

Disengagement, the "Seam" Zone, and Alternative Conflict Management

Shaul Arieli

Israel's long-term strategic goal is to end the conflict with the Palestinians. This can be done only in an agreement that establishes and anchors modes of political separation between Israel and the Palestinians and provides for cooperation in various aspects of normal coexistence. This separation will enable Israel to retain its Jewish character, preserve a democratic regime in which an Arab minority will have equal rights, and be an accepted part of the Middle East and the international community.

The policy of managing a conflict while deferring its solution is legitimate only if this is consistent with the strategic goal, in this case, if it promotes conditions leading to negotiations. Incorrect management of the conflict is liable to escalate the existing confrontation, aggravate instability, and keep the parties away from the negotiating table. The bilateral diplomatic process between Israel and

the Palestinians, now frozen under the claim that "there is no partner," has been replaced by a violent confrontation that is exacting a high price in blood from both sides. The Israeli government headed by Ariel Sharon has chosen to manage the conflict unilaterally and dismiss the attempt to settle it through direct negotiations with the current Palestinian leadership.

This article argues that the Israeli government's policy, reflected in the construction of the separation fence in the Judea and Samaria "seam" zone¹ and in the prime minister's disengagement plan² is preferable to the position of the leaders of the Jewish settlements in the territories, who advocate maintaining the current situation. On the other hand, the government's policy tends to postpone the achievement of the strategic goal, and is therefore liable to force Israel to pay an unnecessarily high cost. After presenting the respective plans of the settlers and the government, the article will propose an alternate plan, including a different route for the separation fence. Adopting this plan would allow Israelis and Palestinians in Judea and Samaria to live regular day-to-day lives. This plan is based on the policy that began


under the Rabin government, which strove to confront Palestinian terrorism without abandoning aspirations to a negotiated solution of the conflict.

The Settlers' Plan to Maintain the Status Quo

In light of the escalating confrontation and deteriorating security situation,³ the Israeli government was forced to respond to pressure from the population within the Green Line to erect a separation fence. A barrier of this sort was consistently avoided by previous governments in order not to detract from Israel's claims in eventual negotiations on permanent borders. Faced with the tangible prospect of a fence, the settler leaders and right wing parties tried to block its approval by the national unity government. They were concerned that the fence would limit – if not determine – the territorial debate and exclude regions that they still hoped to include in the settlement enterprise.⁴ They would have the prime minister and the Israeli public hold steadfast, in the belief that the reality being created in portions of Judea and Samaria will determine the political map,⁵ and also win subsequent international recognition, as happened with the 1967 borders.

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Map 1. Connecting Settlements in Samaria to the Allon Road



Their assumption is that the lightly populated Jordan Valley, which constitutes Israel's "eastern security region" in the "essential interests map" approved by the Israeli government under former prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, can remain under Israeli control for the foreseeable future. The settlers therefore seek to strengthen the communities along the Allon Road, which runs on the Jordan Valley-eastern Samaria border southward to Jerusalem, and create a contiguous strip of communities from "parent" settlements in the elevated areas to the Allon Road by erecting dozens of outposts.⁶ For example, seventeen outposts are located between Ariel and Mevo Shiloh approaching

the Allon Road, six outposts are designed to connect Itamar eastward to the hill range, and fourteen outposts connect Ofra and Beit El to northern Jerusalem (map 1).

In what it regards as a worst-case scenario, this right wing policy envisions the establishment of a Palestinian autonomy or state covering less than 40 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In what it regards as a best-case scenario, in the current circumstances or following another war, which it regards as unpreventable, the Palestinians will move eastward to the Kingdom of Jordan, where already the majority of the population is Palestinian.

