

Hizbollah Espionage against Israel

Amir Kulick

Antagonism among states and between states and terrorist organizations is a complex interface of many layers, among them political, social, economic, and military. The enmity between Hizbollah and Israel is no different in this regard. This article focuses on the intelligence dimension of the hostility, specifically Hizbollah's secret activity against Israel that various espionage affairs have exposed in recent years. Surveying the prominent cases of espionage, the article studies this secret campaign and assesses Hizbollah's modus operandi, its goals, and the implications for Israel.

Since its establishment in the early 1980s, Hizbollah has viewed Israel as a bitter foe to be destroyed. With this mindset, it waged a stubborn military struggle against the presence of the Israeli military in Lebanon until Israel's withdrawal from the security zone in May 2000. This struggle was played out near IDF and SLA outposts and in the villages of the security zone, and included various forms of attacks: standoff fire, booby traps, attacks on outposts, and Katyusha rocket fire on northern Israel. As part of this campaign, Hizbollah gathered intelligence on the security forces operating in Lebanon. Analysis of Hizbollah's activities in those years suggests that the information was gathered primarily through lookouts; the goal was to become familiar with the routine operations of the Israeli forces in the region and improve the effectiveness of attacks on IDF and SLA outposts and the placement of booby traps along the roads. Essentially similar information, though more sharply focused, was gathered by Hizbollah sympathizers within the security zone and served the purpose of carrying out "high quality" attacks, such as the assassination of the commander of the communications unit for Lebanon,

Amir Kulick, research associate at INSS

Brigadier General Erez Gerstein (February 1999), and SLA deputy chief of staff Aql Hashem (March 2000).

Expanding the Geographical Arena

Following the IDF withdrawal from the security zone, the nature of Hizbollah's struggle against Israel changed. The steady intensive fighting against the Israeli forces ceased, and instead the organization began to devote more resources to military buildup in advance of a comprehensive campaign against Israel. While attacks on the border continued from time to time, especially in the Mt. Dov area, Hizbollah's primary military activity centered on different aspects. Accordingly, the type of intelligence Hizbollah sought to compile about the IDF and Israel changed, and with it the operational methods for gathering such information. Analysis of the espionage affairs that have come to light suggests that in the first years after the withdrawal Hizbollah still sought to gather intelligence that was in essence military-tactical. In two prominent espionage cases exposed in 2001-2003, Hizbollah activated two espionage networks, one headed by Saad Kahmouz from the village of Rajar and the other led by IDF Lieutenant Colonel Omar al-Heib, a Bedouin officer, and his partner Mahmad Rahal Abu al-Ez. Both networks were used to gather intelligence primarily about IDF activity in northern Israel. Kahmouz's network was asked to gather intelligence about IDF bases in the region and to photograph major intersections and the entrances to IDF bases, in addition to photographing Kiryat Shmona from various angles.¹ Omar al-Heib's network was asked to provide information about IDF deployment in the north, the structure of outposts, the number of soldiers serving in them, IDF methods of operation in the border area, IDF code maps of the region, the location of observation cameras, and tank ambush sites.² This type of intelligence gathering, a direct continuation of Hizbollah's intelligence gathering activities of the security zone era, could serve the organization in improving its attacks on border outposts or in carrying out more targeted attacks in the depth of the northern area such as in Kiryat Shmona, at the entrances to military bases, or against senior officers.

At the same time, Hizbollah gradually began to expand the range of its intelligence interests to include more remote areas in the heart of the country, and beyond intelligence limited to the IDF. As early as 2002, Nissim Nasser, a part-Jewish part-Shiite Lebanese citizen

