

# The Palestinian Boycott of Israeli Goods: Economic Ramifications

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## Palestinian Boycotts of Israeli Goods

In recent years, attempts to exert political pressure on Israel through economic boycotts have increased, heightened by the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement. Palestinian organizations have long tried to use the boycott of Israeli goods, especially Israeli foodstuffs, as a means of putting pressure on Israel. In 2010, five years after the BDS movement was started by 171 pro-Palestinian NGOs,<sup>1</sup> the PA began adopting the tactic. At first, it focused on goods manufactured in Israeli industrial parks and settlements in the West Bank. The PA government spearheaded a campaign, covered widely in the media, to boycott goods from the settlements, and Salam Fayyad participated in a public destruction of settlement goods.<sup>2</sup> Then-Minister of the Economy Hassan Abu Libdeh embarked on a PR campaign aimed at convincing Palestinian consumers to choose local products over settlement goods, and sent volunteers door-to-door to explain the importance of boycotting settlement products.

In the summer of 2014, the boycott trend went into higher gear because of Operation Protective Edge, and the Palestinian public campaign began to include all Israeli goods, not only those manufactured by Israelis in the West Bank.<sup>3</sup> As part of that campaign, activists went from store to store to place stickers in Arabic on Israeli goods reading, “When buying this product, you are making a donation to the Israeli army.” In early 2015, in response to the freeze on the transfer of tax revenues to the PA, sources identified with Fatah called on the Palestinians to boycott products of six Israeli food manufacturers (Tnuva, Strauss, Osem, Elite, Prigat, and Jafora-

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Tabori) and of Israeli pharmaceutical companies.<sup>4</sup> The boycott campaign included calls to Palestinian consumers to boycott Israeli products and attend “boycott vigils” at stores, and radio jingles calling for the boycott of the “occupier’s goods.” A poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in March 2015 showed that 85 percent of the respondents were in favor of boycotting Israeli goods, and 54 percent declared that they had stopped buying Tnuva and Strauss products.<sup>5</sup> But other than boycotting Israeli consumer goods, there was no evidence of any activity aimed against buying Israeli raw goods or intermediate products by Palestinian industries.

In March 2016, the PA announced a formal boycott of five Israeli food manufacturers – Tnuva, Strauss, Tara, Soglowek, and Jafora-Tabori – and set a target date for the products of these manufacturers to be removed from Palestinian shelves.<sup>6</sup> This announcement came shortly after the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture stopped goods by five Palestinian food manufacturers from reaching East Jerusalem markets. Three weeks later, the Israeli High Court of Justice revoked the Israeli ministry’s order, and consequently the boycott of the Israeli companies also ended. However, in an interview with the Israeli media, Palestinian sources claimed that the boycott had caused the loss of millions of shekels to the Israeli companies.<sup>7</sup> The following month, the chair of the Palestinian Food Merchants Association met with the Palestinian agriculture minister to stress the merchants’ support for the government’s decisions, especially preventing the sale of Israeli goods and boycotting them.<sup>8</sup> In general, boycott announcements are met with broad support, and they will likely be issued in the future as well.

### **The Economic Ramifications of the Boycotts**

Contrary to the claims made in the Palestinian media, an analysis of the PA’s data on trade with Israel shows that the damage inflicted by the boycotts on Israeli companies is quite limited. Although between 2014 and 2016 Israeli exports to the PA dropped and Israel’s share of total Palestinian imports shrank, the major reason was the sharp drop in global fuel prices and its effect on the price of fuel sold by Israeli companies to the PA. By contrast, the effect of the boycott on the sale of Israeli food products, the core of the Palestinian boycott movement, accounted for less than 0.5 percent of the revenue of the Israeli food manufacturing industry.

