The Failed State: Ramifications for Israel's Strategic Environment

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Israel faces a wide range of threats and challenges, among them terrorist attacks against civilian population centers; high trajectory fire from the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Syria; arms smuggling to terrorist organizations; and the growing influence of Iran in the region. Added to these are new social challenges, particularly the arrival of thousands of African refugees seeking refuge and work in Israel. While these may appear to be disparate phenomena, a broader approach links many of the threats and challenges that Israel faces in a single analytical framework centered on the notion of the failed state. This essay explains how a failing or failed state in Israel's near and far circles affects its strategic environment, and demonstrates how the use of this analytical framework suggests some new responses to the challenges Israel faces.

The Phenomenon of the Failed State

Threats stemming in part from the failed state such as civil wars, terrorism, and guerilla warfare are far more common than wars between sovereign states, and since the end of World War II more people have died as a result of these threats than in wars between regular armies.[1] Nonetheless and despite the extensive discussion of the topic in the West, the discourse on failed states lacks conceptual clarity and is oversaturated with different definitions and indices on how to identify a state as failed.[2]

As a rule, a state's power is relative and is measured primarily through its ability to provide its citizens with political assets, chief among them security. To this end, the state maintains and operates police, security, and military institutions intended to protect its citizens from internal and

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external threats. These state institutions have a monopoly on the use of force, and the population generally sees their use of force as legitimate. The situation in the failed state is different. There, the institutions find it difficult to maintain the monopoly on law and order enforcement and often lose the popular legitimacy to exercise this enforcement.

The theoretical distinctions on the subject create a continuum indicating different degrees of state failure. Two central types stand out:

a. The crisis/failing states: In these states, government institutions cannot prevent an internal crisis and even contribute to it through policies that create social, economic, and political inequality between citizens. Additional manifestations of state failure include low levels of human and social development, a low degree of governability, and internal conflict, all of which reduce the central government's ability to provide basic services and security. In some of these states, government institutions do not reflect the will of the people, and instead reflect the will of the ruling elite or a particular ethnic group. In many cases, this situation leads to the rise of power elements in the form of local leaders – tribal chieftains or religious figures – who challenge the central government. Such a process is liable to result in the growth of sub-state entities and in certain cases in civil war, which may cause a collapse of the existing order unless various steps are taken.

b. The collapsed/failed states: These are more extreme cases of state failure and represent the end stage of the process – the collapse of the state. In this situation, central government institutions cannot ensure the necessary conditions for the existence of a state authority or impose any kind of law and order. Accordingly, the regime lacks the ability to provide security and basic services to citizens or to control the state's border effectively. In recent years, the concept of the failed state has become popular and overused, especially because of the difficulty in identifying the line separating the various situations, and so it has come to include many of the situations mentioned in the first category. Some twenty states are currently identified as failed, i.e., states that are in an advanced stage of collapse. Among these, the highest rate of failure occurs in sub-Saharan Africa and in states with a Muslim majority.[3]

What causes state failure? Most of all, a state is liable to fail when it does not succeed in cultivating the kind of loyalty that allows a specific group to shape it as a nation state. The regime's incapacity or illegitimacy causes various power groups to try to take over the regime or to control it through violence. The reasons for illegitimacy vary, from a history of colonialism that created a situation of incongruence between the borders of the state and its ethnic or national identification, to a regime that serves as a means for perpetuating the dominance of one ethnic group over all other groups in the state. Indeed, in many cases failed states are rife with political entities with significant ethnic and/or religious diversity accompanied by constitutional and electoral arrangements that do not ensure a fair division of resources among the various social units.[4]

Although failed states are not identical in terms of their historical, political, and geo-strategic features, three characteristics of state failure lie at the heart of the analytical framework: a weak regime, rampant poverty, and ongoing conflict.[5] Many states presumably appear somewhere on the failure continuum, which by nature is dynamic. What sets the failed state apart, however, is the intensity of the threats and their interrelationships. A regime's illegitimacy and/or its inability to enforce its rule coupled with weak state institutions results in the growth of various power groups trying to seize power or use violence to wreak havoc. At times the groups or organizations competing with the central regime recruit external patrons that for a variety of reasons choose to support their allies. For example, in the case of Iraq, an external power – Iran – supports Shiite political groups and armed militias identified with it religiously.

