on both borders," he said to the Prime Minister. "In the first telegram [that arrived from Washington], there was almost [an air of] panic. [But] the attaché [of the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv] visited the IDF and received a reassuring briefing." In addition, the previous day, the Embassy asked for answers to questions from Washington, and above all: did they know of any "non-scheduled" Soviet flights to Syria and Egypt? Israel's response was that it did know about them, but was not clear about their purpose (Diary of Eli Mizrachi, 1973, p. 5).

The issue of the preemptive strike occupies an important place in Kissinger's references to the war. He claimed that the United States did not stop an Israeli preemptive strike before the war.

And again, Keating specified, we asked the Israelis: do you know of any Egyptian deployment and what it indicates. Israel's reply: we know about the deployment, and it is of a defensive character. We asked the same things about Syria and got a similar response. We asked if they knew about the return of the Sukhoi bombers to the airfield north of Damascus. Their reply: we knew that there were aircraft of this type there, but they left, and we don't know whether they have returned, and if they have returned, what this means" (Diary of Eli Mizrachi, 1973, p. 5).

Keating's report seems to imply that the tremendous prestige of Israel's intelligence capabilities at that time led the United States intelligence personnel to show complacency in the face of the rapidly approaching offensive. Abba Eban, in his testimony to the Agranat Committee, said that since the Six Day War, "there was an impression that [Israeli] intelligence is a successful matter [organization]…following that huge, shining victory, [which] made a name not only for the IDF, its commanders, and fighters, but all over the country and all over the world, our intelligence service had [gained] a special reputation" (Agranat Committee, 1973, p. 20).

Did the United States Block an Israeli Preemptive Strike?

The issue of the preemptive strike occupies an important place in Kissinger's references to the war. He claimed that the United States did not stop an Israeli preemptive strike before the war: "There have been many stories," said Kissinger, "that we prevented a pre-emptive attack by the Israelis and that their setbacks are due to our urging them not to engage in a pre-emptive attack. This is total nonsense" (Minutes, 1973).

Kissinger continued, "We did not urge them not to engage in a pre-emptive attack because we didn't believe that a war was coming. And we had no reason to tell them this." Israel too did not assess that war was about to break out. Moreover, even if Israel had initiated a preventive strike, "it would not have changed the outcome in any sense," in part due to Israel's rigid, single-minded thinking (Minutes, 1973).

The picture presented by Kissinger at that meeting is only partly correct. This argument was perhaps valid until the early morning of October 6, 1973. According to what we can learn from documents available to the public, there was a growing assessment from that time onward that war was certain. The question of a preemptive strike was highly relevant during those critical hours: "As for a preemptive strike," said the Chief of Staff on October 6, 1973, "it naturally [gives Israel] an enormous advantage; it will save many lives." Later, as required by his position, the Chief of Staff specified the expected outcomes of a preemptive attack:

> In operational terms, today at 12:00, we can destroy the Syrian air force

> entirely. After that, we need another 30 hours to destroy their missile system. If they intend to attack at five (17:00), at that time, our Air Force will act [will be able to act] freely against the Syrian army. That's what we can do. It is very tempting to me in operational terms. (Summary of Consultation with the Prime Minister, 1973, p. 4)[3]

Later Kissinger sought to reinforce the impression that the US administration, unlike the Israeli government, had many worries over the possibility of war. At the meeting, he referred to his meeting with the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Simcha Dinitz, before the war, on Sunday, September 30, 1973. Kissinger made it a point that insisted on a meeting on Sunday, although the State Department was not set up for working at weekends. This should obviously enhance his argument that he was genuinely concerned over the danger of an imminent military confrontation in the Middle East:

> I asked him what he thought. He assured me there was no possibility of an attack. And I was sufficiently uneasy about it to ask for intelligence estimates…both of which, however, agreed on the proposition that an Arab attack was highly improbable. These intelligence reports were confirmed during the week. And indeed the morning of the attack, the President's daily brief, intelligence brief, still pointed out that there was no possibility of an attack. For all these reasons, we had no incentive in the world to tell anyone not to engage in a pre-emptive strike. (Minutes, 1973)

Returning to the Meir-Keating meeting: the Prime Minister arrived for this meeting already completely determined to avoid a preemptive strike. Before the meeting, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan asked her if she wanted an intelligence officer to accompany her. Golda Meir said no, and clarified that she wanted to be alone with the Ambassador (Diary of Eli Mizrachi, 1973, p. 2). She began the meeting by telling the Ambassador that Israel had received information "from completely reliable sources" that Egypt and Syria were planning a combined attack on Israel in the late afternoon. She likewise reported to the Ambassador about the hasty departure of Russian advisors from Egypt and Syria. At first, said the Prime Minister, we thought they were worried about an attack by us, and so they built a defense system. There was also a suggestion that their departure was linked to a rift between Egypt and Syria and the Soviet Union. However, in the last few hours, the assessment has changed, and we expect a combined attack from Egypt and Syria "late in the afternoon" (p. 4).

During the conversation, the issue of the preemptive strike arose several times. Right from her opening remarks, the Prime Minister explained that the purpose of the meeting was to report on the situation to the US administration and clarify that "we won't start the war." Later she added: "We have no doubt that we will win, but we wish to inform the Egyptians through the Americans and the Soviets that we are not planning an attack, although clearly, we are ready to repel their attack." Ambassador Keating did not seem entirely convinced by the Prime Minister's promises. He likely found it hard to believe that in such serious circumstances, Israel would waive the option of a preemptive strike that could perhaps give it an operational advantage.

Toward the end of the meeting, he again asked whether Israel would strike Egypt and Syria before they attack. And again, the Prime Minister said, "Absolutely no, although it would make things much easier for us." Again, she asked the administration to contact the Soviet Union and Egypt urgently and make it clear that Israel had no intention of attacking (Diary of Eli Mizrachi, 1973, pp. 5-6) and that it wanted to avoid a "blood bath" (Burr, 2003a). The Prime

Minister ended the meeting by stating that Israel had called up some of its reserves but was avoiding a full mobilization (Memorandum from William B. Quandt, 1973).[4]

Later there would be criticism of the Prime Minister for giving such a fateful commitment to refrain from a preemptive strike without informing the government. The main protest came from Justice Minister Yaakov Shimshon Shapira. The Minister also wondered why the government was summoned to discuss the approaching war only at 12 noon when in the early hours of the morning there were already clear signs that war was imminent. The Justice Minister argued that until that meeting, he was completely unaware of the security tension that threatened the State of Israel. Minister Shapira claimed that many other ministers supported him and that he had to express his protest publicly for it to be taken seriously. He recalled that criticisms of British Prime Minister Chamberlain's actions before the Second World War were also expressed openly in the British Parliament (Goldstein, 1973).

In a conversation with President Nixon on November 1, 1973, Meir claimed that the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff wanted a preemptive strike, but she overruled them: "I said that we would assume the risk; a terrible risk. We had to be in a situation where our friends would know exactly what happened, how the war broke out" (Prime Minister's Meeting, 1973, p. 2).

Kissinger's statement that the United States did not try to prevent a preemptive strike by Israel does not faithfully represent the situation. There is evidence that Washington certainly put pressure on Israel to avoid such a strike before the war, notwithstanding that it could assume that the set of understandings that had been formulated between the United States and Israel in the years prior to the war would in any case lead Israel to refrain from taking preemptive action against Egypt (Six Day War Center, 2021b). More specifically:

a. On October 6, 1973, at 08:29 in the morning Washington time, the Israeli attaché in Washington, Mordechai Shalev, called Kissinger to report that he had just received reports from Jerusalem that during the government meeting, ministers learned that the Egyptian-Syrian attack had begun, mainly with aerial shelling along the Suez Canal and in the Golan. Kissinger replied that Egyptian sources were claiming that Israel had carried out a marine attack near the town of Suez, thereby implying that Egypt was just responding to an Israeli preemptive strike. Kissinger certainly knew this Egyptian information was fake. Nevertheless, he felt it was right, under these circumstances, to ask Israel to restrain its actions (Kissinger, 2004, p. 34).
b. In Kissinger's report to President Nixon, who was in Florida that day, he said that he had called the Israeli attaché in Washington, Mordechai Shalev, and warned him that "there must be no preemptive strike" (Burr, 2003).
c. Prime Minister Meir told the ministers on October 6, 1973: "We had a piece of information that war was due to start at six in the evening…Dado [Chief of Staff David Elazar] suggested [a preemptive strike] that could destroy [our enemies'] aerial array. Meanwhile we got an order [!!] from the Americans not to start with that [preemptive strike]" (Diary of Eli Mizrachi, 1973, p. 9).
d. At the government meeting on the morning of October 7, 1973, Meir hinted that she was not comfortable with the decision taken under American pressure to avoid a preemptive strike: Kissinger "is constantly informed about the military situation and also what our problems are. We never miss an opportunity to tell him again and again that if we were not such decent people, perhaps too decent, our situation would have been completely different. But we all

decided together [to avoid a preemptive strike]—at least there is the advantage that America is with us at present…and he [Kissinger] understands that and appreciates that" (Minutes of Government Meeting 5, 1973, pp. 3-4).

e. At the government meeting on the evening of October 7, Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon said: "By not taking a preemptive initiative, at least we'll have a political gain…and you know that the Americans very much wanted that we would not be the first" (Minutes of Government Meeting 6, 1973, p. 38).

In this context, consider the views of some researchers on the topic discussed above. Hagai Zoref and Meir Baumfeld reject the claim of a prior understanding between Israel and the United States about avoiding a preemptive strike (2022, p. 177). In their book *Golda Meir, the Fourth Prime Minister*, Hagai Zoref and Arnon Lamprom (2016) write: "Later Kissinger denied the charge that he pressured Israel to avoid a preemptive strike. However, the documents clearly show otherwise" (p. 513). William Burr, a senior researcher in the United States National Archive, reached a similar conclusion: "Kissinger has never acknowledged that he recommended against preemption, although his recent collection provides more confirming information on this point" (Burr, 2003).

Indeed, it is hard to understand what motivated such an experienced statesman with such a developed awareness of history, as Kissinger certainly was, to deny a well-documented historical fact so forcefully. He should have known that this would necessarily put him in the embarrassing position of someone not telling the truth. He certainly knew the realities of that times. Though we have no proof, we may assume that as a Jew who survived the Holocaust, he felt great sorrow over the heavy losses Israel sustained in that war. Perhaps he was experiencing doubts, and even pangs of conscience, whether his pressure on Israel to refrain from a preemptive strike was the right thing to do.

Who was Responsible for Thwarting Efforts to Reach a Settlement?

Kissinger's remarks at the October 23 meeting suggest that most of the responsibility for the lack of a settlement with Egypt before the war lay with Israel. Kissinger reported at the meeting that he met Foreign Minister Abba Eban a few days before the outbreak of war to try and promote a peace process. According to Kissinger, Eban claimed "that there was no real need for a peace initiative…because the military situation was absolutely stable and could not be changed, and politically there was nothing to be gained by a peace offensive." Kissinger said that he tried to persuade Eban of the necessity of a political initiative (Minutes, 1973).

Admittedly, in the circumstances prevailing before the war, Israel indeed had an interest in maintaining the status quo created after the Six Day War. The overall assessment was that Israel's control of the territories conquered in 1967 significantly strengthened its strategic position, intensified its deterrent ability, and reduced the danger of war. The posters of the Alignment party for the elections scheduled for October 1973 gave visual expression to this view, showing an IDF soldier bathing in the Suez Canal, with the caption: "Our situation has never been better" (Tekuma, 1998).

