Something New Under the Sun: Public Opinion and Decision Making in Israel

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In recent years, Israel, like many other states around the world, has experienced a significant shift in the relationship between the civilian population and its political leadership.[1] This transformation is manifested in part in the reality that the status of elected officials has lost its luster, such that in the voters' view leaders no longer embody the same professional and moral authority,[2] and in the public's growing demand to have a voice in strategic decision making processes. The prevalent media commentary − and therefore also the broader public discourse − claims that the root of this phenomenon lies in the lower quality of the leadership, a function of "the decline of the generations." However, as will be discussed below, logic dictates that this is not a question of the declining quality of the "human assembly line," i.e., that somehow people who have the capacity of becoming great statespeople are no longer born. Rather, this is a phenomenon connected to a new, profound, and complex set of circumstances, manifested for example in the changing paradigms and relationships regarding the authority of elected officials and voter demands. Significantly, a parallel change is apparent in realms other than politics, e.g., authority relations within the nuclear family and in the schoolroom, the status of the boss at work, and even in the fact that a physician's medical opinion is immediately checked by many against what "Dr. Google" has to say. In light of these new circumstances,

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it is therefore highly doubtful if at present leaders who are regarded as parental figures can emerge, leaders to whom the public looks admiringly and whose opinions are accepted unquestioningly on the basis of a deep trust in the correctness of their decision, even if these decisions entail high costs and risks, such as decisions made once upon a time by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, or David Ben-Gurion.

Public Influence on Political Decisions

One of the results of this change in authority-based relationships is that topics considered in the past as belonging to the realm of "higher politics," i.e., issues that only those in upper level political places can handle in a skilled, informed manner, first and foremost foreign affairs and security matters, are viewed today as eligible for vigorous public debate – often to the chagrin of officeholders and professionals who feel that their areas of expertise are being encroached upon. The current debate about the value, possibility, and foreseeable outcome of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, or the need to avoid such an attack, is only one example of many in this context.

The shift in authority relations between decision makers and the public at large is more apparent in democratic regimes (though not exclusively so, as demonstrated by the Arab awakening this past year). This is not only because they offer freedom of expression and assembly and do not pose a direct threat to anyone who publicly disputes the positions of the leadership or even the leadership's right to make decisions without consulting with the sovereign, i.e., the people, but also because the democratic model is fundamentally based on the assumption of equality among people in terms of their intelligence and moral essence. Democracy defines the people as the sovereign and the decision makers as those who have been appointed only for a limited term. In other words, according to the democratic model, elected decision makers do not necessarily possess essential qualities lacking in regular citizens. Instead, they are viewed as people who chose to compete in the political arena and were elected for a certain set period of time in which they are supposed to serve the public interest to the best of their abilities and nothing else. They are not loftier than the people who elected them and no divine or other grace imbues their decisions. However, political action is very often convoluted and secret and requires rapid decisions, making it difficult to share the

process routinely with the public, and certainly not in times of crisis. Therefore decision makers demand the right to decide without revealing their rationale to their voters and without obtaining their approval in "real time," even if their decisions have far reaching implications. This demand is no longer viewed kindly and contributes to the ongoing tension in the relations between the public and the political elite.

This dilemma between the view of the people as sovereign and the claim that leaders must be allowed to do their job without public interference at every step has no one textbook solution; rather, it has a spectrum of solutions. At one end of the spectrum is a purist approach saying that the public must be involved in political doings only at the polls, i.e., the job of the public is to decide who decides, and that between election campaigns the public must leave affairs of state to the elected echelon and its experts. Should the outcomes prove disappointing, the citizens can, according to this view, always change their leaders in the next elections. However, for the system to function properly, in between elections the public must trust its leaders blindly to do the best they can for the public good.

The opposite purist approach contends that the public must always keep a sharp eye on the leaders and be consulted every time there is a significant issue on the national agenda, because (a) the citizen, as a moral agent, has the right and the obligation to formulate decisions that affect his or her future; (b) decisions affecting national destiny often involve not only professional considerations but also ethical and even ideological ones in which elected officials have no objective advantage over their voters; and (c) decision makers are not free of narrow interests and are not always well equipped with all the knowledge necessary to reach optimal decisions from the point of view of the general good. These respective viewpoints are well reflected by the following two statements, demonstrating that even the political elite itself is divided on the question of the proper measure of involvement. The first text quotes Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who feels that the public debate over fateful decisions ought to be limited, while the second quotes Yossi Sarid, a former politician, minister, and Knesset member, who holds that the public must not be excluded from the preliminary debate about such decisions.