*The Effect of Boycotts on Total Palestinian Imports from Israel*

In 2010-2015, the scope of Palestinian imports from Israel grew. The total imports in the West Bank and Gaza Strip rose from NIS 18 billion a year in 2012-2013 to NIS 20.3 billion a year in 2014-2015. But despite the absolute growth in imports from Israel, the share of goods imported from Israel actually dropped. The annual reported trade data indicate a decrease in the share of imports from and via Israel<sup>9</sup> out of the total Palestinian imports in the last two years – from 71.6 to 58.3 percent (table 1). The monthly reported trade data, which are not final and therefore less reliable than the scope reported in the annual data (figure 1),<sup>10</sup> indicate the timing of the decline: from mid-2014 until early 2016, the share of imports from and through Israel out of all Palestinian imports declined from 67 to 52 percent.

The drop was ostensibly a function of the wave of Palestinian boycotts of Israeli products, which intensified because of Operation Protective Edge. But in fact, most of the decrease stemmed from the global drop in the price of fuels, which accounted for 40 percent of Palestinian imports from Israel in 2013. In 2015 alone, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reported an annual plunge of 29 percent in the total scope of fuel imports, of which some 97 percent are imported from Israel (table 1). The timing of the drop in the rate of Palestinian imports from Israel is also congruent with the decline in fuel prices: had the ratio of fuel in the total of 2013 imports stayed constant, the drop in prices alone would have caused a drop in the value of imports similar to the drop in practice (in figure 1, compare the rate in practice with the projected rate based on the price of fuel).

Once the drop in fuel imports from Israel is deducted, it is evident that between 2012 and 2015 there was only a 4 percent decrease in imports from Israel compared to the total of all Palestinian imports (table 1). While this is a moderate decrease, it occurred in tandem with a significant increase in Palestinian imports from other nations, especially China and Turkey – the two largest exporters to the PA after Israel. The share of imports from Turkey and China grew steadily: from 4.5-5 percent each in 2011, to 7-7.5 percent in 2015. Turkey's political and economic involvement in the PA, including help in building the Jenin industrial zone and assistance to the Gaza Strip (which can be expected to grow as Turkey-Israel relations improve), will likely result in further growth of Turkey's portion in Palestinian foreign trade.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, the increase in imports from China is not surprising, given China's concerted effort to expand its exports to more markets around the world. The increase in imports from these two nations has

allowed the Palestinians to maintain the total scope of imports despite the cut in imports from Israel.

**Table 1.** Reported Palestinian imports, 2011-2014 (in NIS billions in current prices and percentages)


	Imports to the PA				
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Total imports in NIS billions</b>	<b>15.6</b>	<b>18.1</b>	<b>18.6</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>20.3</b>
<i>Of which:</i> West Bank	13.2	15.0	15.1	16.0	17.8
Gaza Strip	2.4	3.1	3.5	4.3	2.5
<b>Share of imports from selected markets</b>					
Israel	70.7%	71.3%	71.6%	69.6%	58.3%
Israel, excluding fuels	39.7%	41.3%	41.0%	37.5%	37.4%
Turkey	4.9%	5.0%	5.6%	5.7%	7.3%
China	4.4%	4.2%	4.6%	5.0%	7.0%
<b>Major import items in NIS billions</b>					
Fuels and mineral products	5.4	6.2	6.4	7.3	5.2
Foodstuffs and tobacco	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.5
Machines and medical instruments	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.8
Stone, cement, and ceramic goods	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5

**Source:** Foreign Trade Annuals, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

### *The Effects of Boycotts on the Import of Israeli Food Products*

Most of the boycott activity has been aimed at large Israeli food manufacturers. Therefore, it is interesting to examine the dynamics of processed food imports made with Israeli produce to the PA and the availability of local alternatives and alternatives imported from elsewhere. Table 2, which shows food imports to the PA from the world at large and from Israel based on economic categories of usage, e.g., consumption by households versus raw industrial products (broad economic categories – BEC classifications), demonstrates that during the first half of the decade, the total of food imports to the PA for consumption and industry grew quite rapidly. Nonetheless, the growth in imports of processed food for household consumption – i.e., the very products targeted by the boycotts – was much slower. The share of import of these products from Israel, which in 2011-2013 was about 55 percent, dropped to 45 percent in 2015. Had the share of Palestinian imports of processed food from Israel for consumption stayed at 55 percent, the