However, at the official level, the leadership in Israel kept repeating that in the framework of a peace settlement, Israel would be ready to make territorial concessions, here and there even adding the words "painful concessions." Overall, the nature and extent of these concessions remained amorphous. However, this readiness by the Meir-led government was never put to a real test prior to the Yom Kippur War. The Arab countries headed by Egypt, it was argued, used a variety of formulations, mostly vague, to explain the nature of the relations that would be created by a settlement (Vanetik & Shalom, 2021a).

At the same time, from the viewpoint of the Israeli government, the Egyptian government had never shown willingness to accept Israel's

unequivocal demand—to institute a system of peaceful relations and normalization as was eventually agreed upon in the peace treaties a few years after the war. In September 1972, Meir said:

> Israel will not return to the June 1967 borders, and neither will it agree to small territorial changes. The changes must be big…Sadat does not want peace…Sadat did not expel the Russians in order to pave the way for peace with Israel. In my opinion, Israel must wait quietly and let Sadat "stew in his own juices" until he makes his calculation and decides which way he wants to go. (Goldstein, 1972, p. 13)

Kissinger claimed that in the Yom Kippur War, Israel wanted to continue with the tactics it used in the Six Day War, under the mistaken assumption that what worked once would work again. It did not consider the possibility that the Arabs had learned to deal with these tactics.

In his remarks in the October 23, 1973 meeting, Kissinger chose not to criticize Egypt's opposition to Israel's basic request to carry out direct negotiations on a peace settlement with Israel. Nor did he even raise reservations on Egypt's positions, which seemed highly uncompromising to the Israeli leadership at that time. He also ignored the fact that the administration itself had reached the conclusion that there was no possibility of making progress toward a settlement before the elections in Israel, scheduled for October 1973. In other words, he ignored the fact that responsibility for the absence of a political process also lay with the US administration, and not only with Israel: "Impending Israeli elections have precluded any new initiatives and have led to a hardening of Israeli policy toward the occupied areas" (Paper prepared by the National Security Council staff, 1973).

His words in the meeting clearly create the impression that the main, or even sole, responsibility for the outbreak of war lay with Israel. It is impossible to escape the feeling that his words also indirectly imply that Israel "deserved" to pay the price for its stubbornness.

Why Israel Failed in the War

Kissinger claimed that in the Yom Kippur War, Israel wanted to continue with the tactics it used in the Six Day War, under the mistaken assumption that what worked once would work again. It did not consider the possibility that the Arabs had learned to deal with these tactics. This meant largely relying on anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, for which Israel had no effective response. In Kissinger's opinion, the Arabs had learned the lessons of the Six Day War better than the Israelis ("the Israelis continue to adopt the tactics of '67. The Arabs developed tactics to thwart the tactics of '67") (Minutes, 1973).

Here again, Kissinger found it necessary to stress that Israel should have known that a preemptive strike would not change the situation since there were new dimensions to the war. The Arabs, Kissinger claims, had also demonstrated the good quality of its military leadership and better morale. This was shown in the way they did not surrender when Israel surrounded them (he was most likely referring to how the Third Army behaved when besieged by Israel) (Minutes, 1973).

Did the United States Want an Israeli Victory?

Kissinger was careful to avoid stating that the United States wanted Israel to win the war, though this could be expected from a partner to the so-called "special relationship," which is often defined as a relationship between "allies." Kissinger limited himself to emphasize that from the start of the war, it was clear that the administration "could not tolerate an Israeli defeat." He did not clarify exactly what the

administration would do if the military situation would not be headed in this direction (Minutes, 1973). On the other hand, in a conversation with senior members of the administration, Kissinger also clarified that the United States did not want another "Arab debacle" (Memorandum of Conversation, 1973).

In this meeting, Kissinger allowed himself to admit frankly that emotional as well as personal considerations regarding Israel and historical contacts played a part in the administration's decisions in the course of the war.[5] However, when referring specifically to the issue of the airlift (discussed below), he stressed that in the end, global strategic considerations played a decisive role in the decisions made during the war. With specific reference to the airlift to Israel, Kissinger explained the strategic consideration that eventually led the administration to carry out the airlift: if another US ally [he apparently meant in addition to South Vietnam] were defeated by a country supported by the Soviet Union and equipped with Russian weapons, then the unavoidable lesson for many countries will be that perhaps they should rely increasingly on the Soviet Union and not on the United States. That would undermine America's status in the Middle East in the eyes of its allies, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and bolster the radical countries supported by the Soviet Union (Minutes, 1973).

In the intensive discussions between Israel and the US administration during the war on accelerating the airlift, ceasefire agreements that would end the war, agreements on a separation of forces, and the interim agreement with Egypt, the heads of the administration tended to stress the level of sacrifice for Israel involved in the decision regarding the airlift. The purpose of this tactic was of course to push Israel to agree to the administration's demands as a "reward" for US activity on its behalf. It is not surprising that the strategic considerations that were dominant in the decisions regarding the airlift, as mentioned above, were played down (Shalom, 2017).

While stressing the need to support Israel at this tough time, Kissinger made it clear that the United States could not permit a situation in which its policy would be "hostage" to Israel, thus limiting its freedom of action:

> Our interests, while parallel in respect to that I have outlined, are not identical in overall terms. From an Israeli point of view, it is no disaster to have the whole Arab world radicalized and anti-American, because this guarantees our continued support. From an American point of view, it is a disaster. And therefore throughout we went to extreme lengths to stay in close touch with all the key Arab participants… On the whole we kept the anti-Americanism in the Arab world, even though this war lasted much longer than the war in 1967, to a much lesser proportion than was the case in 1967. (Minutes, 1973)

The war had clearly changed the status of Israel in the eyes of the United States administration: Israel was regarded as a "preferred state," a confidante of the United States, and an esteemed ally against its rivals. Yet after the war it was seen as a state whose strategic, political, and military weaknesses (notwithstanding its intelligence capabilities, which were the source of most of its glory) had been embarrassingly exposed. In other words, Israel's status as a strategic asset for the United States suffered a severe blow as a result of the war. Meanwhile the United States labored to restore its relations with the Arab world. Israel was required to pay the price of realizing this goal. During the war, in the eyes of many Israelis, this American ambition was regarded as an effort to deny Israel the option of achieving an unequivocal victory and defeating the Egyptian army.[6]

The declining status of Israel as a result of the war was well reflected in a letter of October

21, 1973 from President Nixon to Prime Minister Meir. The President wrote that the matter at hand is a US-Soviet agreement on an immediate ceasefire: "Since the attack on your forces on October 6, we have worked tirelessly for an end to the fighting and bloodshed on terms that would enable you and your neighbors to make a new beginning towards peace." After indicating the benefits of an agreement for Israel, the President clarified to the Prime Minister that he expected a prompt reply to this letter, a reply that would express "full support" for the actions of the United States. The letter was couched in polite terms, but in effect it left Israel no choice but to accept the administration's dictates without delay (Letter from President Richard Nixon, 1973).[7]

The European Countries

In reference to the European countries, Kissinger expressed a very critical and even scathing opinion of their conduct during the war—although this position did not receive prominent public expression. Kissinger said that the Europeans "behaved like jackals. Their behavior was a total disgrace. They did everything to egg on the Arabs. They gave us no support when we needed it. They proclaimed loudly that the Russians had double-crossed us in the declaration of principles we had signed with the Russians," and for them, this justified waiving the policy of détente. Yet they ignored the fact that they themselves had signed similar declarations of principles with the Russians. "Nor were they willing to have any joint moves in the United Nations" (Minutes, 1973).[8]

Kissinger explained that once this crisis was over, in another few days, it "will be absolutely imperative for us" to reassess "just where we are going in our relationship with our allies in Europe. We must also examine what exactly we mean when we speak about the indissolubility of our interests and the total indivisibility of our interests on all issues that are likely to come up" (Minutes, 1973).

The Role of the Soviet Union in the Operation

Kissinger believed that the Russians were not part of the belligerent initiative by Egypt and Syria ("the Soviets did not start it"). They most likely also assessed that the Arabs had no chance of defeating Israel. In the US estimation, said Kissinger, "the Soviets became aware of it around October 3—maybe a little earlier. But it gave them a massive problem, because if they told us and the Israelis pre-empted them, then they would not only have prevented the war, but they would have brought about the defeat of their friends" (Minutes, 1973).

Later, said Kissinger, the Russians began evacuating their personnel from Egypt and Syria. At the military level, the Russians maintained neutrality until the airlift began. Politically, said Kissinger, they pointedly avoided any critical attack on the United States. There was no direct criticism of the United States either in UN debates or in the Russian media, and the military actions of their forces did not feature the kind of provocation that occurred in the Six Day War in 1967 (Minutes, 1973).

At a later stage, there was a massive airlift to the region. Perhaps the Russians assessed that their (Arab) clients would lose and did not want to be blamed for this, or they were trying to generate any possible profit from the crisis by showing loyalty to their allies in the region. He rejected the suggestion that the US would terminate the détente and determined that it was the Soviet Union that initiated the events that eventually led to the war. In Kissinger's view, the détente between the blocs did not interfere with the actions of the United States during the operation (Minutes, 1973).

The Airlift

In the early stages of the war, according to Kissinger, it appeared that Moscow was not eager to agree on a ceasefire. The situation on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts indicated that Israel was in a difficult position and that the Egyptian-Syrian attack would achieve

its objectives. The Soviet Union, therefore, believed that time was on its side and on the side of its allies. In these circumstances, the administration decided that it must find an alternate way of operating to show the Russians that the United States was also able to send an airlift to Israel, its ally in the Middle East ("We could match strategically anything they could put in the Middle East"), and these weapons would reach "more capable hands," i.e., the IDF (Minutes, 1973).

As a result, said Kissinger, the military picture would change and reflect Israel's superiority. This meant that it would be the Soviet Union asking for a ceasefire. That was the main reason why the United States began the airlift to Israel on Saturday, October 13, 1973 (actually October 14). Kissinger said that "having failed to bring the war to a conclusion by diplomatic methods, we concluded that the only way to end the war would be to demonstrate to the Soviets and to the Arabs that the war could not be won by military methods," and that the longer the war continued, the more likely it was that they would ask for a ceasefire" (Minutes, 1973).

Apart from that, Kissinger clarified, the administration estimated that the price the United States would have to pay to maintain relations with the Arab world would increase the longer the war continued. Thus, the administration wanted the fighting to end as quickly as possible. However, "we could not permit Israel to lose" the war, though it was clear that this was what would satisfy the Arabs and bring them to a ceasefire. Therefore, said Kissinger, the US decided to move massively and rapidly. " And this is what we did" (Minutes, 1973).

However, various documents indicate clearly that Kissinger's position on the issue of the airlift to Israel was rather ambivalent, at least in the early stages of the operation: in discussion with leading administration figures on October 9, 1973, Kissinger said explicitly that the administration had four options with respect to Israel's requests for arms: a) approve the requests; b) deny the requests; c) grant partial approval; d) blur the administration's position. Kissinger said that approving the requests would "immediately drive the Arabs wild" (Memorandum of Conversation, 1973a).

Various documents indicate clearly that Kissinger's position on the issue of the airlift to Israel was rather ambivalent, at least in the early stages of the operation.

