

Special Publication, November 16, 2020

25th Anniversary of the Barcelona Process: Has the Mediterranean Vision Come True?

Ofir Winter

The Barcelona Process was launched in 1995 in order to strengthen the relations between countries on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Pursuant to this process, and in an effort to correct its lapses, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was founded in July 2008 as a broad inter-governmental framework with 43 member countries, including Israel. After a hesitant start, the new regional body gradually shaped its organizational identity and scored successes, among them dozens of projects valued at billions of dollars in the realms of employment, education, environment, energy, and climate. For Israel, the organization embodies positive potential, but its actual contribution to date toward improving the country's regional position has remained marginal. Among the opportunities that the UfM framework offers Israel is integration in development of the region through joint projects, expanding the range of Israel's relations with European and Arab countries (including Egypt and Jordan, whose relations with Israel are limited), and further progress in ties with Israel's new peace partners in the Gulf, who are participating in the sponsorship of a variety of projects labeled by the organization. In order to take advantage of these opportunities, Israel should formulate a comprehensive Mediterranean policy, appoint a body in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take responsibility for the connection between the government and the relevant non-governmental sectors, and allocate more resources and personnel to Israel's activity in the organization.

While the countries on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea share a history of thousands of years of trade, conquest, immigration, and settlement, "Mediterraneanism" is a modern concept whose ideological foundations lie in the literature and research of the 19th and 20th centuries. The underlying assumption of this concept is that the Mediterranean region constitutes a well-defined, delineated, and distinct geographic, historical, and cultural unit, a system with deep reciprocal affiliation between all its components, and that the cultures and peoples residing on its shores share common denominators that have given them a unique character. Advocates of Mediterraneanism tend to speak of a "Mediterranean character" manifested in the values, characteristics, and customs particular to it. Some of them cast the Mediterranean Sea as a symbol of

religious and cultural pluralism that formerly characterized some of the human interactions in Mediterranean port cities, and believe that this should be rejuvenated.¹

The idea of Mediterraneanism received its first formal political expression in November 1995, 25 years ago, in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process. The aim of this initiative was to tighten the ties between European countries and Mediterranean countries, and to encourage their cultural and economic integration through dialogue and trade. Twenty-seven countries took part (15 that were European Union (EU) members at the time, and 12 non-EU countries, most of which were from the southern Mediterranean area: Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Cyprus, the Palestinian Authority (PA), and Libya as an observer).

The background to the launching of the Barcelona Process was the end of the Cold War and the forging of a new world order in which the United States played the dominant role and Western liberal democracy emerged as a hegemonic idea. The EU countries initiated the establishment of the joint framework in order to inspire reforms in the southern Mediterranean countries and promote democratic practices and values, human rights, equal rights, and proper governance, in the belief that this would contribute to modernization, progress, and general regional stability. In addition, the Barcelona Process was one of the positive outcomes of the Madrid Conference, the Oslo Accords, and the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan – developments that both enabled Israel and Arab countries to sit together around "the Mediterranean table," and weakened the radical forces opposed to the idea.²

Another layer of the ties between the EU countries and Mediterranean countries was formulated in March 2003 with the launching of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which included differential operational plans for promoting relations between the EU and its non-member neighbors. Inter alia, the founding of a bilateral arm devoted to promoting separate ties between EU countries and Mediterranean countries (together with additional countries in southeast Europe and the Caucasus) illustrated the limitations of the multilateral vision underlying the Barcelona Process.

