

Insights and Policy Recommendations

The goal of this research was to examine and analyze contemporary manifestations of antisemitism, in the political discourse of five major European countries—Germany, France, Spain, Britain, and Ireland—over the course of one year, from June 2019 through September 2020. The basic assumption underlying this research was that the public and the political arenas mutually feed upon one another, such that the political discourse expresses the attitudes of the public to a large extent and influences the social processes and attitudes within the context of the public discourse and therefore also on today's antisemitism. The main research questions asked were: How common was antisemitism in the political discourse among elected officials in these countries during the given time frame? How did antisemitism characterize the political discourse? How did the uniqueness of each country affect this context? Were there similarities between the countries in the way that antisemitism characterized their political discourse? In addition, the research emphasized the way the Jewish community in each country experienced and handled antisemitism.

The research was conducted by systematically monitoring and mapping public expressions of antisemitism by elected officials in the political systems of the five surveyed countries, during the given time period. This resulted in a sample of expressions of antisemitism, limited by time, scope (several dozen elected officials), and findings (several dozen expressions of antisemitism in total). Therefore, the research does not purport to provide a comprehensive account of the long-term trends and developments in the context of antisemitism in Europe; rather it presents a partial picture of contemporary expressions of antisemitism in the political discourses of the surveyed countries, in an attempt to systematically gain insights into the phenomenon in general.

The research also sought to understand how antisemitism was expressed in each of the five countries and if there were similarities and differences. Although the countries had shared characteristics, the research emphasized that the countries differed in terms of antisemitism. Therefore, the findings for the countries surveyed here do not necessarily reflect the situation in other European countries, particularly those countries in Eastern Europe where antisemitism has been more common, given the recent rise of populism and euro-skepticism, both serving as fertile ground for antisemitism. Nonetheless, the insights obtained from one country can contribute to the learning process and in formulating strategies for dealing with the phenomenon elsewhere. Furthermore, because the phenomenon of antisemitism has some shared characteristics, it is possible to formulate guidelines for a strategy to combat the phenomenon as a whole, as described below. The variations of the phenomenon across the different countries, however, calls for an in-depth regional study for formulating a unique regional response, as a complement to the general principles for dealing with antisemitism.

By analyzing the insights and conclusions reached in this study of contemporary antisemitism in Western Europe, it is worthwhile to emphasize that antisemitism is a problem of society as a whole rather than just being a local and domestic challenge faced by the Jewish communities. Antisemitism serves as a mirror to the political, social, and economic problems facing societies in general and countries specifically; that is, antisemitism should be viewed as a benchmark for sociopolitical changes in a country and even as a warning of approaching dangers that could also harm non-Jewish society.

Below are the insights and recommendations resulting from the research. The insights relate to the similarities and differences between the five Western European countries that were surveyed; the ways in which antisemitism is expressed in the political discourse both in the right and the left; and the main challenges in responding to the phenomenon. In the recommendations, we propose a number of guidelines for a more optimal policy in combating antisemitism, particularly for the leadership of the EU and its member countries.

Insights

“The Spirit of the Times” and its Influence on Antisemitism

The current era is characterized by a number of overarching global and regional trends, which have significantly shaped societies and countries and have directly influenced the scope of antisemitism. In recent years Europe has experienced a multifaceted crisis (economic, political, ideological, and social), which intensified during the past year due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The European continent has also become extremely polarized between supporters of the European Union (globalists) and its opponents (euro-skeptics, including rising nationalistic forces), strengthened by populism, the rise of political extremism, and the relative weakening of the political center. Dividing Europe are issues such as immigration policy, the treatment of refugees, and the status of minorities. This public and political discourse, which takes place on social media as well as in the traditional media, is characterized by not only polarization, but also by radicalization, hatred, and the rapid and unchecked dissemination of lies, fake news, rumors, and conspiracy theories.

These contemporary political and social phenomena (the “spirit of the times”) have affected the construction of national “meta narratives.” Processes of political extremism and the rise of populism have led to divisions between groups and sectors, fanning hatred toward minorities, including Jews. Furthermore, catastrophic events, such as the recent waves of refugees, the healthcare disaster during the current COVID-19 pandemic, the economic crisis and slowdown as a result of the pandemic, tensions between unity and separatism, and protest events (like those of the Yellow Vests in France) have encouraged an upsurge in antisemitism at both extremes of the political spectrum. Although these trends have numerous adverse effects on non-Jewish society as well, it would be incorrect to dismiss these expressions of antisemitism as being the exception to the rule, since the phenomenon is again at the center of the sociopolitical discourse and is no longer just a negligible phenomenon in Europe’s margins.