In another discussion of senior administration figures on October 13, 1973, on the subject of the airlift, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements expressed his opinion that the United States should send a massive airlift to Israel. Kissinger had doubts about this position and claimed that it would mean that the United States would lose all its friends in the Arab world. At that discussion, Kissinger explained that Israel was requesting Hawk missiles. He had doubts whether the United States should approve this request. He argued that the United States could not risk losing its friends in Africa because of Israel. Those states were apparently also asking for Hawk missiles (Memorandum of Conversation, 1973b).

After the war, there were numerous critical allegations about Kissinger's actions with respect to Israel during the war. These claims made Kissinger's blood boil. At a personal meeting with Simcha Dinitz, Kissinger furiously refuted all the allegations: "The campaign against us in Israel and among Jewish organizations," he complained, "is completely out of control. How can they say I am struggling against an Israeli victory when we all know the details." Kissinger claimed that Ambassador Dinitz arrived in the United States on Sunday night (October 7). The talks about Israel's military needs began on Monday and Tuesday. On Wednesday, President Nixon approved the transfer of arms to Israel. Two and half days later, US planes bearing arms landed in Israel: Kissinger said there had never been such an achievement in history. "Nobody could have executed such a thing

so quickly. And all this when in the early days everyone was of the opinion that Israel could destroy the Arabs within a few days." Dinitz rightly avoided challenging the Secretary of State by asking him the obvious question: why did the administration have to wait until Dinitz arrived in the United States? Why did they not initiate contact with the most senior ranks in Israel as soon as the fighting erupted to find out what they could do for Israel in its hour of need, as befitting relations between allies? (Dinitz Conversations, 1974, p. 10).

In an effort to shake off responsibility for the entrenchment of the status quo that led to war, Kissinger hinted that until the outbreak of war, Israel often threatened that excessively heavy pressure on it to join political moves, likely including territorial concessions, would lead to war with the Arabs.

The Profit and Loss Account

Later, said Kissinger, the military state of affairs turned drastically against the Arabs, and the Soviet Union faced a scenario that forced it to decide what it would do if Egypt and Syria faced total collapse. In this situation, said Kissinger, it was possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to reach a joint decision in the Security Council. Referring to the proposal at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on October 22, Prime Minister Meir stressed, "We are not the ones who asked for a ceasefire, and we did not ask anyone to seek a ceasefire on our behalf. There were very difficult and harsh days, but we did not go for this [a ceasefire request]" (Foreign Affairs & Defense Committee, 1973, p. 4).

"This," according to Kissinger, was Security Council Resolution 338, which includes the following main clauses: a) a call to all the parties involved in the fighting to cease firing and end all military actions immediately, and no later than 12 hours after receiving this resolution, at the positions they currently hold; b) a call to the parties concerned, immediately following the ceasefire, to start implementation of all parts of Security Council Resolution 242; c) a decision that immediately, and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations will begin with the parties involved, under suitable auspices, in order to bring about the sense of a just and sustainable peace in the Middle East (Backchannel Message, 1973).

Kissinger said that the fact that the proposed resolution was submitted jointly within a short time by the two powers resulted from the administration's policy from the start of the crisis, which was designed to maintain a respectful dialogue with Russia. We never claimed, said Kissinger, "that we relied on good personal relations with the Soviet leaders. We have never believed that we could substitute charm for reality. All we have said is that we could add into the calculations of reality, as the Soviet leaders saw it, an element of their relationship with the United States to be used when objective conditions permitted it" (Minutes, 1973).

The proposed resolution, Kissinger clarified, stipulates a ceasefire at the current lines held by the forces. In effect, Israel now held more territory than it held before the war, due to its control of the west bank of the Canal. The Soviets had no strategic achievement, since Israel's control of both banks of the Canal meant the Canal would not open for shipping without its consent. The resolution also stipulated implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, passed after the Six Day War, although he said that nobody knew what it really meant. The resolution required them to negotiate directly with Israel under suitable auspices, in effect, the United States and the Soviet Union. For many years, the Arabs refused to participate in direct talks with Israel (Minutes, 1973).

The Arabs scored one achievement in the war, said Kissinger: "respectability. They did not surrender. They fought effectively. And while they were defeated, they were not crushed." But their main gain was to shatter Israel's feeling

of superiority ("this cockiness of supremacy is no longer possible"). Like other countries in history, Israel now understood that it could achieve security only through a combination of military power and diplomacy (Minutes, 1973).

In Kissinger's view, Israel had achieved the following: a) it "avoided the precipice"; b) it won yet another war, albeit at a heavy price; c) it obliged the Arabs to recognize the necessity of direct negotiations; d) its support from the United States received practical validation (Minutes, 1973).

In an effort to shake off responsibility for the entrenchment of the status quo that led to war, Kissinger hinted that until the outbreak of war, Israel often threatened that excessively heavy pressure on it to join political moves, likely including territorial concessions, would lead to war with the Arabs. And Israel assumed that in war, it would achieve a great victory, thanks to US weapons in its arsenal. The outcome of the war would certainly neutralize any political initiative. This concept, Kissinger argued, was no longer valid after the war. The Israelis now understood "that if they get into another war, they must do it with our enthusiastic backing, or they are lost" (Minutes, 1973).

Israel, said Kissinger, was in a state of enormous shock due to its heavy losses. It suffered 6,000 casualties, including 2,000 dead [the source of the figures in this context is not clear] in just two weeks, equivalent to 600,000 American casualties. "That is World War I type casualties. So it will take them a couple or three weeks to absorb the impact of what has happened to them. As far as Israel is concerned, we have to be taken even more seriously than we have been in the past. And our insistence on a more politically oriented policy cannot go unheeded" (Minutes, 1973).

The Soviets had no real achievements, said Kissinger. This is the third time since 1953 that they have lost the weapons they sent to Arab states; they have been defeated once again. Their only achievement was that they succeeded in limiting the extent of the disaster. This situation gives the United States a chance to upgrade its status in the Middle East if it acts wisely and with discipline (Minutes, 1973).

The US situation vis-à-vis the Arabs, said Kissinger, is relatively simple. "We are besieged now with oil company executives who tell us that we have thrown away everything in the Arab world." In the current circumstances, none of these allegations are very relevant. Even those who hate the US know very well "there is no way around us. If they want a settlement in the Middle East, it has to come through us. And that incidentally is the theme that I want us to adopt in a very friendly and conciliatory fashion; that it does not pay to antagonize us, that we cannot be pressured into doing things we do not want to do. So they better get us to want to do [things for] them" (Minutes, 1973).

"We will tell them that we are prepared to make a major contribution to remove the conditions that produced this war…But we will do it as an act of policy and not because somebody is blackmailing us." The Arabs understand this, he said. Egypt stopped its propaganda against the US "because we told them the basic fact of the matter is that they would need us in the post-war diplomacy, and we would not play if they behaved in such a way. So I think now we have a good opportunity to try to move towards a fundamental settlement. We have the forum which was established by the Security Council resolution. We have the reality which was established by the war," which is pushing the parties to move toward a settlement. Today, Israel captured more territory in Egypt. The Soviets and the Arabs are "screaming for another Security Council resolution" (Minutes, 1973).

Kissinger summed up by stating that overall, the events of the Yom Kippur War were a huge success for the United States, but that was not all. In his opinion, the events reflected the success of US policy toward the Soviet Union in the period prior to the war. Without the US success in building close relations with the Soviet Union, there would have been a great risk

of the war escalating into hostilities between the powers. He added, "Not that I am saying that the Soviet Union behaved in a friendly fashion, but that there was enough in the relationship to moderate them at critical points. Paradoxically, we are in a better long-term position in the Arab world than we had been before this started. And finally, we have a better position to bring about a permanent settlement than before" (Minutes, 1973).

Conclusion

The focus of this research is on two major aspects: civil-military relations in Israel and the relations between Israel and the United States.

In retrospect, it is impossible to judge if the decision by the Israeli leadership to avoid a preemptive strike was right or wrong. The Prime Minister and the Defense Minister had to take several critical factors into consideration, including relations with the Nixon administration; the commitments perhaps already made to the administration; the need to ensure United States support for Israel during the war and in its aftermath; and more. The political leaders were well aware of the advantages of a preemptive strike, but the political, economic, and military considerations led them to a solid rejection of the proposal by the Chief of Staff to undertake such a strike.

This decision making reflects proper relations between the political and the military echelons in a democratic state. The Chief of Staff can work to convince the political level to adopt his views and can even exert pressure on the political leaders through various channels. However, the military level is never privy to the wider considerations of the political level, and the last word belongs to the political leaders. These inviolable principles were dictated by the leaders who established the state, foremost among them David Ben Gurion, and were upheld firmly since independence was proclaimed in May 1948 (Shalom, 2022).

Since the end of the Yom Kippur War, dramatic changes have occurred in Israeli civil-military relations. There has been an excessive enhancement of power at the military level and a concomitant decline in power at the political level. This development has led researchers in Israel to suggest that Israel has an army that has a state rather than—as should be the case—a state that has an army.

Indeed, recent months have seen these changes in civil-military relations reach unprecedented levels, with protests and demonstrations throughout the country against the government's proposed judicial overhaul. As described by Kobi Michael (2023), "The IDF, against the wishes and not at the instigation of the top military leadership, but specifically because of the mishandling of developments within the military due to the political crisis, has become a political actor."

The overall balance of the US administration's conduct toward Israel in the various stages of the Yom Kippur War invites questions regarding the bilateral relations. In particular, it raises doubts regarding the common belief that Israel's relations with the United States can be defined as a relationship between allies, even though there is no formal treaty between them. Over the years, several elements have been cited to justify this definition: a) shared values, above all, a commitment to democracy, freedom, and individual rights; b) a deep commitment by the United States to defend Israel's right to exist as the state of the Jewish people; c) the commitment on both sides to fight the axes of evil and the supporters of terror in the international arena; d) close and extensive cooperation on matters of security intelligence and warfare against terror (Ben-Zvi, 1993).

The definition of an alliance between states is based first and foremost on a commitment by each to come to the aid of its ally, if and when the other side is attacked by another state. Over the years, Israeli leaders have stressed that Israel is determined to defend itself with its own forces and does not want direct US military involvement. In certain periods, Israel has weighed the option of a bilateral alliance

with the United States and membership in NATO (Shalom, 2005). However, the formulators of Israel's security policy were always concerned that such an alliance would severely limit Israel's freedom to maneuver and take the initiative against its enemies. Moreover, they have always stressed that such an alliance could not replace Israel's independent defense capabilities but only add to them. At the same time, Israeli leaders clarified that they presumed the United States would give Israel suitable tools for its defense and support it politically in order to provide a political base for its military achievements.

In the Yom Kippur War, Israel, a prima facie ally of the United States, was attacked by countries that were obviously supported by the Soviet Union, at that time the adversary of the US. In such circumstances, it appears that the US administration, while expressing support for Israel, acted in ways that seem incompatible with a relationship between allies:

a. Especially in the critical initial stages, the administration turned a cold shoulder toward Israel. It did not initiate close contacts at the most senior levels in order to demonstrate its commitment and support of an ally at such a difficult time.
b. It worked intensively, if not aggressively, to deny Israel the option of a preemptive strike. In the view of many in the political and military leadership, such a strike would have completely changed the face of the war and given Israel the chance of a dramatic victory.
c. Finally, throughout the discussion, Kissinger made it very clear that the United States had no interest in an unequivocal Israeli victory and the defeat of its enemy, Egypt, as would have been expected from a close ally.