From the Barcelona Process to the Union for the Mediterranean

The current and most recent incarnation of the Barcelona Process is the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), founded in Paris in July 2008 at the initiative of then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy. UfM is a broad inter-governmental Mediterranean framework with 43 member countries (28 EU and 15 non-EU countries). Although the organization represents a population of nearly one billion, it has only several dozen employees in its headquarters (mostly appointed by the countries that sent them) and an annual operating budget of less than €10 million. Half of the organization's budget is funded by the European Commission (EC), while the rest is funded by voluntary donations from the member countries. Most of the budgetary burden is naturally taken by the wealthier EU countries. At one time Sweden's contribution was particularly extensive, but in recent

years the main donors in financial and human resources have been France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.³

UfM was founded as a direct derivative of the Barcelona Process, in order to pursue its original goals more effectively: strengthen integration between northern and southern Mediterranean countries by promoting political, security, and civil dialogue; encourage economic, commercial, and cultural cooperation; and develop the Mediterranean area as a region of peace, stability, security, and prosperity. In practice, these goals were not realized in the Barcelona Process to the desired extent, with wide gaps between northern and southern Mediterranean countries in economic growth and balance of trade indicators, and regional integration that did not progress as expected. Critics of the Barcelona Process cited a number of defects requiring correction in the UfM framework.

First, the Barcelona Process adopted an asymmetric perspective that was perceived as biased in favor of the northern Mediterranean countries, serving primarily the interests of the EU countries, and leaving the southern Mediterranean countries with the sense that they were "invited guests" in the enterprise, rather than members with equal status. UfM, on the other hand, aspired to apply the principle of co-ownership, while creating a more equitable system of relations. This was expressed in joint leadership of the organization, shared responsibility, decision making by consensus, and greater balance between EU countries and the other member countries. The UfM secretariat remained in Barcelona, but the organization has two presidents – one from the northern Mediterranean countries and the other from the southern Mediterranean countries, while its secretary general is from the southern Mediterranean countries. In this way, the organization tries to give its members a sense of unity, encourage joint action, and enhance regional harmony and solidarity.

Second, the Barcelona Process aroused tension between northern and southern Mediterranean countries on the question of promoting democracy, an issue perceived by authoritarian countries in the southern Mediterranean as blatant interference in their internal affairs. UfM, on the other hand, keeps its distance from the internal affairs of its member countries. The organization has adopted a pragmatic and realistic approach, while emphasizing broad regional projects in cooperation with the member countries involved.

Third, the dialogue during the Barcelona Process period was affected by the tensions between some of the member countries and external political crises, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the September 11 terrorist attacks, which made it difficult to achieve progress in constructive spheres of action. In contrast, UfM stays away from political conflicts and disputed issues. Instead, it focuses on transnational projects that reflect concrete common interests in economics, society, infrastructure, and resources.

UfM Labor Pains

Despite UfM's latent potential, its initial achievements did not meet expectations. Its early years featured deadlock, sporadic activity, and projects that never got off the ground. After its ceremonial launch in Paris in 2008, there were difficulties in organizing high-level summits between the member countries. Regional conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians (particularly Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 2009 and the dispute between Turkey and Cyprus) continued to cast a shadow over the organization's activity. Difficulties emerged in raising money to pay for the organization's activity because of the global economic crisis that began in 2008. UfM also suffered from structural problems pertaining to its complicated operational mechanism, including the need for unanimous approval for its decisions.⁴

The attempt to inspire a sense of partnership and equality also encountered problems. The asymmetry among the member countries continued in UfM, albeit in new forms. Some of the countries took a leading role in the organization (Egypt, France, and Spain, for example), while others felt less involved (Turkey and the Adriatic countries, for example).⁵ Above all, it appeared that even in its new configuration, the organization was hard pressed to deliver real and visible successes, and was setting general goals instead of adopting focused and practical plans for action.⁶

The "Arab Spring" that began in late 2010 cast new doubt on the common denominators that can connect different parts of the Mediterranean – whether these should be confined to common interests, or whether similar values and a shared identity should also be promoted.⁷ The revolutions and civil wars in the Middle East put liberal ideals, freedom and democracy, and calls for European solidarity with the forces of protest on the regional agenda, and led to the suspension of Syria's membership in the organization. They also highlighted UfM's political weakness, as the organization found it difficult to provide solutions to the underlying socioeconomic problems that ignited the upheavals in the Arab world, such as encouragement of investments, job creation, and attention to issues of immigration, education and research, water, agriculture, and nutritional security.⁸