Social media in particular has immensely influenced the “post-truth” discourse and the status of conspiracy theories. In that anyone can express their opinion as “experts” on social media, the public and political discourse

on social media has become superficial. In the absence of the traditional “gatekeepers,” there are no longer any boundaries about what is appropriate and what is not, nor between fact and fiction. This is essentially the democratization of information: Everything is permitted, everything is published, and anyone who wishes to write something can do so. This is ostensibly occurring in the name of freedom of expression and democracy, even when the tools of democracy are used to disseminate anti-democratic incitement. Moreover, social media is seen by the general public as the means of communication in the hands of the masses; this is, in fact, the reality, in which everything is possible, accessible, and there is almost no division between the center and the margins on social media.

At the same time, this reality facilitates the ability to monitor and identify antisemitic messages. Within the framework of this research, most of the truly antisemitic comments by politicians disseminated on social media were also later covered by the traditional media. As social awareness about antisemitism grows, the traditional media is more likely to address it. The media’s coverage of the discourse of hatred and its accompanying public and political arguments are, of course, liable to sometimes have adverse consequences of fomenting and accelerating the phenomena, alongside positive consequences, such as increasing awareness about antisemitism and its dangers as well as strengthening moderate viewpoints. This delicate balance between the media’s advantages and disadvantages requires a high level of awareness. While addressing the problem of antisemitism necessitates an awareness of antisemitism, it alone is not enough to sufficiently respond and cause its eradication.

Specific Regional Characteristics of Antisemitism

Alongside the shared characteristics of the “spirit of the times,” which have affected the level of antisemitism and its various forms of expression, some unique characteristics emerged among the countries surveyed (see Figure 36). These characteristics related to the country’s historical context, particularly foundational and influential events experienced. A country’s current sociopolitical context also has contributed to the shaping of the leading narratives and has determined the issues raised in the political discourse. Also significant are the characteristics of the Jewish community in each country,

foundational antisemitic incidents, and the manner in which the authorities and the Jewish community have dealt with expressions of antisemitism.

For example, the phenomenon of rewriting history in the context of World War II and the memory of the Holocaust, which has characterized the political discourse among the right in France and Germany—two countries that experienced the Nazi regime—does not resemble the political discourse in Britain, Spain, and Ireland. In Spain and Ireland, where the Jewish communities are particularly small, antisemitism is not necessarily directed at the Jewish community but rather at Israel and at the image of the Jew as the stranger; the Jewish communities, regardless of how small, are still harmed by these antisemitic expressions.

In examining the scope of the phenomenon and the way it is characterized in the political discourse in today's **Germany**, Germany has a unique history in terms of the Holocaust and World War II. Germany also has a historical obligation (primarily led by Chancellor Angela Merkel) to maintaining the memory of the Holocaust and fighting against antisemitism. Nonetheless, Germany has witnessed a significant increase in antisemitic incidents in recent years, as well as in the strengthening of radical groups on both the right and the left, in parallel to the gradual weakening of the establishment. The sociopolitical discourse in Germany has primarily centered on the issue of immigration and in the past year shifted its focus to the public's frustration with the growing economic downfall and the health crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the public in Germany has become increasingly critical of the Merkel government and divisive over the unity of Europe (between those who support globalism and those who back the nation-state).

Concurrent with the strengthening of the radical right and its entry into Germany's sociopolitical mainstream, extreme right-wing groups have carried out the majority of the violent incidents against Jews in the country. The terrorist attack in the city of Halle in October 2019 should be considered a formative event in this context. Similarly, alternative and/or half-true narratives with respect to the history of Germany and the Nazi regime have gained support, alongside the rewriting of history by distorting undeniable historical facts. Parallel to the rise of the right, the radical left has also gained in popularity and is responsible for virulent criticism of Israel, which increasingly includes antisemitic messages. In this context,

it is particularly worth noting that in some cases, antisemitism has been camouflaged as “criticism of Israel” (*Israelkritik*).