In some cases, the end of the Cold War contributed to the failure of the state. In the era following the struggle between the East and the West, various "freedom fighters" that had operated on behalf of either superpower using a range of means were left at loose ends. At times these means were turned against the state in which they were located or even the superpower itself, as was the case in Afghanistan.[6] Similarly, the breakup of the USSR, which had served as strategic support for a number of states, at times caused economic deterioration, putting the states on

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the path of failure. In other cases, democratization itself − especially when externally imposed − resulted in dictatorships turning into failed states (as in Iraq until 2003), often becoming the most dangerous of failed states (though in Iraq and as elsewhere, the conditions for state failure existed previously).

The failed state is not a new phenomenon in the international arena. By 1998, some 135 states were identified as suffering from some level of failure.[7] In the past, when a state was incapable of providing its citizens with security and basic services as the result of various internal events, the ramifications of the new situation affected mostly the state itself and perhaps its immediate neighbors. Today, globalization, information access, open borders, and easy mobility have resulted in a situation whereby ramifications of state failure in any region of the world are liable to affect states hundreds or even thousands of miles away. Thus, refugees from failed states immigrate to Europe and pose new political, social, and economic challenges, unknown as recently as a decade or two ago. At the same time, terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda that view failed states as convenient bases of operation present security challenges to many states around the world.

> Failed states challenge the stability of the Middle East and beyond because of the ease with which external elements can intervene in internal affairs. What may look like an internal conflict or a struggle between armed groups and government forces may in fact be a struggle between regional forces.

This understanding has been internalized by many countries, first and foremost the post-9/11 United States, and the US and others have started to see failed states as a threat to global security. While the United States already felt freer to act forcefully on the international arena after the collapse of the Soviet Union (e.g., the 1993 failed intervention in Somalia), it was only in the following decade, in light of 9/11 and the Afghani situation, that it started to view failed states as a severe − if not the most severe − threat to its vital interests.[8]

The broadened ramifications of the failed state resemble the globalization of the terrorism threat. Until a decade or two ago, these threats were confronted by various states on their own or at times via bilateral cooperation. Over the past years, terrorist threats have also globalized and require cooperation between nations at the political, intelligence,

and operational levels. Today it appears that no country can deal single-handedly with the problems of terrorism or the ramifications of state failure, not even the United States.

By and large states will seek to intervene in the internal affairs of a failed state in a number of situations: an invitation is issued by the local government or a power group within the state; the intervening nation has been directly hurt or its vital interests have been damaged; the nation has the ability to intervene on the humanitarian and/or military level; and the political climate, both internal and international, is one that favors external intervention. Despite the international community's desire to maintain the status quo, it is sometimes the dismantling of the state that will actually result in the reduction of violence and will help the national definition of some of the citizens, as was the case in the Balkans.

To date the international community has limited experience with failed states, handling the phenomenon in an ad hoc and case-by-case fashion, especially once situations became acute and irreversible. Even then, attempts focused mostly on treating the security symptoms of the state failure,[9] as with the international intervention in the Balkans and Somalia in the 1990s. The success of these operations was limited, though it seems that there was no choice but to try to improve the security situation, first and foremost by an external attempt at state building.

Failed States in Israel's Strategic Environment

Unlike the United States or other Western nations, Israel has neither the ability nor the legitimacy to act against threats in failed states within its strategic environment (for the most part comprising hostile regimes), certainly not in distant states. It cannot attempt to fix them, even if it is either directly or indirectly affected by the ramifications of state failures in its near and far circles. Nonetheless, it can warn of such situations and shed light on alternative responses.

Generally, the Middle East provides a live laboratory for examining the problem, as between seven and eleven of the twenty-two Arab League states may be defined as failed or failing states. The accepted criteria, including demographic pressures, inequitable development, illegitimacy of the central government, human rights abuses, impaired security, and external interventions place states such as Sudan, Iraq, and Yemen in

the critical category (actual failure) and states such as Algeria, Syria, and Lebanon at high risk for failure (table 1).[10]

Although the lack of democracy and political freedom are features characterizing most if not all of the accepted checklists of state failure, they are not the sole reasons for the failure of the state. Rather, in most cases the dictatorial regime compensates for − if not whitewashes − essential structural weaknesses, which magnify the chances for state failure. Even in the rich states in the region the wealth enjoyed (coming primarily from natural resources) hides significant structural weaknesses that are liable to lead to future state failure.