who immigrated to Israel in the 1980s, was recruited by Hizbollah and asked to supply a map of the greater Tel Aviv area marked with various infrastructure installations, such as the electric company and the Pi-Glilot gas depot, and to photograph other installations in Haifa and the center of the country.³ Like Nasser, the brothers Mahmad and Ahmad Smali from Rajar, recruited by Hizbollah and arrested for spying in 2003, were asked to transmit written material about Israeli infrastructures to Lebanon.⁴ Hizbollah made an even more sophisticated attempt at gathering precise geographical information about targets inside Israel through Haldon Barghouti, a Hamas activist from Ramallah. During a visit to Syria, Barghouti's handlers gave him a GPS capable of storing data. He was asked to frequent major roads and targets in order to map and analyze the area.⁵ Hizbollah tried to elicit similar information, though apparently of lower quality, from Ismail Suleiman, from the village of Ka'abiya-Hajajra, who was asked by his handler to gather information and photograph sites and army bases.⁶ Hizbollah also tried to elicit specific information about infrastructures in Israel's northern region from Arwa Hassan Ali, an Israeli Arab prisoner who in 2005 escaped to Lebanon. During his debriefing with Hizbollah, Arwa was asked to mark specific locations, such as banks, government institutions, and infrastructures, among them Bezeq and electric company installations, on aerial photographs of Nahariya.⁷ Though this is not an example of classical espionage, it is possible to grasp the type of information Hizbollah was seeking to obtain.

A database about Israeli infrastructure, military, and other installations may help to plan terrorist attacks on such locations, although such sites are heavily guarded and therefore are relatively immune to targeted attacks. Yet in light of Hizbollah's many efforts in recent years to construct rocket and missile systems, such a database would be useful in creating a target bank to serve Hizbollah in a comprehensive war against Israel. True, the artillery at the organization's disposal – Katyushas and heavy rockets of various kinds – is low precision weaponry that veers from its course the greater the launch range. Nonetheless, Hizbollah apparently seeks information about precise targets for two reasons. The first is linked to the manner in which this type of weapon is used. If Hizbollah is in fact preparing to attack targets deep within the northern region and the country's center, it would likely do so by means of shooting volleys towards those targets and thereby raise the chances of

hitting them. In other words, in the next war, the “deep Israeli rear” (i.e., the region stretching from Haifa to Tel Aviv) might be exposed not only to single rockets as in the Second Lebanon War, but also to volleys intended not only to exhaust the civilian population but also – and especially – to damage specific targets. The second reason is connected to capabilities the organization already possesses. According to various Israeli spokespeople, Hizbollah’s weaponry has grown significantly since the last war, both in terms of the rockets at its disposal and in terms of their ranges. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, for example, stated that Hizbollah has rockets that could reach southern Israel, and the number of missiles possessed by the organization has tripled from what it possessed on the eve of the Second Lebanon War.⁸ Perhaps gathering information about potential targets in the form of specific Israeli infrastructure installations signals that not only have the numbers and ranges of their rockets grown, but their precision also has significantly improved. If so, there are serious implications for the civilian rear and Israeli strategic installations.

Analyses of espionage affairs exposed in recent years have also indicated Hizbollah’s ongoing effort to formulate a different sort of target bank – for operational needs such as assassinations and abductions or for intelligence needs such as recruiting higher quality sources – with the aim of obtaining better information. This effort began when Israeli forces were still in the security zone, and information was then primarily intended for assassinations of senior IDF and SLA officers in the area. After the withdrawal from Lebanon, this type of intelligence gathering expanded into the depth of Israel. Thus in 2002 Nissim Nasser, who lived in Holon just south of Tel Aviv, was instructed to gather intelligence about a family member who was serving in a senior position in the security services, and was even asked to supply a photograph of him to Hizbollah. Omar al-Heib was asked to gather intelligence about the movements and security arrangements of Gabi Ashkenazi, then-GOC Northern Command and Meir Kalifi, commander of the Galil Division. In another instance, an Israeli Arab from Kalansawa, Khaled Kashkoush, was instructed to gather information about members of the security services. Recruited by Hizbollah when he was a medical student in Germany, he was told to apply for a job at Rambam Hospital in Haifa to help him with his assignment.⁹

The incident involving Rawi Sultani is of a similar pattern. Sultani, who worked out at the same gym frequented by Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, was apparently recruited by Hizbollah while in Morocco in the summer of 2008; he was instructed to gather information about Ashkenazi's routine arrival times at the gym and the security arrangements there, as well as about other senior personnel. Thus while Hizbollah was able to capitalize on a random opportunity (the access Sultani had to Ashkenazi), there is no intelligence coincidence here, rather an ongoing attempt on the part of the organization to gather intelligence for operations against senior personnel both within and outside of Israel's security forces. Specific information about individuals is liable to be used by Hizbollah in planning assassinations or abductions or, alternately, to recruit individuals into the organization's ranks after some weakness in conduct or character has been discovered.