In Germany, the Jews are often perceived as “responsible for everything” and the word “Jew” remains a curse word that is deeply rooted in the German jargon. The general feeling among many Jews in Germany has been one of insecurity, with police stationed outside every Jewish institution in Germany. Jews have also been hesitant to report antisemitic incidents to the police, on the assumption that it will be in vain, while many of them feel that the system has failed them and has shown little concern for antisemitism (particularly, for example, when some of the supporters of the extreme right have found their way into the law enforcement agencies). Moreover, not all the incidents can be defined as antisemitic and instead are considered a right to freedom of expression; therefore the authorities do not invest much effort in investigating all the complaints of antisemitism. Furthermore, the burden of investigating antisemitism often falls upon the Jewish community rather than the authorities who are supposed to address the phenomenon.

In **France**, with the largest Jewish community in Europe, antisemitic terror attacks carried out by members of ISIS and other radical Islamic groups have seriously affected France in recent years. As for the political–public context, both the “Yellow Vests” protest and the COVID-19 crisis have served as platforms for antisemitic expression on both sides of the political spectrum in France. The tangibility of antisemitism in France has created feelings of insecurity within the Jewish community, causing French Jews to consider emigrating.

In France’s political system, antisemitism is manifested most visibly in the discourse of the extreme left (whose most prominent spokesperson is Jean-Luc Mélenchon). In addition, it is feared that violent acts by extremist Muslims will become increasingly common and that Jews will again be a prime target. On the other hand, the radical right has ostensibly renounced antisemitism, as a cover for advancing other types of hatred (particularly against Muslim immigrants). The far right has been involved primarily in rewriting the historical memory of the Holocaust and the active participation of occupied France in deporting French Jews to the death camps during World War II.

In **Britain**, the most prominent issue in recent years has been Brexit, or the question of leaving the EU and the tension between Britain’s unity

with the EU and its secession. These processes have been accompanied by antisemitic incidents, which have increased in intensity in recent years. In contrast to the other countries surveyed in this research, antisemitism was central to the political discourse during the Corbyn era, which was characterized by revelations of antisemitism in the Labour Party. Corbyn and the Labour Party leadership were criticized for not properly addressing antisemitism (and anti-Zionism) in the party, which negatively affected the party's achievements in the 2019 elections. This affair shook the Jewish community in Britain, affecting its sense of security and becoming a core issue for the Jewish community.

Britain's future raises questions: What will be the place of antisemitism in the political process in Britain in the coming years, after having contributed to the defeat of the Labour Party? Will the Jewish community in Britain return to its former position of stability following the defeat of Corbyn and the replacement of the Labour Party's leadership? Will Britain learn its lesson from the Corbyn affair and will fighting against antisemitism change its character? Finally, will Britain serve as a model and a warning sign to other countries?

Spain—with its small Jewish community—faces the phenomenon of “antisemitism without Jews,” characterized by expressions of antisemitism against a religious background, anti-Israel criticism, or discrimination against immigrants. The main trait identified within Spain's political discourse is the vehement criticism of Israel, which sometimes becomes clearly antisemitism. The leftist party Podemos, which began as a marginal and revolutionary party, has gradually gained in political strength; currently, it is part of the government coalition and is hostile toward Israel in both domestic and international arenas. The Jewish community in Spain perceives Podemos as a threat, while the secessionist and nationalistic discourse in Spain also is a source of antisemitism and a potential danger.

Antisemitism is not common in **Ireland**, which has a tiny Jewish community, although criticism of Israel—to the point of hostility—is certainly present in the political and public discourse. Ireland's independence from British rule a hundred years ago is a foundational experience in the national narrative, and it provides the conceptual prism through which the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is seen. This situation has led to the leftward tilt of the political system in Ireland and sympathy with the Palestinians, alongside vocal

criticism of Israel and its policy toward them. In this context, the Sinn Féin Party, which has grown significantly in strength—it is currently the leader of the opposition—is a major player in the hostile discourse against Israel. Antisemitic conspiracies also sometimes enter into the discourse, although not without censure by the current party leadership; however, it is too early to say whether real change is taking place within the party.

