

Introduction

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The saying “in every generation they rise up against us to destroy us” in the Passover Haggadah reflects the fear that has accompanied the Jewish people since the beginning and—over the course of the two thousand years of exile and persecution—has become an inseparable part of its narrative. The State of Israel, which was established in the shadow of the trauma of the Holocaust, has also faced severe threats since its establishment—some of them existential. Israel is in an ongoing state of existential threat as a small country that seeks to fulfill the right to sovereignty of a national and religious minority, surrounded by states that have refused (and some of which still do) to recognize it and consider it a “foreign implant” in the region.¹ The establishment of the State of Israel has thus been accompanied by constant fears that it would be lost, consequently shining a paradoxical light on the Zionist enterprise: On one hand, its establishment was a historic response to Jewish insecurity; on the other hand, Israel is the modern version of this cognitive state.² The centrality of fear to Jewish-Israeli existence has advantages and disadvantages: As an advantage, it fulfills a functional role as a catalyst for advancing mechanisms to defend against real threats. These mechanisms include preparing for threats, taking preventive measures to thwart them, and dealing with efforts to carry them out. As a disadvantage, it includes existential anxiety, which—if it does not reflect a real threat—can be a barrier to rationally analyzing a situation, taking calculated risks, realizing opportunities, and making vital strategic decisions.

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The following study is the result of a project conducted at the Institute for National Security Studies in 2018–2020 and provides an analysis of scenarios that could, in the future, pose existential threats to the State of Israel, while seeking to encourage governmental and public discussion on the issue. The study analyzed five severe threat scenarios that could potentially become existential: the formation of a regional military coalition against Israel; the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East; the collapse of Israeli defense systems due to a massive, combined precision-missile attack led by Iran and its proxies; international isolation and boycott of Israel; and the disintegration of Israeli society and the loss of its internal cohesion and foundations of its Jewish and democratic identity. Each scenario was examined through the parameters of severity and probability given the existing situation and possible future scenarios. The research team pointed out threat catalysts and positive trends that should be maintained and encouraged for each scenario. The team formulated recommendations regarding preventive steps and measures for developing future capabilities to cope with the threat scenarios presented here. Models built for the study helped the teams analyze Israel's security pillars and examine their importance and functioning vis-à-vis the scenarios.

In the following, we discuss the theoretical definitions of the concept *existential threat*, survey the existing research discourse on the issue in the Israeli context, and present the research methodology.

Existential Threat

The concept of existential threat is used in the public and research discourse in Israel as a description of both external security threats such as the Iranian nuclear threat and internal threats to Israeli society such as a deterioration in the achievements of the education system. The existential threat—with its various meanings—can be imagined or real. While defining a threat as existential can be the result of the balance of military power, it can also be based on subjective and controversial views among societies and individuals.³ As the potential consequences of existential threats are extremely destructive, and since their prevention is justified and the state is even obligated to take significant steps,⁴ their definition is critically important.

Research literature on existential threats can be found in several fields. Some studies examine scenarios that could cause the annihilation of the

entire world population or the vast majority of it or make the environment unlivable and offer responses and solutions for them.⁵ The threat factors in this context include global warming; severe natural disasters such as an asteroid collision; pandemics; exploitation of all the natural resources; and the misuse of technology and artificial intelligence.⁶ Other studies, from the field of psychology, examine the existential threat in the broader context of anxiety about death. The most prominent theory in this context is the terror management theory, which examines how anxiety about an existential threat affects people's self-esteem or their attitude toward moral and cultural issues.⁷ In the Israeli context, studies in this field claim that many Israelis experience feelings of continued existential threat and of being under siege.⁸ While Israel is a distinct case,⁹ studies show that other states and societies also live with a sense of existential threat.¹⁰

