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STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
Multidisciplinary Journal on National Security

The purpose of *Strategic Assessment* is to stimulate and enrich the public debate on issues that are, or should be, on Israel's national security agenda.

Strategic Assessment is a quarterly publication comprising policy-oriented articles written by INSS researchers and guest contributors. The views presented here are those of the authors alone.

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A Note from the Editors

The April 2020 issue is the second issue of *Strategic Assessment: A Multidisciplinary Journal on National Security* in its new, expanded format. The issue is published at the height of the COVID-19 crisis, which in many respects has changed the global order. Indeed, the pandemic has challenged accepted understandings about the essence of national security, and the influence of health and ecological crises on the resilience of nations and the entire international system.

Although we did not plan to devote the issue to COVID-19, some of the articles that appear here deal with subjects whose importance has only increased with the coronavirus outbreak. These include, for example, the article by Meir Elran, Carmit Padan, and Aya Dolev on emergencies and resilience in cities; Avner Barnea's article about the importance of incorporating the discipline of counterintelligence in national security perspectives; and Michael Milstein's article about the battle for cognitive awareness.

In addition to these articles, which bring unique critical perspectives to three areas relevant to management of the coronavirus outbreak, we chose to open the Policy Analysis section with Benjamin Miller's article, which presents an initial analysis of the geopolitical implications of COVID-19. A second article, by Raz Zimmt, deals with how the regime in Iran, which thus far has been the most serious coronavirus epicenter in the Middle East, has managed the outbreak.

Creating the foundation for new high-quality knowledge about such a complex and significant phenomenon obliges researchers to use accurate statistical information and, most of all, to have a broad perspective. We intend to dedicate one of the upcoming issues to this subject and are in the process of compiling and preparing relevant material. At the same time, we continue to receive manuscripts for all categories of articles published in the journal (see the call for submissions at the end of this issue) and prepare to publish them in accordance with our stringent publication standards.

Articles accepted for publication will first be published online on the journal's website (https://strategicassessment.inss.org.il/) and subsequently assigned to a particular issue. This format, comparable to the standards of leading journals around the world, prevents a delay in publishing articles that have completed the full evaluation and editing process.

Kobi Michael and Carmit Valensi
Editors, *Strategic Assessment*

Tel Aviv, April 2020

Israel Defense

Emergency, Resilience, and the Big City

Meir Elran, Carmit Padan, and Aya Dolev

In many respects, Israel is one large city, or a diverse urban network of sorts, and will certainly remain so as it becomes even more crowded. This has far-reaching security implications, especially in expected conflict scenarios. If these scenarios materialize, the Israeli home front will have to cope with a large scale attack against population centers and critical infrastructure waged with unprecedented quantities of various weapons, particularly high-trajectory weapons of different sorts. The vast majority of weapons of this type are unguided and designed primarily to harass the civilian population, but some are precision-guided missiles with heavy payloads that can cause significant damage with much greater lethal potential. This article analyzes the connection between emergency security situations in an urban environment and urban resilience as a strategic response. It examines the capacity of the Israeli city, its inhabitants, and its leadership to manage the expected security threat, maintain functional continuity, and thereafter bounce back rapidly. The article first analyzes the generic city as a complex system and the features of urban resilience from a theoretical perspective. It then analyzes the city of Tel Aviv-Jaffa as a case study of the urban core of the home front in Israel. It attempts to assess to what extent Tel Aviv-Jaffa is prepared for an expected security disruption, to what degree urban

resilience will enable it to maintain necessary functional continuity in a large-scale conflict, and whether it is possible to evaluate the city's subsequent ability to recover. Finally, the article offers systemic recommendations for improving preparedness and urban resilience in Tel Aviv-Jaffa and the Israeli home front in general. This article was written before the COVID-19 outbreak, but its principal insights and recommendations are valid for responses to a pandemic and any major disruption.

Keywords: resilience, urban resilience, emergency, Tel Aviv, mass disasters

Theoretical Introduction

In the contemporary urban environment, the relationship between the environment and its inhabitants is mediated by socio-technical networks composed of infrastructure, information, and institutions (Portugali, 2012). The essential function of the urban system under the official responsibility of the local authority is defined by Da Silva, Kernaghan, and Luque (2012) as support for the wellbeing of a city's residents. The local authority is meant to furnish this support by providing basic services that are grounded in a sense of belonging, social cohesion, and freedom of choice and action (Alcamo et al., 2003).

"Resilience," a leading term in the professional literature on disaster management, refers to the capacity of any system, such as a municipal system, to face a severe disruption or disaster and the consequences that challenge its functional continuity, recover from it quickly, and return to the original level of conduct (bouncing back), or to a higher level of operation (bouncing forward), following systemic processes of organization and learning.

Routine management of the urban systems also dictates the role of the local authority in an emergency,[1] which at that time becomes more significant, both because it is the main governmental entity in the theater where the event takes place and because it is more accessible to the population and the local economy than any other authority. The local authority will therefore usually be involved in the initial response to a mass disruption or to any other kind of emergency (Dodman & Satterthwaite, 2008; Alexander, 2005; McLoughlin, 1985; McEntire, 2007; Eriksson, 2010).

Even though government bodies are commonly involved in severe emergencies, in many places around the world the local authorities are also active in varying degrees. Responsibility is not confined to actions during an emergency situation; it also extends to the preliminary stages of preparation for it, and to the subsequent stage of recovery (Murphy, 2007; Eriksson, 2010). For this reason, broad reference to the role of the municipalities can be found in the literature dealing with disaster management in the domains of planning, risk reduction, mitigation, and promotion of effectiveness of the systems providing services to the city (Huq, Kovats, Reid, & Satterthwaite, 2007; Da Silva et al., 2012; Bulkeley, 2011; Jabareen, 2013).

One common assertion in the literature is that the key role of the local authority in the initial response mandates ongoing preliminary action on its part to enhance preparedness for extreme disruptions. "Preparedness" is defined as the array of actions before an emergency in order to prevent the event or limit the damage and losses it might cause (Cutter

et al., 2008). This preparedness refers to the set of tools needed for the purpose of coping with the emergency and for the development of strategies that further the components of organizational and public resilience.

"Resilience," a leading term in the professional literature on disaster management, refers to the capacity of any system, such as a municipal system, to face a severe disruption or disaster and the consequences that challenge its functional continuity, recover from it quickly, and return to the original level of conduct (bouncing back), or to a higher level of operation (bouncing forward), following systemic processes of organization and learning. Flexibility is a critical element in this process. It is important to take into account the magnitude of the disruption and the extent of the damage caused, as well as the level of preparedness for an emergency, as these are significant factors affecting the level of resilience (Padan & Elran, 2018).

There are many different approaches and models for implementing the resilience concept in an urban system. Among these, the engineering, the evolutionary, the ecological, and other approaches are discussed at length. For example, according to the engineering approach, it is possible to prepare for physical threats, handle them, and overcome them through advance planning (Coaffee, 2013). According to the evolutionary approach, areas of damage cannot be analyzed separately and neutrally, and must be seen as complex and connected socio-spatial systems (Davoudi & Porter, 2012). Some of the resilience experts adopt an expanded approach. This entails a holistic handling of a city's social, economic, and infrastructure components, not necessarily in the context of deliberately promoting preparation for an emergency, but as part of a basic concept designed to generate growth that can also support society in the case of an emergency. Others adopt an intermediate approach that focuses on preliminary public investment in organizational, infrastructure, and social aspects as fundamental elements in advancing the preparedness for a relevant emergency. In contrast, others prefer the functional approach, which focuses mainly on preparing tools that will facilitate proper management of the system during and following an emergency. The leading principles of the three approaches are recognized in the research literature, and share a common denominator (Desurbs, 2014).

According to a comprehensive UN document, urban resilience can be defined as "the measurable ability of any urban system, with its inhabitants, to maintain [functional] continuity through all shocks and stresses, while positively adapting and transforming toward sustainability" (UN-Habitat, 2018). Another definition is offered by the 100 Resilient Cities supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, which defines urban resilience as "the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience" (100 Resilient Cities).

The perception of the city as a system is prominent in the literature dealing with urban resilience (Hatuka, Rosen-Zvi, Birnhack, Toch, & Zur, 2018). The distinction between the local authority and its organs and other bodies operating in the city, such as the local communities, the business sector, and civil societies, is not always clear. In many cases, when the focus of interest is on local governance, researchers focus on the necessary connection between various sectors as an element that furthers urban resilience (Murphy, 2007). In this context, the necessary connection between the municipal management and local initiatives reflects different aspects of emergency management, which is designed to generate the systemic whole. The difficulty in creating a clear distinction between these two levels—the providers and the receivers of services—results from the city being a complex system containing sub-systems with dynamic

and evolving reciprocal relations between them. In emergencies, it becomes even more difficult to isolate the way each sub-system handles the consequences of the emergency.

The resilient city approach emerged from the ecological approach, which also perceives the city as a system that must deal with threats and risks, and as such, the need of people and communities to adapt to crises (Murphy, 2007). This assertion is linked to the notion of the "risk society" presented by Ulrich Beck, who characterizes the current period as a "second modernity," in which we no longer deal only with physical natural risks but also with human induced hazards, which are impossible to predict. While the likelihood that some of these risks will materialize is relatively low, their consequences are highly destructive. Examples of risks listed by Beck are terrorism, nuclear weapons, and global warming (Beck, 2009). This might pose challenges at several levels: from the spatial perspective, it obliges society to ensure urban planning, which plays a key role in making cities more resilient, by designing both the physical environment through forecasting and anticipating risks and uncertainties, and by ways of coping with them (Jabareen, 2013). From the physical perspective, resilient cities are perceived as ecosystems that further flexibility and adaptability (Pickett, Cadenaso, & Grove, 2004). According to this concept, man-made or natural risks must be taken into consideration in developing physical systems and infrastructure (Godschalk, 2003), including through resilience-oriented planning. From a social perspective, the resilience concept represents a change in the division of responsibility for crisis management: although the central and local governments are still considered key players in building resilient communities, the resilient city approach supports decentralization of authority, and demands that the community rely on itself (Beck, 2009). In this framework, the contribution of social capital to societal resilience is critical, particularly elements such as trust, social cohesion, volunteering, and inclusive leadership (Paton, 2008). Inclusive leadership assigns its highest priority to the interests of the lead sectors (Randel et al., 2018). Finally, it is commonly suggested that communities with a great deal of social capital are also resilient, which enables them to handle severe disruptions better and subsequently to bounce back more quickly (Aldrich, 2012).

In order to enhance urban resilience, the literature commonly proposes principal organizational elements. The most important treat the emergency as part of the agenda of the decision makers and ensure that planning processes for an emergency are part of the organizational routine, while maintaining constant learning processes on emergency. Part of this entails developing new capabilities for flexible handing of new and unknown crises (Boin & Lagadec, 2000). At an individual level, the literature also proposes:

a. Active and inclusive urban management of the disruption, based on accurate assessments and readiness to initiate and take responsive actions (Stewart, Kolluru, & Smith, 2009).
b. Quick monitoring and identification of the risks and the vulnerable groups, granting priority to the disadvantaged on the one hand, and to interventions designed to reduce vulnerability of the public, infrastructure, and urban assets on the other hand (Dodman & Satterthwaite, 2008).
c. Development of communication systems for transmitting information and warning messages before, during, and after the disruption; taking action to reduce damage and to enhance public benefit, such as providing aid and carrying out rapid mass evacuation if necessary (Tanner et al., 2009), while maintaining the residents' trust in the municipality and the transmitters of the information (Comfort & Zagorecki, 2003).
d. Redundancy: Construction and maintenance of parallel systems capable of providing services and facilitating service continuity in the event of damage to one of the systems.

> Redundancy will not be confined to the physical domain, but will also extend to the social systems and response mechanisms (Bruneau et al., 2003).

Based on this theoretical background, the main questions of this article are how the complex urban systems in Israel deal with severe man-made disruptions—various types of war and terrorism—and what is and should be the role of resilience in managing such dire situations. These questions will be considered here through an analysis of urban resilience in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, with reference to historical, conceptual, and organizational aspects.

The Israeli Case: Resilience in Face of a Severe Security Disruption in the Urban Domain

The Security Context

The urban population in Israel constitutes 92 percent of the total population, among the highest rates in the world. More than a third of Israel's population lives in the country's ten largest cities. Israel has four major metropolitan areas, which together are home to over 60 percent of its population. A third of Israel's population lives in the greater Tel Aviv metropolis alone.

This picture has clear security significance, given the security-related scenarios regarding the "strike on urban space" by high-trajectory weapons (Elran & Padan, 2017; Laish & Amir, 2012). The main new feature in this scenario lies in the qualitative component introduced by the precision-guided missiles, which enable the adversary to switch from its previous strategy of harassment, based primarily on unguided weaponry, to a strategy of severe disruption, based on targeting military and civilian quality targets. The Home Front Command referred to this change by stating that the new capabilities "have led to the development of a concept by which fire will not be used merely for the purposes of terrorism and intimidation, but also in order to *paralyze the home front*" (emphasis added) (Yadai, 2019).

Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah spoke of his intentions in a forthcoming conflict with Israel in an interview with the Lebanese television station *al-Manar*, when he stated, "We can attack northern Israel…but *most important is the Israeli coastal plain…from Netanya to Ashdod*. First, a large part of Israel's population is in this region… all of the country's centers are in it—the army command, government offices…*Instead of wasting the missiles on the north, we will go for this region*" (Salami, 2019, emphasis added). Presumably the Tel Aviv area will have high priority in this context. In previous conflicts, Hezbollah lacked long range ammunition to reach Tel Aviv, while Hamas did target the city in 2012 as part of its attack against Israel (Operation Pillar of Defense), in 2014 (Operation Protective Edge), and in March 2019, by launching unguided rockets that in recent years have been intercepted with great success by the Iron Dome system. Thus far, Israel's adversaries have not made use of precision-guided missiles; Hezbollah still possesses only small quantities of such weaponry. It apparently possesses several hundred non-precision rockets with a range extending to central Israel and warheads with 1200-600 pounds. Israel has regarded this threat by Hezbollah and Hamas to the home front as its main immediate security challenge since the Second Lebanon War, which caused large scale civilian paralysis in the northern part of Israel.

Israel's security concept, which developed during this period, was designed to create the conceptual framework for dealing militarily with the developing military challenge (Dekel & Orion, 2016). This was strongly reflected in the two versions of the *IDF Strategy* published by the IDF General Staff, headed by then-Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, in August 2015 and April 2018. These defining documents conceptually address the necessary responses to these threats against Israel (Elran et al., 2016), but they focus primarily on the military aspects, and far less on the means of defense. They do

not provide the required response to the civilian challenges (Elran & Padan, 2019).

The Home Front Response to a Security Disruption

The Israeli conceptual response to the threats against the home front is mainly military, comprising three interlocking components. The first is deterrence, designed to postpone the next expected military disruption by instituting and maintaining the adversaries' awareness that they had better refrain from launching an attack on the home front. The second is quick and lethal offense based on ground maneuvering and large scale use of precision fire, aimed at a decisive Israeli victory that will renew and enhance deterrence. The third is defense of the home front elements through advanced physical means, primarily the three-layer active defense system designed to safeguard both the IDF bases essential for conducting the offensive, the critical national infrastructure designed to ensure operational continuity in an emergency, and densely populated areas (in that order) (Elran, 2016). As stated in the minutes of the Knesset Subcommittee for the Examination of Home Front Preparedness on May 15, 2018 regarding the local authorities in emergency scenarios, the government has established a plan for sheltering 105 critical infrastructure facilities, 50 of them in the first stage. As of now, this process has been completed for 10 facilities, and another 19 are in the advanced planning stages.

The Israeli approach to the response regarding threats to the home front is questionable on two counts. The first, based on Israel's experience in the four recent conflicts against Hezbollah and Hamas, questions the likelihood of the assumption (or the hope) on which the concept is based—that Israel can indeed achieve a quick victory against its adversaries. As to the critical question on the duration of a future conflict, the relation between the ability to achieve a quick victory and the fortitude of the civilian home front is clear. We have witnessed predictions of a short war that were proven false: the Second Lebanon War lasted 33 days; Operation Protective Edge against Hamas continued for 51 days.

The other question concerns the IDF's investment in the order of battle of the Iron Dome air defense batteries—to what extent will it be a sufficient response for protecting densely populated areas. Thus, Maj. Gen. Yoel Strick, on the occasion of his departure as Home Front commander in February 2017, suggested in an interview with Yoav Limor (Limor, 2017) that "we won't be able to intercept everything that is launched against us. Many more rockets will hit the ground than before. This means that the idea that you have a dome on your head that hermetically protects and covers you, and isolates the home front, has to change." In these circumstances, despite the goal to conclude the next round of conflict quickly, and despite the excellent capacities of Iron Dome, the other side will likely try to challenge this paradigm with its own capabilities, thus prolonging the hostilities, with broad damage to the home front.

Of particular interest in this context are remarks by the current head of the Home Front Command, Maj. Gen. Tamir Yadai: "There is a gap between the threat and the way we are currently organized in the context of the battle front and the home front…Therefore, more than ever, the IDF's performance and achievements depend to a large extent on Israel's operational continuity, and vice versa…*The ability of the civilian front to cope with emergencies has a direct and important impact on Israeli deterrence* (Yadai, 2019, emphasis added). This is a wakeup call for understanding the connection in the current defense context between the military front and the home front, because the longer the duration of the hostilities beyond what is expected, and the difficulty perforce in achieving a quick military victory, the greater will be the challenge to the home front. At the same time, difficulty and broad restriction of the operational continuity and resilience of the home front are liable to affect the IDF's ability to achieve

the expected/hoped for victory. The problem is that the home front's readiness for a large scale conflict is insufficient for the challenges expected in future conflicts. As Strick said, "On the whole, the state of home front preparedness is more than a glass half full, but it has to be clear: the next war will be an experience of a different and very challenging kind, with substantial operational disruptions." What is involved here is a very complex non-linear fabric of civilians, individuals, and communities, some of them disadvantaged, with first response organs, local authorities, civil societies, the national economy, and the relevant government ministries. In an emergency, these systems are supposed to depend on and prepare with the Home Front Command, the National Emergency Management Authority, Israel Police, and other organizations. The introduction of precision-guided missiles to the arsenal of Hezbollah (and Hamas?) is liable to prove a game-changer for the defense of the home front, as suggested by the current commander of the HFC: "Targeting barrages of projectiles together with precision-guided capacities of the adversary are expected to enable it to systematically and deliberately challenge and penetrate our air defense layers and reach quality targets with accurate missiles." Such capability enables the enemy "to think about ideas such as 'closure,' 'curfew,' and 'economic paralysis' in Israel…in order to disrupt civilian and military operational continuity and negatively affect the mindset, thus disrupting the resilience of Israeli society in the long term" (Yadai, 2019).

The City as a "Basic Building Block" in a Security Emergency

The HFC leadership is well aware that defending the home front in a future large-scale conflict is a difficult task. The challenge consists of simultaneous local disruptions in a large number of locations, which makes it very difficult to provide the necessary rapid and quality response. Over the years, the HFC has devised a well-ordered doctrine regarding home front defense, to include provisions for what must be done by whom in order to implement the approach. However, in this context it is understood that one of the main obstacles to preparation for a vast emergency on the home front is the absence of legislation in Israel addressing the central question of responsibility and accountability in the sphere of emergency management (Elran & Altshuler, 2012; 2013). In this context, Yadai writes that "the separation between the agencies preparing for earthquakes and those preparing the forces to operate in an emergency will create total chaos" (Yadai, 2018). In this legal and bureaucratic void, as stated in HFC documents as early as 2008,

> The local authority, in military terms, is the "basic unit" whose functioning and support are of supreme importance in an emergency…in order to enable it to function independently and effectively in an emergency. The expectation from the local authority is to function even in the most severe circumstances, while providing a response to the great and small distresses liable to occur. The local leadership is expected to demonstrate fortitude (i.e., the ability to manage the crisis in a competent way while limiting damage to facilitate rapid recovery), determination, patience, and imagination in finding adequate solutions for people whose daily routine has been disrupted (Home Front Command, 2008).

This raises the question of what it means to expect the local authority to function independently and effectively in an emergency. The official answer relies on a number of sources: the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Defense, the HFC, the National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), and the Center of Local Authorities in Israel.

a. A 2009 HFC document states that "the main purpose of the local authority in an

emergency is to maintain the emergency routine for its residents, while serving as the main interface between the population and all of the state agencies operating in its territory" (Home Front Command, 2009).

b. In a 2010 document, NEMA states that "the local authority constitutes a governing body that provides services and products to its residents in order to maintain an orderly fabric of life…while the head of the local authority…is responsible to the residents in ordinary times and in an emergency… continuously, as in the transformation from routine to an emergency" (NEMA, 2010).
c. A 2013 HFC document suggests that "the local authority is responsible for making all of the preparations necessary to ensure its proper operation in an emergency, and to guarantee essential services for its residents in an emergency. It is also responsible for issuing orders that will ensure that individuals and the community are prepared" (including issues of protection and shelters) (Home Front Command, 2013).
d. A 2017 document of the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Defense (NEMA) asserts that "the local authority is the basic building block in providing a response in an emergency…the HFC is responsible for preparing the local authority for an emergency, without derogating from the responsibility of other government ministries…[while] in peaceful times, the HFC, in cooperation with NEMA, provides the local authorities with a reference scenario, on whose basis the local authority devises a plan for preparing for an emergency" (Prime Minister's Office round table, 2017).

Since quite a few of the local authorities have trouble fulfilling their needs in ordinary times and even more so in an emergency, two important questions arise: what is the function of the state in managing an emergency in a local authority, and what is the role of the state and its agencies (the HFC? another organ?) if a local authority collapses as the result of a severe security or other disruption.

These guidelines indicate that the local authority has ostensibly been assigned a key role in preparing for an emergency, managing it, and conducting the subsequent necessary reconstruction and recovery. At the same time, the guidelines listed above do not stipulate in binding fashion what is the local authority's responsibility and what are the legal obligations of the head of the local authority in an emergency (not just a security-related emergency). The difficulty in implementing these definitions becomes greater, not only because the 257 different municipalities, local councils, and regional councils in Israel differ greatly from each other, but also because there are major differences within each of the local governing systems. There are major differences between the large municipalities and the small and medium-sized ones, between strong and weak local authorities, between Jewish and Arab local authorities, and between the sense of independence and functional autonomy of each local authority head. In any case, an indication of the dismal state of the local authorities in an emergency is the lack of a national long range plan for ensuring the preparedness of the local authorities for an emergency, as stated by the HFC commander to the Knesset Subcommittee for the Examination of Home Front Preparedness on May 15, 2018. This is the key to a local authority's functioning in an emergency. Since quite a few of the local authorities have trouble fulfilling their needs in ordinary times and even more so in an emergency, two important questions arise: what is the function of the state in managing an emergency in a local authority, and what is the role of the state and its agencies (the HFC? another organ?) if a local authority collapses as the result of a severe security or other disruption. Amir Yahav, head of the doctrine and exercises

division in the Ministry of Defense, raised these questions in a letter to the Knesset Research and Information Center, dated November 23, 2016 (the letter appears in a study of preparations and readiness for earthquakes in the local authorities). In the Municipalities Ordinance, there are a number of provisions making the mayor personally responsible for carrying out the provisions of the Ordinance, including the duty to prepare for and operate the emergency economy. In addition, as the chairman of the Emergency Economy Committee, one of the functions of the head of the local authority is to set the goals and priorities for operating the various systems in an emergency. Neither NEMA nor the HFC has legal authority over the heads of the local authority that do not fulfill their duty in this matter. There is no adequate system-wide solution for these questions, or an authorized, up-to-date, and public document describing the state of the local authorities' preparedness for an emergency.

It can thus be concluded that the cities in Israel do not necessarily represent the optimal model for the generic urban system, because each of them is situated in a different environment and circumstances and at a different stage of development. In order to analyze the city as a complex system and the effect of its characteristics on urban resilience, the next section looks at Tel Aviv-Jaffa as a case study.

Tel Aviv as a "Basic Building Block" in an Emergency

Tel Aviv-Jaffa (TA) will serve as a case study of the concept of urban emergency (Tel Aviv-Jaffa municipality, Center for Economic and Social Research, 2019; Hasson, 2017). TA was chosen because it is the urban core of the home front in Israel, and can therefore serve as a model for other local authorities in preparing for an emergency, even if like all other cities, it has its own singular characteristics. This section comprises three parts: the first sketches the special historical background of TA; the second addresses the conceptual and practical patterns promoted by the TA municipality in preparation for an emergency; and the third presents the resilience concept as it is reflected in the city. From a conceptual and theoretical standpoint, there is a close connection between the three parts, because the historical background shapes the city's threat mindset and the response to it, while these in turn affect the doctrine of managing severe defense disruptions. Together they constitute the basis for applying the resilience concept as a key component in dealing with hazards and disruptions.

Historical Background

Tel Aviv, which by the late 1940s was already the main metropolitan city in Israel, suffered repeated attacks by Egyptian and other aircraft on military and civilian targets in the War of Independence. These attacks saw 172 soldiers and civilians killed and 321 injured (out of 213,000 civilians, then comprising approximately one third of the country's population). In this challenging situation, classes in the elementary schools were halted, the opening of the beaches was postponed, and there was a sharp drop in the number of people attending movie theaters and spending time in cafes. The general atmosphere, however, featured a degree of complacency, especially in comparison with besieged Jerusalem and other communities regarded as being in the frontline. This attitude was described by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion as "steadfastness" on the part of the residents, comparable to that of Londoners during the Blitz and Russians in the "Great Patriotic War," both regarded as exemplary models of societal behavior in wartime. According to Ben-Gurion, "Superiority in the air gives the enemy a great advantage, but our public is not afraid…it is impossible not to note its steadfastness…I was astonished by the self-control our public exhibited" (Naor, 2009).

Greater TA experienced another severe defense disruption at the time of the Iraqi Scud missiles attacks during the First Gulf War

(January-February 1991). The lessons of 1991 can be summarized in five main points. First, the initial shock affected the behavior of civilians and the feeling of anxiety. On the other hand, the expectations that chemical warheads would be used against Israel, which gave rise to a complex improvisational measure at the national and personal level (sealed rooms, the order to drink water, gas masks) did not materialize. Second, the initial number of casualties was very low, even if in retrospect, the number of fatalities reached 95 recognized as victims of hostile action, mostly from heart failure or stroke, or from misuse of the gas masks (Bar-Mocha, 2001). Third, most of the city's residents remained relatively calm during the attacks. A total of 1,059 people went to hospital emergency rooms, 22 percent of them as the result of a hit, most of them during the first stage of the offensive. A clear process of adjustment and learning took place among those hospitalized. Most of those exposed to traumatic events were sufficiently resilient to overcome the experience without long-term adjustment difficulties (Neria et al., 1998). Fourth, many people left the city at night and returned to work during the day. They were labeled "deserters" by then-TA Mayor Shlomo (Chich) Lahat. Today, this would be perceived as a natural coping reaction to a disturbing constraint, and a flexible response indicative of social resilience on the part of individuals and the community. Fifth, following the lack of advance municipal preparedness at the time, subsequent lessons were learned concerning municipal organizations that today serve as a basis for the civil defense system.

Past cases show the success of TA and its residents in overcoming difficult security threats, based on the military's role in defeating the threats, improvisation of local civilian responses, reasonable operational continuity, and above all, the demonstrated capacity to bounce back rapidly and maintain growth in the long term. Together these form the dominant trend characterizing TA—a continued trajectory not halted by security disruptions. All of this reflects a high degree of societal resilience in the city up until now.

The most recent period of security disruptions experienced in TA involved 22 suicide attacks by Palestinian terrorists between 1996 and the end of the second intifada (2005); 116 people were killed in these deadly attacks. No study was found that analyzed the effects of these terrorist attacks on the city and its residents. In the absence of such research, the following main conclusions can be drawn from a study on the effect of the second intifada on Israeli society (Elran, 2006). The first is that the intifada failed in its drive to undermine the stability of Israeli society, which was consistent through most of the indicators examined in the study. The second conclusion is that in its immediate responses, the Israeli public demonstrated sensitivity to terrorist actions; these responses featured clear and immediate expressions of fear and anxiety. Usually, however, acute stress was relieved shortly after the incidents, and public conduct reverted to normal patterns. Second, the flexibility in the public responses showed a strong coping capacity. The third conclusion is that even during the worst periods, optimism prevailed, and the public demonstrated that it can withstand the terrorist assaults and expressed its hope for a better future for the individual and society. It was thus concluded that at that dire period, Israeli society manifested a high level of survivability and significant capacity of steadfastness, indicating high national resilience. Even the negative effects of the lethal terrorism during the five years of the second intifada on the Jewish public's positions concerning national security issues was far from unequivocal. If the intifada's horrific events had any real effect on public attitude, it was generally short term, mostly ebbing as the intifada subsided (Ben Meir, 2010). Isolated indications also point to the existence of this significant trend in Tel Aviv. For example, the data (Tel Aviv-Jaffa municipality,

2017) regarding the number of visits to cultural institutions in the city since the intifada erupted (2000) shows a steady upward trend in visits to museums and theaters, with a temporary decline in 2009-2010, followed by a return to the ongoing increase.

Past cases show the success of TA and its residents in overcoming difficult security threats, based on the military's role in defeating the threats, improvisation of local civilian responses, reasonable operational continuity, and above all, the demonstrated capacity to bounce back rapidly and maintain growth in the long term. Together these form the dominant trend characterizing TA—a continued trajectory not halted by security disruptions. All of this reflects a high degree of societal resilience in the city up until now.

Preparing the Municipal System in Tel Aviv-Jaffa for an Emergency

Since the second intifada ended in 2005, TA has enjoyed a long period of relative security tranquility. Nevertheless, the municipality, according to its website, has advanced its preparations for a severe security event. In a September 12, 2019 interview, David Aharoni, director of TA's Security and Emergency Services Branch, outlined the city's preparations (as published in the "Tel Aviv-Jaffa: A Smart City—From Peacetime to Emergency, Preparation for an Emergency" municipal booklet) for a future emergency as follows:

a. According to the leading municipal directive for an emergency, the municipality is to continue providing the same services as in ordinary times, with an emphasis on giving the public information and guidance; absorbing evacuees when necessary; ensuring the availability of water; providing essential services; taking care of vulnerable groups and people at risk; and assisting in rescue operations. This directive reflects a concept of active and comprehensive municipal involvement in an emergency; providing information before, during, and after an emergency; and monitoring risks and vulnerable sectors.
b. Following lessons learned from past wars and terrorist attacks, a professional municipal apparatus has been established, with the task of providing residents and visitors with essential services in an emergency, caring for them, and returning quickly to routine life, in coordination with the national emergency agencies.
c. The organizational structure of the municipality in an emergency is based on a municipal war room (including a command system with advanced remote monitoring capacity, and a substitute war room in Jaffa) adjacent to the HFC's district war room, teams of forward command, and seven staff units (welfare, education, community, information, administration, engineering, and operations). These units operate with 25 professional branches in various spheres, and with seven community regions responsible to provide immediate support for residents in an emergency.
d. In building reinforcement and shelters, the municipality is geared to provide professional assistance for family shelters for about 50 percent of the residential units; 240 public bomb shelters; 100 renovated multi-purpose school bomb shelters; and 100 underground parking lots with 4 million square feet to accommodate up to two million people (designated mainly for non-residents). The municipal apparatus also plans to upgrade schools for bomb emergencies, in accordance with the HFC standard.
e. Exercises according to an annual plan designed to improve urban preparedness for an emergency are conducted by the municipal apparatus in cooperation with relevant external agencies, such as the HFC and NEMA. These exercises include the participation of residents, particularly of school pupils. The municipality strives to develop mechanisms for emergencies

based on the patterns of conduct in routine times. At the same time, while TA organizes for emergencies in the common framework practiced by other towns in Israel, it also designs unique features in reference to some of the specific demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the city. These include mechanisms designed to deal with the social gaps between wealthier groups and disadvantaged groups. Included in the latter are groups like the Arabs living in Jaffa and the many foreign workers (constituting approximately 10 percent of the city's residents). In addition, TA serves as a center of employment and leisure for more than a million non-residents. These have direct significance in an emergency, as the city's leadership seeks to maintain municipal and metropolitan operational continuity even in conditions of severe disruptions.

f. Public mindset: Notwithstanding these extensive preparations, TA also features a great degree of complacency, evidenced by a low level of prior personal and public awareness of hazards. This results in less than sufficient individual and family preparedness, reflected also in a tendency to rely on the municipal authorities and the HFC to provide the necessary response in an emergency. The municipality also prefers not to give much conspicuous public presence to its emergency preparations. This is a known fault. In the past there were some attempts to deal with this challenge by initiating proactive advances (such as a "Resilience for People" program) to make residents, community leaders, neighborhood committees, activists, and volunteers more familiar with and better prepared for emergencies. However, these programs failed to stir the public's interest and participation. Consequently, and based on past experience, the municipality works on the assumption that when an emergency occurs, the public will rapidly awaken and function at a reasonable level, even in the absence of adequate advance preparation. It is unclear to what extent this hope will be borne out in the event of severe disruptions.

g. Economic operational continuity depends to a large extent on non-municipal components, such as electricity, public transportation, communications, and the private sector. The municipality also has limited influence on critical spheres, such as food supply, consumer goods, fuel, and others, and therefore intends to design a basic plan for ensuring continuity in the supply of goods and services from the outside. At the same time, difficulties arise in the advancement of this needed process, due to the dependence on numerous external parties. Inability to complete this process is liable to cause difficulties in this critical sphere, and certainly in the event of prolonged disruptions. If and when this plan does materialize, the municipality will have a redundancy resource in an emergency to facilitate operational continuity in a prolonged disruption. Another critical question in this context is the provision of services that depend on digital networks, which are liable to be threatened by a disruption of the electrical system (Weinstock & Elran, 2016) or large-scale cyberattacks. There is a major gap in this area at the municipality, which should be addressed at the national level as well, as this is a challenge not restricted to TA. For example, as recently as September 2019 the Ministry of National Infrastructure, Energy, and Water Resources issued a tender (no. 2019/20) for consulting services in the sphere of preparations for an emergency, cyber, and operational continuity for its systems. Nor is the municipality responsible for the continuity of public services in areas such as health and education, or—generally speaking—for making the decisions on the initiation of an emergency situation, or for early warning on rockets attacks on its territory or regarding any other type of security disruption.

These issues brought forth by the municipality highlight the considerable systemic obstacles to preparing the city for an emergency. The assertion that the local authority is the "basic building block" in managing an emergency ostensibly makes it the main governing organ responsible in an emergency, at least vis-à-vis its residents. In practice, however, regardless of how strong, well-established, organized, and prepared for an emergency a local authority is, such as Tel Aviv and others in Israel, its actual capacity to provide a complete response to severe hazards, especially prolonged ones, is limited. Beyond this, it is difficult to assess credibly the connection between Tel Aviv's preliminary preparation for a crisis and its actual ability to meet future security risks. Both past experience and current systemic preparations do not necessarily indicate how the city, the municipality, the residents, and others present will respond to a future conflict, which is likely to involve an unprecedentedly high level of risk.

Functions of the Local Authority in Promoting and Preserving Resilience: The Case of Tel Aviv-Jaffa

The TA municipality recently joined the 100 Resilient Cities international network. The basic principles of the resilience concept in Tel Aviv reflect the expanded concept that goes beyond a mere response to disruptions, toward perceiving resilience as a lever to handle the challenges facing the city in the 21st century, including immigration, climate change, and a city branded as one that is positioned on the track of growth and prosperity. These principles were incorporated in the strategic plan for Tel Aviv-Jaffa—Urban Resilience in June 2019. The expanded concept of resilience was reflected in the introduction by the mayor to the publication of the urban resilience concept:

> The reality and the processes around us pose such challenges to the city that require *advance preparation*…TA still needs to stand in the front…regarding urbanism in Israel…in this situation, it is imperative to confront challenges such as density… multiculturalism, and immigration crises…economic gaps, social segregation, alienation… and extreme climate change. The resilience plan for Tel Aviv…offers *solutions that connect* residents to each other, to local businesses, and local infrastructure. These connections are designed to enhance trust between the different groups, and to generate *new opportunities—social and economic—while improving the quality of life for the residents*…in order to facilitate joint alignments to stand up to the challenges…we are submitting…practical proposals… *for connecting population groups and communities—at ordinary times and in emergencies* (Tel Aviv-Jaffa municipality, 2019, emphasis added).

These emphases represent the objective of strengthening social capital, which is the foundation of societal resilience (Aldrich, 2012), as suggested by the expanded approach presented in the theoretical preface. Integrated and comprehensive systemic planning, based on these principles, is a basis of a policy that ensures—assuming careful long-term implementation—a robust society with a high level of resilience that can better withstand disruptions, challenges, and perils of various types, including severe security risks.

In this framework, one can see the priority assigned by the TA municipality to enhancement of social resilience in general and increased trust between the Arab residents of Jaffa and the municipality as part of its vision (December 2017), through cooperation and enrichment of the community fabric, and the social order in particular. Trust in the individual's independent capabilities, trust in other people, and trust in

the social and municipal systems are among the components of social capital that contribute to a resilient community.

This expanded concept also affects and is reflected in the messages appearing in the vision of the municipal Social Services Administration. Inter alia, it refers to development of personal, family, and community resilience, as stated by Sharon Blum Melamed, head of the municipality's Welfare, Public Health, and Human Administration, in an interview conducted on December 4, 2019. Here again, the seminal idea is to improve the quality of life in the city, including social justice and equal opportunities for all of its residents, thereby also furthering societal resilience in the face of security and other disruptions. This systemic concept also extends to other municipal units, such as the Education Administration and the Community Administration, and was recently translated into the particular platform that links resilience to the municipality's preparation for an emergency. A 2019 document (unpublished) written by the Security and Emergency Services Branch contains the following guidelines:

a. Resilience begins with attention to the residents' needs and the connection with them, adequate management by the municipality, and public order. Community strengthening, through creation of a cohesive and supportive society, is also essential. As part of this concept, the municipality is now creating an administration to empower the local community and improve the connection with the residents.
b. Another level is perceived to be the continuous preparation for an emergency—creating effective interfaces between the municipality's units, the government ministries, and the security forces. Activity should be ongoing and cyclical.
c. Public activity should be continued in an emergency in accordance with the emerging specific risks, thereby delivering an important message of coping and capability and the expectation that routine life can go on during an emergency.
d. There should be cooperation with other agencies dealing with emergencies, assistance provided to the rescue units, information and support disseminated to the population, lessons learned, and dialogues conducted, while taking concerted action to restore the city's ordinary life.
e. There should be ongoing learning from rapid dramatic changes in the reality of the city and its surroundings, while setting a clear policy to meet needs, even in conditions of uncertainty.