After thirty years of settlement ef-

forts, the demographic reality in most of Judea and Samaria is different from what the settlers expected. The 400,000 Israelis living beyond the Green Line are outnumbered by 2.2 million Palestinians, except in a narrow strip in western Samaria and East Jerusalem.⁷ Nor is there any basis for the belief that future international legitimacy will be forthcoming for the expansionist vision or operational plan. Since the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 242 in November 1967, which gave tacit recognition to the State of Israel's sovereignty over 77 percent of the land of Israel west of the Jordan River,⁸ there has been no shift in the international position. UN Security Council resolution 338,

adopted after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, did not change this attitude. According to the Clinton proposal of December 2000,⁹ Israel would annex 3 percent of Judea and Samaria and approve a compensatory territorial exchange, but this proposal was removed from the diplomatic agenda with the end of Clinton's term as president.

Most alarming, however, is that continuation of the current situation is liable to harm the Jewish character and democratic regime in the state of Israel. The more time that goes by without a solution, the less practical the idea of two states for two peoples becomes. In a bi-national state, the Palestinians will justifiably demand equal political rights (one man, one vote), and Israel will have to choose between its democratic identity and its Jewish identity.

The Pitfalls of the Prime Minister's Plan

The prime minister, Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who in December 2003 advocated unilateral separation of Israel from the Palestinians, and many others in the Likud have realized the necessity of establishing a Palestinian state and of implementing a solution to the conflict. Prime Minister Sharon, contending that there is no "partner," seeks to orchestrate the process unilaterally, in order to avoid conceding what to him would be an acceptable territorial solution.¹⁰ This approach postpones the solution, at the cost of a painful and unnecessary price for both sides.

The route of the fence, which the

prime minister himself has approved, apparently indicates his concept of a territorial solution. Officially the Israeli government is erecting the fence as a defensive measure, to protect itself against terrorism and other crime¹¹ caused by the economic gap between the two societies,¹² and against illegal residence of Palestinians, which affects the demographic balance within Israel (200,000 Palestinians currently reside illegally on the Israeli side of the Green Line). More than anything else, however, it appears that the Israeli government wishes to use the route of the fence, which includes many settlements in Judea and Samaria, to influence the determination of Israel's permanent borders.

The process of classifying territory essentially began with the interim agreement signed in September 1995 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which created three areas in the West Bank: Areas A, B, and C. The built-up area of Palestinian villages and cities was delineated as areas A and B. Most Palestinian agricultural land was not included in these areas, particularly in areas defined within the interests of Israel in a permanent settlement: western Samaria and Judea, the Jordan Valley, and the area surrounding Jerusalem. The fence demarcation reflects this approach, but the fact of the physical barrier creates a different reality than mere categorization of territorial areas.


The Ministry of Defense website lists ten principles according to which the demarcation was to be deter-

mined.¹³ The principles are appropriate, but the route was actually determined primarily by two interests. One, as listed, was to "avoid including Palestinians on the west side of the barrier." The other governing interest, "include a maximum number of Israelis and a maximum amount of area on the west side of the barrier," is not officially listed, but is perhaps implied by the fifth principle: "Consideration of the lives of the population along the seam line, and the aspirations of the Palestinian and Israeli population."

An effort was made to enable the Palestinian population to continue working their lands, through agricultural gates and a regime of institutionalized permits along the length of the separation fence. It was promised that land appropriated under military order would be returned to its owners when it was no longer needed for the security fence.¹⁴ The Supreme Court, however, ruled on a petition regarding the area northwest of Jerusalem that this solution does not give suitable weight to the damage that the route actually causes the Palestinians.¹⁵ Only the latter interest, therefore, can explain the fence demarcation, which is routed around areas A and B wherever possible, leaving Palestinian land on the western side of the fence with the settlements¹⁶ or without them¹⁷ – without any sufficient security justification (map 2).

Does this fence route resolve the security, economic, and demographic threats, or does it aggravate them? The data on the fence demarcation indicates that nearly 400,000 Palestinians live between the Green Line and

Map 2. The Western "Seam" Zone



the fence route that has been approved.¹⁸ This number does not contribute to preservation of the demographic balance, even if citizenship status does not change in the coming years. To this number must be added two groups comprising 200,000 Palestinians. The first group is those whom the fence will surround in every direction, except for a single access road. These people will be cut off from much of their land, their wells, and reasonable access to key Palestinian cities. The second group is those who will be separated from their land, which will remain on the western side of the barrier.¹⁹ These two populations, which are mostly rural, are becoming poorer and

needier. This situation will increase the pressure to get work in Israel, to commit agricultural theft, to resort to crime of various kinds, and to reside illegally in Israel in Arab villages and mixed-population cities, especially Jerusalem, for long periods. It is also likely that these populations, which are directly affected by the construction of the fence, will increase their support for terrorist operations, and perhaps even assume active terrorism roles themselves.