In the circle closest to Israel there are a number of states undergoing a process of failure, or states whose statistics place them in the potential failure category, liable to slide down the slippery slope to actual failure. The most prominent example is Lebanon. Here there is the confluence of a number of basic conditions inviting the collapse of the existing political order, in turn leading to its becoming a failed state. At the root is the Lebanese state's problem of legitimacy. Like most state entities in the Middle East, Lebanon was established through colonial arrangements between France and Great Britain after World War I. As a result, the region was artificially divided into a number of states lacking historical roots, and this division was imposed on the local population. In the case of Lebanon, a number of regions (the mountains, the Beqaa Valley, Beirut, Tripoli, and southern Lebanon) were united as a single political entity under Christian dominance.

Over the years and after the bloody civil war, various arrangements were made for the division of power in the state, but the ethnic foundation remained firmly in place and was even anchored in the political system that continues today. As a result, the loyalty of several groups, especially that of the Shiites, is divided between the community and the state. This situation worsened in the 1980s and 1990s when Hizbollah became one of the dominant power groups in the state, as Hizbollah's primary goal is to change the state's social and political status quo by establishing an Islamic republic under Shiite dominance. On the pretext of defending Lebanon, the organization has constructed a military and security establishment competing with the Lebanese state. Because of the delicate community balance and the fear of sparking a new civil war, the state leaves this power group in place. Given this situation, the potential for

Table 1. Selected States in the Region
Ranked by Severity of Failure

State / Ranking	Fund for Peace Failed States Index	Center for Global Policy at George Mason University	Brookings Index of State Weakness
1. Somalia	1	1	1
2. Sudan	3	2	6
3. Afghanistan	7	4	2
4. Iraq	6	13	4
5. Pakistan	10	27	33
6. Yemen	18	28	30
7. Eritrea	36	39	14
8. Algeria	24	24	57
9. Syria	39	82	59
10. Lebanon	29	69	93

internal conflagration is clear. At the same time, this reality in practice allows Hizbollah to control large areas of the Lebanese state, especially in Beirut's southern neighborhoods and in southern Lebanon, the central Beqaa area, and northwards of it, and to act there autocratically.

Despite the fact that the Lebanese situation is acute – with many actors other than the state wielding control of the means of enforcement – it is not materially different from what is happening elsewhere in the Arab sphere, where religious-ethnic identities and fealty to tribal structures are often stronger than loyalty to the nation state. This, in tandem with high rates of poverty, inequality, and the lack of political freedom turns these states into social and political powder kegs where only the power and centralism of the government prevent the eruption of an internal conflict, which could under certain circumstances turn them into failed states. Some states host various elements, particularly fundamentalist Islamic, that view the states as illegitimate political entities and seek to change the prevailing order by means of violence.

In the farther circle, there are several states experiencing ongoing crises. In Iraq, the state is absent from large parts of Iraqi territory. In the Kurdish region, there is a de facto independent state. In the rest of the country, the Sunnis feel deprived by the Shiite majority and are engaged in a political battle and violent struggle with the central government. Fundamentalist terrorists seek to establish an Islamic regime as part of

a new Islamic empire, and powerful external forces are involved in Iraqi affairs. Large parts of the Iraqi public are loyal to extra-state political and social frameworks, and thus far, the historical attempt to construct an Iraqi people has failed.

The cases of Yemen and Sudan are even more extreme. The Yemenite state (which to a large extent is an arena of struggle between regional forces) is trying to tackle simultaneously a violent uprising with ethnic overtones in the north, a separatist struggle in the south, and growing global jihad activity. As the poorest Arab state, it is already posing a string of challenges not only to its neighbors in the Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea region but also – as evidenced by international interest – to the entire free world. The presence of hundreds of thousands of displaced people and refugees from Yemen and elsewhere, inter-tribal and inter-religious violence, rampant crime, maritime piracy, significant demographic changes (headed by uncontrolled urbanization and a disproportionately large number of young people in the population), hunger, and disease – all these are part of Yemen's daily reality.[11] In Sudan, the Arab-Islamic central government has for years been waging a violent struggle against the Christian south as well as African-Muslim tribes in the west. In all three cases – Iraq, Yemen, and Sudan – the result is a weak central government, poverty, internal conflict, and lack of security.