This outline of principles, which the TA municipality is trying to implement, still without the necessary synchronized organizational envelope, corresponds to the principal elements presented in the literature as central ingredients in urban resilience, in accordance with the resilient city model. At the same time, considerable additional progress is needed in order to achieve the level of resilience required by foreseeable risks, even if the expanded (revised) urban resilience concept already creates a basis for success in future severe security challenges. It appears that the still missing element is the rational construction and careful operation of an integrated municipal apparatus closely connecting the preparations for a security—or other—emergency with the enhancement of societal resilience, which can possibly be better achieved in collaboration with the national government agencies and civil society. Such a connection is likely to create the necessary synergy between "hard" inputs (in the sphere of organization, infrastructure, and the connection with non-municipal bodies) and "soft" inputs (promoting individual, community, and urban resilience, including the recruitment of groups the civil society). Such an integrated system, which is still far from completion, should perform according to municipal policy, in a way that it will be ready to function before the next major crisis occurs.

Conclusions and Systemic Recommendations

This article analyzes the nexus between urbanism and emergency security situations, and the response of urban resilience. The study focuses on how the complex, dynamic, and multidimensional municipal system in Israel manages severe man-made disruptions—war and diverse types of terrorism—and what role the resilience concept plays in this context. The theoretical chapter presents a generic framework of the city as a complex system facilitating its continued existence and the implementation of its diverse functions, even in conditions of severe crises and emergency security situations. The characteristics of the local authority influence the way the resilience concept is applied in practice, since the conceptual framework must be filled with different content in different cities, including in Israel, according to the local vision and the extent of the capacity of the local authority to further it.

TA is classified as one of the cities in Israel with the most robust preparedness for an emergency. As a likely target for a large-scale missile attack, it has taken steps to integrate municipal investments in construction of a response system with an expanded and updated concept of enhancing resilience. The aim of this integration is to create a basis for devising a synergetic system that will facilitate a reasonable level of disaster management during a large-scale challenging security disruption. Such a system, however, is designed to deal not only with emergency security events, but also with other kinds of crises resulting from natural disasters. The tragic death of a young couple in TA's Hatikvah neighborhood when they were trapped in a flooded elevator during heavy rains in early 2020 illustrates that the construction of such a system is no guarantee for optimal integrated action by the authorities vis-à-vis the diverse communities and residents in the city. It appears that the municipality was not properly prepared for possible floods in the city, even though such floods occurred occasionally even before Israel gained independence (e.g., in 1935), especially in the poorer neighborhoods of southern TA. Furthermore, the municipality should also take into account the methods employed by national agencies, such as rescue units, for which the municipality is not directly responsible, but on whose services it depends. For example, an interior investigation by the National Fire & Rescue Authority found that at the time when the couple was trapped in the elevator, the call center received thousands of calls, but could handle only 200 (Yarkechy, 2020).

Israel has no orderly and accepted defense concept in the critical sphere of the home front. Most of Israel's conceptual management models of this matter are from a military perspective, while the civilian dimension is addressed only marginally in both the national and local frameworks as well as in actual force buildup. Such a comprehensive civilian doctrine should be formulated, with the local authority and societal resilience model placed at its center. The local authority should be assigned the formal responsibility and the required resources to exercise this responsibility in an emergency.

In conclusion, several main issues are raised here for national consideration in preparing for a future severe and prolonged emergency security scenario, as well as conclusions and systemic recommendations:

a. Israel has no orderly and accepted defense concept in the critical sphere of the home front. Most of Israel's conceptual management models of this matter are from a military perspective, while the civilian dimension is addressed only marginally in both the national and local frameworks as well as in actual force buildup. Such a comprehensive civilian doctrine should be formulated, with the local authority and societal resilience model placed at its center. The local authority should be assigned

the formal responsibility and the required resources to exercise this responsibility in an emergency.

b. Every local authority is a unique microcosm. Communities in Israel differ greatly from each other. This is also true within the cities, some of which—like Tel Aviv-Jaffa—are highly heterogenic. Every local authority, therefore, needs to specify its own needs, including for security and civilian emergencies, based on known basic principles and its own characteristics.

c. Local authorities usually give preference to current and immediate needs, which they always regard as urgent. The system-wide attitude toward (often unfamiliar) future scenarios, which may not materialize in the near future or during the term of a particular serving mayor, requires distributive leadership that foresees future processes, is aware of the public's needs, and internalizes them in a rational manner. The societal resilience approach, whose main construct is presented here from TA's perspective, illustrates how systemic municipal strategy, aiming at building a flourishing community, can also provide a response to urgent needs, to include trust and linkage between agencies and people. It can give rise to an urban resilience fabric that will greatly improve the city's capacity to cope successfully with the ominous threats of a future disruption, including a dire security event.

d. Public documents portray the local authority as the "basic building block" in the defense of the home front. However, as of now, the practical meaning of this principle is unclear. It is not supported by binding legislation, budgetary allocations, continual government control and monitoring, and other measures needed in order to implement it. In particular, the question of the attitude toward disadvantaged local authorities unable to muster the necessary capabilities by themselves should be seriously addressed. Some local authorities are more capable of taking care of themselves than others. Local authorities that are strong in routine times are usually also robust in managing a crisis. Some are blessed with leaderships capable of devoting focused and adequate attention to the challenges of emergency; too many others, especially at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale, remain marginalized and subject to daily pressure. A functional long term national plan is therefore required to enhance the ability of every local authority, according to its risk scenarios, the characteristics of its residents, and its own capabilities.

e. Even the more effective local authorities with better preparedness for an emergency are liable to find themselves subject to a challenging crisis with dire consequences in the form of damage and casualties. The local authority has only limited resources to protect itself and its residents. The IDF is responsible for most of the defensive measures against security scenarios. The IDF's effect on the extent of the damage and the enemy's ability to inflict damage serve as the central factor.

f. For this reason, the local authority's main contribution is the enhancement of societal resilience that will make it possible, given severe and prolonged security disruptions, to maintain a reasonable degree of emergency routine and thereafter to bounce back rapidly. This is no trivial expectation. Although it was evident in the past that the Israeli public is capable of mobilizing and uniting at times of security distress and of demonstrating functional resilience, it must be remembered that every disruption is local, and thus the response is commonly local. Consequently, resilience too must be tested from a local perspective. It should therefore be fostered at the local level according to familiar guidelines, whose essence is strengthening the local social capital. This should be the

main role of the local authority in preparing for an emergency.

g. Hence, it should be ensured that each of the local authorities designs and executes a long-range multifaceted resilience plan, in line with its needs and qualifications, that is well integrated with all of the relevant agencies in the city, and is supported differentially by the government and the HFC in both planning and execution.
h. The article presents an example of a model for a local authority in promoting societal resilience and preparedness for an emergency. There are other local authorities with other models that stand out in this sphere. Learning from success is a powerful tool that needs to be used in organizing a viable network of local authorities, perhaps through the Ministry of the Interior and the Union of Local Authorities in Israel, to serve as centers for learning and joint implementation for emergencies.
i. One of the most obvious defects in public preparation in Israel for a security crisis involves inadequate awareness. The indifference and the assumption that difficulties will work themselves out detract from the minimum level of preparation required from the public. The assumption that it will be possible to shift from the daily routine to an emergency immediately and effectively is not well founded, and depends greatly on the extent of the crisis. A rational national messaging plan that will present to the public the severity of the security threats should therefore be promoted. Such a plan should state what the individual, family, and community can do in order to cope successfully with these threats. It is possible, and necessary, to add to this deployment of volunteer groups, such as teenagers, who will be trained to function in an emergency in their neighborhood.

Theory provides appropriate models for furthering societal resilience as an important lever for dealing with security disruptions at the municipal level. This article presents a rather successful Israeli model, and there are others. Every local authority can choose the right model for itself. As always, the main benchmark is to be found in the sphere of implementation, which is based on awareness and mindfulness of the issues; understanding of the relevant threat, whether security or otherwise, that requires informed advance municipal preparation as part of its principal tasks; and translation of this understanding into relevant planning, and especially strict implementation. This article was written before the COVID-19 outbreak, but its principal concepts, arguments, and recommendations apply to responses to a pandemic and any other major disruption.

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Note

1 The article focuses on emergency security events. Most of the insights also apply to natural disasters, as presented in the theoretical section.

Integrating the Counterintelligence Discipline into Israel's Security Concept

Avner Barnea

In recent years, as terrorism has evolved into a global threat, a debate has arisen in Israel and in other democratic countries on the role of counterintelligence. However, discussion and thinking in Israel on the subject of counterintelligence has not received the attention it deserves in academic research and the public discourse on security compared to other national intelligence issues, and the topic remains in the shadows and almost unknown to the public. Israel's security concept does not address internal security challenges and the intelligence challenge from internal threats, and indeed, the internal dimension is not reflected in various reports about the security concept. However, Israel's unique internal security issues and the growing weight of counterintelligence in security decisions requires analysis as to if and how counterintelligence can become an official component of the security concept in response to existing and future security requirements. The article reviews various aspects of Israel's security concept, discusses the nature of the counterintelligence discipline and its implementation in Israel, examines the situation in other democratic countries, and offers a framework for thinking that integrates counterintelligence into Israel's security concept.

Keywords: counterintelligence, security concept, Israel, national security, internal security, Israel Security Agency

Introduction

Israel's security concept has undergone little change since it was shaped by David Ben-Gurion in the 1950s, despite the many military campaigns the state has experienced. While the foundation for Israel's security concept remains the IDF's strength and its ability to fulfill its missions, Israel does not appear to have a security concept that is updated, defined, and well-formulated. According to Gadi Eisenkot and Gabi Siboni (2019), bringing the security concept up to date is not highly ranked on either the public or academic / research agenda.

This article considers a particular element that is absent from the security concept: how should counterintelligence[1] be integrated into the security concept? Israel's unique internal security problems and the weight of counterintelligence in security decisions necessitate serious thought and debate on if and how counterintelligence can be part of Israel's security concept in response to existing and future security requirements. For this purpose, the article reviews aspects of Israel's security concept and the nature of the counterintelligence discipline and its implementation in Israel, and offers a framework for its integration into Israel's security concept.

Counterintelligence and the Israeli Perspective

In Israel, as in other Western democracies, there is a state intelligence service that is responsible for counterintelligence, namely, the Israel Security Agency (ISA). In the early 1950s, the ISA was made responsible for counterintelligence activity: counterterrorism, counter-espionage, and counter-subversion.

This was validated legally with the passing of the ISA Law in 2002 (under the name of the General Security Services Law), in which clauses 7(a) and (b) state: "The Service shall be in charge of the protection of State security and the order and institutions of the democratic regime against threats of terrorism, sabotage, subversion, espionage and disclosure of State secrets." Other responsibilities were included in the Law, such as: "protecting persons, information and places...determining directives on security classification for positions and offices in the public service and in other bodies...establishing protection practices for bodies determined by the Government" (General Security Service Law, 2002). A comparative analysis shows that among counterintelligence agencies in Western democracies, the ISA enjoys the broadest scope of responsibilities (Barnea, 2017).

An important term in the ISA law is "subversion," which is not defined sufficiently, leaving the door open to wide interpretation by the ISA and granting it the independence to define individuals and/or organizations as subversive, without authorization from any other body. This in turn allows the use of covert tools provided to the ISA in order to protect state security, including wiretapping (without judicial oversight), and relatively free access to communications data in order to determine their legitimacy. Even though the ISA deals primarily with counterterrorism and counter-espionage, the definition of subversion has been a topic of debate due to the danger that the regime could be active in this field, via the ISA, in a way that is contrary to a democratic regime. For example, this was the case of the Wadi Salib events of 1959, when demonstrations and riots erupted in Haifa and around the country against a backdrop of ethnic discrimination and deprivation. At the request of the Prime Minister, the ISA took charge of intelligence "for the purpose of preventing terrorist activities and hooliganism" and operated some 50 informants in 35 communities in order to restore public order (Spiegel, 2017). Despite the issue being subject to police responsibility for public disturbances and not one of subversion (which is under ISA responsibility), the ISA was required to deal with it at the instruction of its direct government superior—the Prime Minister.

In view of the ambiguity regarding the term "subversion" as it appears in the 2002 ISA Law, in 2009 the ISA and the Justice Ministry were

called on to define it following a petition to the Supreme Court submitted by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, which claimed that the lack of a definition in the ISA Law leaves too much open to interpretation. This is the definition that was proposed and then accepted: "An activity, even a nonviolent one, which has covert aspects, arising from ideological motives or the interests of foreign parties, the purpose or result of which is a violation of the law or the endangering of state security, or harming the democratic regime or its institutions or harming other state interests vital to the national security of the state as determined by the ISA Law" (Margalit, 2018). This important clarification, which *prima facie* does not necessarily include an element of illegality, was made in a letter sent by ISA head Yuval Diskin in April 2007 to the Attorney General (Nizri, 2007), but was not updated in the ISA Law, where the definition of "subversion" remains vague and therefore subject to different interpretations. The change was not brought to the attention of the public, and the ISA was forced to reveal it only in response to a petition to the High Court.

The ambiguity regarding the nature of "subversion" and the role of the ISA in this context returned for debate in the Supreme Court in 2017 (HC 13/5277) following a petition filed by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel against the ISA's practice of summoning political activists for warning meetings. At the heart of the hearing was the fundamental question: What is the role of a covert security organization in a democratic country, and what are the powers granted to the ISA to deal with "subversion." The court accepted the ISA's fundamental position that summoning civilians to informal conversations on grounds of fear of "subversive" activity may be legitimate in certain circumstances. However, it did set various restrictions on use of that authority, primarily, when concern arises regarding illegal activity that may compromise national security. The court also conditioned this use of power on the ISA's making clear to the person summoned that questioning is completely voluntary and that he/she is not bound to show up for it.

Interestingly, the British counterintelligence agency (MI5) does not explicitly operate against subversion and the word does not appear in legislation. Rather, the Official Secrets Act (1989) forbids operations intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political, industrial, or violent means. However, it does not make use of the term subversion, but rather explains the concept, most likely to avoid too wide an interpretation of this term, which could be abused by the regime.

The ISA Law (2002) was passed in the Knesset while the public was preoccupied with the terrorist attacks of the second intifada. The subject did not awaken public debate and Knesset members questioned about it admitted that it was not at the top of their agenda at the time (66 MKs took part in the vote: 47 voted in favor, 16 against, and 3 abstained). While in the 1980s there were events that threw the public spotlight on the ISA (such as the Bus 300 affair, which was a formative event), on the whole its operations remained in the shadows and almost unknown to the public. An examination of online surveillance conducted by the ISA revealed fundamental questions that necessitate regulation. Cahane and Shany note that there is no regulation of fundamental issues in this field such as "sweeping communications collection," and there is lack of transparency, only partial judicial oversight, and the same for parliamentary oversight. The researchers offered a number of recommendations to rectify the situation (Cahane & Shany, 2019).

Following the release of the documentary *The Gatekeepers* (2012), a film that aroused great interest, a book *The Gatekeepers: Six Heads of the Shin Bet Speak* followed (Moreh, 2014; in English, 2018, *The Gatekeepers: Inside Israel Internal Security Agency*). The book takes a wider view than the film, with six senior officials providing their perspective on intelligence and internal security in Israel. The book focuses on first hand witness accounts by six heads

of the ISA interviewing for a documentary for the first time since the establishment of the state. It reviews ISA conduct from the Six Day War onward, from the extermination of terror cells that sprung up following the capture of the territories, through to the first intifada, the Oslo Accords, the Rabin assassination, and the targeted killing policy of the second intifada. The cumulative effect of the statements coming from these senior figures was that Israel's policy is driven by narrow tactical thinking and not by a comprehensive strategy. Therefore, consideration of the integration of the ISA into the national security concept is absent.

Israel does not have an official text of a security concept. Unlike Israel, in the United States, each incoming president publishes a new, updated National Security Strategy that serves as the guiding foundation for security strategy and military strategy, from which security policy and an approach to the use of force are derived.

This is hardly surprising. As Dror Moreh, who wrote the book and directed the film, notes: The heads of the ISA "have always been at the forefront of operations, party to all secrets, close to prime ministers…their opinions and assessments have affected government policy in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip more than anyone else's" (Moreh, 2014). So when did they have time to think about integrating the ISA into the national security concept?! Avraham Shalom referred in a roundabout manner to demands that could have come from Israel's leaders, saying, "We didn't have strategy, just tactics" (Moreh, 2014). In other words, the expectation of Israel's leaders was to solve security issues at a tactical/local level; and debates did not take place at a leadership level with the participation of the heads of the ISA regarding expectations from the ISA as to policy toward the Palestinians in the medium and long terms.

Formulation of the Security Concept and the Security Discourse

Israel does not have an official text of a security concept. Unlike Israel, in the United States, each incoming president publishes a new, updated National Security Strategy that serves as the guiding foundation for security strategy and military strategy, from which security policy and an approach to the use of force are derived.

What has become accepted as Israel's security concept was formulated in 1953 by David Ben-Gurion, who would later write: "In our day, wars are waged between peoples, without any distinction between soldier and civilian. Today's war is total, and any community without exception may find itself under attack. The men will be in their combat units, and, I hope, will not sit in their homes and towns, but will go out in our military for offensive operations, crushing the enemy in its own territory. And we cannot assume that the enemy will lay idle; it will attack our towns" (Ben-Gurion, 1955). He added: "We have a unique military problem—we are few and our enemies are many. So how have we stood firm until now and how will we do so in the future? Only through our qualitative edge and our moral and intellectual superiority" (Ben-Gurion, 1955).

In August 1953, Ben-Gurion, who was Prime Minister and Defense Minister at the time, withdrew from politics and devoted his time to study Israel's security needs. He wrote: "This examination requires one to forget what one knows, drop one's prejudices, and see everything anew" (Ben-Gurion, 1955). The result was an 18-page document that presented a complete security doctrine that was brought before the government and to this day constitutes the basic outline of Israel's security concept. Among its tenets are the need to take the war to enemy territory, the IDF as a militia army (in that the bulk of its force consists of reserves), and the need to take the initiative immediately at the beginning of the war (Harkabi, 1999). The security concept dealt with the threat of an attack by an Arab coalition on several fronts

at the same time, and finding the necessary response to remove this threat. Ben-Gurion's security concept is not limited to just the military, but also incorporates distinct internal issues such as society, economy, science, and technology (Shelah, 2015).

The security concept has three main pillars: deterrence, strategic warning, and decision (Bar-Joseph, 2000). The approach to use of military force derived from the doctrine is that Israel must strive for short wars and quickly transfer the war to enemy territory. In the event that Israel is taken by surprise in the first phase, the regular army should hold off the enemy until the reserve forces are mobilized and the IDF can move to the offensive. It is from this concept that precedence is given to air superiority and advanced intelligence capabilities. Isaac Ben-Israel claimed that Ze'ev Jabotinsky's article "The Iron Wall," which was published in Russian in 1923, provided the blueprint for the principle that the Arab states must be seared with the understanding that the Jewish presence in the Land of Israel cannot be destroyed by force—a principle that was later adopted by Ben-Gurion and became one of the foundations of his security concept (Ben-Israel, 2013).

Writings from the 1950s by then-head of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi (Harkabi, 2015) were the first attempt to describe the complete range of Israeli intelligence challenges. The topic of counterintelligence was almost completely absent from the book, including of course from the context of a security concept: "Security Intelligence [counterintelligence] is expressed particularly in assistance to security bodies... The topics of research in the security field: the enemy's intelligence, detailed research on the enemy's work in the country, and the research of underground circles and candidates for underground operations and their occurrence over there." Elsewhere in the book, Harkabi states: "Deceptive intelligence [counterintelligence]—the overall measures to prevent the enemy from obtaining intelligence and undermining the enemy's agencies [through] the designated special organization." Harkabi's work also lacks a clear concept of counterintelligence, and his perspective is one of "security intelligence" in the context of the IDF's intelligence activities, and not a state preventive intelligence organization (ISA). Harkabi briefly mentions "underground circles," but not other important aspects of counterintelligence such as counter-espionage and counter-subversion.

Since the 1950s, there have been various attempts to update Israel's security concept that were not officially authorized. In 2006, the Committee for the Formulation of Israel's National Security Doctrine, headed by Dan Meridor, presented its report, which aimed to examine the validity of the existing security concept and to recommend an updated security concept. The Committee's report was adopted by the Defense Minister and presented to the Prime Minister, the Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs (the security cabinet), the heads of the security establishment, the forum of the IDF General Staff, and other officials. The report gained widespread approval and in practice some of its recommendations were adopted. For example, a fourth pillar (defense) was added to the security triad of deterrence, warning, and decision (Meridor & Eldadi, 2018). The Meridor Report does not contain any reference to Israel's internal security challenges. A document that examined the Meridor Committee Report a decade after its submission noted that a significant portion of the principles of the security concept remain relevant, and stated that there is a vital need for an updated and relevant national security concept to be formulated as soon as possible.

The need to reformulate Israel's security concept was also raised at the Herzliya Forum for Re-Formulating Israel's National Security Doctrine in 2014. Alex Mintz and Shaul Shay noted in a position paper: "During the past two decades there have been dramatic changes in the geopolitical fabric of the countries of

the Middle East, and since 2011, following the 'Arab Spring' revolutions, the region has been characterized by instability and crises that are still ongoing. The region is marked by uncertainty about its future. Changes that took place in the past and are still ongoing demand a re-examination of Israel's security concept, which is based on a very different geopolitical reality" (Mintz & Shay, 2014). Alongside the "big four" (deterrence, warning, decision, and defense), the authors suggested an additional component to Israel's security concept: adaptation to dynamic and changing realities due to the frequency of regional and intra-state geopolitical changes, including in conflict states. The authors pointed to new challenges in the arena, emphasizing that this was not a tactical aspect of the concept, but a perceptual-strategic aspect. Their document does not address aspects of internal security in Israel.

Former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, together with Gabi Siboni, recently published *Guidelines for Israel's National Security Strategy*. The two address the essence of the threats currently faced by Israel. "Israel today finds itself navigating a landscape of changing threats. The major distinguishing shift is that the principal adversary is no longer a coalition of Arab states set on destroying Israel through large-scale ground maneuvers. Adversaries now include nonstate organizations wielding a strategy of limited attack and incursions onto Israeli soil. While the overarching goal of these enemies remains the same—causing the State of Israel's collapse and thus eliminating it as a political entity—their modus operandi has changed fundamentally. It now combines two efforts—physical and cognitive. The cognitive effort consists of applying continuous pressure on Israeli society and Israel's standing in the international community" (Eisenkot & Siboni, 2019, p. iv).

The authors define the external threats faced by Israel as follows: "**Conventional threats** from state militaries or non-state organizations operating like state militaries. **Nonconventional threats**, mainly consisting of efforts to achieve military nuclear capabilities. **Subconventional threats**, which include guerrilla warfare and terrorism from both within and outside Israel. **Cyberspace and information threats** (Eisenkot & Siboni, 2019, p. v, emphasis in original). Reference to internal challenges is minimal, and the authors define them as centering on "an erosion of solidarity among segments of the population" as a result of deep differences of opinion on issues that are key to the character of the state (p. v). The document does not comprehensively address the subject of internal security, in particular in aspects that this article addresses. The *IDF Strategy*, originally published in August 2015 and in an updated version in April 2018, likewise does not address the issue in the chapters on the connection between IDF strategy and national security, but it appears that this topic is worthy of a separate discussion.

In a series of articles published in 1987 under the title *Intelligence and National Security* (Ofer & Kober, 1987), leading defense researchers and thinkers comprehensively address the issue of internal security and intelligence from numerous aspects. However, not one of the 38 articles in the book references the internal threat, internal security, and other aspects connected to intelligence, in this case, counterintelligence. Meir Amit, in his article "The Israeli Intelligence Community" (Amit, 1987) mentions the ISA on only one occasion. In Haim Yavetz's article "Intelligence in the National Security Concept and Force Buildup" (Yavetz, 1987) there is no mention of the counterintelligence aspect. Aharon Yariv, in "The Role of Intelligence in Fighting Terrorism" (Yariv, 1987), tries to deal with the operational aspects of intelligence in this field, and not in a broad context of the security, intelligence, and internal security concept.

Arnon Sofer presented a different approach. In 1985, Sofer wrote an article titled "Geography and National Security" in which he addressed the internal security threat to Israel from the

country's Arab minority and the Arab population of the territories. Sofer wrote: "Special weight should be placed on the distribution of the Arab population in Israel. There are many risks inherent in the location of most of the Arab population in the Israeli mountain range (Galilee, Samaria, Jerusalem, and Judea) and this has a great impact on Israel's national security equation...In every place in the world where a large minority population is located in a specific territory there are pressures for autonomy or irredentism. In Israel's case, this population is part of the majority population in the region: It has family ties with those on the other side of the border and is characterized by a high level of hostility to Israel and furthermore enjoys massive international support...[geographical] distribution is not static. It has dynamics of profusion and expansion in every direction...the need to supervise this population is a serious security worry...necessitating the allocation of large forces to secure routes (Sofer, 1985). Dan Schueftan wrote in a similar vein when addressing the security threat as a result of the intention of Israel's Arabs to bring about the collapse of the Jewish state and found a bi-national state in its place, which would be a stage on the road to an Arab state (Schueftan, 2011).

The perception that the IDF is capable of achieving complete decision on the battlefield no longer seems realistic. General Israel Tal wrote of this many years ago: "Forcing one's will on the enemy requires the denial of its sovereignty by force and its return only for the fulfillment of conditions dictated to it. This is beyond Israel's power" (Tal, 1996). Uri Bar-Joseph claims that Israel's security strategy is defensive, and its goal is to achieve victory and push off the next round as much as possible. The idea that if we deal the Arabs a strong enough blow they will be deterred from challenging us has been proven wrong over and over again (Bar-Joseph, 2000).

While Israel's national security concept is focused primarily on the IDF's ability to deal with external threats, it also includes internal aspects connected to solidarity and national resilience, and on ties with the United States. The addition of a defensive component to a security concept affects military deployment and preparation, primarily the preparation of the home front, and it was for this purpose that the Home Front Command was established and has subsequently received greater resources and attention in light of the increased threat to the civilian population. The establishment of the Home Front Command was also one of the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War.

Thus, Israel's counterintelligence approach is based on the ISA Law (Clause 7 (a)) as follows: "The Service shall be in charge of the protection of State security and the order and institutions of the democratic regime against threats of terrorism, sabotage, subversion, espionage and disclosure of State secrets." The above is based on an unwritten law regarding the ISA's fields of responsibility that were formulated over the course of many years following the establishment of the State of Israel. The security concept does not address internal security challenges, and in particular the role of intelligence in confronting internal threats, and therefore, is not addressed in the various reports on the security concept.

The Internal Security Threat: Until the Six Day War

Until 1967, the possibility that Israel's Arab minority could create an internal security threat during a war with surrounding Arab states was not considered, even though since the establishment of the state, Israel saw its Arab population as a security threat. This was expressed, inter alia, by Yigal Alon, one of the top Ahdut HaAvoda (Labor Unity) leaders, who asserted that "the Arabs identify with the enemies of the state, and listed the dangers to Israel as a result: (1) espionage (2) sabotage and terrorism (3) a fifth column in the event of war (4) incitement and scare tactics employed by Arab extremists toward the rest of

the population (5) an attempt to form a regional autonomy (6) activity for the return of refugees (7) disturbances in order to gain attention" (Baumel, 2007). Thus, until 1966 Israel's Arab population lived under military rule governed by the IDF with significant assistance from the ISA as the intelligence arm of the military rule; the main goal was to deter any attempt at uprising and to receive alerts on any subversive deployment that could threaten Israel. The cancelation of military rule can be explained by the recognition that the threat was no longer as significant or dangerous as it had been.

The fear of Israel's Arabs was manifested in one extreme case: the Kafr Kassem massacre, in which 43 residents of the village were killed on the first day of Operation Kadesh (October 29, 1956), following a decision to impose a curfew on Arab villages near the Jordanian border given concerns that during the military operation Arab residents could carry out acts that would harm state security.

Prime Minister and Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion claimed that military rule was a necessity in order to prevent the Arabs from rebelling. Indeed, military rule documents from 1956 stated: "Out of 200,000 Arabs and other minorities in Israel, we have not found anyone loyal to the state" (Raz, 2020). Today, in retrospect, it would seem that the threat of subversion leading to hostilities inside Israel was non-existent then, primarily because the ISA had highly developed intelligence gathering and early warning capabilities.

In 1959, the Arab al-Ard (Land) movement was established. The movement was opposed to the existence of Israel as a Jewish state and its goal was to turn the country into a multinational state. The movement was outlawed on the basis of emergency regulations, and the High Court of Justice ruled that there was a need to protect the state from "subversive elements who wished to destroy it from within" (HCJ 64/253). The leaders of al-Ard tried to run for the Knesset, but their list was disqualified by the Supreme Court (Yardour ruling, 1965). The movement's activities were exceptional, did not receive public support, and disappeared from the public agenda. During this period, the ISA dealt mainly with subversive activities by Arabs in Israel, inter alia, from the Arab branch of Maki, the Israeli Communist Party, and Rakah, the New Communist List that had split off from Maki and was marginal and did not endanger national security. During the waiting period before the Six Day War, there was some unrest on the Arab street in Israel and identification with Egyptian President Nasser, but nothing beyond that.

The decision by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to suspend military rule was not an easy one (Goldstein, 2003). The move was opposed by the IDF and to a certain extent by the ISA as well (Osetzky-Lazar, 2002). Eshkol believed that suspending military rule alongside policy changes would enable the Arab population to cooperate with the Jewish government. In his opinion, military rule made it difficult to integrate the Arab population into Israeli society. At the same time, the lifting of military rule did not create significant change in the lives of Arab residents, as even after the step there remained "security areas" where the police and ISA continued to operate.

In practice, until the Six Day War, the ISA continued to focus on countering East European espionage, in particular on the part of the Soviet Union. Indeed, quite a few spies were arrested during that period, including some that managed to cause significant damage to Israel's security (Bergman, 2016). Israel was an important target for Soviet intelligence due to its special relations with the United States and the Western world. The more the Soviets and their satellites tightened their military connections with Arab states, in particular Egypt and Syria, the more their intelligence took an interest in Israel. The embassies of these countries in Israel became centers for gathering intelligence on the state. The espionage activities of Arab countries, especially Egypt, was of a small scale and did not pose a significant threat.

From the Six Day War to the Present

The major turning point in the history of the ISA commenced with the end of the Six Day War (1967). The agency found itself faced with new, unfamiliar problems: the responsibility to prevent Palestinian terrorism and subversion in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip fell to the ISA, which responded to the new challenge and deployed quickly in the territories. The ISA, unlike the IDF, did not have a contingency plan for deployment in the territories. The IDF had prepared the Shaham program to divide the territories into districts with professionals in charge of each district (Michaelson, 2019). In his book *The Stick and the Carrot: The Israeli Administration in Judea and Samaria* (Gazit, 1985), Shlomo Gazit, who was the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, describes the policy principles governing the war on terror as defined by then-Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and later carried out by the ISA and IDF. The first and primary assumption of the war on the phenomenon of terror was that there is no way to achieve total victory over terrorism, and that there was no chance of maintaining military rule over the territories over a long period of time without the population attempting uprisings.

International experience has shown that as long as the political problem is not solved, punishment and repression, however painful, are not sufficient to create an absolute deterrent. Hence, Gazit claims that the purpose of Israeli policy in the territories was to minimize terrorism and keep it on a low flame as much as possible, and to create a situation in which acts of sabotage and the phenomenon of resistance would not reach dimensions that would dictate fundamental and principal Israeli decisions. The main goal in fighting hostile terrorist activity was to isolate the terrorist from the population so that it would refrain from hiding and assisting him, even though the population's natural sympathy was to terrorists and not the Israeli regime. Indeed, since the Six Day War and the capture of the territories, the ISA, with the assistance of the IDF and the Israel Police, has focused primarily on preventing Palestinian terrorism from the territories. After a short period in which the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) operated from the West Bank and Gaza, most terrorist activity in the territories was directed from PLO command centers and those of other Palestinian organizations operating from beyond Israel's borders, primarily from Jordan and Lebanon, and later from Tunisia (until the Oslo Accords). Since the middle of the 1990s, terrorist operations have been directed from within the territories, primarily by Hamas, and there has also been an increase in lone-wolf terrorism (Barbing & Glick, 2019).

In the 1970s, Palestinian terrorists began to operate against Israel from overseas by conducting terrorist attacks against Israeli targets beyond Israel's borders. The most prominent example was the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. The ISA was tasked with security at Israeli institutions overseas such as diplomatic missions, official representations, and El Al Airlines.

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Beyond comprehensive, day-to-day counterterrorism activities, which are largely operational and assisted by the IDF and the Israel Police, two insurgencies among the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza stand out: the first intifada (which began in late 1987) and the second intifada (which erupted in 2000), both of which seeped over into Israel. During periods when Israel was engaged in

military campaigns, the Yom Kippur War (1973), missile fire on Israel by Iraq in the First Gulf War (1991), the First Lebanon War (1982), the Second Lebanon War (2006), and rounds of conflict in Gaza, there was no severe unrest in the territories or overflow into Israel. Even the events of the Western Wall Tunnel riots in September 1996, in which 17 IDF soldiers were killed, did not spill over the Green Line. In recent years, the Palestinian security apparatuses have been of great assistance in maintaining quiet in the West Bank and reducing friction during clashes with Gaza (Barbing & Glick, 2019).

The cyber arena has also become a focus of security threats and risks to Israel. There has been extensive activity in this arena that jeopardizes national security, inter alia by state espionage, industrial espionage (mainly theft of advanced technologies), damage to critical national infrastructure, and attempts to influence public opinion.

The cyber arena has also become a focus of security threats and risks to Israel. There has been extensive activity in this arena that jeopardizes national security, inter alia by state espionage, industrial espionage (mainly theft of advanced technologies), damage to critical national infrastructure, and attempts to influence public opinion (National Cyber Directorate, 2017). The head of the ISA, Nadav Argaman, warned in 2019 that a foreign power could try and intervene in elections "by cyber means—hackers and so forth" (Ynet, 2019). "The National Cyber Directorate is the national security and technological agency responsible for defending Israel's national cyberspace and for establishing and advancing Israel's cyber power. The Directorate operates at the national level to constantly strengthen the level of defense of organizations and citizens, to prevent and handle cyberattacks and to strengthen emergency response capabilities. As part of its roles, the Directorate advances innovative cyber solutions and forward-looking technological solutions" (National Cyber Directorate website). In practice, this means coordinating and managing all the bodies and units dealing with cyber defense in the IDF, ISA, and the civilian sector under one roof. With regard to the prevention of cyber attacks on Israel, even though significant information is not published about threats and preventive operations (Eichner, 2017), it is clear that the issue assumes an important place in the preventive activities of the ISA and the security establishment. Details of the ISA activities in this area are available on the organization's website (ISA website). Publicly available data does not provide any clear evidence of a negative impact of the ISA cyber activity on Israeli democracy, and the topic is outside the scope of this article, although worthy of independent research.

Case Study: Participation of Israel's Arab Citizens in the Second Intifada

In order to illustrate one of the possible scenarios of insurgency in the West Bank spilling over into Israel and creating an internal security threat that could be intensified if Israel was attacked at the same time by an external enemy, the essay examines the participation of Israel's Arab citizens in the second intifada. Early warning of such an event or a similar event should come from the ISA, causing police and perhaps even military deployment ahead of time**.** In this case, there was no early warning,

The second intifada (which began in September 2000) erupted in the West Bank and Gaza after the head of the opposition, Ariel Sharon, went up to the Temple Mount. It included significant civil unrest by Arabs around Israel that continued for about a week and was a strategic surprise for the government, which encountered great difficulty in lowering the flames and restoring order. The Or Commission, or by its full name the Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes Between Security Forces and Israeli Citizens in October 2000, was set up to investigate the events of October 2000: a wave of

protests and demonstrations by Arabs in Israel identifying with the Arabs of the West Bank after the outbreak of the second intifada. The Commission's report provides us with a glimpse of one of the possible threat scenarios. The Commission noted in its report that the riots that took place in the Arab sector inside the country in early October 2000 were unprecedented and extraordinary. During the events, 13 Arab citizens and one Jewish citizen were killed (Or Commission, 2003).

There were warnings about the explosive situation in the Arab sector some six months before the riots broke out, but nevertheless, Sharon was not prevented from going up to the Temple Mount. The unrest that grew into the second intifada quickly spilled over the Green Line. According to the Or Commission, there were warnings of widespread riots since late May 2000, following the manifestations of radicalization among Israeli Arabs (Or Commission). However, the ISA's assessment of the outbreak of a civilian uprising was as follows (Clause 189): "At this stage, an intifada is not expected, in the sense that this term is used for events that occurred in the territories in 1991-1987. The intention was that a general popular uprising was not expected against the state and state institutions, employing violence and establishing alternative institutions. The head of the ISA's northern district testified in this spirit before the commission."

However, a document prepared by the National Security Council on September 26 predicted developments correctly, stating: "The activities of Israeli Arabs could take on a similar but more violent character to previous activities during the difficult period of the 'intifada.' The intensity of the reaction depends on the situation that develops and may include violent demonstrations, roadblocks, and attacks on symbols of the state such as police stations, post offices, and bank branches. Israel's response to Palestinians activities [could lead] to a Palestinian counter response, escalation, and wide scale expansion of hostilities in the 'territories'...[and these] could intensify the nature/activity of Israeli Arabs; and the more Palestinian casualties there are, the more resistance by Israeli Arabs will increase as more and more moderates are swept into taking part in violent demonstrations" (Clause 193).