A third field of study—of which this paper is a part—discusses existential threats in military and political contexts. Some studies in this area engage in historical analysis of the sense of an existential threat and its impact on the state's foreign and military policy.¹¹ Others discuss existential threats from the perspective of the field of security studies. This field is divided into various schools: The traditional approach analyzes international relations from a realistic perspective and focuses on military might and military responses to existential security threats; in contrast, according to the securitization theory, one should differentiate between an existential threat in reality and the concept of the threat as existential. The supporters of this approach claim that overpoliticization can cause “regular” threats—military and civilian—to be presented as if they were existential threats, in order to provide political forces with a pretext for implementing far-reaching measures to thwart them.¹² One example is the description of terrorism as an existential threat. While many would agree that terrorism is a military threat, it is questionable whether it is also an existential threat that undermines the foundations of Western states, as it is occasionally portrayed.¹³

Over the years, whether Israel is subjected to changing existential threats has been the focus of debate among both defense officials and politicians.¹⁴ Two conceptualizations are prominent in Israel's research discourse. Kobi Michael defines an existential threat as a “trend, process or development that significantly threatens the very existence of the State of Israel and its ability to be the national home of the Jewish people.” He divides the existential

threats into three categories: demographic (the loss of the Jewish majority); political (the loss of international legitimacy); and security (military threat). According to Michael, most of the public discussion relates to the third category, while the first two categories—which are no less severe—do not receive much attention.¹⁵ With regard to this specific project, Michael suggests to add a fourth category—the quality or efficiency of governance. Steven David argues that military threats are not the be-all and end-all and concludes that since World War II, the vast majority of states that have been erased from the political map collapsed due to internal ethnic tension and the lack of international legitimacy and were not annihilated by a military threat.¹⁶ According to another conceptualization—proposed by Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer—Israel is in a state of “continued existential threat” affected by the circumstances of its establishment, the fact that both internal and external sources see its legitimacy as controversial, and the many expressions of hostility from these sources.¹⁷

The research presented here is based on two premises: first, that existential threats are dynamic and are influenced by a range of changing factors, including the threat environment, the range of capabilities for dealing with threats, and the subjective perception that specific threats are “existential”; and second, that an existential threat can be posed not only to the military but also to the state’s sovereignty and even its identity and fundamental values. While Israel theoretically could be a political entity that exists separately from its Jewish and democratic identity, the research team believes that this scenario would threaten the essence of its existence, as defined in Israel’s Declaration of Independence and shaped over the years of the state’s existence. Consequently, an existential threat is defined as “a threat with the clear potential to cause real damage that threatens the very existence, sovereignty, conventional identity and/or ability of the state to successfully cope with external and internal dangers.”

This existential threat relates to three main spheres: Israel’s physical security, its sovereignty, and its identity. In terms of Israel’s physical security, an existential threat could critically harm the State of Israel, after which it might not recover and return to normal functioning. An extreme case would be a foreign conquest of the majority of Israel’s territory and population; the collapse of the state’s security capabilities, such as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF); or the complete destruction of much of its essential infrastructure and

mass killing of its residents. In terms of sovereignty, an existential threat would diminish the state's control over its population and resources over time. In terms of identity, an existential threat would destroy the state's moral character as a sovereign, independent, Jewish, and democratic entity that can fulfill its purpose as the nation state of the Jewish people.

In assessing if a threat should be defined as “existential,” it should be asked whether recovery in a reasonable time frame after the materialization of a threat is possible, as this is critical to the definition. The ability to recover could indicate the system's resilience and its ability to cope with severe disruptions, unless the strength of the threat that materializes, together with a lack of prior preparations, destroys the ability to recover. In the last case, a severe threat should be considered “existential.”

Methodology

The study presented here involves two methodological challenges: the first is the difficulty—and sometimes the inability—to predict existential threats that reflect long-term trends or acute events with destructive consequences in a world of infinite variables, fast changes, and uncertainty. In order to address this challenge, the study turned to the field of future studies and used its methodologies for attempting to predict developments and events in the medium and long term. There are different approaches to predicting the future. One approach is based on previous patterns of activity and models, as in predicting likely trends. Another approach presents possible scenarios with varying degrees of probability that allow decision makers to optimally prepare and expand their perspectives, such as in the attempt to forecast black swans¹⁸ or “wild cards”; that is, potential events whose probability is low but whose impact, if they materialize in extreme situations, could be destructive.¹⁹ According to another approach, the researcher plays a role in not only predicting but also helping to shape and identify the desired future.²⁰ On this basis, the research team aspired to identify Israel's security pillars and to offer ways of consolidating and strengthening them so that they help prevent the development of existential threats, defend against them, or thwart them.