Ramifications of Failed States for Israel

Failed states pose a number of central challenges to the security of Israel and its internal stamina. The first is the terrorist challenge. Failed states present international and regional terrorist organizations with a convenient base of operations, and are more likely than other states to host terrorist organizations on their soil. Terrorist organizations take advantage of the porous borders and the fact that the central government is weak or absent from large parts of the state in order to develop operational and logistical infrastructures. Thus, a failed state becomes the safe harbor for terrorist organizations. In addition, the host state provides a pool of potential activists, as the citizens of a failed state tend to join such organizations at a higher rate than citizens of a non-failing state.[12] Moreover, given that a significant number of terrorist organizations active in the world today have a regional or even global agenda, failed states become the exporters of terrorists. In this context,

Sudan, Yemen, and Iraq have long been transit points for organizations such as al-Qaeda and elements supporting terrorism such as Iran. For example, it has been reported that Yemen in recent years has "exported" global jihadists to the Gaza Strip.[13] In addition, Yemen and Sudan both serve as important way stations in the arms running route from Iran to Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[14] In light of the many terrorist organizations operating on its soil, Israeli security personnel have even defined Sudan as "an important central axis of global terrorism."[15] In areas in Lebanon where the state is imperceptible, Hizbollah and fundamental Islamic terror groups operating in Palestinian refugee camps, such as Fatah al-Islam, are thriving.[16]

Second is the crime challenge. Similar to terrorist organizations, criminal organizations also take advantage of the governments' loose control in failed states to promote their interests. In many cases, such states become large exporters of illegal drugs grown by criminals and terrorists. For example, Afghanistan is the biggest exporter of opium and hashish in the world.[17] Similarly, the Beqaa region in Lebanon serves as a center for the supply of heroin and hashish to the Middle East, and criminal elements such as the Shiite Jaffar clan are linked to regional and international drug networks. Terrorist organizations make use of drugs for their own ends: for Hizbollah, the drug trade is a primary tool for its intelligence sector seeking to recruit Israeli agents. Indeed, a number of spy rings consisting of Israeli Arabs were in fact formed on this basis.[18] The connection between crime and terrorism is also relevant at the other end of the region: Iranian ships smuggling arms to Hamas in the Gaza Strip are a platform for smuggling goods and illegal workers to the Gulf states.[19] In addition, although it does not threaten Israel directly, piracy is common in the shipping lanes where Israeli ships sail. So, for example, in March 2010 a Zim-owned ship was attacked in the Bab el-Mandeb Straits, located between the two failed states of Yemen and Somalia.[20] A further dimension is the financial link between profits from piracy in the Horn of Africa and terrorist organizations. A great deal of money from piracy, amounting to millions of dollars a year, especially in Somalia, finds its way to Islamic charity funds that funnel money to Hamas and Hizbollah.[21]

A third challenge is the threat of non-conventional arms proliferation. Failed states, both near and far, are liable to worsen the threat of non-

conventional arms to Israel, for two primary reasons. First, it is more difficult for crisis states than functional states to secure materials and sensitive information. Thus failed states in Africa are a source for Iran for yellow cake, a powdered form of uranium ore.[22] Similarly, Pakistan – experiencing an ongoing state crisis – might find it hard to contain its nuclear knowledge and material and prevent them from falling into the hands of Islamic extremists operating in its midst. Second, failed states may exacerbate the non-conventional arms threat by being a source for weapons of mass destruction for sub-state entities such as Hizbollah. Organizations such as Hizbollah thrive in failed states and as in Lebanon are liable to develop an operational infrastructure, which could allow them to assimilate and operate weapons of mass destruction, without the checks and balances applicable to sovereign states. These borderless threats challenge a nation's capability to deter attacks against it: if you do not know who is behind an attack, you do not know whom to threaten in response. This situation is especially serious in the context of deterrence against an attack with weapons of mass destruction. In recent months there have been several reports of chemical weapons in Hizbollah hands, providing the most striking example of this scenario.[23]