Figure 36. Similarities and Differences Between Countries of Western Europe

	Germany	France	Britain	Spain	Ireland
Number of Jews and percentage within the total population (in parentheses) ^a	118,000 0.14% (83 million)	450,000 0.69% (65 million)	292,000 0.44% (67 million)	13,000 0.03% (47 million)	2,700 0.05% (5 million)
Characteristics of the period	Multidimensional crisis (health, economic, political, and social); political polarization between supporters of unity and its opponents; strengthening of the extremes and populism and weakening of the center; debate over immigration; the domain of social media; the era of post-truth and fake news; diverse ties with Israel alongside sharp criticism.				
Historical impacts	Second World War, the Holocaust, and the division of Germany	Second World War and the deportation of French Jews	The Mandatory heritage	Expulsion from Spain, the civil war	Liberation from British rule and Irish independence
Unique sociopolitical context	Weakening of the political center and strengthening of the extremes; rise of the extreme right.	A large Muslim community, struggle against Islamists, the "yellow vest" protest.	Brexit (unity vs secession); large Muslim community, Corbyn and antisemitism in Labour.	Rise of the radical Left (Podemos); domestic secessionist dialogue.	Strong tendency to the left.
Foundational antisemitic events	Halle (2019)	Ilan Halimi (2006), Toulouse massacre (2012), Hyper Cacher (2015), Sarah Halimi (2017), Mireille Knoll (2018)	Corbyn affair	'Apartheid-Free Zone' campaign; Meitayahu affair	

Note. The numbers are taken from S. DellaPergola, and L. D. Staetsky, *Jews in Europe at the Turn of the Millenium*, Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2020.

Antisemitism in the Political Discourse Between the Right and Left

“Traditional” antisemitism on the right

Despite assuming that Europe is highly aware of antisemitism among the right and has assimilated lessons from the past, the extreme right (in addition to radical Islamic groups) has instigated most of the violent antisemitic attacks in Europe. The growth of the extreme right parties in the past years have led to a significant increase in their disseminating of antisemitic messages. The discourse of the extreme right usually blurs and distorts historical facts, attempts to paint themselves as the victims of history (victim consciousness), denies and minimizes the cooperation of their people or country in the systematic murder of Jews during the World War II, and makes racist claims against minority groups, especially immigrants, Muslims, and Jews.

In recent years, the discourse has been highly affected by the crisis of unity in Europe, centered on the struggle between euro-skeptics and supporters

of who support the EU. Although this discourse has distanced itself from antisemitism, it has helped the extreme right parties to gain entry into the political mainstream, where it received a stamp of approval for other types of hatred—primarily against immigrants and Muslims. Furthermore, they have transformed the image of the “Jew” into a political alibi. To avoid accusations of being antisemitic, some extreme-right parties identify themselves as “friends of the Jews,” “supporters of Israel,” and sometimes even as “defender of the Jews,” while at the same time, some of their members continue to make frequent and deliberate use of classic antisemitism.

The “new” antisemitism on the left

The phenomenon of antisemitism in the context of criticizing Israel is relatively new; it began a few decades ago, shaped by developments in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and takes place in academic, public, and political discourses. It centers on blurring the boundaries between legitimate criticism of Israel’s policies and its behavior within the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, laden with anti-Israeli, anti-Zionist, and antisemitic rhetoric. The phenomenon is often characterized as being a slippery slope, in that legitimate criticism of Israel gradually deteriorates into using antisemitic stereotypes against Israel, Israelis, and Jews. In other cases, what is referred to as “legitimate criticism” of Israel is often used as a pretense for antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes and a denial of accusations of antisemitism. The antisemitism that often appears in the discourse of the extreme left includes denying Israel’s right to exist as the national homeland of the Jewish people, portraying Israel and Israelis through antisemitic tropes and conspiracies, i.e., as a source of evil in the world, and comparing Israel to Nazi Germany. In addition, the extreme left in Western Europe has crafted a high level of sociopolitical antisemitism as opposed to the classic religious antisemitism that characterizes the Eastern European countries.

Convergence of the extreme right and left

The phenomenon of antisemitism has created an unlikely connection between opposing extremes on the left and the right, and it is their meeting that distinguishes antisemitism from most phenomena of hatred and racism. First, the expressions of antisemitism on the right and the left are manifested by similar—and sometimes identical—content: antisemitic images and symbols,

demonization of Jews or Israelis, and various conspiracy theories. Both sides of the political map also make use of social media and are no longer limited to a marginalized discourse conducted in closed and underground groups; sometimes they even meet and take inspiration from one another. In addition, these two political extremes often share a common target/enemy, which usually involves a struggle against the establishment and the existing order and often attribute the Jews as being responsible for the ills of the country.