The second challenge in assessing existential threats lies in the influence of the individual's subjective perception on predicting threats and defining them as “existential,” even if they do not have such proven potential—a

situation which creates unconscious cognitive biases that influence the research.²¹ Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have shown that people's decision-making process is not rational and rather is influenced by a series of psychological, cultural, and social variables, while their conclusions also have implications for assessment failures in the field of intelligence and in predicting the future.²² In order to minimize the biases in the study presented here, three guiding principles were applied: having a diversity of researchers from different areas of knowledge—military and security studies (international relations), political science, law, and history—with different approaches for analyzing existential threats and future studies; having a conscious focus on worst case scenarios that could pose an existential threat to the State of Israel; and identifying the security pillars that can accelerate or inhibit the development of various kinds of existential threat scenarios. That being said, it is important to emphasize that the assessments offered here all have an inevitable subjective component. The estimated time frames for the possible materialization of the threat scenarios studied were divided into three categories: the short term (up to five years); the medium term (5–10 years); and the long term (over a decade).

The research process was divided into several stages: In the first stage, the research team defined the term “existential threat”; in the second stage, a number of severe threat scenarios that potentially could become existential were selected; in the third stage, an anonymous questionnaire was drafted and sent to the researchers at INSS, in which they were asked to rank the likelihood and the severity of each threat scenarios selected, given the challenge inherent in them and according to Israel's level of readiness for them. Furthermore, the respondents were asked to propose additional threat scenarios. After calculating the results of the questionnaire, the research team chose five leading threat scenarios and divided into separate research groups to study each scenario. The scenarios were examined according to uniform parameters: analyzing the existing situation regarding the threat in question; identifying factors that accelerate or inhibit/restrain possible threats; assessing the likelihood of the threat and estimated time frames for its possible materialization; and determining policy recommendations (see figure 1).




Figure 1. Israel’s security pillars




Figure 2. Israel’s security pillars and possible connections between them

The threat scenarios were analyzed using the security pillars model (see figure 2), which helped the research groups systematically analyze the components and characteristics of Israel’s broad and comprehensive military response to each of the five threat scenarios discussed. According to the model, Israel’s response capabilities are based on four overarching

pillars that represent the following categories: military power, technological superiority, national resilience, and foreign relations. These categories represent the variety of capabilities that Israel needs in order to provide a comprehensive security, military, diplomatic, and economic response to the existential threat scenarios included in the study; they fulfill various functions in Israel's national security, in building up its "hard" and "soft" powers, and in keeping existential threats at bay.²³ Here is a breakdown of their components:

Military power: Military power forms the toolkit that Israel uses to deter enemies and, if necessary, to neutralize the military threat and seriously harm the enemy. Israel's military edge over its enemies is based on organizational, operational, and human qualities; on advanced combat capabilities; and on the highest level of combat and intelligence measures. This edge has been achieved and is maintained by the continued investment in developing the human resources, in addition to the IDF's command, its value, and the overall defense system. It is also based on independent development, the acquisition of advanced weapons systems, and on stockpiles that are necessary when put to the test. In addition, this edge is particularly the result of the ongoing cultivation of the special relations with the United States. Furthermore, strategic, operative, and tactical intelligence capabilities; passive defense system that is getting stronger; and a unique multi-layer active defense system all increase Israel's ability to successfully cope with military threats. Israel's image of unconventional deterrence also serves as a central component in deterring the regional states, especially within the content of another state posing a nuclear threat but also in terms of other existential threats.

Technological superiority: Capabilities in the field of cyber, satellites, space, and UAVs are significant in achieving Israeli technological superiority vis-à-vis potential regional enemies and building up capabilities in the face of potential threats. Technological superiority also provides Israel with "soft power" that helps it achieve national objectives and contributes to its standing in the regional and international arenas. This technological superiority can be attributed to an education system that has emphasized scientific education and has cultivated institutions of scientific study and research that are global leaders at the highest level.