Hopefully Israel will never again find itself in such a terrible position as it was at the opening of the Yom Kippur War. However, current threats from Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other hostile elements compel it to recognize that a new dire scenario is quite possible. The Yom Kippur War teaches that a country such as Israel must assume that even scenarios that it assesses are of very low probability may be realized. It is not impossible that a situation will arise when Israel finds itself in a military confrontation that would again require massive assistance from the United States. Israel must take into account that such assistance may not be forthcoming, certainly not at the time and to the extent that it would like. That Israel must be ready for the worst possible scenario and confront it with its own forces must continue to be the guiding directive for the Israeli leadership.

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The author would like to thank the interns who assisting him in his research: Zhanyang Liu, Linor Gormezano, Shai Shoval, Amit Olami, Michal Bakshi, Sharon Melamed, Ignatius Rivas, Almog Alon, Neriya Gerafi, Sophia Schmidt, and Ben Zion Berkowitz.

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Notes

1 Kissinger noted that Sisco told him that Egypt and Syria were about to attack Israel. It happened about an hour and a half before the operation began. Israel estimated that firing would only start four hours later. See also Harvard University, 2012.

2 Present at the meeting: Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State from February 1973, Acting Secretary of State, September 3–September 22, 1973; Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; David H. Popper, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, June 25, 1973-January 2, 1974; Thomas R. Pickering, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department; Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State from October 1973, member, National Security Council Staff from June 1973. For the views of various elements in the administration regarding the arrangement before the war, see Vanetik and Shalom (2010).

3 Chief of Staff David Elazar said at the pre-dawn meeting on October 6 (p. 3): "A preventive strike could be launched at around 2-3 o'clock in the afternoon." In May 1973 Commander of the Air Force Benny Peled referred to the option of a preventive strike, saying: "If we have grounds or the opportunity or the possibility of delivering a preemptive strike—the first consideration: to hit the Syrian and Egyptian air forces simultaneously, with the following division of force: hit and destroy most of the Egyptian Air Force's airfields, and shut down and destroy all the Syrian Air Force's airfields. After that we will attack the missiles to help the IDF." See presentation of aerial plans to the Minister of Defense, May 22, 1973, p. 4.

4 Foreign Minister Abba Eban confirmed this in his speech to the UN General Assembly on October 8, 1973: "The United States Ambassador was informed, several hours before the assault, that Israel would not take any pre-emptive action [and] would bear the sacrifice which that renunciation implied." See also: Kissinger, 1982.

5 In his interview with Prof. Uri Bar-Yosef and Dr. Ronen Bergman about the Yom Kippur War, Kissinger reminded them that he comes from a German Jewish family that managed to flee Germany before the Holocaust (Yom Kippur War Center, 2021a).

6 On Israel's status in the eyes of the administration before the war, see Vanetik and Shalom (2012b).

7 In fact, Israel's response to the President's letter included a demand for clarifications of various items, stressing the significance of various formulations in Israel's eyes. See Minutes of Government Meeting 20.

8 The Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was signed (Note 12) by the two countries after the summit meeting between Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev on May 29, 1972.

Is the General the Policymaker?

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Shooting and Not Crying: The New Militarization of Israel in the 2000s
by Yagil Levy
Lamda, Open University Press, 2023
448 pages [in Hebrew]

The main theme of Yagil Levy's new book is how political logic is shaped by military logic. What prompted this book is likely Israel's policy toward Hamas, which is characterized, in the words of former IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi, by the desire to deny the enemy its fighting capability, until it is completely quelled. Kochavi even specifically stated that the army must be lethal (p. 260). The drive to defeat the enemy by exerting violent power is contrary to what Levy expects: a statesmanlike approach that would transform Hamas into a sovereign governing entity, tempered by the responsibility incurred by its new status (p. 81).

Furthermore, Levy attributes the rise of military logic among those who would be expected to spout political logic not only to the government, which adopted the Eisenkot-Kochavi doctrine (p. 83), but also to the Israeli left, which, during Operation Protective Edge, joined those who regard Hamas as a terrorist organization (p. 81). Thus, the author claims, instead of looking at the full picture, which includes political prospects, Israeli decision makers, and in fact the entire Israeli public, have been possessed by an approach whereby military prowess has created a belief in our ability to eliminate the military threat lying at our door, ruling out the need for a political solution. Levy calls this process, in which the means (military, force) justifies the end (minimizing casualties) and imposes military logic, "instrumental rationalism" (p. 90). This perception constitutes, according to Levy, the main element in the new militarization of the political culture in Israel; for its part, the new militarization is the common denominator of a series of phenomena, from banning organizations such as B'Tselem from appearing at high schools to the supporting voices that accompanied Elor Azaria on his way to court (pp. 188-189).

The book is constructed in an organized, even didactic manner, and begins with a description of the research field. Levy systematically makes sure to establish his claims on a robust theoretical foundation, starting with an in-depth discussion, based on existing literature, of the terms militarization and legitimacy, and ending with breaking down more complex terms, such as the one he calls "the militarization paradox." This new term describes the historical processes through which modern social arrangements that spurred citizens to be engaged in managing the country, and managing political power as a result, were supposed to impose dominant anti-violent norms. Yet it was the gap between the political culture and the violent reality that generated the dire need of state institutions to justify organized violence.

Joining the theoretical foundation is a historical review that allows the readers to track the chronology of the development of

militarization in the State of Israel. In addition, the review also includes the evolution of the understanding of the limits of power within Israel society at historic milestones, such as the Yom Kippur War, followed by the Camp David Accords, the Lebanon War, the first intifada, the Gulf War, and the unilateral withdrawals (from Lebanon and Gaza). Levy presents geopolitical processes, including an international regime that acts according to specific norms, the mitigation of the sense of existential threat in Israel since the 1980s, and the transition of Israeli society from republican to liberal approaches. Along with these processes, which were expected to strip the society of any militaristic approaches, Levy describes in detail other processes, some of which took place in tandem: the Oslo Accords, the second intifada, and the failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000, which led to a threat on the ethno-national identity, and actually to a reversal of the trend of demilitarization.

Following the definitions and the historical review, the author describes the internal logic behind the explanation for the increasing justification of violence within Israeli society. He presents the book's primary challenges: mapping the characteristics of the new militarization; identifying the explanations for this phenomenon; and attempting to understand the ways in which the militaristic political culture is translated into justification of violence. Throughout the book, with its abundance of analyses and examples, Levy thoroughly explores these challenges, which he positions as road signs to chart his path.

The book's principal claim is that the promotion within the society of the justification for the use of military force—and particularly among the middle class, which is at the base of a democratic society—requires a reduction in the costs of maintaining the conflict (p. 16). Only the reduction of the economic burden of the war and fewer casualties enable the creation of a society that accepts with understanding the exercise of military violence, and often supports it. Levy details the elements of the new militarization and dedicates a separate chapter to each of these elements.

The book claims that the promotion within the society of the justification for the use of military force—and particularly among the middle class, which is at the base of a democratic society—requires a reduction in the costs of maintaining the conflict.

The first element is the weakening affinity between the use of force and political logic, in effect turning political logic into military logic. This chapter is based mainly on Levy's perception, shared by others, that a considerable part of military confrontations, such as Operations Cast Lead (2008) or Protective Edge (2014) were the result of an Israeli failure. According to this premise, Israel could have taken other measures, especially the establishment of a Palestinian state that includes Gaza. It was the turning of political logic into military logic that prevented it. One way or another, this chapter deals to a considerable extent with how instrumental rationalism, namely focusing on tactics (such as targeted assassinations or target banks), underlies Israeli policy (pp. 57-111).

The second element is the way in which the army and politicians alike, as well as actors in the civil sphere, blur the political logic behind the use of force. Levy points to what he calls "creating ignorance as a means for political legitimacy," using as an example the concealment of facts from the public: emphasizing violations of agreements by Israel's enemies while ignoring any violations by Israel (pp. 117-142). The third element is the way in which dehumanization of Arab combatants and leaders has been transformed into dehumanization of Arab society as a whole (pp. 143-176).

The fourth element is the social phenomenon—unlike in the past—of publicly highlighting and displaying violence as a source of pride. To that end, violence undergoes verbal

transformation and normalization, in a form of language laundering. Various terms are formulated to illustrate destruction and killing in way that sounds more pleasant to a civilized ear: surgical action, thwarting, clearing, and so on. Levy also follows the social transformations that have occurred in the IDF, mainly in combat units. He focuses on the argument that the entry of groups that were previously excluded from elite units, primarily religious and Jews of Eastern origin, has also brought about explicit manifestations of the perceptions of such groups and cultivated a new violent discourse. Such a discourse emphasizes, for example, the motive of vengeance as justification for violence. Another example is the use of biblical expressions, such as Amalek or Philistines, when referring to Arabs (pp. 177-264).

The fifth element is the occurrence of intra-military processes, mainly what Levy terms as "Judaization of the army." As part of his perception of this term, he uses the example of the document titled "Destiny and Uniqueness" of 2004, which, with the blessing and authorization of then-Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon, defined the IDF as the army of a country in which Jewish identity forms the core of the national identity of the State of Israel. These processes are accompanied by extra-military processes, mainly the harnessing of the education system to the needs of the army and sealing the army against liberal influences by civil society. The army recruits schools for this mission, actually using them as part of the enlistment process; alongside this propaganda-like activity, the army also encourages technological education in the geographic periphery in order to increase the number of recruits joining technological units (pp. 266-288).

The sixth element is what Levy calls "the unintended paradox," where liberalism absurdly becomes a significant factor in winning hearts and minds for the full justification of the exertion of military violence. In this chapter, Levy discusses a variety of activities in different fields, all boiling down to a presentation of an army whose activities are accepted with understanding by those espousing liberal views: human rights organizations overseeing the army; international law; a technological image focusing on efficiency and precision killing; sensitivity to human lives that transfers the risk from IDF soldiers to the enemy; individualization of bereavement, which leads to depoliticization of the victims; and feminist militarism, which promotes women's roles and their motivation to adopt the full military approach in the name of gender equality (pp. 290-370).

The book is masterfully built, with Levy raising the construction of his claims to no less than an artistic level. However, notwithstanding the strength of the author's thesis, I would like to present several reservations. Levy's approach, evident in his previous works, binds together the support of violence and the reduction of the costs of the conflict (pp. 41-47). This perception entails a neo-Marxist element, which ascribes the understanding of people's behavior to their economic motives. Accordingly, Levy even calls militarism in its older format "materialistic militarism." Quite a few researchers of political psychology might disagree with this approach and find other collective motives for supporting fighting, many of which are actually contrary to the personal economic interest. For example, the increased and often costly participation of religious Zionists in the various fronts can have other explanations, originating from concepts of group identity, such as a national story (narrative) or a civil religion.

Remaining faithful to his neo-Marxist perception, Levy claims that Israel has experienced a breach of the republican agreement between the army and the middle class, which has led to a decrease in the motivation for conscription (p. 35). Full disclosure: this is the tip of the iceberg of a longstanding debate that I have with Yagil Levy. While Levy claims the existence of a contract based on an equation that includes a reward, even if merely a symbolic one, I believe that the essence of republicanism is the view of loyal

citizenship as a moral value and a civil virtue in its own right. Therefore, I am not convinced that the motivation for drafting is actually disintegrating; quite the opposite—the large-scale military campaigns fought by the IDF in recent decades, such as Defensive Shield (2002), Cast Lead (2008), and Protective Edge (2014), were characterized by high fighting spirit in the regular army, as well as the reserves, and not to a lesser extent, civilian voluntary initiatives for supporting the fighting forces that flourished among the civil society.