The festival surrounding Iran requires self-scrutiny. One must ask what exactly we were doing here. Was the discourse deep or shallow? The way in which the discourse was held, including the contribution of previous officeholders, was at times disgraceful...It is only proper that such a discourse be responsible and serious, and that it be clear that Netanyahu and Barak are not Bublil and Bashevkin [stars of a popular TV reality show]. We consider the situation day in and day out, and do so responsibly. There is no risk here, we're not acting alone, and in any case everything requires the government's authorization.[3]

To ask, always to ask, and not accept any answer as a convention; to investigate, always to investigate, because things that are unusual to you aren't clear to them; do not be tempted into stupidly thinking that they, up there, know so much more and therefore will make the smart decisions. Don't agree to concede your sovereignty of thought and deposit it with either God or man.[4]

Between the one purist approach and the other, represented by separate political practices, there is a range of approaches and views, including deliberative approaches[5] and various sorts of referendums.

Beyond the fundamental question of if, when, and how the elected decision maker must consult the public, there is another no less thorny question. Let us assume that the voice of the public or a particular population sector is heard on high. To what extent should that voice affect the decision, and how can one assess, after the fact, whether it had an effect or not? This question too lacks a single clear answer, because first of all, the system has many players, both individuals and organizations, fiercely competing for influence. Ex post facto, it is usually difficult if not impossible to isolate the particular influence of any one actor. In other words, the system comprises many sides whose respective powers change from one issue to another and from one time to another, wielding influence that is not fully transparent and effecting results in a way that is not fully clear.

Second, public opinion, if it exists at all,[6] is not always uniform. In fact, it is almost never uniform. In a democratic society, one should expect opinions to differ and expect that any decision is likely to have been influenced by or be contrary to some segment or another of "public opinion." For example, figure 1 shows the division in Israeli-Jewish public

opinion about the government's approach to the "price tag" phenomenon (acts of violence perpetrated by extreme rightists in response to actions either by Palestinians or Israeli establishment authorities against their sector or philosophy), segmented by the self-identification of the interviewed parties as to their degree of religiosity.


Figure 1. Assessment of Israeli authorities' response to "price tag" actions (percent of a Jewish sample according to self-definition of religiosity)

Source: Ephraim Ya'ar and Tamar Hermann, *Peace Index*, October 2011, Israel Democracy Institute and the Evans Program for Conflict Resolution Research, Tel Aviv University[7]

In other words, if the policy towards the "price tag" perpetrators becomes harsher, it would be in keeping with one "public opinion" (primarily secular) and against a different "public opinion" (traditional, religious, and ultra-religious), and vice versa. In this context it is also impossible to avoid the question of what constitutes the relevant public opinion, i.e., whose opinions should decision makers take into account and whose opinions are they free to ignore, and who decides who's "in" and who's "out." As figure 2 demonstrates, it becomes clear that today there is a large majority of the Jewish population in Israel that does not see Arab citizens as constituting part of the "public opinion" that ought to be considered when making fateful decisions affecting the nation, not only in the realm of security and foreign affairs but also in terms of government and the economy.

Figure 2. Agree that a Jewish majority is required in order to make decisions on the following issues (percent of a Jewish sample)

Source: Tamar Hermann et al., *2011 Democracy Index* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2011), p. 97.

Third, it is difficult to assess the effect of the public because decision makers generally try to conceal it: for many of them, admitting that such an effect exists decreases their value as "policy experts." It is only rarely that they whip out the subject of the public will and put it on full display, usually when that public will matches their own priorities or when they worry about electoral backlash. A rare instance of such an admission by someone who was party to making upper level decisions is a statement by Ami Ayalon, former head of Israel's General Security Services, that the IDF withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 due to public pressure (contrary to the repeated claim made by then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak that the public pressure manifested by the Four Mothers movement had no effect on him whatsoever).[8] Another example of public influence, albeit in the opposite direction, i.e., of a government action designed to prevent a swell of public opinion in a direction deemed undesirable by the government, was the testimony by Dov Weisglass, the close confidant of then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, that the unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip was meant in part to pull the rug out from under the Geneva initiative, which at the time was gaining popularity in public opinion.[9]

Fourth, the relationship between the public and the decision makers is often a two-way street, making it impossible to identify cause and effect − the public position and the leadership position − with any certainty.