The Or Commission points to the potential for civil uprising inside the Green Line, as a result of developments in the territories, inside the Green Line, or a combination of both. Therefore, the possibility should not be excluded that a future round of conflict on one or more fronts simultaneously could be a catalyst for such events. Gathering intelligence that could prevent unrest and a deterioration that could lead to violent activities is the responsibility of the ISA, with the police in practice carrying out required operations, inter alia on the basis of reports received from the ISA.

The events of the second intifada can be analyzed through elements of the security concept. From the Commission's report we can learn that the ISA had warnings of possible unrest in the Arab sector in Israel. Evidently, the warning was not effective, and the security establishment did not deploy as it should have with the intelligence at its disposal. Following the outbreak of violence, the ISA and the Israel Police focused on defense and calming tensions, but they had difficulty in doing so because, as the Or Commission noted, the police were not ready and the level of violence in at least parts of the country, primarily the north, was high.

In times of calm, Israel's Arab citizens are not generally involved in terrorist activities, although in recent years there have been a number of serious cases, such as the terrorist attack in Dizengoff Street in Tel Aviv by a resident of Arara (January 2016), the attack on the Temple Mount by two men from Umm el-Fahm (July 2017), and the attack on the central bus station in Beersheba by a resident of the village of Hura in the Negev (October 2015). The case study described above deals with an extreme scenario that could happen again in the future

in certain circumstances, such as an uprising in the West Bank.

Counterintelligence and the National Security Concept

The field of counterintelligence in Israel, which was not regulated until 2002, is formally established in the ISA Law. As noted in the law, it includes several fields belonging to the broader framework of state security, beyond the "classic" roles of counterintelligence organizations such as counterterrorism, counter-subversion, and counter-espionage. These include preventing the leak of secrets, personal protection of public officials, protection of information and facilities, and security classification. However, beyond this law there is no reference to interfaces with other relevant bodies such as the Israel Police and the IDF. No official publications were found dealing with this issue that concerns the implementation of lessons learned from the Or Commission report. Even *Guidelines for Israel's National Security Strategy* (Eisenkot & Siboni, 2019) does not contain any reference to internal security and to internal threats. Nor does it contain any reference to the response to these threats that necessitates integration and synchronization of efforts between the IDF, Israel Police, and the ISA, along with definition of fields of responsibility, roles, and interfaces between these three organizations. The Or Commission report, which is a formative document, did not become the foundation and reference point that it should have on the role of counterintelligence in the national security concept, and to a great extent this constitutes a missed opportunity.

The field of counterintelligence in Israel, which was not regulated until 2002, is formally established in the ISA Law. As noted in the law, it includes several fields belonging to the broader framework of state security, beyond the "classic" roles of counterintelligence organizations such as counterterrorism, counter-subversion, and counter-espionage.

In Israel, as well as in other Western countries, there is a public debate over the balance between security requirements and democracy, such as individual rights and freedom of expression. In 1989, Supreme Court Justice Yitzhak Zamir stated that "when there is a frontal clash between national security and human rights and there is no way to reconcile them, national security prevails." However, Zamir went on to say, "In practice, such a clash rarely occurs. It is usually possible to find an intermediate way. For the most part, human rights need not be sacrificed for state security. The two can be balanced without compromising state security at all" (Zamir, 1989).

The tension between national security and human rights exists and is often debated in the courts and in the public discourse, usually in the context of counterterrorism operations and political subversion. Among the issues discussed (Gil, Tuval, & Levy, 2010): administrative detention, rights of those interrogated, house demolitions, use of physical pressure in interrogations, targeted killings, deportations, outlawing of political activities and more—all issues in which the ISA is actively involved, as they fall under its jurisdiction—are counterterrorism and counter-subversion, in which the ISA operates together with the defense establishment, the courts, and State Attorney's office.

The question of how the ISA should be integrated in the national security concept, with regard to internal security threats, has not been discussed. The main reason is that in Israel the security concept is focused on external military threats, and the intelligence component supports military operations aimed at deterrence, strategic warning, decision, and defense. Another possible reason is the estimation, based on past experience, that the internal security threat does not constitute a serious risk factor. When the State of Israel was

busy fighting wars with its enemies, the internal security front remained quiet.

An additional reason is the estimation that the ISA is effective and focused in countering terrorism and countering subversion among the Arabs of the territories and Israel, and vis-à-vis foreign intelligence organizations and cyber attacks, and therefore its operational and deterrent capabilities will suffice in exceptional cases, as noted above. With the establishment of the state, the Arab minority was defined as having equal rights. Despite this, however, Israel for many years maintained military rule over Israel's Arab population due to security concerns that in retrospect turned out to be exaggerated. When the first intifada broke out in 1987 there was concern that unrest would spill over into the Green Line but that did not happen, as actions were taken to make clear to the Arab leadership in Israel that the Israeli response would be uncompromising. This was not the case in October 2000, immediately after the start of the second intifada.

Since 1967, Israel's security situation has become more complex. The State of Israel controls a large and hostile Palestinian population in the West Bank. Inside the Green Line as well, there is an Arab population that often identifies with the Palestinians in the territories, and within that population there are persons who constitute a security risk. The question whether the Arab minority constitutes a security risk is politically sensitive and is part of the debate on how the Arab minority is treated in Israel as a democratic state. In recent years it has also surfaced in court rulings in Israel. For example, in a Supreme Court ruling dealing with the absence of enforcement of the Defense Service Law on the Arab minority, the court accepted the position of the security establishment that one of the reasons underlying this arrangement is: "security reasons...on account of which, in the absence of an overall peace agreement, the Arab minority constitutes a security risk, and it is reasonable to assume that this will continue to be the case in the future" (Orgard, 2006). However, in another Supreme Court ruling on the issue of discrimination of Arabs at airports, the court ruled that "an entire population cannot be tagged as a security risk" (HCJ 07/4797).

The significance of the proposal to integrate counterintelligence officially in the security concept as part of the fourth pillar of the security concept is to make it part of the defense element. In other words, when threats are assessed, internal threats should also be addressed comprehensively, especially in times preceding violent conflict, during clashes, and even during wars. The situation could be especially troubling if Israel were to find itself in a scenario of simultaneous external military conflict and internal unrest.

The ISA must be involved in the state's security concept, especially in view of the definition of its fields of responsibility in the ISA Law. The significance of the proposal to integrate counterintelligence officially in the security concept as part of the fourth pillar of the security concept is to make it part of the defense element. In other words, when threats are assessed, internal threats should also be addressed comprehensively, especially in times preceding violent conflict, during clashes, and even during wars. The situation could be especially troubling if Israel were to find itself in a scenario of simultaneous external military conflict and internal unrest. This has not happened in the past, and the question is whether the security establishment is ready from both a conceptual and operational point of view for such a scenario. An additional component for the national security concept is also possible, whereby internal security is coordinated by the IDF, the ISA is charged with gathering intelligence, and the Israel Police with maintaining public order, and if necessary IDF forces will be mobilized, primarily from reserve forces. This is not a response to the missile

threat on the home front, but a response to internal security threats.

There is a need to consider how to provide a response to a dual threat. A simultaneous external security threat and an internal security threat requires prior deployment and preparation, including the allocation of special resources to the IDF and the police to deal with internal threats and to prepare them for operations in such a scenario in order to prevent the development of a twin scenario. In the current situation it is not clear what the response to an internal security threat will look like during an emergency on the military front, and what kind of prior deployment is needed in order to provide an effective response. It is possible that the dual threat scenario will receive a suitable response as part of preparation processes for times of emergency, if these become part of Israel's national security concept.

Conclusion

This article reviews the main points of Israel's security concept, focusing on important aspects of counterintelligence activities in Israel, along with a brief overview of this field around the world, as this security discipline is not sufficiently well known. The article surveys the development of the ISA over the years and places special emphasis on the ISA Law, which gives an official seal to the organization's activities and in practice gives legal countenance for activities that were already commonplace for many years. The debate over counterintelligence and the national security concept draws attention to the existing differential given the reality in which counterintelligence is integrated into internal security on issues that fall under ISA responsibility, while conceptually it is not "officially recognized" as part of the security concept.

In the United States there is explicit and official reference to the role of counterintelligence. This appears in official internal security policy documents and the official document signed by the President of the United States concerning the national security strategy (National Security Strategy, 2017). Homeland Security and counterintelligence roles are discussed in further detail in the National Intelligence Strategy (2019), signed by the head of the US intelligence community. This can serve as an example that could be implemented in Israel, with the necessary adjustments.

The question arises why counterintelligence is not part of Israel's official security concept, despite its great importance to national security and despite the high regard for the ISA's counterintelligence activities. The threats that the ISA deals with today are primarily prevention of terrorism and subversion, fields in which its operations are sometimes revealed to the public, while other fields it deals with such as prevention of cyberattacks and counterespionage against Iran, Russia, China, and other countries is usually covert and does not receive recognition as being integral to national security.

In recent years, the influence of counterintelligence on security preparedness and on decision making in Israel has become of paramount importance, both in terms of routine security and for deployment ahead of and during times of emergency, such as war and wide scale military operations. The article calls for an official debate on counterintelligence in Israel's security concept, a debate that will strengthen the adaptation of the security concept to the challenges facing the country.

In order to examine the integration of the internal security threat in Israel's security concept (as part of the defense pillar) broad staff work is needed that will include the ISA, outlined as follows:

a. Analysis and assessment of the internal threats in routine times, with an emphasis on the security threat from a flare-up in the territories and within Israel, and on cyber threats.
b. An assessment with regard to a simultaneous external and internal security threat in

times of emergency (war or wide-scale IDF operations).

c. Preparation of scenarios for possible developments in various security situations, both internal and external, and the integration of counterintelligence into the possible responses of the defense establishment.

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Note

1 Counterintelligence: "Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities." Director of National Intelligence (2016), National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/Regulations/National_CI_Strategy_2016.pdf

Equipocafeina

The Cognitive Campaign: Myth vs. Reality

Michael Milstein

Discourse on the cognitive campaign has increased in recent decades, accompanied by many practical efforts by governments around the world. However, in the excitement surrounding the cognitive campaign, insufficient attention is paid to its inherent fundamental problems and lapses. There is no agreed and systematic definition of the concept, and the result is the inclusion of a large spectrum of phenomena under the broad umbrella of "cognitive campaign." In addition, there is relatively little study of the outcome of the campaign, and no distinction between elements of limited influence (led by the pretension to change fundamental attitudes among target audiences) and those of greater influence (such as cognitive subversion in the fake news era). This article seeks to organize the methodological dimension of the discourse on the cognitive campaign, while proposing which elements of the campaign are worthy of investment and which are not.

Keywords: cognition, cognitive campaign, cognitive subversion, intelligence

Discourse on the cognitive campaign has increased in recent decades, accompanied by many practical efforts by governments and security agencies around the world, especially in the West. The heightened effort is based on a premise, which is fundamentally correct, that the cognitive campaign is an essential component of the contemporary approach to national security: both in dealing with the threats facing modern countries, and in advances against adversaries—from enemy states, to societies and communities on the other side of the border, and to non-state entities, which have been the focus of numerous conflicts around the world in recent decades.

However, in the excitement surrounding the cognitive campaign, insufficient attention is paid to its inherent fundamental problems and lapses. First, the extensive focus on the issue is marked by somewhat limited examination of the practical impact of cognitive efforts and their achievement of their intended objectives. Second, the discourse on the subject is fairly chaotic. There is no agreed and systematic definition of the concept, which results in the inclusion of a large spectrum of phenomena under the broad umbrella of "cognitive campaign." In fact, the concept has undergone a substantial change, and the way it was defined for decades is essentially different from how it has been described in recent years. Third, the idea of the cognitive campaign has been glorified considerably. Thus, those who address the issue sometimes leave the practical and especially the military aspects to one side, placing at the center of a confrontation issues such as the perception of reality and the world of images.

This article does not seek to question or reduce the value of the cognitive campaign; on the contrary. It is a significant element in the contemporary era, which affects both the fighting forces, as well as (and perhaps mostly) governments and the public. This paper attempts to organize the methodological dimension of the discourse on the cognitive campaign, while shedding critical light on the fundamental problems, most notably the lack of a clear conceptual framework, a lack of systematic questioning of effectiveness, and the failure to analyze the profound change this issue has undergone in recent decades.

The cognitive campaign is commonly defined as a set of actions and tools through which parties that collaborate in a systemic framework seek to influence or prevent influence on certain target audiences. The purpose of the cognitive campaign is to cause the target audiences to adopt the position of who or what is behind the campaign, so that he/it can advance strategic or operational goals more easily.

The focus here is primarily on Israeli discourse on the cognitive campaign. Writings, statements, and practical moves of security officials and political leaders on the subject are addressed; these are joined by references and analysis of various international cases. The findings and conclusions drawn from the analysis are therefore of particular relevance to Israel, yet also have implications for other elements dealing with the issue, especially in Western countries.

The cognitive campaign is commonly defined as a set of actions and tools through which parties that collaborate in a systemic framework seek to influence or prevent influence on certain target audiences. The purpose of the cognitive campaign is to cause the target audiences to adopt the position of who or what is behind the campaign, so that he/it can advance strategic or operational goals more easily.

The cognitive campaign is promoted by various methods, both overt and covert. Part of the campaign aims to promote specific goals in the immediate future, while part embraces ambitious pretensions to change a collective way of thinking. In this context, there is a distinction between a negative cognitive effort, that is, preventing the development of

unwanted states of cognition, and a positive battle, embodied in an attempt to produce a desired state of awareness (clearly, the distinction between "positive" and "negative" depends on its initiator, since something that is defined by one party as positive is a threat to the other) (Israeli & Arelle, 2019; and Eisen, 2004, which refers to a United States Army document defining perception management as "a set of moves whose purpose is to pass on certain information to foreign knowledge audiences [or withhold it from them] in order to influence their emotions, intentions, and desires, influence their assessment of the situation, its objectives, and conduct of the intelligence arms and leaders on all levels, in a way that serves the initiator"). In recent years, a new goal has emerged in the form of an aspiration to plant deep confusion in the opponent's collective perception, which prevents it from assessing reality accurately. This component is the key to the concept of the cognitive campaign today.

The numerous aspects and elusive features that have always characterized the concept of cognition appear to seep into the concept of the "cognitive campaign," and call for a profound examination of its content and degree of influence, along with an understanding of the evident gaps or lack of updates. There is a need to distinguish between old components that are part of the cognitive campaign toolbox, many of which have not shown impressive success, and new and different components that have growing impact.

A thorough review of the many publications in Israel and abroad on the cognitive campaign raises a number of fundamental problems. The numerous aspects and elusive features that have always characterized the concept of cognition appear to seep into the concept of the "cognitive campaign," and call for a profound examination of its content and degree of influence, along with an understanding of the evident gaps or lack of updates. There is a need to distinguish between old components that are part of the cognitive campaign toolbox, many of which have not shown impressive success, and new and different components that have growing impact.

The analysis highlights several problems. The first is *eclecticism*, such that the conceptualization of the cognitive campaign is not uniform or clear. Analysis of various studies shows a cluster of several phenomena that have a common denominator, although it is often very general. In this context, four major efforts are usually evident. The first is cognitive subversion, an element that is perceived as "new" and influential, and that in the eyes of societies and governments is considered a major threat given its impact on public discourse through a number of tools: social networks that produce quick viral transfer of information and perceptions; the impact on elections (for example through disruption of voting systems on election day, or the counting of votes); fake news and cyber warfare (Siman-Tov, Siboni, & Arelle, 2017). The second effort is an attempt to influence the adversary's cognition, in particular its perception of reality and the world of beliefs and values of the wider public in which it operates (one of the "old" components that raises a serious question, especially with regard to campaigns between Western elements, including Israel, and forces and communities outside them, especially in the Middle East). The third effort is psychological warfare (PW) initiatives and intelligence warfare (IW), i.e., "traditional" fraudulent actions that are usually accompanied by operational moves; and the fourth effort is information and diplomacy (Waxman & Cohen, 2019). The various initiatives are promoted with different methods, the scale of their success is different, and those who promote them should have a range of skills: communication, networking, and cyber experts for cognitive subversion, culture and language researchers to modify cognition; and figures for action, advocacy, and diplomacy in other areas. In addition, there

is a difference between the target audiences of the various endeavors: most of them are aimed at the "other's" cognition, and their basic purpose is to influence its way of thinking and behavior, while some are focused on domestic society (in an attempt to establish an image of the campaign underway), or even external factors involved in the campaign (especially the international arena), whose attitudes and moves regarding the conflict are of great importance.

A second problem is *theoretical overload*: the large number of studies on the cognitive campaign reflects a plethora of theoretical conceptualizations and analyses (most of which correspond with theories of crowd psychology, philosophy, and networks research). On the other hand, there are relatively few analyses of concrete examples of threats or moves that illustrate the cognitive campaign, and even fewer on significant successes that reflect its impact. A survey of dozens of studies on the cognitive campaign shows that most of the research discourse today is focused on the efforts of cognitive subversion, or on information and cognition (a phenomenon perceived as a concrete and strategic threat in the Western world, including in Israel), and only a relatively small part of research addresses the effect on the opponent's awareness—a topic seen as highly promising a few decades ago, but has proven to be a source of disappointment. In this context, conflicts waged by Western countries against non-Western societies and entities stand out. One of the most notable was the American attempt to instill fundamental cultural change in the Middle East, initiated following September 11, 2001 ("the battle for hearts and minds"), which was especially evident in the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The limited American goal was to overthrow hostile elements and neutralize their military capabilities, but the broader goal was a profound change in the political and public arena in those countries, which was supposed to turn them into stable democratic nations. This effort found it difficult to bridge fundamental social issues that were not sufficiently understood by the Americans, above all the basic public hostility of the Muslim world toward the United States, as well as the depth of clashing identities and hatred between communities and religions and the strength of sub-national social identities, which made it difficult to bring about any change of attitude toward the goals of the US government.

A third problem concerns *innovation*. As many researchers have remarked in recent years, engaging in the cognitive campaign is not new, but is simply a recent embodiment of the understanding and endeavors that have existed for thousands of years, and in the modern era have been more commonly referred to as psychological warfare and intelligence warfare. However, while in the past most of the moves were focused on deceiving the opponent, especially at the military (strategic or tactical) level, today's cognitive campaign is coupled with an ambitious desire for a profound change in the perception of reality and the thinking patterns of the "other," and a strong desire to influence wide audiences. The current intensive preoccupation with consciousness stems from a number of changes that have taken place in modern reality, most notably the information revolution and the focus on social media and technological transformation (in which the rising cognitive subversion threat is rooted); the dominance of asymmetrical conflicts in the modern era (from the Vietnam War, through the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, to the battles that Israel has conducted in recent decades in the Palestinian and Lebanese arenas) whose methods and conclusion are devoid of any clarity and necessitate the engagement in narratives and propaganda; and the increased importance of publics and communities in modern conflicts (both in the West and beyond, where other campaigns are underway), which also raises the need to influence their way of thinking.

The lack of in-depth examination: The practical preoccupation with promoting the cognitive campaign in recent decades has

produced relatively limited study as to the success of moves that were promoted, compared to the goals they were supposed to achieve and the resources invested in them (especially regarding moves aimed at initiating a significant cognitive change in communities, which largely failed due to cultural obstacles). As for cognitive subversion, more serious questioning is evident, in part because it is a relatively new and very concrete threat for modern societies (especially democratic societies), which touches on the foundations of their governmental, political, and public existence (here the West is particularly concerned about the Russian effort to influence public discourse and election campaigns, as well as deep disruptions in the fabric of life—in times of routine and emergency—as a result of cyber efforts). However, research is more limited in areas where the lack of success is more pronounced, most notably in the attempt to influence the broader collective consciousness of the other side, beginning with the American moves in the Middle East two decades ago in an attempt to establish a cultural-consciousness change in the peoples of the region, and Israel's efforts to instill insights and change perceptions in the public, especially in arenas where it conducted military campaigns, most notably Lebanon and the Palestinian arena. (In this context there were measures aimed at "tainting" local leaderships in the eyes of their audiences, beginning with distributing "scent trees" intended to ridicule Hassan Nasrallah in the eyes of the Lebanese public, and the "disclosure" of allegedly embarrassing details about Hamas senior officials such as Yahya Sinwar, alongside an attempt to present positive aspects of Israeli conduct, emphasizing its assistance to the civilian population in those areas). These moves were intended in part to illustrate to the enemy the cost of losing a confrontation, or to improve the basic and negative image of the promoters of the cognitive campaign (the United States and Israel in particular) in the eyes of the "other side." The less presumptuous public diplomacy efforts directed at concrete goals were more successful, as they targeted more focused issues such as exposure of the Iranian nuclear effort and Iran's involvement in terrorism in the Middle East and the international arena, aimed at exerting international pressure on Tehran, and before that, in the efforts to malign Hamas and Hezbollah in the eyes of the international world in order to legitimize a military campaign against them that inevitably involved both the military and the civilian spaces.

Confusion between the kinetic and subconscious dimensions: In much of the research on the cognitive campaign there is often confusion between the subconscious effort and operational moves that affect the image of reality (and therefore naturally, also the conduct of human beings and the way they perceive reality). The cognitive change is largely derived from the intensity of the kinetic move taken and the circles of influence that it creates. The US bombing of Hiroshima, Israel's Operation Focus that started the Six Day War with the destruction of the Egyptian air force, and Israel's Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in 2002 were first and foremost practical moves that changed reality, and only as a by-product led to cognitive changes. In many cases, without the kinetic move there would have been no cognitive change, and a move that is focused exclusively on the cognitive dimension, without an accompanying practical effort, will nearly always have limited impact. Some of the research is clearly inspired by conflicts with semi-state elements such as Hezbollah (the Second Lebanon War) or Hamas (three rounds of fighting between Israel and this organization over the past decade in the Gaza Strip) that cling to the concept of resistance, *al-mukawama* (Milstein, 2010). They try to convey an externalized interpretation, claiming that in spite of the many casualties they have suffered and their basic inferiority against their enemy (Israel), they have won the battles by showing patience, denying the enemy victory, and sometimes even firing the last shot.

The discourse promoted by these elements has helped to establish the widespread claim that there is great importance to the image of victory, and not only how the battle actually ends. Sometimes this has led to a simplistic adoption of the other side's rhetoric, without attention to the reservations and deep-seated hesitation that has developed (largely due to the heavy price paid by the public in the campaigns, and the fears of Hezbollah and Hamas that this will damage their legitimacy at home), alongside their understanding of the gap between outward propaganda and the actual situation.

It is hard to shake off the impression that the cognitive campaign is in fact a further expression of the confusion felt by many modern governments and armies in the battles they have faced in recent decades, particularly in the Middle East, South East Asia, and Central Asia. These are conflicts without glory, in which it is very difficult to achieve decisive victories against the enemy, and in fact there is an inability to define the enemy. The situation becomes even more complex when Western armies and regimes find they are facing a combination of civilian and military elements, which creates moral and ethical dilemmas, particularly for Western audiences. This frustrating reality has led to the creation of a collection of concepts to provide Western decision makers, armies, and publics with an interpretation of the conflicts that seeks to explain how they differ from past wars, their limitations, and the possible achievements.

A critical examination of the comprehensive research and preoccupation with the cognitive campaign shows that the entire subject is undergoing a process of change, and in fact a dramatic move away from "old" concepts, which should perhaps be discarded in favor of "new" ones. It is important to recognize the difference between the various components of this campaign, understand that some have already failed and perhaps become irrelevant, and above all, see the effort to effect a cognitive change in the enemy (which is still energetically promoted by various Western elements, including Israel). On the other hand, some components are gaining force and should be at the focus of an updated strategic concept of the cognitive campaign, first and foremost the effort to influence public discourse (mainly through the use of online networks) and to interfere with election campaigns.

Cognitive subversion should without doubt be the focus of the effort (Rosner & Siman-Tov, 2018), inter alia by means of developing both defensive (monitoring and neutralizing) and offensive capabilities, as well as through education for digital awareness. In this context there is an obvious need to give the general public insights into ways of dealing with fake news and with hoaxes intended to mislead, confuse, and create panic.

Contrary to the conclusions of numerous studies, which state that Western countries should increase their efforts in the cognitive campaign (beyond the vast amounts of material resources already invested), it would in fact be more correct to determine what in the broad basket of components should be classified as concrete threats, as objectives that can be realized, or as anachronistic means that are pointless to continue nurturing. And this is even before we start establishing additional bodies to concentrate or promote the cognitive campaign, which always means the creation of more bureaucracy and unwieldy work processes.

Cognitive subversion should without doubt be the focus of the effort (Rosner & Siman-Tov, 2018), inter alia by means of developing both defensive (monitoring and neutralizing) and offensive capabilities, as well as through education for digital awareness. In this context there is an obvious need to give the general public insights into ways of dealing with fake news and with hoaxes intended to mislead, confuse, and create panic (Brun & Roitman, 2019). This has been shown clearly in the last

decade in moves made by Russia against its enemies in Eastern Europe, particularly the Ukraine, and in the West, particularly the United States. Presumably this effort will increase in the future, most of all in periods of emergency involving military conflicts, as a way of sowing fear and interfering with communication between governments and the public.

On the other hand, most of the efforts made so far to bring about a deep cognitive change in the public "on the other side" have had limited success. The distribution of videos, festival greetings, and caricatures that mock the enemy's leaders are popular as entertainment, but they are generally treated as anecdotes or specific information that was not familiar in that society. So far they have led to only a slight change in how those publics perceive the situation, and it appears that they have utterly failed to change their values and beliefs, particularly with respect to attitudes to Israel. In this context, there is a range of evidence, from public opinion polls in the Arab world, through examination of attitudes in the media and public and online discourse about Israel, to a study of actual behavior in the "street" with reference to Israel, where it is easy to identify expressions of basic hostility (which often differ from the government's position, particularly in the Gulf states that have recently promoted relations with Israel, including publicly).

The cognitive campaign that Israel should adopt should have more defensive characteristics intended to prevent damage to the soft underbelly of democracy, and fewer offensive characteristics intended to change perceptions and values on the other side, which have proven to have limited influence.

Two decades after the promotion of intensive investment in cognitive campaigns in Israel, while focusing on the establishment of bodies in the security system and in government ministries charged with handling this subject, Israel must conduct a thorough, direct, and honest investigation of its success in this field. Radio and TV channels aimed at the Arab world (a move that began back in the 1950s with the Voice of Israel radio channel in Arabic and the publication of state sponsored Arabic newspapers, and later led to specialized items in Arabic on Israeli television, and the Voice of Israel channel in Farsi) have not yielded—insofar as this can be measured in the Arab world—a basic cognitive change regarding attitudes toward Israel (based on the metrics mentioned above, which of course are not methodical or completely accurate, but do give a good illustration of the weight of central streams in the Arab space). Other steps taken in recent years, above all the operation of internet sites in Arabic by official entities (such as COGAT—the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories, the IDF Spokesperson's Unit, and the Foreign Ministry) have achieved only isolated positive reactions (as well as much contempt) but so far do not seem to have led to any deep change in how Israel is perceived by societies in the region that are mainly shaped by local media, social frameworks, educational institutions, and the religious establishment. Until there is a deep and broad change in these elements, there is unlikely to be any real change in public awareness.

The use of online channels in recent years is not without benefits: they have managed to provide Arab audiences with alternative information that is generally perceived by them as credible about issues (including Israel's actions) that they do not get from other sources. However, the Israeli effort has not brought about a fundamental change in how Israel is perceived in the region. Sometimes Israel has praised itself for "changing awareness" of the other side (mainly in the context of the Palestinian campaign) or for "cracks in public trust" of their leaders (as was claimed about Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah), but it appears that the actual impact is far more limited. If and when there is internal protest and criticism of those forces, they generally derive

from internal processes (such as the economic situation in Lebanon or government corruption in Iraq last year) and not because of any Israeli cognitive campaign.

In conclusion, it appears that when Israel analyzes its moves in the cognitive campaign, it must focus its efforts on defense against subversion in the shape of fake news, while restricting its investment and expectations (and the description of successes) with respect to changing the thinking of societies and population groups. This effort should continue, since it has importance that could well increase over time, but it is also necessary to recognize its actual impact. In other words, the cognitive campaign that Israel should adopt should have more defensive characteristics intended to prevent damage to the soft underbelly of democracy, and fewer offensive characteristics intended to change perceptions and values on the other side, which have proven to have limited influence (excluding more focused moves that amount to deception, accompanied by tactical or strategic military actions).

In addition, it is necessary to demonstrate caution in attempts to influence awareness on the other side, which could have the opposite effect. An example is the encouragement expressed in Israel for protests in Lebanon, in which the points of dispute are not between supporters and opponents of Israel, and where Israeli support for one side could damage its public image. In another context, it is recommended to avoid confusing success in the creation of perceptions of the price of heavy losses for the enemy, leading to unwillingness to make operational moves (and generally achieved after intense military conflicts, as discernible among Hezbollah and Hamas in the last two decades), and cognitive change—an objective that is also directed at the society in which the enemy operates, and which embodies belief in the ability to bring about fundamental changes in how Israel is perceived and the formulation of the "other" party's basic existential values and principles.

And as always, deeper familiarity on the part of those engaged in the cognitive campaign, headed by intelligence personnel, with the cultural world, language, and history of the object of their research, which has actually declined in recent decades (Michael & Dostri, 2017), should always be the main key to more effective—and no less important, more realistic—moves with respect to attainable objectives, as opposed to unattainable ones (Milstein, 2017). However sharp their intelligence, people who engage in the cognitive campaign without an understanding of the cultural codes and expertise in the language of their targets will have difficulty finding the precise weaknesses or in defining moves that will have real impact. In this context, Shimon Shamir, a scholar on the Middle East and veteran diplomat, noted that "knowledge of the language gives access to content and nuances that are almost impossible to translate. It opens a window onto the world of values and attitudes, wishes, and hopes in the neighboring society in a way that has no substitute" (Shamir, 1985); while Martin Petersen, a former senior CIA official, has stated that for intelligence personnel there is no substitute for familiarity with the language and culture of their research subjects (Petersen, 2003).

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The American-Israeli Dialogue at the Start of the First Lebanon War

Zaki Shalom

In their meeting a few weeks after the start of the First Lebanon War (June 1982), Prime Minister Menachem Begin and US President Ronald Reagan focused on the military conflict underway. Given the disturbing images on television of the destruction caused by Israeli attacks in Lebanon and the many demonstrations around the world protesting Israel's acts in the war, President Reagan was obliged to express his criticism regarding Israeli activity in Lebanon. However, the criticism was moderate, and included a clear message that the administration was eager to overlook the existing disputes in order to reach understandings that would serve the strategic interests of both countries. Prime Minister Begin, however, decided to expound on the justice of Israel's activity in Lebanon, which necessarily focused most of the discussion on the war, and largely diverted attention from the need to utilize this important meeting to realize the overall interest of both sides—to intensify strategic cooperation between the two countries. The stances of both leaders in the meetings between them contain important lessons for contemporary times as well.

Keywords: United States-Israel relations, Menachem Begin, Ronald Reagan, Alexander Haig, Benjamin Netanyahu, Lebanon War, national security

A few weeks after the start of what came to be known as the First Lebanon War, Prime Minister Menachem Begin visited the United States for a meeting with President Ronald Reagan that had been arranged prior to the outbreak of the war. The difficult images of the war on televisions across the US naturally created an unfavorable atmosphere regarding Israel's military action in Lebanon. To his credit, Prime Minister Begin warned President Reagan about the problematic timing of the meeting in view of the serious tension in the north. The complex dialogue that took place between Israel and the United States during the period preceding the war and during its first stages, including the meetings between Begin and Reagan, is documented in archival documents in Israel and in the United States. This record provides noteworthy perspectives regarding the special nature of relations between the two countries and offers important lessons for contemporary times as well.

At the government meeting on June 5, 1982, Prime Minister Begin told the ministers that he had received a letter from President Reagan, in which he asked Israel not to take any action that could worsen the situation in the Middle East. Begin clarified that under the circumstances, Israel could not accept President Reagan's request. He again noted that the aim of the action was just 40 kilometers, and that as soon as Israeli forces reached that goal, Israel would cease its fire. The government approved Begin's proposals. A short time thereafter, Israel launched the First Lebanon War, originally named the Peace for Galilee War.

The Start of the War and the Dialogue with the US Administration

On June 3, 1982, Palestinian terrorists who were members of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) attempted to assassinate Israel's Ambassador to Britain, Shlomo Argov. The ambassador was critically wounded in the assassination attempt. The following day, President Reagan sent Prime Minister Begin a letter in which he used harsh language to condemn the "cowardly and unconscionable attack" (Reagan, 1982b). Secretary of State Alexander Haig was also quick to send Begin a letter condemning the "criminal act" against the ambassador. However, he also expressed his hope that the attack would not lead Israel to deviate from its joint efforts with the US to build a world of peace. It was clear that this was a strong hint to Israel to avoid any broad military response (Haig, 1982).

Israel did not respond positively to these demands. Despite the fact that there had been relative quiet along the Lebanese border in the months prior to the war, and although the attack on the ambassador was carried out by a group that was opposed to the PLO, the government decided to implement plans to attack Lebanon, which had been formulated long before. The following day, the government authorized an attack on 11 terrorist targets in Lebanon—two in Beirut (one was an ammunition warehouse that was hidden underneath the seats of a sports stadium), with the others in southern Lebanon. Begin's assessment was that the terrorists would almost certainly respond with a massive attack on communities in Israel's north, and that in such a case, Israel would need to debate whether to embark on a larger campaign in Lebanon. As expected, the PLO responded with massive Katyusha rocket fire toward Israel's northern communities (Naor & Lamprom, 2014).

In the explanatory notes for the decision to attack, Begin and Sharon clarified that the action would be up to a line about 40 kilometers from Israel, and that it was not planned against Syria. The IDF would not attack the Syrian army deployed in Lebanon but would return fire if the Syrians attacked first. During the government discussion, Prime Minister Begin stressed that this period was an opportune time for launching the attack in Lebanon, and that Israel must not miss it. "Neither the US President nor Secretary of State Haig," said Begin, "asked us to hold back. The Western countries are busy with the

Falklands War between Britain and Argentina, while Iran and Iraq are fighting each other" (Naor & Lamprom, 2014).

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On June 6, 1982, President Reagan sent another letter to Prime Minister Begin. In view of the increasing tension and the assessment of upcoming all-out conflict between Israel and the PLO in Lebanon, President Reagan made one final effort to prevent this serious development, clarifying to Begin that the United States was acting together with other countries in Europe and the Middle East to prevent deterioration in the situation. Therefore, he asked Prime Minister Begin to consider seriously avoiding military steps that would increase tension. President Reagan wrote that it was the common aim of both Israel and United States to bring calm and stability to the region. President Reagan ended his letter with the hope that the violence that had developed in Lebanon recently would not escalate (Reagan, 1982c).

Within a short time, Prime Minister Begin responded to President Reagan with a message that clearly indicated Begin's desire to create legitimacy for a far-reaching military campaign in Lebanon. Begin opened by describing Ambassador Argov's critical condition. Since the assassination attempt, Begin emphasized, the northern communities had been under harsh shelling from the PLO that aimed indiscriminately to kill Jews. No country in the world would tolerate such a situation without response. As proof, Begin noted that Britain was engaged at that time in a campaign over the Falkland Islands, thousands of kilometers from its home territory. The Israeli government was resolved to put an end to this intolerable situation, and the IDF had received instructions to push the terrorists to a distance of 40 kilometers from the border. Begin emphasized that Israel had no claim to Lebanese territory, and that it wanted a peace agreement with the Lebanese government. Begin ended his letter by expressing the hope that President Reagan would show understanding for Israel's motives in this serious campaign, for which Israel was not to be blamed (Begin, 1982b).

Early in the campaign, Israel sent a message to Syria through the US administration stating that if Syria would avoid action against IDF forces, Israel would not act against it. In his meeting with American envoy Philip Habib on June 8, 1982, Prime Minister Begin asked him to convey to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad the following message: "a. We do not want a war with your army. b. Please instruct your army not to attack our soldiers. If our soldiers are not attacked, they will not attack your army. c. Pull your army back from west to east and from south to north to the starting point at which they were stationed before the campaign started. d. Instruct the terrorists to retreat 25 kilometers northward" (Naor & Lamprom, 2014).

On June 9, 1982, President Reagan sent a letter to Prime Minister Begin expressing a crisis of trust that was developing between the two countries. President Reagan expressed concern in view of the IDF's advance into central Lebanon and regarding the increasing confrontations with the Syrian army. Already then, Reagan was critical of the fact that Israel had gone "substantially beyond" the 40-kilometer line that Prime Minister Begin noted in his June 6, 1982 letter. Moreover, Reagan tried to underscore that the war threatened the stability of the entire international system and presented a threat to US national security: "The tactical advantages

of this deviation," Reagan wrote, "are not balanced against the risk of getting entangled in a war with Syria, and perhaps even with the Soviet Union." Reagan noted that he received a letter from Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev warning the US against the development of an "extremely dangerous situation" due to the Israeli action in Lebanon. Reagan warned that an Israeli refusal of the request "would worsen the already serious danger to world peace, and the already existing tension in Israeli-American relations" (Reagan, 1982d; Naor & Lamprom, 2014). In parallel, the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent a serious warning letter to Israel regarding its activity close to Beirut and demanded that Israel stop its military action in the area. Any damage that would be caused, warned the Soviets, would be the responsibility of the State of Israel (Soviet Foreign Ministry, 1982).

At this point, US Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis wrote a letter to Prime Minister Begin, expressing the administration's determination to intervene actively to end the military confrontation. The ambassador clarified that the administration demanded that Israel agree to a ceasefire the following day, June 10, 1982, at 6:00 am local time. A similar demand was sent to Syrian President Assad through US envoy Habib, and indirectly to the PLO as well. Ambassador Lewis clarified that the administration would ensure that Israel's security interests would be maintained, inter alia, by casting a veto on proposed Security Council resolutions that were hostile to Israel. This carried with it an implicit threat to Israel if it did not accede to the administration's demands. Ambassador Lewis emphasized that both President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig asked that Prime Minister Begin provide his answer as soon as possible (Lewis, 1982).

