

# Neutralizing Terrorism-Sponsoring States: The Libyan "Model"<sup>1</sup>

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Over the past few months, Libya has taken final steps to return to the community of law-abiding nations and to the arena of consensus within the international community. Libya's actions follow decades of being cast as a pariah state, primarily due to its support of international terrorism and its involvement in developing non-conventional weapons. Such an extreme and seemingly sudden reversal in the foreign policy of a "rogue" state is not a routine development in international relations. Perhaps for this reason it is a particularly encouraging indication of the possibility of putting rogue states back on the "normative" track without the use of military force, but rather by means of diplomatic activity complemented by sanctions enforced and coordinated by many countries, especially ones with international political and economic influence.

In contrast to its portrayal in the media, the change in Libyan policy was gradual and protracted. The neutralization of Libya as a terrorism-sponsoring state was a process that lasted years and involved a combination of political and economic sanctions that cost Libya more than \$30 billion in economic damage.<sup>2</sup> Yet the

geopolitical implications of September 11, 2001 and the military action undertaken against individual rogue states by the American-led international anti-terrorism coalition are what appear to have convinced Libyan ruler Muammar Qaddafi to accelerate the process of terminating his membership in the community of disreputable rogue states and ceasing his country's development of non-conventional weapons.

This essay will explore the method that successfully compelled a rogue state – one that was caught "red-handed" and as a result was subjected to effective international sanctions – to transform its policy on terrorism. It will explore whether this method can and should be adopted as a model for neutralizing other terrorism-sponsoring states that are currently active on the international level, notwithstanding the various differences between individual states, the nature of their respective regimes, and their relations with the West.

## State Involvement in Terrorism

The history of international terrorism over the past four decades reveals that state involvement in terrorism and

state support of terrorist organizations are among the primary reasons that terrorism now commands a central role in international relations.<sup>3</sup> Terrorism emerges from many varied root causes and is exercised by perpetrators who act in the name of a range of ideologies in different geographical areas. On the whole, it is safe to assume that terrorism would exist even without the assistance of sovereign states. Still, without states' active and passive support of terrorism,<sup>4</sup> be it direct or indirect, terrorist organizations would not possess the impressive capabilities to survive and inflict damage, powers that lend them the ability to influence international political affairs so significantly.

The main challenge in compelling states to abandon a terrorism-sponsoring policy stems from the difficulty of acquiring legal proof of their involvement in terrorism, because countries do not claim responsibility for terrorist attacks in which they are directly or indirectly involved. When they are accused of involvement, they cling to a policy of denial. As a result, terrorism-sponsoring states are able to continue working behind the scenes and use terrorism to advance their interests. Instances in which states

have been caught red-handed – where it has been possible to prove their guilt publicly in a court of law without having to endanger sensitive intelligence sources – are rare.

Aside from the experience of Libya, two additional cases are worth mentioning in which rogue states were deterred from continuing their intensive and direct involvement in international terrorist attacks: Syria and Iran. A change in policy of these two countries was less dramatic than with Libya, and only occurred after their involvement in terrorism was exposed in public court rulings that pointed to senior officials' direct responsibility for attacks that were planned or executed in Europe. Syria's involvement was exposed in the Hindawi case<sup>5</sup> and Iran's in the Mykonos case.<sup>6</sup> The different international responses to these states, however, as opposed to the response to Libyan involvement in terrorism, were at least in part a function of casualty results. In the Syrian instance, the attack on the El Al plane was foiled and therefore resulted in no casualties, while in the Iranian instance the number of people killed in Germany – in this case Kurdish exiles – was relatively small. Mykonos thus represented another example of German government and European tolerance towards rogue states settling their own domestic scores on European soil. The sanctions that Europe and the United States applied against these two countries were circumscribed in scope and in time, and therefore they proved of limited though nonetheless important influ-

ence. Syria and Iran were successfully deterred from further overt, direct involvement in international terrorism.

An important inference that emerges from these events is that a coordinated multi-national policy that sets a high enough price tag for any country that is proven guilty in a court of law is likely to cause a terrorism-sponsoring state to seriously reconsider the cost-effectiveness of its policy. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a need to design a global policy, involving as many countries as possible, that raises the cost to terrorism-sponsoring states to one that will outweigh the potential benefits and deter them from even indirect or passive involvement in terrorism.