Annexing the western seam zone is a central component of the prime minister's map, as it has been, in government plans, since 1995. To this should be added annexation of the Ma'ale Adumim area, Kiryat Arba,

and the Jewish community in Hebron,²⁰ and the "eastern security zone," although there are signs that this zone is regarded as less necessary in terms of territorial annexation; it is eyed mainly as bargaining material in future negotiations.²¹ Not surprisingly, the map resulting from connecting all these zones resembles the map that Israel presented to the Palestinians at the Camp David summit in July 2000. This obvious resemblance disproves the claim that the fence route is motivated solely by security and does not pretend to be a future political border.

This policy of designing reality²² and imposing it through the fence, even if much more modest in propor-

tion than the aspirations of the leaders of the Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, will eventually require international legitimacy. This legitimacy, however, was granted to Israel only when it demonstrated its military supremacy in defensive wars, at a time when the Arab world, including the Palestinians, refused to become a partner in dividing the land and accepting the State of Israel as a legitimate entity of the Middle East. This situation changed after the Arab countries accepted UN Security Council resolution 242. Thus, when Israel signed peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, in 1979 and 1994, respectively, it in effect accepted the interpretation that the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" means evacuating all territories occupied in 1967.

Against this background, it is easy to understand why the prime minister persists in refusing to accept the Palestinian leadership as "partners," including former Palestinian prime minister Abu Mazen and his successor, Abu Ala, who were appointed as a result of pressure by Israel. There is no point in talking of an attempt to foster and strengthen a moderate leadership, because such a possibility would deprive Israel's unilateral measures of legitimacy.

Prime Minister Sharon believes that legitimization of his measures will come from the current US administration, since most countries in the world embrace the accepted territorial interpretation of resolution 242. Like Menachem Begin, who sought to

guarantee the continuation of Israeli rule in Judea and Samaria by signing a peace agreement with Egypt and giving up the entire Sinai, Sharon is attempting to obtain US recognition of the future annexation of the western seam zone and other areas listed above in return for the dismantling of seventeen Jewish communities in the Gaza Strip and four in northern Samaria through a plan he calls "disengagement."²³

The prime minister's plan, based on the assumption that Israel has no "partner," is liable to escalate the conflict in every aspect that it seeks to address.

Perusal of the disengagement plan shows that in addition to the evacuation of 7,500 Jews now residing among 1.3 million Palestinians and holding 17 percent of the land in the Gaza Strip, the absence of any "partner" will prompt Israel to continue its effective control of the Gaza Strip. Israel will control the airspace, territorial waters, fishing areas, crossings into Egypt, the border with Egypt, and the passage of goods. Israel will also supply electricity, water, and other services. Implicit is that Israel will bar any link connecting the Gaza Strip with Judea and Samaria, and will also conduct Israel Defense


Forces (IDF) operations of varying intensity against the terrorist organizations.²⁴

Despite the various interpretations given of Bush's letter to Sharon, even the Americans, who wish to restart the diplomatic process, are supporting the prime minister's measures only in the short term. They are aligning their position with that of Europe, and giving an obscure commitment regarding the territorial issue in a permanent settlement.²⁵ There is nothing new in Bush's declaration that Jewish settlement blocs will remain under Israeli sovereignty, because the Palestinians already agreed to this in July 2000 at the Camp David summit. The dispute is over the borders of the blocs.

