

Conclusion

On the basis of the analysis of each model, it is possible to summarize their characteristics in respect to each of the parameters:

1. Territorial division

There is no border within the state in any model, although in the autonomy model, a physical barrier could be feasible if the territory of the autonomous area is contiguous. In the confederation, there is a defined border based on the 1967 line, although it will be an open border without any physical barrier.

2. Status of the settlements

All the models provide for the possibility of leaving the settlements in place, although in the autonomy model, a number of settlements might be evacuated to ensure contiguity in the autonomous area. In the confederation model, the settlements will be part of the Palestinian state and their inhabitants will be residents of the Palestinian state but citizens of Israel.

3. Status of Jerusalem

In all models, Israel retains a degree of control over Jerusalem. However, while Israel has full control in the unitary and autonomy model, the Palestinians will be involved in the administration of certain parts of the city (including the Holy Basin or parts of it) in the federation and confederation models.

4. Aspects of citizenship and residency

In all the models, except for the confederation, the Palestinians become permanent residents of the State of Israel and are also eligible to become citizens. Depriving Palestinians of full citizenship as a permanent solution conflicts with the democratic character of the State of Israel. In the confederation model, there is a distinction between citizenship and residency: the Palestinians are citizens of the Palestinian state, even if they live in the territory of the State of Israel, while the Jews are citizens of the State of Israel, even if they are permanent residents of the Palestinian state.

5. Governmental authority

In the unitary model there is no central government that rules the entire state.

In the autonomy and federation models, the powers are divided between the central government and the government in the autonomous area or district, respectively, which can lead to friction, as well as duplication, complexity, and excess. The confederation model also provides for some division of power between the states and the confederative government, although it is limited, which could result in friction on matters that remain at the confederative level and on issues that concern both states.

In every model, except for the confederation, government institutions must be established to meet the needs of the Palestinian population that joins the state, including the provision of services in Arabic.

6. Palestinian involvement in government

Apart from the unitary model, the models give the Palestinians self-rule in certain domains within the territory under their jurisdiction. In the unitary model, it is possible for the Palestinians to have cultural autonomy.

In all models, apart from the confederation, the Palestinians also have the right to participate in elections to the central government, which is based on their right to Israeli citizenship. In the autonomy model, it may be decided that representation of the residents of the autonomy

in the central government will be through appointed representatives, rather than by direct elections.

The denial of full rights to the Palestinians, including the right to vote and be elected, is contrary to the democratic character of the State of Israel. Furthermore, if they are not given full rights in the state, increased hostility and alienation can be expected.

Giving the Palestinians the right to participate in the political processes in Israel could cause concern that they will pursue interests within the political system that conflict with Jewish national interests, to the point that they may attempt to change the Jewish character of the state, or at least to strengthen its Palestinian character. In a confederation, the Palestinians are not involved in the government of the State of Israel, and their influence is limited to those domains under the jurisdiction of the confederative government.

7. Freedom of movement in the state

Both Palestinians and Israelis have freedom of movement in the entire territory in all the models. In the confederation model, the Palestinians have freedom of movement throughout the confederation as a result of the lack of borders between the states, even though they are not permanent residents of the State of Israel. None of the models, except the autonomy model, have a physical border within the state, so that it is impossible to effectively restrict freedom of movement. In the autonomy model, a physical barrier may be possible, if the territory is contiguous. In this case, border control could take place at crossing points if necessary. However, the right to freedom of movement of the residents of the autonomous area must be respected as part of their status as permanent residents of the State of Israel. Unrestricted freedom of movement potentially could lead to strife between Palestinians and Jews within the state.

8. The refugee issue

The refugee issue is external to all the models and depends on how the matter is settled between the two sides. Nonetheless, it can be assumed that the Palestinian side will raise the issue as a condition for agreeing

to the model. In all the models, there is a concern that the refugees who are currently within Palestinian territory will exploit the freedom of movement to realize the “right of return” to their family’s place of origin within Israel’s territory. In a confederation, refugees from abroad might be able to enter the territory of the Palestinian state, unless it is otherwise agreed upon between the sides.