Shaping the UfM Character

Following its early difficulties in acclimatization, UfM began to grasp its strengths and weaknesses, shape its organizational identity, and even achieve successes. The challenge it faced was to develop the ability to promote practical projects and maintain a sense of commitment and interest among the member countries, despite the political, budgetary, and structural limitations. Fruitless involvement in political disputes and useless efforts to demand that autocratic countries change their ways gradually gave way to an economic orientation. In addition, instead of leading expensive projects by itself, the organization decided to concentrate on launching more modest projects with a label that the initiators could use as a basis for raising money from external capital funds. Beyond that, UfM provides a framework for intercultural dialogue and political and professional discussions between government ministers, diplomats, professional

experts, and civil society activists on matters of common interest, including urbanization, immigration, transportation, the environment, employment, and education.

UfM's most effective operational tool is labeling Mediterranean projects, thereby making them more attractive for external investment. The labeling process has turned the organization into a platform for marketing projects, instead of executing the projects by itself. The approved projects are supervised by the organization, but are carried out by private and public sector entrepreneurs. Through these projects, UfM realizes some of its original regional goals. In contrast to the Barcelona Process, UfM's message, which has shaped its orientation, is positive pragmatism, as reflected in its focus on the possible, instead of the desirable but impossible.⁹

A decision to label projects is taken after their details are studied. It is conditional on UfM concluding that the projects are economically sustainable for potential public and private investors.¹⁰ The execution stage for projects includes their design and approval, raising funds, finding partners, and monitoring implementation.¹¹ The criteria for granting a label are visibility, practicality, and utility. The projects are selected according to their contribution to the welfare of the peoples in the region, the encouragement of movements of people and goods, and the augmentation of regional integration.¹² In its early years, the organization focused on ambitious flagship projects costing hundreds of millions of dollars and designed to generate marketing and symbolic value, such as construction of desalination projects in the Gaza Strip and founding Mediterranean universities. In subsequent years, however, the organization preferred to concentrate on more modest and practical projects, for which it was easier to raise funds.¹³

Principal Spheres of Activity

With the founding of UfM in 2008, six divisions dealing in six priority areas were formed, with their content determined by the secretariat in Barcelona: economic development and job creation (including promotion of small and medium-sized initiatives); higher education and research (including the founding of Mediterranean educational institutions); social and civil matters (including civil defense); water, environment, and blue economy (including the purification of the Mediterranean Sea); traffic and urban development (including the creation of marine and land routes between countries); and energy and climate (including the development of alternative energy sources).¹⁴

UfM public relations releases naturally focus on the organization's successes and achievements, rather than limitations and difficulties. According to a report summarizing UfM activity in 2008-2018, in its first decade, UfM held over 25 meetings at the ministerial level, founded 12 regional platforms for experts, organized over 300 forums for dialogue, and connected over 25,000 parties with common interests from all over the region. Furthermore, the organization was behind 54 projects with an aggregate value of \$5.6 billion in a wide variety of spheres, ranging from municipal infrastructure to gender equality to jobs creation, and benefiting hundreds of thousands of people.¹⁵

Among the organization's prominent projects is the Med4Jobs initiative, launched in 2013, which promotes an integrative regional approach to jobs creation. This project seeks to increase employment among young people and women, and to encourage entrepreneurship and development in the private sector. As part of Med4Jobs, a label was granted to ventures that furthered a solution to the high unemployment rates in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, mainly due to professional training for employees that did not match the needs of the market. Labels were also granted to projects supporting synergy in small and medium-sized businesses and contributing to regional integration.¹⁶

One example of such a venture is the Euromed University of Fes in Morocco, which aims to train a young generation to contribute to integrative development of the Mediterranean and increase general growth in the region. The university's founding was approved in 2012; it opened in 2014 with 2,000 students from various countries. It promotes dialogue, intercultural contact, exchanges of knowledge, research cooperation, and regional integration. Construction of the university will be completed in 2021, with the goal of accommodating 7,000 students and 650 staff by 2024.¹⁷