National resilience means wisely building up systemic capabilities to successfully cope with severe threats so that disturbances—as they occur—

will be flexibly contained, while allowing for a fast systemic recovery that will restore damaged systems to normal function and even better. Israel's governance capabilities enable it to cope with difficult domestic and external challenges, overcome crises, wisely invest resources in advancing national objectives, and reduce risks posed by strategic threats. These abilities are based on Israel's being a democratic state with advanced and effective management, control, and supervising mechanisms that are capable of mobilizing the national resources for socioeconomic growth, defending national interests, creating broad public confidence in the cause and in the state's institutions, and developing social solidarity. The state's governability and sovereignty, its systemic functional continuity, infrastructure, and economic system all contribute to Israel's national resilience.

Foreign relations provide the depth of Israel's resilience and its response, and they are an important tool in preventing and reducing potential threats. Foreign relations include the special relations with the United States, which provide Israel with diplomatic, military, and economic partnerships and are a pillar of Israel's national security; close relations with states in Europe, Asia, and Africa, which are also a significant component of building up Israel's military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities; the connection with diaspora Jews; and peace agreements and forms of cooperation and coordination over shared interests with pragmatic players in the region. Israel's relations with Arab states grant it regional equity, but they are not immune to possible shocks due to political upheavals or extreme events. Striving for peace and diplomatic agreements with its neighbors helps Israel to strengthen its international standing and to fight attempts to isolate and boycott it.

The various security pillars are connected to one another and influence one another, as the arrows in figure 2 show. For example, military capabilities (through necessary military development, which is later translated into and adapted to the needs of the civilian market) help develop technological superiority (which is expressed in innovation, elite technologies, and cyber); technological capabilities serve military capabilities and the national economy; and foreign relations influence infrastructure and the economy, given the characteristics of the Israeli economy, which is export-oriented and dependent on international markets. Israel's conduct in these markets

is influenced, in part, by the quality of its diplomatic relations with players in the international arena.

Arab observers who have analyzed Israel's successful survival, despite its being state of a religious and national minority in the middle of the Arab-Muslim states—some that are hostile—have also pointed to similar security pillars. For example, in a series of articles published between 2018–2019, Egyptian economist Adel El-Labban noted that Israel has the following security pillars: (1) military superiority based on the ability to independently develop advanced weapons, conduct research, and develop cooperation with the arms industries in the United States; (2) the cultivated image of nuclear deterrence and of maintaining a regional nuclear military monopoly; (3) the assurance of a Jewish majority that is vital to maintaining Israel's character by encouraging immigration and by undertaking measures to disengage from the Palestinians; (4) the development of a technology-export economy that turns to the most advanced markets in the world and is not dependent on the markets of Israel's neighbors, in the understanding that a strong economy is essential for strengthening the military and civilian sectors, absorbing waves of Jewish immigration, and developing its foreign relations with the world powers; and (5) the ability to suppress the spirit of resistance and battle among the Arab nations and leaders and instill a sense of weakness and defeatism among them, by convincing them of Israel's superiority and the pointlessness of continuing the struggle against it.²⁴

The Threat Scenarios

One of the challenges faced in this study was selecting the threat scenarios. The research team had decided in advance to not focus separately on the Iranian nuclear threat, as previous INSS studies had already examined it in depth.²⁵ As a result, the Iranian nuclear threat appears as part of two broader threats, with added research value: the formation of a regional coalition and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (chapters 1 and 2). In addition, it was also decided not to discuss natural disasters in this project, as they are a different genre of existential threats.

Following the questionnaire conducted among INSS researchers, the team chose five leading (but not exclusive) threat scenarios, which are severe threats to Israel and could possibly become existential:

1. *The formation of a regional military coalition against Israel:* This is a physical threat in which an external regional coalition seeks to destroy Israel. The analysis was based on the regional situation, the positions of key states (Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia), and the possible impact of Israel's policy, external variables, and extreme scenarios.