The text of the letter was resolute but lacked any concrete threat against Israel if it did not accept these demands. The administration almost certainly understood the chance that Israel would agree to a ceasefire at such an early stage, before it was able to realize even some of its goals, was very low. Begin proposed that Israel announce that it would agree to the "concept of a ceasefire." This meant that the timing and understandings involved in the ceasefire would be defined later, which would enable Israel to continue combat with the aim of coming to the ceasefire negotiations with a clear advantage. All of this, Begin emphasized, was on condition that the PLO pull its forces back 40 kilometers away from the Israeli border. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon opposed accepting the administration's demands. In the end, the government approved the text presented to it by Prime Minister Begin.

During the government meeting, it was announced that Secretary of State Haig would arrive in Israel the following day. It was therefore decided to wait with the approval of the ceasefire until his arrival in order to reward him, a close friend of Israel, with a diplomatic achievement, while also giving the IDF an additional day of action. In his remarks to the cabinet on the five days of fighting, Begin praised the military operation up to that point. "It's really one of the most impressive operations in Israel's history… It's an operation that is meant entirely to ensure the peace of our citizens…It's not the conquest of territory, or even pushing back the enemy. It is to ensure the peace of our citizens. This is a very humane mission" (Naor & Lamprom, 2014).

These words are a strong indication of the high level of euphoria among the Israeli leadership during the first stages of the war. To a certain extent, it also indicates that the leadership was at least somewhat disconnected from the reality at that time, with a troubling ignorance of the difficult aspects of the combat that began to emerge already in the initial stages of the fighting. In the second week of the war, Menachem Begin still sounded enthusiastic about the campaign and its achievements. His comments again reflected a worrisome gap between the information he had and the situation on the ground.

However, by the cabinet meeting of June 15, 1982, Begin sounded more realistic about

the achievements of the war and the chances of bringing it to a swift end. Begin clarified that the war was not finished. "On the ground," he said, "there are still terrorists. There are cells of terrorists. There are still large concentrations of weapons and ammunition discovered each and every day." As such, even at this stage, Begin shook off the prevailing idea that Israel would act only within 40 kilometers from the border. "The statements as if we committed to wipe out terrorists only in a range of 40 kilometers have no basis. Are other terrorists, murderers of women and children, immune beyond the 40-kilometer limit?" (Naor & Lamprom, 2014).

On June 15, 1982, Israel's Ambassador to Washington, Moshe Arens, was called in for an urgent conversation with Secretary of State Haig, with a heavy sense in the administration that Israel was not providing truthful reports to the administration about the war and IDF actions. Haig relied on reports from envoy Philip Habib that he himself had seen the entry of IDF forces into western Beirut. However, even as part of this admonishment, Haig clarified that the administration was giving Israel time "to finish the job." According to the ambassador's report, Haig expressed the opinion that "we must allow the IDF to finish the job, but we cannot create the impression here that we are misleading the President." After requesting clarifications from Israel, Arens rejected the claims regarding the entry of IDF forces into western Beirut (Naor & Lamprom, 2014).

Israel and the United States: Between Agreement and Dispute

On June 21, 1982, a few weeks after the start of the war, Prime Minister Begin met with President Reagan at the White House. The meeting was preceded by an embarrassing diplomatic incident. When he arrived in New York, Begin was told by the media that the President had canceled the meeting with him. Apparently an announcement of this sort had been issued by one of the President's assistants, almost certainly without full coordination with the President. It is very likely that the President's assistants wanted to convey the administration's displeasure with the campaign in Lebanon, hoping that the incident would put Begin on the defensive before the discussions with the President began. In response, Begin threatened to return to Israel immediately. Secretary of State Haig understood that such a reaction would lead to a deep crisis in relations between Israel and the United States, which would harm not only the interests of Israel, but also those of the United States. Haig's assessment, almost certainly, was that such a step would not deter Begin in his determination to bring an end to the violence against Israel by terrorist forces in Lebanon. He further estimated that the administration would be able to make more significant achievements through direct dialogue with Israel rather than through a policy of threats, punishments, and sanctions. Against this background, Haig quickly called Begin and clarified to him that the matter of the meeting with the President was arranged, after Haig hinted at the possibility that he would resign if his position was not accepted (Naor & Lamprom, 2014).

The talks Begin held with administration leaders were a clear reflection of the longstanding disputes between Israel and the United States concerning the justification of Israel's use of military force against Arab countries, disputes that began in the early 1950s, when the Israeli government under David Ben-Gurion adopted a policy of retaliation against infiltrations, which was a major threat to Israel at the time.

Begin arrived at the meeting with an ordered and fully formulated agenda concerning Israel's security situation and what measures were required to be undertaken from the point of view of the State of Israel to preserve and enhance its security. The talks he held with administration leaders were a clear reflection of the longstanding disputes between Israel and

the United States concerning the justification of Israel's use of military force against Arab countries, disputes that began in the early 1950s, when the Israeli government under David Ben-Gurion adopted a policy of retaliation against infiltrations, which was a major threat to Israel at the time. The US administration rejected the retaliation policy in principle. It demanded that Israel view infiltrations as a criminal phenomenon, and that it deal with them as it would have dealt with routine criminal events within Israel. If Israel were to use military force in any case, argued the American administration, it must emphasize a defensive campaign, and in any case its responses must be proportional and balanced relative to the attack against it (Shalom, 1996).

From the administration's point of view, the war in Lebanon was one of many expressions of the prevailing tendency of Israeli governments to adopt narrow-minded thinking regarding suitable measures to be undertaken in the struggle against strategic threats. Within this thinking, the military-security aspect was dominant over the diplomatic and political component. The administration, however, contended that Israel's policy must be more inclusive and reflect a broad comprehensive strategy. That strategy should integrate with the prevailing American view that it was important to ensure the establishment of pro-Western Arab regimes that would help push the Soviet Union out of the region and enhance the United States' position in the Middle East.

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In any case, the administration claimed, regimes with a pro-Western orientation would work toward establishing a situation of security, calm, and economic prosperity—objectives that Israel also wanted to see realized. The realization of these goals would make it necessary for those states to suppress the terrorist organizations that were threatening not only Israel, but also like-minded Arab regimes. Thus, with a far-reaching view, Israel would, according to the American view, be able to achieve its true goals, even if in the immediate period it would need to restrain itself and sustain a painful price. If it would carry out a military campaign against the terrorist organizations at this time, it might achieve short-term tactical goals, but it would necessarily weaken those regimes while causing long-term damage on the strategic level.

Indeed, the campaign in Lebanon was launched just a few years after the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed. The US administration almost certainly hoped that following the peace treaty with Egypt, the Lebanese government would see fit to sign a peace treaty with Israel as well. However, the violent events along the northern border,

mainly the repeated attacks against Israel from terrorist groups operating in Lebanon, intensified the tension. Israel's infiltration of Lebanon abolished any hope of a peace arrangement between the two countries and worked in the completely opposite direction. It also weakened the American position in the Middle East. The main asset that the administration had in its relations with the Arab world was its argument that only Washington had the ability to restrain Israel and make it avoid steps that would harm the essential interests of Arab states. Now, following Israel's military action, the Arab states would understand that there was no basis to this presumption on the part of the administration. Israel was acting callously against United States interests and positions, and against its own essential interests as seen by the administration. As President Reagan told Prime Minister Begin in his opening remarks, "Your actions in Lebanon have seriously undermined our relationships with those Arab governments whose cooperation is essential to protect the Middle East from external threats and to contain forces of Soviet-sponsored radicalism and Islamic fundamentalism now growing in the region" (President Ronald Reagan's meetings with Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, 1982; hereafter Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

The US administration repeatedly emphasized that it was not ignoring the murderous nature of the terrorist organizations. It was well aware of the intensity of the terror operations they were carrying out against the State of Israel and recognized Israel's right to defend itself against them, including through military means. However, Israel must understand that its actions are inextricably linked to the main goal: turning Lebanon into a strong, stable, and pro-Western state. When this goal is achieved, it is clear that the war against the terrorist organizations would be much easier. The Israeli government led by Menachem Begin paid no heed to this advice. It seemed to the Israeli leadership that these words reflected unrealistic wishes that could not be fulfilled in the Middle East reality.

Israeli governments encountered similar positions later on as well. During the second intifada, the US administration worked to prevent Israel from acting aggressively against the Palestinian Authority under Yasir Arafat. The argument was that all in all, the Arafat regime was committed to a political arrangement, contrary to more extremist Palestinian organizations such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others. A serious operation by Israel against the Palestinian Authority, it was argued, would lead to the collapse of the Arafat regime, which was working toward an arrangement, and the rise of extremist terrorist organizations that rejected any arrangement with Israel.

During the Second Lebanon War, heavy pressure was exerted on the Olmert government to avoid Israeli strikes against national infrastructure in Lebanon. Here too, the main argument was that responsibility for belligerent actions in Lebanon was placed on Hezbollah, which was a negative factor from the standpoint of the Lebanese government. Attacking Lebanon's national infrastructure—fuel, electricity, and transport—would harm the moderate and pro-Western Lebanese government. The Olmert government essentially yielded to this pressure and focused its responses against Hezbollah. This policy, to some extent, contributed to the lack of decisive victory in the war.

The Israeli government is currently encountering a similar phenomenon in its relations with Hamas. Despite the sporadic rocket fire toward Israel, Hamas repeatedly argues that it has no interest in such fire toward Israel, and that it is not responsible for it. The rocket fire, Hamas claims, is carried out by "recalcitrant" terrorist organizations, mainly Islamic Jihad, and Hamas does not have the power to completely prevent such fire. The Israeli government does not accept this logic. It makes sure to adhere to the principle that Hamas is the sovereign power in the Gaza

Strip, and that Israel views it as the party responsible for attacks on its sovereignty. However, in practice, when the information in Israel's possession tends to validate Hamas's arguments, and when it turns out that Hamas is indeed acting to prevent rocket fire toward Israel, it shows a clear tendency to moderate its military response in Gaza.

The Begin government acted on the basis of an assessment that the lack of a determined response to provocations from the Arabs would be interpreted by Arab states as weakness on Israel's part, and would only encourage Arab countries to escalate their actions against Israel. Beyond this, the Israeli government did not accept the argument regarding the division of Lebanon between "good" and "bad," which presented the Lebanese government as being the "good guys." It seemed to Israel that the Lebanese government was not making a sufficient effort to change the situation in which the terrorist organizations were acting from within its sovereign territory, and that it was evading responsibility with the argument that it could not control them.

To a great extent, it was argued, this situation was quite convenient for the Lebanese government. On the one hand, it enabled Lebanon to present itself as a state committed to the "Arab cause." By enabling the Palestinians to act against Israel from its territory, Lebanon removed itself from the image of a government that relies on Western powers and serves their interests, which run counter to those of the Arab world. On the other hand, Lebanon did not have to pay what from Israel's point of view was an intolerable price. As Israel began to attack Lebanon, the United States and other Western countries would take Lebanon's side and work to restrain the State of Israel. The way to change this equation, in the view of the Israeli government, was for the Lebanese government to actually realize its sovereignty and forcefully prevent the terrorist organizations from carrying out violent operations against Israel.

The Lebanese government, according to Israel, would act this way only if it became clear that it would have to pay a heavy price for terrorist operations against Israel from its territory. The situation was parallel to Jordan's. For years, terrorist organizations operated against Israel from the Jordanian border. The United States as well as other Western countries warned Israel to refrain from carrying out painful operations against Jordan, which was always considered a major pro-Western state in the region. Israel indeed made the utmost efforts to restrain itself. However, as the threats against it escalated, Israel eventually decided to heighten its response and launched major attacks against Jordanian economic and security targets. These actions forced the Hashemite kingdom to act violently against the terrorist organizations in September 1970, which led to prolonged calm along Israel's border with Jordan. It was assumed that a similar development might well take shape in Lebanon if Israel acted determinedly against Lebanon and the terrorist organizations.

Finally, Begin again emphasized that his overall commitment was first and foremost to protect the security of the State of Israel and its citizens. Based on this commitment, Israel launched its campaign to extract them from a mortal danger. This, Begin stressed, is how the United States and any other country in the international system would act. President Reagan's administration presumably understood Begin's arguments, and in closed meetings may have even justified the Israeli government's steps. However, officially, in front of assistants and advisors from both sides, the Reagan administration had no real choice but to clarify to Israel that it could not accept its arguments.

In addition, the military campaign revealed Israel's strategic weakness. The ongoing attacks by Palestinian organizations against Israel's civilian population reflected clearly that the IDF did not succeed in establishing deterrence against the terrorist organizations in Lebanon.

The continued fighting in Lebanon a few weeks after the outbreak of the war, notwithstanding Israel's overwhelming military superiority over the terrorist organizations, indicated failed IDF performance. Public opinion in Israel and abroad inevitably recalled Israel's stunning and rapid victory over three Arab states in the Six Day War, and thus necessarily prompted the question as to why the IDF was hard-pressed to bring the confrontation to a quick conclusion given that the warfare was against relatively inferior terrorist organizations. Moreover, the disturbing pictures of the Israeli attacks in Lebanon and the suffering of the civilian population that accompanied the campaign in Lebanon made it very difficult for the administration to avoid open protest against Israel's actions during the war. Under these circumstances, the administration found it difficult to accept Israel's arguments that only someone in tangible day-to-day danger of death could understand the nature of the dangers that Israel was facing, and that it was neither correct nor fair to give advice to Israel from the calm and safety of Washington.

The Meetings between President Reagan and Prime Minister Begin

The first meeting between President Reagan and Prime Minister Begin took place with both ambassadors in attendance: US Ambassador to Israel Lewis and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Arens. President Reagan opened the meeting, based on written remarks he held in his hands, with the message that in view of the difficult circumstances under which the visit was taking place, he had to give it a formal, somewhat rigid, and less friendly nature: "I am delighted to see you here," the President told Begin, "though I wish very much the circumstances could be different. I had originally hoped that we would discuss the many common problems we face in the Middle East and beyond. However, events have occurred such that we are now forced to focus our attention on the grave risks and opportunities that your operation in Lebanon has created" (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

Such an unfriendly international atmosphere, with the gloomy military situation on the battlefield, would presumably lead Israel to understand that the US administration's maneuvering room was quite narrow at the time and required the administration to show a very critical posture toward Israel's activity in Lebanon. These circumstances could have led the Israeli government to understand that the timing of Begin's visit to the US was not suitable and should have been postponed.

Indeed, under the circumstances, the President essentially had no choice other than to focus on the IDF action in Lebanon. It was clear from the outset that any such discussion would heighten the disputes between the two countries regarding the circumstances that would justify Israel using its military power against Arab states. International sentiments toward Israel were extremely critical, and no US president, however friendly toward Israel, would be able to ignore them. Many countries in Europe had called on Israel to retreat from Lebanon right at the start of the action, and later, a number of countries, including Britain, contemplated the use of punitive measures, mainly economic. In addition, the possibility of an arms embargo against Israel was considered (EC Actions Against Israel, 1982).

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at that time was certainly ample reason to delay the visit, and this would likely have been accepted with understanding by the United States administration. However, it is not known whether such an option was even considered by the Israeli leadership (Naor & Lamprom, 2014).

Prime Minister Begin decided to adopt an opposite approach that was very daring, given the overwhelming asymmetry in the balance of power between the two states. He elected to proceed with the visit and jump straight into the lion's den precisely at this difficult time, and to clarify to the US administration in quite a scathing way, likely unprecedented, that the administration was in no way morally justified in preaching to Israel how to ensure its security. Israel alone would decide on the means to ensure the safety of its people. In his memoirs the President himself summarized the Prime Minister's position toward the administration with these words: "Mind your own business. It is up to Israel alone to decide what it must do to ensure its survival" (Reagan, 1990, p. 419).

Begin's response was quite brazen. Over the years, even during serious disputes with the US administration, Israeli leaders acted with honor, dignity, and respect toward the President of the United States as the leader of the American people. Indeed, Israel was overwhelmingly dependent on the United States in various fields crucial to its very survival and could not afford to offend or embarrass the President, even if he adopted positions that Israel deemed harmful to its interests. One famous exception to this norm was Prime Minister Netanyahu's decision in 2015 to address the United States Congress to oppose the nuclear agreement formulated by President Barack Obama. This reflected a trend that was similar to that of Begin, and to a certain extent even more serious: a Prime Minister coming into the President's backyard in front of the entire world (contrary to Begin, who did it in a small, closed group) to level harsh criticism at his strategic decision, i.e., the nuclear agreement with Iran. At the same time, however, Netanyahu sought to insist that he was maintaining the honor of the President, and took pains to praise the President for his actions on behalf of the State of Israel.

Quite surprisingly, the administration chose to contain Begin's provocative pronouncements and avoid escalating the confrontation with Israel. This suggests that despite the administration's criticism of Israel's military action in Lebanon, it viewed Israel as an important ally with which it must cooperate in advancing the strategic interests of both countries. Referring to the war in Lebanon, the President clarified his negative position toward the IDF action at the outset of his remarks. He defined the action as a "massive invasion" by Israel "into a country whose territorial integrity we're pledged to respect." He made it clear to the Prime Minister that the Israeli action was disproportionate to the provocations that preceded it. He further stressed that this was not an issue that concerned only Israel, Lebanon, and other countries in the region, but also US national interests, and therefore, the President was no less than "genuinely shocked" by the IDF action (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

The President subsequently sounded like someone trying to remove the administration's "mark of Cain" as if it gave Israel a "green light" to act against terrorist organizations in Lebanon: "You and I," the President told Begin, "have communicated personally about developments in Lebanon for more than a year. I tried to make clear that I share your concerns for the implications of the situation in Lebanon for your [Israel's] security, but repeatedly I've expressed the view that diplomatic solutions were the best way to proceed. I have said repeatedly that we would be unable to understand any military operation which was not clearly justified in the eyes of the international community by the nature of the provocation" (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982). In his autobiography, the President wrote, "I supported Israel's right to defend itself against attack. However, I asked them not to carry out a broad attack, unless it was provoked by its enemies with an attack that

justified its attack in the eyes of world public opinion" (Reagan, 1990, p. 419).

Perhaps in order to evince some kind of balance and latent understanding of Israel's combat activity, the President condemned the criminal act against Ambassador Argov, and emphasized that there could be no justification for terrorism. He emphasized that he was not ignoring the continued terrorist activity by the PLO from the Lebanese border against Israel in the past year, which led to an "accumulation of losses" in Israel. However, according to the President, this did not justify the tremendous "death and destruction" that the IDF action brought with it. In his opinion, the assassination attempt on Israel's ambassador and the PLO's terrorist activity against Israel did not justify Israel's destruction of Lebanon.

The President did not say so explicitly, but hinted that Israel had sought a pretext for exercising the strategic plan it had put together years earlier to bring about a change in the political situation in Lebanon. "At the beginning of 1982," Reagan recounted, "we started to receive credible messages that Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Sharon were planning a wide-ranging infiltration of Lebanon, and were waiting for some opportunity that would justify the realization of such an action" (Reagan, 1990, p. 419). According to this plan, Israel hoped to link up with the Christian minority in Lebanon with the aim of putting a Christian at the head of the Lebanese leadership. This leader would work to expel terrorist organizations from Lebanon, and strive for cooperation with Israel, and even for an official peace treaty. Indeed, following the war, there were similar arguments in Israel regarding Israel's military steps following the assassination attempt on Ambassador Argov. Claims were heard in many circles that this was a war of choice that was morally unjustified, because the State of Israel was not under immediate existential danger.

At this stage, it seems that the President apparently understood that his arguments had been exhausted and that there was no point in continuing the reprimand. In any case, the impression gained was that this was a friendly admonishment, and not a heated rebuke. The President clearly showed an understanding of Israel's intolerable situation, and it is doubtful whether he himself believed that it would be possible to restrain the terrorist organization's actions against Israel through diplomatic means. President Reagan is known as among the most pro-Israel American presidents. In the reception for Prime Minister Begin on September 9, 1981 in the United States, President Reagan referred to the State of Israel as a "friend" and "partner" of the United States (Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel following their meetings, 1981). In a letter to Prime Minister Begin in honor of Israel's Independence Day, President Reagan said that the ties between the United States and Israel can never be broken, and that they are eternal bonds. Israel would always be strong and prosperous, and the United States will be its closest friend (Reagan, 1982a). Here too, from the June 1982 protocols, it is difficult to judge the severity that the President attributed to Israel's actions, but the impression is that the words were spoken in a conciliatory rather than belligerent tone.

After finishing his criticism of Israel's action, the President was quick to clarify that "what's done is done," and said he was determined to "salvage from this tragedy a new Lebanon which will no longer constitute a threat to Israel, and which can become a partner in the peace process." "I know," said Reagan, "that these are also primary objectives of yours [Israel's]." At the same time, while trying to mollify the Israeli team, the President added a veiled threat: "If we work at cross purposes, Israel's own interests will be damaged." (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

Over the years, previous US administrations had made efforts to advance a peace process that would result in a kind of peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states. In most cases, these plans saw no significant achievements,

primarily because neither side had sufficient interest in concluding an agreement or was ready to pay the price entailed in such an agreement. The successes of the Nixon administration, Secretary of State Kissinger, and President Carter in formulating far-reaching agreements between Israel and Egypt were attributed to the traumatic effects of the Yom Kippur War. The war had extracted an extremely high price from both Egypt and Israel and pushed them to the conclusion that it would be in their best interest to reach an agreement that would end the conflict between them.

Thus, after finishing his admonishment, the President proposed a plan to solve the crisis in Lebanon, which would also serve Israel's interests. The current crisis, said the President, created an opportunity to work toward the establishment of a new government in Lebanon that would represent all of the major political and religious streams in the country, and would have the power to enforce its authority throughout Lebanon. Israel must help in realizing this process. In that context, almost certainly in view of information, Reagan clarified that the administration was well aware that Israel was acting to bring about a situation where a Christian leadership that was close to it would take control of Lebanon. The President stressed there would be no benefit to such a move since the new government in Lebanon would appear to be a surrogate. The President added that the current crisis was also an opportunity to expel foreign military forces from Lebanon, mainly Syrian and Palestinian forces. The Palestinian militias would need to be disarmed or evacuated from Lebanon, and the Lebanese government would need to decide the best way to do this. The Palestinians who decided to remain in Lebanon would need to live there in peace, with the understanding that they are subject to the authority of the elected government in Lebanon (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

The President continued that when the Lebanese government requested, Israel would need to pull its forces back to 40 kilometers from the border. Thereafter, discussions could begin on a gradual withdrawal of IDF forces and the entry of UN forces that would maintain the calm until the consolidation of the Lebanese government. In parallel, a timetable would be set for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. A discussion was to begin immediately on the structure and composition of the UN separation forces.

The President clarified that he was aware of Israel's opposition to UNIFIL forces fulfilling this role, and its preference for a multinational force. The President stressed that he prefers a reorganization of UNIFIL with a different composition than what is there instead of creating a new force. However, he is prepared to take heed of Israel's position on this matter (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982). Indeed, historical experience shows that UNIFIL forces, of any composition, are unable to prevent mutual belligerence between Israel and Lebanon. In a situation of mutual deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah, where both sides have an interest in maintaining calm, UNIFIL forces can play a positive role, mainly at the tactical level. Regarding UNIFIL's role years later, Assaf Orion writes, we need "a sober, balanced view of UNIFIL II" in the decade of its operation. Alongside a number of positive aspects relating to UNIFIL's contribution, Orion emphasizes that UNIFIL failed in fulfilling its major mission—perhaps inherently a "mission impossible: to support the Lebanese government and army in executing a move they had no intention of performing, namely disarming southern Lebanon, which in practice would have meant disarming Hezbollah" (Orion, 2016).

"Menachem," the President said to the Prime Minister, "our efforts to pursue new opportunities in Lebanon are consistent with our common goal of strengthening Israel's security. My commitment to Israel's security remains stronger than ever. Israel's qualitative superiority over its neighbors was shown in the battle in the Bekaa Valley." (The President

was almost certainly referring to the Air Force's successful destruction of Syria's surface-to-air batteries positioned in Lebanon, as well as dozens of Syrian Air Force combat aircraft in the early days of the war; Ivri, 2007). The President emphasized that the United States was committed to maintain Israel's qualitative military edge. Therefore, it was essential that Israel have confidence in the United States and in the objectives that it wanted to realize in the long term, first and foremost, ejecting the Soviet Union from the region and strengthening pro-Western regimes in the area. The President clarified that these regimes were now putting heavy pressure on the United States, demanding that it punish Israel for its combat actions in Lebanon. The United States' position in the Arab world was harmed as a result of the war in Lebanon. However, the United States was determined to maintain its relations with pro-Western countries in the region, primarily Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, and, if possible, even to improve relations with them (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

The President emphasized that he was ready to invest major political efforts to satisfy Israel's demands in Lebanon. This meant neutralizing heavy pressure from European states and the Arab world for a significant Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon: "I plan to also make tremendous efforts to establish a strong and stable government in Lebanon and an international policing force that will serve as a buffer between Israel and Lebanon until we can reach a comprehensive arrangement of the dispute." "However," he clarified to Begin, "I must have from you explicit commitments that Israel will take those steps necessary to achieve a breakthrough in the autonomy negotiations" (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

The autonomy plan proposed by Begin was intended to enable the Palestinians to manage their lives as independently as possible, though without sovereignty. Their areas of control were supposed to focus on internal issues such as education, healthcare, cultural life, and more. The Palestinians did not accept this plan and made it very clear that they demanded an independent state with full authorities and sovereignty. Like other administrations that believed it was possible to bridge the differences between Israel and the Palestinians, President Reagan's hope was that pressure on Israel to make its positions more flexible would advance the autonomy discussions. This would lead to the completion of an Israeli-Palestinian arrangement that would weaken the enemies of Israel and the United States, and perhaps enable a breakthrough to peace in the region. Obviously, due to the huge gaps in the positions of the parties, this assessment was based on unfounded expectations. An arrangement regarding autonomy, the President stressed, would also make it easier to reach favorable arrangements with Lebanon (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982). Thus, as an aside, the President created clear linkage between resolving the Lebanese problem, the security threat to Israel, and the Palestinian problem. Unquestionably the President knew that making such a connection touched on very sensitive nerves of the Prime Minister.

Later, the President raised the issue of US weapons sales to pro-Western countries in the region, chiefly Jordan and Saudi Arabia. All of this was almost certainly in view of his concerns that Israel would try to use its lobby in Congress to block these deals, which were considered by the Reagan administration to be highly important for the United States. The President's words emphasize clearly the powerful image that the Jewish lobby had within the administration. The President first said that there may be differences of opinion regarding the steps that should be taken in this context, but these countries depend on the United States for their security. Selling weapons to them would strengthen their security and encourage them to take risks for peace. "I don't expect you to come out and approve this," the President emphasized, "but for heaven's sake don't oppose us. I want again

to stress my commitment to maintain Israel's qualitative edge. Our ultimate purpose is to create 'more Egypts' ready to make peace with Israel" (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

Overall, the meeting was highlighted by several salient points. First, the President leveled criticism at Israel's military action in Lebanon, but the criticism was couched in moderate language. The President gave the impression that his criticism was obligatory lip service, and that he genuinely believed it was worth focusing on the main strategic issues that are of concern to both Israel and the United States. Second, the President presented clear positions on the issue of Lebanon and the resolution of the Palestinian issue. Third, he was committed to maintain Israel's qualitative edge over the Arab countries, and to consult with Israel before formulating clear ideas for an Arab-Israeli arrangement. Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister would have done well to humbly accept the criticism of the world's largest superpower, whose good will and cooperation were critical to Israel. It was important for the Prime Minister to focus on the truly essential issues for Israel's national interests, chiefly, strategic cooperation with the United States to limit the Soviet Union and its allies in the Middle East, led by Syria and the terrorist organizations.

However, it appears that Begin seemed personally insulted by the President's criticism of the war in Lebanon. He came to the meeting prepared to refute the arguments against the offensive in the north, and to clarify to the administration the justness of the war at any cost. This required him to put the issue of the war at the top of the agenda, and basically to argue with the President of the United States. To what extent, if at all, this mode of action was beneficial for Israel's interests, is unclear. "I have listened to your words very attentively," the Prime Minister told the President. "There were many words of criticism…I must openly respond to them, as is necessary between good friends." Israel, Begin stated, had found ten times as many Soviet weapons as they had thought existed in Lebanon, and that just a few days ago, Israeli forces had found a huge weapons storehouse in Sidon; Israel assessed that it would need ten large trucks working around the clock for six weeks to transfer the weapons to Israeli territory. Basically, Begin argued that this area of Lebanon had become a giant Soviet base that supervises Soviet activity in the region, that these bases house terrorists from other countries as well, and there is evidence of cooperation with terrorist organizations in various countries in the Soviet bloc (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

Beyond the need to justify the war, Begin's words were intended to instill in the Reagan administration the assessment that there was a clear confluence of interests between Israel and the United States, and that Israel's combat activity in Lebanon also served US interests and not just those of Israel. "Our military actions," Begin stressed, "removed the danger of death that threatened Israel's citizens in the north. At the same time, our action was of tremendous help to the United States and the free world as well. We managed to take a Soviet base and the command center of an international terrorist organization out of action. The terrorists are still in western Beirut, but they are in a state of confusion and retreat. There were a number of difficult battles. My heart is pained over every loss, whether Lebanese or Palestinian, but I am especially pained over the loss of Israeli soldiers. So far, we have 216 dead and over 1,000 wounded. For the Jewish people, who lost six million in the Holocaust, this is a heavy price. We did not want trouble with the Syrians and we tried to avoid it. But they insisted on joining the battle" (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

The Prime Minister then moved to explain the issue of the objectives of the war, which was a bone of contention between Israel and the United States, as well as among the Israeli public. In particular, he took time to explain going past the 40-kilometer boundary, which

aroused serious disputes both abroad and in Israel: "I understand," he said, "someone told you that I had misled you. I am an old man, and in all my life, I never knowingly misled anyone. I would surely not deceive the president of the most powerful nation in the world. As far as the 40-kilometer zone which was actually our objective, we had to go well beyond it in order to assure we would not continue to be fired on from beyond the zone. These were purely military tactical moves which any army would have to do to assure the security of the 40-kilometer zone itself" (Regan-Begin meeting, 1982).

It is very doubtful whether these explanations were sufficient to convince the President, who clearly did not have the tools to judge the necessity of Israeli action beyond the lines to which the Israeli government had committed. His ability to be convinced by these arguments depended on the degree of personal trust he felt toward Begin. From this standpoint, the lengthy attention that Begin paid to the President's comments concerning Israeli operations in Lebanon and his own attention to the details created the misleading impression of a significant disagreement between the two countries in this regard and increased the suspicion between them (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

Adding to these remarks, Begin gave the President many examples from US history to prove that the US acted in many instances similar to the way Israel was acting, again to prove the justness of the war. The Prime Minister then moved to criticize the President over the fact that he used the term "invade Lebanon": "For god's sake," he said to the President, "we did not invade Lebanon; we were being attacked by bands operating across our border and we decided that we had to defend ourselves against them. What would you have done if Russia were still occupying Alaska and was permitting armed bands to operate across your border?… What we did was merely to defend ourselves" (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

The President stressed that the impression created in the United States was different, namely, that Israel blew up targets in Beirut after the attempt on Ambassador Argov's life, and that the firing of missiles at Israel was in reaction to those attacks. "We must consider the picture seen by public opinion," Reagan told the Prime Minister. "Our public saw destroyed buildings in Beirut and views your actions differently than what you expected." In response, Begin claimed that the liberal media was biased against Israel, and that Palestinian losses reported in the media were highly exaggerated. Moreover, Begin told President Reagan, "your Jewish citizens are strongly behind us. There are millions of Christians in the US supporting us" (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982).

"I understand," Begin said to the President, "someone told you that I had misled you. I am an old man, and in all my life, I never knowingly misled anyone. I would surely not deceive the president of the most powerful nation in the world. As far as the 40-kilometer zone which was actually our objective, we had to go well beyond it in order to assure we would not continue to be fired on from beyond the zone. These were purely military tactical moves which any army would have to do to assure the security of the 40-kilometer zone itself."

Begin then again discussed the political aspect of the crisis. He expressed support for President Reagan's announcement that Israeli forces would need to withdraw from Lebanon, but also that it would be necessary to prevent continued terrorist action against it. Israel proposed a 40-kilometer buffer zone where multinational forces would be stationed. He clarified that the United States had experience with multinational forces, and that the UN was belligerent toward Israel, which this was reflected in the fact that many delegations left the General Assembly hall before he began his speech there (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982). Begin did not completely reject the

option of positioning UN forces as a buffer, but his remarks clearly indicated a preference for American forces, perhaps in conjunction with other pro-Western countries. Such forces were positioned in Sinai as part of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.

Following the broad forum, the two leaders conferred as part of a lunch with their teams. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger opened with a review of the American strategy in the Middle East. Begin expressed reservations regarding the trend outlined in these remarks; he apparently saw it as an attempt to strengthen the administration's relations with the Arab world at the expense of Israel. At this stage, Weinberger, who was known for his anti-Israel approach, interrupted and argued that the good relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia made it possible to press the PLO to accept a ceasefire with Israel (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982). The comment greatly angered Begin, almost certainly because its message was that Israel was in an inferior position to the PLO, which required it to "beg for its life" as it were, and to seek a ceasefire. Begin cut off Weinberger, stating that he was mistaken. According to Begin, it was Egypt, and not Saudi Arabia, that had exerted pressure on the PLO to agree to the ceasefire. Weinberger tried to defend and explain himself, but Begin would not let him continue, and said that the President gave him (Begin) permission to speak (Reagan-Begin meeting, 1982). During the cabinet meeting after his meeting with President Reagan, Begin said that there were two schools of thought in the American administration. One, led by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, was friendly toward Israel, and the other, led by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, was hostile (Naor & Lamprom, 2014).

Conclusion

The strategic dialogue between Israel and the United States prior to the outbreak of the First Lebanon War and during the early stages of that war reflects the beginning of a slow and gradual change in US-Israel relations. This trend was not consistent, and featured ups and downs over the years. In the first decades after the establishment of the State of Israel, the emphasis in the administration's policy was based on the assumption that in the Arab-Israeli dispute, the national interest of the United States required it to support the Arab position almost entirely. This US stance was well reflected in the policy that the US adopted following the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the conclusion of the armistice agreements. Although the United States was a major player in formulating the processes to bring an end to the Israeli War of Independence and the signing of the armistice agreements, in practice it did not recognize the outcomes of the war. Throughout the 1950s, the United States demanded that Israel retreat from the status quo that was created after the war and officially agreed upon in the armistice agreements with regard to the following main issues: the validity of the armistice lines; the status of the Palestinian refugees, and Jerusalem. The administration's assumption was that Israel was almost completely dependent on the United States, and therefore it would have no wherewithal to refuse demands from the administration on issues surrounding Israel's security policy and its relations with the Arab world.

The heavy pressure accompanied by harsh threats applied by various presidents toward Israel regarding the advancement of agreements between Israel and the Arab states should be seen against this background. During the 1950s, the United States under President Eisenhower, in conjunction with Britain, formulated a plan for a diplomatic arrangement between Israel and Egypt (the Alpha Plan), under which Israel would need to withdraw from large parts of the Negev. The two powers threatened to apply serious economic sanctions against Israel if it refused to accept the proposal. In the end, the plan was shelved due to Egyptian opposition. Following the Sinai Campaign (1957-1956) the United States in conjunction with the Soviet

Union successfully applied heavy pressure on Israel to withdraw from Sinai.

Over the years, American administrations came to recognize that despite Israel's heavy dependence on the US in a wide variety of areas, the United States could not force Israel to adopt positions that were contrary to Israel's vital interests. Eventually, American administrations gradually realized that they were acting within a power structure of different and sometimes conflicting interests that did not allow them to apply their full enforcement capabilities on Israel. Those factors included the White House, Congress, the judicial system, public opinion, the media, ethnic and religious groups such as the Evangelists, various lobbying groups, and more.

A clear expression of the limits of the administration's power came during the difficult struggle between the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations against the continued development of an Israeli nuclear option. Immense pressure was applied on Prime Ministers Ben-Gurion, Eshkol, and Meir to halt this strategic project. Eventually, it became clear to the United States that this was a supreme Israeli national interest and that Washington would do well to come to agreements in this context on the terms and ways it should continue to operate instead of unsuccessfully trying to stop such activity completely. On issues such as the status of the territories, the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, and Jerusalem, there has also been a marked change over the years in the American position to Israel's benefit. On all of those issues, the American stance was initially almost absolutely opposed to Israel's positions. All US administrations since the end of the Six Day War, in different levels of intensity, argued that Israel should basically agree to withdraw to the June 5, 1967 armistice lines, and that settlements in the territories were an obstacle to peace.

This change in US positions in this regard was evident in a letter from President George W. Bush to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (Bush, 2004), in which he stipulated that it would be necessary to demarcate a border that would recognize the demographic situation created over the years in Judea and Samaria, with the construction of large settlement blocs in parts of that area (Shalom, 2010). Another tangible expression was provided by the Trump administration with the transfer of the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the recognition of the application of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and the declared support for Israel's positions concerning the Palestinian issue (Yadlin, 2017). There is a real possibility that before the end of his first presidential term (November 2020), President Trump may recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley.

The minutes of the meeting between President Reagan and Prime Minister Menachem Begin examined in this essay show that the Reagan administration clearly recognized the limits of the administration's power over Israel in the early stages of the First Lebanon War. On the one hand, the President felt bound to express his anger over Israel's military action in Lebanon, which harmed US interests, and particularly its ties with the Arab world. On the other hand, the way he expressed his position indicates his understanding that Israel's action was necessary in order to defend the State of Israel and its citizens, and that in any case the US was limited in its ability to force Israel to end the war without assuring Israel that the threats from Lebanon would be removed. A hidden component in formulating the US position regarding the campaign in Lebanon was the fact that the IDF did not fulfill the administration's expectations to tap its absolute military superiority in order to bring the campaign to a quick end with minimal harm to the civilian population. This undoubtedly contributed much to the weakening of the Israeli position vis-à-vis the US. A similar phenomenon repeated itself during the Second Lebanon War and during Operation Protective Edge, when following weeks of fighting, the IDF did not succeed

in attaining a victory over either Hezbollah or Hamas, even though the administration supported Israel's right to defend itself and granted it broad freedom of action (Shalom, 2014; Shalom & Hendel, 2007). It is very clear that had the IDF succeeded in achieving a decisive victory in Lebanon within a short time and with minimal harm to the civilian population, the Reagan administration's position toward the campaign would likely have been very different.