Figure 37 shows a breakdown of antisemitic expression by elected politicians from both ends of the political spectrum in the five countries surveyed over the period of one year, from late 2019 until late 2020. The types of antisemitism are defined by the IHRA (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance) working definition. The research revealed that the primary forms of antisemitism expressed a malicious attitude toward Jews and used stereotypes (39%), compared Israel to the Nazis (36%), and denied the right of the Jewish people to self-determination (14%).

Figure 37. Analysis of Discourse





Figure 38 presents the three leading types of antisemitism according to whether they were expressed by politicians from the right or left. The chart clearly shows that the two political extremes converge in adopting malicious attitudes and antisemitic stereotypes.³⁶

Figure 38. Analysis of Discourse



The Main Challenges

The gap between overt and latent antisemitism

Are politicians careful in what they say? What is the political price of voicing antisemitism? Based on the findings of our research, and despite its limited scope, we can say with a reasonable degree of certainty that only a small proportion of politicians in Western Europe have made overt antisemitic statements, and even if they do, most of them do not repeat these statements.

Nonetheless, the phenomenon of latent antisemitism among politicians is presumed to be more widespread. Some elected public officials may refrain from publicly expressing antisemitism due to their own political interests and particularly due to the fear that they will pay the price for making public statements against Jews. The political discourse and its norms are influenced by the unbridled discourse that takes place on social media, which includes widespread exposure of messages of incitement and hate. In the past, this messaging did not have an effective public platform and was expressed primarily in restricted settings or in closed groups. Without diminishing the gravity of the problem of latent antisemitism and the antisemitic sentiments shared by many sectors of the population, as well as the growing dissemination of antisemitic content on social media, efforts need to be directed to ensure that antisemitism does not flourish and does not attain legitimacy, especially not in the political arena and among elected public officials.

The politicization of antisemitism

As in the case of many other issues, including those that enjoyed a broad political consensus in the past, the occurrence of antisemitism has also become a tool within the context of today's polarized political discourse. Populistic expressions of antisemitism contribute momentum to various political agendas, to attack political rivals, and to justify various attitudes and actions. As part of antisemitism's politicization, the two political extremes often identify antisemitism as being prevalent only among their political rivals, while ignoring antisemitic incidents within their own ranks; even worse they show support for those within their own camp who have voiced antisemitic views, as part of the clash with their political rivals. This reality undermines the welfare and security of Jews in Europe and weakens the political consensus to fight antisemitism, which was reached many decades ago and is essential in the struggle against antisemitism.

At the same time, the politicization of antisemitism potentially could encourage discussion and awareness of the problem and could lead to a joint response between Europe's Jewish minority and the non-Jewish majority (with other minority groups among them). One prominent example has been the effort of the Labour Party in Britain to deal with the antisemitic statements by its leader, Jeremy Corbyn, and some of his supporters and the subsequent campaign against antisemitism in the Labour Party. These internal efforts may have been insufficient, however, as evidenced by the party's failure in the 2019 elections and its decline since then.

Cracks in the consensus on the right and on the left

The broad political and public consensus in combating antisemitism of any type and from any source has been one of its most valuable assets. In recent years, this consensus against antisemitism has begun to break down. Behind this growing rift is mainly the distorting and rewriting of historical facts relating to World War II and to the memory of the Holocaust by political leaders in the context of the anti-globalist discourse on the right, in addition to the antisemitic expression that is manifested in the anti-Israeli and anti-colonial discourse by political leaders on the left. One of the main challenges in this context is deciphering and understanding the use of well-camouflaged codes within the language, which indirectly convey antisemitic messages that are not "permitted" in public (although this barrier was also breached in

recent years). Furthermore, surveys show that classic antisemitic views are still common among the general public along the entire political spectrum in both Western and Eastern Europe—the latter where the findings are even more worrying.