Hizbollah undertakes similar intelligence gathering efforts to locate potential targets for terrorist attacks within Israel, though based on what has been published to date this effort seems secondary in scope. So, for example, Manar Jabrin, a university student, was recruited by Hizbollah and trained to gather detailed intelligence on buildings.¹⁰ In addition to gathering information about the chief of staff, Rawi Sultani was also allegedly instructed to gather information about potential targets for terrorist attacks in Israel. One may ask why Hizbollah would want to gather such information, as a terrorist group organized by Israeli Arabs or Arabs in the territories is much more likely to have a better knowledge of potential targets for attack and better access to updated information of this sort.

A possible answer may lie in previous Hizbollah failures in sending attackers from abroad into Israel. Since the 1990s, Hizbollah has tried to smuggle operatives into Israel in order to carry out showcase mass casualty attacks. The first was Hassan Miqdad, a Shiite accountant, who was recruited into Hizbollah's apparatus for attacks abroad; he underwent training with explosives and managed to smuggle in a bomb and plastic explosives through Ben Gurion Airport. Israeli intelligence personnel concluded that he was trying to decide on a place for carrying out a mass casualty attack in Tel Aviv. In any case, his plan went awry when the explosives he was handling exploded in his hands during his stay at the Lawrence Hotel in Jerusalem in April 1996. Another attacker, Steven

Smirk, a young German convert to Islam, was sent to Israel in November 1997 after being trained on light weapons and explosives by Hizbollah in Lebanon. According to Israeli sources, when he was arrested at Ben Gurion Airport he was carrying a video camera, which he was supposed to use to gather information about Tel Aviv and Haifa and select an appropriate spot for a suicide attack. A third incident took place close to the outbreak of al-Aqsa Intifada, when a Hizbollah operative named Fuzi Ayoub arrived in Israel in October 2000. Ayoub had also been trained in Lebanon, including in bomb assembly, and was supposed to carry out a showcase attack in Israel. Ayoub was arrested by the Palestinians when he arrived for an operational meeting in Hebron, and ultimately fell into Israeli hands in 2002. A fourth incident occurred in 2001, when the Israeli security service arrested Jihad Soman, a British-Lebanese citizen who was dispatched by Hizbollah to carry out a terrorist attack in Israel. In Soman's hotel room a Jewish skullcap, a timer, and three cell phones were found.¹¹ If Hizbollah has succeeded in preparing a list of potential targets where showcase attacks could be carried out, it might pave the way for actions of such terrorists by significantly cutting down on intelligence gathering and operational preparations, and thereby also make it harder for Israel's security services to foil their plans.

Expanding the Conceptual Sphere

Along with its physically expanded theater, Hizbollah has also expanded its sphere of conceptual interests. Many of the Hizbollah agents were instructed to gather information not immediately useful for direct operational needs, rather meant to meet broader purposes. Hizbollah, together with Iranian elements, is attempting systematically to gather infrastructure information about Israeli society and the State of Israel. So, for example, Saad Kahmouz's ring was asked to pass on to Hizbollah not only tactical information about IDF preparations in the north but also Israel's statistical annual as well as various books and periodicals. Around the same time, Nissim Nasser was also asked to provide his handlers with information about the Israeli mindset.¹² Similarly, while interrogated by the Hizbollah, Elhanan Tanenbaum was asked about the atmosphere and way of life of Israeli society alongside questions about Israeli politics, the relations between Jews and Arabs, and other such topics.¹³ It would seem that the reason behind attempts to produce information of this type

is both intellectual curiosity about the phenomenon that is the State of Israel, and the desire to find more effective ways of fighting it.