Nonetheless, identifying priorities in time may indicate the direction of influence, from top to bottom or from bottom to top. For example, in May 2002, when then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was vehemently opposed to the idea of a unilateral withdrawal from the territories, there were already clear indications of the existence of a small majority of the Jewish population (51 percent) in favor of such a withdrawal, in light of the deadlock in the negotiations with the Palestinians (36 percent were opposed while the rest were undecided).[10] This would seem to imply a certain response by decision makers to public opinion, continually consulted by contemporary leaders via polls, surveys, and other samplings they may commission.

Narrowing the Gap between Politician and Voter

What, then, are the elements of change in the relationship between the public and decision makers mentioned at the start of this discussion?

a. The complexity of the problems facing decision makers is growing as the complexity of the political-economic world increases because of, e.g., accelerating globalization processes placing national decision making in a much broader geographical and regional context than ever before. Thus decision makers find themselves at a loss or conflicted among one another in the face of problems, and are struck by the difficulty of trying to formulate a uniform, resolute policy.[11]

b. Politics as a whole, and electoral politics in particular, are becoming increasingly personal, i.e., decision makers at the top are much more exposed to personal criticism than in the past when they were merely part of the leadership and could often justify their actions as being "at the behest of the movement/party." Frequent media revelations about personal-political considerations erode the public's trust in the unbiased manner of the decision making process and decision makers' moves, especially given the already low esteem in which political institutions have been held in recent years.[12]

c. As noted, decision makers very frequently commission public opinions polls. Although such surveys, generally conducted in confidence, are in theory only meant to determine the effect that a decision will have on their popularity, in practice this means not just an output but also an input – consciously or not, the results of the polls affect the decision makers as they undertake their next moves.[13]

d. In recent years media coverage of the political elites and their political moves has been unprecedented in its intensity. The sense of awe that ordinary citizens used to have for their leaders, often inspired by distance, has been considerably eroded since the close-up came into being. Every tasteless joke and bead of sweat that pops out under pressure are covered and reported to viewers and listeners in real time, not to mention reporting straight from the battlefield, as was the case in the Second Lebanon War (2006). Having to perform at all times in front of the camera and near a microphone creates pressure, making it difficult to take measured, reasoned decisions.[14]

e. The easy access by the public – whose educational level is constantly rising – to a range of information channels and to an unprecedented abundance of commentary creates a much more informed public than existed 20, 50, and certainly 100 years ago. The internet and other modern means of communication create a situation in which the public feels equipped with information that is (almost) as good as that held by the decision makers; accordingly, it is only right that its preferences be heard and taken into account. The empowerment of the citizen, a significant improvement in the democratic performance, thus closes the gaps that in the past fed the public's willingness to accept the elected echelon's decisions as divinely ordained.[15]

The narrowing of the distance between the public and the decision making process – though to a great extent it is only virtual – is seen by many in the political elite as a negative, if only because it limits their freedom of action. In this context, one shudders at the memory of the unfortunate slip by Likud MK Meir Cohen-Avidov, who called the members of the Mothers against Silence protest movement, which called for the withdrawal of troops from Lebanon, "the cows of Bashan" (a derogatory epithet used by the prophet Amos) – contending they were not worthy of interfering in a critical national issue of this sort. However, he was hardly an atypical MK or a voice of the past. For example, only recently the incumbent Finance Minister, Dr. Yuval Steinitz, expressed himself similarly – though in somewhat more refined language – when asked about the large protest march planned as part of the public campaign for the release of Gilad Shalit: "The decisions about the release of Gilad Shalit cannot be made in the street, in marches or by referendum. They are not the decisions of public opinion."[16]