Levy's historical review also contains some arguable interpretation. According to his perception, Gush Emunim promoted an ethno-national discourse that was materially different from the official state republican discourse supported by the secular elite (p. 33). This interpretation, consistent with Levy's approach, whereby religionization processes are underway in society in general and the military in particular, is not compatible with very significant elements of the statism approach, led by David Ben-Gurion until his departure from the center of the political stage in the 1960s: consider only the message sent by the Prime Minister to the soldiers and commanders of Brigade 9 following the occupation of Sharm el-Sheikh in 1956, in which he defined the state as the "third Kingdom of Israel."

The rationale behind Levy's thesis, that the state has entered an informal contract with militias of settlers performing acts of violence against Palestinians, is unclear (p. 52). Regarding the so-called hilltop youth as militias is not in line with sociological studies that follow this phenomenon and its implications (Mash et al., 2018; Friedman, 2017). Likewise, referring to the authorities granted to military security coordinators in the territories as proof of the delegation of military authorities to the settlers (p. 53) does not reflect the situation precisely. Security coordinators are qualified to perform the military roles based on full military training, and are subject to military command and law. Due to security circumstances, the role of military coordinators in the territories is indeed broader than within Israel proper, but their authorities are anchored in law (IDF—Order no. 432). Therefore, referring to military coordinators as a local militia is no different than referring to reserve units as militias. Even the argument that the policing army serves as a "gray arm" of the state to promote creeping annexation (p. 51) is somewhat of a conspiracy theory. On the contrary, under Israeli control and IDF supervision, Palestinian construction has seen unprecedented expansion in recent years (Ministry of Intelligence, 2021). The Civil Administration's disregard of most instances of this phenomenon may even raise the suspicion that the policing army prefers "industrial quiet," even at the cost of potential future loss of vast territories.

In the chapter on the second element of the new militarism, and particularly the issue of ignorance, Levy mentions the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in general, and the former Executive Director of INSS, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin in particular, as an example of a knowledge agent encouraging ignorance. According to Levy, the Institute's research dealing with Iran's nuclearization lacks depth; it presents the threat as an established fact that does not require any clarification, and hence lacks any discussion of value (pp. 126-128). As a follower of INSS publications, I question this argument. The last annual strategic assessment report of 2023, presented by INSS to President Herzog, is a solid counter-example; actually, the three issues leading the list of security threats in the report are the relations between Israel and the US administration, the implications of the judicial reform, and the Palestinian arena (Hayman et al., 2023). I believe that it would be wiser to look for the propagators of ignorance, as Levy puts it, in other places.

As part of his discussion of dehumanization, Levy quotes former Israel Police Commissioner Roni Alsheikh and former Minister of Defense Moshe Ya'alon, and claims that their attitude toward the issue of *shahids* (Muslim martyrs), is

The book offers a detailed and systematic analysis of processes underway within Israeli society and reflected in its civil-military relations.

nothing short of a moral exclusion of the entire Palestinian society (pp. 152-153). According to Levy, this pattern, which has accompanied the Zionist movement since its early days, is to a certain degree an expression of racism. Without completely denying Levy's perception of the element of dehumanization, it seems to me that the main theme of this chapter could have been shaped without being drawn completely into the Palestinian narrative. This issue—the acceptance of the correctness of the Palestinian view of the conflict—is evident in other parts of the book as well, such as the description of Raed al-Karmi as a military activist who was a member of the Fatah organization (p. 94). One may support Levy's claim that Karmi's assassination occurred at a wrong time and led to an escalation, as is also claimed by others (for instance, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Eiland); but even those arguing that this action was damaging could use a bit more accurate attributes than "military activist" to describe Karmi, or at least mention that his so-called military activity amounted mainly to mass killing—including with his own participation—as well as planning lethal terrorist attacks and supervising their execution.

My most serious reservation was about the comparison in the chapter on the fifth element—between Jewish education in the army (to Levy: Judaization) and the activities of the Nazi Wehrmacht (p. 275). Admittedly, prior to this comparison he notes that the comparative aspect does not offer a complete historical analogy, but this sentence in itself does not eliminate the clear comparison. Levy could have made his point even without this blunder.

In his conclusion, Levy presents three cumulative conditions that he believes could stop the wheels of militarization: a significant increase in the costs of the conflict (in political and economic terms, as well as the death toll); exhaustion of all military options; and a confidence-inspiring peace initiative (pp. 381-382). It seems that for those observing the conflict realistically, these possibilities—all of which, according to Levy, must be fully realized—leave very little hope for a different future in our region.

In conclusion, the book offers a thorough, detailed, and systematic analysis of processes underway within Israeli society and reflected in its civil-military relations. The original arguments presented in a structured form build on the academic studies of other scholars, as well as the previous writings of the author himself. I recommend even those who disagree with Levy's approach to read the sociological analysis presented in the book. One does not necessarily have to accept all claims, but this is definitely a worthwhile work encouraging thinking out of the box in which many of us live.

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

1948, 75 Years Later: Does the "Nakba" Continue?

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Stranger in My Own Land: Palestine, Israel and One Family's Story of Home
by Fida Jiryis
Hurst, 2022
447 pages

Seventy-five years after the establishment of the State of Israel and the creation of the refugee problem, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues, with no end in sight. The choices of the Palestinian national leadership in their attempts to lead their nation—initially the liberation of "Palestine" through armed struggle, and then a political, two-state solution—failed. That the PLO ignored the issue of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel during the Oslo process made it clear that they themselves must face their fate and struggle for their status and their future in the state, and in practice strengthened the trend of their integration in Israel's society and economy. At the same time, some members of the second generation of the "Nakba," including Israeli citizen Fida Jiryis, are unwilling to accept the results of the Nakba and seek to turn the clock back to 1948.

Family Nakba Stories of the Second Generation

Although Fida Jiryis does not come from a refugee family, her autobiographical work can be categorized as part of a wave of literary creations by Palestinian women authors and poets, most of whom are the daughters of refugee families and live in the diaspora. They write in various styles about the events of the 1948 Nakba as their families and members of their people experienced it.[1] This literary phenomenon, which began some two decades after the Oslo process was revealed to be a failure—leaving the Israeli occupation intact while undermining the PLO's role as representative of the Palestinian people—has generated interest among various researchers, particularly in light of the 75th anniversary of the Nakba and the establishment of the State of Israel.

This literature diverges from the establishment ideological literature of the Palestinian national movement that the PLO itself shaped, which served as a means of recruitment for the national struggle and a means to encourage armed struggle (Kanafani, 1966). The personal and familial stories of the Nakba, with the psychological trauma they entailed, were almost never told.[2] The new literature, written by members of the second generation, expresses an increasing need by Palestinian individuals to make their voices heard and to author their own personal narratives and the narratives of their families and their people. In this manner they seek to prove to themselves and to the world that they are surviving, continuing their lives, and maintaining their collective identity, in spite of becoming refugees in 1948 and in spite of the uprooting of 1967, as well as the decades of life under military occupation in conditions

of ongoing national struggle. They thus prove the strength of Palestinian national identity and culture, which were maintained in the transition from one generation to the next.

The book reflects the author's despair at her gloomy personal situation as a member of the Nakba's second generation. In the fifth decade of her life she feels lonely, is in the midst of a severe identity crisis, and has not found her place in her homeland.

The conclusion Jiryis reaches in her book is that the problem of the Palestinian people is with the 1948 Nakba and the establishment of Israel, and not with the 1967 occupation. This clearly places her in the company of writers such as Elias Khoury, who believe the "ongoing Nakba" is still underway, and that one must not reconcile with its consequences (Khoury, 2002).[3] This is in contrast to other writers, such as Emile Habibi (1988) and Mahmoud Darwish (2012), who took the approach that the Nakba was an event in the past and an established fact, and therefore the Palestinians must look ahead and build their future while finding a solution to the consequences of the 1967 war. The latter saw the center of gravity of the conflict with Israel as territorial, and therefore supported partition into two states, so that the return of refugees would be to the borders of the Palestinian state rather than to their homes from 1948.

Professor Said Zidani, an Arab Israeli living in Ramallah, has taken a public stand against the expression "the ongoing Nakba" and claims that it harms the Palestinian cause conceptually, politically, and educationally. He contends that the events of the Nakba took place between the UN decision on partition on November 29, 1947 and the ceasefire agreements between Israel and the Arab states that were concluded on July 20, 1949; during this time the Palestinian people's right to self-determination on its land was denied, and two-thirds of Palestinians were uprooted beyond the borders of Palestine. In his eyes, any attempt to present crimes that took place against the Palestinian people afterwards as an ongoing Nakba originate in irresponsible conceptual confusion (Zidani, 2023).

The Autobiography of Fida Jiryis

The title of Jiryis' autobiographical work represents its central, complex, and pretentious idea: to tell her personal story as a stranger, in exile while in her homeland, thus interweaving the story of the Palestinian people with the story of her family, from the onset of the conflict with Israel until the present day. The book opens with an introductory chapter overviewing the period from 1897-1948, starting with the first Zionist Congress and concluding with the establishment of the State of Israel and the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. The author presents the Jews as a "religious community" and denies that Israel, which was established "on the historic land of Palestine," is the nation-state of the Jewish people (p. 1). The following sixteen chapters describe events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in chronological order, including the stages of armed struggle, popular uprisings, and the failed political process between Israel and the PLO. The author incorporates within this chronological framework her own personal story and the story of her family and her people, and presents them as victims of the 1948 Nakba, whose consequences are still felt today.

The book reflects the author's despair at her gloomy personal situation as a member of the Nakba's second generation, who in the fifth decade of her life feels lonely, is in the midst of a severe identity crisis, and has not found her place in her homeland. At the same time the book presents a dark picture of members of her people living in Israel, which she defines as an apartheid state, as well as those living in territories of the Palestinian Authority under Israeli military rule, which is described as tyrannical and oppressive.

Jiryis was born in 1973 in Beirut to a family that voluntarily left Israel in 1970 and returned

in the wake of the Oslo process in 1995. The first decade of her life was spent in the shadow of the prolonged civil war in Lebanon and the Israeli invasion in 1982. In a chilling chapter of the book, "The Dark Hour," she describes witnessing bombing from air, sea, and land during the siege of West Beirut, the limited supply of food, water, and electricity, and the urgent attempts to escape to hiding places during bombings, given the lack of shelters. "It was completely incomprehensible to us children; we saw the panic-stricken faces of the adults and watched normality evaporate," she writes (p. 208).

Jiryis' autobiography—the story of someone born and raised in exile who only set foot on her homeland for the first time at the age of 22, is suffused with disappointment at the reality of life there, and with desperate searching for home, identity, and belonging. When she comes to Israel she discovers that the "homeland was lost," and her pessimistic writing expresses a deep, unforgiving anger at the State of Israel, for its policy toward its Palestinian citizens and the Palestinians living in PA territories, and for its opposition to the return of refugees to their homes. The content of her book reflects disappointment from her personal situation due to the foreignness and alienation she feels in her homeland, and despair at the chance of an agreement that would secure national independence for her people.

Jiryis's story, narrated in the first person, begins in the 1940s in the Christian village of Fassuta in the hills of the Western Galilee, where her parents were born. Her work of her father, Sabri Jiryis, a lawyer and political activist with a developed Arab nationalist outlook, led to repeated arrests and severe limitations on his freedom of movement and activity imposed by the Israeli military government. This reality led him to emigrate voluntarily to Lebanon in 1970. There he managed the Palestine Research Center and influenced the development of pragmatic thinking on statecraft in the PLO during the 1970s and 1980s. Sabri served as Arafat's political advisor and held secret meetings on his behalf with Jewish and Israeli individuals, including Nahum Goldman. The author's mother was killed in February 1983 in a car bombing at the entrance to the building where the Palestine Research Center operated, which was most likely carried out by a Lebanese Christian organization.