This insight remained relevant in other confrontations, and it will remain relevant into the future. Since the First Lebanon War, Israel has engaged in a number of military confrontations with its enemies, chiefly Hezbollah and Hamas. None of those confrontations ended rapidly, and certainly not with a decisive victory. In all of the confrontations, the dilemma of extracting a heavy price from the enemy versus the knowledge that such an action would necessarily involve harm to the civilian population surfaced repeatedly. In view of the massive media presence in these confrontations, it is quite clear that any confrontation would necessarily lead to damage regarding Israel's position in global public opinion. Future military confrontations will also likely place Israel in similar dilemmas. The basic assumption is that the harsh pictures that flood television screens will also force countries that are friendly toward Israel to protest its military actions, and this in turn will naturally narrow Israel's maneuvering room. Therefore, Israel's ability to bring about a rapid end to a future military confrontation with minimal loss of life to civilians takes on critical importance.

The Reagan-Begin meeting contains important lessons in the context of Israel's relations with the United States, for our time and for the future. Under the circumstances created with the opening of the campaign in Lebanon, and in view of the increased protests surrounding Israel's military action as the war proceeded, it should have been considered carefully whether the timing of the meeting was proper. A meeting between an Israeli Prime Minister and a US President must be held at a time convenient to both sides, which helps ensure its success. In such a critical issue to the State of Israel, extraneous risks should not be taken.

During the meeting, the Prime Minister left much room for a confrontation with the President and his staff surrounding the administration's criticism of Israel's military actions. There is no great advantage to a confrontation over criticism from a friendly power such as the United States regarding Israel's military actions, especially since this criticism seemed to be very moderate, almost as if obligatory. The Israeli reaction just sharpened the dispute between the states and did not contribute to strengthened bilateral ties.

Beyond that, during the meeting Prime Minister Begin showed an exaggerated tendency to oppose President Reagan, while frequently presenting events from American history that ostensibly revealed political hypocrisy. This undoubtedly created embarrassment within the American administration, but it is unclear how it served Israel's national interests. Prime Minister Netanyahu was forced to adopt a contrarian approach to the US when he decided to speak before Congress and level public criticism at President Obama over the nuclear agreement with Iran, which Netanyahu saw as a tangible threat to Israel's security. Although the Obama administration drew no satisfaction from this show of strength in its backyard, it did not react with any substantial harm to Israel's important interests. During Obama's term, the strategic ties between Israel and the US grew significantly tighter.

Any Israeli leadership must clearly recognize that the relationship between the two countries is asymmetrical, and there is no point in demanding equality in the attitudes toward the two countries' military actions. Under the circumstances in which the meeting between President Reagan and Prime Minister Begin was held, the disputes should have been minimized as much as possible,

and the discussion should have focused on gaining far-reaching understandings with the administration surrounding ways in which Israel needed to act in order to minimize the threats it faced. However, the impression gained from the minutes of the meeting is that the Reagan administration apparently realized that Menachem Begin was a "different species" of prime minister. This was a leader who carried with him the tragic history of the Jewish nation over thousands of years, and the need that burned in his bones to emphasize the justice of Israel's path against other nations. Under these circumstances, the administration understood that it should not expect that traditional diplomatic niceties would be binding on him. Netanyahu also tends to weave Jewish and historic motifs into his remarks. It seems that the inclusion of such motifs has contributed to his international standing.

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Compositional and Operational Flexibility in the "New Wars": Military Mission Formations and Collective Action

Eyal Ben-Ari

In contemporary conflicts, militaries participate in multi-member mission formations: temporary structures composed of armed forces, governmental organizations, and civilian entities. To achieve flexible, coherent, collective action, these formations must be adaptable to in-theater conditions and external demands, and to expectations about how armed force is used. This article is integrative and synthetic: integrative in that it incorporates diverse sources and cases, and synthetic in that it formulates a model of how today's forces are shaped and used for successful adaptation. First, it argues that today's formations are marked by a scale, complexity, and diversity that is very different from past amalgamations. Second, it contends that internal diversity allows them to adapt both to changing operational environments and external demands. Third, it explains that their internal diversity represents both an adaptive potential but also difficulties for achieving coherent, collective action. The article concludes with six major dilemmas in the design of current-day mission formations.

Keywords: mission formations, adaptation, organizational flexibility, new wars

Introduction

Clearly how armed forces of industrial democracies operate in contemporary armed conflicts has changed. These conflicts, often characterized as the "new wars," are complex and fuzzy, relatively permanent or lingering, and combine an often-bewildering array of actors with manifold interests, values, and goals. Accordingly, operating in theater has come to involve not only multiple units (often spanning the entire spectrum of military capabilities) but also a host of governmental organizations (intelligence and espionage or diplomatic and developmental) and civilian entities (such as humanitarian movements and the media, or private security companies and logistics firms). In addition, in-theater forces have to meet the demands and expectations of external actors (governments, the media, judicial systems, or social movements) regarding where, when, and how they use armed force. As a consequence, we are told, militaries have, or should, become variously modular, malleable, seamless, ambidextrous, or hybrid (Haltiner & Kummel, 2009; Kummel, 2011; McChrystal, 2015; Shields & Travis, 2017; Soeters, 2008). All these terms emphasize flexibility and adaptability given the diverse and at times conflicting expectations and dictates directed at armed forces in theater. But how does one achieve such flexibility and adaptability?

To meet the challenges of current conflicts and enabled by new technologies (King, 2011; Shields, 2011), the armed forces have developed organizational structures based both on older forms of hierarchy and newer ones, such as networks, teams of teams, heterarchical models, or temporary ad hoc coalitions. Organizationally these, most often temporary, structures are diverse in terms of numbers and diversity of components, size and boundary status, motive structures, temporal orientations, and types of internal and external linkages. The highly diverse composition and modes of action of the new military formations are the organizational answer to the complex, often contradictory, environments within which armed forces operate (Hasselbladh, 2007; King, 2011; Zaccaro et al., 2011). In other words, the internal diversity of the new ensembles must match the variety and complexity of the environment if they are to address and adapt to the multiple challenges before them (Finkel, 2011; Gill & Thompson, 2017; Nuciari, 2007; Poole & Contractor, 2011). Thus, how is collective, coordinated, and concerted action possible within flexible, adaptable structures marked by high internal diversity?

Adaptation is the process of adjusting one's actions, assumptions, or predictions about operational environments in ways that alter interaction with those environments either in the immediate timeframe or in preparation for future interaction (Murray, 2011). Adaptation contrasts with innovation that takes place during periods of relative calm, and involves thinking through problems and adopting previous adaptations within an organization so that it will be able to succeed in a similar fashion. Seen in this manner, the question guiding this article differs from the one usually asked by scholars and professionals about military adaptation. Many previously published studies focus either on the macro-level of states and armed forces (for instance, Barry, 2016; Fox, 2017; Finkel, 2011) or the micro-tactical level (see Griffith, 1996; Lupfer, 1981; Gudmundsson, 1989). Furthermore, the majority of such studies focus on adaptation in conventional wars and usually investigate one national military (or compare discrete national cases). Studies of today's conflicts—amalgams of older and newer forms—usually continue to concentrate on one country (Catignani, 2014a; Marcus, 2017; Russel, 2010; Schmitt, 2017; Serena, 2011). Theoretically, these works typically use various forms of organizational learning models to analyze the propensities toward adaptation and the processes by which it takes place (Jensen, 2018). Farrell's work alone or with others (Farrell, 2010; Farrell et al., 2013a; Farrell et al., 2013b) is

representative of this very fruitful line of analysis that emphasizes the dimensions that shape adaptation (military culture and history, civil-military relations, or different kinds of national political dynamics).

The focus of this article, however, is different and is much closer to the relevant literature on forms of multinational forces (McCrystal, 2015; Goldenberg & Dean, 2017) in that it does not analyze inclinations to adapt or the dynamics by which units acquire new abilities. Rather, it centers on the potential for a particular organizational form that has evolved: to the how rather than the when, and under what circumstances of actual adaptation. Along these lines, I adopt Finkel's (2011) emphasis on the importance of flexibility in war, but shift the analysis to its organizational building blocks. Again, the article does not deal with how mission formations came about (through improvisation or planning, top driven or emerging from the bottom) but rather what this new paradigm looks like and what potential it represents.

I thus approach the question of adaptation through an analysis of how contemporary military formations (alone or with civilian partners) are designed and operate both to adapt and achieve coherent, collective action. My analysis is based on a wide-ranging reading of professional and scholarly literature on the contemporary armed forces of industrial democracies and is integrative and synthetic in its aims: integrative in that it incorporates diverse sources and cases, and synthetic in that it formulates a model of how today's forces are shaped and used to adapt successfully to both in-theater operational challenges and external demands.

Before moving on, let me further clarify my analytical focus. To begin, one could surely argue that such mission formations have long been used by the armed forces (Finkel, 2011) and that military doctrine of many forces already embody the importance of such formations. However, I show that today's amalgamations are far more diverse than those used until the end of the Cold War, even though the beginnings of change were evident already then. In addition, the very scale and level of formations is very different from that found in conventional wars with, for example, divisions now spanning hundreds of kilometers and including a vast array of elements, including many civilian (King, 2019). Hence, this is not an article about doctrine or military theory, nor is it a text that provides recipes for how to improve the effectiveness of current operations (although such prescriptions can be derived from it). Rather, it offers a sustained investigation from the perspective of organization studies that aims to widen our understanding of the kinds of forms through which many of today's missions take place. This point definitely does not mean that mission formations are a guaranteed solution to all current security problems and armed conflicts. Instead, it shows the organizational potential that has led decision makers to adopt these organizational forms.

My argument is threefold. First, I contend that today's formations are marked by a scale, complexity, and diversity that is very different from such amalgamations in the past. Second, I argue that their internal diversity allows them to adapt both to changing operational environments and challenges and to transforming political and social expectations about how armed force is to be used. Third, I explain that their internal complexity and diversity represents both an adaptive potential but also difficulties for achieving coherent, collective action.

Mission Formations and Collective Action

To answer the question about collective action, I develop a conceptual framework initially formulated with colleagues (Ben-Ari 2011, 2015, 2017; Brond, Ben-Shalom, & Ben-Ari, forthcoming; Sher et al., 2011), focusing on the composition, dynamics, and dilemmas of what we called military mission formations: combinations, fusions, and blends of various

military units, sometimes with civilian entities (governmental and non-governmental) in temporary, usually mission-specific amalgams for specific tasks, including violent encounters. In theoretical organizational parlance, these mission formations are organizational ecosystems marked by their own internal logic and order but also capable of adapting to their environments. The concept of mission formations may include not only fighting configurations, but groupings centered on military units working alongside others in disaster relief or supplying medicine and food to endangered populations.

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Thus, I use the concept of mission formations rather than task forces or multi-team systems (Zaccaro et al., 2011) to convey a wider array of organizational phenomena that include temporary battle groups, intelligence fusion centers (Dostri & Michael, 2019; Michael et al., 2017), study missions, multi-national contingents (Friesendorf, 2018; King, 2006; Ruffa, 2018), mission control rooms, project teams, alliances between units and NGOs, technical unions (Lo, 2019), groupings of military forces and private companies (providing, for example, security and infrastructure) (Osinga & Lindley-French, 2010), modular forms organized for high-intensity policing, ensembles of regular and reserve forces (Bury, 2019; Schilling, 2019), groups for humanitarian work (Eldridge, 2017), or logistical task forces (van Kampen et al., 2012). For the purposes of this article I do not examine more or less permanent structures like NATO, but do refer to formations as the forces constructed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, Peace Keeping Operations, or the special forces task force created in Iraq (McChrystal, 2015). In addition, all these organizational forms are peopled by troops that are diverse in terms of gender and sexual orientation, race and ethnicity, class and educational level, as well as motivations and experiences, military occupation, and training or belonging to support or combat units (Michael, 2007).

Analytically, the concept of mission formations is intended to capture the (ongoing) processual nature of the amalgamations, assemblages, or combinations that military involvement in conflicts necessitates (Brond, Ben-Shalom, & Ben-Ari, forthcoming). They are all what Czarniewska (2005 ,2004) calls action sets oriented toward goals and seeking information about their environments, possessing internal (sometimes contradictory) structures, and marked by specific social and organizational characteristics and by degrees of temporariness (with many being one-time ventures). Mission formations habitually carry out tasks both sequentially (differing actions along a timeline) and simultaneously (heterogeneous activities at the same time). Moreover, in contrast to permanent organizations, there is no assumption about mission formations reproducing themselves and remaining constant over time (Poole and Contractor, 2011) (although a series of overlapping and interlocking mission formations may coalesce into a more lasting structure [Mathieu, 2011]). Accordingly, my focus is on "tailored" temporary organizational "conglomerates" that include an array of capabilities and expertise to meet the complex demands of today's missions (only some of which are akin to classic task forces).

The governing consideration in all of these formations is that they fit and adapt to the challenges of their specific environments (Kramer et al., 2012). Thus, there is no set, "standard" (schoolbook) model for such

formations, although general guidelines for design are useful and can be found in some military doctrine (Leonhard, 2008). The very specificity of each mission formation is especially important in today's "complex irregular warfare" or "hybrid wars" (Hoffman, 2007) where the complexity of arenas and adversaries necessitate unique compositions and operation. But the challenges are not only "in theater," because such formations must also answer macro social expectations—casualty aversion, marketization, technologization, or juridification of the military, to mention a few (Shaw, 2005; Levy, 2012)—that inform and shape concrete prescriptions for action. In other words, today's mission formations must meet not only military challenges but the newer social expectations emanating from their societies that dispatched them and the international community.

This point explains the reason for the internal organizational diversity of today's mission formations, as the internal diversity of formation must match the variety and complexity of its environment if it is to deal with the operational challenges and social expectations of that environment (Finkel, 2011; Gill & Thompson, 2017). Concretely, the fact that any specific conflict is no longer limited to the actual theater where violence is used but takes place in other arenas—the media, parts of societies, or judicial systems—has brought about the creation of new, or expansion of older, organizational structures whose aim is to answer the new challenges. It is for this reason that many of today's formations include such roles as military lawyers, spokespersons, and liaison officers who hold boundary-spanning roles linking the formation to external environments and who operate variously as mediators, brokers, cultural interpreters, negotiators, or sometimes "fixers" (see McChrystal, 2015 on liaisons).

The classic, if at times stereotyped, military solution to achieving collective action in uncertain environments has centered on planned, controlled, and coordinated actions based on professional training and socialization, and embedded knowledge and competence in organizational doctrines, recipes, and practices (Hasselbladh, 2007). This design and standardization serves to ensure the exchangeability of personnel who are trained similarly and are versed in articulated procedures. But in today's mission formations, it is hard to standardize across so many participating roles, units, and organizations (many outside the armed forces), and hierarchical authority must be complemented by persuasion and partnering.

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Against this background the especially problematic nature of achieving coordinated, collective action in mission formations is evident. Such collective action among any group of actors involves dependency on partners' cooperating behavior (Bollen & Soeters, 2007) and often competition over resources (Michael et al., 2017), and is intensified in mission formations since the constituent units are all embedded in differing "home" organizations, be they national militaries or "organic" regiments or outfits (Zaccaro et al., 2011). Thus, the problems of achieving collective action are compounded by differences in professionalism, inter-service, and sometimes inter-agency rivalries, modes of operation, and in the case of multinational forces, differences in national military ways or communications styles (Autesserre, 2014; Friesendorf, 2018; King, 2006; Ruffa, 2018;

Soeters et al., 2012). Compounding these difficulties is the fact that these formations are usually loose, temporary structures sometimes marked by unclear division of labor and authority, and are political arenas through which constituent actors promote and advance their own ends (Winslow, 2002). One example is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams established in Afghanistan where tensions often arose between military officers, civilians dealing with political and developmental tasks and police who handled law and order with each having different goals and motivations, images of "customers," assumptions about security, or temporal orientation (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005; Poole & Contractor, 2011).

Key Features of Mission Formations

While the built-in diversity of components and the existence of boundary-spanning roles help mission formations achieve their goals, they do not suffice. Rather, other conditions and processes must be in place to achieve adaptable collective action.

Standardization within participating entities. For all of the flexibility necessitated in today's missions, it is clear that there is a continued need for standardization and solidity *within* a formation's components—especially in its military units. While standardization and bureaucratization of organizations can lead to rigidity and inertia (Biehl, 2008), they also have advantages. With too much change and adjustment, military units lose their robustness, resilience, and consistency (Hasselbladh & Yden, forthcoming). The deployment of military forces in situations marked by an inherent potential for violence, chaos, and strategic ambiguity means that military organizations, perhaps even more than other large scale organizations, depend on formal rules and procedures (Barkawi & Brighton, 2011). In other words, it is the very solidity of the constituent military units—their capacity for autonomous action—based on standards, intense socialization, training, doctrine, and discipline that grants them the capacity to be central modules of mission formations (De Waard & Kramer, 2007); in fact, solid, robust, and resilient autonomy facilitates operational flexibility (Kramer & De Graaf, 2012).

Two examples may illuminate this point. While Europe's new brigades studied by Anthony King (2011) are composed of a much larger variety of components than the brigades of the Cold War, their constituent units (e.g., companies of engineers or units of artillery as well as infantry and armored forces) are capable of autonomous action and predicated on organizational solidity. This means that under trying circumstances they have the potential for survivability. Similarly, in the combined special operations formation in Iraq, each unit was expected to stay true to its own ethos while capable of being linked to other units in various ways (McChrystal, 2015). Hence just as professionalism, a clear doctrine, and mastery of drills allow improvisations, so component-centered stability, solidity, and order enable flexibility.

Autonomy and collective action. While the autonomy of constituent units contributes to the adaptability of mission formations, membership in mission formations is not "natural" for the constituent entities, since they may not have previous relations between them, and joining in collective action involves a loss of independence and discretion, and possible loss of uniqueness and identity. Formations are not just means for coordination where there are clear boundaries between organizations so that there is no hindrance between the actions of one and the other as in national battalions working alongside each other in many multinational forces (Friesendorf, 2018; King, 2006; Ruffa, 2018), nor are they mergers where the constituent units lose their independent identity and structure. Rather, the idea is that participating in formations necessitates both a consciousness of common goals and the independent, autonomous contribution of each member entity (a similar conceptualization can be found in Michael et al., 2017).

Dominant cores. A key feature of successful mission formations is the existence of a dominant core, whether it be a main military discipline or arm or (as in multinational formations) a major nation (say, as in the PRTs). This core provides a strong national or disciplinary collective repertoire for understanding (classification, selection, and interpretation) and action (prescriptions) (Hasselbladh & Yden, forthcoming) and is what directs and controls the formation. For example, in Afghanistan's Uruzgan the Australians had to adapt to the larger Dutch component, and in Iraq's Samawah the Japanese had to adapt to the Dutch contingent that led the efforts there (Aoi, 2017). In both cases, the Dutch component supplied a structure as an anchoring core for other units. Similarly, to follow King (2011), in multinational headquarters there is an advantage if the key element of formation speaks its own language, has common professional practices, and sometimes is composed of personnel who know each other. Other components can unite around this core staff since they provide a common reference point. Or, to offer another example of the Joint Special Forces Task Force in Iraq headed by McChrystal (McChrystal, 2015), the team of teams coalesced around the dominant American core. The disadvantage of this situation is that too strong a core may lead to domination by one group. This has sometimes been the case, as in the supremacy of US components in NATO's efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina or the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Gill & Thompson, 2017; Soeters et al., 2012).

Designed modularity. The constituent elements can then be assembled into formations in modular forms that combine different kinds of expertise to enhance their adaptability (Kramer & de Graaf, 2012). This is the basis for their flexibility because a modular composition makes it easier to change overall composition as new circumstances emerge. Furthermore, this design balances a preference for core units around which the formation is created with the creative potential arising out of the upredictable relations developing between the constituent units in what McChrystal (2015) calls serendipitous encounters.

Communication and trust. Designing and assembling formations is not enough since the interactions linking their components are no less central to effectiveness and adaptability. As in all relations, trust is a key element. At their inception, trust in mission formations involves swift trust based on categorical knowledge, that is, interactions based on stereotypes of others (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Hyllengren et al., 2011; Schilling 2019). But over time more lasting forms evolve (Gill & Thompson, 2017; McChrystal, 2015; Michael et al., 2017; Soeters et al., 2012). Trust—and not necessarily friendship—is usually the outcome of military competence and mutual professional respect, as among many of Europe's highly professionalized troops (Biehl, 2008; King, 2011) or SOF where members learn a "fluency" with their team members (McChrystal, 2015). Yet according to studies of mission formations, trust can also evolve out of other processes, be they informal meetings over food and drink or "conversations at the coffee machine" (Elron et al., 1999, 2003; Goldenberg & Dean, 2017; Leonhard, 2008; Maniscalco, 2008; Van den Heuvel, 2007) or the sharing of information that is seen as both an index of and a way to gain confidence in relations (Bury, 2019; Kramer & de Graaf, 2012; Resteigne & Van den Bogaert 2013; Soeters et al., 2010).

Operationally, trust emerging across components of formations is often the result of overlapping personal networks through which much of the informal communication, information sharing, and social exchange occur. As studies have shown, these networks are crucial, since they allow disseminating knowledge that is often non-transferable via formal means (Catignani, 2008, 2014b; Goldenberg & Dean, 2017; Hasselbladh & Yden, forthcoming; Leonhard, 2008; O'Toole & Talbot, 2011). This localized learning is related to the collective action of formations:

double-loop learning is what gives formations the ability to change norms and practices according to local circumstances or emerging contingencies. Yet such networks also carry potential disadvantages, since sharing may create local parochial knowledge that cannot be generalized, and horizontal ties can lead to cliques and over-politicization of formations.

Control and direction: Leadership. To achieve cooperative, coordinated action, any system needs some kind of control and direction personified in command (Ben-Ari, 2011). The emphasis is command and not commanders, since functions of leadership may be divided among a group of individuals into what King (2019) calls a "command collective" or what is known in organization studies as "distributed leadership" (Bolden, 2011). This point is important since "command" combines the executive function of making decisions along with motivating, creating a common consciousness, and managing operations. Importantly, in temporary structures like mission formations, shared consciousness—or shared mental models (Crichton et al., 2005; Goodwin et al., 2018)—does not imply some kind of sameness of interpretation and action, but rather a common understanding that leaves place for discretion. To cite McChrystal (2015), this means a generalized awareness with specialized expertise.

The advantage of mission formations lies in the fact that in today's complex conflicts they are tailor-made by combining entities of different size, expertise, or capacity according to circumstances (composition flexibility). Further, once in place, such compositions are ideally able to adapt flexibly to local circumstances by changing configurations and capacities in uncertain environments (operational flexibility).

Commanders have an especially important role in creating these shared understandings through concrete practices that also underlie trust. One such set of practices centers on managing distributive fairness (a seemingly just allocation of resources), burden sharing (in terms of risks), or power (access to decision making processes) (Bogers et al., 2012). Perceived justice can also be symbolic as in acknowledgment by leaders of even temporary status as a member of the formation. But composed as they are of diverse components, this point may be problematic in formations since there is a need to share glory and achievements with others, and some member entities may not be satisfied with such a situation.

One fruitful way to understand command in temporary, ad hoc formations is via the idea of missions as ventures or projects; an idea that encapsulates undertakings requiring concerted, coordinated effort toward organizational goals according to planned and emergent schemes for a limited period but allowing for their constantly contingent nature and the emerging processes by which such schemes come to fruition. Commanders as managers of projects thus often head temporary organizations, and their role lies in setting objectives, motivating team members, and planning and executing work (Gill &Thompson, 2017; Goldenberg & Dean, 2017; Soeters, van Femema, & Beeres et al., 2010; Zaccaro et al., 2011).

Flexibility, Adaptability, and Control

Against this background, the (potential) adaptability of mission formations should be analyzed. Here de Waard and Kramer's (2007) differentiation is instructive. They distinguish between strategic flexibility entailing the ability to assemble and reassemble different configurations or components into an organizational form, and operational flexibility involving the capacity to deploy effective task forces able to adapt and remain adaptable to local conditions. Modularity of diverse components is at the heart of both kinds of flexibility, and systems are modular when their components can be disaggregated and reconfigured into new configurations with little

loss of functionality (de Waard & Soeters, 2007), due to their autonomy and in the case of the military solidity and resilience.

From an operational point of view, the advantage of mission formations lies in the fact that in today's complex conflicts they are tailor-made by combining entities of different size, expertise, or capacity according to circumstances (composition flexibility). Further, once in place, such compositions are ideally able to adapt flexibly to local circumstances by changing configurations and capacities in uncertain environments (operational flexibility). Because components of formations differ in their capacity for autonomous action or the degree of "local autonomy" given them, in different instances they may be loosely or tightly coupled with other entities and controlled or directed to a greater or lesser degree.

Control and coordination are crucial here. In strictly military formations the coordination leading to collective action is relatively simple given hierarchical structures and clearly defined authority. However, the greater the diversity of components—e.g., in multinational contingents or those combining military and civilian entities—the more the need not only for formal authority but for softer forms of motivation, regulation, supervision, and oversight. Here the role of the core component is central in that it provides the headquarters and liaison roles and uses combinations of orders, persuasion, coercion, or bargaining through material or other incentives. However, a central component is not enough. To operate coherently, participants need to be able to interact and cooperate with each other laterally, sometimes independently of the explicit direction of their commanders. A "simple" emphasis on mission control or mission command with autonomy granted to local level commanders misses the point of how so much of collective action is the outcome of horizontal linkages (some tightly and some loosely coupled, with more or less permeable boundaries) that any given unit develops. The interstitial nature of these forms is crucial, as suggested by Michael et al. (2017), whose analysis of the adaptable potential of intelligence fusion centers is applicable more generally. They posit that such centers—in my conceptualization, mission formations—are a separate space (away from each entity's home organizations) within which new kinds of knowledge and action become possible. Within these organizational forms the individual autonomy of each entity is granted, even promoted, but in a way that contributes to the overall goal.

Until now the emphasis in my analysis has been on operational requirements. What I add to de Waard and Kramer's conceptualization is that mission formations must meet not only operational demands, but the contemporary social and political expectations of how armed conflicts are waged. Hence, I now move onto the macro-social changes that, while outside the theater, greatly influence the composition and modes of action of mission formations. While mission formations bear similarities to parallel civilian cases, being military in nature, they always contain the potential for using organized (legitimate) state violence. In this respect, Shaw (2005) has posited the emergence of "risk-transfer war" centered on minimizing life risks to the military, and thus the political risks to their civilian leaders. This consideration is compounded by the much greater monitoring of military—its "global surveillance" (Shaw 2005)—by a plethora of political overlords, senior commanders, the media and the courts, and NGOs and various "locals." This situation signals a clear change from the ad hoc task forces of the conventional wars (e.g., the October 1973 War or the Gulf War of 1991). Today's mission formations now include a complex of media, legal, and new logistical roles and units, and no less important, the integration of these functions into the key decision making processes of formations.

First, the very legitimacy of international missions is based on a multi-national configuration (Leohard, 2008) signaling through its composition that it is implementing the will of the international community. In armed struggles

waged by one country, say Israel, international legitimacy is no less important. This legitimacy in turn is predicated on meeting expectations about when, where, and especially how the conflict is pursued. Historically the most obvious answer to external expectations and dictates has been a host of "hyphenated roles" combining new responsibilities with conventional military ones. To Janowitz's (1971) soldier-police officers charged with constabulary roles, Moskos (1988) added the soldier-diplomat, soldier-statesman, and Goodwin (2005) the soldier-scholar. But at present there seems to be a proliferation of such military roles that include soldier-media expert, soldier-social scientist, soldier-social worker, soldier-nation builder, soldier-relief worker, or soldier-alderman (Haltiner, 2005). These roles are not only a means to control military operations, but also measures that the military uses to manage its relations with groups in the civilian environment and whose values, needs, and identities may contradict its own.

In a related manner, such processes as the mediatization, juridification, and "humanitarianization" of military action affect the composition and operation of mission formations (privatization is beyond the scope of this article). Mediatization (Bet-El, 2009; Maltby, 2012; Moskos, 2000b; Sweeney, 2006) refers to how media reports from missions are part of a feedback circle in which publics are courted if their support is essential. Consequently, armed forces have created or strengthened organizational units placed at the operational level—e.g., liaison, public relations, or press units—to mediate between them and various media. These roles control information, offer positive portrayals of military action, or provide its narratives of events. One example from Israel (Shai, 2013) are the ensembles established during the second initifada, the Second Lebanon War, and the series of operations into Gaza to handle Israel's public diplomacy efforts: while a key component of these were units from the IDF Spokesperson's Office, they also included civilian governmental and non-governmental entities, with the latter more loosely coupled to the IDF-government nexus.

Another development has been the "judicialization" of military action centered on minimizing casualties (Rubin, 2002). Today's armed forces are required to abide by and clearly signal their acceptance of closely monitored demands that they use armed violence in a legal and acceptable manner. It is for this reason that military lawyers have become an essential part of operational decision making cycles (Cohen & Ben-Ari, 2014). At the beginning, there was much tension within missions between commanders and legal experts, but as judicial considerations have become integrated in operational concerns, so lawyers have become an integral part of today's formations.

Yet another addition is related to the emergence or reinforcement of various humanitarian and CIMIC officers that create ties with locals and NGOs (Byman, 2001; Winslow, 2002) and that again answer social expectations that the armed forces ensure the basic needs of populations in areas of conflict. Analytically, humanitarian or CIMIC officers are mediators that link the military to civilian entities through embodying in their functions the logics of two or more organizations. In effect, in CIMIC organizations members wear uniforms but also represent part of the military's responsibility for civilians. As such, its members are, in a sense, both in and out of the military, and it is not surprising that sometimes CIMIC officers have been labeled as having dual loyalty (Rietjens & Bollen, 2008).

Common to these organizational entities is that they link mission formations to external communities of professional practice on which they are mutually dependent (Hajjar, 2017). These are all boundary-spanning components that may exchange information, coordinate, or integrate (Alvinius et al., 2014). Accordingly, these roles and organizational arrangements are internal roles that "represent" and mediate the relations with various external actors and their demands and expectations. Boundary-

spanning thus allows adaptation to changing circumstances within and outside the theater. While many of these mechanisms have existed historically, they are now integrated at the operational and sometimes tactical levels.

Yet in contrast to potential tensions between combat components, these units add a different kind of problem for formations, related to their role as boundary-spanners. Take the "symbiotic" relationship between the media and the military: while differing in expectations, professional socialization, and modes of action, they are still dependent on each other in today's conflicts. Yet in many if not most contemporary formations the tension between the military and media communities is intensified because members of the media are much more independent of the military than in the past. The relations between members of the armed forces and members of human rights and humanitarian movements are no less complex. In this case, the differences between the two sides seem more far reaching than those between the military and the media (Winslow, 2002). Humanitarian movements are marked by a very different type of organization from the military in that that they possess an egalitarian (as opposed to the military's hierarchical) mode of deciding and operating, often international (in contrast to national) loyalties, or definitions of success and time frames for realizing it (Archer, 2003). Indeed, while members of humanitarian movements may fear loss of independence when military components become directly involved in humanitarian action, the military may see them as potential hazards in carrying out their assigned missions (Dobbins et al., 2007).

Conclusion: Dilemmas and Tensions

Today's armed forces are marked by greater compositional flexibility (facilitated by technology and training) than in the past. This flexibility refers to the variety of entities and expertise—military and at times civilian—that can be combined in temporary mission formations. Moreover, the sheer diversity of capacities and varied proficiencies of the constituent units marks a clear difference from the ad hoc task forces of the past. Compositional flexibility, in turn, allows much greater operational flexibility, since the potential of utilizing the capacities of constituent units in adapting to local circumstances is much greater.

In conclusion, five points should be emphasized, four related to the analysis of mission formations and one centered on key operational dilemmas in their organizational design. First, the model charted is cumulative rather than linear in the sense that new military capacities, conditions, and organizational configurations have been added to conventional ones. New ad hoc formations create a necessity for newer and older forms of training, professional practices, and no less important, expectations. Thus, the classic military emphases on intense socialization, strict discipline, hierarchical authority, and personal commitment continue to be important, especially among the combat arms.

Second, the analysis emphasizes the need for a much more dynamic—and social and organizational—view of militaries-in-use than those provided by classic formulations in the social scientific and professional military analyses of combat units. It is for this reason that both the compositional and operational flexibility of mission formations are emphasized. In today's conflicts, military formations have to answer at once operational challenges in the theater and external expectations about how they achieve their missions. This is the armed forces' answer to the central features of today's conflicts that combine not only a vast array of means and actors used by enemies but a much closer monitoring of military activities by external bodies that express external demands and expectations. It is for this reason that the focus on mission formations can well illuminate the combinatorial organizational forms through which the armed forces answer both operational and social and political necessities.

Third, the political dimensions of mission formations are especially important since they link the strategic to the tactical. Ruffa et al. (2013) explain that in contemporary armed conflicts, the tactical level can be politically problematic given the actions of "strategic corporals" (Krulak, 1999) or participation of troops in non-combat tasks such as nation-building or provision of humanitarian aid. Political problems are multiplied in mission formations. First, in multinational forces there are different national stipulations about what is and what is not appropriate, and this can lead to tensions as well as harm to collective action. Second, new roles such as lawyers or humanitarian officers as integral parts of some formations may limit the kinds of actions deemed apt and may even become "lobbies" for external publics. Third, and in a related manner, the mechanisms for monitoring formations become complex, particularly in multi-national contingents where forces are open to regulation by national and global entities and by institutional and extra-institutional actors. Thus, the media may control mission formations both through the actions of in-house media experts or the scrutiny of media in the theater. Finally, within formations, monitoring of non-traditional roles is more difficult than control and direction of troops and units that are similar to commanders.

The creation of mission formations is a key way the armed forces of the industrial democracies have been operating, and that these formations, when designed and operated carefully, may provide many answers to today's conflicts. In turn, this situation necessitates development of proper social scientific and organizational tools for the analysis of mission formations.

Fourth, the analytical approach used here could be adopted to the study of other forms of collective action among actors in the security and strategic communities. Indeed, if one looks at formations constructed in regard to major challenges entailing national security, a similar need for adaptability arises. Thus, for example, issues related to national disasters (earthquakes, floods, or tsunamis), protection of civilian communities during wars, or efforts combining traditional and new forms of diplomacy all necessitate the establishment of organizational configurations that span them and create a temporary interstitial space within which collective action emerges.

The fifth part of the conclusion suggests six key dilemmas evident in the design and operation of mission formations. The first is the tension, or balance, between maintaining unit identity and separateness and the "surrender" of some capacities and credit in the name of synergy and successful adaptability. The idea is to achieve a combined effect through collective action alongside preservation of the identity and professional capacity and authority of its component organizations.

The second dilemma involves the dominant core around which the formation is designed and created. This core must provide both the basic terms of reference and essential capacities, but it must not overshadow the other components so as to neutralize them or relegate them to be mere servants of the mission without due sense of participation and recognition.

The third and closely related predicament is between the openness of communication and interactions between the component units and the potential for the emergence of cliques and promotion of sectional interest. To be sure, any organization and perhaps mission formations in particular are arenas for political action, but given the need for a common set of goals, leaders must harness all the elements without the emergence of parts that are bent solely on advocating their own goals.

Fourth, a principal tension in execution is between central control and allowance for the operational autonomy of components. Adaptability is based on elements of operational

flexibility in which there is leeway for discretion and self-organizing in local circumstances. This again is a classic military dilemma, but in mission formations it is especially acute given the diverse kinds of linkage between units and the fact that components are often embedded in very different home organizations and differ in modes of interpreting reality and operating on it.

Fifth, adaptable mission formations must be able to undertake a translation of the strategic into the operational and tactical levels. Translation refers to how complex understandings are turned into concrete tactical prescriptions; to the manner by which the diverging, often contradictory, external dictates and interpretations are formulated as prescriptions for concrete action.

The sixth dilemma is how to manage formations without the "hijacking" of action by either external or internal expectations, i.e., how one set of expectations may come to govern action. For example, casualty aversion (derived from political demands) may dictate ways of using armed violence and the risks to one's troops in ways that jeopardize the achievement of goals.

In conclusion, my argument is not some simple plea for more combinations, additional jointness, or added amalgams as a panacea for any contemporary problem, a slogan that has sometimes been over-hyped in the professional military literature. Rather, from this analysis and on the basis of studies published over approximately the past three decades, it seems that the creation of mission formations is a key way the armed forces of the industrial democracies have been operating, and that these formations, when designed and operated carefully, may provide many answers to today's conflicts. In turn, this situation necessitates development of proper social scientific and organizational tools for the analysis of mission formations.

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

The Geopolitical Effects of the Coronavirus Crisis

Benjamin Miller

This essay focuses on evaluating the geopolitical effects of the coronavirus crisis on the key conflicts in contemporary world politics. In liberal eyes, the outbreak of the coronavirus seems to justify the liberal arguments about the global and trans-national nature of threats to all of humankind. Such threats should compel large scale international cooperation among states and the construction of powerful international institutions. At the same time, there are some grounds for concern that the post-coronavirus world might be less liberal and pursue less international cooperation—even if it is not fully rational in light of the need for greater international cooperation in order to cope effectively with epidemics. At this stage, it is quite worrisome that it looks as authoritarianism, nationalism, and unilateralism have accumulated some advantages and that this outcome will aggravate the struggles inside and among states and also great-power competition, notably the rivalry between China and the US.