9. Security aspects

External security and securing the external borders remain Israel’s responsibility in each model, although in the confederation model, Palestinian forces and the representatives of the Palestinian state may also be involved in such matters, at least gradually. Furthermore, Israeli security forces will have the right to operate in territory under Palestinian control to handle internal security threats. In the autonomy model, the division of power between the security forces of the central government and those of the autonomous area must be established. In the confederation model, the ability of Israeli security forces to operate in the Palestinian state will probably be limited to exceptional cases and phased out over time.

10. Social aspects

In all the models, genuine processes of reconciliation between the Jewish and Palestinian publics in the state are crucial, given the close connections between the societies. This is particularly important the unitary state and federation models, but also in the autonomy and confederation models.

11. Economic and civil aspects

In all models, responsibility for macroeconomic policy is given to the central government (in the confederation, it is the confederate government) and uniform rules of trade are required. In all the models, except for the confederation, the ultimate responsibility for the welfare of all the Palestinian residents rests with the government of Israel. Each model requires investment by the state in order to narrow the major economic disparities, including finding a solution for rehabilitating the existing

refugee camps. This is particularly the case in the unitary and federation models, but also in the autonomy model. In the confederation model, as well, reducing economic disparities between the states composing the confederation is important, for the sake of stability.

12. Preservation of the Jewish character of the state

All the models, except for the confederation model, pose a challenge to preserving the Jewish character of the State of Israel, by adding a large Palestinian minority. Moreover, the Palestinians could gain considerable influence over strategic decisions that could affect the state's Jewish character. This is especially the case in the unitary and federation models, but could also occur in the autonomy model. In contrast, in the confederation model, the Jewish character of the state is preserved, as Palestinian national identity is realized in the Palestinian state.

13. Preservation of the democratic and the liberal character of the state

The confederation model improves Israel's capability to adhere to democratic values, since it ceases to control the Palestinians. In all the models, preserving the state's democratic character requires that the Palestinian residents who join the other state receive all the rights granted to residents of the State of Israel, including the right to become citizens of the state.

Beyond that, retaining the democratic and liberal character of the state will also depend on how the Palestinian governing bodies—whether at the level of the district or of the autonomous area—ensure respect of basic freedoms and human rights. In the confederation model, if the Palestinian state is not democratic, the coexistence of a democratic state and a non-democratic state under the same confederative government will pose a challenge to the model's stability.

14. Implications for Israel's Arab citizens

All the models make it possible for Israel's Arab citizens to connect with their Palestinian brethren in the West Bank (and Gaza) who will also become part of the state (or confederation). In the autonomy and

federation models, the choice of some Arab citizens of Israel to become part of the Palestinian autonomous area or district could be taken into account when determining the borders of the autonomous area or of the district. In the confederation model, they could be given the choice of becoming citizens of the Palestinian state, while remaining residents of Israel. Implementing all the models places the Arab citizens in a dilemma as to whether they should join the Palestinian side within the one state, at the price of less integration into Jewish Israeli society.

15. Implications for the PA

The status of the PA will undergo a major transformation in all the models. In the unitary model, it will be dismantled altogether, while in the federal model, the PA will be transformed into a district government with limited powers. In the autonomy model, the PA can remain the governing authority in the autonomous area under Israeli authority. In the unitary model, the PA's security forces will be dismantled altogether while in the case of the autonomy and federal models, the security forces will be modified and become a regional police force. In the confederation model, the PA will be able to upgrade its status to that of the government of the Palestinian state.

16. Status of the Gaza Strip

In every model, the inclusion of Gaza complicates the possibility of successfully implementing the model. Excluding Gaza, however, means that the conflict will not be fully resolved, and Gaza will remain a source of instability on the border of the state. The confederation model has greater flexibility to include Gaza in the model, by implementing arrangements that take into account the complexity of this area.