In the field of renewable energy, UfM founded the SEMed Private Renewable Energy Framework (SPREF). This enterprise supports development of environmentally friendly energy in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Lebanon by encouraging private investors to fund projects, and provides technical support for these projects.¹⁸ Also in the energy field, the organization is supporting a project for construction of wind turbines in Jordan that are planned to supply 3 percent of the energy in the kingdom in the future.¹⁹ A more modest accompanying venture provides free online courses on energy subjects to professionals all over the region.²⁰

In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, UfM spotted an opportunity for bolstering its status as a regional platform for dealing with the crisis and leading the anticipated recovery processes. UfM Secretary General Nasser Kamel noted that the crisis has demonstrated the crucial role of adopting regional approaches, and highlighted the need to enhance regional resilience in the face of future pandemics and climate crises. He emphasized the importance of developing independent capabilities, both in each individual country and in the Mediterranean region in general.²¹ Kamel announced that the organization would participate in developing a drug and a vaccine for Covid-19 and in the exchange of medical knowledge, adding that UfM would support projects for helping to create jobs, encourage trade, boost growth, promote digitalization, and reduce the damage caused by the crisis.²²

At the same time, UfM continues to draw criticism for its faults, first, as an intergovernmental organization whose policy is top-down via intensive governmental involvement, and with little participation by non-governmental organizations, which in turn have no direct formal influence in its framework. UfM's intergovernmental character is in part a result of the dim view taken by autocratic regimes in the southern

Mediterranean of involvement by civil society actors not subject to the countries' control. Another reflection of this governmental character is the tendency by member countries to appoint diplomats to key positions in the organization, instead of professionals with expertise in the particular spheres. Second, the small size of UfM's budget causes a shortage of resources, and prevents the organization from achieving its goal of promoting projects in its own right. UfM is therefore forced to confine itself to adopting small projects, some of which would have taken place without it. Furthermore, the success of the labeled projects depends more on the initiators' commitment and ability to carry out projects than on the organization itself. Third, political disagreements and disputes often hinder agreement between the member countries concerning both the joint summary statements on meetings between foreign ministers and the joint projects.²³

UfM Importance to Israel

In recent years, the Mediterranean has become an area of growing importance for closer relations between Israel and some of its Arab and Hellenic neighbors, which share with Israel a common interest in shaping an environment of stability, prosperity, and peace. This development is reflected in the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which Israel founded in Cairo together with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan, and the PA. From a historical perspective, EMGF is the culmination of a trend that began in 1995 with the launching of the Barcelona Process, which enabled Israel to meet with Arab countries for the first time in a shared regional framework, and to conduct a direct dialogue with them on regional topics. The establishment of the EMGF and the growing tension in the eastern Mediterranean between the EMGF members and Turkey have so far not affected UfM's functioning or status. At the same time, the very need for a new subregional organization dealing with natural gas demonstrates the fundamental limitations of a broad multilateral framework like UfM.

Since it was founded, UfM has served as a platform for meetings, dialogue, and cooperation on a range of interests between Israel and Mediterranean countries, including Arab countries, some of which, such as Egypt and Jordan, have a cold peace with Israel, while others, such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon, have no official relations with Israel at all. Furthermore, Israel has knowledge and experience in some UfM areas of focus, such as renewable energy, science, and the environment. Israel can play an active and constructive role in the development of regional integration, and is eager to do so.