Keywords: coronavirus, great power competition, liberalism, nationalism, United States, China

The 21st century, especially its second decade, has witnessed growing domestic and international conflicts. On the international level, observers have noted the rising great power competition, led by the rivalry between the West and Russia, and even more so, between the US and China. At the same time, following the Arab Spring, failed states flourished in the Middle East (Syria, Yemen, Libya), as well as in other regions as a result of state collapse (Somalia, Afghanistan, and quite a few others).

Joining the geopolitical component of the rising great power rivalry is an ideological competition between the democratic versus the authoritarian model. This dimension was strengthened following the 2008 financial crisis in the West, while China argued that its "state capitalism" was more effective than the Western liberal free market model.

Inside the democratic world, a rising conflict emerged between liberals and nationalists-populists with regard to economic globalization, immigration, the checks and balances on elected officials, and the partly related role of the so-called "deep state" (which in the populist view includes the professional civil service, experts, academics, the mainstream media, and the judiciary). Especially in recent years, the nationalist-populist camp has scored unprecedented accomplishments, with the UK's exit (Brexit) from the European Union (EU), the election of Donald Trump, the rise of far-right parties in Europe, and elections results in Brazil and India.

This short article argues that the coronavirus crisis is likely to aggravate all these major disputes.

Liberalism, it could be claimed, has much to offer following the crisis. A traditional liberal argument, strengthened especially after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, is that the real security threats are not the classical inter-state national security threats over power, dominance, borders, control of territory, and raw materials. Rather, the relevant security threats in the 21st century are trans-national, namely, common threats to the whole of humanity, such as climate change and pandemics. Such threats should lead to high levels of international collaboration among states and the rise of effective global institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) with regard to diseases. Such institutions should have growing authority vis-à-vis sovereign states even if it leads to some erosion of national sovereignty (probably quite limited in the initial stages).

In liberal eyes, the outbreak of the coronavirus seems to justify the liberal arguments about the global nature of threats to all of humankind. A disease that erupts in a Chinese city rapidly crosses international borders and reaches Italy and then the rest of the world. The problem was aggravated since the WHO is powerless to lead an effective international response and does not dare to stand against powerful countries such as China.

Moreover, an authoritarian state such as China suppresses early warning signs of the outbreak and punishes those who warn of an upcoming medical disaster. Such a suppression of information is not supposed to take place in liberal democracies, which thus have an advantage over authoritarian states in the early exposition of threats such as the coronavirus.

In sum, these are powerful and meaningful liberal arguments.

At the same time, there are some grounds for concern that the post-coronavirus world might be less liberal and pursue less international cooperation—even if it is not fully rational in light of the need for greater international cooperation in order to cope effectively with epidemics.

The first liberal victim might be economic globalization, which has become a prominent attribute of world politics after the end of the Cold War. The coronavirus crisis demonstrates that there might be critical situations that would compel states to have high degrees of economic independence despite the substantial economic costs of disengagement from globalization and from economic interdependence. Such high

degrees of independence might be necessary in vital fields such as medical and food supplies, among others. Countries might not want to depend on others when there is an almost universal closure of borders and international flights are drastically curtailed.

The closure of borders contradicts the liberal spirit of open borders in every respect (such as goods, services, investments, people, ideas). So far international cooperation has been very limited, even if there has recently been some rhetoric and limited action in this direction. Tensions between the two most powerful countries—the US and China—have increased since the outset of the crisis, with mutually vocal allegations that the other side is responsible for the spread of the pandemic.

President Trump talked about the "Chinese virus," while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo referred to the "Wuhan virus." At the same time, official Chinese spokespersons raised their own conspiracy theory that the disease allegedly originated with the US military. While the *New York Times* reported in early April that the US and China settled "on a tentative, uneasy truce," this truce might not last for a very long time in light of the growing US-Chinese rivalry in many domains: the trade war, technological competition, the maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, and disputes with regard to Taiwan. The coronavirus crisis might just become another manifestation of the rising great-power competition.

An even more dramatic example of lack of cooperation during the pandemic is Italy and the European Union. The EU is the most remarkable example of post-World War II international cooperation in the liberal spirit of open borders and member state concessions on some elements of national sovereignty. But when the coronavirus crisis struck in Italy, the other member states closed their borders and focused on their own problems. Who then came to help the Italians? China!!

Indeed, China has accumulated much knowledge and medical resources by addressing the pandemic successfully before other states—even if with a high price tag, including tight coercive means. The accumulation of expertise and tools reflects China's position as the focus of the outbreak, as well as the discipline, efficiency, and hard work of the Chinese people.

In contrast to China's activism, the United States of Donald Trump has conceded its traditional role of leading major multilateral moves and its provision of collective goods in the international arena. One reason during the corona crisis might be related to the spread of the pandemic in the US itself, in contrast to the Ebola crisis, for example. But a more fundamental source of Washington's global inaction is Trump's "America First" orientation, namely that the US should focus narrowly only on its own national interests and problems rather than leading global efforts to address world or regional challenges.

China acts along two strategic avenues following its successful coping with the pandemic. One avenue is a moderate one of what might be called soft power: China ostensibly demonstrates the advantages of an authoritarian power in dealing with a pandemic or epidemic—its power of social control over citizens as supposedly an attractive model for imitation. This is in contrast to the seeming helplessness of Western democracies, committed to individual freedom, which have a difficult time imposing a full lockdown on all their citizens even when it is needed to fight the spread of the pandemic. This is probably also designed to undermine the global criticism of the Chinese initial mishandling of the crisis, which led to the eruption of the pandemic in the first place.

Another Chinese strategic avenue is based more on coercive diplomacy. China works hard to strengthen its influence on other states, particularly weak ones, by leveraging its provision of pandemic-related assistance for the purpose of increasing states' dependence

on China. One example is Serbia, but there might be quite a few other weak states (such as Cambodia, Iran, and Pakistan) that depend on Chinese aid and are thus potentially prone to become Chinese clients.

The struggle between liberalism and its ideological rivals will continue after the coronavirus. Yet at this stage, it is quite worrisome that it looks as authoritarianism, nationalism, and unilateralism have supposedly accumulated some advantages and that this outcome will aggravate the struggles inside and among states and also great-power competition, notably the rivalry between China and the US. Globalization—and immigration—will at any rate be challenged to one degree or another.

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Liberals, for their part, always argued that in a globalized world such unilateralism and disengagement are too costly and might be impossible to sustain in the long run. Yet the coronavirus crisis might generate growing tendencies to focus on domestic American issues rather than a leading role in addressing global problems. Such domestic issues might include the problematic American health care system, a debate on the role of experts in the decision making process in key policy areas, and the need for lessening the dependence on foreign sources in critical domains such as health-related equipment and re-building the domestic industry more broadly. This tendency might be especially powerful if the US suffers heavy casualties during the pandemic and enormous economic costs in its aftermath, as now looks quite likely.

At any rate, either by soft power or by coercion, the authoritarian model might be viewed more attractive to numerous states despite the initial major failure by China to address the outbreak. More generally, the closure from the external world and the focus on protecting the state and its citizens might further increase the nationalist/unilateralist and illiberal/authoritarian tendencies of the last few years. At the same time, the initially incompetent treatment of the pandemic by nationalist-populist leaders such as Trump, Bolsonaro of Brazil, and Boris Johnson of the UK demonstrates the potentially great problems when leaders tend to downgrade expertise and institutions. One major reason is the tendency of the populists to overlook the advice of the "deep state," which includes experts and civil servants in different domains, notably the public health field (and also climate change).

In contrast, the relatively successful coping with the pandemic by the Asian liberal democracies—Taiwan and South Korea—is noteworthy. This might suggest that such regimes can cope well with crises of this sort even if this is not the impression one necessarily gets when looking at the European and the American cases.

The perception that liberal democracy might pose an obstacle to the struggle against a pandemic indeed led quite a few countries to adopt laws or various measures that limit individual rights and curtail political freedom. These measures inter alia infringe on the freedoms of expression and assembly, permit the detention of citizens indefinitely, and expand state surveillance. Hungary's Viktor Orban, who already in the last few years transformed his country from a post-Cold War liberal democracy into an "illiberal democracy," is again leading the way of making democracies into semi-

authoritarian regimes in grabbing almost unlimited authority following the outbreak of the coronavirus.

This turn to increasingly more autocratic means is not limited to weak democracies such as Hungary. Thus, even such an old-time and well-established democracy as the UK has adopted what critics call almost "draconian" non-democratic measures. While that might supposedly make sense for coping with pandemics, the problem is that in many cases, such limitations might stay in place even in the aftermath of the crisis. An example is the Patriot Act, which was legislated in the US following 9/11 and gave the US government wide authorities over surveillance of its own citizens, while simultaneously reducing checks and balances on those powers. The Patriot Act has remained in place even though almost 20 years have passed since the seminal terrorist attacks. Moreover, some politicians might promote such illiberal measures because of their self-serving political interests to take advantage of the crisis in order to maximize their own power at the expense of their political rivals and the opposition.

In sum, the struggle between liberalism and its ideological rivals will continue after the coronavirus. Yet at this stage, it is quite worrisome that it looks as authoritarianism, nationalism, and unilateralism have supposedly accumulated some advantages and that this outcome will aggravate the struggles inside and among states and also great-power competition, notably the rivalry between China and the US. Globalization—and immigration—will at any rate be challenged to one degree or another.

Such gains by the authoritarians will be temporary if democracies recover and cooperate—in multilateral inter-state frameworks or through international institutions—in an effective struggle against such rising challenges to humanity, while preserving individual liberty and human rights.

An additional area of grave concern refers to the failed states. In these states, institutions malfunction even in normal times. The crisis might produce greater levels of domestic instability, which might lead to regional instability, notably in the Middle East, but also in Africa and South Asia. There is a great danger that these failed states will be forgotten when the rest of the world faces a major crisis. Yet in recent years, Middle East instability notably had major effects on the developed world through its "export" of terrorism and illegal migration. Thus, the more affluent countries have a strong self-interest to help the weak states cope with the coronavirus crisis in order to avoid another round of "instability export" on top of the major humanitarian crisis in the developing world itself.

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Reuters

Responding to the Coronavirus Crisis in Iran: The Regime and the Public

Raz Zimmt

The coronavirus outbreak in Iran has exposed a series of weaknesses and failures in the regime's management of emergency situations. The regime, which was slow to handle the crisis and has tried to hide its scope, has once again been exposed as helpless in the face of structural challenges such as internal power struggles, institutional redundancy, ideology prioritized over pragmatic considerations, and economic constraints. For its part, the government has tried to provide stopgap measures and immediate solutions, and to date there is no evidence of a loss of control or an inability to ensure the provision of essential goods and services. In the public arena, the crisis reflects the growing alienation of Iran's citizens from regime institutions, although this is accompanied by a high degree of social solidarity. Both the regime and the public in Iran have in the past proven their ability to overcome serious crises. However, their ability to deal with the current crisis over an extended period of time depends on how long it takes to bring the outbreak under control and the extent of its economic impact.

Keywords: Iran, coronavirus, Iranian regime, Rouhani, public opinion

The coronavirus crisis hit Iran while it was experiencing one of the most difficult periods in its history. The maximum pressure policy and the reinstatement of economic sanctions by the United States have exacerbated the hardships faced by the state, which fueled waves of protests over the past two years that shook the institutions of power. In view of the growing challenges, the Iranian regime has worked in recent years to stabilize the socio-economic arena and strengthen the hardliners' grip on power.

Even after authorities were forced to admit the outbreak of the pandemic and began publishing data on the extent of the casualties, official reports were met with disbelief. Confusion and panic among the public increased when foreign media, social networks, and even politicians claimed that the numbers of infections and deaths were several times higher than those published by the government. A World Health Organization senior official said in mid-March that the number of coronavirus-related deaths in Iran could be as much as five times higher than official figures, as coronavirus tests were only carried out on people who developed serious symptoms.

In the public arena, the failure of the regime to provide solutions to the plight of the civilian population and the sense that the authorities are incapable of solving the fundamental problems in the Islamic Republic have intensified public despair. The intervals between outbreaks of protest have shortened, and protests are more widespread and radical than in the past, both in their violence and the rhetoric against the very existence of the regime. These developments have emerged against the backdrop of the far-reaching demographic, social, and cultural transformations that Iranian society has undergone since the Islamic Revolution, including the widening of the gap between the public and the institutions of power and clerical institutions, as well as processes of secularization and the adoption of Western approaches. These changes pose complex challenges to the Islamic Republic.

Against the background of these trends, the outbreak of the coronavirus, which has so far taken the lives of thousands of people in Iran, allows us to examine the response of the regime in the face of national crises. The authorities' response to the ongoing crisis opens a window into how the regime's institutions operate and into the decision making processes of the Iranian leadership in times of emergency. Furthermore, the current crisis enables an examination of the relations between the Iranian public and state institutions, as well as the effect of profound processes underway in Iranian society on its response to crisis conditions.

The Iranian Authorities and the Coronavirus Outbreak

The response by the Iranian regime in February 2020 to the pandemic revealed a number of shortcomings, especially in the early stages of the outbreak, and even after the first two deaths were reported on February 19. For example, Mahan Air, owned by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, continued to operate flights to and from China, presumably to preserve the vital economic ties between the two countries. In addition, for weeks, the authorities refrained from taking preventive measures that might have prevented the spread of the disease, such as imposing a lockdown, closing down educational, cultural, and sports institutions, and restricting mass gatherings, especially in the Shiite city of Qom, the epicenter of the outbreak.

The regime, with its hesitant initial response, tried early on to hide the dimensions of the outbreak from the public. The attempt to conceal the situation attests to both a desire to cover up the authorities' failures and the fear of generating public panic, as well as political considerations, most notably concern that the February 21 parliamentary elections would not proceed as planned. The head of the epidemiological committee at the

National Coronavirus Combat Taskforce, Ali-Akbar Haqdoust, confirmed that the virus first appeared in a number of cities in Iran as early as the end of January, but was only identified by the Health Ministry a few weeks later. The Iranian regime has likewise attempted in recent months to cover up the involvement of the IRGC in the January 2020 downing of a Ukrainian plane, as well as the number of fatalities in gasoline protests, which broke out across Iran in November 2019. Not only did these attempts fail, but they also led to increased public criticism, which in several incidents was silenced by the authorities and regime media. For example, Iranian state television cut short a live broadcast of a program aired on March 16 when during an interview, the actor Amir-Hossein Rostami criticized authorities for allowing continued flights to China and not imposing a lockdown on Qom.

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The difficulty faced by the government in meeting the heavy economic cost, the concern for the livelihoods of millions of workers, and the need to ensure regular provision of essential goods and services have resulted in a significant delay in enforcing closures and restrictions on movement across the country. For several weeks, the President refused to impose a full lockdown despite the recommendations of leading health officials, although he called on citizens not working in essential services to remain at home and announced the closure of some commercial centers, leisure and cultural centers, some government offices, and schools and universities. The Iranian sociologist, journalist, and regime critic Abbas Abdi said the decision to refrain from imposing a full lockdown was due to the weakness of regime institututions. He contended that imposing a lockdown requires decision making capabilities, operational capabilities, and the capability to ensure the necessary measures during the lockdown period and enforce the lockdown on civilians. These conditions, he said, do not exist in Iran. It was only in late March, after all attempts to curb the spread of the pandemic failed, that the government decided to impose more serious restrictions on the movement of vehicles and civilians between cities.

As soon as restrictions were imposed on economic activity, the authorities were quick to provide immediate solutions for the public, out of concern over the possible reaction. President Hassan Rouhani reassured the public that there was no fear of a shortage of goods and medicines, and the government authorized an aid package for three million citizens without a permanent income and provided interest-free loans to four million workers who lost their livelihoods as a result of the crisis. Furthermore, the government plans to raise salaries for state employees by 50 percent and postponed tax payments and loan repayments to May.

Divisions among the Iranian Leadership amidst the Crisis

The outbreak of the coronavirus has shone a spotlight on familiar divisions within the top echelons of the regime that caused further delays in responding to the virus. President Rouhani's political rivals have taken advantage of the crisis to criticize his response, claiming that even after the outbreak of the pandemic he did not assume direct responsibility for management of the crisis and left the campaign in the hands of the Health Minister, whose

powers are limited. The head of Iran's judiciary, Ebrahim Raisi, who is considered the President's political rival, claimed that the President should hold staff meetings on fighting the coronavirus every day, not just once a week.

It was only on March 10 that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei instructed the President to head the national coronavirus taskforce. However, a few days later the Supreme Leader placed Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Mohammad Bagheri in charge of the health taskforce aimed at coordinating the effort to defeat the virus. The step reflects familiar conduct by the Supreme Leader, who tends to opt for institutional redundancy and even encourages competition between various centers of power with parallel authority. His aim is to prevent over-concentration of power in their hands, and especially in the hands of the President, who is often used by the Supreme Leader as a scapegoat, in order to deflect public criticism of the regime's failures. Differences of opinion surfaced quickly between the President and the chief of staff. In the first meeting of the health taskforce Bagheri announced that the authorities would clear the streets of people within 24 hours, but shortly afterward the President declared that rumors of towns being placed under lockdown were untrue and citizens could carry on with their business.

Similar to past emergencies such as natural disasters, the current crisis is also characterized by a growing role of the Revolutionary Guards in managing the crisis, containing infection, and assisting victims—for example, disinfecting streets, setting up hospitals, carrying out virus testing, supplying medical equipment, and assuring logistics and personnel. The growing involvement of the Revolutionary Guards, made possible by the ample resources at their disposal, is important not only to protect the organization's economic interests, but also to keep their political strength in the internal balance of power within Iran, especially against the President, and to improve their public image and deepen their penetration of society. This serves security interests pertaining to the stability of the regime.

The Regime and the Coronavirus: Between Ideology and Pragmatism

Although the regime does not readily veer from its revolutionary outlook, Iran's policy from the first days of the revolution indicates much pragmatism. In certain conditions the Iranian leadership prioritizes national interests over revolutionary and Islamic ideologies, out of a belief that temporary flexibility does not compromise long-term ideological strategic goals.

The combination of ideology and pragmatic considerations based on essential interests is also evident in the regime's conduct in the current crisis. There is no doubt, for example, that religious considerations influenced the decision not to shut down religious centers in the early stages of the outbreak. Mohammad Sa'idi, Supreme Leader Khamenei's representative in Qom, argued even after the outbreak of the pandemic in the city that there was no need to shut down the Fatemeh Masumeh mosque, claiming that it safeguards the health of the citizens. However, once it became clear to the regime that the virus continued to spread, it was forced to show flexibility on issues it had considered taboo. For example, the authorities canceled Friday prayers throughout Iran for the first time since the revolution, eased regulations on Islamic burial ceremonies, and shut down Shiite holy places in Qom and Mashhad. In a highly unusual move, they even allowed the reopening of a factory that manufactures alcohol for disinfectants, which was closed after the revolution due to the religious prohibition on the consumption of alcohol—this after several hundred people died from methanol poisoning after trying to cure themselves from the coronavirus by drinking the poisonous material. The decision to close religious centers was taken even at the expense of clashing with hardliners. Following the closure of religious centers in Mashhad and Qom, there was an

attempt by several dozen believers to storm into closed mosques, and they clashed with security forces. Several times the authorities also operated against expressions of Islamic radicalism and superstitions. Thus, for example, the authorities arrested two worshippers who were documented on social media licking the Fatemeh Masoumeh grave to prove that the holy sites of Islam are immune from the virus. In another incident, the authorities called in for questioning a cleric who went around a hospital without protective equipment and promised patients they would be cured from the virus through prayers and miracles.

At the same time, the adherence of senior regime officials to revolutionary ideologies is reflected in their reluctance to accept assistance from the United States in the effort to curb the spread of the virus. Commander of the Revolutionary Guards Hossein Salami claimed that the American aid proposal was no more than lies and demagogy, and even went as far as declaring mockingly that Iran was prepared to render assistance to the United States if it needed it, but that Iran did not need American aid. Supreme National Security Council secretary Ali Shamkhani expressed the Iranian position succinctly, tweeting that prior to the Islamic Revolution Iran was completely dependent on the services of foreign doctors, but thanks to the revolution it can handle the pandemic by itself. Iran even deported a team from the humanitarian organization Doctors Without Borders who had arrived in the country to assist in halting the pandemic, on the grounds that it does not require foreign aid. The rejection of aid from the organization resulted from pressure from radical circles in Iran, which apparently feared exposing the real dimensions of the pandemic to foreign entities.

Moreover, rejecting aid offers, senior regime officials also disseminated conspiracy theories claiming that the source of the pandemic was American biological weaponry. In his address for the Iranian New Year (Nowruz), Supreme Leader Khamenei claimed there may be some truth to the theory that the United States was responsible for developing the virus, and even hinted that the virus was specifically engineered for Iran through the use of genetic information on the Iranian people that the United States obtained in various ways. The refusal to accept assistance from the West, while presenting it as being culpable for the spread of the virus and even for creating it, serves not only revolutionary ideology but also the needs of the regime, which requires an external enemy to ensure its survival, in order to maintain the image of the West and in particular the United States as an enemy to be confronted, ascribing blame and responsibility for the crisis to foreigners.

The mismanagement by the authorities and their attempts to hide information from the public have dealt a further blow to public trust, which in any case has eroded over the years. This gap was on full display in protests that erupted in Iran following the downing of a Ukranian plane in January 2020, and in the low turnout in the recent parliamentary elections.

Nevertheless, for the first time since the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian authorities had to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and request a $5 billion loan from the Rapid Disbursing Emergency Financing Facilities established to help countries deal with the coronavirus crisis. The government's request sparked opposition from hardliners, who have been reluctant to turn to the IMF, and claimed that doing so requires parliamentary approval.

Iranian Society and the Coronavirus Crisis

The mismanagement by the authorities and their attempts to hide information from the public have dealt a further blow to public trust, which in any case has eroded over the years. This gap was on full display in protests that erupted in Iran following the downing of a Ukranian plane in January 2020, and in

the low turnout in the recent parliamentary elections. The disregard displayed by many citizens for the recommendations to avoid large gatherings and non-essential travel reflected the undermining of public confidence, alongside complacency and essential economic needs. With the start of the Iranian New Year holiday on March 20, the Iranian authorities reported that some three million people went out of their home provinces. The political analyst and pro-reform critic Sadeq Zibakalam blamed the public's disregard for government guidelines on the distrust between the public and the authorities that has led to citizens not taking government recommendations with the requisite seriousness.

Nonetheless, there is currently no evidence of a loss of control on the part of the Iranian authorities, a systemic collapse of the economy, or the inability to ensure regular provision of essential goods and services. Furthermore, the Iranian regime has shown in the past that it has the ability to overcome serious crises, in particular after years of significant economic sanctions.

The outbreak and the spread of the coronavirus have eroded not only the public's trust in the authorities, but also the standing of religious clerics who have ruled the country since the revolution. In recent decades, Iranian society has undergone a process of secularization and growing alienation between the public and the religious establishment. The uncompromising positions of the conservative clerics, who for weeks refused to shut down religious centers in order to curb the spread of the virus, threaten to alienate them even further from the Iranian people who claim that the clergy's uncompromising positions are a threat to public security. Manifestations of religious radicalism on the part of believers and the clergy provoked outrage and ridicule on social networks.

Contrary to the growing alienation between the public and authorities, the pandemic has encouraged solidarity and social cohesion. Since the 1990s there has been an evident process of individualization in Iranian society, especially among the revolution's second generation. At the same time, Iranian society continues to a great extent to be characterized by collectivism, reflected in the commitment to family and to joint national and cultural identity, and displays of solidarity, especially vis-à-vis external enemies and at times of crisis such as natural disasters. Displays of solidarity during the pandemic have included civilian mobilization to assist in providing food and essential supplies to the needy; the mobilization of businessmen and trade bureaus to help civilians who have been financially affected by the crisis and raise funds to set up medical centers and supply medical equipment; civilian volunteer efforts to help in hospitals or to remove the bodies of those who died from the disease; and rent relief for tenants by mall and shop owners. On the other hand, the crisis has also revealed the weakness of civil society, whose institutions, including women's and student groups, have been systematically oppressed over the past decades by the regime, which strives to retain exclusive control.

Conclusion

The coronavirus has exposed fundamental weaknesses and failures in how the Iranian authorities respond in emergency situations. The regime, which was slow to address the crisis and tried to hide its extent, has once again been exposed as helpless in the face of structural failings such as internal power struggles, serious economic constraints, and controversial priorities, for example, the continued funding of military investments outside of Iran, which exact a heavy economic cost at the expense of dealing with the hardships of the Iranian people. These constraints limit the ability of the regime to prepare for emergency scenarios and to ensure a satisfactory response to the

hardships faced by the Iranian people in routine times and in an emergency.

Nonetheless, there is currently no evidence of a loss of control on the part of the Iranian authorities, a systemic collapse of the economy, or the inability to ensure regular provision of essential goods and services. Furthermore, the Iranian regime has shown in the past that it has the ability to overcome serious crises, in particular after years of significant economic sanctions. Sanctions have required Iran to adapt to conditions of uncertainty and economic crisis, improved the ability of the economy to adapt to external constraints, and strengthened the standing of the Revolutionary Guards, whose involvement in the internal affairs of the state has increased in crisis situations.

The erosion of public trust and the growing alienation between religious and state institutions and the Iranian people impair the regime's ability to recruit public support at a time of crisis. On the other hand, the crisis has the potential to strengthen social solidarity, which could be reflected in the future in the way the country deals with an external enemy, and not just a pandemic or natural disaster. Like the regime, the Iranian public is characterized by a high degree of adaptability. Years of internal repression and economic sanctions have made Iranian citizens accustomed to economic hardships and severe limitations, both domestic and foreign. Thus, the ability of the regime and the Iranian public to deal with the coronavirus crisis over an extended period of time depends to a great degree on how long it takes to bring the virus under control and the extent of its economic impact.

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Reuters

The Yemeni Civil War in Flux: Where is it Headed?

Ari Heistein

The Arab Spring reached Yemen in 2011 at a moment when both popular and elite support for Yemen's then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh were low, leading to the disintegration of a triumvirate that had ruled Yemen for decades. Since then, efforts to formulate a new configuration of national governance through dialogue, civil war, external intervention, and negotiations failed to yield results. Although Israel is not an influential player in the theater, it does have interests that could be affected by developments there: containment of the Iran-backed Houthi threat, the extrication of its unofficial Saudi partner in the anti-Iran coalition from the Yemeni quagmire, and prevention of the expansion of radical Sunni jihadist groups. After a recent lull in the fighting between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis followed by a steep escalation, it is worth considering three possible scenarios for how the future might unfold in Yemen.

Keywords: Yemen, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Houthis

Background

Modern Yemen's numerous tribal, sectarian, ideological, and regional fault lines are exacerbated by the country's dearth of resources, which encourages loyalty to smaller sub-groups to ensure survival. The country's brief experience during the modern era as a formally unified entity, from May 1990 onward, has been punctuated by a civil war between North Yemen and South Yemen in 1994 and numerous instances of unrest in the north in the 2000s. Thus, from a greater historical perspective, it should not have come as a surprise in 2014 that Yemen was once more facing division and civil war.

The long-term domestic causes for the 2011 demise of Ali Abdullah Saleh's government in Yemen are twofold. First, the overall trend of centralization and concentration of Yemen's patronage and privilege in the hands of the elite in Sana'a at the expense of the north and the south of the country aggravated separatist sentiments in the periphery, as evident from the Ansar Allah (Houthi) rebellions in the north from 2004 to 2010 and the establishment of the Hirak southern separatist movement in 2007. Second, the triumvirate of President Saleh, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and the al-Ahmar family (no direct relation to Ali Mohsen), which had long dominated the country politically, militarily, and economically, was beginning to dissolve. In particular, the President's grooming of his son to take on the premiership caused friction between the head of state and the ruling elite who sought to prevent the establishment of dynastic rule, much like with the Mubarak family in Egypt.

The spark ignited by the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia and Egypt reached Yemen in late January 2011, at a moment when both popular and elite support for the Saleh regime was low. The government response, which ultimately proved ineffective, was to use carrots and sticks to quell opposition to Saleh's continued rule. On the one hand, Saleh conceded that he would not run in the 2013 presidential election and that his son would not succeed him; in parallel, the protestors were violently repressed by regime security forces. After government forces killed dozens of protesters on March 18, 2011, Ali Mohsen and the al-Ahmar family officially defected from the Saleh regime and deprived the President of the tribal and military power that was critical for the continuation of his rule.

As the anti-government protests continued to grow, in April 2011 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sought to mediate by presenting an agreement facilitating the transition of power from Saleh to his Vice President, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. The agreement stipulated that Saleh would step down and hand power over to his Vice President within 30 days in exchange for immunity from all legal infractions committed during his reign, and then national elections would be held within the next 60 days. But after agreeing in principle to the proposal, Saleh refused to sign the agreement presented to him on at least three occasions over the course of several months, despite pressure from the GCC to do so.

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Then in June 2011, Saleh was badly injured in an assassination attempt that also wounded many other senior officials as they were praying in the mosque of the presidential compound. He reportedly blamed the Ahmar family for the attempt on his life, which took place in the context of his own forces clashing in Sana'a with militias loyal to the Ahmars, though they denied culpability. Eventually, in November 2011, before leaving for New York for medical treatment, Saleh signed the GCC initiative in Riyadh and relinquished power to then-Vice

President Hadi. Three months later, President Hadi, who ran unopposed, was "re-elected" with over 99 percent of the popular vote.

By March 2013 and in accordance with the GCC initiative, Hadi's transitional government embarked on a process known as the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which sought to address Yemen's key problems and form the basis for drafting a new national constitution. The Conference included non-traditional stakeholders as well as traditional elites in what was described by the US Institute of Peace as "inarguably the most inclusive political negotiation process in Yemen's modern history." Yet it was nonetheless opposed by a number of powerful forces in Yemen who sought to subvert it for their own ends, including Saleh loyalists, southern secessionists, and the Houthis. When the process concluded in January 2014, the recommendations presented by the NDC were not adopted in order to formulate a new constitution. Instead, the decision on how to restructure the Yemeni state was left to a commission appointed by Hadi, which issued a proposal to re-divide Yemen into six provinces (to replace the existing 21 governorates). This was promptly rejected by the Houthis and triggered a political crisis that gave rise to the Houthi offensive in late 2014.

As a result of the support provided to the Houthis by Iran, the military forces loyal to Saleh who defected with him, and Saleh's strong relations with key tribes in Yemen, the Houthi-Saleh alliance enjoyed a great deal of initial military success against Hadi's government.

Initially, the balance of forces between the two sides heavily favored the rebels. Though Saleh had fought against the Houthis in numerous campaigns from 2004 to 2010, after his resignation he assessed that the synergy of their military power could augment their political power, leading the two to launch a joint campaign in 2014 against Hadi's Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG). As a result of the support provided to the Houthis by Iran, the military forces loyal to Saleh who defected with him, and Saleh's strong relations with key tribes in Yemen, the Houthi-Saleh alliance enjoyed a great deal of initial military success against the ROYG. Between late 2014 and early 2015 they advanced from the capital city of Sana'a in central Yemen to the makeshift capital of Hadi's "government-in-exile" in the southern coastal city of Aden.

Saudi Arabia has long sought to retain influence over developments in Yemen, believing that events in Yemen could affect the stability and security of the Kingdom. Yemen, as the more populous southern neighbor, has traditionally posed two varieties of threat to Saudi Arabia. First, if the Yemeni state is weak and fragmented, the country's instability could spread through demographic channels and impact negatively on the Saudi regime's control over its population. Second, if Yemen proves functional enough to build up military power, it would be perceived as a military threat, given its geographic proximity to the Kingdom. The current risk posed by the civil war and the rise of the Houthis in Yemen is a combination of the two, as mass displacement and power vacuums provide fertile breeding ground for extreme ideologies, both Sunni and Shia, while at the same time Iran supplies its Houthi allies with advanced weaponry capable of inflicting precision strikes on Saudi infrastructure.

Considering the intensifying competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Arab Spring, particularly in theaters that have been destabilized and contain significant Sunni and Shia populations, it was no surprise that this rivalry bled into Yemen. From the Saudi perspective, however, one of the few possibilities more dangerous than protracted anarchy in Yemen after Saleh's fall was the configuration that actually emerged—the rise of a group backed by Riyadh's archrivals in Tehran. Saudi media in 2015 described the

Houthi enclave as an "Iranian foothold" that the Kingdom could not accept.

The Saudi-led Campaign to Nowhere

By early 2015 the camp that would later be named the Arab Quartet, consisting of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt, believed that the regional momentum was moving in a direction favorable to their interests. Initially, the Arab Spring ushered in a series of developments that upset the status quo and worried leaders who sought to preserve it; regimes were displeased by the unrest sweeping through the region that could potentially spread to their own populations, as well as by the replacement of their longtime partners with unknown entities. But in 2015, the Quartet appeared to have overcome those challenges, first, by engineering a coup d'état in Egypt in 2013 to replace Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated President Mohamed Morsi with military strongman Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Second, after winning the 2011 vote, the Islamist Ennahda Party in Tunisia lost the country's 2014 parliamentary elections and peacefully relinquished power. Third, Bahrain withstood popular unrest among its Shia majority through a combination of external assistance and growing domestic repression. In Syria, where the members of the Arab Quartet either supported regime change or did not take a public stance on the matter, it appeared then that President Bashar al-Assad's days were numbered, particularly after his regime lost nearly 20 percent of its territory in the first eight months of 2015.

Overconfidence in the ability to influence the outcome of the conflict in Yemen might have been a product of the Quartet's earlier successes in the region. The Saudi-led military campaign Operation Decisive Storm (*Amaliyyat 'Āṣifat al-Ḥazm*) was launched in March 2015[1] with the initial stated aim of eliminating Houthi "air capabilities, their air defence capabilities, to destroy 90% of their missile arsenal" and then push for a political solution favorable to Saudi interests.[2] (A possible unstated motive for launching the anti-Houthi coalition, which nominally included the participation of some countries that did not contribute much to the effort, including Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, and Qatar, might have been to buttress Saudi Arabia's position of leadership in the Sunni Arab world.) However, Riyadh's belief that establishing air superiority would then create a pathway to imposing Saudi interests on the Houthis, and Yemen more broadly, underestimated the complexity of translating airpower into far-reaching strategic goals.

The Saudi-led coalition, with the help of forces from South Yemen that were trained, equipped, and directed by the UAE, managed to push the Houthis back from Aden by June 2015, but the limits of Saudi airpower became apparent early on. According to one *LA Times* article from as early as April 2015:

> Coalition airstrikes have destroyed fighter jets, ballistic missiles, antiaircraft guns and other military hardware held by the Houthis and their allies, who have taken control of large parts of Yemen. However, residents say the strikes have done little to reverse the territorial gains of the insurgents and restore exiled President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi to power in the quickly fragmenting country.

Though the coalition had far greater resources at its disposal than the Houthi-Saleh forces, it suffered from severe weaknesses that made the campaign costly and progress slow.

The primary shortcomings of the coalition and its execution of the campaign were the result of miscalculation. First, the Saudis overestimated the degree of support that their more militarily experienced allies might offer them; in particular, Pakistan refused to deploy forces to Yemen, while the United States and Egypt agreed to play a minimal role only. This, combined with the Saudi and Emirati sensitivity

to casualties and relative inexperience, led the coalition to rely heavily on airpower and foreign mercenaries—neither of which could provide effective or sustainable methods for conquering and holding territory from local populations over the long term. Second, the coalition initially focused on targeting the heavy weapon systems that were in the hands of Ali Abdullah Saleh's forces, and this changed the power balance in the Saleh-Houthi alliance in a manner that increased the dominance of the more hostile and ideological Iran-backed Houthis. Third, the regionalist prism of the Yemeni civil war made it very unlikely that ROYG and southern forces would successfully maintain control of an antagonistic population in the Houthi heartland in north Yemen, especially in the absence of its presentation of any appealing alternative to Houthi governance. In addition, the forces from South Yemen trained by the UAE largely sought greater autonomy or even independence, so from their perspective it would have been useless to embark on a campaign to retake Northern Yemen only to remain largely separate from it.

In late 2019, Netanyahu traded threats with Houthi defense officials. In December of 2019, Houthi Defense Minister Major General Mohammed al-Atefi warned that his forces have a "bank of military and maritime targets of the Zionist enemy…we will not hesitate to attack them if the leadership decides to."

With the conflict stalled since 2018, the Saudi-led coalition activities in Yemen have seen diminishing returns. Houthi missile and drone capabilities have grown more dangerously precise (very clearly with Iranian assistance), as exemplified by the Houthi "airport for airport" policy, which stipulated that so long as the coalition enforces the closure of the Sana'a airport, they would target Saudi and Emirati airports—which they did. The abysmal humanitarian situation in Yemen, which is largely a product of the conflict and has been coined the "worst humanitarian situation in the world," has severely damaged the international reputations of Saudi Arabia and the UAE and undermined their relationships with Washington,[3] perhaps one of their most important strategic assets.

By the second half of 2019, the motivation of the warring parties to continue the conflict appeared to decline for a variety of reasons.

a. The Emiratis announced a withdrawal from Yemen in June 2019, as a possible response to growing criticism of the Yemen campaign in Washington and the desire to end involvement prior to the upcoming 2020 presidential election; fear of escalation on another front, as Iran launched attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf beginning in May 2019; and having accomplished the bulk of what it had sought to achieve vis-à-vis South Yemen.
b. After being pressed by Iran to claim credit for a massive strike (which they did not launch) on Saudi oil production in September 2019, the Houthis declared a unilateral ceasefire in regard to Saudi territory, indicating they wanted to avoid international blowback from claiming responsibility or had reassessed their anti-Saudi alignment with Iran.
c. In response to the Houthi overture and progress in negotiations with them, Saudi airstrikes against Houthis declined considerably as of October 2019.
d. After a brief escalation in Aden regarding control of the Presidential compound in August 2019, the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the Saudi-backed ROYG reached a power-sharing compromise known as the Riyadh Agreement in November 2019.

While it is true that early 2020 witnessed a slight increase in fighting between the Houthis and Saudi-led coalition, perhaps in an effort to improve their respective negotiating positions, it is premature to dismiss efforts made to wind down the conflict.