**Figure 1.** Reported Palestinian imports from Israel and other economies, 2011-2016 (in NIS billions at current prices and percentages, without seasonal adjustments)



**Source:** Monthly Announcement on Foreign Trade, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

**Note:** The projected share of imports from Israel based on fuel prices is calculated using the monthly price of Brent Crude and the share of fuel imports in 2013 according to Comtrade.

scope of imports in 2015 would have been NIS 194 million higher than it was in practice. Table 2 also shows that imports from the EU, the Arab states (Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia), and East Asia partly replaced the import of processed foodstuffs from Israel.

**Table 2.** Reported trade in foodstuffs by the PA in broad economic categories (BEC) with the world and with Israel (in NIS billions at current prices) and employment in the Palestinian food manufacturing industry

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Food imports to the PA</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.3</b>
<b>Of which: imports of processed food products for household consumption*</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>2.1</b>
Of which: Israel	56%	54%	55%	49%	45%
EU	13%	14%	11%	14%	16%
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia	8%	8%	9%	9%	10%
Turkey	8%	9%	9%	10%	9%
India, China, Thailand	4%	4%	4%	5%	6%
<b>Imports of raw materials for industry**</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.5</b>
Raw materials for industry as a share of total food imports	34%	37%	37%	38%	35%
<b>Exports of food from the PA</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.8</b>
Of which: to Israel	0.3	0.4	0.55	0.4	0.5
Food exports to Israel as a share of total food exports	74%	65%	81%	67%	65%
<b>Palestinian food manufacturing industry</b>					
Number of employees (thousands)	14.9	15.2	15.5	17.7	
Overall input – hours of work (thousands)	686.8	756.6	764.9	812.6	


**Source:** Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reports to Comtrade, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics Labor Force Surveys

\* Category 122 of BEC classification: food and beverages, processed, mainly for household consumption

\*\* Imports of raw materials for industry include both processed and unprocessed products. This is a sum of two items: BEC code 111: food and beverages, primary, mainly for industry; and BEC code 121: food and beverages, processed, mainly for industry

Israeli data on sales to the PA in the food manufacturing industry (selling Israeli-made products) and the food trade industry (selling both Israeli and foreign products) support the conclusion derived on the basis of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics data: figure 2 shows that starting in mid-2014, sales by the Israeli food manufacturing industry to the PA dropped, whereas sales by the food trade industry, which sells both Israeli and foreign products, has not changed since 2014. It seems that the timing of the decline in sales by the Israeli food manufacturing industry, starting with Operation Protective Edge, supports the claim that Palestinian boycott activities caused the drop in Israeli sales. Had the sales of the food manufacturing industry retained the difference in sales compared to the food trade industry, they would have been some NIS 200 million higher. A NIS 200 million annual reduction in sales<sup>12</sup> does not represent a significant threat to the Israeli food manufacturing industry, whose proceeds in 2013 came to NIS 63 billion; at most, this represents a loss of less than 0.5 percent of revenue.

**Figure 2.** Reported sales of the food manufacturing and food trade industries to the West Bank (NIS millions in current prices)



**Source:** Israel Tax Authority and authors' calculations



Beyond their limited effect on Israeli industries, boycotts may actually be a double-edged sword, causing damage to the welfare of the Palestinian consumer: at the anecdotal level, data collected by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics suggests that in 2010-2015 prices of locally manufactured goods such as yogurt and juice rose, compared to the prices of the Israeli counterparts.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, replacing Israeli imports with imports from other economies (in greater quantities in recent years) means higher costs, thereby reducing the availability of some items to the low income population. In addition, not only Palestinian consumers, but store owners as well are liable to pay a price for the lack of some products and price increases on others; one Ramallah supermarket owner said he lost \$10,000 for participating in the boycott.<sup>14</sup> In practice, the economic price that individuals are forced to pay reduces the ability of Palestinian organizations to promote a broader, long term boycott of Israeli goods that would persist even in the absence of deterioration in the security situation or tensions.