Fourth is the social challenge. Failed states in Israel's far circle, especially in Africa, are exporters of refugees and migrant workers to Europe and the Middle East. In July 2010, the Minister for Internal Security reported that every month some 1,200 Africans cross the Egyptian border into Israel and that between 1 and 2.5 million other Africans are located in Cairo, waiting for their opportunity to do the same.[24] The presence of this population in Israel has many short and long term implications. In the primary areas where they congregate – Eilat (where they represent some 15 percent of city residents), Arad, and Tel Aviv (where over 50,000 live in the area of the old central bus station) – there has been an increase in crime rates, especially offenses involving drugs, violence, and alcohol.[25] About 10 percent of all murders in Israel in the first half of 2010 occurred among this population.[26] Beyond the criminal issue, the flood of refugees and other illegal aliens presents Israel with economic and social challenges, among them negative impacts on employment opportunities and conditions among unskilled Israeli laborers, which in turn leads to the spread of poverty in Israel and a heavier burden on the welfare system. Because the majority of those hurt by the employment of non-

Israelis have poor job skills and the main beneficiaries are the employers and skilled labor belonging to the stronger economic classes, the employment of non-Israelis also expands the gap in income distribution. At the same time, in certain sectors such as agriculture, the availability of unskilled non-Israeli labor proves to be a disincentive to technological improvements and reduces the need to train skilled manpower.[27] Clearly, the Sudanese and Eritrean refugees are not to blame for all of this, but there is no doubt that their growing presence in Israel contributes significantly to these phenomena.

The final challenge for discussion here regards regional security. In the broader context, failed states present a challenge to the stability of the Middle East and beyond because of the ease with which external elements can intervene in internal affairs. What may at first glance look like an internal conflict or an armed struggle between armed groups and government forces, such as in Lebanon or Iraq, may in fact be an arena for a struggle between regional forces. The weakness of the central government and the cultivation of groups competing with the state are an excellent opportunity for various state elements seeking to expand their influence on the region. Lebanon is the most prominent example of this in the circle closest to Israel. For years Lebanon has been the arena for a struggle between different regional and international power groups: Iran, seeking through Hizbollah to expand its influence over Lebanon and in the long term turn it into a Shiite-led Islamic republic; Syria, seeking to impose its control over the country; the United States, seeking to curb the Syrian-Iranian influence and establish a Western-style democracy in Lebanon; Saudi Arabia, seeking to support its Sunni allies there; and finally Israel, conducting a longstanding struggle against Shiite terrorism emanating from Lebanese territory. A similar struggle is taking place in the Gaza Strip, which is also to a large degree exposed to Iran's influence. In the more distant circle, Iraq and Yemen are arenas for similar struggles between the different forces of the United States, Iran, and the Sunni states, led by Saudi Arabia. In practice, failed states are a source of regional instability and at times are also exporters of

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crises. In the case of Yemen, the regime's inability to impose its authority on Shiite groups caused the fighting to spill over into Saudi territory in late 2009. Similarly, in Lebanon the government's ongoing inability and/ or unwillingness to impose its authority on Hizbollah has for years been a source of instability in Israeli-Lebanese relations. This state of affairs peaked in July 2006 and led to the outbreak the Second Lebanon War.

Using the Analytical Framework

The challenges enumerated above comprise part of Israel's current strategic environment. Examining these phenomena through the prism of state failure allows us to see some of the challenges in a different light and examine Israel's interests from a different point of view. In the case of Lebanon, Israel's primary concern – and correctly so – is the disarming of Hizbollah. At the same time, looking at the issue through the failed state prism may actually lead to the conclusion that should the attempt to dismantle the organization's military structure result in undermining Lebanon's internal situation, it may be preferable to leave it in place, as – what is so often the case in the reality of the Middle East – the choice is between bad and worse. Therefore, it may be that Hizbollah's remaining armed is the lesser evil when compared to the collapse of the Lebanese state.

A similar issue is the Israeli discourse about damaging the infrastructures of the Lebanese state if and when another war with Hizbollah breaks out in Lebanon. If the issue is examined through the failed state prism, it may be that Israel's interest is best served by preserving the institutions of Lebanon rather than by weakening the central government and destroying its infrastructures. In a broad historical view, preserving and even strengthening the Lebanese state could, from Israel's perspective, be seen as a win-win situation.