In parallel to the general trend of a reduction in fighting, however, the Houthis were reportedly developing capabilities with assistance from Iran to launch strikes on a new front: Israel. During US Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin's visit to Israel on October 28, 2019, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained to the US delegation [emphasis added]:

> *Iran is seeking to develop now precision-guided munitions*, missiles that can hit any target in the Middle East with a circumference of five to ten meters. They are developing this in Iran. They want to place them in Iraq and in Syria, and to convert Lebanon's arsenal of 130,000 [imprecise] rockets to precision-guided munitions. *They seek also to develop that, and have already begun to put that in Yemen, with the goal of reaching Israel from there too.*

In the weeks and months that followed, Netanyahu traded threats with Houthi defense officials. In December of 2019, Houthi Defense Minister Major General Mohammed al-Atefi warned that his forces have a "bank of military and maritime targets of the Zionist enemy…we will not hesitate to attack them if the leadership decides to."

In light of what appears to be a changing trajectory on the Yemeni battlefield as of the latter half of 2019, it is important to consider how developments might unfold. Israel, because it is not an active or significant player in the Yemeni theater, has limited ability to influence outcomes there, but it must nevertheless monitor them with three desired priorities in mind (in order of importance): preventing Houthi acquisition of the capability to strike Israel or Israeli assets with advanced weapons; ending Riyadh's involvement in the war in Yemen, so Jerusalem's unofficial Saudi partner in the anti-Iran coalition can redirect its resources toward more productive ends; and preventing the expansion of Salafi-jihadi groups such as AQAP that could target Israel's partners, including the US, or even Israel itself.

Future Scenarios

When considering the future of Yemen, it is important to lay out clear guidelines that ground expectations in the existing reality. First, the stakeholders in Yemen who enjoy positions of power and influence today are beneficiaries of the current system and are unlikely to relinquish those advantages quietly, making any serious governmental reform for the sake of greater efficiency or equality extremely difficult, if not impossible. This is exemplified by deposed President Saleh's returning to Yemen after recovering from the assassination attempt, aligning with his former nemeses, and fighting a war against the ROYG in order to retake power. Second, reunifying Yemen in any meaningful way is not a top priority for two of the more significant military powers in the conflict, the Houthis and the STC. Third, President Hadi faces considerable constraints that prevent him from taking material steps to promote a unified Yemen under his control: because he lacks a substantial personal power base, he is dependent politically, financially, and militarily on other actors that often have conflicting agendas, including Saudi Arabia, Ali Mohsen, and the UAE-backed STC forces.

The first scenario, and the most optimistic of the three, is one in which the war in Yemen is resolved and a political settlement is implemented that takes into account the interests of all major stakeholders. This would likely occur in a piecemeal fashion rather than in the form of a grand-bargain involving all of the different actors, and it would probably be facilitated by an Arab head of state whose position in the conflict has not strongly favored any particular side, such as the Emir of Kuwait or the newly anointed Sultan of Oman. The resulting unified Yemeni state would need to be highly decentralized for the powerbrokers who emerged from Yemen's most recent

fragmentation to agree to rather than thwart its establishment. The Saudis would likely provide a significant amount of funding for the government of Yemen in order to influence its policies, and that money would be distributed through patronage networks to ensure their loyalty. However, Riyadh faces a difficult quandary when considering how it might end its active military involvement and blockade of Yemen while ensuring that its Houthi adversaries refrain from exploiting any peace agreement for the purpose of upgrading their capabilities (reminiscent of Israel's dilemmas regarding Hamas).

The second scenario, and perhaps the most realistic, is that of a partially resolved conflict with a general reduction in the intensity of the fighting. Resolving all of the many layers of the Yemeni war may prove too ambitious, but settling particular dimensions of it is certainly achievable. One conceivable configuration that could emerge: the Houthis refrain from attacking external actors, such as the Saudis, Emiratis, and international maritime shipping off the coast of Yemen, while the Saudis withdraw their forces from Yemen and end their air campaign but continue to financially and politically back the ROYG and the forces from South Yemen. This would satisfy Riyadh's aim of exiting the war, but may not prevent Houthi force buildup and would likely fail to secure long term Saudi goals of building durable channels of influence in the Yemeni arena.

A third scenario is that the war remains unresolved or even reignites, following failed efforts to broker agreements. Presumably this could happen under a variety of circumstances: one side escalates in order to gain leverage during the negotiations but miscalculates, there is a failure to reach an agreement after extended talks lead one or more groups to revert to conflict to achieve goals, or external actors like Iran might seek to complicate the Saudi exit from Yemen by prolonging the war. In any event, given the extensive damage already done to Yemeni infrastructure and economy as well as donor fatigue from intractable conflicts, it is likely another round of fighting will have even more severe humanitarian effects than the previous round.[4]

These scenarios present a degree of friction between Israel's interests in Yemen. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia performs an important function by targeting Iran's allies in that theater that might otherwise grow into a more significant threat with its sights set on Israel. On the other hand, the coalition's campaign does not exact a significant price from Iran for its malign activities in the region, as Tehran has little invested in Yemen, but it does distract and arguably weaken Saudi Arabia, an important member of the anti-Iran coalition. These tensions can be neutralized by a Saudi departure from the Yemeni theater on favorable and enforceable terms that limit Iran's ability to operate there, but it remains to be seen whether Saudi Prince Khalid bin Salman can arrange such an agreement with his Houthi interlocutors.

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Notes

1 The then-ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran, within the context of P5+1 talks to reach a nuclear deal, may have also alarmed Riyadh and caused it to question the wisdom of continued reliance on the US.to provide for its security.

2 Based on a 2016 statement by then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to *The Economist*, the Saudi-led campaign was intended to prevent the emergence of a Houthi threat on the Saudi-Yemeni border analogous to the Hezbollah threat Iran had created on the Israel-Lebanon border: "I have surface-to-surface missiles right now on my borders, only 30-50 km away from my borders, the range of these missiles could reach 550 km, owned by militia, and militia carrying out exercises on my borders, and militia in control of warplanes, for the first time in history, right on my borders, and these war planes that are controlled by the militia carry out activities against their own people in Aden. Is there any country in the

world who would accept the fact that a militia with this kind of armament should be on their borders?"

3 The erosion of support for the Saudi-US relationship is particularly pronounced among Democrats in Congress, and criticism of the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen became a frequent talking point for Democratic presidential candidates. In late February 2020, all Democratic Party candidates supported "ending military and intelligence assistance for Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen." Even some Republicans participated in a September 2019 effort to prohibit logistical support to Saudi military activities in Yemen. Thus the future of broad-based support for the bilateral relationship appears precarious, and some attribute Emirati withdrawal from Yemen in the summer of 2019 to an effort to avoid association with such a divisive issue on the eve of the presidential elections. Yet even a Saudi withdrawal from Yemen would be unlikely to end widespread animosity toward the Kingdom in the US, as incidents like the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi have inspired considerable attention and controversy regarding ties to Saudi Arabia, including among universities and think tanks.

4 Of particular concern is if/when the coronavirus will reach Yemen, as around 70 percent of the country's citizens lack access to basic medical care.

Reuters / Lintao Zhang / POOL

Saudi Arabia-China Relations: A Brave Friendship or Useful Leverage?

Yoel Guzansky and Galia Lavi

"China is not necessarily a better friend than the US, but it is a less complicated friend."
Prince Turki al-Faisal

Riyadh and Beijing are deepening their economic ties and expanding them in other areas as well. Overall, Saudi-Chinese relations enjoy relative stability but remain limited, inter alia due to China's lack of interest in deeper involvement in the Middle East at the present time. Aware of Washington's sensitivities, Riyadh and Beijing do not want to invite pressure from the United States. Saudi Arabia understands that there is no good alternative to the US security guarantees at the present time, but doubts about the credibility of Washington's political commitment in the long term persist. Moreover, in Riyadh's view, relations with China can complement its relations with Washington in certain respects, and may even serve as potential leverage over Washington.

Keywords: Saudi Arabia, China, United States, Iran, Israel, Pakistan

Introduction

With the exception of energy security, the Middle East has long been mostly peripheral to China's overall map of interests. However, under the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping, a greater emphasis has been placed on the region in general and the Gulf in particular, an emphasis that goes beyond purely economic interests. For example, China's "Arab Policy Paper," presented by President Xi on the eve of his visit to the Middle East in early 2016, emphasized, alongside trade and investment, the need to strengthen the political, cultural, and security aspects of China's relations with Arab countries. These join Beijing's traditional policy principles, most notably mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. This "neutral" policy on Beijing's part can raise its standing in the eyes of the Gulf rulers, who are sensitive to criticism regarding human rights and freedom of expression in their countries. At the same time, there is a sense in the Gulf that the trend that began under the Obama administration whereby the United States aims to reduce its involvement in Middle East conflicts is continuing under President Donald Trump.

Paradigms that formerly characterized the Chinese perspective on the region remain primary, most notably energy security. The main motive behind Chinese involvement in the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular, therefore, remains economic: the region is of strategic importance to China, which imports about 70 percent of its oil needs, primarily from the Gulf. Moreover, the Gulf countries believe their geographic location allows them to integrate easily into the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and China, due to its relative economic advantages, can assume a more central place in the reforms that Arab Gulf states seek to implement in their economies.

This paper seeks to map the spectrum of cooperation between Saudi Arabia and China, and to suggest potential ways this dynamic can develop in various fields.

Geopolitical Interests

In China's view, relations with the Gulf states serve diverse interests, first and foremost energy security and economic growth. China has publicly expressed its concern about the friction between the Gulf states and Iran, and among the Gulf states themselves, given that this friction could undermine stability in the Gulf that is necessary for economic growth.

Relations between China and Saudi Arabia have grown closer since the year 2000, and bilateral trade jumped from $3 billion to $41.6 billion in one decade. Oil constitutes a significant part of bilateral trade, and China is Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner and oil consumer. China's demand for oil is expected to increase in the coming decades; hence Saudi Arabia's central importance in China's overall considerations in the Middle East. In addition, China sees Saudi Arabia as a potential investment market, both for heavy industry infrastructure such as ports and railways, and as a destination for Chinese technology.

At the same time, Beijing is concerned that in the event of American sanctions against China, Saudi Arabia will remain loyal to its ally, the United States. Furthermore, China retains close ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia's greatest enemy. China and Iran have developed extensive ties over the years, which reflect China's energy needs and Iran's natural resources, as well as additional economic ties such as the sale of arms—a partnership hardly to Riyadh's liking. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China has given significant political backing to Iran, even though the scope of oil trade between them has declined since the US administration canceled the waivers it granted Beijing. The cancellation of the waivers and deepening American sanctions against Iran led to a dramatic increase in Chinese oil purchases from Saudi Arabia in 2019-2018, at the expense of oil purchases from Iran, making Saudi Arabia China's largest oil supplier in the Middle East.

In order to maintain a balance between Tehran and Riyadh, China is careful to divide its contacts and visits equally between the two countries. Thus, in 2016, President Xi made sure to visit both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Furthermore, just days before Mohammed bin Salman's arrival in Beijing in February 2019, the Chinese hosted a senior delegation from Iran. From a military perspective as well, China maintains such a balance; about a month after holding a joint military exercise with Saudi Arabia in November 2019, it held a joint naval exercise with Iran (and Russia).

Riyadh's ties with China are increasingly connected to its insecurity with regard to its relations with the United States, and more and more it may come to see China through a prism of security. Riyadh understands that at present, there is no substitute for a US military presence in the Gulf to halt Iranian expansion, but it does not want to find itself in a state of total dependence on the United States. The importance of the Kingdom as a source of energy for the United States has diminished, and it is evident that the Saudis in turn are sympathetic to the Chinese model of economic openness and controlled politics. Moreover, China is a reliable partner for Saudi Arabia and a market that has huge potential for expansion. From Riyadh's perspective, ties with China are not meant to replace ties with the United States, but rather to complement them in economic and political aspects—and without the bothersome Western criticism on issues of human rights and democratization. Thus for example, following the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, China was one of the only countries to openly express support for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Both countries therefore find comfort in mutual respect of their sovereignty, without striving for change in the other; both are troubled by the challenges to their stability posed by the upheavals in the Middle East; both strive for stability and security in the Middle East and for secure energy supplies; and both identify a mutual zone of interest in economic development while preserving the ruling order.

Economics and Trade

Beijing makes frequent use of its economic power to promote its political objectives, and the Gulf arena is no different in this respect. China's increased economic activity in the Gulf can be explained by its desire to find markets for its products and surplus capacity, with emphasis on infrastructures and its need for energy security, and hence its interest in geopolitical stability.

The development of China's economic relationship with the Gulf is linked to its desire to obtain natural resources from the Gulf. China is dependent on oil imports from the Gulf, and the volume of trade between Arab Gulf countries and China has increased steadily from $10 billion in 2000 to $117 billion in 2016. Furthermore, by 2020, China is expected to become the main export destination for the Arab Gulf countries (although this expectation is currently challenged by the outbreak of the coronavirus in China: the drop in oil prices will increase sales to China, but the volume of trade may well decline as well). Saudi Arabia, one of the two largest economies in the Middle East, is a major target for China, and its trade with the Kingdom in 2017 was $45 billion (around 38 percent of China's total trade with the Gulf states).

Beyond oil exports, Saudi Arabia, which seeks to diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on oil exports, is looking to position itself as a major destination for Chinese investments and, in order to do so, integrate into the Belt and Road Initiative. For Chinese companies, increased involvement in Arab Gulf states—particularly in development and construction of ports and railways—is (for the most part) economically worthwhile and (often) the right move from a geopolitical perspective, as long as it matches party aspirations and provides concrete substance to the initiative. It is not inconceivable that the Chinese presence on

the ground will gradually lead to greater Chinese political influence in Arab Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, and in the future may even create potential Chinese leverage on the Gulf regimes.

The Political-Strategic Arena

China is still largely sitting on the sidelines of the political playing field in the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular. Its involvement in the Middle East arena does not receive the kind of attention that Russia's involvement receives, but in the long term, it could be far more significant. Political ties between China and Saudi Arabia are conducted with mutual avoidance of issues of conflict in an attempt to focus on issues where there is common ground. This delicate balancing act has achieved significant success and is reflected in China's consistent avoidance of declaring a definitive regional policy, taking a clear stand on issues of contention, and adopting a particular side in disputes. In this way, China avoids inviting pressure, especially from the United States, on Beijing and its Arab partners in the Gulf. These countries, in line with the position of the Arab League, support the One China policy and at the same time have extensive economic and trade relations with Taiwan.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia, like other Arab Gulf states, avoids public statements and positions on issues that may embarrass China and generate international pressure, especially on domestic issues. Saudi Arabia understands Chinese sensitivities and realizes that such steps would harm the fabric of a relationship that has a strategic importance for it. Thus it avoids statements on the human rights situation in China and refrains from criticism of China's treatment of the Uyghur Muslim minority in Xinjiang Province, which has worsened since 2016, when about one million Uyghurs were sent to "re-education" camps. Furthermore, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia, the "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques," is active and shows concern for Muslim minorities elsewhere in the world, including outside of the Middle East, when bin Salman visited Beijing in February 2019, the Saudi Crown Prince justified Beijing's actions against the Uyghurs and declared that "China has the right to take anti-terrorism and de-extremism measures to safeguard national security." Furthermore, in July 2019, Saudi Arabia was among the thirty-seven countries that sent the United Nations a letter of support for China and praised it for "remarkable achievements in the field of human rights." Interestingly, at the same time a Chinese delegation from the Council for Promoting South-South Cooperation visited Riyadh and explored options for expanding Chinese investment in the Kingdom.

Strengthened political ties between China and Saudi Arabia are evident in several areas, beyond increasingly frequent reciprocal visits by heads of state. In 2016, relations between the countries (and subsequently between China and Iran and Egypt, in order to create a balance) were upgraded to a "comprehensive strategic partnership"—a largely symbolic definition that implies a tightening of long term ties. Alongside its political and economic influence, China is also investing resources to increase its cultural presence. For example, in June 2019, the Confucius Institute was opened at King Saud University in Riyadh. The Institute will provide Chinese language courses and promote cultural communication between the countries. Yet despite these positive developments, China's involvement in Saudi Arabia can still be defined as "limited," with Beijing marking its presence through vague declarations and token attempts at mediation in times of crisis.

On the regional level, China is making an effort to maintain parallel relationships, and is doing its utmost to avoid the need to "choose sides." For example, China's security ties with Iran include the export of weapons that Tehran could conceivably use against the Gulf states. Beijing has called for an end to the fighting in Yemen and has expressed concern about the humanitarian situation there, though without criticizing Saudi Arabia, which is fighting the

Houthi forces allied with Iran. Moreover, Beijing continues to sell attack drones to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that are in use in the fighting in Yemen, including in targeted attacks. Within the framework of this Chinese policy, increased tension in the Gulf since May 2019, which saw Iranian attacks on oil tankers and Saudi oil facilities that directly hurt one of China's important partners and Chinese economic interests, passed without any public criticism from Beijing. It was only in September 2019, following a direct hit on the Saudi Aramco refineries, that China officially condemned the attacks on the oil facilities, but did not specify which country was behind them. Furthermore, the US proposal to form a coalition to protect tankers in the Gulf was seen in Beijing as a scheme to impose new sanctions on Iran, and an attempt to establish an "Arab NATO" in the Gulf. It is unclear how long China will be able to pursue its "balancing" policy, but for the moment there are no signs that would indicate that Beijing plans to deviate from it.

Regarding great power relations, Saudi Arabia has so far been able to develop its economic ties with China, without damaging ties with the United States. This is largely due to China's consistent avoidance of taking clear positions on controversial issues, and from explicitly siding with any party to disputes and public quarrels—this all within the framework of a policy full of contrasts and internal contradictions. China cannot and does not want to take the place of the United States as a strategic guarantor for the security of the Arab Gulf countries, with all the responsibilities involved. However, Beijing could take advantage of Saudi apprehensions with regard to its traditional ally, the US, to push a wedge between them, and try to fill the void and strengthen its relations with Riyadh at the expense of the United States.

Overall, the Gulf arena represents a remote operating space for China that can be used as leverage over the United States to obtain concessions in areas of greater importance to Beijing that are closer to its strategic environment, such as the South China Sea. At the present time, the extent of the US military presence and its ability to project power, along with the quality of its combat systems, the depth of military and political relations, and its ability to act jointly with friendly militaries are beyond China's ability to compete, at least in the near and medium terms. Saudi Arabia understands that currently there is no substitute for the US presence in the Gulf to halt Iranian expansion, even though Riyadh does not want to find itself completely dependent on the United States. Thus relations with China complement relations with the US and can provide Riyadh with leverage over Washington. This is aimed, inter alia, at signaling to the American administration, especially during periods of tension, that ignoring its demands can incur a price.

Security Aspects

Over the years, China has stood in the shadow of major Middle East arms suppliers, led by the United States, Britain, and Russia. Its volume of arms sales to the region is limited in comparison to these countries, with only 6.1 percent of Chinese defense exports going to the Middle East. Most weapons come from the West (mainly from the United States and the United Kingdom), and Arab armies in the Gulf are built around these weapon systems—including the entire logistical and support systems, advisers, and training—which will make it difficult for them to introduce Chinese systems in the future. However, China's security needs (the increase in the size of its army and the development of its security industries) contribute to an increase in the export of unique platforms to the Middle East in general and to the Gulf in particular. At the same time, over the last decade the defense budgets of Arab Gulf states have increased steadily in line with threats of reference faced, despite the fall in oil prices.

The close strategic ties between Saudi Arabia and the United States determine the boundaries of its relations with China, out of

an understanding that the US is its guarantor and will remain so for at least the foreseeable future. However, Saudi Arabia's arms purchases aim at tightening its relations with Beijing, in an attempt to create leverage over the United States—in part in response to the US refusal to sell it certain systems—and to reduce its dependency on a single supplier. Purchasing weapons from various sources requires matching parts, specialized training, and a specific maintenance system, and therefore imposes a burden on armies. However, decentralization of procurement also reduces dependence on the United States and strengthens the ability to pursue independent policies, a trend that may strengthen if the question marks regarding US policy in the Middle East continue.

In recent years, China has increased its security footprint in and around the Gulf: Chinese naval forces were dispatched to the Gulf of Aden (to combat maritime piracy); Chinese ships have visited ports in the Gulf; a naval and aerial support base was opened in Djibouti, China's first outside of its borders; China took over management of a sea port in Pakistan; and joint military exercises were conducted by China with Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, new areas have joined China-Saudi security cooperation. Riyadh's increasing interest in unmanned aerial vehicles and the continued US refusal to provide certain capabilities (with emphasis on offense vehicles) due to policy restrictions, export controls, and the need to consider Israel's security needs has led to its acquisition of these capabilities from China. Although the Chinese platforms are known to be of lower quality compared to Western products, they seem sufficiently satisfactory, and in any case it is evident that this quality is constantly improving.

It seems that China, at least at this stage, does not seek to compete with the United States, but rather to gain a foothold in this lucrative market and at the same time gain necessary combat experience for its platforms—an excellent marketing tool. In addition to the relatively low cost of Chinese platforms (approximately one third of the cost of comparable Western platforms), China is prepared to transfer its advanced platforms to its clients. In this context, Beijing has reportedly agreed to manufacture jointly with Riyadh CH-4 unmanned aerial vehicles that Saudi Arabia already operates, and to this end establish a factory in Saudi territory. Overall, Riyadh and Beijing seem willing to expand military cooperation gradually. For example, in October 2016, Chinese and Saudi forces completed the first joint drill of its kind in counterterrorism, and in November 2019, conducted the joint naval exercise, the first of its kind in the Red Sea. Such collaborations will allow both parties to gradually advance their military ties on "soft" issues as a low risk support to their economic ties, in the service of their mutual interests.

A new field of cooperation between the countries is space. During his visit to China in 2017, King Salman signed a space research cooperation agreement between the countries: the Saudis have decided to establish a satellite research, development, and production infrastructure with Chinese assistance in order to gain independence in the field. In December 2018, it was reported that two Saudi-designed earth observation satellites were launched on a Chinese rocket and would be operated from a research center in Riyadh.

Another aspect of cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia is the civilian nuclear field. In response to Iran's nuclear development and due to considerations of prestige and growing energy needs, Saudi Arabia has in recent years begun to explore the nuclear path. The Kingdom recently declared that it plans to develop a nuclear program for electricity production and water desalination. Riyadh is already making preparations and has signed a number of cooperation agreements in the field with several countries. Since 2012, relations between Saudi Arabia and China in the nuclear

field have tightened and a series of memoranda of understanding have been signed, including the opening of a branch of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) in Riyadh.

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Significance and Recommendations

In a study published by the RAND Corporation, China was defined as being an "economic heavyweight...a diplomatic lightweight and...a military featherweight" in the Middle East. This pattern remains true for China's ties with Saudi Arabia, and Beijing has so far managed to "get along with everyone" and adopt a "selective policy" centered on certain countries and fields. However, as China's political and security weight increases in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf in particular, Beijing will find it increasingly difficult to maintain this delicate balance. Moreover, Washington would probably not hesitate to put pressure on Saudi Arabia too, if certain aspects of Riyadh's cooperation with China were perceived by it as harmful.

In addition to the American constraint, there may also be points of contention on other issues, most notably economics. Unlike other countries, especially in the developing world, Saudi Arabia has considerable leverage over Beijing given its oil resource. Another economic aspect is related to the continued slowdown in economic activity in China, accelerated by the coronavirus outbreak in 2020, which could challenge its ability to continue investing in various projects in Saudi Arabia and the region to the same degree. In view of the fact that China is the only country investing in mega-projects and building large scale infrastructure in the Gulf, economic slowdown in China could impair its ability to realize some of its most ambitious projects in the Kingdom.

Increased Chinese economic interest in Saudi Arabia could force Beijing to build up military capabilities gradually to protect its interests, and in order to do so increase its overall involvement in the Middle East. Israel will need to monitor the development of ties between China and Saudi Arabia and their implications for Jerusalem, as well as the advancement of Riyadh's nuclear program and the arrival of advanced weapon systems, which could affect the military balance in the region and Israel's qualitative military edge. In addition, while the Saudi regime explores ways to advance its national power by establishing industries, Israel should monitor the growth of Chinese-assisted military industries in Saudi Arabia. These topics should be discussed between the security establishments in Israel and the United States, as well as between the Israeli government and the Chinese government, and, if possible, between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

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National Identity: The Political Idea that Refuses to Disappear

Vera Michlin-Shapir

"In recent years, any writer who predicted that nationalism was the wave of the future would have been regarded as eccentric….However, it [has] become increasingly clear that nationalism is back."

Gideon Rachman, *The Economist*, November 13, 2014

National identity has always commanded much attention among social scientists, but recent years have shown increasing interest in the subject, evidenced by new and fascinating studies. Renewed engagement with national identity is connected to political processes around the world in recent years that have changed international politics immeasurably. The rise of the political right in Europe, Britain's departure from the European Union, and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States—events in which national identity played a central role—sparked new interest in the topic. The reexamination of national identity has also prompted the reemergence of old questions, such as: How should national identity be defined? What are the roots of this identity? Are there different types of national identity—ethnic vs. civil? The renewed interest has also raised new questions about the future role of national identity.

This review will map the academic debate regarding national identity in various periods. It will first review the classic discourse on national identity, ongoing since the middle of the last century, which focuses on the source and roots of national identity: Is this a modern social structure, or an identity whose origins

are deeply rooted in the more distant past and are an integral part of human nature? Later, the review will track developments in the debate from the 1990s, when with the rise of globalization and neoliberal economics, the Western world apparently transitioned to the post-nationalist era. At the same time, however, nationalism came under increasing attention, mainly in East European countries, where 15 new nation-states were created with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and others were released from the Warsaw Pact. The review then outlines new studies in the field of national identity, which deal with the "return" of nationalism to center stage in the West in recent years. In conclusion, issues will be raised that have not yet been the subject of in-depth discussion and merit further study. In view of the large number of studies on the subject, examples are presented of leading research in each school of nationalism studies, and the survey focuses on the most prominent scholars in each of these schools.

National Identity: Real or Imagined?

The debate regarding national identity has dealt with a variety of questions, led by: What are the roots of such identity? Is it a new phenomenon that was invented as part of the transformations that took place in modern society? Is it an integral part of human history and embedded deep within the human soul? These questions have become a central axis in the discourse on national identity, since they have far-reaching political implications.

Those propagating nationalist ideas, most of whom were European intellectuals from the mid-19th century, implored their people to adhere to the romantic notion of nationalism in order to break from the old, rotten order of imperialist-monarchist regimes in Europe and to attain popular freedom. This was the original, primordial concept of the nation, which viewed national identity as a natural part of the identity of each person, as much as the color of her eyes or shade of his skin. These ideas formed the basis of the "Spring of Nations" in 1848.

Among the primordial school of thought were various approaches to the nature of national identity. For instance, in 1882 French philosopher Ernest Renan characterized nationalism as a spiritual and emotional idea, and not a physical quality implanted within a person (Renan, 2018). This was the basis for civil nationalism, which includes those who identify with its ideas. In contrast, German thinkers in the 19th century, such as Johannes Gottlieb Fichte (Fichte, 1922) emphasized the deep common characteristics that communities shared over the years, which gave rise to their national identity.

Notwithstanding the rise of the nationalist idea in the 19th century, it was the end of the First World War in the 20th century that led to the establishment of dozens of nation-states as part of Wilson's "Fourteen Points" (Rachmimov, 2004). These nation-states demanded of their citizens absolute loyalty to their national identity and the commitment to sacrifice themselves and their children for the national idea and the national interest. Pursuant to the romantic ideas of the 19th century, the nation-states adopted nationalist ideologies that related to nationality as an integral part of the person, and exhorted citizens to follow the order of their natural—i.e., national—identity.

Beginning in the mid-20th century, the primordial approach attracted various critiques. The most important of them was put forth by a group of sociologists who argued that national identity is a modern social construct. The most prominent among this group, who became known as modernists, were Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Eric Hobsbawm. Gellner described nationalism as a creation of modern society and of processes that took place in the 19th century: industrialization, urbanization, and education (Gellner, 1983). The transition from a rural to an urban and industrialized society broke the traditional identity links of many Europeans, which were based on family and local, rather than state, identity. Furthermore, education weakened the place of religion in

the lives of citizens. This created a need for an overarching unifying identity that would provide a response to the alienation of urban life in an industrialized society. Hence, instead of tribal-family, local, and religious loyalties in the urban, educated, and industrialized society, people began identifying with the nation.

Anderson emphasized the role of education and printing in the rise of nationalism, and argued that national identities are the "imagined" structures of an educated society that records its history as it wants to imagine it. During such writing, the nation edits its narrative—what it wants to remember, and even more importantly, what it wants to forget. This imagined narrative becomes the story that motivates citizens to commit to serve it and even to sacrifice their lives for it (Anderson, 1983).

Hobsbawm explained the emergence of national identity from a modernist-Marxist viewpoint. He argued that modernism released the masses from the bonds of religion and from traditional loyalties, and threatened the ruling elites in European countries. He described the emergence of nationalism as a response by the elites to a situation in which they were about to lose their place, and as a tool of renewed incitement and enslavement of the masses. According to Hobsbawm, the elites came up with traditions and customs that appeared as if they had been taken from the distant common historical past of the nations, but they invented traditions in order to create legitimacy for their continued leading role in society (Hobsbawm, 1983).

The common thread among modernist thinkers is that they view the nation and national identity as a novel social construct that emerged as part of the transition from the ancien régime to the new modern era. The modernist approach resonated widely in social sciences, and became almost hegemonic in nationalism studies. It also enriched the constructivist theoretical discourse that became central in the social sciences.

A deep theoretical and ideological chasm opened between the primordialists and the modernists. If national identity is a new, imaginary phenomenon manipulated by the elites, then the primordialist proponents and defenders of nationalist ideas are in the best case mistaken and misleading, and in the worst case exploiters and manipulators. The question becomes even starker in conflict and war: Do we send our children to die for an imaginary idea, or even worse, for an elitist manipulation?

A bitter political discourse took place in Israeli society as well surrounding the question of the origin of national identity—Israeli-Zionist and Palestinian alike. From the Israeli political-left, historian Shlomo Zand argued that the Jewish nation is a modernist invention of Zionist leaders (Zand, 2008). In contrast, those on the Israeli right explain the phenomenon of Palestinian nationalism as a result of post-colonialist theory (see, for instance, Greenstein, 2015). These politically and socially sensitive topics have turned the primordialist-modernist debate into a long, bitter dispute.

Despite the divide, a few researchers have enriched the discussion from different angles. Alongside primordialism, there are researchers who argue that nationalism is not a new phenomenon, but a continuation of identities with deep historical roots, known as perennialism. Perennialists do not view nationalism as an integral and natural part of the person, but the roots of nationalism are to be found in ancient history. Gat and Yakobson described a situation of this sort in their book *Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Gat & Yakobson, 2012), positing the existence and continuation of the foundations of national identity before the modern age. The book brings examples of the solidarity and attachment that were characteristic of ethnic groups from ancient times until today, which in the opinion of the authors refutes the arguments of the modernists regarding nationalism as a modern and invented structure that exists in the imagination of citizens in the new age. In the Israeli context, the book by Assaf Malach,

From the Bible to the Jewish State (Malach, 2019), presents a perennialist approach that attempts to challenge the modernist concept by Zand and connects perennialism to the current Israeli political discourse.

In parallel with the theoretical discussions on national identity, two historical events in the final decades of the 20th century became a turning point in both the historical development of national identities and the academic discourse and writing on the topic—the rise of neoliberal globalization, and the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union.

The second group of scholars between the modernist and primordialist poles are the ethno-symbolists, led by historian Anthony Smith. Smith argued that while nationalism is a new phenomenon that developed in the modern period and an invention by the elites who created national narratives and myths, these narratives rely on identities and symbols with a deep history that provides them with exceptional political power (Smith, 1999). Smith exposed the foundations underlying national identity, and those that turned national myths from a meaningless story to a strong political narrative that drove masses. Smith described certain patterns that repeat themselves in national myths, including a common distant past, hardships that were experienced along the way, and stories of heroism about figures that overcome the difficulties. All these bind the nation together and structure a similar way in which individuals, primarily in ethnically-based nations, tie their fates to that of the nation.

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From the End of History to the End of Nationalism?

If the end of the First World War became the "big bang of nationalism," as described by historian Iris Rachmimov (Rachmimov, 2004), globalization was supposed to end the nationalist idea, together with the end of history as foreseen by Francis Fukuyama at the end of the Cold War (Fukuyama, 1992). Neoliberal globalization, which is the current faster wave of human convergence, accelerated the transfer of goods, resources, and people around the globe at a pace unseen in human history. Behind all these stood ideas of freedom and nonintervention of the state in the global economy and in civilian life. The nation-state retreated both from physical management and from the creation of ideological narratives for its citizens. In addition, the Western economy moved to the post-industrial age service-based economy and toward the digital age.

These processes were described by sociologists Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman, who argued that modernity itself changes and becomes the new modernism—"late modernity" (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 1996). Bauman and Giddens concurred with modernists regarding the roots of national identity as a modern structure created as a result of urbanization, education, and industrialization, but they argued that as modernity evolves, national identity refashions itself along with it. They described how the state's retreat from the life of its citizens since the 1980s has blurred and weakened national identity. Citizens in the West were empowered to decide on their identity, and together with increased migration, societies in the West became more pluralistic in relation to the identities of their citizens. As Bauman described it, globalization put the creation of identity in the hands of individuals, who could rely only on themselves to produce new identities that matched the fast-paced world that was developing around them. The new identities that were created were more

flexible, and Bauman used the metaphor of liquid to describe them.

However, Bauman and Giddens did not deny that alongside cultural pluralism and the retreat of the state from the lives of its citizens, national identity continued to play a role in the political life of advanced post-industrialist Western states. Sociologist Michael Billig described national identity in the post-industrialist era as "banal" (Billig, 1995). He argued that national identities in this age are the default of each citizen in an advanced Western country, and are deeply imprinted in citizens. However, and perhaps because of the deep assimilation of these identities, the citizens in those countries no longer have to engage in grandiose actions to demonstrate their national affinity, but reflect such affinity through everyday practices. Thus, nationalism in this age, as described by Giddens and Bauman, has weakened and become flexible, but as Billig noted, is an underlying and unspoken force that still dominates life in Western societies. In contrast, enthusiastic and fervent nationalism has been branded in the post-nationalist age as a dangerous ideology that exists in the global periphery and among peoples who lag behind progress. As Billig described it: "The guerilla figures, seeking to establish their new homelands, operate in conditions where existing structures of state have collapsed, typically at a distance from the established centres of the West" (Billig, 1995, p. 5).

The rise of the post-nationalist era deflected nationalism to the global periphery, and mainly to the new countries in Eastern Europe that were established following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Theoretician Rogers Brubaker reframed the topic of national identity in Eastern Europe (Brubaker, 1996). He described three types of nationalisms that developed in Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The first type is "nationalizing nationalism," which drives groups that feel they have been marginalized in the past and now demand national hegemony in their "own" territory. This type of nationalism was attributed to ethnic groups in the new countries that were created in the 1990s, which demanded that these countries reflect their national uniqueness. The second type of nationalism Brubaker described is "homeland nationalism," which comes from the source countries, and aims to protect minority groups that remained outside the national borders. For instance, the nationalist movements in Russia frequently championed the minority rights of ethnic Russians who remained outside Russian borders and were given inferior status in some new countries. The third type of nationalism is "minority nationalism" belonging to those who remained outside the borders of the new national entities that were created. Following the imperial collapse, these minorities who remained outside the borders of the national state of the ethnic group to which they belong, were exposed to nationalist policies of the new countries. They developed nationalist concepts that differed from what the leaders in their countries of origin expected. The three types of nationalism defined by Brubaker provided the framework for understanding the development of nationalism in Eastern Europe following the

During the 2000s, it seemed that this status quo would be maintained for the foreseeable future. Nationalism was withering away while globalization conquered new territories, including most East European countries, which had joined the European Union, and whose citizens were abandoning the national idea in favor of the more flexible and adaptive global idea. Places such as Putin's Russia, for instance, where there was a strengthening of national policies supported by a regime that was becoming increasingly involved in the lives of its citizens, seemed to be an anachronistic reaction. No one foresaw the surprising sharp return of nationalism to the center of the political stage.

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Back to the Future: Is the Post-Nationalist Era Coming to an End?

2016 proved to be the breaking point for the globalist dream. Brexit in the UK and the election of President Trump seem to have heralded a radical change of direction in the balance between globalism and nationalism. Two major countries that had been symbols of the post-industrialist and post-nationalist age chose to deviate from the global path and reinforce their national identities. However, many of the signs of the crisis were in place long before 2016. Neoliberal globalization had economically served neither emerging countries, nor the entire public in developed countries. But of no less importance, the lack of the anchors of identity, the demand for constant adaptation, and the blurring of national identity were shown to be unpleasant for many. For various population sectors, 2016 was the culmination of years-long erosion in their status, their financial state, and their perception of themselves and their identity.

In fact, as far back as the 1990s, Gidden and Bauman indicated the gaps in neoliberal globalism that in their view were a risk to its continued development (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 1999). Giddens noted that nationalism had a psychological function. It creates continuity of people's identity and a sense of ontological security. This security described by Giddens develops from day-to-day practice and from long-term relationships that create people's identity. Neoliberal globalization intentionally undermines the continuity of identity in that it calls for flexibility and rapid adaptiveness to new situations, thereby undermining the ontological security of many citizens. Giddens and Bauman warned back in the 1990s that these cracks would create social tensions over the years, which would be impossible to overcome. They both indicated that this state of affairs would lead to a "longing for identity [that] comes from the desire for security."

It certainly seems that Giddens and Bauman's warning was on the mark. In the second decade of the 21st century, there was an unprecedented nationalist mobilization relative to previous decades, which was based on the yearning for a strong, stable, and more defined identity. These calls came at the expense of global values and the expression of national identity through banal practices. With the re-emergence of nationalism in the West, the nationalist mobilization in Putin's Russia seems a vanguard in a world that is becoming ever more nationalistic. As Putin's former advisor Vladislav Surkov concluded: "When [the West] was still crazy about globalism…Moscow provided a clear reminder that sovereignty and national interests matter.…They taught us that there is no reason to hold on to the values of the nineteenth century.…The 21st century, however, turned out to be closer to our path: the English Brexit, 'Make America Great Again,' and the anti-migrant movements in Europe are just the first items on a long list of the ubiquitous manifestations of deglobalization, resovereignization, and nationalism" (Surkov, 2019).