This is especially the case when Iranian elements are involved in generating the information. Mahmoud Mahajna (Abu Samara), the treasurer of the Islamic Movement who was recruited by Iranian intelligence in 2001, was asked to pass along information about events in Umm el-Fahm and about Israeli Arabs in general.¹⁴ Iran and Hizbollah sought to elicit even more general information about Israel and Israeli society through Jaris Jaris, the head of Fasuta's Local Council in 2001-2003. Jaris wanted to establish a research center, and on the basis of advice from a Lebanese friend, tried to obtain financial support from Hizbollah and Iran. In the end, Jaris was recruited by Iranian intelligence in November 2004 and was asked to provide information about Israeli society, the system of government, the various political parties, social struggles, and conflicts between various elements in Israel. At a deeper level, Jaris was asked to forge relationships with Israeli politicians and even to run for the Knesset as a member of one of the existing parties.¹⁵

The attempt to gather information to better understand the Israeli mindset peaked with the alleged espionage affair of Knesset Member Azmi Bashara. According to the indictment, Bashara was in contact with Hizbollah intelligence personnel and supplied them with various assessments about Israel's policies in the period before the Second Lebanon War. During the war itself, he maintained his contact with Hizbollah and even advised the organization on how to improve its political-psychological war against Israel and what media messages should be directed to the Israeli public, both Jewish and Arab.¹⁶

Thus in recent years, Hizbollah and Iran have added a dimension of conceptual depth that is beyond the immediate military level. Apparently the drive to make the comprehensive battle against Israel more effective, in the broader sense of the notion, is what lies at the root of this phenomenon. They seem to have concluded that military efforts alone do not suffice in the struggle against the Zionist entity.

Change in Methods of Operation and Agent Recruitment

The cases of espionage exposed in recent years reveal greater sophistication by the organization in recruitment of new members. In the first years after Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizbollah used

primarily drug smuggling as the means to recruit agents within Israel. The connection between terrorism and drugs is not a new phenomenon, nor is taking advantage of drugs as a means for attaining different goals. Indeed, various terrorist organizations around the world take advantage of the drug trade to finance their activities and use the infrastructures for smuggling drugs to transfer weapons and operatives from one place to another. From time to time terrorist organizations have even added an ideological aspect to this activity: flooding the countries they are fighting with drugs in order to weaken them socially and economically.¹⁷ Intelligence organizations (police and military) around the world have also used the illegal drug trade to activate agents and to produce intelligence. For example, major Lebanese drug traders such as Ramzi Nahara and Mahmad Biro and his son Qaid served as Israeli agents. In exchange for the information they provided, the Israeli authorities ignored their criminal activities and allowed them to operate essentially unhindered.¹⁸

When the IDF withdrew from the security zone, Hizbollah entrenched its military presence in Lebanon more firmly. Hizbollah fighters were deployed at roadblocks throughout the south and manned a line of outposts along the border with Israel. Consequently, the organization became the sole power in the region, and it used this power to pressure Lebanese and Israeli drug smugglers. In order to obtain Hizbollah's permission to continue operating, the drug dealers were forced to cooperate and supply Hizbollah personnel with information about Israel. Ramzi Nahara and his brother Kamil who were previously Israeli agents now started to operate spy rings among Israeli Arabs on behalf of Hizbollah. In exchange for the continued flow of drugs from Lebanon, these Israeli Arabs in turn fed Hizbollah information about the army and the country. This is how Kamil Nahara operated Lieutenant Colonel Omar al-Heib's spy network in 2002, while around the same time his brother Ramzi operated the Rajar-Kiryat Shmona spy ring of drug dealer Saad Kahmouz. Qaid Biro, a friend of the brothers (who also took an active part in the abduction of Elhanan Tanenbaum¹⁹), recruited and ran two Israeli Arab drug dealers, the brothers Mahmad and Ahmad Smoli from Rajar. In 2003 they traded drugs in exchange for information about Israel. Qaid's name also came up in the context of the Nissim Nasser espionage affair.

Hizbollah continued to use drug dealing as a convenient platform for recruiting agents in Israel in subsequent years as well. Noaf Hatib Sha'aban from Rajar was arrested in 2006 on the charge that in exchange for drugs he transferred security information to Hizbollah that included maps specifying the locations of Israeli army bases.²⁰ That same year, Riyadh Mazarib, from Mazarib in the Jezreel Valley, was arrested for having transmitted to the Shiite organization information about events in Israel and sites where rockets fell during the Second Lebanon War. Like the others, Mazarib undertook these activities as part of drug dealing with Lebanese elements.²¹ Finally, Louis Balut, an IDF NCO, transmitted information about IDF preparations in the north in 2008 as part of a drug running ring operating in the border area.²²