The book tells the story of seven and a half decades of blood-soaked conflict between two national movements struggling for the same piece of land, characterized by asymmetric power relations and dwindling chances of resolution. The author, who is not a historian, tells the story of the conflict from a vantage point that is both personal-familial and Palestinian nationalist. Her effort to relate the details of the historical developments of the conflict is admirable, but readers will notice historical inaccuracies, missing contexts, and imbalanced descriptions. For example, the principled and absolute rejection by the Palestinians and Arab states of the two-state partition plan (Resolution 181), which was approved by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, is not mentioned as context or as a direct cause of the war that broke out in 1948 (Zureiq, 1948). Jordan's administrative disengagement from the West Bank in the summer of 1988 in the context of the first intifada, which constitutes a central historic event in the story of the Palestinian people, finds no mention in the book.

Encountering the Homeland, the Village, and the Family

The author's encounter with the reality of life in the shadow of the national conflict between the State of Israel, of which she is a citizen, and the Palestinian people, to which she belongs, shook her world and offered her soul no respite. Her encounter with her homeland and her extended family raised questions about personal, social, existential, ethical, national, political, and religious identity—both in relation to Israeli Jewish society and in relation to Arab

Palestinian society. Her encounter with the villagers of Fassuta was a clash of cultures. She quickly became aware of the deep cultural and social gaps between herself and them; they were members of a collective, patriarchal, conservative society, while she was a young individualist educated in the West.

The author's outlook on the conflict is thus fundamentally pessimistic. Her book conveys the message there is no chance and there has never been a chance to achieve peace with the State of Israel.

Her accumulated experiences encountering her homeland and her exposure to the reality of life of her compatriots in Israel and the PA territories led the author to the conclusion that there is no difference between the Nakba and the occupation of 1947, on the one hand, and the Naksa and the 1967 occupation on the other hand. In her view, Israel is working to maintain its ethnic Jewish purity (p. 407), and its apartheid policy is directed at dispossessing Palestinians from their homes and their lands; Israel is systematically taking over their territories; and harsh violence is used against them on a daily basis (p. 429). In her view, Israel's "conflict management" policy aims solely to perpetuate the occupation. She therefore criticizes the Palestinian leadership for continuing to believe in the Oslo Accords and the partition of the land between the two peoples.

The intergenerational comparison between the father, lawyer Sabri Jiryis, and his daughter, is unavoidable and fascinating. The father adopted the pragmatic political approach as early as the 1960s, within which he viewed the establishment of a Palestinian state on part of the homeland as a possible resolution; he influenced the outlook of the PLO leadership in this direction during the 1970s and 1980s. After the Oslo Accords he concluded that Israel was not interested in a political resolution that would lead to the partition of the land. His daughter, who with her arrival in her homeland experienced life both in Israel and in the PA territories, reached two main conclusions. First, the central problem of the conflict is not the 1967 borders, but rather the very existence of Israel as a state born out of ethnic cleansing in 1948, on lands stolen from the country's native inhabitants. Second, the suffering, trials, and travails that the Palestinian people faced as a result of the establishment of Israel and the Nakba in 1948 continue today. She believes that if not for these events, her fate as the daughter of a family from an Arab village in the Galilee, like the fate of the Palestinians as a people, would necessarily be different, and better.

Consequently, the father, as a member of the generation that experienced the Nakba, and his daughter, as a member of the second generation, have an almost shared, despairing outlook, whereby there is no point in pursuing a pragmatic approach to the conflict with Israel or in endorsing a fruitless solution of partitioning the land into two states. Both also admit today that they feel like strangers in their homeland.[4]

The author's outlook on the conflict is thus fundamentally pessimistic. Her book conveys the message there is no chance and there has never been a chance to achieve peace with the State of Israel. The element of her worldview that is nonetheless optimistic relates to the resilience of the Palestinian people. She boasts proudly of the fact the Palestinians within and outside their homeland continue to exist as a collective and to maintain their national identity, despite the Nakba and despite all attempts to dispossess them of their land, break their spirit, and blur their identity. It is true that the PLO leadership failed when it gave into the temptation to recognize Israel during the Oslo process, but in her words, the fact remains that one generation passed on and another took the reins, and the current generation is carrying on the national identity and leading the resistance, aspiring to end the occupation and fulfill the refugees' right of return.

The Nakba as a Defense Mechanism against Personal and National Self-Criticism

It seems that the author's description of herself throughout the autobiography as a direct victim of the Nakba, like the way she describes the Palestinian people, is a kind of defense mechanism that allows her to blame an external entity, namely, Israel. This defense mechanism makes any personal or national soul-searching or self-criticism superfluous, and makes it difficult to draw conclusions or lessons in order to correct a course or plan the future by setting realistic and achievable targets and progressing toward their implementation.

On the personal level, self-criticism would have allowed the author to relate to the traumatic events she experienced during her childhood in exile, including the loss of her mother and life in the shadow of war in a foreign country, and to understand their weight and their role as elements that influenced her personality and her adult life. Consequently, the lack of self-criticism and the one-sided and imbalanced presentation of existing reality denied her the ability to cope with her past, to free herself from the sense of victimhood, and to find her place in society and in her land. In a confession from the epilogue, she admits that since the time she arrived in her homeland, she has been struggling to find her place: "Is it as a 'citizen' in a state that discriminates against me and labors to negate my existence; a member of the Palestinian community in Israel that suffers as inferior citizens; or a Palestinian among my brethren in the Palestinian territory, whose lives are a story of suffering each day?" (p. 427).

In the same fashion the book lacks a measure of national criticism, regarding the weight of responsibility of Palestinian national movement leaders for the type of strategic decisions they made while waging an armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine, and later in waging a political struggle for a resolution with Israel. Thus, for example, the conduct of PLO factions in Jordan in 1969-1971, which led to their expulsion to Lebanon; Yasir Arafat's support for Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War, which caused significant economic and political damage to the PLO; the nature of PLO decisions during the Oslo process, which allowed Israel to continue building settlements, left the occupation in place, and worsened the situation of the Palestinian people; and generation of the deep rift in the Palestinian arena between a national authority supported by the West and moderate Arab states, and an Islamic authority supported by Iran (al-Taher, 2019; Khalidi, 2006).

The fact is that the Palestinian leadership failed in its attempt to lead its nation to fulfilment of its national desires. Blaming Israel alone and abstaining from self-criticism prevent the possibility of recognizing strategic mistakes that were made and suggesting practical steps toward change and repair. Without a deep examination and profound soul-searching for the reasons behind the gloomy state of the Palestinian people, the Palestinians and their leadership will find it difficult to chart a practical path toward fulfilling their right to self-determination.

Along with Palestinian authors from the 1960s and 1970s who refused to accept the defeat of 1948, such as Ghassan Kanafani (Kanafani, 1963, 1966), the author too refuses to accept the fact of the Nakba. She believes that Israel is responsible for the situation of the Palestinians, and that repairing the results of the Nakba will only be possible after the wheel of history is rolled back, and the right of return for refugees is implemented in practice (Falah Saab, 2023). At the same time, she does not offer a practical path for the young Palestinian generation. She concludes her epilogue with a rhetorical question: "Yet, how long can this last against the winds of freedom, justice, human rights, and equality?"(p. 429).

Arab Authors in Israel: "There is Life after the Nakba"

Jiryis describes the conditions of her life as an Israeli citizen from the Arab-Palestinian minority,

and projects her experiences onto the entire community. She portrays a dismal and hopeless reality, in which Israel works incessantly to negate the existence of the Arab minority. In so doing, she ignores the far-reaching benefits that members of this minority have enjoyed in terms of their social, economic, and political status and their many accomplishments, notwithstanding the discriminatory policies they have suffered. They have come a long way in terms of social and cultural interaction with the Jewish society in which they reside, and the new middle class that has emerged within their ranks is struggling to achieve full rights as citizens and indigenous people. This trend was given added impetus by the Palestinian Liberation Organization's decision to ignore their interests during the political talks with Israel, since Arab citizens of Israel learned that they would have to look out for their own status and future as a minority in Israel. They demand full partnership in the decision making process of Israel and recognition that they are an integral part of Israeli society.

In factual terms, Arab society in Israel is forming itself increasingly into a (civilian) community, separate from the other parts of the Palestinian people, and the vast majority of its members are not willing to renounce their Israeli citizenship for citizenship of any other entity. This is notwithstanding the fundamental national tension that exists and the sense of exclusion and alienation from the Jewish state, given laws like the nation-state law. They are increasingly integrated into the Israeli economy, society, culture, higher education, government, the healthcare system, and a wide range of other vocations; they contribute to the building of the country and they engage in broad reciprocal trade with the Jewish society in many areas.

Many members of Arab society in Israel today have a hybrid identity, Palestinian and Israeli, and unlike the author, they recognize Israel's right to exist, even if they object to its self-definition as a Jewish state. This dual identity provides them with an opportunity to free themselves from the traditional frameworks that were forced upon their parents' generation. Arab writers from the second generation after the Nakba, for example, who were raised on a culture that was committed to the national struggle and dedicated to memories of the lost homeland, understood that dealing exclusively with the conflict led to the atrophy of Palestinian creativity. These writers are now determined to turn over a new leaf and address "life itself" in their writing, since, as they see it, the Palestinian story is not just checkpoints and rocks. They seek to generate a significant change in the social and cultural structure and want to address painful issues in the patriarchal Arab society, such as the status of women and homophobia (Bsoul, 2017).

Even those who still address the national issue now offer a different perspective on the conflict. Take, for example, Prof. Nidaa Khoury, the poet and writer from Fassuta, who has been a standard bearer for the Palestinian national struggle for decades and is now calling for the Israeli and Palestinian sides to end their struggle for territory. She proposed a humanist and universalist approach that would be more suited to the new era of humankind, which exists in a virtual space where there are no borders. This kind of thinking, she explains, will allow nations to liberate themselves from the traumas of the past and from a place of victimhood, and to focus on freeing people and society from the chains of tradition and religion (Goldberg, 2009).[5]

In conclusion, writing an autobiography might have been therapeutic for Fida Jiryis and might have helped her overcome the scars she suffered in the past. Combining her personal story with the Nakba and the Palestinian tragedy allowed her to be part of the collective and to place the blame for her dire situation on an external element, i.e., Israel, but, at the same time, it prevented her from looking inward at herself, something that is essential in healing traumatic, unresolved experiences from the past.

It seems, therefore, that the Western audience that she was aiming for in her book, which was written in English, can get only a general idea about the conflict and identify with the sense of victimhood that accompanies her. Israeli readers, meanwhile, will no doubt find it hard to accept the content of the book, especially given its one-sidedness, its limited credibility, and its being an indictment against Israel as a purported apartheid state. Israelis will see it as a manifest for the Palestinian national narrative more than an autobiography in which one can identify with the protagonist.

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Notes

1 One of the best-known is Susan Abulhawa, daughter of parents from East Jerusalem who now live in the United States. Her debut work, *Mornings in Jenin* (2006), describes the travails and tragedies of a Palestinian family expelled in 1948 from the village of Ein Hod who ended up in the Jenin refugee camp. Her second book, *The Blue Between Sky and Water* (2015), also relates the history of a family expelled in 1948 from the village of Beit Daras, which was destroyed and burned down, and the long and difficult journey to a refugee camp in Gaza. The two books were translated into 20 languages and became global bestsellers.