The strengthening of the margins and increased antisemitism in the political mainstream

The political power of extremist movements has increased in recent years, within the context of the multifaceted crisis affecting most of Europe. Antisemitism exemplifies these movements, and their growing power comes at the expense of the parties in the political center and the traditional institutions. Many of these once marginal movements have entered the political mainstream (such as the Podemos Party in Spain and the Alternative for Germany Party), and some have become part of the government, where they often hold key positions. This situation creates fertile ground for antisemitism. In other cases, their entry into the political mainstream has been gradual, becoming visible when marginal groups take control of the sociopolitical agenda of the political center (such as in the Labour party in Britain during the Corbyn era), including the creeping legitimization of antisemitic views and statements originating in the margins by the political center.

Recommendations

In recent years, we have witnessed a growing trend of antisemitism in the West and in particular in the Western European countries surveyed in this report. They all have experienced an increasing number of reported antisemitic incidents and in some of the countries, the incidents have been severe. In addition, these countries have all witnessed the spread of antisemitism from marginal groups—on both ends of the political spectrum—to the political mainstream, sometimes becoming the center of the political discourse.

The above analysis of antisemitism in the political discourse in the countries surveyed indicated that the balance between those having a moderating effect on antisemitism and those promoting it has tilted increasingly toward the latter. This disturbing trend is mainly due to the process of sociopolitical radicalization and polarization, which in turn has led to the rise of the extremist margins at the expense of the moderate center. These processes have been accelerated by social media, which is reshaping the triangular relationship between the political system, the media, and the public, and is being used to disseminate hateful and inciteful content almost without any restrictions or limits—at least for now—in addition to shattering norms that govern the boundaries of political discourse. This has also led partly to antisemitic attitudes penetrating the political mainstream, the politicization of antisemitism (with both its usage and the struggle against it as a means of attacking one's political rivals), and the appearance of cracks in the broad consensus surrounding the memory of the Holocaust and the struggle against antisemitism, which is primarily manifested by distorting and rewriting history (on the right) and in anti-Israel discourse (on the left).

Therefore, in responding to antisemitism in the political discourse and strengthening the more moderate elements and weakening those who accelerate the spread of antisemitism, we recommend to focus on the following goals:

- monitoring antisemitic expressions in the political discourse and identifying and quantifying trends and deviations that call for a response.
- increasing the public, political, and legal price paid by whoever expresses antisemitic views or espouses antisemitic ideology. This should be accomplished by documentation, exposure, and condemnation, as well as enforcement, legal prosecution, and legislation if needed.

- formulating or improving limitations to the dissemination of antisemitic content in both the traditional and social media.
- expanding the basis for political, organizational, and public support of the fight against antisemitism and other forms of hatred.
- educating about the Holocaust and about values that compete with hatred and antisemitism.

Below are the recommended components for formulating a response to antisemitism in the political discourse. These recommendations are directed primarily toward the leadership of the EU and its member countries:

1. The need for a broad coalition in the struggle against antisemitism

The politicization of antisemitism, which differentiates between expressions of antisemitism from one camp or another, endangers the ability to respond effectively to the threat. Efforts should be directed toward preventing all uses of antisemitism as a tool for attacking a political rival, especially between competing political extremes. As described above, we have witnessed antisemitism in various forms on both the right and the left, in the political margins as well as the political center. Therefore, the struggle against antisemitism must be firmly and clearly directed against antisemitism of any type, from any source, and particularly against any extremist phenomena before gaining legitimacy within the broader political–public discourse.

To this end, building broad coalitions and cooperation in the fight against antisemitism is essential for creating a far-reaching consensus among all the relevant EU countries. The aim of achieving this consensus is to improve awareness of the gravity of antisemitism and its consequences in the long and short term for the security of the countries in general and their Jewish citizens specifically, in addition to maintaining the resilience and values of the entire population. Building coalitions and cooperation will create the basis to formulate strategies to fight antisemitism and to manage efforts to eradicate it.

2. A multi-effort, integrated response

The accumulative experience in dealing with antisemitism indicates that the response should involve a combination of simultaneous efforts and tools from a variety of fields. These include widespread and ongoing monitoring, measurement, and assessment for formulating strategies and managing the

struggle; education on all levels and professional training in how to combat antisemitism, preserve the memory of the Holocaust, and fight racism and hatred of the other; focusing efforts on the traditional and social media; bringing about legislation, justice, and law enforcement; and ensuring the safety and security of the Jewish community.