While the drug trade was a convenient and available recruitment mechanism, it allowed the organization to recruit only agents of a particular type, i.e., those already involved in criminal activity. Their intelligence gathering access is usually limited, and the danger of exposure by Israeli security forces hovers at all times. Therefore, it seems that in tandem with the drug platform, Hizbollah in recent years started to locate candidates for potential recruitment on ideological grounds. Accordingly, it changed its modes of operation and expanded the geographical areas in which it operated from an intelligence-operational point of view. Here it chose to focus primarily on Israeli Arab university students, especially those studying or traveling abroad. Within this circle, Hizbollah could not operate with the help of drug dealers, and therefore started to train designated intelligence officers who would find and recruit agents. Rather than in the northern sector of Israel, they operated in institutions of higher education and sites abroad hosting activities for Israeli Arab youth. One example was the Manar Jabrin case, a student from Umm el-Fahm who studied dentistry at the University of Amman. She was recruited by Hizbollah in 2003 after forming a friendship with an agent who operated relatively freely on campus, took various courses, and openly voiced anti-Israeli sentiments.

This approach produced good results for Hizbollah also in later years. In late 2006, the organization succeeded in recruiting Khaled Kashkoush, a medical student studying in Germany. Dr. Hashem Hassan, a Lebanese resident of Germany who headed the charity organization called the Lebanese Orphans NGO linked to Hizbollah's Lebanese civilian division,

determined Kashkoush was a candidate for recruitment. The actual recruitment was effected by a designated intelligence officer named Mahmad Hashem (Rami). According to sources in the Israeli intelligence community, Hashem is a professional handler of agents who operates abroad on behalf of Hizbollah. Kashkoush's recruitment was a process that lasted some four years, from the initial contact made in 2002 until the completion of the recruitment sometime in 2006 – evidence of an orderly recruitment process and thorough intelligence work. The Kashkoush espionage affair may also say something about the task the organization has in mind for agents of this type: not only intelligence gathering but also locating potential candidates for recruitment. Hizbollah in fact asked Kashkoush to name Israeli Arabs studying abroad who were suitable for operation in the ranks of Hizbollah.²³

Two additional espionage affairs involving young Israeli Arabs demonstrate the new dimensions added to Hizbollah's intelligence activity. The first was the affair of Ismail Suleiman from Ka'abiya-Hajajra. He was recruited into Hizbollah by a professional recruiter while on a religious pilgrimage in late 2008. Based on Suleiman's own testimony, he was approached by a man who introduced himself as a Palestinian resident of Lebanon, Abu Qassam, while he was at a mosque with some friends in Mecca. The Palestinian made initial contact with the group and zeroed in on Suleiman. At a meeting some days later, the Hizbollah operative carried out the initial triage by asking Suleiman about his religious leanings, his views about the Second Lebanon War, and, finally if he would be willing to gather information to be used against Israel. At the end of the meeting, Abu Qassam explained to Suleiman the arrangements to be used for clandestine communication, set up another meeting to complete the recruitment process, and gave Suleiman his first test: to photograph and gather information about strategic sites and military bases in the vicinity of Suleiman's home.²⁴

That same year Rawi Sultani from Taibe was apparently recruited into Hizbollah's ranks. The connection between Sultani and Hizbollah was made at a summer camp for Arab youths being held in Morocco. The Hizbollah operative showed the campers movies about the organization's activities against the Israeli army during the Second Lebanon War. At the end of one of the films, according to the indictment, Sultani approached the operative and told him that he worked out at the same gym frequented

by Ashkenazi. The Hizbollah operative arranged to be in touch with Sultani via e-mail, and about a month later, the Hizbollah operative invited the youth to a meeting abroad. According to the indictment, this meeting took place in Poland and was attended by someone who, on the basis of his actions and behavior, seems to have been a professional intelligence officer: setting up a meeting in one location and holding it elsewhere, giving Sultani a detailed list of information to gather – in this case about security arrangements surrounding the chief of staff and other information about the setting – and finally, making arrangements for secret communications: handing over encryption software and instructing Sultani how to use it. In this case too, like the Kashkoush affair, Sultani was asked if he could point out potential candidates for recruitment who were studying abroad and who would agree to help Hizbollah.²⁵

Conclusion

Several key inferences emerge from this backdrop. First, Hizbollah undertakes systematic intelligence gathering about Israel at a number of levels:

- a. At the tactical level: intelligence gathering about the northern sector and IDF assessments about the region. Apparently, this information is meant primarily to prepare a database to assist in carrying out acts of terrorism along the border.
- b. At the operational level: intelligence gathering about essential sites and installations inside Israel. Apparently, the purpose is to improve Hizbollah's ability to cause more significant damage to Israel's rear during an all-out war.
- c. At the strategic level, which involves two layers: the first is intelligence gathering in order to better understand the workings of the Zionist entity, to find more ways to attack it and be better equipped to analyze its future moves. The second layer involves intelligence gathering for the purpose of carrying out a spectacular mass casualty attack or abduction. Such an operation would in all likelihood be an expression of the organization's desire to react to an Israeli attack (such as the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh or some other senior Hizbollah member in the future), to restore the old rules

of the game or to determine new rules that are more convenient from the organization's perspective.

The second inference is that Hizbollah's intelligence work is not random, rather systematic and well established. As such it resembles more the work of an institutionalized espionage agency than that of a terrorist organization or other irregular body. Task-oriented intelligence gathering, operating within different target audiences, developing expertise among those recruiting sources, and more are all evidence that the process of institutionalization taking place within Hizbollah's armed wing in recent years was also applied to the field of intelligence.²⁶ In intelligence and operational terms, this process has made the organization sharper and more focused, thus also more dangerous and efficient than before.

The third inference is largely an outgrowth of the second. The fact that Hizbollah's intelligence has become more organized and focused is likely to make the next battle against the organization more difficult and complex, especially in everything concerning Israel's rear. The preparation of a systematic database covering Israel's rear in conjunction with improved fire capabilities significantly raises the probability that in the next war not only will Israeli population centers be exposed to harm but so will national installations and infrastructures in the heart of the country. It seems that this point will become most essential in the future; it requires extensive preparation on the part of Israel's civilian authorities and the military, which together bear the responsibility of neutralizing this threat as quickly as possible. The Hizbollah threat in formation and its severe implications must be clear to Israel's national leaders and to the public. Ideally, in any future battle against Hizbollah or another organization or country, there will be no disparity – unlike during the Second Lebanon War – between knowing the facts and understanding them.

Notes

- 1 Sharon Rofeh Ophir and Felix Frisch, "Indictments: Israeli Drug Dealers Aided Hizbollah," Ynet, February 17, 2003; Meir Zohar, "Accused Released Home Flees to Lebanon," *Haaretz*, September 21, 2006.
- 2 Indictment against al-Heib: <http://www.4law.co.il/moslab1.pdf>; for more about the affair, see Felix Frisch and Sharon Rofeh, "IDF Officer Accused Today of Spying for Hizbollah," Ynet, October 24, 2002.