2. *Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East:* A domino effect of regional nuclearization would occur following the development of nuclear technology—military or civilian—by central regional players, led by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. In this scenario, the team analyzed the roles of external players in the nuclearization processes, including Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea, and offered ways in which the international community, the United States, and Israel can prevent them.

3. *The collapse of Israel's defense systems due to a massive, combined precision missile attack led by Iran and its proxies:* A failure of the Israeli response to a combined precision attack on Israel would lead to the collapse of its defense systems and damage its ability to exercise sovereignty. Furthermore, the materialization of this scenario could lead to additional threats—direct and indirect—against Israel, influencing its military capabilities and its national resilience. In this scenario, the team analyzed the nature and outline of a possible attack, as well as critical factors in Israel's defense systems in the face of such an attack.

4. *International isolation and boycott of Israel:* International sanctions, boycott, and isolation would severely harm Israel's military and economic capabilities as well as its international standing. In this scenario, we also discussed the challenges facing Israel's special relations with the United States, as well as between Israel and the Jewish diaspora.

5. *The disintegration of Israeli society and the loss of its internal sources of strength as well as its Jewish and democratic identity:* This scenario would harm the current character of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and as the home of the Jewish people in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. In this scenario, threats with severe consequences for Israel, its cohesion, and its way of life were analyzed, including the loss of its democratic identity, the loss of its Jewish identity, and a civil war between different factions of Israeli society.

Notes

- 1 For more on this, see Oren Barak and Gabriel (Gabi) Sheffer, “Israeli Democracy in the Face of Existential Threats: Comparative Examination,” *Politika* 20 (2010): 77–97, <https://bit.ly/2UqfOOOn> [Hebrew].
- 2 Uriel Abulof, “Free or Fearful? Zionism’s Responses to Jewish Insecurity,” in *Routledge Handbook on Israel Security*, ed. Stuart A. Cohen and Aharon Klieman (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), 13–24, <https://bit.ly/2ZqjFRj>.
- 3 Uriel Abulof, “At the Abyss,” *Azure* 25 (2006), <https://bit.ly/2ZCC906> [Hebrew]; Gilad Hirschberger, “Talking at the Abyss,” Alaxon, April 10, 2014, <https://bit.ly/2RoRWYc> [Hebrew].
- 4 Ian Manners, “European [Security] Union: From Existential Threat to Ontological Security” (working paper, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2002), 10, <https://bit.ly/32nbWAj>.
- 5 Nick Bostrom, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” *Journal of Evaluation and Technology* 9 (2002), <https://bit.ly/30NYTYD>.
- 6 About the collapse of civilizations throughout history, and the challenges that humanity will face in the twenty-first century, see Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (Viking Press, 2005).
- 7 Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Thomas Pyszczynski, “The Cultural Animal: Twenty Years of Terror Management Theory and Research,” in *Handbook of Experimental Existential Psychology*, ed. Jeff Greenberg, Sander L. Koole, and Thomas Pyszczynski (New York: Guilford, 2004), 13–34.
- 8 Raffaella Del Sarto, *Israel Under Siege: The Politics of Insecurity and the Rise of the Israeli Neo-Revisionist Right* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017); Gad Yair, “Israeli Existential Anxiety: Cultural Trauma and the Constitution of National Character,” *Social Identities* 20, no. 4–5 (2014): 346–362, <https://bit.ly/2PztBDt>; Daniel Bar-Tal and Dikla Antebi, “Siege Mentality in Israel,” *Papers on Social Representations* 1 (1992): 49–67, <https://bit.ly/32jrepM>.
- 9 Asaf Siniver, “Israeli Identities and the Politics of Threat: A Constructivist Interpretation,” *Ethnopolitics* 11, no. 1 (2012): 24–42, <https://bit.ly/2Ukfqkq>.
- 10 See, for example, Michael Desch, “Liberalism and the New Definition of the ‘Existential’ Threat,” *Politika* 20 (2010): 15–37, <https://bit.ly/2LcNxt> [Hebrew]. On the question of whether radical Islam organizations indeed pose an existential threat to the United States, see Francis Fukuyama, “The Neoconservative Moment,” *National Interest* (2004), <https://bit.ly/34i34Oa>; and Charles Krauthammer, “In Defense of Democratic Realism,” *National Interest*, no. 77 (2004): 15–25, <https://bit.ly/2NHWhYo>.
- 11 An example in the Israeli context is the debate on the impact of the sense of existential threat on Israel’s national security policy. See David Tal, *Israel’s Conception of Current Security—Origins and Development, 1949–1956* (Beersheva: Ben Gurion