### Principal Libyan Involvement in International Terrorism

Libya's distancing from international terrorism began more than a decade ago. As Libya was undoubtedly one of the states most actively involved in international terrorism for twenty years, its neutralization as a state supporter of terrorism was a critical factor in the disappearance of a number of dominant international terrorist organizations.

Under the regime established by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi at the end of the 1960s, Libya embraced terrorism as a tool to fortify the regime and disseminate its revolutionary ideology. Qaddafi used terrorism on a number of different levels, acquiring for himself and his regime an international reputation of revolutionary. Libya, which had previously been a

country of peripheral importance in terms of international relations, became the object of an unusual degree of international interest in the 1970s and 1980s due to the country's power and importance in terms of "geo-terrorism" (a concept applied of late to al-Qaeda, which has endowed states with hitherto peripheral roles in foreign relations with new strategic importance, based on the activity or presence of al-Qaeda or its supporters within their sovereign territory).<sup>7</sup> Qaddafi exercised state terror against opponents of his regime within Libya itself and cruelly crushed every attempt to remove him from power. By means of intelligence agents who operated in Arab and Western countries, he resorted to terrorism against exiles and opponents living outside of Libya and assassinated dozens of opponents of the regime with complete disregard for the laws of the host countries.

The example that best exemplified Qaddafi's willingness to flout international norms while carrying out acts of murder abroad occurred in London in November 1984. From inside the Libyan embassy, Qaddafi loyalists opened fire at a group of protesting exiles who had assembled outside the embassy's gates, killing a British policewoman and injuring eleven demonstrators. When asked to turn over those responsible for the shooting, Libya refused. Instead, it took counteractions against the British embassy in Tripoli, besieging it with recruited Libyan protesters until the Libyan officials in London were safely spirited from Britain without facing trial for their crimes, despite the heavy diplo-

matic toll the country paid by having its diplomatic relations with Britain severed.

Mostly, however, Qaddafi earned his notoriety in the realm of terrorism from his support for a broad spectrum of terrorist organizations from all over the world representing a variety of ideological streams, all in the name of the revolutionary ideology he articulated his *Green Book*. The organizations included European groups that fought under the flag of national liberation (such as the ETA, the IRA, and the Corsican FLNC), organizations that operated in the name of ideological Marxist-Leninist revolutionism (like the Red Brigade, the French Action Directe, the German Red Army Faction, and the Japanese Red Army), South American terrorist groups (such as FARC, ELN, and FSMLN), and Palestinian terrorist groups.

In the tradition of leaders of terrorism-sponsoring states, Qaddafi himself established a "Palestinian" terrorist organization called the Arab National Youth Organization (ANYO). This group operated in the name of the Palestinian people for a short time and carried out a number of murderous attacks against American aviation targets during the early years of the 1970s, blowing up an American plane in mid-flight and attacking the ticket counter of an American airline. This group was controlled entirely by the Libyans, but was quickly dismantled out of fear that its direct ties with Qaddafi would be discovered. Qaddafi then moved to support of Palestinian terrorist groups,

which were heavily involved in international terrorism during the 1970s. Support ranged from active and direct backing of Palestinian terrorist organizations and selected foreign groups (such as the Japanese Red Army), which he provided with financial, logistical, and operational assistance, to passive support, such as hosting delegations and conferences, and permitting international terrorist groups to maintain offices in Libya.

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The scope of Qaddafi's support for the terrorist activities of Palestinian groups changed over time. Qaddafi's most significant links in the realm of international terrorism were with Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council. This organization, which operated in the service of a number of countries, began receiving intensive and broad Libyan aid during the mid-1980s and incorporated the direct involvement of Libyan intelligence in planning and assisting in murderous attacks abroad. Among the most prominent of these attacks were the hijacking of an Egypt Air flight in 1985, the attack

on El Al ticket counters in Rome and Vienna in 1985, and the hijacking of Pan American planes to Karachi in 1986. Palestinian groups such as Ahmad Jabril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command, the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and Abu Abbas's Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) also received financing, training by Libyan instructors, and safe haven for command headquarters and training camps within Libya. Yasir Arafat's Fatah organization was likewise awarded generous financial aid from Qaddafi, primarily during its involvement with international terrorist activity in the 1970s by means of the Black September organization.