Despite the great potential that Israel finds in the Mediterranean region, the UfM contribution to Israel's regional relations to date has remained negligible. One reason is the organization's intergovernmental character, which from the outset limits its ability to help develop relations between civil society and peoples in the respective countries.²⁴ A second reason is the organization's preference for labeling projects in poor countries in the southern Mediterranean, rather than in Israel.²⁵ A third and even more important reason is the restrictions that Arab countries still apply to their ties with Israel, and the

traditional link they have made between normalization and Israel's policy on the Palestinian issue. This stance was particularly prominent in the organization's early years. The summits at the level of national leaders and ministers were suspended as a result of Operation Cast Lead, and disputes between Israel and the PA caused delays in the formulating of joint regional strategies.²⁶

The Arab Spring upheavals changed regional priorities, and also slightly lowered the critical tone towards Israel in the UfM framework. Today, only a few discussions in UfM concern political issues, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is only one of many issues raised. Questions of immigration, terrorism, employment, and climate have assumed greater urgency and command far greater attention.²⁷ At the same time, the Arab reluctance to normalize relations with Israel still exists, albeit to a lesser extent, and continues to hamper cooperation between the parties in the UfM framework, especially in projects with great visibility. In addition, since organizational decisions require unanimous approval, each country has the right to veto projects with Israeli participation, and every project requires prior Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab agreement before it is brought to a vote.²⁸ This situation has thwarted Israeli initiatives in the organization on a number of occasions.²⁹

Another factor limiting UfM's contribution to Israel is the small scale of Israel's own contribution to the organization in human and financial resources. Israel does not contribute regularly to the UfM budget, and since 2016 has chosen not to send its own representative to UfM headquarters in Barcelona. When the organization was founded in 2008, Israel and Arab countries reached agreement on the appointment of an Israeli deputy secretary general in exchange for granting the Arab League observer status in UfM. Prof. Ilan Chet served on Israel's behalf as UfM Deputy Secretary General for Higher Education and Research in 2010-2016. Since he left his post, however, Israel has not appointed another representative in Barcelona, and Israel's connection with the organization runs through the Department for Multilateral European Organizations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. This decision is a result of economic considerations: Israel believes that the benefit of sending a permanent representative does not justify the financial cost, and that it is enough for Israeli ministers, diplomats, and professional staff to participate in UfM's periodic meetings.

Interviews with UfM officials indicate that the organization perceives Israel as a constructive actor. Memories from Prof. Chet's term in office are positive, mainly due to his contribution to the establishment of the university in Morocco and his interpersonal relationships with colleagues from elsewhere in the region.³⁰ Another enterprise led by Chet in Israel itself, which won a UfM label and €11.8 million in funding from the Israeli government and European funds in 2016, was the Eastern Mediterranean International School and Foundation (EMIS) in Hakfar Hayarok, which grants international matriculation certificates. Classes at the school are held in English (Hebrew and Arabic are studied as second languages). 190 students in grades 10-12 from the Mediterranean region and outside it study at the school, 20 percent of whom are from Arab countries.

The project is designed to contribute to the education of a young and creative generation in the Mediterranean region, and to give it a sense of belonging to the region.³¹

Another area promoted by UfM that is of relevance to Israel is water. In December 2018, the organization approved a document dealing with a regional agenda for water and a financial strategy for implementing that agenda.³² Furthermore, construction of a UfM-sponsored desalination facility for residents of the Gaza Strip, who suffer from a severe shortage of fresh water, is scheduled in the first half of the current decade, and will also improve the water delivery infrastructure there. The project was delayed for years because of its high cost (€562 million), half of which comes from Gulf states and the rest from the EC, France, Spain, and other sources. At least 85 percent of the donations for the project have already been guaranteed. Partners in the projects include the PA, the EC, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), and the World Bank (WB). Beyond the direct benefits, the project is designed to prevent water disputes, enhance stability, create conditions for implementation of a two-state solution, assist industrial and agricultural development, create employment, and prevent a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.³³