2 See in this context the article by Rosemary Sayigh (2013) discussing that almost no literature describing "trauma from the past" was written about the 1948 Nakba. The exception is Ghassan Kanafani's 1963 autobiographical novel.

3 This motif repeats itself in Khoury's weekly column in *al-Quds al-Araby*. See for example his commentary on the Israeli plan to regulate the Bedouin issue in the Negev (the "Prawer plan") (Khoury, 2013).

4 The title of the author's book, *Stranger in My Own Land*, is very similar to the title of one of the chapters of the important 1966 book by her father, Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, "Strangers in Their Own Land." This was the first book written in Hebrew on the Palestinian minority in Israel. The book was translated into Arabic and other languages. See also Melamed, 2019.

5 From an interview conducted by Amit Goldberg with poet and writer Prof. Nidaa Khoury.

Israel and the Region: Still Trapped in a Maze

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Middle Eastern Maze: Israel, the Arabs, and the Region, 1948-2022
by Itamar Rabinovich
Maarachot and the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2022
486 pages [in Hebrew; published in English, Brookings Institution, 2023]

Middle Eastern Maze by Prof. Itamar Rabinovich is based on two of his previous books, *The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East, 1948-2011* (Brookings, 2012) *and Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs 1948-2003* (Princeton University Press, 2004). In his new book, Rabinovich combines insights drawn from his rich diplomatic experience as Israel's Ambassador to the United States and Israeli negotiator with Syria with the conclusions of a long-time historian and researcher of the Arab-Israeli conflict. His purpose is to lead readers through the winding Middle East maze that Israel has navigated since its establishment in 1948. Out of the tangled events, the author proposes a dual and ostensibly paradoxical thesis: on the one hand, the center of gravity of the regional dispute involving Israel has moved from Arab states to Iran; on the other hand, the Palestinian question, at the root of the conflict, is still at the heart of the Middle East agenda and refuses to go away (p. 11).

This thesis was honed in the years 2012-2022, the period that separates this book from its predecessor, and the events of those years justify the expansion and update of that book. The last decade included the aftershocks of the so-called Arab Spring, the recurrent outbursts of violence between Israel and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the nuclear deal (JCPOA) between Iran and the great powers and its collapse, three United States presidents, an ongoing political crisis in Israel, the signing of the Abraham Accords, and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, whose end is still not in sight.

The book has 11 chapters, most with a chronological orientation: a background chapter that summarizes the course of the conflict in the years 1948-1991; three chapters that focus on the peace process that began with the Madrid Conference, continued with the Oslo Accords, and ended with the second intifada; two chapters devoted to the regional changes during the governments of Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert; three chapters covering the decade that began with the Arab Spring and ended with the Abraham Accords; and finally two thematic chapters discussing the nature of Arab-Jewish relations and Arab attitudes to normalization.

With the period it covers, *Middle Eastern Maze* speaks to the new book by Eli Podeh, *From Mistress to Known Partner: Israel's Secret Relations with States and Minorities in the Middle East, 1948-2020* (Am Oved, 2022), and adds to it. While Podeh focuses on the level of covert relations, Rabinovich mainly discusses

the overt layer, and while Podeh looks deeply into bilateral contacts between selected Arab states and Israel, Rabinovich takes a bird's eye view of historical events, describing a variety of changing perspectives. For example, the Oslo Accords and the peace treaty with Jordan are examined against the background of internal Palestinian and internal Israeli disputes around the peace process, the concerns of regional actors such as Syria and Egypt, and the international interests of the United States (pp. 52-53, 60-61, 66, 76-79).

The book does not overlook historical episodes that are mired in public and academic controversy, and above all the failure of the 2000 Camp David Summit, notwithstanding the unprecedented concessions offered to the Palestinians by then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The author proposes four competing explanations for the failure of the talks: the first, called the "orthodox" explanation, places most of the blame on Yasir Arafat, who was unable to grasp the momentous nature of the opportunity; the second, the "revisionist" explanation, puts the blame on Barak's mishandling of the negotiations; the third, the "deterministic" explanation, claims that the summit was doomed to failure due to political circumstances in Jerusalem and Washington; the fourth, the "eclectic" explanation, splits the responsibility between all the parties involved (pp. 162-178).

Contrary to previous studies on this subject (for example, Sasson, 2004, pp. 277-280; Morris, 2012, pp. 95-105), Rabinovich avoids a definitive choice among the four proposed narratives, but it seems that he leans toward the eclectic. He notes that Arafat withdrew compromise offers regarding the territories of the future Palestinian state and refused to be flexible on the issues of refugees, Jerusalem, and the end of the conflict (pp. 153-154). At the same time, he is sensitive to the Palestinian assumption that Israel was weak and further concessions could be squeezed from it, and criticizes the Israeli negotiators who were unable to express clearly and provide a solid basis for their demand to maintain sovereignty over a small part of the West Bank (pp. 179-181).

Later Rabinovich criticizes Abu Mazen for his refusal to commit in writing to the understandings that were achieved in the negotiations that began in November 2007 with the Ehud Olmert government at the Annapolis Conference, and defines this as "a serious error" (p. 256). He notes that Olmert gave the Palestinians the most far-reaching offer they had ever received but they chose not to respond, due to the Israeli Prime Minister's shaky political status and with the vain hope that they could win further concessions in talks mediated by the Obama administration, which assumed office in January 2009.

Out of the tangled events, the author proposes a dual and ostensibly paradoxical thesis: on the one hand, the center of gravity of the regional dispute involving Israel has moved from Arab states to Iran; on the other hand, the Palestinian question, at the root of the conflict, is still at the heart of the Middle East agenda and refuses to go away.

Benjamin Netanyahu served as Prime Minister for much of the period covered by the book. His first government (1996-1999) is accused of slowing down the peace process with the Palestinians, whether deliberately or because of inexperience, evidenced inter alia by the uncoordinated opening of the Western Wall Tunnel, the internal differences that clouded the work of the government, and the reduced interest in the peace process shown by the US administration. Rabinovich describes how satisfaction with Netanyahu's election—in Jordan (hoping that his victory would prevent hasty moves to set up a Palestinian state) and in Egypt (wanting to pull back slightly from the realization of Shimon Peres's vision of "the new Middle East")—was replaced by a crisis in their relations with Israel due to what they saw as an extreme change in his government's policy (pp. 102-114).

Netanyahu's lengthy second term of office (2009-2021) is discussed mainly in the context of the Arab Spring and the Abraham Accords. The author believes that the change in the Prime Minister—from acceptance of the two-state principle in the Bar-Ilan speech in June 2009, to a freeze on the Israeli-Palestinian track in the past decade—is connected to his perception that a period of regional upheaval and uncertainty requires a more cautious approach that avoids concessions. In parallel, Netanyahu invested much effort in promoting routes to regional peace with the Gulf states and pushed aside the Palestinian problem in favor of focusing on the Iranian issue (pp. 271-299). As Rabinovich sees it, the US withdrawal in 2018, with Netanyahu's encouragement, from the 2015 nuclear deal achieved the opposite of its desired aim, and brought Iran closer to the status of a nuclear threshold state (p. 310).

Readers who wish to study the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict in a regional and broad international context will find great value in this text.

The Abraham Accords are presented by Rabinovich as the ironic and unplanned outcome of Donald Trump's "deal of the century," to which Netanyahu was pushed by default, after the US administration opposed the annexation of areas of the West Bank, due to pressure from Defense Minister Benny Gantz, Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi, and Arab countries. As such, he in effect adopts the narrative presented by Barak Ravid in his book *Trump's Peace* (2022). The added value of the analysis by Rabinovich is its placement of the Abraham Accords within a broad historical perspective, mainly as the outcome of shared Arab-Israeli challenges that emerged during the previous decade due to threats from Iran, Turkey, and Salafi-jihadist terror, reduced United States involvement in Middle East affairs, and increasing opportunities for economic and energy collaboration (pp. 379-399).

The book's two thematic chapters can easily stand alone, but remain detached from the book as a whole. While the chapter dealing with the web of relations in the Middle East broadens the debate on the roles of Turkey, Iraq, and Israel's Arab minority in the regional dynamic, it also repeats much of the content of previous chapters, and deviates from the book's chronological structure. It would have been better to make use of the important new items it includes—such as the negative role played by Egypt at the 2000 Camp David Summit (p. 320)—to enrich the relevant chapters. For its part, the chapter on the Arab discourse regarding normalization lacks an up-to-date discussion of positions that have arisen over the last two decades in online media. Technological innovations paved the way for the emergence of a new, young Arab generation of intellectuals, bloggers, and activists on social media, for whom Arab-Israeli normalization is no longer an abstract idea but a daily reality, even if largely conducted in cyberspace (Sallam & Winter, pp. 26-28).

The book is easy to read, although more thorough editing would improve its quality. In some places there are typographical and design errors (for example on pages 83, 103, 225). More jarring are the lack of necessary corrections and updates of some details that appeared in previous versions of the book: contrary to what is stated in the text, Operation Cast Lead took place 14 years before the book was published, and not just four (p. 261); David Petraeus has not been the director of the CIA since 2012 (p. 267); the civil war in Syria has claimed half a million victims and not 8,000 (p. 282); Mohamed Sid-Ahmed's book *After the Guns Fall Silent* was published almost 50 years ago and not over 25 years ago (p. 412). These are just a few examples, but they should be corrected in its online electronic version or when another edition of the book is printed.

In conclusion, readers who wish to study the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict in a regional and broad international context will find great

value in this text. Rabinovich has enriched the academic bookshelf with an essential, succinct, and free accessible guide that will be very useful to anyone who wishes to navigate the Middle East maze that continues to challenge Israel, even 75 years since its establishment. In the closing chapter of the book, the author adds a message with echoes for the future (pp. 444-447): while Israel has had the opportunity to form new normalization agreements with new Arab countries and to reinforce some aspects of the older agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is at the heart of the Arab-Israeli struggle, has only grown deeper. The sub-text is that the viable way to exit the maze was and will continue to be dependent on the resolution of this conflict.

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What Do the Ultra-Orthodox and Secular Fear?

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When the Ultra-Orthodox Become the Majority
by Yitzik Crombie
Miskal (Yediot Books), Beit Yotzer Israel Series, 2022
350 pages [in Hebrew]

The ultra-Orthodox ideology of segregation from the State of Israel and its symbols and how the state addresses this phenomenon may propel Israel to the brink of an existential crisis. The Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that by 2065 every fourth Israeli citizen will be ultra-Orthodox. As long as the non-ultra-Orthodox majority actively wishes to have the ultra-Orthodox minority assimilated, or at least integrated, into the general population, the ultra-Orthodox will regard such attempts as a threat to their symbolic existence. This fact creates a mutual sense of distance, alienation, and contempt, which maintains and perpetuates barriers to ultra-Orthodox integration, and even increases their isolationism.

In *When the Ultra-Orthodox Become the Majority*, Yitzik Crombie, a social and hi-tech entrepreneur, reveals just how much this subject is close to his heart. The book, written in plain language and a friendly and heartfelt tone, is divided into ten chapters, covering four subjects related to the ultra-Orthodox sector: ideology, education, conscription into the IDF, and the economy. Including many important points, the book skillfully presents a magnificent and rare composition, combining current academic research and words of Torah, religious thoughts, stories of Jewish sages, and historical reviews. All these are accompanied by anecdotes from the author's personal experience, gained through his activities as a social entrepreneur involved in both the secular and ultra-Orthodox worlds.