Within the political elite, those who oppose the public demand for a voice in decision making processes support their position with claims – some of which have been scientifically refuted[17] – about the supposed instability of public opinion and the political ignorance of the man or woman on the street. However, figure 3, based on *Peace Index* findings from the recent decade that show (1) the annual averages of support for conducting negotiations with the Palestinian Authority and (2) the annual averages of the belief that these negotiations will bear fruit in the visible future, demonstrates that Israeli public opinion is in fact remarkable for its stability – to the point of stagnancy – rather than for acute swings, reducing the chance for a strategic reversal. The maximal distance between the annual averages over the last decade is about 12 percent when it comes to "support" and some 11 percent when it comes to "belief." Moreover, the gap between the two annual averages also remained remarkably constant throughout the decade, with a gap of only 12.4 percent between the maximal point (33.4 percent) and the minimal point (21 percent).


Figure 3. On negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, 2001-2011 (percent of a Jewish sample)

Significantly, the Israeli public describes itself as highly interested in political matters. Indeed, when it comes to the general public's knowledge of political issues (and the Israeli public ranks very highly relative to other publics in the world when it comes to knowledge of and interest in politics), the situation is much less dire than claimed by those opposed to public involvement. Thus, in an empiric examination recently conducted

regarding a set of questions involving political knowledge, the following distribution emerged: 21.4 percent of respondents in a representative national sample were seen as having a low level of knowledge, 62 percent as having an average level of knowledge, and 18.4 percent as having a high level of knowledge.[18] Figure 4 presents the percentage of Israeli citizens (Jews and Arabs) who think of themselves as having a high degree of interest in politics.


Figure 4. Israelis who consider themselves as having high political awareness

Source: Hermann et al., *2011 Democracy Index*, p. 148.

The fact that the public takes an interest and apparently is knowledgeable about politics does not necessarily mean that its preferences are free of error. However, that is also true about the preferences and decisions of those in the political leadership. Furthermore, no one argues that the decision makers must follow what the public says exactly in the way dictated by the public. Instead, they are supposed to use their professional considerations and those of their advisors and explain to the public why they chose this way or that. In this context one should note the frequent claim that one of the reasons – even if not the main one – for the collapse of the Oslo process was the fact that the Rabin government may perhaps have made the right decision, but it certainly did not make an effort to try to explain it to the public in order to enlist its support for the move.

Nevertheless, decision makers try to preserve this niche for themselves and restrict outside interference. An excellent example of

this tendency is represented by the serious charges heard in government corridors against former security personnel expressing their opinions about the Iranian issue in public. No one disputes their expertise, yet once they leave the system they become part of that "public opinion" whose sound effects elected officials would like to reduce. Thus, MK Zeev Begin, speaking of public statements made by former Mossad head Meir Dagan against an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, proclaimed:

> This is a breach of trust, simply disgusting; this is a villain- ous act stemming from people's megalomania... Public of- ficials commit themselves to keep state secrets they came to know as a result of being in public office without a statute of limitations, even after leaving their jobs. I think we need to view these acts with all due gravity because they generate the kind of media discussion that truly sabotages the gov- ernment's ability to make decisions.[19]

The media, which broadcasts public sentiments on political issues, also comes under occasional attack. Here the charges generally focus on the media being a tool used to manipulate public opinion by certain interest groups. Indeed, when it comes to this point, the media outlets often attack one another. For example, one paper wrote the following of Channel 10's decision to screen a documentary about the campaign to free of Gilad Shalit at the same time that Channel 2 was screening the popular TV reality show "Big Brother":

> Is Channel 10 trying to change and influence the public agenda and the discourse of the next day? Is it possible that someone over there decided to flip a switch in his head and remind us that there is a bigger, more important tribal bon- fire than the one conducted by Erez Tal? It may be that on Sunday night we will all be put to the test, one that will place a mirror in front of us all that will reflect not only our view- ing preferences but also our priorities as a society.[20]

However, the claim that the media is a tool wielded by interest groups lacks serious weight in light of the prominence of digital media in the public discourse, especially media such as Facebook, Twitter, and cell phones. With these media it is impossible to speak of editorial decisions of one kind or another meant to manipulate public opinion, because every individual with the appropriate device and desire becomes a news editorial staff-of-one who writes, broadcasts, photographs, and provides

commentary on personal, municipal, national, and even global events, and distributes these to masses of readers or viewers.