The picture emerging from Sharon's basic plan concerning the future of the Palestinian state is quite clear: Israel will annex 20 percent of Judea and Samaria, and will have 82 percent of the western land of Israel, which will house 5.3 million Jews and 1.3 million Arabs. The remaining 80 percent of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip (18 percent of historical Palestine) will house 3.5 million Palestinians, who will have to absorb hundreds of thousands of refugees in the state of Palestine. It is obvious that no significant Palestinian leader will agree to such a plan after Yasir Arafat, who agreed in 1993, in opposition to most of the Palestinian leadership, to accept 23 percent of Palestine, refused Barak's suggestion at Camp David that Israel annex "only" 13 percent of the West Bank.

Not only has the prime minister's plan no chance of being accepted by

Map 3. Settlements and Roads East of the Fence



the Palestinians as a permanent solution; it will also force the two peoples to continue existing in a state of "non-partnership" and non-disengagement from Judea and Samaria for a long period. Implementing the disengagement plan and completing the western seam zone according to its current design will enable the Israeli government²⁶ to withdraw the IDF and remove Jews from the Gaza Strip, but will leave fifty-eight Jewish settlements, dozens of illegal outposts, and dozens of the security forces installations and bases east of the fence. The settlers will continue traveling on more than 700 kilometers of main traffic roads, which the Palestinians are forbidden to use (map 3).

What about violence and terrorism? They will be diverted in the short term from Israel, which will be protected by the western fence, to Jewish settlements and illegal outposts. The security forces will have to bear an extra heavy burden – guarding 700 kilometers of the fence; guarding the Jewish settlements, dozens of outposts, and 700 kilometers of roads east of the fence; and preventing terrorist operations. As if that were not enough, the Israeli government must hope that the Palestinian Authority does not completely collapse or fall apart, which would force Israel to re-establish the civilian administration and care for 3.5 million Palestinians.

In short, the prime minister's plan,

based on the ostensible assumption that Israel has no "partner," on the intention of establishing facts on the ground that will later gain international legitimacy, is liable to escalate the conflict in every aspect that it seeks to address: demographic, since 400,000 Palestinians will be left between the fence and the Green Line; economic, since an additional 200,000 Palestinians will become dependent on a regime of permits in order to farm their land; security, because the affected population will be incited and the Palestinians will conclude that only terrorism on the model of Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip will bring about a Palestinian state; and political, since Is-

rael's standing will continue to erode when the consequences of the prime minister's full plan become clear. Is the slight chance of annexing another small part of the western land of Israel, in addition to the areas already agreed on previously, worth this price?

It appears that most players in the international community, as well as pragmatic parties on both sides, realize that an agreement on the end of the conflict is possible, if based on the principles of Security Council resolution 242: (1) a solution to the problem of refugees that does not involve their return to Israel; (2) an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders with mutual border adjustments; (3) establishing Jerusalem as the capital of two states; and (4) a cession of violence and terrorism. The road inevitably leads in the end to an agreement based on these four principles, and it is therefore necessary to present a different mode of managing the conflict, which will lead the parties to the same objective, without an added painful and unnecessary price over what was paid in recent years.

The Proposed Alternative

The proposed alternative rests on three pillars. The first is the removal of settlers and IDF bases from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria, which is likely to strengthen the moderate Palestinian "partner" – if the area is transferred to its control – and jumpstart the roadmap, which has been accepted by the Quartet and the international community and which

both sides have accepted in principle. The second is the construction of the fence along a different route. The third consists of measures aimed at creating conditions for reaching and implementing an agreement with international support.

Even under the pessimistic assumption that there is no "partner" for a permanent agreement at the present time, achieving Israel's strategic objective – an agreement ending


Regarding security, economics, and demographics, the proposed alternative has obvious advantages over the government plan.

the conflict – requires the strengthening, even the creating, of a moderate party that regards the four above-mentioned principles of resolution 242 as a basis for a permanent agreement. The possible Palestinian "partner" at the present time is apparently still the PLO.²⁷ This organization is the only Palestinian organization that has accepted resolution 242 and the idea of two states for two peoples.²⁸ If Arafat is considered to lack credibility and to be someone who cannot or does not want to end the conflict, Prime Minister Abu Ala or other moderate elements with personal power bases can be strengthened.