At the same time, several indicators suggest that there is currently greater availability of locally produced alternatives than in the past, a factor that could enable further boycotts. Table 2 shows that in 2010-2014 there was a moderate increase in the import of food that served as raw materials for industry as a share of all Palestinian imports, although the rate dropped somewhat in 2015. This increase, as well as the rapid growth in exports of foodstuffs from the PA, including to Israel, suggests an increase in the importance of the local Palestinian food manufacturing industry and the creation of local alternatives to Israeli products. As seen in table 2, in 2010-2014 employment in the Palestinian food manufacturing industry grew.

In this context, one could view the calls for a boycott of Israeli products and the encouragement of consumption of Palestinian products as a form of protectionism for Palestinian industries that are getting off the ground; competing against established Israeli companies makes it hard for new enterprises to develop. If so, it may be that economic considerations are actually driving the politics, rather than the other way around: the development of Palestinian industry made the boycott of Israeli goods possible and expanded the lobby supporting the boycott. Thus, it may be that the continuing development of the local food industry will serve as a catalyst for more boycotts.

Furthermore, the expansion of Palestinian food manufacturing will presumably increase Palestinian demand for raw materials, including raw materials from the Israeli food industry and Israeli agricultural produce. At



the same time, the sale of Israeli foodstuffs will continue, whether through merchants reporting to the tax authority or through direct purchases of goods by Palestinian households in Israeli West Bank shops. Moreover, the sale of food to secondary food markets in the Arab areas and East Jerusalem will likely grow, but it is doubtful that the Palestinian food industry will manage to sell large quantities to the Israeli food market, especially given hurdles such as kosher certification and standards.

In addition to the emerging growth in the availability of local alternatives to processed foodstuffs made in Israel, imports of food from the EU, nearby states (e.g., Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia), and even East Asian markets stand to expand (table 2). The growth in availability of alternatives to Israeli food products (both made in Israel and imported from elsewhere) in 2010-2015 is thus in line with the long term decrease in the sales of the Israeli food manufacturing industry to the PA.

### **Growth in the PA's Economic Dependency on Israel**

At the same time, recent years have actually seen a growing dependency of the PA's economy on Israel. First and foremost, Israel is the PA's most important export market, buying more than 80 percent of all Palestinian export goods (table 3). The geographical proximity, the shared tax system, and the common currency region save on costs and simplify trade with Israel, even considering the security restrictions.

The reported export of Palestinian goods rose in recent years, and by 2015 reached NIS 3.7 billion, virtually all of it exported from the West Bank. Quick foreign trade assessments indicate further growth in Palestinian exports to Israel in 2015, especially until the start of the latest wave of terrorism (in September 2015), although the annual data suggest a stabilization in the portion of exports to Israel (perhaps due to the escalation in attacks). Also, reported export data do not include some sales to Israeli citizens, which do not have to be reported (by means of "P" tax invoices) or sales to Israeli businesses that, in violation of the law, fail to report on transactions. Because the scope of non-reported sales to other states is small, their portion of the total reported and non-reported exports from the West Bank to Israel is even greater than the above estimate.

Second, PA government revenues also come largely from Israel. As a result of the freeze on local tax collection and the recent drop in foreign donations, the tax transfers from Israel – which collects import duties, value added, and excise taxes on behalf of the PA – have become the PA's

**Table 3.** Reported Palestinian exports, 2011-2015 (NIS billions in current prices and percentages)

	PA Exports				
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Total exports (NIS billions)</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.7</b>
<i>Of which: West Bank</i>	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.7
Gaza Strip	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02
<b>Percentages to selected markets</b>					
Israel	86.3%	81.7%	87.3%	83.9%	83.9%
Jordan	5.2%	7.5%	6.2%	7.0%	6.3%
Gulf states	2.5%	3.3%	1.8%	2.7%	3.5%
<b>Major export goods (NIS billions)</b>					
Stone and construction materials	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8
Vegetable products	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.5
Foodstuffs	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
Various industrial products	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4

**Source:** Foreign Trade Annuals, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

main source of revenue. On average, the tax transfers represent two thirds of the PA's nominal income. Tax collection by Israel increased from an average of NIS 510 million a month in 2013 to an average of NIS 715 million a month in 2015.