The old-new situation and the return of nationalism to center stage in the current era has led to a resurgence of attention to the topic and a large number of books that have tried to

explain the phenomenon. The most prominent of these include the book by historian Timothy Snyder, *The Road to Freedom: Russia, Europe, America*, in which Snyder links the rise of authoritarians in Russia and the nationalist movements in Eastern and Western Europe with the rise of Trump in the US (Snyder, 2018). Although Snyder deals frequently with Russia's direct influence on Western countries and its undermining of liberal democratic ideas, he also emphasizes the close link between the in-depth processes that have taken place both in Russia and in the West and have led to a rise of nationalism.

Another prominent book that deals with the rise of Trump and the rise of nationalism in the United States was written by anthropologist Arlie Russell Hochschild (Hochschild, 2016). In her book *Strangers in Their Own Land*, she explains the philosophies and the sense of loss and estrangement felt by layers of the white working class in the United States regarding the changing world around them, in which identities became flexible, while groups such as migrants and Afro-Americans "jumped" the line on the way toward the American dream. Former Israeli education minister Yuli Tamir presented her theory in her book *Why Nationalism* (Tamir, 2019), which describes the political, social, and economic gaps in the post-nationalist era, and in which she calls for liberal nationalism to heal the rifts created in society due to globalism. Journalist Nadav Eyal also touched upon similar points in his book, *The Revolt against Globalization* (Eyal, 2018).

As the list of new books and articles on national identity becomes longer, most researchers show a tendency to describe the return of nationalism to the center of the political agenda as a pendulum, with global identity on one side and national identity on the other. As the pendulum swings from one side to the other, identity transforms from global to national. If so, are we going back toward a society similar to the one of the 19th or early 20th century, or is the return of nationalism a sudden short-term flickering that will disappear as the pendulum swings back toward globalism? These directions of thought may soon prove to be overly simplistic. The likelihood that in a few years we will find ourselves living in a futuristic version of 19th century politics is quite low. To the same extent, it is clear that the return of nationalism indicates a deep difficulty within the process of globalization. It is therefore difficult to show that it may be possible to limit these tensions quickly and successfully, and to continue with the dizzying pace of globalization that we have so far experienced.

From a historical point of view, this may not be a pendulum movement, but an internal struggle within societies and between various groups with conflicting philosophies. In historical struggles such as this, the results have frequently been surprising and completely unexpected, and have led to the emergence of new ideas. For instance, the idea of sovereignty

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that formed the basis for national ideas and nation-states grew out of the wars of religion in 17th century Europe. Therefore, researchers in the field must take nonlinear developments and implications into account, as well as the appearance of unexpected black swans that fundamentally change the face of society (such as the coronavirus that is currently spreading throughout the world and may have far-reaching implications for national ideas). These directions of thought have not yet attracted attention from national identity researchers, and are awaiting in-depth thought and further research.

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Challenges to Israel's Identity

Where is Israel Going? Inner Challenges Facing the Jewish and Democratic Identity of the State of Israel and an Outline for Confronting Them
by Moshe Hellinger (with Baruch Zisser)
Hebrew University, Magnus Press, 2019
592 pages [in Hebrew]

Pnina Sharvit Baruch

In *Where is Israel Going?* Moshe Hellinger examines—as indicated by the book's subtitle—challenges to the Jewish and democratic identity of the State of Israel, and proposes a framework for confronting them. The author explains that while the integration of Jewish and democratic perspectives is a convention embedded in the heart of the Israeli Jewish consensus, some circles in Israeli society call this into question—whether questioning the Jewish aspect, the democratic aspect, or the synthesis between them. The book paints an interesting yet worrisome picture, while offering thought-provoking ideas on how to confront these challenges.

In the first part, the author describes approaches of various sectors and addresses the challenges these approaches pose to the state's Jewish and democratic identity. He divides Israeli society into cultural groups: the Arab minority, non-Jewish immigrants, religious Zionists, Mizrahim with a traditional orientation, immigrants from the former USSR, the Ethiopian community, and secular Ashkenazim. These groups are analyzed with various academic studies; the book is therefore a convenient resource for anyone looking for source material on the topic. On the other hand, this approach turns some chapters into a literature review, at times making it difficult to elicit a clear and comprehensive picture.

Obviously, any attempt to attribute a common denominator to members of any one group risks over-generalization, and the author is aware of this problem. The division into groups also makes it hard to relate to phenomena stemming from other contexts. For example, the analysis dealing with individualistic and hedonistic tendencies in the younger generation, appearing in the chapter devoted to the secular Ashkenazi elite, also applies to the younger generation of the Mizrahi traditionalists, as this is more a generational than ethnic matter. By locating this analysis in the chapter dealing with secular Jews, the author creates the impression—though it is not explicitly stated—that a connection to the Jewish tradition reduces these tendencies.

The author devotes the second part of the book to challenges posed by post-Zionist radical left ideologies and nationalistic right ideologies, both religious and secular. In the chapter dedicated to the post-Zionist challenge, the author relates to two main approaches: positive post-Zionism and negative post-Zionism. The first views the goals of Zionism in a positive light, but maintains that these goals have been realized, thanks to the establishment of a strong, affluent nation; now it is time to ensure full equality for all of Israel's citizens. The second rejects the Zionist enterprise a priori, viewing it as an unjust project that must come to an end, while adopting the Palestinian narrative from an anti-Zionist perspective.

The chapter dealing with the nationalistic right is three times longer than the chapter devoted to the radical left, and for good reason. The author contends that the radical left's

views are held by only a very small part of the Jewish public in Israel, though they may still be prevalent in various university departments and among artists and cultural icons. By contrast, at present, the nationalistic challenge, both religious and secular, is much greater to the democratic identity of the state, and, according to the author, also to its Jewish identity. The chapter presents the development of religious Zionism from the Hapoel HaMizrahi era and the beginning of the Mafdal era, characterized by both political and religious moderation, to a present in which the nationalist aspect has been greatly enhanced. The shift began mainly after the Six Day War and the start of the settlement enterprise in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, when settlement of the Land of Israel became the supreme manifestation of Jewish identity, thus weakening the universal dimension of Judaism, and with it, weakening the commitment to democracy. At the same time, the non-religious political right was also undergoing a change:

According to Hellinger, both the Jewish and democratic identities of the state must be enhanced together, with an emphasis on the principles allowing for their integration. Thus, it is necessary to stress the moral, social, and universal elements in the Jewish tradition that are aligned with the general values of universal morality. Adopting Jewish values of social justice can thereby strengthen Israel's democracy, as can weakening the central government and strengthening political decentralization.

the right began with the liberal values espoused by Zev Jabotinsky and Menachem Begin, but then adopted ethnocentric nationalistic trends, including signs of intolerance toward the Arab minority and left wing positions. The author demonstrates that nationalistic expressions once considered illegitimate are now acceptable to large segments of Israeli society, which is currently more ethnocentric and nationalistic. These trends challenge Israel as a liberal democracy.

The third part of the book examines several core issues reflecting the complexity of integrating Jewish and democratic aspects in the image of the State of Israel and its Zionist identity. The three main issues examined are: citizenship and the Law of Return, which applies only to Jews, with no right of return for Palestinians; Israel's control of Judea and Samaria, where Palestinians lack civil rights; and religious coercion and the relationship between religion and state. The author feels these issues can be resolved, while maintaining the Jewish and democratic nature of the state. He argues that it is possible to justify the Law of Return and the lack of a right of return for Palestinians while still maintaining Israel's democracy. By contrast, the ongoing occupation and the denial of civil rights to millions of Palestinians are highly problematic for Israel's democratic foundation, and it is therefore necessary to work toward a two-state solution while preserving Israel's security interests. As for the religion-state issue, Hellinger believes it is imperative to reduce religious coercion in Israel, as this directly infringes on the rights of anyone who is not religiously observant.

In the last chapter, the author lays out his own approach, which calls for a synthesis between religious Judaism and liberal democracy. Hellinger's main thesis is that an attempt to create a valid democracy in Israel cannot be based solely on Western liberal democratic values; it must also be based on the unique cultural elements of the society and people, i.e., the Jewish heritage. In his opinion, such an approach has the best chance of being accepted by the Jewish public in Israel, much of which is influenced more by Jewish tradition than by liberal democratic values.

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universal elements in the Jewish tradition that are aligned with the general values of universal morality. Adopting Jewish values of social justice can thereby strengthen Israel's democracy, as can weakening the central government and strengthening political decentralization. Furthermore, it is possible to learn about human dignity from Jewish sources. At the same time, Hellinger calls for the adoption of a liberal democratic ideology that is committed not only to universal moral values but also to communal values. This entails solidarity with one's own group, which in the Israeli context means the Jewish people, while still maintaining equality toward the Arabs and other non-Jewish minorities in Israel.

Hellinger, himself a religious Jew, elaborates on how principles of social justice and political decentralization, derived from Jewish sources, can be applied in the Israeli context—thus reducing gaps in Israeli society, strengthening the regional dimension, and allowing cultural autonomy for different segments of society. He proposes reducing the impact of the coercive religious establishment, which is one of the factors that drive many in Israel away from any Jewish religious tradition. He also calls to adopt a more humble Israeli discourse instead of the prevalent aggressive discourse, which would make room for acknowledging the injustices to Arabs and Palestinians without skirting the responsibility the other side bears and without conceding claims on the moral justification for Zionism. In particular, he suggests adopting universal approaches embedded in Judaism that stress human dignity (the human being as created in God's image) instead of the particular collective notion of giving Jews absolute precedence over non-Jews.

Hellinger acknowledges that his general approach and proposals might be viewed as unrealistic, given the current atmosphere in Israel. Nonetheless, he believes that this does not excuse him from making suggestions that are morally correct and practically beneficial.

His idea of stressing the Jewish values of human dignity, humility, and justice, as well as his striving for a policy that takes non-Jews, including the Arab minority in Israel and the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, into consideration is laudable, as are his liberal approach to the religion-state balance and his opposition to religious coercion. It is important to highlight the existence of Jewish approaches that promote democratic and universal values, so that the nationalistic ideologies are not branded as the only correct ones from a Jewish perspective. The rise of moderate Jewish voices such as Hellinger's could both affect the worldview of some religious Jews and influence how secular people view Judaism. It could also improve relations with Diaspora Jewry, especially in the United States, where Jews tend to have a liberal outlook. However, it is hard to envision Hellinger's moderate stance on political and religion-state issues currently adopted by the rabbinical leaders and other policymakers in religious Zionist and ultra-Orthodox circles. Unfortunately, for many years, the consistent trend in these sectors has been toward greater emphasis on particular nationalist values, conservative religious worldviews, and above all the Greater Land of Israel as a leading value. As such, any hope that the state's Jewish identity, to the extent it is defined by these circles, may be translated into liberal values of universal justice seems slimmer than ever before.

The world as a whole is experiencing a regression of liberal values and a surge in nationalist and even ultra-nationalistic values, which seems to be a counter-reaction to an over-acceptance of universal liberal worldviews that ignore collective elements and national feelings. Hopefully, this is not a unidirectional trend but the swing of a pendulum that in the future will see liberal values return to the forefront, albeit with greater consideration of legitimate national feelings than in the past.

Within the non-religious Israeli public, many hold right wing nationalist and even ultra-nationalistic values, but it seems that the chance of changing these outlooks and strengthening liberal values based on a non-religious discourse is higher, because the non-religious public is more open to hearing a range of opinions and because it is more accessible. Moreover, the non-religious leadership changes more frequently and holds less rigid and ideological worldviews than their religious counterparts and is also more open to influence from the outside. The world as a whole is experiencing a regression of liberal values and a surge in nationalist and even ultra-nationalistic values, which seems to be a counter-reaction to an over-acceptance of universal liberal worldviews that ignore collective elements and national feelings. Hopefully, this is not a unidirectional trend but the swing of a pendulum that in the future will see liberal values return to the forefront, albeit with greater consideration of legitimate national feelings than in the past. If this happens, liberal values intertwined with a national worldview might gain strength also in Israel. As such, realistically, the hope for countering the threats to the democratic character of the state lies primarily in strengthening a political leadership with liberal values. The chance such leaders may emerge from the religious Zionist sector seems remote indeed. Nonetheless, it is important to think of Judaism as a source for liberal and democratic values, and there is great value in stressing Hellinger's message, namely, that there is no contradiction between the state's liberal democratic aspect and its Jewish identity.

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Sudden Attack: About the Past or the Future?

Sudden Attack: The Ultimate Test of Intelligence and Leadership
by Uri Bar-Yosef
Dvir, 2019
480 pages [in Hebrew]

David Siman-Tov

In *Surprise Attack*, Uri Bar-Yosef returns to an issue that has engaged him in many of his books, namely, the collapse of warning systems in Israel and the personal responsibility, as he sees it, of the heads of the intelligence community for the lapse. In addition to the Yom Kippur War, about which he has written previously, here he examines, in his fluent and wide-ranging style, other familiar surprise attacks in the 20th century: Operation Barbarossa (the German invasion of Russia in the Second World War) and the Korean War.

In the first part of the book, which presents a theoretical and historical framework on the nature of surprise attacks in the 20th century, the author searches for the causes of the event—be they intelligence (lack of information or lack of understanding); personal; group; or organizational factors—whereby the attacked side was unprepared. The second part is devoted to the three said events that marked a failure on the part of those surprised on the battlefield. The analysis of each event proceeds in the same way: the decision to launch the attack; a description of the preparations; the extent of the threat that the attack represented for the victims; the information received by the victim about the intention and the preparations; and the victim's processes of evaluation and decision making.

A surprise attack is an astonishing event, and not just a surprise, in which one side in a strategic situation suddenly understands that it has acted on the basis of a mistaken perception of the threat from the other side. When the astonishment involves heavy losses, the result is national trauma for many years. This was the case of the surprise on Yom Kippur 1973, when there was a sharp transition from the sense of confidence and arrogance in Israel that followed the Six Day War, to a sense of fear and the loss of national security, and concern for the future of "the Third Temple." Successful surprise attacks paralyze the enemy and shatter the equilibrium of decision makers. Sometimes they confound the victim's ability to learn, so that it is unable to recover and lose the campaign. However, this book presents cases where the surprised side managed to learn important lessons, overcome the surprise, and eventually win the campaign.

According to Bar-Yosef, the failure of early warning often has its roots in conscious actions by the heads of intelligence organizations. For example, he argues that Eli Zeira, head of intelligence in the Yom Kippur War, misled the political leadership by not telling them about the non-activation of "special measures" for gathering intelligence. By contrast, Charles Willoughby, General MacArthur's head of intelligence in the Korean War, adjusted his assessment to the policy of his commander. The question that occupies Bar-Yosef is, what motivates the people involved—political and military leaders, intelligence personnel—and why do they refuse to recognize a change in the situation.

The human element plays a central role in the book, and Bar-Yosef makes use of a

The Korean War: The North Korean invasion and the Chinese invasion of South Korea (1950)

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War/Back-to-the-38th-parallel

comprehensive review of the literature to perform a "psychological analysis" of key figures who, he believes, had it within their power to prevent the surprise attacks. In this framework he analyzes their personality and family structure, their attitude toward other leaders (Stalin believed Hitler and identified with him, because he resembled him), and the history of their close family (MacArthur was deeply affected by the fact that his father did not become chief of staff). A large portion of the book, perhaps too much, is devoted to analyses of the personalities and characteristics of the leaders—such as paranoia, conspiratorial thinking in Stalin, and arrogance and impatience in Zeira in comparison to his predecessor Aharon Yariv, who nurtured research officers, guided them to act with caution, and encouraged them to recognize and examine their mistakes.

According to Bar-Yosef, most of the surprises discussed in the book were not due to failures of systems such as inadequate intelligence organizations, inability to gather information, or armies that were not properly prepared for war, but due to one or two people (usually a political or military leader acting with an intelligence figure) who estimated that the enemy would not attack and retained this preconception, even when it was no longer relevant.

However, this analysis leaves an uncomfortable feeling, apart from the fact that the writers on whom Bar-Yosef bases his book have not performed any psychological analysis of the leaders and intelligence figures. The question arises whether it is possible to use the same personality traits to explain conflicting actions (in the case of Stalin, for example, his scorn for intelligence, and after he was surprised—his eagerness to listen to the intelligence). Moreover, over-emphasis on the human dimension reduces the attention paid to aspects of perception, such as the lack of understanding of Egyptian perceptions in the Yom Kippur War as a conceptual underpinning that necessarily led to failure.

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as social pressure) and organizational aspects (such as compartmentalization, lack of pluralism, and internal power struggles), but the main emphasis is on the failure of senior personnel. For example, the power of denial of signs that conflict with preconceptions can be seen in the seizure of invading patrols, in Russia or Sinai. Although the interrogation of the captured soldiers clearly indicated that war was imminent, this was seen (by Stalin or Zeira) as deception or provocation, and they refused to recognize a significant change in the actual situation, which should have led to a reassessment of the intelligence. Another factor is individual initiative that in Bar-Yosef's view led to a destructive outcome: here, for example, he refers to Zeira's decision not to activate the "special measures" and not to report this, and also to Willoughby's decision not to involve intelligence personnel in the interrogation of captives. Zeira's explanation, that the decision not to report was based on his concept of command ("what is my responsibility I don't pass on to my superior officers") is not acceptable to Bar-Yosef. On the other hand, Zeira does not consider the importance of dialogue between leaders as a basis for deciding policy, an approach that has taken root in the IDF in recent decades.

There is tension between policy and intelligence. In both Operation Barbarossa and in the Yom Kippur War there was concern that raising alertness or shooting down the enemy's aerial reconnaissance sorties (in Russia) could lead to escalation, and therefore the victim of the surprise attack, the side that did not want war, avoids adopting intelligence assessments that would necessarily lead to escalation. This is the gap between an intelligence error and a policy that may be mistaken but is legitimate. For example, this was possibly the logic behind Stalin's aim to postpone war with Germany as long as possible, because he did not rely on the Red Army and wanted to give it time to recover, so he therefore preferred not to accept the intelligence assessments. In this

Operation Barbarossa – German attack on the Soviet Union (1941)

Source: R. Zuljan, 2018, Map of Operation Barbarossa, June 21 – September 1, 1941, https://www.onwar.com/wwii/maps/efront/05efront.html

context, he recalls the words of Russian Foreign Minister Molotov: "They accuse us of ignoring the intelligence, yes, they warned us, but if we had listened to them, we would have given Hitler an excuse to attack us sooner. We knew that war would soon break out and that we were weaker than Germany. We did everything we could to delay the war, and we succeeded."

Running through the book is a clear preference for information over assessment. Bar-Yosef glorifies the intelligence gatherers unit (in Israel, Zvi Zamir, head of the Mossad, and Yoel Ben-Porat, commander of the Sigint Unit) compared to the researchers (led by Eli Zeira and Yona Bandman), and this reflects a preference for facts over research assessment. While the North Korean invasion to conquer the peninsula indicates the difficulty of human intelligence to penetrate a closed dictatorial regime (then as now), it seems that the failure in the strategic assessment of relations in the Soviet Union-China-North Korea triangle indicates a failure of perception. According to American intelligence, Stalin, and not the

North Korean leader, was the triangle's center of gravity, and therefore if the Soviets were not interested in getting involved in a war (before their nuclear arsenal was ready), then a North Korean invasion was unlikely. From this we can learn that reliance on intelligence gathering, however good, does not grant immunity from mistaken preconceptions, and the dependence on intelligence gathering was problematic. There was no sign of information, however classified, that provided an understanding of the nature of strategic relations within the triangle, and therefore abstract understanding was required. Understanding is at the heart of strategic research.

In the wars and conflicts of recent decades, Israel did not need an early warning of sudden enemy attacks because the conflicts were initiated by Israel. The definition of warning of a surprise military attack, which Bar-Yosef treats as the main function of intelligence, seems less relevant in times of regional upheaval, the rise and fall of ISIS, the field of cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and the subversion of democratic governments, and all this when the Syrian army is not expected to initiate a surprise attack on Israel, strategic relations with Egypt are strong, and foreseeable wars will involve (precision) missiles, rounds of rocket firing, and the "campaign between wars."

Bar-Yosef attaches great importance to individual and organizational abilities to learn as the basis for ultimate victory. On the one hand, he presents Stalin in Operation Barbarossa, who changed his attitude after the surprise, and began to relate more openly to his generals, and this led, inter alia, to victory in the campaign for Moscow. On the other hand, he describes the IDF as apparently a learning system, although in fact he only mentions the central role played by Zamir, and how Zeira was pushed out of the decision making circle. It is not clear how tactical learning by the Armored Corps from dealing with Sagger anti-tank rockets, as described in the book, helped—if at all—in the strategic learning that was required by the Israeli security system.

In addition to the analysis of test cases, the book includes a review of surprise attacks in the 20th century, at the outbreak of hostilities and during the fighting. The question arises whether it is correct to describe attacks in the course of conflict as strategic surprise attacks, when all systems are alert and prepared so that the surprise, if any, is tactical or operational, but certainly not strategic. The review appears to describe history rather than any future threat. It is not by chance that the historical review ends with the attack on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001, as an unprecedented and different type of surprise attack. However, the reference to Russian interference in the United States presidential elections in 2016 does not seem to fit the concept of a sudden attack.

In the wars and conflicts of recent decades, Israel did not need an early warning of sudden enemy attacks because the conflicts were initiated by Israel. The definition of warning of a surprise military attack, which Bar-Yosef treats as the main function of intelligence, seems less relevant in times of regional upheaval, the rise and fall of ISIS, the field of cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and the subversion of democratic governments, and all this when the Syrian army is not expected to initiate a surprise attack on Israel, strategic relations with Egypt are strong, and foreseeable wars will involve (precision) missiles, rounds of rocket firing, and the "campaign between wars."[-]

Bar-Yosef's book examines the test cases that shaped the 20th century mainly from a personal point of view, so that it could almost be called "A Personal Surprise Attack." He presents, with the wisdom of hindsight, strategic errors by military and political leaders and intelligence organizations, but is not convincing in his claim that these were unavoidable errors due to their personalities, since everyone involved wanted to succeed and win. Even if some had narcissistic or paranoid personality traits, in

Egyptian attack in the Yom Kippur War, October 1973

other cases such traits did not prevent them from succeeding in a campaign or in assessing intelligence. Moreover, he inevitably plays down their part in the failure of the whole intelligence system and its internal processes, and vis-à-vis the political echelon.

Is this a book about the past or the future? The reader is left with no answer to this question or the question of whether the surprise attacks described in detail in the book are characteristic of the challenges of the last century, or can teach us about the challenges of the next century. From an Israeli point of view, it appears that the main threats facing us at present are those of an enemy that can disappear underground or under cover of civilians, and the intelligence challenge is to reveal them quickly and accurately. It also seems that humanity as a whole is facing new global threats such as climate change, pandemics (like the coronavirus), and demographic changes, and the intelligence community must address them because they are a challenge to national security in the broadest sense, rather than focusing purely on military threats.

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The Chief of Staff Put to the Test

The Chief of Staff
by Meir Finkel
Modan, 2018
242 pages [in Hebrew]

Gal Perl Finkel

Unlike other Western countries, in Israel the Chief of the IDF General Staff, commander of the armed forces, is perhaps the most important person in the country after the Prime Minister on all matters of security. He is familiar with the use of military force, he commands the body responsible for the organized staff work most relied on by the government, and he is usually the most experienced man in the room, since most other ministers arrive for cabinet debates with almost no prior relevant knowledge (Shelah, 2015).

Although the Chief of Staff is subordinate to the government, it is hard to imagine a situation when the government would recommend not taking his advice. Prominent examples of this acceptance can be found in the way Chief of Staff Dan Haloutz dominated government proceedings during the Second Lebanon War, and the report of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that examined the multiyear Gideon plan, initiated by Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. According to the report, the government approved the plan almost without examination, mainly because it was recommended by the Chief of Staff.

That is why this book by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Meir Finkel, formerly commander of an armored brigade and head of the Dado Center for Military Interdisciplinary Thinking, is so important.

According to the Basic Law: The Military (April 9, 1976), the Chief of Staff is the "supreme command level in the army," and "subject to the authority of the Government and subordinate to the Minister of Defense." *The IDF Strategy*, published by Chief of Staff Eisenkot, broadened the scope and defined the Chief of Staff as "commander of the campaign" and "the one who determines the idea and the concept for achieving the mission." Eisenkot writes that the Chief of Staff performs three unique functions in the IDF: looks at the whole war arena of as a matter of strategy; takes a broad overview of strategy; and takes an operational view that goes beyond the individual services. In effect, he functions as the link between the military and the political echelon, the government, and the cabinet; as an adviser on force buildup and operation; as the overall commander of the army; and as the contractor who implements government decisions on the army.

In this book, Finkel offers his job description for the position: "to interpret and mediate between understandings, decisions, and definitions of the political echelon and the IDF (in all senses—scope, organization, capabilities, and so on) and the way the IDF is used in conflicts, while developing directions for action and formulating advice on political decisions." As he sees it, the Chief of Staff is responsible for setting priorities for the entire organization and leading the ensuing changes, and for defining the organizational culture, that is, the values of the army and the behavioral norms for commanders and soldiers. For him, the term "IDF culture" covers all values, i.e., behavioral norms, from dedication to the mission, to the approach toward breaches of discipline and sexual harassment.

In the book it is clear that Finkel wishes to show how the institution of Chief of Staff is a unique mixture of the function of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is familiar from other militaries, with the role of head of the General Staff. Finkel argues that the strength of the institution derives from the weakness of the mediating mechanism between the military system and the political system: the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, and the National Security Council.

Research Methodology

While every period has its own challenges and contexts, there are still common features that can be instructive regarding the challenges, responsibilities, and tasks embodied in the institution of the Chief of Staff. At the same time, the author cautions that although he is ostensibly dealing with one position, the Chief of Staff, in fact, he sees it as part of a complex environment—the Minister of Defense, the Prime Minister, the cabinet, the political system, and the General Staff.

The author presents a comparative analysis of how various Chiefs of Staff have functioned with reference to six aspects that he defines as significant. The research is neither historical/documentary nor does it cover all Chiefs of Staff, only 15 of them. The analysis is based on material from the IDF History Department, personal biographies, media reports, and interviews conducted by the author with senior officers and with some of the Chiefs of Staff themselves. He assumes that it will not be possible to make an overall assessment of the term of office of each of those he presents, and indeed, some of the individuals and their approach to various situations are mentioned in several chapters, while others appear in only one chapter.

Finkel has chosen to examine patterns of action and command as reflected by Chiefs of Staff in extreme situations: war, changes in strategy, and changes in force buildup. To that end he defines six challenges or aspects, and compares how several of these individuals have dealt with similar situations:

1. Identification of a change in reality, followed by activation of appropriate changes in the military
2. Familiarity of a Chief of Staff from a ground force with ways to use the air force in war (and vice versa—familiarity of a Chief of Staff from the air force with the ground forces)
3. The crisis of trust—the Chief of Staff's loss of trust in a general during combat
4. Command of an army in crisis, after a war that is perceived as a failure
5. Initiation of different trends in force buildup
6. Working relations with politicians on force buildup.

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From the start the author acknowledges that there is a difficulty in this comparative study. For example, in the War of Independence, the function of mediating between political understandings and decisions and the actions of the IDF was performed by Defense Minister and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, while in the Sinai Campaign this was the job of Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan. In the Six Day War this role was filled by Northern Command General David (Dado) Elazar, who performed the same function in the Yom Kippur War, but this time as Chief of Staff. During the First Lebanon War, this was the job of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. In other words, each period or event has additional elements that affect the dialogue

and mediation between the actors, deriving from the strengths and weaknesses of different parts of the system. Nonetheless, the analysis of how some Chiefs of Staff have responded to the challenges allows the author to formulate a conclusion on the nature of their performance, and to deduce from that how each one is likely to respond to a given challenge.

Finkel's analysis is detailed and methodical and offers some eye-opening insights. An instructive example that appears in the chapter about the role of the Chief of Staff in identifying changes in the reality refers to Amnon Lipkin-Shahak and the security zone in Lebanon in 1995. This is particularly important because of the dearth of research and writing about the IDF's 18 years in Lebanon.

Lipkin-Shahak's predecessors perceived the presence of the IDF in the security zone as a normal security action, and no special General Staff efforts were invested in matters such as directing intelligence, organization, or the development of weapons, whereas he, who took on the role in 1995, announced that this was no ordinary security situation, but a war against a terror organization and guerrilla forces. As Chief of Staff, he diverted intelligence resources, oversaw the development of specific weapons and the Egoz Unit to combat Hezbollah, and in general led a determined fight against Hezbollah. The changes ordered by Chief of Staff Lipkin-Shahak had a considerable effect on IDF achievements against Hezbollah in Lebanon, but the author is careful to note that although he correctly identified the change, without the involvement of "agents of change" in the regiments and battalions, it would not have happened.

Assessment

According to Finkel, "The role of the Chief of Staff is a challenging one that demands a thorough understanding of a range of subjects, the ability to lead and command at the level of the supreme authority, sharp senses to identify changes, the ability to initiate processes and handle opposition to them (internal and external), composure in difficult circumstances, and much more." The author has chosen good test cases to measure each Chief of Staff, and the comparative analysis produces many interesting insights. Inter alia, he states that simply identifying a change is not enough, and it must be backed by tangible actions.

With reference to the challenges faced by a Chief of Staff from the ground forces regarding the air force (and vice versa), Finkel is correct that the supreme commander must be familiar with the force's capabilities and plans, and even be involved in shaping them. However, the structure of the IDF and the fact that the air force is separate from the ground force makes this difficult to implement.

Another conclusion refers to the situation in which the Chief of Staff loses faith in a commander in wartime. Although it is not possible to prevent the tension, it is possible, both before and during the fighting, to create forums for learning in which disagreements can be discussed discreetly while avoiding wars between generals. This happened during Operation Defensive Shield, when there was friction between Chief of Staff Mofaz and GOC Southern Command Yitzhak Eitan, and lessons can be learned from this situation.

The author notes that the range of tasks and areas of responsibility placed on the Chief of Staff are too broad for one person alone. That is why the United States divided the role of commander of the army between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is responsible for building the force and advising the President on military action, and the heads of regional commands, who are directly subordinate to the President. Since the situation in Israel is different, Finkel lists a number of factors that help the Chief of Staff handle the challenges: personal experience, suitable personnel in supplementary positions (such as a Deputy Chief of Staff from the ground forces, when the Chief of Staff comes from the air force), processes of active learning, and recognition

of the Minister of Defense as a real partner in carrying the burden.

Missing from the Book

Although the research is comprehensive, it avoids dealing with many aspects of the Chief of Staff's job. Of course, any research study is subject to this claim, but it could be argued that the role of the Chief of Staff regarding how Israel deals with the threat of nuclear weapons, an issue that was and remains relevant, should be examined and analyzed. Although many of the debates on how to deal with the Iranian nuclear program and the question of whether or not to attack remain classified, it is possible to discuss the role of Chiefs of Staff Rafael Eitan and Gabi Ashkenazi in the discussions prior to the attacks on the nuclear reactors in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007), in leading the preparations for the missions and their consequences, and to draw conclusions from this regarding future processes.

The challenges of force buildup analyzed in the chapter on commanding the army in a crisis, as they relate to Gabi Ashkenazi's term of office, lack the background information that it was necessary to prepare the army for a campaign that could erupt in the north only a year after the end of the Second Lebanon War, because Hezbollah and the Syrian army were likely to respond and events could easily escalate into a war (Katz, 2019).

Some time later, Ashkenazi said that when he assumed the position, he defined the Syrian nuclear threat "as the first and top priority for the IDF. It was clear that we had to destroy this reactor, but my definition was to destroy it without deteriorating into war, but if it did deteriorate into war—to be capable of winning it" (Ben-Yishai & Somfalvi, 2018). Later publications show that the option of attacking from the air, supported in the discussions by the Chief of Staff and Commander of the Air Force Eliezer Shkedi, was the option that the cabinet, led by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, chose to approve (Katz, 2019). Clearly, the Chief of Staff had a decisive influence on how the action was carried out as well as responsibility for its possible outcomes, including war.

Two principal insights emerge from this book. The first is the importance of the Chief of Staff in the processes of building the force, since he plants seeds whose fruits will only be enjoyed by his successor or the one after that. The second insight in the book is that the supreme test of a Chief of Staff is war, and in war, according to US General Douglas Macarthur, "there's no substitute for victory."

Another element that is missing in the book concerns the military background of the various Chiefs of Staff. No one is born a Chief of Staff. He has grown up in the military system, starting as a new recruit, then a junior commander, becoming a senior commander, and finally the commander of the whole army. This route determines his expertise in the various fields, and it is not surprising that in the chapter on the professionalism of Chiefs of Staff, the author examines the performance of ground force commanders in the operation of the air force during fighting. For example, when Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi was appointed after the Second Lebanon War and was required to rehabilitate the IDF ground forces, the fact that he rose through the ranks of the Golani infantry brigade, and throughout his service commanded ground forces in fighting and in routine, had immense significance (Hendel & Katz, 2012).

Conclusion

This fascinating book is an important resource for a better public understanding of the role of the Chief of Staff, his responsibilities, and the challenges he faces. One important challenge is to shape the IDF's fighting spirit and its sense of capability. In a 2019 post on his Facebook page, MK Ofer Shelah wrote about his experiences from 1979, when he participated as a soldier

in the Paratroopers Brigade in Operation Menorah in southern Lebanon, the first raid in which he participated. Shelah stated that he was very impressed by the professional calm demonstrated by the commander of the Paratroopers Brigade at that time, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, and the commander of his battalion Shaul Mofaz (both future Chiefs of Staff). He wrote that the IDF of those days was less professional and powerful than Israel's army is today, but "it had a spirit of attack and raid, commanders that you followed without hesitation, the focus of an army that starts each day with preparations for war." Shelah wrote that the job of the current Chief of Staff, Aviv Kochavi, who also served under Mofaz in the Paratroopers, is "to instill a similar spirit in the army of our time." The challenge facing Kochavi is the one that faces every Chief of Staff and remains as central as ever, as demonstrated by the author in his examination of the actions of Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, designed to change the IDF fighting spirit before the Sinai Campaign.

Two principal insights emerge from this book. The first is the importance of the Chief of Staff in the processes of building the force, since he plants seeds whose fruits will only be enjoyed by his successor or the one after that. The second insight in the book is that the supreme test of a Chief of Staff is war, and in war, according to US General Douglas Macarthur, "there's no substitute for victory."

Gal Perl Finkel is the coordinator of the INSS Military and Strategic Affairs program. He wishes to thank his mother, the late Dr. Gilly Perel-Dayan, for her helpful comments on the article. There is no family relationship between himself and author Brig. Gen. (ret.) Meir Finkel.

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Call for Papers for *Strategic Assessment*

The editorial board of the INSS journal *Strategic Assessment* invites authors to submit articles to be published in the journal's updated format. Proposals for special themed issues are also welcome.

Strategic Assessment, a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary peer-reviewed journal on national security, cyber, and intelligence, was launched in 1998 and is published quarterly in Hebrew and English by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University. *Strategic Assessment* serves as a platform for original research on a spectrum of issues relating to the discipline of national security, cyber, and intelligence. The purpose of the journal is to spark and enhance an informed, constructive debate of fundamental questions in national security studies, using an approach that integrates a theoretical dimension with policy-oriented research. Articles on topics relating to Israel, the Middle East, the international arena, and global trends are published with the goal of enriching and challenging the national security knowledge base.

The current era has seen many changes in fundamental conventions relating to national security and how it is perceived at various levels. As national security research evolves, it seeks to adjust to new paradigms and to innovations in the facets involved, be they technological, political, cultural, military, or socio-economic. Moreover, the challenge of fully grasping reality has become even more acute with the regular emergence of competing narratives, and this is precisely why factual and data-based research studies are essential to revised and relevant assessments.

The editorial board encourages researchers to submit articles that have not been previously published that propose an original and innovative thesis on national security with a broad disciplinary approach rooted in international relations, political science, history, economics, law, communications, geography and environmental studies, Israel studies, Middle East and Islamic studies, sociology and anthropology, strategy and security studies, technology, cyber, conflict resolution, or additional disciplines.

In the spirit of the times, *Strategic Assessment* is shifting its center of gravity to an online presence and availability. While INSS will continue to prepare issues on a quarterly basis, articles approved for publication, following the review and editing process, will be published in an online version on the journal's website in the format of "published first online," and subsequently included in the particular quarterly issues.

Strategic Assessment publishes articles in five categories:

Research Forum – academic articles of a theoretical and research nature on a wide range of topics related to national security, of up to 7000 words in Hebrew or 9000 words in English (with APA-style documentation). Articles should be researched-based and include a theoretical perspective, and address a range of subjects related to national security. All articles are submitted for double blind peer review. Submissions must include an abstract of 100-120 words; keywords (no more than ten); and a short author biography.

Policy Analysis – articles of 1500-2000 in Hebrew words and up to 2500 words in English that analyze policies in national security contexts. These articles will be without footnotes and bibliography and use hyperlinks to refer to sources, as necessary. Recommended reading and additional source material can be included. Submissions must include an abstract of 100-120 words; keywords (no more than ten); and a short author biography.

Book Reviews – book reviews of 800-1300 words (up to 1500 words in English) including source material (APA-style) on a wide range of books relating to national security. Submissions must include a short author biography.

Professional Forum – panel discussions on a particular topic, or in-depth interview, of 2000-3000 words (up to 3500 words in English) including source material (APA-style). Submissions must include a short author biography.

Academic Survey – a survey of 1800-2500 words (up to 3000 words in English) including references and recommended reading (APA-style) of the latest professional literature on a specific topic relating to national security. Submissions must include a short author biography.

Articles should be submitted electronically to editors-sa@inss.org.il indicating the category of the attached article. You may also use this e-mail address for questions or additional information about the journal.

Kobi Michael and Carmit Valensi
Editors, *Strategic Assessment*