This plan undertakes to create a regular pattern of give and take, while giving the other side a feeling of success at every stage, in order to achieve the defined objectives. The Israelis and Palestinians will exchange assets according to parameters to be agreed, which will reinforce a basis of common interests and foster trust in the entire process. Moving the process forward and ensuring its durability in the face of terrorist organizations and extremists in both camps depends on the realization by both sides that a permanent settlement must be based on accepting the four above-mentioned principles. Without this realization, the parties will repeat the process that caused the Oslo process to collapse.

The evacuation of the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria²⁹ should be accompanied by complementary measures, some conditional, designed to create the infrastructure for a Palestinian state, while preserving the interests of the state of Israel. Israel, the stronger and more organized of the two sides, will freeze construction in all Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria, as the prime minister promised the US president, prevent the construction of illegal outposts, and dismantle those that have already been built. Depending upon Palestinian actions, Israel will permit transit between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, under a rigorous "safe passage" procedure, and allow the Palestinians to begin construction of a seaport. This project will create 30,000 jobs in the Gaza Strip, cause a boom in stone quarrying on southern Mt. Hebron,

Map 4. The Alternative Proposal for the Fence Route



heighten the demand for cement produced in Israel, and boost Israeli and Palestinian transport. Israel will reopen the fishing area in the Gaza Strip, which will provide a living for thousands of fishermen, and permit operation of the Dahania airport, according to the 1998 security protocol. At the same time, during this year, the Palestinians will carry out the reform program, headed by the transfer of power centers from Arafat's exclusive control to the Palestinian government,³⁰ and will implement the security plan drawn up with Israel, Britain, and the United States. Israel will reserve the right to continue fighting terrorist organizations, and will do so, according to circumstances.

Construction of the fence in Judea and Samaria will accompany the process, continue independently of the Palestinians, and be based on the following parameters: the settlement blocs near the Green Line that can be connected to Israel without harming the Palestinians' day-to-day life will be included within the fence; other blocs will be protected within a defensive space; and the rest of the fence will follow the Green Line.

A comparison of the demarcation approved by the government with the proposed demarcation (map 4 and table 1) shows that almost the same number of Israelis will be west of the fence, but the proposed route includes just over a quarter of the area pro-

posed by the government decision. Approximately 30,000 Palestinians³¹ are in this area between the fence and the Green Line, and the route does not harm other Palestinians by separating them from their land, infrastructure, wells, and roads to major Palestinian cities.

The Supreme Court ruling against the fence route being constructed northwest of Jerusalem is designed to guide the security forces in determining criteria for changes to both the current and future fence route. Proper implementation of the ruling depends on the security forces adhering in practice and not just in theory to the ten principles that the defense establishment outlined for planning the

Table 1. Comparative Data on the Government Route and the Proposed Alternative

The Government Route				Proposed Route		
Parameter	Approved government route	Ma'ale Adumim and Kiryat Arba (estimate)	Eastern security zone (estimate)	Proposed alternative route (including Ma'ale Adumim)	Ariel, Immanuel, Karnei Shomron as a separate bloc	Eastern security zone (excluding a fence)
Length	686 kilometers	80 kilometers	200 kilometers	508 kilometers	52 kilometers	150 kilometers
Area	904 square kilometers	150 square kilometers	1,700 square kilometers	266 square kilometers	62 square kilometers	812 square kilometers
Israelis	316,000	38,000	12,000	301,000	29,000	7,500
Palestinians	389,000	10,000	14,500	31,000	0	6,500

route. The three parameters have governed the alternative proposal for the fence route presented here, and the Supreme Court twice referred the security forces to this route. Commenting on the recently-banned demarcation, it noted, "this damage is disproportionate. It can be reduced substantially by an alternate route.... Such an alternate route exists. It is not a figment of the imagination. It has been presented to us,"³² and later, "The proposals by the experts of the Council for Peace and Security, whose security expertise is acceptable to the military command, are worthy of consideration."³³ Adopting this route will not change the decision of the International Court of Justice at the Hague, which ruled that the entire fence on the West Bank should be dismantled, but it can certainly be accepted as a temporary security route, as part of the comprehensive plan for promoting a settlement proposed here.