Similarly, non-Arab terrorist groups enjoyed Qaddafi's extensive support and direct involvement in their activities. The most prominent group of this kind was the Japanese Red Army, which, although a Japanese group, was actually an element of international Palestinian terrorism, in part because its members spent most of their time between the 1970s and the mid-1990s in various Middle Eastern countries. Libya's use of this group to execute revenge attacks against Western targets, primarily British and American, reached its height during the second half of the 1980s. The withdrawal of Libyan sponsorship for this group and the expulsion of its activists from Libyan territory during the 1990s was a major contribution towards its elimination.



## The Gradual Turnaround in Libya's Involvement in Global Terrorism

Two decades of hindsight allow us to determine that the turnaround in Libya's involvement in international terrorism stemmed, ironically, from the escalation in the use of terrorism against the West. Recourse to terrorist attacks that were especially bloody, even for a state that had previously not been shy of violent means to achieve political ends, is what eventually led Libya to its entanglement, exposure, and punishment.

Libya's direct involvement in international terrorism peaked in the mid-1980s, and Qaddafi did not go to great lengths to deny it, at least not on ideological grounds. In the wake of a series of terrorist attacks in late 1985 by Abu Nidal's group that resulted in the death of American citizens, the United States, which led the campaign against international terrorism, took countermeasures. First, it sent an aircraft carrier to the Libyan coast. Then, as a measure of deterrence that included an element of provocation, it sent planes to patrol a disputed area of the Mediterranean Sea that Libya claimed as in its territorial waters. Unable to resist the provocation, Qaddafi ordered his ships to fire on the American planes. When the ships were sunk in response, Qaddafi in turn ordered his forces to retaliate with an attack on a target in Berlin known to attract Americans. The target chosen was "La Belle," a discotheque frequented by American soldiers, and the explosion that was carried out by a small group

under the direction of Libyan intelligence killed three people (two Americans and a Turkish citizen) and injured 200. Libya's involvement in the attack was brought to public attention by American president Ronald Reagan, who even disclosed sensitive intelligence that had been obtained by American eavesdropping units in order to provide justification for the attack carried out by American planes on Qaddafi's headquarters in the Libyan capital of Tripoli in April 1986.

Despite the impression imprinted on public memory that Qaddafi was deterred by America's display of strength in Tripoli, the Libyan leader actually responded to the American attack with a murderous campaign of terrorist attacks through the Abu Nidal Organization and the Japanese Red Army. Serving as proxy organizations for Libya, these groups attacked American and British targets in Pakistan, Italy, India, Sudan, and Indonesia. Qaddafi's counterattack reached a new height on December 21, 1988, when at his direction Libyan agents blew up Pan American flight 103 above Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people. The following September, Qaddafi proteges assisted the cell responsible for blowing up a plane of the French airline UTA in the skies above Niger, resulting in the death of 169 passengers and crew.

A joint American-British investigatory commission, which published its findings in November 1991, pointed to Libya as the party directly responsible for the explosion aboard the Pan Am flight and the mass killing of citizens of various nationalities. Expo-

sure of Libya's involvement in the explosion aboard the French plane facilitated the consolidation of a broad and coordinated international coalition which, for the first time in the history of the international struggle against modern terrorism, succeeded in imposing and enforcing effective sanctions against a terrorism-sponsoring state under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.<sup>8</sup>

As a condition for the removal of sanctions, the UN Security Council demanded that Libya cease all aid to terrorist groups, refrain from providing terrorists with safe haven in Libyan territory, and cooperate fully in trying those responsible for the Lockerbie attack and turning them over to either the United States or Britain. For a few years, Qaddafi did not fulfill these conditions and instead opted for a series of steps that included defiance, threats, and diplomatic activity ultimately aimed at extracting Libya from the damaging economic and political position in which it found itself as a result of the sanctions. These measures were also intended to enable Qaddafi to continue denying personal responsibility for the state terrorism practiced under his leadership.

At the same time, however, Qaddafi gradually moved Libya away from involvement in international terrorism. He closed the offices and the camps of Palestinian terrorist organizations in Libya and even expelled their leaders, first and foremost Abu Nidal and the members of the Japanese Red Army. His people were restricted from carrying out terrorist

attacks abroad, and Qaddafi eventually even turned over the two main Libyan suspects accused of planting the explosive device aboard Pan Am flight 103 to a Scottish court sitting in The Hague (as a compromise with the Libyan demand that the accused be tried by an international court), qualified by a series of conditions relating to implications of any personal responsibility, in the event that the extradited Libyan intelligence agents were found guilty.