Added to this is the income of Palestinian workers employed in Israel, which supports more than 16 percent of all West Bank employees. Palestinian employment in the Israeli economy (including the settlements in the West Bank), both legal and illegal, has been on the rise in recent years, a direct outcome of the Israeli policy to issue more work permits while only partially enforcing the law on illegal labor. According to Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics data, at the end of 2015, there were 63,000 Palestinians working in Israel with a permit, and 37,000 working without one, a total of 100,000 Palestinian workers.<sup>15</sup>

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the average wage of Palestinian workers in the Israeli economy is more than twice as high as the average income in the Palestinian economy in the West Bank. As the number of workers in the Israeli economy rises, so does the contribution of their wages to the national economy, which increased

**Table 4.** Growth in Palestinian employment in Israel, 2011-2015

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
West Bank residents employed by Israelis (in thousands)	52.4	60.4	82.1	92.2	112.7
Of which: employed with permits	32.2	38.6	49.0	58.8	63.3
employed without permits	20.1	21.8	33.1	33.4	36.6
<b>East Jerusalem residents employed by Israelis*</b>	30.4	22.4	17.2	15.1	12.9
<b>Share of all employed West Bank and East Jerusalem residents**</b>	14.0%	13.8%	16.6%	16.1%	16.6%
<b>Daily average wages (in NIS)</b>					
Employee in the Israeli economy (Israel and West Bank Jewish settlements)	162.2	164.0	175.4	187.6	198.9
Employee in the Palestinian economy in the West Bank	85.0	87.1	89.0	90.0	94.0
<b>Total income of those employed in the Israeli economy</b>					
Total income (in NIS billions in current prices)	2.37	2.94	3.89	4.45	4.88
As a share of GDP in the West Bank***	8.4%	8.9%	11.5%	12.7%	13.2%

**Source:** Labor Force Surveys and balance of payments of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics


\* Holding an Israeli ID card or foreign passport

\*\* Reports issued by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics do not distinguish between West Bank and East Jerusalem residents, and it is therefore not possible to calculate the rate of Palestinians employed by Israelis without counting East Jerusalem residents employed in Israel.

\*\*\*The GDP of the West Bank does not include the income of those employed in the Israeli economy.

from the equivalent of about 8 percent of the GDP in 2011 to more than 13 percent of the West Bank GDP in 2015 (table 4). Furthermore, in early 2016, the security establishment formulated a program to provide work permits to another 30,000 workers. The full, or even partial, implementation of that program would allow another increase in the legal employment of West Bank Arabs in Israel and in their contribution to the PA's GDP.

**Figure 3.** Palestinian employment in Israel (seasonally adjusted data), 2010-2016



**Source:** Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics; seasonal adjustments by the authors

## Conclusion

Despite the impression they have tried to create, Palestinian organizations have shown limited ability to damage the Israeli economy through boycotts. Israel's trade with the PA represents a small fraction of the country's foreign trade overall: according to a 2014 Bank of Israel survey, about 5 percent of Israeli exports and 1 percent of Israeli imports.<sup>16</sup> In particular, the Israeli food manufacturing industry's dependency on the Palestinian economy is low: the total sales of this industry to the PA represented some 2-3.5 percent of the industry's revenue.<sup>17</sup> While these rates are not negligible, they represent mainly trade in traditional or semi-traditional low-mixed technology industrial products whose added value to the Israeli economy is low.