The comparison in table 1 shows

that in three aspects – security, economics, and demographics – this proposal has an obvious advantage, as follows:

■ **Security** – The shorter fence route and the drastic reduction in the number of agricultural gates will greatly reduce the number of soldiers required to maintain the seam zone. Not separating Palestinians from their land will reduce their motivation to seek revenge. Avoiding damage to day-to-day life on the traffic routes between Palestinian communities; in commercial and economic centers, especially in East Jerusalem; and to their ability to obtain services provided by the Palestinian Authority will diminish the points of friction between the IDF and the Palestinian population. The presence of most of the Palestinians on the other side of the fence will lower the number of special operations by the IDF, the police, and the General Security Services needed to prevent uncontrolled entry into Israel.

■ **Economics** – Avoiding a separation between the Palestinians and their lands and wells, avoiding damage to thousands of olive and other trees, keeping traffic routes open for the Palestinians, and refraining from cutting off East Jerusalem from the rest of the Palestinian population in Judea and Samaria will make possible continued Palestinian activity at both the community and municipal level.

■ **Demographics** – The Palestinian population west of the barrier will have a much higher standard of living, due to its access to labor and commerce in Israel. This is likely to provide an incentive for illegal immigration of Palestinians from Judea and Samaria. Freezing the situation and recognizing the borders of the western buffer zone in the context of a permanent settlement is liable to harm the State of Israel's demographic balance.

Adopting the proposed plan means that even in case of an unde-

sirable suspension of the process at this stage, the two sides will be in a more constructive dynamic to continue after Israel evacuates the Gaza Strip under an agreement with moderate and middle-of-the-road Palestinians. The fence in Judea and Samaria will be constructed on a more modest route, which will provide an appropriate answer to threats but keep damage to the Palestinian population to a minimum. The international community will be a partner in, and witness to, the effort to reach a fair solution to the conflict. The Palestinians will control the entire Gaza Strip, which will facilitate economic activity, and might also attract foreign investment.

This alternative can be developed in two directions. One, which is less preferable, is to endorse the second stage of the roadmap, and establish a Palestinian state with temporary borders. Israel would continue to dismantle isolated Jewish communities east of the fence and preserve its control of the area west of it and of the Ariel-Immanuel-Karnei Shomron bloc. Israel will also retain control of a limited area in the Jordan Valley, based solely on Highway 90, the north-south road that runs through the Jordan Valley near the Jordanian border (map 4). During this period, the Palestinians will continue building the institutional, physical, and security infrastructures of the state in formation. The two sides and the international community will prepare the organizational and physical foundation for the cooperation necessary for managing two municipalities in

Jerusalem, solving the refugee problem, absorbing Israelis forced out of Judea and Samaria, and connecting Gaza with the West Bank. The second and preferred option is to begin gradual implementation of a permanent agreement achieved through negotiations between the parties. As such, all the activity described above will probably be part of a general plan for implementing a permanent solution.

In conclusion, the proposed plan requires large scale international involvement, and the effort and optimism of all the parties involved. It appears, however, that above all, pressure by the two societies, Israeli and Palestinian, on their leaderships to find a way out of the useless cycle of blood that the extremists on both sides are seeking to perpetuate will have the most significant effect on continuation of the process.³⁴ The price that the two societies have paid and continue to pay, while deriving no benefit whatsoever from it and without changing the basic problem facing them, will continue to constitute a motivating factor to persist in outspokenness and political pressure.