The acquittal of one of the accused and oblivion to the conviction of the other served as another stage for Qaddafi's denial of his country's involvement and for his claims that the entire affair was nothing more than an international scheme aimed at besmirching Libya, which was innocent of any crime. After this did not result in the lifting of sanctions against Libya and after subsequent extensive negotiations, Qaddafi agreed to compensate the families of those killed on the American and French flights: \$10 million to the immediate families of each of the victims aboard the Pan Am flight,<sup>9</sup> and \$1 million to the immediate families of each victim aboard the UTA flight.<sup>10</sup>

Concomitant with the steps in the realm of terrorism, the United States undertook a campaign of consistent and uncompromising diplomatic pressure on Libya regarding weapons of mass destruction. These combined efforts, which began prior to September 11, 2001, eventually resulted in Libya's public assertion of its willingness to cease developing non-conventional weapons and to place its

installations under international supervision, as the international community had demanded unsuccessfully for years.<sup>11</sup>

### Options for Neutralizing Rogue States

The Libyan case exemplifies the method that compelled a rogue state – with a one-man rule that had been in power for an extended period, used terrorism in the international arena,

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assisted the terrorist acts of a large number of organizations around the world, and was directly exposed in this participation – to surrender to a coordinated counter-policy adopted by an international coalition led by countries with high international status. Through effective sanctions leveled under the auspices of the UN, the state was impelled to transform its policy with regard to terrorism. Later, this coordinated counterpolicy also resulted in a change in the country's policy on the development of weapons of mass destruction.

It is important to emphasize that the international coalition against

Libya emerged against the backdrop of a number of processes unfolding in the international arena, most importantly the formative events that led to the exposure of Libya's direct involvement in the murder of numerous citizens of several nationalities. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the crystallization of a one-superpower world, and the 1991 formation of an international coalition to resist the aggression of Saddam Hussein, who was seen by the international community as an uncontrolled tyrant leading a rogue state in terms of terrorism and non-conventional weapons, also contributed to the evolution of coordinated international action to restrain Qaddafi's policy of terrorism.

The Libyan case, which can be described as a "political force model," can be contrasted with two examples of military force used during the period following the September 11 attack, which can be dubbed the Afghan/Iraqi model (despite the differing circumstances in which each of these two countries was attacked, the differing constitution of the international coalitions in each case, and the respective justifications for using force). According to the "military force model," ousting rogue regimes objectionable in their pursuit of terrorism and non-conventional weapons can only be achieved through the application of massive military force by an international coalition, aimed at compulsory and relatively quick regime change. The Taliban regime was held responsible for the phenomenon of the "Afghan alumni" and for the widespread terrorism that they exe-

cuted against the West, which reached its height in the September 11 terrorist attacks. Saddam Hussein's regime was charged with involvement in international terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction, and was considered a power that might spur proliferation in both of these areas. These two regimes were deposed through physical power, once international sanctions proved to be of limited effectiveness and insufficient deterrence and were followed by the recourse to military force.

The international community, led by the United States and Europe, faces a major challenge that entails influencing rogue states, first and foremost Iran and Syria, to transform their policies with regard to terrorism and non-conventional weapons. The Libyan model is one option of how meet this challenge.

Most countries clearly prefer employing a policy of diplomacy in order to induce rogue states to agree to a transformation based on the Libyan model (albeit at a much quicker pace), instead of enforcing such a change through a policy of military might based on the Afghan/Iraqi model. While military force appears to promise desirable results in the short term, the potential dangers it creates raise great opposition and concerns regarding the stability of the international system in the long term. Thus Iran, for example, has over the past few months been the target of international diplomatic efforts aimed at placing the country under closer and more intrusive international supervision by the IAEA. The discovery of

Iran's activities and its violation of its international obligations can be regarded, to a certain extent, as being caught red-handed in the nuclear realm. The public disclosures on this subject have resulted in unusual coordinated steps by Germany, France, and Britain and in a threat on their part to level sanctions against Iran if it refuses to meet its obligations fully, including ratification of the Additional Protocol. At this stage, this

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warning is being put to the test as to the effectiveness of such steps in bringing about a change in the way that Iran manages the issue of developing nuclear weapons.