This book is a must on every Israeli bookshelf, especially among those dealing with the study of Israeli or Jewish society. Besides its theoretical contribution, it provides a singular reading experience. Few authors are capable of conveying the sense that they are actually present in the same room with the readers, reaching out to them and leading them on a personal, pleasant, and enriching tour through the contents of a book, and Crombie is definitely one of them. He presents the painful truth as it actually is, honestly attempting to unfold the scene in a balanced and unbiased manner, yet with a degree of charm and grace, softening the reality with humorous and light references. Thus, the final product allows ultra-Orthodox and non-ultra-Orthodox readers alike to sit back, read, identify, and understand.

Perhaps two short excerpts concerning the drafting of the ultra-Orthodox best reflect the spirit of the entire book:

> 19-year-old Moishe is long weary of studying, and running about on dunes with a rifle on his shoulder sounds like

> a much more thrilling experience. So Moishe arrives at the IDF Induction Center ("bakum") and sits down in front of a female soldier...Moishe is well taken care of. He serves with fellow men and eats glatt kosher food in the mess hall, all in accordance with law and custom. And then comes Memorial Day, and a female soldier goes on stage, preparing to sing. Oy vey! A woman's voice! The ultra-Orthodox soldier is trapped between his duty to take part in the ceremony, and *halacha* [Jewish law]...If Moishe is smart, and his commander is willing to turn a blind eye, a short visit to the restroom may be a good solution to those five critical minutes. Yet at events of larger scale, especially those of high public profile, such an encounter may prove disastrous for Moishe and damage the trust between the army and the ultra-Orthodox. (pp. 216-217)

> The ultra-Orthodox have no problem with matters of spirit, values, and ethics, as long as they are determined by God and rabbinical authority—and not by the drafter of the IDF Code of Ethics, Prof. Asa Kasher. However, the spirit of the IDF, though imbibing from the generations of Jewish tradition, is light years away from the spirit of ultra-Orthodox Judaism, and when the IDF, being a secular army, defines these values, the ultra-Orthodox can by no means identify with them...Just as a secular person would not educate his son according to the values and ethics of the Ponevezh yeshiva, the ultra-Orthodox are afraid to send their children to the IDF's melting pot, where they might absorb Israeli-secular values. (pp. 219-221)

Alongside its many strengths, the book seems to lack adequate clarity on some issues and includes some lack of precision, for example, regarding ultra-Orthodox education. There is immense importance attached to this issue, regarded by many as a key to a successful integration of the ultra-Orthodox in Israeli society, and it necessarily extends to other issues, such as isolationism, military service, and the integration in the workforce.

The belief that civics, math, and English classes in elementary school would necessarily prompt the ultra-Orthodox to rush to higher education, the IDF, and the workforce embodies a certain degree of condescension and a sense of disrespect toward ultra-Orthodox ideology and people.

The belief that civics, math, and English classes in elementary school would necessarily prompt the ultra-Orthodox to rush to higher education, the IDF, and the workforce embodies a certain degree of condescension and a sense of disrespect toward ultra-Orthodox ideology and people. Although this premise has not yet been validated or even empirically proven, it is widespread among many people and entities, which makes the discourse on this issue rather inaccurate, and even erroneous at times. When reading the chapter dealing with education, I sometimes had the impression that this conception had infiltrated certain parts of the book, causing one to ignore different methodological facts.

For example, the book cites, inter alia, the poor achievements of ultra-Orthodox schools in comparative exams (Meitzav) (p. 119), failing to mention the fact that no exempt institutions take part in these exams. Paradoxically, it is ultra-Orthodox schools that wish to teach their students core subjects that participate in the Meitzav exams. These institutions enjoy generous funding, and their teaching staff meet the requirements of the Ministry of Education. In the absence of an alternative explanation to the relatively poor achievements of these schools, it would seem that the learning capabilities of

the students sent by their parents to institutions that teach core subjects are not high enough.

A second point: The author vaguely refers to the societal affiliation of ultra-Orthodox parents wishing to expose their children to core studies. He refers to them alternately as elitists (p. 131), and elsewhere as modern ultra-Orthodox (p. 136). Later (p. 138), however, he notes that modern families refrain from sending their sons to institutions that teach core subjects. Therefore, it should be stressed that no detailed and valid survey exists of the families whose sons study core subjects. The absence of such mapping makes it difficult to examine the existing model and try to draw any applicable conclusions regarding the ultra-Orthodox education system. One may assume, based on the existing evidence, that very few of the parents of these students, if any, dedicate their lives to studies at a Kollel (advanced full-time Judaic studies program for men). The various factors leading to this situation require thorough examination and qualitative as well as quantitative explanations. Based on my own experience with these research studies, I can say that any attempt to examine the matter in a level-headed and objective manner encounters barriers and covert as well as overt objections, particularly on the part of the non-Orthodox, seemingly due to the difficulty involved in listening and in critical introspection regarding the purity of the intentions and concern toward the ultra-Orthodox population. This applies to the authorities in general and researchers in particular.

The issue of the professional training of the ultra-Orthodox has significance for the future of the State of Israel. According to the State Comptroller's report of 2019, 76 percent of ultra-Orthodox students are likely to drop out of their studies—a cause for concern for the country's future. Many tend to attribute these dropout rates primarily to difficulties resulting from the lack of core studies at elementary schools. Those propounding this view urge incentivizing ultra-Orthodox institutions to include core subjects within their curricula, mainly by imposing fines or various sanctions.

Yet surprisingly, some of the entities and individuals acting to implement core studies in ultra-Orthodox institutions specifically prevent the existence of culture-sensitive academic frameworks that would enable ultra-Orthodox men and women to study separately. Thus, while these entities state that their activities are intended to aid the integration of the ultra-Orthodox in the workforce, their actions work to the opposite effect. They seem to be unaware of the inherent contradiction within their activity, and they might also be assured that their course of action actually benefits the ultra-Orthodox and the general population. An example of this phenomenon can be found in Crombie's reference to the Supreme Court's approach toward integration of the ultra-Orthodox in higher education. While the Supreme Court has declared the importance of integrating the ultra-Orthodox in higher education, it has imposed many restrictions and in effect denies the ultra-Orthodox the possibility to obtain higher education and advanced academic degrees while preserving their identity and values. Crombie notes:

> However, the Supreme Court has established several balancing factors in order to offset potential discrimination against female students who wish to study in mixed gender departments, as well as female lecturers wishing to teach courses intended for men. It has also been determined that separate programs will be offered during B.A. studies, but not for advanced degrees...During the deliberations, the justices claimed that segregated courses harm the principle of equality to a certain extent, but ruled that they are "reasonably proportionate"... and that the purpose of the segregation is to allow better integration of ultra-Orthodox men and women in higher

education and the workforce, which constitutes an interest of individuals as well as Israeli society at large.

The Court's ruling injects a new element. Contrary to the conception that regards segregation as a basic right of students, as established by law in 2007, the Supreme Court "apologized" for having to allow segregation and cede the equality principle, as segregation serves an important purpose—integrating the ultra-Orthodox in the academia... This glass ceiling blocks many ultra-Orthodox from even considering academic studies, since they realize that the purpose is to integrate them in the secular society and change their way of life. Higher education does not recognize the right of the ultra-Orthodox to study according to their lifestyle and religious principles, keeping them away. (pp. 176-177)

Critical studies regarding culture (acculturation) and relations between majority and minority groups have suggested repeatedly that research in this field is indeed psychologically biased. This bias causes researchers within the majority group to forget that the customs and values of the minority group are not necessarily wrong, and thus in turn they interpret the findings erroneously. Researchers may often, in good faith (or not), wrongfully rely on misleading information or misguided interpretations that have taken root with those who first shoot the arrow (core studies), and only then mark the target (advancement and integration of the ultra-Orthodox society). As long as no body of theoretical and empirical knowledge is built from the ground up by a diverse team of researchers that includes some who advocate core studies for the ultra-Orthodox, as well as some who oppose it, this field will be flawed and not be able to constitute an informative and reliable body of knowledge, based on reasonable, balanced facts. Given that, the few errors found in the book may be regarded as acceptable, since the author relied on misleading information that has come to be accepted over the years. This is especially true considering the author's evident efforts to clarify and validate the information to the best of his ability.

Yitzik Crombie's book is an excellent work that provides an enriching, detailed, and thoughtful glimpse into the complex relations between the State of Israel and the ultra-Orthodox population.

In summary, Yitzik Crombie's book is an excellent work that provides an enriching, detailed, and thoughtful glimpse into the complex relations between the State of Israel and the ultra-Orthodox population. Although this is an explosive issue that is close to the heart of most Israeli citizens, Crombie has managed to present it in a reader-friendly manner, providing readers with relevant, up-to-date, and comprehensive information that can prompt a paradigm shift and constructive curiosity in searching and identifying potential solutions that would secure a better future for the State of Israel.

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Call for Papers for *Strategic Assessment*

The editorial board of the INSS journal *Strategic Assessment* invites authors to submit articles to be published in the journal's updated format. Proposals for special themed issues are also welcome.

Strategic Assessment, a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary peer-reviewed journal on national security, cyber, and intelligence, was launched in 1998 and is published in Hebrew and English by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University. *Strategic Assessment*, accredited by the Planning and Budgeting Committee of the Council for Higher Education in Israel, serves as a platform for original research on a spectrum of issues relating to the discipline of national security, cyber, and intelligence. The purpose of the journal is to spark and enhance an informed, constructive debate of fundamental questions in national security studies, using an approach that integrates a theoretical dimension with policy-oriented research. Articles on topics relating to Israel, the Middle East, the international arena, and global trends are published with the goal of enriching and challenging the national security knowledge base.

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The editorial board encourages researchers to submit articles that have not been previously published that propose an original and innovative thesis on national security with a broad disciplinary approach rooted in international relations, political science, history, economics, law, communications, geography and environmental studies, Israel studies, Middle East and Islamic studies, sociology and anthropology, strategy and security studies, technology, cyber, conflict resolution, or additional disciplines.

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Research Forum—academic articles of a theoretical and research nature on a wide range of topics related to national security, of up to 8000 words in Hebrew or 10,000 words in English, including source material (with APA-style documentation). Articles should be researched-based and include a theoretical perspective, and address a range of subjects related to national security. All articles are submitted for double blind peer review. Submissions must include an abstract of 100-120 words; keywords (no more than ten); and a short author biography.

Policy Analysis—articles of 1500-3000 in Hebrew words and up to 3,500 words in English that analyze policies in national security contexts. These articles will be without footnotes and bibliography and use hyperlinks to refer to sources, as necessary. Recommended reading and additional source material can be included. Submissions must include an abstract of 100-120 words; keywords (no more than ten); and a short author biography.

Professional Forum—panel discussions on a particular topic, or in-depth interview, of 2000-3000 words (up to 3500 words in English) including source material (APA-style). Submissions must include a short author biography.

Academic Survey—a survey of 1800-3000 words (up to 4000 words in English) including references and recommended reading (APA-style) of the latest professional literature on a specific topic relating to national security. Submissions must include a short author biography.

Book Reviews—book reviews of 800-1500 words (up to 2000 words in English) including source material (APA-style) on a wide range of books relating to national security. Submissions must include a short author biography.

Articles should be submitted electronically to editors-sa@inss.org.il and indicate the category of the attached article. You may also use this e-mail address for questions or additional information about the journal.

Kobi Michael and Gallia Lindenstrauss
Editors, *Strategic Assessment*

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