The State of Israel should draw the optimal point for its future according to the geographic, demographic, and democratic aspects on the 1967 borders, with border adjustments acceptable to the Palestinians in Jerusalem and western Samaria. This decision will renew the strategic choice made by David Ben Gurion: "The IDF can conquer all the territory between the Jordan River and the sea. What country can we have, however, assuming

that there are elections, and Deir Yassin is not our policy? We will have a Knesset with an Arab majority. Between the completeness of the land and a Jewish state, we have chosen a Jewish state."³⁵

Notes

1. Approved by the cabinet in two stages – in June 2002 and in October 2003.
2. The Israeli government approved the disengagement plan on June 6, 2004.
3. Nearly 1,000 Israelis have been killed and thousands wounded since October 2000.
4. This drive fulfills Sharon's call following the Wye Agreement of October 1998 to "seize every hill."
5. The argument rests on facts like the abandonment of Qalqilya by 8,000 Palestinians since the fence was built, and the emigration of 10,000 Palestinians of the educated class with dual citizenship from Ramallah and other West Bank cities.
6. Most were constructed illegally.
7. See Elisha Efrat, *Geography of Occupation* (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2002).
8. As did the Rhodes agreements of April 1949.
9. "94-96 percent of the area of the West Bank should be allocated for a Palestinian state. The Palestinian side should be compensated for the territory to be annexed to Israel with alternative territory of 1-3%."
10. Due to his concern over the imposition of other political solutions (such as the Geneva initiative), Sharon ensured that President Bush clarify in his letter of April 14, 2004, "The United States remains committed to my vision and its implementation, as described in the roadmap. The United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose any other plan."
11. Palestinians working without a permit, agriculture-related theft, vehicle

- theft, drugs, and more.
12. Per capital GDP is \$16,300 in Israel and \$940 in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (see *World Bank Report*, 2003).
 13. See <http://www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/Pages/Heb/tvai.htm>
 14. Implementation of the gates solution failed for Druze-owned land in the Golan Heights, as well as in the settlements that include within their boundaries privately owned Palestinian land, which the owners are legally entitled to work.
 15. Supreme Court Ruling 2056/4.
 16. For example, the Jus a-Ras area, and the Tzofin and Sal'it settlements.
 17. For example, the Bak'a al-Sharkiya area, which has been revised, or the Barta'a and Zeita areas.
 18. This number includes the 186,000 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and the 112,000 Palestinians living between the main separation fence and a proposed eastern fence in the Nili, Na'aleh, and Highway 443 area. Due to the changes planned in the fence route, this number may change.
 19. For example, see Qalkikya, Batir, Husen, Rafet, A-Zavia, Havla, Jeus, and other towns.
 20. As Sharon announced in his Passover 2004 speech before leaving for his meeting with US President George Bush.
 21. In this concept, Sharon has adopted the attitude of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Shlomo Ben-Ami, who persuaded Barak, regarding the permanent settlement, to focus on the western border, at the expense of the eastern border. Shlomo Ben-Ami, *A Front Without a Rear* (Tel Aviv: Maskel, 2004), chapter 4.
 22. On designing reality, see Shaul Arieli, "Coordinating with a Disappointed Populace," *Ofakim Hadashim*, July 2003, pp. 8-9.
 23. The name may be replaced and the plan may become more measured, but it will remain in essence a unilateral step, similar to the gradual withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983, 1985, and 2000, from which no peace treaty emerged, due to Israel's refusal to withdraw from the Golan Heights.
 24. These operations are liable to exact a painful price in blood from the IDF.
 25. "It is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities," Bush's April 14, 2004 letter to Sharon.
 26. As the prime minister promised Minister of Finance Binyamin Netanyahu and other ministers.
 27. In the future, it may also include pragmatic elements in Hamas.
 28. At the Algiers conference in 1988, approved in the amendment of the Palestinian National Covenant by the Palestinian Legislative Council in April 1996, and at the Palestinian Legislative Council conference with Clinton in Gaza in December 1998.
 29. Removing six Jewish communities: Ganim, Kadim, Sa-nor, Humash, Mevo Dotan, and Hermesh.
 30. Consolidation and control of the security apparatuses, transparency and control of the budget, and approval of negotiating positions.
 31. This number represents East Jerusalem residents.
 32. Supreme Court Ruling, 2056/4, p. 33.
 33. Ibid, p. 36.
 34. For example, the demonstration with 150,000 participants on May 15 in Rabin Square in Tel Aviv, and the letter by 70 Palestinian intellectuals, administrators, and academics condemning the violence.
 35. Knesset speech, Volume 1, April 4, 1949.

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