The projects promoted by UfM are also likely to constitute a basis for cooperation between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, echoing the momentum in their relations in the natural gas sector in recent years. Egypt regards the organization as an important international platform for its connections with EU countries, based on shared political, security, and economic interests. Former Egyptian Ambassador to the United Kingdom Nasser Kamel was elected Secretary General of UfM in 2018, and has strengthened his country's ties to the organization. Thanks to UfM, Egypt is benefiting from a host of projects in a range of areas, including trade, job creation, business training for the young generation, promotion of higher education, solutions to water shortages, development of energy sources, and digitalization.³⁴ Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi announced in December 2019 a plan for developing a Euro-Mediterranean region for higher education in New Alamein City, which is now under construction west of Alexandria. Technological, tourism, and business ventures are planned for the city under UfM supervision. In addition, an advanced scientific center, likewise under UfM sponsorship, is scheduled for construction in the new Egyptian administrative capital.³⁵

Jordan has promoted the Jordanian Railway Network project in the UfM framework since 2013. The project is designed to make transportation within Jordan and between Jordan and other countries in the region cheaper and more efficient. Theoretically, this project could fit in with Israel's Tracks for Regional Peace project, which is designed to include a railway route between Israel and the Gulf states passing through Jordan. The main route planned for the Jordanian Railway Network runs from north to south, from the Syrian border to the port of Aqaba and passing through Amman. The project's long-term vision, however, is creating a connection reaching Turkey and Europe on the one hand and the Gulf states on the other, which will bolster Jordan's access to the Mediterranean and provide new economic opportunities for the business sector in Jordan.³⁶ The nearly €400

million cost of the project is funded mostly by the Jordanian Ministry of Transport and the Saudi government.³⁷

Conclusion and Recommendations

Over the past decade, UfM has become a body with a well-defined identity. Still, while it helps promote projects, its practical contribution to Mediterranean integration remains limited. The organization has chosen to focus on shared regional interests in "soft" matters, with an emphasis on labeling small and medium-sized projects, while avoiding "hard" and disputed political and security issues and expensive projects. In this way, the organization has succeeded in defining its unique added value, while taking note of its strengths and weaknesses, and has several actual successes to its credit. At the same time, the organization's potential influence is inherently limited, and it is still required to justify its existence and fight to secure its status and importance among the member countries.

Along with the improvement in its status, UfM continues to face a number of difficulties. Its small budgets do not allow it to carry out independent projects without reliance on external players. Disputes and tensions between its member countries detract from their trust in each other and their ability to act in concert. The involvement of non-governmental organizations in UfM is limited. Since 2008, the organization has held no summit of national leaders, who sometimes prefer to work on joint Mediterranean affairs through bilateral and other multilateral channels, including sub-regional frameworks, such as the EMGF.

Still, UfM offers Israel a range of opportunities in an era of increasing normalization and closer ties between Mediterranean countries. It provides Israel with equal and recognized membership in a regional club containing both European and Arab countries, including some with which Israel has no diplomatic relations. Through UfM, Israel is also able to promote dialogue and cooperation with countries in the region on "soft" matters, some of which are not addressed in Israel's bilateral relations. This is particularly true of Arab countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, whose relations with Israel are still limited in scope, content, and participants. Following the Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, UfM is likely to serve as a platform for improving Israel's ties with the Gulf states, which are contributing to a range of projects in the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, including the desalination facility in the Gaza Strip and the Jordanian Railway Network.

In order to take advantage of its opportunities, Israel would do well to take action in a number of directions. First, Israel should formulate comprehensive Mediterranean policy that will make it possible to expand the spectrum of shared interests with countries in the region. Second, Israel should address Mediterranean matters at the heart of UfM business more closely, including the environment, climate change, renewable energy, desalination, nutritional security, science and research, and employment and advancement of young people. Third, an integrative body should be established in the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take responsibility for connections between the relevant government ministries and economic sectors and Israeli non-governmental civil groups that can provide knowledge, experience, and capital for Mediterranean enterprises. Fourth, Israel should allocate more financial and personnel resources to UfM in order to bolster the Israeli role in the organization and in the projects promoted in its framework. Since UfM's budget is modest, the investment needed in order to increase Israel's influence is also relatively small.