Is Anything New under the Sun?

Focus thus far has been on general trends that may be identified in Israel as well as in other democratic nations that have changed the relationship between the public and its leaders, and consequently, it would seem, also the relative impact of these two elements on national decision making. One is of course free to question these distinctions and say that there was always some sort of opposition to steps initiated and taken by the leaders, including those with tremendously high levels of public support, from David Ben-Gurion to Ariel Sharon. Therefore some would, along with Ecclesiastes, say that there is nothing new under the sun.

However, those who study Israeli society are convinced that this is not the case, and that at this time Israel is experiencing an unprecedented deterioration in the credit the public is willing to extend to its leader. There are sociologists who go so far as to point to a grand transformation in the Israeli public, which signals the appearance of a breed of "new Israelis":

> The new Israelis are not prepared to let anyone hide from them the processes determining their lives: market mechanisms, the power of the tycoons, and the arrangements made by the state and its institutions. The new Israelis do not humbly accept sovereign declarations that always claim that "this is not the right time for budgetary demands," or that the state "is doing everything in its power" for the public good. The new Israelis demand transparency in the conduct of the state because they understand that when a state operates in the dark it is contrary to the public good. They demand to be included in public activity because they understand that blind faith in the establishment will again make them hostages to the state, lacking the ability to tell themselves that they are solid, moral and ethical Israelis.[21]

Indeed, the empirical data indicates that the lack of public satisfaction with their leadership has reached new heights, especially with regard to the attention decision makers pay to their voters, the set of considerations guiding them, their professional ability, and their integrity. Even after the wave of protests of the summer of 2011, the majority of the Israeli public still feels that it has little political influence, as demonstrated by figure 5. A clear majority (63 percent) feel that politicians are not responsive to the

opinions of the "ordinary person on the street," and that the public has no voice in the national decision making circles.

Figure 5. To what extent can you and your friends affect government policy? (sample of Jewish population, in percent)

Source: Hermann et al., *2011 Democracy Index*, September

In addition, as charted in figure 6, today – as opposed to the past – the large majority also thinks that the government does not bother to explain its decisions to the public.

Figure 6. Percent of those who think that recently the government has not done enough to explain its decisions to the public

Source: Hermann et al., *2011 Democracy Index*, September

If the public thought that the government does what it is supposed to do, it could be that the sense of having little or no influence and the lack of governmental attention to the public would not be as disturbing as they are. However, as charted in figure 7, today most of the Israeli public, including the 18-34 year age cohort, which jumpstarted the recent wave of protests, feels that the government is handling the nation's problems poorly:


Figure 7. How well do you think the government is handling the nation's problems? (Jewish population, in percent)

Source: Hermann et al., *2011 Democracy Index*, September

The most prominent and troubling finding within this general picture of alienation between the public and its leaders is that the Israeli citizen seems to have adopted a national set of priorities that is manifestly different from that of the sitting government. As shown in table 1, which presents the percentages of what respondents in a representative national sampling said was the most important national priority in their opinion, citizens are no longer bothered by the faulty connection between them and their leaders (only 1.2 percent said that this is the supreme national priority), and that improving the systems of governance in Israel hardly interests them at all (5.5 percent). Even attaining peace with the Palestinians is a relatively lowly priority (12 percent), while strengthening Israel's military power ranks even lower

(8.4 percent). Instead, undisputedly, the top national priority of the "new Israelis'" is closing the social and economic gaps, a topic the government barely dealt with until recently; even now, as much as it attends to these issues, it seems to be doing so with marked unwillingness, as if coerced.