- 3 Vered Lubitsch, "Accused of Spying for Hizbollah: I Gave Information They Already Had," Ynet, October 2, 2002.
- 4 Ronen Bergman, *The Point of No Return: Israeli Intelligence Versus Iran and Hizbollah* (Or Yehuda: Zmora-Bitan, 2007, Hebrew), p. 407.
- 5 Ibid., p. 406.
- 6 Sharon Rofeh Ophir, "Accusation: Galilee Youth Recruited as Hizbollah Spy," Ynet, March 1, 2009.
- 7 Ahiya Raavad, "Accusation: Prisoner Crossed into Lebanon, Passed Information to Hizbollah," Ynet, January 19, 2006.
- 8 Arik Bender, "Barak: Hizbollah Has Missiles Capable of Reaching Dimona," NRG, November 24, 2008, <http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/815/544.html>. For an analysis of the growth of Hizbollah after the Second Lebanon War, see Amir Kulick, "The Next War with Hizbollah," *Strategic Assessment* 10, no. 3 (2007): 41-50.
- 9 Amos Harel, Yoav Stern, and Jacky Hourri, "Revealed: Kalansawa Resident Accused of Spying Against Israel," *Haaretz*, August 7, 2009.
- 10 Ahiya Raavad, "Young Woman from Um el-Fahm Imprisoned for Hizbollah Connection," Ynet, November 28, 2007; Liat Schlezinger, "Dangerous Spy or Innocent Girl?" *Maariv*, January 17, 2008.
- 11 Bergman, pp. 349-51, 381-82; Barak Ben Tzur, "Hizbollah's Agents: Not What You Thought," NRG, April 19, 2009; Efrat Weiss, "Appeal of German Citizen Who Joined Hizbollah Rejected," Ynet, March 4, 2002; announcement by Prime Minister's Office spokesperson, "Israel and the IDF have arrested a senior Hizbollah agent who operated in Israel at the organization's behest in order to carry out terrorist missions," January 30, 2002 at <http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMO/Archive/Spokesman/2002/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%98%D7%95%D7%91%D7%A8/Spokesman7385.htm>.
- 12 Vered Lubitsch, "Nissim Nasser Convinced of Spying for Hizbollah," Ynet, November 28, 2002; Yoav Stern, "Returned to His Mother in Lebanon, Daughters Stay in Israel," *Haaretz*, June 2, 2008.
- 13 Bergman, p. 372.
- 14 Bergman, p. 408; for more on the case of Abu Samara, see Prime Minister's Office, "Head of Islamic Movement and its treasurer are accused of conspiring with Nabil Mahzouma, an agent of the Iranian intelligence services," June 24, 2003, at <http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMO/Archive/Spokesman/2003/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99/Spokesman8463.htm>.
- 15 Efrat Weiss, "Suspicion: Iran Planned to Plant Agent in the Knesset," Ynet, January 7, 2006.
- 16 Yohanan Liss and Amos Harel, "Azmi Bashara Suspected of Aiding Hizbollah Fire at Israel," *Haaretz*, May 3, 2007; Yohanan Liss and Yoav Stern, "Sources in Investigation: There is Evidentiary Basis to Indict Bashara," *Haaretz*, May 4, 2007.
- 17 Yaffa Tzuberi, *Terrorist Organizations, the Drug Industry and Their Links (Narco-Terrorism)*, the National Authority for the War on Drugs, March 20, 2003.

- 18 Yossi Melman, "Get to Know the Enemy; he Already Knows You," *Haaretz*, July 22, 2006; Bergman, p. 340.
- 19 Yossi Melman, "Since IDF's Withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizbollah Intensifies Attempts to Recruit Agents," *Haaretz*, October 24, 2002; Felix Frisch and Sharon Rofeh, "IDF Office to Be Charged Today with Spying for Hizbollah," *Ynet*, October 24, 2002; Sharon Rofeh Ophir and Felix Frisch, "Indictments: Israeli Drug Dealers Aided Hizbollah," *Ynet*, February 17, 2003; Bergman, pp. 368-71, 407.
- 20 Eli Ashkenazi, "Resident of Rajar Arrested on Suspicion of Furnishing Hizbollah with Information," *Haaretz*, June 5, 2006; Shlomi Diaz, "Rajar Resident Suspected of Transmitting Information to Hizbollah," *news1*, February 5, 2006.
- 21 Sharon Rofeh Ophir, "Indictment: Spied for Hizbollah During the War," *Ynet*, August 10, 2006; Eli Ashkenazi, "6 Yrs. in Jail for Drug Dealer for Passing Information to Hizbollah," *Haaretz*, May 24, 2007.
- 22 Jacky Hourri, Fadi Iadath, and Yuval Azulay, "Accused of Spying for Hizbollah: They Pushed Me into It," *Haaretz*, April 1, 2008; Jacky Hourri, "NOC Louis Balut Sentenced to 11 Yrs. in Jail for Spying for Hizbollah," *Haaretz*, September 4, 2008.
- 23 Amos Harel, "Israeli Arab Accused of Spying for Hizbollah," *Haaretz*, August 6, 2008; Amos Harel, Yoav Stern and Jacky Hourri, "Revealed: Kalansawa Resident Accused of Spying Against Israel," *Haaretz*, August 7, 2009.
- 24 Sharon Rofeh Ophir, "Indictment: Galilee Youth Recruited as Hizbollah Agent," *Ynet*, March 1, 2009.
- 25 Ofra Idelman, "How Easy Is It to Get to Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi?" *Haaretz*, August 31, 2009.
- 26 For an analysis of Hizbollah's fighting against Israel in the summer of 2006, see Amir Kulick, "Hizbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dimension," *Strategic Assessment* 9, no. 3 (2006): 29-33.