Finally, Palestinian and Arab reservations regarding normalization still obstruct Israel's ability to fulfill UfM's full potential. While Israel recently normalized its relations with some countries in the Arab world, the Palestinians still have veto power in UfM, given the consensus requirement. Progress in the peace process with the Palestinians is therefore still essential for development of Israel's ties in the Mediterranean in general, and in UfM in particular. Building relations of trust and cooperation with the PA in the promotion of joint enterprises is likely to make it easier to achieve Israeli-Palestinian agreements in the organization, and also to pave the way for Arab countries to participate in them or help finance them.

The author wishes to thank Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss for her helpful comments.

¹ Yaacov Shavit, ed., "Introduction," *A Mediterranean Anthology* (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2004), pp. 19-46.

² Mohammad el-Sayed Selim, "Egypt and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Choice or Adaptive Mechanism?" *Mediterranean Politics*, 2, no. 1 (1997): 69-71.

³ Alfred Tovias, "The Union for the Mediterranean: The First Decade," *IEMed*, 69, July 18, 2018, <https://www.iemed.org/recursos-compartits/pdfs/69-Tovias.pdf>.

⁴ Rym Ayadi and Salim Gadi, "The Future of Euro-Mediterranean Regional Cooperation: The Role of the Union for the Mediterranean," *Papers IEMed* 7, November 2011, pp. 7, 16-19, 25.

⁵ Timo Behr, "The Institutional Framework of the Union for the Mediterranean: Analysis and Suggestions," *IEMed*, 2011, pp. 30-33.

⁶ Peter Miltner, "The Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership: A Comparative Analysis," Natolin Best Master, Thesis 02 / 2010, pp. 39-40, 74.

⁷ Senén Florensa, "Union for the Mediterranean: Challenges and Ambitions," *IEMed*, 2010, pp. 58-67.

⁸ Bishara Khader, "The UfM: A Union of Projects... But Which Projects," *Euromed Survey*, 2011, pp. 214-16.

⁹ Interview with Mario Gomes, Portuguese representative and a member of the UfM cabinet, and with Almotaz Abadi, a representative of the Palestinian Authority at the UfM and a member of its division responsible for water and environmental projects, June 20, 2019.

¹⁰ Tovias, "The Union for the Mediterranean: The First Decade."

¹¹ Ayadi and Gadi, pp. 21-22.

¹² Senén Florensa; Tovias, "The Union for the Mediterranean: The First Decade."

¹³ Interview with Mario Gomes and Almotaz Abadi.

¹⁴ Roberto Aliboni and Fouad M. Ammor, "Under the Shadow of 'Barcelona': From the EMP to the Union for the Mediterranean," *Euromesco Paper* 77 (January 2009); Elistania Elistania, Farandy Nurmeiga and Agung Permadi, "Strategy to Strengthen Cooperation Between the European Union and the Mediterranean Countries Through the Union for Mediterranean (UfM)," *Global Jurnal Politik Internasional* 21(2) (December 2019), pp. 242-261.