Table 1. Most important national priorities
(national sample, in percent)

Issue	March 2011	September 2011
Integrating the ultra-Orthodox into the job market	2.7	7.8
Closing socioeconomic gaps	24.9	40.2
Improving relations between Jewish and Arabs citizens	2.7	2.0
Strengthening the connection between elected politicians and the citizens	.90	1.2
Helping young people become homeowners	11.9	12.2
Making peace with the Palestinians	14.0	12.0
Strengthening Israel's military capabilities	23.9	8.4
Improving Israel's international image and status	10.2	7.8
Improving the systems of governance	4.2	5.5

Source: Hermann et al., *2011 Democracy Index*, September

This severe crisis of trust emerging against the background of a much more polyphonic "street" means that the relationship between the public and its leaders has in fact become an arena of contention in terms of setting the national agenda. Decision makers are trying to defend their exclusive prerogative while the public is demanding its right to have a say. Moreover, it also seems that each side is armed with its own agenda. This will presumably affect the ability of leaders to make strategic

decisions on the assumption, which was once a given, that the public will back them without hesitation and contribute its share, even in the case of painful decisions. In other words, this situation is liable to undermine the chance of mobilizing critical public backing if and when leaders try, want, or are forced to make far reaching strategic political decisions in the future. In this sense, it would seem that there is definitely something new under the sun.

Notes

1   For more on the change in the relationship between the public and the politi-cal leadership, see E. J. Dionne, *Why Americans Hate Politics* (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992); R. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2004); and C. Boggs, *The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of Public Sphere* (NY: Guilford Press, 2000).

2   On the erosion of authority, see J. Rosenau, "The Relocation of Authority in a Shrinking World," *Comparative Politics* 24, no. 3 (1992): 253-72.

3   Ehud Barak, quoted in *Globes*, November 8, 2011, http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000696031.

4   Yossi Sarid, "Don't Go There," *Haaretz*, November 11, 2011.

5   E.g., Ronen Gopher, "Participatory Deliberative Democracy: Practices from Around the World," http://snipurl.com/21z90hy.

6   The famous French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, for example, claims that "there is no such creature" as public opinion as expressed in public opinion surveys and polls. See "Public Opinion Does Not Exist," *Issues in Sociology* (Tel Aviv: Riesling Press, 2005), pp. 207-16.

7   Available online at http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonth.aspx?num=235&monthname=%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%98%D7%95%D7%91%D7%A8.

8   Ami Ayalon, in Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, *The Generals Speak: The Collapse of the Oslo Process and the Violent Israel-Palestinian Confrontation* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, Davis Institute, 2003), pp. 5-12.

9   Ari Shavit, "The Full Interview with Dov Weisglass," *Haaretz*, October 8, 2004, http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/9/609133.

10 http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonth.aspx?mark1=&mark2=&num=97.

11 For an interesting discussion of the effect of globalization on Israeli policy in the Israeli-Palestinian context, including the context of decision makers and public opinion, see G. Ben Porat, *Global Liberalism , Local Populism* (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006).

12 For more on the low level of trust in political institutions in Israel, see, e.g., T. Hermann et al., *2011 Democratic Revolt* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Insti-tute, 2011), pp. 139-45.

13 For the effect of polls, see, e.g., R. Hinckly, *People, Polls and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Securit*y (New York: Lexington, 1992).

14 For more on the role of the media in the connection between spectators and national leadership, see, e.g., M. Schudson, "What's Unusual about Covering Politics as Usual," in B. Zelizer and S. Allan, eds., *Journalism after September 11* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 36.

15 See, e.g., Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1992): 439-66.

16 "Hamas: Gilad Shalit is not in Jail" *Ynet,* June 26, 2010, http://reshet.ynet.co.il/%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/News/Politics/Security/Article,46359.aspx.

17 For refutation of the traditional position (the "Almond-Lipmann consensus") that public opinion on national matters is not based on knowledge and shifts with the wind, see B. I. Page and R. Y. Shapir, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), ch. 9; W. Chittick, K. R. Billingsley, and R. Travis, "Persistence and Change in Elite and Mass Attitudes toward U.S. Foreign Policy," *Political Psychology* 11, no. 2 (1990): 385-401.

18 Hermann et al., *2011 Democracy Index*, p. 249.

19 Army Radio, http://glz.co.il/NewsArticle.aspx?newsid=92824.

20 "Preferences: Gilad Shalit Competes with 'Big Brother' for Your Attention," *Akhbar Ha'ir*, December 4, 2009, http://www.mouse.co.il/CM.articles_item,1318,209,42791,.aspx.

21 Gad Yair, "Ron Arad and the New Israelis in Israel," *Haaretz*, October 16, 2011, http://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/1.1567286.