- University Press, 1997) [Hebrew]; Benny Morris, “On the Researcher’s Obligation,” *Cathedra* 95 (2000): 147–154, <https://bit.ly/2LivYVS> [Hebrew].
- 12 For more on security theory and criticism of it, see Barry Buzan and Others, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1998); Michael Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 47 no. 4 (2003): 511–531, <https://bit.ly/2LiQGF3>.
 - 13 Desch, “Liberalism,” 15–37.
 - 14 See, for example, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement that Iran is an existential threat in *Mako*, August 23, 2017, <https://bit.ly/2UmIMOY> [Hebrew]; Israel’s president, Reuven Rivlin, has also spoken about the existential threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program. See, for example, *Ynet*, January 23, 2019, <https://bit.ly/2zCdAlx> [Hebrew]. Efraim Halevy, in contrast, claims that the existential threat is not necessarily Iran but rather “the demographic threat.” See *Arutz Sheva*, April 17, 2018, <https://bit.ly/2ZDwEuh> [Hebrew]. Conversely, former prime minister Ehud Olmert claimed that there is no existential threat to the State of Israel. See *Maariv*, November 21, 2018, <https://bit.ly/2HAY2aG> [Hebrew]. The executive director of INSS, Major General (ret.) Amos Yadlin, also has argued that there is no existential threat to the State of Israel, but rather there are strategic threats. See *Arutz Sheva*, January 13, 2017, <https://bit.ly/2ZnEXim> [Hebrew].
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 - 16 Steven David, “How Do States Die: Lessons for Israel,” *Israel Affairs* 22, no. 2 (2016): 270–290, <https://bit.ly/2HCcVVw>.
 - 17 Barak and Sheffer, “Israeli Democracy.”
 - 18 For more on black swans, see Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable* (Random House, 2007).
 - 19 Sandro Mendonca et al. “Wild cards, Weak Signals and Organizational Improvisation,” *Futures* 36, no. 2 (2004): 201–218, <https://bit.ly/2AUkm6P>.
 - 20 David Passig, *The Future Code: Israel’s Future Test* (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2008), 60–63 [Hebrew].
 - 21 Many studies show a series of cognitive biases that influence people’s way of thinking and memory. See, for example, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” *Science* 185, no. 4157 (1974): 1124–1131, <https://bit.ly/32itWMd>.
 - 22 For more on the impacts of these biases on the assessment of military threats, see Ephraim Kam, *Surprise Attack* (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1990) [Hebrew].
 - 23 See *IDF Strategy*, Chief of Staff’s Office, April 2018, <https://bit.ly/2K6GZev> [Hebrew]; Reut Institute, “Israel’s Relations with the Jewish World: Leading to a ‘Yom Kippur Surprise,’” (June 2019): 7, <https://bit.ly/2HbCOLO> [Hebrew].

- 24 Adel El-Labban, “The Last of the Wars,” *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, December 19, 2018, <https://bit.ly/2Lg7z4G> [Arabic]; “The Last of the Wars: The Iron Hand,” *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, December 26, 2018, <https://bit.ly/2HDS985> [Arabic]; “The Last of the Wars: The Demographic Bomb,” *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, January 2, 2019, <https://bit.ly/2Bgb9WE> [Arabic]; “The Last of the Wars: The Money and the Will,” *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, January 9, 2019, <https://bit.ly/2LeNrjl> [Arabic].
- 25 See, for example, Ephraim Kam, *A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can be Done*, Memorandum 87 (Tel Aviv: INSS, 2007), <https://bit.ly/34eUaBh> [Hebrew].