At issue is whether it will be possible to convince Germany, France, and Britain, who joined forces with other European states to deter Iran on the nuclear issue, to adopt a joint policy with the United States aimed at neutralizing Iran's policy regarding terrorism as well. Iran's pivotal role in strengthening the capabilities of terrorist groups in the Middle East has already been publicly exposed by Western intelligence agencies, and is

regularly mentioned in the State Department's annual report to Congress and in the EU-Iranian dialogue. These groups include Hizbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, elements within Fatah and the Palestinian Authority working to heighten the role of violence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as well as al-Qaeda networks and its affiliates.<sup>12</sup>

Syria, which has also been under the scrutiny of the international community in general and that of the United States in particular, has been classified in the same category as Iran. In October 2003, the US Congress approved the Syrian Responsibility Act, obligating the President to enact sanctions against Syria if it fails to comply with a number of demands, including ending its support of terrorist organizations working in or passing through its sovereign territory, preventing terrorists from crossing into Iraq from its territory, and developing and maintaining weapons of mass destruction. Sources in the White House have announced that the president will authorize the use of economic sanctions against Syria, but will at this stage refrain from applying other harsh limitations in order to prevent "irreparable" damage to the relations between the two countries.<sup>13</sup>

The ability of decision-makers in the United States and Europe to meet the challenge of changing the terrorist policies of Iran and Syria depends to a great extent on convincing senior American and European officials, along with respective domestic public opinion, of the active pivotal role played by these states in strengthen-



ing international terrorism. However, Iran and Syria have been careful not to involve directly their own agents or emissary groups to carry out terrorist operations as they had in the past, and are content to provide indirect assistance to groups and maintain a passive policy with regard to limiting the activities and movement of terrorists within their territory. They either do not arrest them or do so for short periods, releasing them and refusing to hand them over to the countries where they are sought. In this way, their support of terrorism remains behind the scenes.

It appears that the manner in which rogue states are being handled today – that is, by means of diplomacy and empty warnings that are not backed up by effective, comprehensive sanctions supported by a broad coalition, as per the Libyan model – will not succeed in bringing about a transformation in the terrorism policies of rogue states. In the event of another terrorist attack in the United States or Europe similar in dimension to the attacks of September 11 (an event some see as inevitable and only a matter of time) or a less deadly attack (or attacks) using non-conventional weapons, European and other states are likely to espouse the Libyan model as a preferred model of action, even if only to preempt the adoption of the alternative model of military force.

The tragic and deadly attack carried out in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which stands out as the most severe in the history of European terrorism, may serve as a wakeup call for the

leaders and citizens of Europe.<sup>14</sup> It is an indication of the urgent need for a comprehensive, activist approach for facing the challenge of international terrorism in general. Most important, it must underscore the need to alter the behavior of states that support terrorism and compel them, preferably through diplomatic pressures, to shun assistance to any form of terrorism, irrespective of the particular motivating ideology, and to assist in the fight against it.

## Notes

- 1 The Libyan "model" consists of a rogue state ruled by an authoritarian regime that has been in power for a long period of time; directly involved with mass casualty international terrorist attacks; "caught red-handed"; proven guilty by authorized commissions of inquiry of international standing or in Western courts; requested to assist in investigating an attack and extraditing suspects but has refused to do so; has had a broad international coalition assembled against it; has had comprehensive international sanctions used against it by the United Nations Security Council; was deterred from continuing its direct involvement in international terrorism; and eventually changed its policy on the development of weapons of mass destruction.
- 2 Yehudit Ronen, "Libya," in *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Tel-Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, 2000), p. 397.
- 3 Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, *The Globalization of Terror: The Challenge of Al-Qaida and the Response of the Inter-*

*national Community* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers of Rutgers University Press, 2003), pp. 1-7.

- 4 There are different levels through which states are involved in terrorism:
  - a) *Local Regime Terrorism* – oppressive violence carried out by a regime against the population of the country it governs. The first known use of this type of terrorism can be identified in the murderous violence used by Robespierre against opponents of his regime following the French Revolution. This subject usually does not receive considerable attention when a country is cast as a "rogue state."
  - b) *State Terrorism* – terrorism carried out systematically at the initiative of a state and performed by its agents or by proxy organizations that operate under the state's auspices to advance its interests.
  - c) *State-Sponsored Terrorism* – terrorist activities carried out by terrorist organizations, with the support of a state in various forms of assistance including: logistical support, operational support, or safe haven in its sovereign territory or in territory under its control. Indirect involvement of states in terrorism is also manifested in actions such as knowingly hosting ideological conferences of terrorist organizations out of identification with their struggle, allowing terrorists to live and manage their affairs in the country, and permitting command headquarters and training camps to function in their sovereign territory. Such involvement can be referred to as a policy of passive support.

In recent years and primarily after September 11, 2001, an additional sub-

category has been especially visible: a state's passive tolerance of terrorist groups present within its sovereign territory, without taking practical steps to remove them. This phenomenon exists primarily though not exclusively in countries that are sometimes referred to as "failed states."

- 5 On April 17, 1986, an attempt to blow up an El Al plane was foiled when Anne-Marie Murphy, an unsuspecting Irish citizen, was arrested at London's Heathrow Airport while carrying a 1.5 kg explosive device hidden in her suitcase that was intended to be detonated during the flight, which carried 375 passengers of different nationalities. The device was given to Murphy by her fiancé Nezar Hindawi, who was being operated by Syrian intelligence and received assistance from the Syrian embassy in London in carrying out the operation. Hindawi sent his fiancé to Israel, ostensibly to meet his parents who lived in Bethlehem. In October 1986, a court found Hindawi guilty of attempting to carry out the attack and sentenced him to forty-five years imprisonment. The British government expelled the Syrian ambassador and others on the diplomatic staff and severed diplomatic relations with Syria immediately following the verdict. The United States recalled its ambassador from Damascus for "consultation." At a meeting held in London on November 10, 1986, foreign ministers of the European community decided on measures of increased security and cooperation.
- 6 In September 1992, four leaders of the Iranian opposition Kurdish Demo-

cratic Party (KDP) were murdered in the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin. The four were invited to a reconciliation meeting at the restaurant by official representatives of the Iranian regime. They were shot to death by a Hizbollah cell of three members living in Germany that was commanded by an Iranian student who lived in Berlin and was supervised by an Iranian intelligence officer who came to Germany especially for the operation. Those involved in the attack, except for the Iranian intelligence officer who supervised the operation and escaped to Iran, were arrested and tried. On April 10, 1997, a Berlin court found the four guilty of murder. The Iranian student, Kazem Darebi, was sentenced to life imprisonment, and the other three were sentenced to prison terms of varying length. In its verdict, the court pointed an accusing finger at top echelons of the Iranian regime for its direct involvement in ordering the murders. This was the first time that a European court determined publicly and explicitly that the leaders of Iran – including Khomeini, the country's spiritual leader, the president Rafsanjani, and other senior officials – stood behind the policy of terrorism that had been used by the country systematically since the establishment of Iran's Islamic regime in 1979.

In light of the court's ruling in the Mykonos case, the German government took a number of disciplinary measures against Iran, including recalling the German ambassador to Germany for "consultation" and expelling "Iranian diplomats" who were

suspected of "undiplomatic" (i.e. terrorist) activities. For its part, Iran responded with immediate counter-measures including: the immediate recall of Mousavian, its ambassador to Germany; the expulsion of German diplomats from Iran (the same number that were expelled by Germany); and an announcement that it had no interest in renewing the "critical dialogue" with Germany (referring to the policy of support and aid that Germany, in contrast to the other countries of Europe, had espoused with relation to Iran).

- 7 Ahmad M. Zaidan, *Osama bin Laden Revealed* (Beirut: World Book Publishing, 2003), p. 12 [Hebrew translation].
- 8 Yoram Schweitzer, "The Lockerbie Affair: Over but not Done With," [www.ict.org.il](http://www.ict.org.il).
- 9 Lynette Clemetson, "Lockerbie Victims' Relatives See Glimmer of Hope," *New York Times*, August 16, 2003.
- 10 Patrick Tyler, "U.N. Council Postpones Votes on Libya Penalties," *New York Times*, January 27, 2004.
- 11 "Libya Accepts Spot Checks," *New York Times*, December 21, 2003.
- 12 Ephraim Kam, *From Terror to Nuclear Bombs: The Significance of the Iranian Threat* (Israel: Ministry of Defense Publishing House and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 248 [Hebrew].
- 13 Natan Gutman, "United States: Economic Sanctions against Syria Soon" *Ha'aretz*, May 2, 2004.
- 14 Yoram Schweitzer, "Another Deadly Wakeup Call for Europe," *Tel Aviv Notes*, No.101, March 15, 2004.