On the other hand, Israel is the PA's most dominant trade partner, responsible for some 60 percent of Palestinian imports and more than 80 percent of Palestinian exports. Palestinian revenue from employment in Israel is even higher than its income from exports. Furthermore, the drop in the portion of Palestinian imports from Israel of the total of the Palestinian

imports stemmed mainly from trends not connected to boycotts of Israel goods, in particular the drop in the price of fuel that began in mid-2014. Sales by the Israeli food trade industry remained the same in 2012–2014, before the boycott declared in the wake of Operation Protective Edge. More than likely, the reason for the stagnation was the development of local alternatives and imports from elsewhere replacing the Israeli products. Sales by the Israeli food manufacturing industry, which was the focus of Palestinian calls for boycotts, declined in late 2014 and in early 2015, perhaps because of the boycotts, with damage amounting to less than NIS 200 million a year, about one half of a percent of the industry's revenue. Therefore, attempts to boycott made-in-Israel goods – which may have supported the development of the local industry – are not expected to be effective in exerting political pressure on Israel.

## Notes

- 1 Ben Hoffman and Tal Schwartzman, "The Israeli Economy in the Shadow of the Delegitimization Campaign: Recent Developments," Ministry of Finance, International Relations Department in the Chief Economist's Bureau, February 1, 2015.
- 2 Danny Rubinstein, "David Threatening Goliath: Palestinian Boycott of Settlement Products Expands," *Calcalist*, March 10, 2010, <http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3396699,00.html>.
- 3 David Raphael, "Old Protest, New Mood: Government Stops Denying Boycott, Tries to Act," *Calcalist*, August 18, 2014, <http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3638589,00.html>.
- 4 Rania Zabaneh, "West Bank Boycott Takes Aim at Israeli Food Products," *al-Jazeera*, March 22, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/03/west-bank-boycott-takes-aim-israeli-food-products-150318103411547.html>.
- 5 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, *Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 55*, April 8, 2015, <http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/poll%2055%20fulltext%20English%20final.pdf>.
- 6 "PA Bans Imports from 5 Major Israeli Food Companies," *Ma'an News Agency*, March 22, 2016, <https://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=770799>.
- 7 Ora Koren, "The Palestinian Boycott of Tnuva, Strauss, and Coca-Cola Lifted; 'The Companies Lost Millions of Shekels,'" *The Marker*, April 17, 2016, <http://www.themarker.com/news/macro/1.2917460>.
- 8 "The Food Trade Association Met with the Minister of Economy," *Ma'an News Agency*, April 19, 2016, <https://www.maannews.net/Content.aspx?id=842261>.

- 9 Imports from and via Israel include the import of Israeli products and goods imported to Israel, sold by Israeli importers to Palestinians, and reported by means of "I" tax invoices.
- 10 The process of collecting tax invoices for trade with Israel is lengthy, and therefore the monthly trade estimates with Israel are only partial. The rate of imports from Israel reflected by the monthly data is lower than that reflected by the annual data.
- 11 In May 2016, Turkish businessmen met Palestinian counterparts in Ramallah to discuss ways of expanding trade between the two in various fields, including food, agriculture, and clothing. See the Portland Trust, "Palestinian-Turkish Trade Relations," *Palestinian Economic Bulletin – Issue 117*, June 2016, <http://portlandtrust.us4.list-manage.com/track/click?u=3b2560c960f7c1b0e26bbebf1&id=2810bb7f5f&e=4f7d709f60>.
- 12 The value lost by Israel in the processed food market is also parallel to the annual gap between the sales of the food manufacturing industry and the food trade industry before Operation Protective Edge, which was erased in 2014–2015.
- 13 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Prices and Price Indices – Annual Bulletin* (for 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015), [http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/pcbs\\_2012/Publications.aspx](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/pcbs_2012/Publications.aspx).
- 14 Zabaneh, "West Bank Boycott Takes Aim at Israeli Food Products."
- 15 At present, Gaza Strip residents cannot obtain work permits to work in Israel; all Palestinians officially working in the Israeli economy are from the West Bank.
- 16 Bank of Israel Research Department, "Trade Relations Between Israel and the Palestinian Authority," *Recent Economic Developments: October 2013 to March 2014*, June 2014, <http://www.boi.org.il/en/NewsAndPublications/RegularPublications/Research%20Department%20Publications/RecentEconomicDevelopments/develop137e.pdf>.
- 17 Ibid.