3. The role of leadership

Leaders throughout Europe need to be encouraged to act determinedly, rapidly, proactively, and uncompromisingly against antisemitism at home and in other countries, regardless of whether the antisemitism is overtly or latently expressed, while also addressing the deep-seated problems, of which antisemitism is one of the symptoms.

4. Overall state responsibility

The fight against antisemitism requires overall responsibility of the state. Given the complexity in responding to antisemitism, a dedicated government entity should coordinate the efforts and maintain contact with the Jewish communities. In addition, each country should create its own capabilities and processes for dealing with antisemitism, which will include all the relevant authorities, institutions, and non-government organizations, as well as the local Jewish community.

5. Adoption and internalization of the IHRA definition of antisemitism

It is extremely important to push the adoption of the IHRA definition throughout Europe as a standard definition, as a compass for dealing with antisemitism, and as a means of increasing awareness and internalizing the need to eradicate antisemitism among the general public. The main challenge facing countries and organizations that have already adopted the IHRA definition is to translate its principles into effective working processes and into control mechanisms among law enforcement, the education system, and elsewhere.

6. Monitoring, measurement, and assessment

Monitoring, measurement, and assessment are important components for increasing awareness of antisemitism and for supporting decision making,

especially in assisting entities that deal with antisemitism to help them identify its sources, its characteristics, and its trends and to formulate efficient responses.

Currently, major gaps exist in the monitoring and measurement of antisemitism. Even when systematic monitoring takes place, the criteria for measurement, the extent of information and knowledge sharing, and the ways of sharing and using information vary immensely. Based on this research, it is recommended that the EU countries continually monitor antisemitism within the political discourse. This step can contribute to raising awareness of antisemitism and serving as a lever for its effective prevention.

7. Repairing the cracks in the battle against antisemitism

The research noted the major cracks that have occurred in the consensus that was created to battle antisemitism. These include the distorting and rewriting of history, which has incited both the populist and extreme right-wing discourse in Europe and the growing toxic anti-Israeli discourse that has antisemitic nuances among both the left and Islamist circles. For addressing these phenomena, we recommend enlightening the public and defining the proper and legitimate discourse within a clear and principled framework, of honoring the memory of the Holocaust and recognizing Israel's right to exist as the national homeland of the Jewish people.

8. The fight against antisemitism in social media

The discourse of hatred in social media, including the growing expression of antisemitism, is one of the main challenges for contemporary society. Dealing with this challenge is still in its early stages and requires joint effort by countries, non-government organizations, and social media platforms. This endeavor should focus on creating effective legislation and regulation; defining the ways in which social media platforms should be responsible for the content posted by users; constructing an infrastructure to comprehensively and effectively monitor antisemitic content that is posted online; removing harmful content in a timely manner; and efficiently handling violators.

9. The Corbyn affair as a warning sign

The exposure of antisemitism in Britain's Labour Party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn surprisingly placed the issue on Britain's political agenda,

shocking both the country and the party. It also stirred Britain's Jewish community, which has been worried about its future and its existence. The Corbyn affair can impart lessons about what is happening or could happen in other European countries and how we must combat antisemitism before it is pushed to the center of the political arena.

10. The role of Israel and the Jewish communities

Although each country should assume responsibility for fighting antisemitism, Israel and the Jewish communities also need to build a common front against it, in addition to standing against hatred and negative and violent stereotypes that marginalize other groups. In this context, Israel and other Jewish communities need to strengthen the assistance that they give in this field to both European countries and their Jewish communities, particularly those that are in distress and unable to obtain the protection and support they need from their governments.

11. Continuation of research efforts and strategic planning

As in many other instances, this research has exposed the lacunae in information and knowledge as well as the need to expand research efforts, to increase the understanding of key issues, and to acquire better tools for formulating strategy to combat antisemitism. It is recommended that research and strategic planning efforts focus on the connection between the degree of antisemitism within political discourse and antisemitic attitudes among the public; the link between antisemitic attitudes, comments on the various social media platforms, and actual in-person events; the effect of antisemitism on the security of the Jewish communities; the gaps between overt and latent antisemitism; the means of preventing the spread of antisemitism; analysis of the causes of social radicalization that leads to increased antisemitism; monitoring and quantifying antisemitism in the political discourse of other European countries, while expanding the knowledge about antisemitism in key countries; and lastly, building an infrastructure for the widespread monitoring of antisemitic discourse, particularly on social media.