When it comes to the Palestinian Authority and the future establishment of a Palestinian state, many interests guide Israeli policymakers. One of these interests perhaps should be the establishment of a functioning Palestinian state with strong government institutions working on behalf of its citizens' welfare. If and when a Palestinian is established, the absence of functional institutions will almost certainly result in another failed state, which would only exacerbate regional instability and present Israel with heightened security challenges. Indeed, Israel must stress that

appropriate security arrangements with the Palestinians are not merely a gesture to Israel. Rather, the world at large cannot afford another terrorist or failed state in the region. Therefore, it is in the common interest to produce the security arrangements that are essential to ending the conflict. The need to prevent creation of a failed state in the Gaza Strip is also an important concern, though it appears this issue is more complex and requires a separate discussion.

In addition, examining Israel's interests through this prism may underscore that Israel's borders must be sealed as rapidly as possible. It is important to increase efforts to erect an effective barrier along the Egyptian border and even along the border with Jordan, in order to reduce the risks of the negative phenomena surveyed above and to prepare for the emergence of risks to these regimes' stability. Constructing an unbroken barrier along the nation's borders that befits an international border is a legitimate, effective way to curb many of the phenomena resulting from the failure of nearby states. Even if such a barrier did not completely stop the entrance of hostile elements into Israel's sovereign territory, it would serve as a deterrent. The understanding that the flow of refugees is not coincidental but stems from state failure in Israel's far circles may clarify to the leadership that the phenomenon is not about to end and in fact stands to grow in the future.[28]

The perspective of state failure may also give Israeli intelligence a tool for assessing the stability of regimes. Head of IDF Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin noted: "Forecasting the stability of regimes and trying to time their collapse…is a highly complex intelligence challenge, demanding both care and humility."[29] Various models for forecasting state failure can help intelligence and bridge the gap between the focus on political and military issues on the one hand, and the need to understand the undercurrents in these societies on the other. Indeed, the need to identify possible threats and follow their developments in a given state caused the Central Intelligence Agency as early as 1994 to construct capabilities that would better allow it to forecast regime stability and state collapse (the State Failure Task Force). Furthermore, social and economic questions such as a nation's openness to foreign trade, the rate of infant mortality, the size of the population, the type of Islam prevalent in the state, ethnic diversity and breakdown, and other factors may serve as excellent indicators helping to forecast state failure or regime stability.[30]

In light of the ramifications of state failure in Israel's far circle, the scope of intelligence's interest should be expanded to include regions that would otherwise be deemed as having limited relevance when examined through a narrower intelligence lens.

It is not impossible that threats against Israel will increasingly be caused by ramifications stemming from the weakness, if not outright dismantlement, of national units in its strategic environment. Israel must already tackle semi-sovereign elements and is finding it difficult to establish deterrence and decision in the classical sense against them. Consequently, it may be necessary to update traditional views of national security, which focus on fighting between sovereign states, to include analyses of and responses to threats coming from ungoverned areas. Despite the vibrant discourse on the topic, very little is known about the conditions for the development of border-crossing security threats and why some states are more identified with them than others, as well as why Muslim states are more associated with the phenomenon than others.

This essay has sought to shine some light on state failure and jumpstart consideration of failed states in the Israeli context. A better understanding of the elements, expressions, and ramifications of these states could at the very least provide a better understanding of the security challenges Israel is facing. An examination of the challenges to the State of Israel by means of the state failure phenomenon will not resolve them, but it has the potential to delineate dilemmas more clearly and offer a new perspective on longstanding trends and developments. This would primarily entail a comparative historical perspective, which looks at long term processes and provides a somewhat different attitude to current problems. It may lead to different conclusions regarding possible responses to these problems than those offered by more conventional analysis.

Notes

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2   The Crisis States Research Center, London School of Economic and Political Science, Crisis State Workshop 2006. See also Congressional Research Service Report to the United States Congress, "Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and United State Policy," 2008.

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5   Robert Zoellick, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008.

6   John Rapley, "The New Middle Ages," *Foreign Affairs* (May-June 2006).

7   "State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings," September 30, 2000, pp. 4-5, http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/SFTF%20Phase%20III%20Report%20Final.pdf.

8   The White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," March 2006, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/.

9   So, for example, even if the United States eliminates the threat posed by al-Qaeda to American national security, this will do little if anything to strengthen the Afghani or Yemeni state, and with time these may generate additional threats.

10   *Foreign Policy* and the Fund for Peace Failed States Index at www.foreign-policy.com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index.

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29 Insitute for National Security Studies, "Security Challenges of the 21st Century," December 15, 2009, http://www.inss.org.il/events. php?cat=257&incat=&read=3572.

30 See, e.g., "State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings."