

Relying on a Splintered Reed? Intelligence about Allies and Partners

Udi Golan

Israel has recently been thrust into a tenuous and declining situation with regard to its allies and strategic partners. The toppling of President Mubarak in Egypt surprised intelligence organizations in Israel and the West; the Israeli embassy in Cairo was attacked by mobs and evacuated; and uncertainty hovers over the future of Israel's relations with Egypt. The web of strategic relations with Turkey has collapsed and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has sounded militant declarations against Israel. The unrest in the Middle East raises questions about the stability of the Jordanian regime and the future of Israel's relations with the monarchy. Even with regard to the United States, voices have warned of cooler relations and in the longer term, of the waning of the strategic alliance with Israel.¹

It is only natural that intelligence focus on the enemy – gathering intelligence and studying the states that represent a threat to the country and are liable to go to war against it. However, as recent events have shown, a surprise on the part of a nation's ally or partner can also have far reaching implications. A warning about relying on a questionable ally or unreliable partner was issued already in the time of the Bible by Assyrian King Sennacherib to Hezekiah, King of Judah, who rebelled against Assyria and sought to rely on Egypt: "You are relying on Egypt, that splintered reed of a staff, which enters and punctures the palm of anyone who leans on it" (Isaiah 36:6).²

In contemporary times, Israel has encountered a number of instances where a change in an ally had strategic meaning (such as the fall of the

Udi Golan is a journalist and researcher in the fields of intelligence and security. He holds a degree in international relations from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Shah in Iran; the alliance with the Christians in Lebanon 1975-83; the collapse of the South Lebanon Army and its effect on Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon). Today too Israel is forced to confront a complex reality in which intelligence not just about its enemies but also about its allies and partners is of the utmost importance. Pressing current questions in this vein include: can the Palestinian security forces stand up to Hamas? is it possible to put together a coalition against Iran consisting of moderate Arab nations? how stable are the moderate Arab regimes?

This essay addresses the growing importance of intelligence about allies, particularly in light of the scant academic research on the topic. "Allies" and "partners" refer here to states or non-state actors with which a state maintains security relations, and not only states with which official treaties have been signed. The essay does not deal with political and/or diplomatic intelligence routinely gathered about various states, rather intelligence about allies that is important from strategic and security perspectives. The essay claims that intelligence organizations confront unique challenges and dilemmas (in terms of gathering, research, relations between the intelligence community and the political leadership, and more) when the object is an ally or partner (intra-alliance intelligence) rather than an enemy. Most of the information in the field of intelligence about allies is classified. The essay is based on non-classified information and uses some prominent examples from the Israeli and American experience in order to present the complexity and dilemmas of intelligence about allies.

The Need for Intra-Alliance Intelligence

Espionage and the use of intelligence services vis-à-vis allies and partners are common phenomena in the world of intelligence. Even where there may be operational or intelligence cooperation between allies in a certain area, such as the war on terrorism, at the same time allies gather intelligence about one another and relate to this as a straightforward intelligence objective.³

Given the nature of the subject matter, which because of its political sensitivity has remained classified for many years, intelligence gathering among allies and its role in creating and managing alliances and coalitions has been studied little at the academic level (though in the 1990s there was some academic interest in economic and industrial espionage between

allies). In a 1998 essay in the journal *Intelligence and National Security*, Prof. Martin Alexander quoted a definition of intelligence as “the missing dimension” in the study of international relations, and named the secondary field of intra-alliance intelligence as “the missing dimension of the missing dimension.”⁴ Following the September 11 attacks, academic research on intelligence liaisons and cooperation between intelligence organizations grew.⁵ However, these areas do not sufficiently address the expanding phenomenon of deviations from traditional alliances (NATO) and cooperation between the US and random allies and partners whose loyalty is suspect and might even represent a potential threat (Pakistan, Karzai’s regime in Afghanistan, the new regime in Iraq, and others). The need for intelligence surveillance about these new or occasional allies is critical.⁶

For the US the question of intelligence gathering about allies is particularly apparent in the case of Pakistan, on the one hand an important ally in the war on terrorism, but on the other hand, a nuclear power suffering from political instability and a state suspected of providing assistance or harboring elements that provide such assistance to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The US has cooperated with Pakistan in the war on terrorism, but has also carried out independent intelligence operations in Pakistan, including surveillance of the Pakistani armed forces and intelligence services. The elimination of Osama Bin Laden by US special forces on Pakistani soil without prior coordination with the Pakistani government and military is an excellent example of the problematic relations between the two allies.⁷

Though obviously in a different category, Israel too is the subject of American intelligence gathering activity, primarily because of Israel’s ability to make unilateral moves that affect American interests in the Middle East. The US has followed the development of Israel’s nuclear program, continues to follow construction in the territories, and in general takes a great deal of intelligence interest in Israel (e.g., will Israel attack the Iranian nuclear installations), but it is only rarely that information about this is made public.⁸

Academic research in the field of intelligence has dealt extensively with the question of intelligence surprises and failures, especially surprise attacks on the part of a hostile nation (Operation Barbarossa, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Yom Kippur War).⁹ However, there

has been virtually no study of the phenomenon of surprises by allies. It is important to distinguish between allies/partners that do not represent a threat and are unlikely to become an enemy, though there is an interest in conducting relevant surveillance, as opposed to allies/partners that are liable to become future enemies. Likewise, it is important to distinguish between intentional changes initiated by the leaderships of allied states (such as severing relations) on the one hand, and on the other, events that lead to material changes (e.g., a revolution that surprises even the leader of the ally in question), consequently affecting the relations between the nations. Allies may generate several types of surprises:

- a. A state ally/partner undergoes a transition and becomes a state enemy.
- b. The ally/partner deserts the alliance and becomes neutral and uncooperative.
- c. The ally/partner undergoes a political/military collapse in wartime (e.g., the quick collapse of France in the face of the Nazi attack in May 1940, surprising Great Britain).¹⁰
- d. The ally goes to war or undertakes a military operation without prior coordination, with ramifications for the state, including the risk of being dragged into the fighting (Great Britain, France, and Israel went to war in 1956 without coordination with the United States).
- e. A revolt or a change in the regime of the ally/partner leads to a change in relations and possibly even the loss of the ally/partner (the fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini's regime led to the loss of Iran as a central ally of the US and Israel).

Intelligence vis-à-vis an Ally/Partner

How are different stages in the intelligence cycle, i.e., the work of intelligence, affected when the object is an ally rather than an enemy?

Critical Data Identification

The first task in intelligence work is critical data identification (CDI), i.e., setting priorities (determining which states and areas should be of focus), and deciding how to use available resources (recruiting agents, wiretapping, training investigators, acquiring language capabilities, and so on). The highest priority of CDI has traditionally been given to early warning of war; in recent decades, terrorism and the proliferation of non-conventional weapons have also assumed primacy in critical

data identification. During the Cold War, the US directed most of its intelligence efforts to the USSR. In the first three decades of the state, Israel focused its efforts on states with which it was in conflict and the risk of conventional war; Egypt was the primary object until the 1979 peace agreement. Over the next twenty years, Iran headed the list of priorities, alongside Syria, Hizbollah, and Hamas. Allies too, especially those whose actions have important implications for national interests, are included in CDI, but fewer resources and much less attention are directed to them.¹¹

Intelligence Gathering

At least on official levels, allies and partners assume certain restrictions in espionage and intelligence gathering activities against one another. In 1951, Israel and the United States (the Mossad and the CIA) reached an agreement about intelligence cooperation that included an understanding that they would not spy on one another. However, in 1952-53, the FBI claimed that some Israeli intelligence representatives in the United States were involved in illegal espionage activity on American soil.¹² Since the peace treaty with Egypt, Israel has imposed limits on covert intelligence gathering there. Over the years there have been several Egyptian reports about arrests in Egypt of people accused of spying for Israel, the best known among them being Azzam Azzam and more recently Ilan Grapel. Israel has denied that either acted as spies on Israel's behalf.¹³

One may distinguish between active, invasive means of intelligence gathering, whose use against allies would be considered illegitimate, and passive means of intelligence gathering, which would be considered less problematic. Humint – the deployment of spies or other human sources – is considered illegitimate, as illustrated by the Pollard case. Jonathan Pollard, a US Navy intelligence analyst who spied for Israel, did not collect intelligence about the US, but gathered information about Arab states from American databases. However, the very fact that Israel, an ally, operated a spy in the US was seen as highly problematic, evidenced by the heavy sentence imposed on Pollard and the refusal to grant him a pardon. The affair damaged relations between the nations (intelligence relations were suspended for a short while) and Israel consequently made a commitment not to engage in espionage in the United States.¹⁴

Signals intelligence (Sigint) – planting wiretaps on the soil of a friendly nation or in its embassies – is also illegitimate, though ambassadors operate on the assumption that their conversations are tapped and take necessary precautions. However, more passive eavesdropping – by means of satellites or other means not located on the ally's soil – is less problematic. In the field of visual intelligence (visint), sorties of planes taking aerial photographs in the airspace of an ally are problematic, whereas satellite photography does not violate the sovereignty of a nation. Likewise, intelligence gathering by means of special units is unacceptable with regard to an ally.

Embassy staff and/or military attachés stationed in an allied nation can also be considered intelligence gathering operatives. They operate under clear limitations and are not authorized to use covert methods associated with intelligence operatives. The gathering of internal political and even security intelligence is seen as legitimate if it is done using acceptable methods (e.g., open sources, meetings of diplomats and military attachés for debriefings). Here too, however, there may be a blurring of the line separating diplomatic activity and military liaisons from covert intelligence activity. There have been cases in which embassy personnel and military attachés have been expelled from the host nation on the basis of accusations of espionage.¹⁵

With regard to intelligence gathering, relating to an ally as if it were an enemy is liable to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The exposure of espionage on allied soil or publicizing the very fact that intelligence relates to the ally as if it were a threat is liable to damage relations between allies and be the source of considerable tension.

The fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979 demonstrates the importance as well as the limits and advantages of intelligence gathering about an ally. Israel's representatives in Iran, Ambassador Uri Lubrani and Mossad representatives Reuven Merhav and Eliezer (Geizie) Tzafrir, identified the growing destabilization of the Shah's regime – thanks to their experience and ability to travel through Iran and gauge the mood – and submitted warnings to that effect. In March 1977, the Israeli government held a discussion about the stability of the Shah's regime and Lubrani made the assessment that the regime was in danger and capable of lasting three years. An emergency plan for evacuating Israeli personnel from Iran was prepared and steps were taken to minimize the damage of the regime's

collapse. By contrast, the American intelligence services failed to foresee the Shah's fall from power.¹⁶

However, the Israeli representatives still found it difficult to gather information about the situation in Iran precisely because it was an ally: Israel's connections were with the regime rather than with any opposition element. Personnel of the SAVAK (the Iranian internal security organization) did not discuss the regime's stability with their Israeli colleagues, and Mossad headquarters did not authorize its representative in Iran to contact opposition elements for fear of damaging relations with the regime. Only at a later stage, when it was clear that the regime was in danger, was an intelligence gathering effort made to contact opposition elements. Similarly, the Israeli representatives made use of Israeli citizens working in Iran and Iranian Jews in order to gather information about the country's internal situation.¹⁷

Intelligence Liaisons

Intelligence services of allied nations routinely exchange information and assessments on shared interests, yet however intensive or extensive the exchange of information may be, it is always subject to limitations. The information is never shared in its entirety between allies for reasons of source confidentiality, contradictory interests, differences of opinion regarding the use that will be made of the intelligence, and more. When the ally is liable to become a future enemy, there is another consideration to withhold information, means, and methods of cooperation, as these might later be used against the nation. Intelligence services are not in the habit of providing their counterparts with information about the internal situation in their own countries (the stability of the regime, internal politics).

Since 9/11 intelligence services around the world have expanded and deepened cooperation on the subject of terrorism with the emergence of a broad shared interest of fighting al-Qaeda. Israel too is a partner to this effort. During the tenure of Meir Dagan, the Mossad reportedly lifted limitations and greatly expanded cooperation with foreign intelligence services, thereby also increasing intelligence reliance on them.¹⁸

David Ignatius, a senior intelligence commentator for the *Washington Post*, has described a process whereby since the 9/11 attacks, the CIA works in close cooperation with the intelligence services of the Arab nations (Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia) in the war

on terrorism. American intelligence relies more and more on this cooperation, as it has yielded good results. At the same time, the CIA has curtailed some of its own intelligence activities (intelligence gathering) in these nations so as not to damage relations with the hosts and the willingness of the political leaders and intelligence services to cooperate. According to Ignatius, during the recent uprising in Egypt the CIA had several intelligence sources in the country, but far fewer than in the past. Edward Walker, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs and Ambassador to Israel and Egypt, has also claimed that, "We became far too overreliant on those networks. When you are totally dependent on local intelligence organizations, you tend to protect them." As a result, America too was blind to what the regime would not see, i.e., the revolutions in the Arab world.¹⁹

Research

The IDF Military Intelligence Directorate is Israel's foremost strategic, military, and political research element. The ongoing attempt to create research pluralism has been only partially successful: the research division of the General Security Services (GSS) has been strengthened and is now Intelligence's equal on the subject of the Palestinians. Research at the Mossad has also developed, though it specializes primarily on specific issues (such as non-conventional weapons), while the Center for Political Research at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has failed to become a significant factor in the intelligence community. Military Intelligence is still predominant when it comes to formulating a comprehensive national intelligence assessment. Its Research Division is divided by geographical area and subdivided by country. In each branch dealing with a country, there is an internal division into areas (political, military), but there are also differences in research emphasis: for non-enemy states (Egypt, Jordan) there is greater emphasis on the political aspect and the question of regime stability. Research on allies is usually accorded fewer resources (researchers), quantitatively and possibly also qualitatively, than research on enemies. As a result, gaps may be created in research information about allies.²⁰

One of the frequent claims is that the unusual situation in Israel, whereby Military Intelligence is responsible for strategic and political research, is problematic: given the nature of officers' training, their

short terms of service, their rapid job turnover, and their organizational subordination to the military, these officers are experts in the military realm but are less trained to handle assessments in the affairs of state, internal political matters, and social issues that are critical when it comes to regime stability. Research in these areas requires a long period of specialization, more varied experience, and a broad civilian and/or academic approach. This claim is particularly relevant for research about allies. In recent years, Intelligence has worked to improve its research capabilities in the non-military areas and to give their researchers academic training as well as to recruit researchers with academic backgrounds. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Mossad could potentially improve the level of research about allies should their research capabilities be strengthened. A researcher working on a certain country who served as a diplomat, a military representative, or intelligence officer in that country may have an advantage over a researcher who never lived there. Former head of Military Intelligence Aharon Zeevi (Farkash) claimed that in 2003-4 Intelligence presented the nation's leaders with an assessment about the instability in the Arab world and thereby provided a strategic warning about the revolutions of 2011, even though it did not predict when precisely the upheavals would begin. It may be that in this case too, concentration on the enemy, i.e., Iran, the second intifada, the Second Lebanon War, the bombing of the Syrian reactor, and Operation Cast Lead, earned more of the attention of intelligence personnel and pushed aside consideration of the possibility of a revolution in an ally as important as Egypt.²¹

Dissemination of Information

Another problem concerns the critical stage of information dissemination. Intelligence that fails to reach the right personnel who will analyze it and grasp its significance and is therefore not used might as well not exist. Covert information about allies, especially information touching on the ally's relations with the nation in question, is particularly sensitive. Intelligence in which Israeli statesmen and senior personnel are mentioned is the most classified, because of the involvement of internal politics and the possibility that political use might be made of it. Generally, therefore, such material is made accessible to a few individuals

only. The compartmentalization is liable to have a negative impact on the ability to gather information and conduct research on an ally.²²

Intelligence and the Political Leadership

Relations between intelligence and the political leadership, by nature complex and prone to tensions,²³ become more complex when the subject is intelligence about an ally. Regarding an enemy state, especially when there are no diplomatic relations or contacts between leaders (Israel and Syria, the US and Iran post-1979, the US and North Korea), intelligence personnel have a monopoly on knowledge: they study and are familiar with the enemy nation and its leadership. They present their information and assessments to the political leadership and advise it. The political leadership may formulate its own assessment about the enemy on the basis of ideology or a different interpretation of the material with which it was presented, but it is dependent on the intelligence personnel who represent the political leadership's source of knowledge.²⁴ With regard to an ally, the political leadership (or in certain cases, a special envoy) is in personal contact with the ally's leader, receives information from him/her, and formulates an assessment about him/her. The political leadership may choose to share this with the intelligence community or shelter the information. In the case of Egypt, it was Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer who met with President Mubarak on many occasions, developed a close personal relationship with him, and was considered an expert on Egypt.²⁵

In addition to the upper political level, the security and military echelon may also maintain contact with their counterparts. The intelligence services may participate in this dialogue, but they have no exclusivity and usually, with the exception of secret relations, are not the leading element. The strategic dialogue may be an additional channel for information gathering and clarification of the ally's positions, although this channel may also be used to conceal information and practice deceit.

Acquaintance between the political leaderships and channels of dialogue between them and/or between other echelons in the two states offer valuable advantages in understanding the other side. The intelligence services no longer have a monopoly on the information and assessment about the ally. In certain cases, however, this may be a drawback: the political leadership may be swayed by personal

impressions or personal relations that have developed and discount information provided by intelligence sources that contradicts its own assessment. A related question is: does a nation confront an ally with intelligence about its activities, thereby revealing its spying activities?

The complexity of the relations between intelligence and decision makers in the context of an ally was clear in the case of the relationship between Israel and the Lebanese Christians in 1975-83.²⁶ The Mossad was responsible for creating and managing the secret contacts with the Christians and supported cultivating them as an ally. Military Intelligence opposed this relationship with the Christians, claiming they were unreliable as an ally and it would be wrong to base the plan for a war in Lebanon on cooperation with them. At a certain point, the decision makers in Israel – Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, and to a lesser degree, Prime Minister Menachem Begin – started meeting in person with Bachir Jemayel and other Lebanese Christian leaders to coordinate the war in Lebanon with them. It seems that they generated a set of expectations about an alliance with the Christians based on the promises made and personal relationships that were created, choosing to ignore the warnings issued by Military Intelligence and the reservations of some people in the Mossad. When the war broke out, however, Bachir Jemayel refused to respond to most of Israel's requests; the Christians hardly participated in the fighting; and in 1982, Prime Minister Begin was surprised when in a meeting with Jemayel the Christian leader told him that at that time he was unable to sign a formal peace agreement with Israel. After Bachir Jemayel was assassinated, a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon, led by Amin Jemayel, was signed, but the agreement was not approved and never implemented. The assessment by the intelligence services about the intentions and limitations of the Christians' power proved to be accurate.²⁷

Israeli Intelligence regarding Allies and Partners

Egypt: After President Mubarak was deposed, the press reported that since the peace treaty with Egypt, Israeli Military Intelligence has neglected intelligence gathering about Egypt, especially its military: the army was unwilling to devote intelligence resources to Egypt given the assessment that should there be a regime change in Egypt and the risk

of a military confrontation with its return, Israel would have years-long warning in order to prepare for such an eventuality.²⁸

Warning of a popular uprising such as took place in Egypt is a very difficult – perhaps impossible – challenge, but intelligence services are still required to attempt to assess the stability of a regime. This requires devoting intelligence gathering and research efforts to social and political forces and processes beyond the traditional fields of the military and regime. The difficulty in predicting regime change and consequently a change in policy may lead to the conclusion that it is necessary to strengthen military research (i.e., focus on capabilities) also with regard to an ally/partner that is liable to become an enemy or at least a potential threat.

Turkey: Following the *Marmara* episode and the subsequent charges of an intelligence failure in information gathering and risk assessment, the head of the security and political division at the Ministry of Defense, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Amos Gilad said that Turkey had never been included in intelligence coverage. He supported this by saying, “Intelligence cannot gather information about everything; it has limited resources.” Turkey was a central ally of Israel in the region. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was included in Israel’s peripheral alliance; relations grew closer in the 1990s and a strategic alliance was created. Thus, Turkey was never considered a threat or an intelligence target.²⁹ However, the change in Turkish policy and the waning of the strategic alliance with Israel emphasize the importance of political intelligence and warnings of a change in relations that also has serious security implications.

Jordan was an enemy state and an object of Israel’s intelligence services, but at the same time the Jordanian regime maintained secret relations with Israel. Jordan may be considered a strategic partner of Israel at least since 1970, when Israel helped save King Hussein’s regime. King Hussein held secret meetings with Israel’s political elite while the Mossad maintained routine contact with Jordan. In September 1973, King Hussein met with Prime Minister Golda Meir and transmitted a general warning that lacked specific details about the risk of war. After the Yom Kippur War erupted, Israeli intelligence was asked to assess whether Jordan would join the effort alongside Egypt and Syria. (Jordan sent a force to the Golan

Heights front but did not open an additional front and informed Israel of its moves.) During the Gulf War in 1991, King Hussein cooperated with Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Israel again found itself wondering about a possible Jordanian threat. In a secret meeting between King Hussein and Prime Minister Shamir, the two formulated understandings whereby Jordan would not allow operations against Israel from its soil.³⁰ In 1994, the Israel-Jordan peace treaty was signed and security cooperation between the countries was formalized. Today, Israel is primarily concerned with a risk to the stability of the Jordanian regime.

United States: The US is Israel's primary ally, and thus information about its policies and intentions (will the US attack Iran? how would the US react to an Israeli attack on Iran? will the US launch a new peace initiative?) is of extremely high importance. The two nations maintain close relations at all echelons (including decision makers, military and intelligence personnel) and a periodic strategic dialogue. An understanding of intelligence cooperation was arrived at already in 1951. It included a mutual commitment not to spy on one another, and it preceded the formulation of the strategic alliance between the two nations. However, there are issues about which the US is likely to conceal information from Israel, or have considerations that are not shared with the decision makers in Israel.³¹ The issue of intelligence in the US is especially sensitive (the Pollard affair) and Israel avoids seeing the US as an intelligence target. However, subject to limitations, Israel's intelligence services gather information and undertake research about the US, primarily in the political field.³²

The Palestinian Authority: Since the Oslo Accords in 1993, there has been a framework in place for security cooperation with the PA to fight terrorism. The PA was thus considered a partner, albeit problematic. The Palestinian arena was the focus of an Israeli intelligence effort during the peace negotiations, but there were gaps, such as information about the Palestinian security forces. The GSS relied on cooperation with the Palestinian security forces and reduced its independent intelligence gathering activities.³³ After the al-Aqsa Intifada broke out, the PA was defined as a target in the war on terrorism; security cooperation with the Palestinians was suspended, and the GSS once again established a massive

intelligence presence on the West Bank. In 2005, the cooperation with the Palestinian security forces was renewed and the latter won accolades for their anti-terrorist activities. However, the reconciliation agreement with Hamas and the Palestinian statehood bid in the United Nations have increased Israeli concerns that the Palestinians security forces will take a neutral stance in a confrontation and perhaps even turn into an enemy. According to one report, alongside preparations for popular protests, Military Intelligence, the GSS, and the civilian administration are busy identifying signs that would indicate the deterioration of relations between the PA and its institutions, on the one hand, and Israel and its security services, on the other. The question of intelligence gathering with regard to the Palestinian arena is quite complex: the very question of whether to define the PA as a partner or an enemy was hotly debated in the Israeli intelligence community and within the political echelons. Intelligence work with regard to the PA was also affected by the direct relations that Israeli intelligence personnel (especially in the GSS) and decision makers maintained with their Palestinian counterparts.³⁴

Conclusion

Intelligence work quite rightly gives preference to “know your enemy” (warnings of war, terrorist attacks, the proliferation of non-conventional weapons) and will continue to devote most of its resources and attention to those potential threats. However, surprises on the part of allies can have strategic implications, so that “know your friend” is also imperative. Intelligence work with regard to allies is subject to certain limitations and encounters dilemmas that do not exist – or exist in less serious form – when it concerns the enemy (lower priority to critical data identification, limitations on intelligence gathering, political leaders maintaining direct contact with the leaders of the target nation, and so on.). In light of the upheaval in the Middle East, what has already occurred and what has yet to come, Israel’s intelligence must be prepared not only to issue warnings and follow the state’s enemies, but also to assess the changes likely to occur within allied nations, warn of the weakening of existing treaties, and note the possibility of creating new alliances and partnerships (with opposition elements requesting aid or with new regimes in the Arab world), while still examining the risks and limitations of such pacts. The first steps in improving intelligence regarding allies might be to

increase the intelligence community's awareness of the possibility of a surprise by an ally; demonstrate the challenges and dilemmas involved in intelligence work on an ally, and formulate ways of confronting them.

In the field of intelligence gathering, it is necessary to exhaust gathering capabilities and gathering from open sources, subject to the necessary limitations. In terms of research, it is necessary to strengthen the research response to the different types of surprises, and to enhance the warning system regarding intentional policy changes (breaking off relations, allies going to war against a third party). Military and political research must be improved, and the issue of regime change requires research about social and cultural depth processes (e.g., heightened religious fundamentalism) that could have political manifestations, the rise of new forces to power, the effect of new elements on foreign policy, and others.

As shown by international and Israeli experience, intelligence services have on more than one occasion failed to assess and predict enemy moves; intelligence is not a magic solution. However, wise use of intelligence may reduce the region's uncertainty and help Israel's political leadership manage the nation's strategic relations.

Notes

- 1 For information about the events in Egypt and Turkey and the sense of isolation experienced by Israel, see Amos Harel, "Intelligence Experts did not Predict the Severity of the Change," *Haaretz*, January 30, 2011, <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1212218.html>; Aluf Benn, "Oops, Revolution," *Haaretz*, February 18, 2011, <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1215943.html>; Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, "Isolation Deepens," *Haaretz*, September 16, 2011; Zvi Barel, "Erdoğan: Let's completely freeze security and commercial ties with Israel," *Haaretz*, September 7, 2011. For information about the future of relations with the US, see Nadav Ravid, "Robert Gates: Netanyahu is an ingrate and is endangering his country," *Haaretz*, September 7, 2011; Lior Hadar, "A New Treaty for Israel," *Haaretz*, December 29, 2010; Natasha Mozgovaya, "Report in the US: Israel has become a contentious topic," *Haaretz*, September 16, 2011.
- 2 A similar reference to Egypt is found in 2 Kings 18:21.
- 3 When the "Echelon" scandal broke, exposing America's global wiretapping system, and it became clear that the US was listening in on its allies, the head of the CIA, James Woolsey, admitted that the US had been spying on its European allies, claiming that it was because the latter used bribes in order to close deals and compete against American companies. Fred Kaplan,

- "The Friendly Spook," *Slate*, September 1, 2004, at <http://www.slate.com/id/2106079>; R. James Woolsey, "Why We Spy on Our Allies," *Wall Street Journal*, March 17, 2000; <http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm>.
- 4 Martin S. Alexander, "Introduction: Knowing Your Friends, Assessing Your Allies – Perspectives on Intra-Alliance Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 13, no.1 (1998): 1-17.
- 5 For information about the expansion of intelligence cooperation and intelligence alliance, see Adam D. M. Svendsen, "Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations," *Intelligence and National Security* 24 no.5 (2009): 700-29; Richard J. Aldrich, "Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances," *Harvard International Review* (Fall 2002); Stephane Lefebvre, "The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 16 (2003): 527-42.
- 6 For information about America's problematic allies, see Steven Metz, "Unruly Clients: The Trouble with Allies," *World Affairs*, March/April 2010.
- 7 For information about the complex relationship between the US and Pakistan, see Mark Mazzetti, "When Spies Don't Play Well with their Allies," *New York Times*, July 20, 2008, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/weekinreview/20mazzetti.html>; Kathey Gannon, "Pakistani Intelligence: Friend or Foe?" *Time*, May 11, 2011; <http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2011/may/11/pakistani-intelligence-friend-or-foe>; David Ignatius, "Did Pakistan Know bin Laden Was 'Hiding in Plain Sight'?" *Washington Post*, May 11, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/did-pakistan-know-bin-laden-was-hiding-in-plain-sight/2011/05/10/AFNxZ3jG_story.html; Natasha Mozgovaya, "The Americans Prepared for the Possibility of a Confrontation with the Pakistani Army after the Assassination of bin Laden," *Haaretz*, May 11, 2011; Tzur Shizaf, "In Osama's Court," *Yediot Ahronot*, May 6, 2011.
- 8 Regarding American intelligence surveillance of Israel's nuclear option, see Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Zaki Shalom, *Israel's Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy between Dimona and Washington* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005). According to Wikileaks, American diplomats were instructed to gather information about Israel's policy: Arik Bender, "Buzhi-leaks, Wikileaks, and American Intelligence," *Maariv*, April 17, 2011, at http://www.nrg.co.il/app/index.php?do=blog&encr_id=9c49ef7f18fd2856e25ba3f733093f7a&id=2351; Arad Nir and Udi Segal, "New Wikileaks Documents: Condoleezza Rice requested information about IDF soldiers," *News2*, November 29, 2010, at <http://www.mako.co.il/news-world/international/Article-b09298593d89c21004.htm>. Recently, in light of the arrest of Shamai Leibowitz, it was revealed that the FBI was wiretapping the Israeli embassy in the US. See Scott Shane, "Leak Offers Look at Efforts By U.S. to Spy on Israel," *New York Times*, September 5, 2011; Yossi Melman, "New York Times: The FBI tapped Israel embassy phone calls in Washington," *Haaretz*, September 7, 2011.

- 9 For a brief overview of the extensive literature dealing with intelligence failures and surprises, see Gustavo Diaz, "Methodological Approaches to the Concept of Intelligence Failure," *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 7, January 2005, pp. 1-16, at <http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/767/76711286004.pdf>.
- 10 When Churchill visited France in 1940 and received a report about the dire situation of the French army, which was on the verge of defeat, he wrote, "'I admit this was one of the greatest surprises I have had in my life. Why did I not know more about it?'" Quoted by Alistair Horne, *To Lose a Battle: France 1940* (New York: Macmillan, 1969).
- 11 The critical data identification by Israeli intelligence as determined during the tenure of Prime Minister Sharon included: a. providing early warning and intelligence about hostile activity and terrorism; b. providing early warning about war; c. providing early warning and intelligence about surface-to-surface missiles and non-conventional weapons. It was only later that two more objectives were added: d. the PA; e. regime stability. See Shlomo Gazit, *Between Warning and Surprise: On Shaping National Intelligence Assessment in Israel*, Memorandum No. 66 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 23, 29-30. In light of the discussion over cuts to the defense budget, Alex Fishman reported: "In light of the events in the Arab world, the need to examine in-depth the arenas Israel in the past could afford to neglect, such as Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and to an extent, Turkey, was also discussed. This involves an enormous investment, particularly in intelligence." See "Everything's PR," *Yediot Ahronot*, August 12, 2011.
- 12 In a May 1951 meeting between Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and the head of the CIA Walter Bedell Smith, it was agreed that there would be intelligence cooperation between Israel and the US, including the exchange of liaison officers and avoidance of mutual espionage. The following month the head of the Mossad, Reuven Shiloah, met with senior CIA personnel in order to formulate the details of the understanding. According to Yaniv, the agreement was signed; according to Melman and Raviv, relying on the testimony of Meir de Shalit, there were only unwritten understandings. See Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, *Imperfect Spies* (Tel Aviv: Maariv Press, 1990), pp. 73-77; Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, *Partners in Action* (Or Yehuda: Maariv Press, 1994), pp. 54, 59-66; Avner Yaniv, *Politics and Strategy in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Hapoalim Press, 1994), pp. 90-91, 409. On FBI claims of Israeli espionage, see Melman and Raviv, *Partners in Action*, pp. 64-65.
- 13 For information about Israeli intelligence activity with regard to Egypt since the peace agreement, see Alex Fishman, "Ho Southwards," *Yediot Ahronot*, March 4, 2011; Alex Fishman, "The Burning Desert," *Yediot Ahronot*, April 29, 2011. For analysis of the alleged spying in Egypt, see Boaz Bismut, "The Heir to the Shark," *Yisrael Hayom*, June 17, 2011, at http://www.israelhayom.co.il/site/newsletter_article.php?id=11650.

- 14 For information about the Pollard affair, see Yaniv, *Politics and Strategy in Israel*, pp. 408-14; Scott Anderson, "Free Pollard? Never," *Los Angeles Times*, February 11, 2011, at <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/11/opinion/la-oe-anderson-pollard-20110211>; Amir Oren, "This is How I Foiled the Release of Pollard," *Haaretz*, March 11, 2011, at <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1219644.html>.
- 15 Israel's military attaché to Russia was recently expelled from Moscow on the charge of having engaged in espionage. See Ron Ben Yishai, "IDF Attaché Arrested at Meeting with Russian Officer at Café," *Ynet*, May 19, 2011, at <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4070834,00.html>; Yossi Melman, "IDF Attaché to Russia, Col. Vadim Leiderman, Expelled," *Haaretz*, May 18, 2011, at <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1228365.html>.
- 16 Roni Cohen, "Intelligence: The Islamic Revolution in Iran – a 30-Year Perspective," *Intelligence and Terrorism Information Overview* No. 54, September 2009, pp. 10-13. Uri Bar Yosef, "American Failure – Israeli Success," *Intelligence and Terrorism Information Overview* No. 59, April 2001, pp. 32-35. Eliezer (Geizie) Tzafrir, *Big Satan Little Satan* (Or Yehuda: Maariv Press, pp. 40-41, 64-70, 100-2). For information about the failure of American intelligence in Iran, see Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010, pp. 15-122).
- 17 Tzafrir, *Big Satan Little Satan*, pp. 55-57, 61-63, 89-91, 151.
- 18 See note 5. See also Ronen Bergman, "Targeted Assassination," *Yediot Ahronot*, June 6, 2008; and "In Her Majesty's Service," *Yediot Ahronot*, February 5, 2010.
- 19 For intelligence consequences, see David Ignatius, "In the Middle East, a Catch-22 for the CIA," *Washington Post*, February 10, 2011 at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/09/AR2011020904531.html>; Edmund Walker is quoted in Christopher Dickey, "Intelligence Test," *Newsweek*, June 12, 2011, at <http://www.newsweek.com/2011/06/12/how-the-arab-spring-has-weakened-u-s-intelligence.html>.
- 20 For information about research done by the Israeli intelligence community and the primacy of the Military Intelligence Directorate, see Gazit, *Between Warning and Surprise*, pp. 24-44; Efraim Halevy, *Man in the Shadows* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006); Aharon Zeevi (Farkash), "Early Warning as a Fundamental Concept in Security Doctrines," *Maarachot* No. 363, pp. 11-12.
- 21 For information about criticism of placing research in the hands of Military Intelligence, see Uri Bar Yosef, "Let the Officer Count Tanks," *Haaretz*, September 5, 2002, at <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/205310.html>; Uri Bar Yosef, "Don't Give Them Research!" *Maarachot* No. 328, February 1993, pp. 38-45. On the claim of having provided strategic early warning about the revolts in the Arab nations, see. Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, "This Is How We Predicted the Revolution," *Haaretz*, March 11, 2011.
- 22 For information about the sensitivity of information about allies, see Ronen Bergman, *Permission Granted* (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot Press and Hemed Books, 2002), pp. 71-80.

- 23 Uri Bar Yosef, "The Problematics of Intelligence-Leadership Relations," in *Intelligence and Political Leadership* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publications, 2004), pp. 40-67.
- 24 There are nations in conflict that maintain diplomatic relations and hold meetings between leaders (the US and the USSR during the Cold War), but not at the same level of intensity and closeness as allies. For information on the political echelon's dependence on intelligence personnel regarding terrorism and non-conventional weapons as well as new enemies, see Halevy, *Man in the Shadows*, pp. 142-44.
- 25 Yuval Azoulay, "Ben Eliezer, 'Mubarak Told Me He Is Determined to Get Through the Crisis,'" *Globes*, January 30, 2011, at <http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000619281>.
- 26 For information about the history of the alliance between Israel and the Lebanese Christians, see. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *Lost War* (Tel Aviv: Schocken Press, 1984), pp. 40-76. For information about the position of Intelligence and the Mossad and the difference of opinion between them, see Kirsten E. Schulze, "Perceptions and Misperceptions: Influences on Israeli Intelligence During the 1982 Lebanon War," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 16 no. 1 (1996); Amos Gilboa, "From the North Shall Come Intelligence and the Lebanese Arena," in Amos Gilboa and Ephraim Lapid, eds., *Work of Art*, pp. 97-98; Nahik Navot, "Keeping the Memory of Bashir Jamail Alive," *Haaretz*, February 20, 2009; Schiff and Yaari, *Lost War*, pp. 24-27, 110-11; Aviezer Yaari, *The Road from Merhavia* (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 2003), pp. 201-20; The Commission of Inquiry Investigating the Events in the Refugee Camps in Beirut 1982, *Report*, pp. 96-100, 103.
- 27 For information about the meetings between Israeli decision makers and the leaders of the Christians, see David Kimhi, *The Final Option* (Idanim Press, 1992), pp. 161-67; Schiff and Yaari, *Lost War*, pp. 67, 74-75, 98-101, 104-5, 123, 352-53; Yossi Melman, "Waltz without Bashir," *Haaretz*, September 22, 2010, pp. 40-44; Ohad Leslau, "The Effect of Intelligence on the Decision Making Process," *Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*.23 (2010): pp. 439-43. For information about the disappointment with the Christians, see Schiff and Yaari, *Lost War*, pp. 75-76, 227-28, 238, 240-43, 285-91, 307-8.
- 28 Fishman, "Ho Southwards"; and "The Burning Desert"; Benn, "Oops, Revolution."
- 29 The Mossad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are responsible for intelligence research about Turkey from the political perspective. For Gilad's declaration, see Yael Abadi, "Turkey Never Included in Intelligence Coverage," *IDF Radio Website*, June 6, 2010, at <http://glz.co.il/newsArticle.aspx?newsid=63485>; Orah Koren, "Exports to Turkey in the Billions of Dollars at Risk," *TheMarker*, April 28, 2010; Orah Koren, "From Strategic Partnership to Just Another Customer," *TheMarker*, April 28, 2010, at <http://www.themarker.com/misc/1.564931>. Recently, Erdoğan hinted that Israel tapped the meeting between the head of Turkish intelligence and PKK

- representatives and leaked the contents. "Erdoğan Hints Israel Tapped and Leaked Information," *Ynet*, September 17, 2011, at <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4123306,00.html>.
- 30 For information about Jordan and the 1973 war, see Avi Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace* (London: Penguin, 2007). See also for information about the crisis in the Gulf.
- 31 See note 12. For information about the complexity of the Israeli-American dialogue on the issue of the Iranian threat, see Ronen Bergman, "Nuclear Alienation," *Yediot Ahronot*, June 10, 2011; Chuck Freilich, "Speaking About The Unspeakable: U.S-Israeli Dialogue on Iran's Nuclear Program," *Policy Brief 77*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2007.
- 32 Military Intelligence's Research Division has an American Desk; the Mossad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also deal with research about the US. One can learn about the fields of research from an advertisement for a research assistant for American matters at the Center for Political Studies at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "In charge of following up on American foreign relations and policies, following up on developments on the internal American arena (political, economic and social, the mood, the media, and more)." Tender #00015342 for position of research assistant for American matters at the Civil Service website, www.civil-service.gov.il. In his memoirs, Uri Saguy, who served as head of Intelligence in 1991-95, reviewed the chief intelligence assessments of those years, which dealt with the US, especially in context of its involvement in the peace process. See Uri Saguy, *Lights in the Fog* (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 1998), pp. 152, 171-72, 177, 181-83, 229-30.
- 33 For information about security and intelligence cooperation with the Palestinians and the differences of opinion about it, see Matti Steinberg, *Facing their Fate* (Tel Aviv: Yediot Press and Hemed Books, 2008), pp. 391-92; Moshe Yaalon, *The Long Short Way* (Tel Aviv: Yediot Books, 2008), pp. 95, 129-33; Boaz Ganor, *The Maze of War on Terrorism* (Herzliya: Interdisciplinary Center 2003), pp. 58-61, 117-18, 258-59. On the collapse of the security cooperation and the return of the IDF and the GSS to the West Bank, see Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *The Seventh War* (Tel Aviv, 2004), pp. 325-28.
- 34 For information about intelligence work in the Palestinian arena and its complexities, see Bergman, *Permission Granted*, pp. 92-110; Ephraim Lavie, "Intelligence Work in the Palestinian Arena," *Intelligence and Terrorism Information Overview* No. 52, December 2008, pp. 30-33; Yossi Kuperwasser, "Intelligence Assessments on the Eve of the Second Intifada," *Ibid.*, pp. 34-37; Alex Fishman, "The IDF Prepares for a Parade," *Yediot Ahronot*, May 27, 2011; Hanan Greenberg and Attila Somfalvi, "Worry in Israel: What will become of security coordination?" *Ynet*, April 28, 2011, at <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4061553,00.html>; Avi Issacharoff, "Abbas: As long as I'm in office security coordination will be maintained," *Haaretz*, September 6, 2011.