17. Execution of the model

All the models involve a drastic regime change that requires direct approval by the people. Apart from the unitary model, reaching a detailed agreement with the Palestinians is a necessary precondition to the implementation of the model. Implementing the unitary model will also be difficult if the Palestinians are opposed to it, and violent confrontations

are expected in such a case. Each model requires formulating a new constitutional framework and implementing major structural changes, which will require a significant transitional period, with the federation model proposing the most drastic changes.

In the confederation model, the transfer of parts of East Jerusalem to the Palestinian state requires a referendum or a vote of a majority of 80 members of the Knesset, according to current Israeli law.

A challenge in all of the models—except for the confederation—is the harmonization of civil law, at least in domains that do not fall exclusively in the realm of the autonomous area or district, respectively. Thus, for example, it will be necessary to register land located in territory that is added to the State of Israel in accordance with Israeli law, especially in the unitary and federation models.

18. Feasibility

In all the models, except the confederation, obtaining Palestinian consent is highly dubious, since the Palestinians will be agreeing to join part of a state with a Jewish character and without fully realizing Palestinian national aspirations. Implementing a model without Palestinian agreement would most likely require the use of force and lead to international pressure on Israel. It also is likely to create conflict among the Israeli public, particularly if the model is perceived as threatening to the Jewish or democratic character of the state. In the confederation model, the Palestinians will be able to realize their national identity, although its implementation requires that they agree to the Israeli settlements remaining in place. Moreover, the sides will have to reach detailed agreements on the core issues of the conflict and complicated arrangements for coordination, rendering the negotiations complex and challenging.

The likelihood of the models' success as a permanent solution to the conflict

None of the models appear to have auspicious prospects of bringing about a permanent, stable, and successful solution to the conflict. One main reason is the high potential for friction between Israelis and Palestinians due to

the freedom of movement granted in all the models. Given the deep-seated hostility between the two populations over the past decades and their religious, cultural, social, and economic differences, the models raise concerns that tensions between the populations will lead to violent internal strife and ultimately to the state's instability.

In all the models in which the Palestinians become part of a state with a Jewish identity without being able to realize their national identity, hostility between the peoples is liable to increase over the years. The confederation provides an adequate solution to this aspect; hence, with this model, friction could decrease over time. Denying the Palestinians full rights in the state not only would be a fatal blow to Israel's democratic character, but it would deepen hostility and inevitably lead to violence that could escalate into a full-fledged civil war. Granting the Palestinians full and equal civil rights could lead them to alter the Jewish nature of the state. Additionally, even if the Palestinians are given full and equal civil rights, national tensions will continue to exist and destabilize the state. The confederation is the only model that offers a solution to these concerns since each nation controls its own state.

All the models also impose a heavy economic burden on Israel, as it must provide for the needs of all the new Palestinian residents who join the state. Although Israel is not directly responsible for the residents of the Palestinian state in the confederation, their economic situation is of critical importance. Indeed, bridging economic gaps within the confederation is crucial for its stability. In addition, dividing the state into districts and regions, as suggested in the federation and autonomy models, creates duplication, complexity, and excess, especially given the small size of the country.

Furthermore, implementing the models requires the consent of the Palestinians, and the two sides must manage to resolve numerous controversial issues. It is difficult to see how this can be achieved. Moreover, all models (except, perhaps, the unitary model) require reaching agreements with the representatives of the Palestinians in a continuous fashion as part of the implementation of the model. This entails endless disputes.

In contrast to the models analyzed here, which are based on the idea of a continued connection between the Jewish and Palestinian peoples in the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, the two-state solution is based on the idea of separation. This model has not been explored in this

document but has been extensively analyzed over the years, including by the INSS. This solution has significant shortcomings, as it requires dividing the land and evacuating settlements, as well as posing certain security risks. Nevertheless, as the analysis clearly shows, the impossibility of a model based on the union of the two peoples as a stable solution to the conflict leads inevitably to the conclusion that, despite its shortcomings, separation is indeed the preferable solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.