- ¹⁵ "The 2018 Forum," UfM, October 8, 2018, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/regional-forum-2018/>; Tovias, "The Union for the Mediterranean: The First Decade."
- ¹⁶ "Mediterranean Initiative for Jobs (Med4Jobs)," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/project/mediterranean-initiative-for-jobs-med4jobs/>.
- ¹⁷ "Euromed University of Fes," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/project/the-euro-mediterranean-university-of-fez/>; "The Union for the Mediterranean: The First Decade," *IEMed Barcelona*, March 21, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXnJu4p7Dec&feature=youtu.be>; "Euromed University of Fes," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/project/the-euro-mediterranean-university-of-fez/>; Even earlier, in June 2008, a European Mediterranean university (EMUNI University) was founded in Piran, a port city in Slovenia, and was granted UfM sponsorship. The university holds an annual conference devoted to Mediterranean challenges, publishes a periodical, and operates a research center on promoting relations between European countries and Arab and Islamic countries. See "EMUNI University," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/project/emuni-university/>.
- ¹⁸ "SEMed Private Renewable Energy Framework 'SPREF,'" UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/project/semmed-private-renewable-energy-framework-spref/>.
- ¹⁹ "Tafila Wind Farm," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/TAFILA-WIND-FARM.pdf>.
- ²⁰ "UfM Energy University by Schneider Electric," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/project/ufm-energy-university-by-schneider-electric/>.
- ²¹ "What Will the Post-Pandemic World Look Like in the Mediterranean Region?" UfM, July 1, 2020, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/what-will-post-pandemic-world-mediterranean-region/>.
- ²² Ibrahim Amran, "UfM Secretary General: Mediterranean Basin Countries Facing Covid-19 Challenge; We Propose Workshops for Reinforcing People's Awareness," *al-Ahram*, March 30, 2020, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/2390153.aspx> [Arabic]; "UfM Member States Take Stock of UfM Activities during the Pandemic and Discuss Challenges and Opportunities for the Recovery," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/som-22july2020/>.
- ²³ Ayadi and Gad; Interview with Prof. Ilan Chet, former UfM Deputy Secretary General for Higher Education and Research, October 13, 2020.
- ²⁴ Roberto Aliboni, Ahmed Driss, Tobias Schumacher and Alfred Tovias, "Putting the Mediterranean Union in Perspective," EuroMeSCo Paper 68, June 2008, pp. 24-28.
- ²⁵ Interview with Ilan Chet.
- ²⁶ Raffaella A. Del Sarto, "Plus ça Change? Israel, the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Politics* 16: 1, 2011, pp. 117-134; Ayadi and Gadi, pp. 16-17; Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan, "Arab States and the UFM," *IEMed*, 2010, pp. 68-71.
- ²⁷ "The Union for the Mediterranean: The First Decade," *IEMed Barcelona*.
- ²⁸ Interview with Mario Gomes and Almotaz Abadi.
- ²⁹ Interview with Ilan Chet.
- ³⁰ Interview with Mario Gomes and Almotaz Abadi.
- ³¹ "Eastern Mediterranean International School (EMIS)," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/project/eastern-med-international-school-emis/>; "EMIS Eastern Mediterranean International School," UfM, https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/HER-EMIS_EN-1.pdf; "EMIS – School for Change," UfM, <https://www.emis-school-for-change.com/>.
- ³² "UfM Financial Strategy of Water," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/UfM-Financial-Strategy-for-Water-for-web-paginas.pdf>.
- ³³ "The 'Desalination Facility for the Gaza Strip' Project," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/project/the-desalination-facility-for-the-gaza-strip-project/>; "Giving Gaza Hope," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Gaza-Plant-Factsheet.pdf>; "Desalination Facility for the Gaza Strip," https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/EW-Gaza-strip_EN.pdf; "Spain Unveils EUR 1 Million Financing to the Construction of a Desalination Facility for the Gaza Strip," UfM, June 25, 2020, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/spains-commitment-mediterranean-ufm/>.

³⁴ "Union for Mediterranean Secretary General: Arab Spring Affected Regional Integration," *al-Masry al-Youm*, April 9, 2019, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/1386096> [Arabic].

³⁵ Ofir Winter, "Under Mediterranean Skies: Channels for Deepening Israel-Egypt Relations," <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/under-mediterranean-skies-channels-for-deepening-israel-egypt-relations/>; Wael Rubay'i, "Union for the Mediterranean Secretary General in an al-Youm al-Sabea Interview," *al-Youm al-Sabea*, December 3, 2018; "World Youth Forum: More Than 90 Young People Discussed Employment and Climate Action Initiatives at the First Model UfM," UfM, December 16, 2019, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/ar/world-youth-forum-model/> [Arabic].

³⁶ "Jordanian Railway Network," UfM, <https://ufmsecretariat.org/project/jordanian-railway-network/>.

³⁷ "Jordanian Railway Network," UfM, https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/TUD-Jordanian-Railway_EN.pdf.