National Security in a "Liquid" World

Carmit Padan and Vera Michlin-Shapir, Editors

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iNSS Institute for National Security Studies

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Memorandum No. 195   October 2019

ביטחון לאומי במציאות 'נזילה'

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עורכות: כרמית פדן, ורה מיכלין־שפיר

Contents

Preface

The Neubauer Research Fellowship Program, which places outstanding PhD candidates in research positions at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), has been in existence for more than a decade. It started as a modest initiative to augment the professional capacities of the Institute, to help realize its vision and fulfill its goals of impacting the public discourse on Israel's national security and providing recommendations to decision makers, political leaders, and strategists in Israel and abroad.

The decision to establish this unique program was based on the realization that the INSS research team should be more balanced. Thus, Jeanette Lerman-Neubauer and Joseph Neubauer, dear friends and supporters of INSS from Philadelphia, USA, suggested that we actively incorporate young, promising academics to become members of our team. INSS leadership and the veteran researchers, with long practical experience in the defense establishment and academic credentials, welcomed the idea of infusing the institute with new blood, expecting younger researchers to contribute greatly to enhancing the joint abilities of the institute's professional staff. It was felt that Neubauer Fellows working side by side with the more established researchers would be mutually beneficial and would improve the institute's research products.

Today, twelve years later, we are happy to note that the institute has been immeasurably enriched by more than forty Neubauer Fellows, each of whom has invested two years of demanding work in the institute's various fields of research. We are proud to say that eight former Neubauer Fellows have joined the permanent INSS research staff. Given this, we may conclude that the vision of the program founders has proven to be most worthy. In fact, the results have far exceeded our initial expectations.

The number of candidates and their academic distinction, as well as their distinguished personal qualifications, are constantly on the rise, commensurately making it more challenging to select the most outstanding

ones to meet the high demands of INSS. Over and over again, Neubauer Fellows challenge the scope and depth of the institute's work with their groundbreaking studies in new fields and add new research dimensions, perspectives, and methods that we had not experienced before. This volume, the first of its kind, consisting of studies by some of the Neubauer Fellows, is an extraordinary example of the high level of professionalism these researchers bring to INSS. We are equally proud of the fact that dozens of Neubauer Fellows now hold senior positions elsewhere—in the academia, government ministries, the media, and other fields—where they successfully apply the unique skills, knowledge, and tools they developed at INSS.

Based on these accomplishments, we are more committed than ever to maintaining and strengthening the Neubauer Research Fellowship Program at INSS to further hone its abilities, research products, and achievements, as well as its impact on the strategic community in Israel and abroad. We are convinced that this will result in an even greater benefit to the institute and to Israel's national security.

We would like to use this occasion to thank, once again, the Neubauer Family Foundation for its crucial and continuous support for the Institute for National Security Studies in general and the Fellowship Program in particular.

Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Meir Elran, senior research fellow at INSS and coordinator of the Neubauer Research Fellowship Program

Introduction

This memorandum consists of articles written by young researchers—PhD candidates and others—who were part of the Neubauer Research Fellowship Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and participated in the Neubauer Research Project which was carried out at INSS during 2017. The research fellows who took part in this project studied together various aspects of national security linked to Israel's domestic, regional, and international strategic environment. The objective of the project was to examine concepts and patterns in present day's national security and contemporary research in the field, as a basis for an up-to-date analysis of specific issues relevant to Israel's national security.

The research challenge underlying this Neubauer Research Project was to adapt, define, and structure theoretical approaches and relevant concepts of national security and the global changes rooted in accelerated technological processes and political trends, including the upheavals in the Middle East, waves of terrorism in the international arena, cyberattacks, and the growing use of autonomous weapons. The assumption is that the recognition of theories and their critical exploration will be helpful to better analyze in a reliable manner the present challenges and consequently will enable suitable policy recommendations.

This analytical project represents the core objectives of INSS to continuously examine and analyze the strategic issues relating to Israel's political and security agenda and to propose policy recommendations based on the results of that analysis, while encouraging the growth of a future generation of national security researchers through theoretical and practical expertise.

The Neubauer Research Project was carried out in four stages. Firstly, academic experts presented diverse updated social science theories in international relations, political science, and sociology, as a basis for further discussion. Secondly, the participating researchers presented their topics,

followed by discussions. This led to the third stage, in which the researchers composed, critiqued, and revised their articles in a peer-review process. In the final stage, the studies were presented at a seminar on "National Security 2.0," held at the INSS in November 2018.

This memorandum consists of eight articles dealing with theoretical and applied aspects of the concept of national security written by former and current Neubauer Fellows. It ends with a concluding article by Prof. Yoram Peri.

"Dangers, Risks, and "Unknown Unknowns": National Security in the Global Era" by Vera Michlin-Shapir and Carmit Padan is the first article in this volume. It focuses on the connection between sociological concepts and the content of security studies in order to analyze how the characteristics of this era—defined as the "second modernity," thus adopting the concept of the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman—impact one's understanding and definition of the term "national security," thereby hastening the need to redefine it in the contemporary political contexts.

Yaron Schneider's article "The New Security: Trends in the Study of Security in International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era" discusses the factors that led researchers to reconstruct research methods and theories for deciphering national security phenomena (such as ethnic conflicts and international terrorism) following the Cold War. One main conclusion of the study is that the rise in the influence of non-state players in the international arena was central in the reformulation of new reasoning to national security dilemmas.

In his article "Egypt's Challenges after the Arab Spring," Khader Sawaed examines three major policy dilemmas that Egypt has faced since 2011: the state's monopoly in the context of the use of force, the administrative efficacy of the bureaucracy, and domestic civic consent on the collective identity and the role of the state. Sawaed's analysis leads to the conclusion that the economic, social, and political success of the Egyptian leadership to address these challenges will impact the internal Egyptian and the regional stability, which might necessarily influence Israel's security interests.

Liran Antebi's article deals with "The Proliferation of Autonomous Weapons Systems: Effects on International Relations." The study examines the possible influence of the widespread use of autonomous weapons on the battlefield of the future and the political, economic, and civil impact these

systems are bound to have on the international arena and security studies. The article asserts that such systems have implications that go far beyond the legal and moral contexts currently at the heart of the discourse on the issue.

In his article "The State as a Double Agent: National Security Versus Privacy and the State's Role in Cyberspace in the United States," Ido Sivan-Sevilla traces the paradoxically dual role the state plays in the digital age. On the one hand, the state goes to great lengths to promote cybersecurity, protect privacy, and defend national security. At the same time, the state exploits cyberspace to gather data and, in doing so, violates privacy for the sake of attaining national security goals. This state of affairs raises the question of how legislation and regulation in the United States construct the relationship between national security and privacy.

In her article "When the House Is on Fire: Ethnic Diasporas During Flare-ups in Their Countries of Origin," Gallia Lindenstrauss deals with the way ethnics communities in their new countries relate to conflicts and peacemaking processes in their motherlands and their respective regions. Her case study focuses on the Kurdish community in Germany and its attitudes to the 2015 violent flare-up between Turkey and its Kurdish minority. The article discusses aspects of the community's identity, such as relations with rival diaspora communities and the meaning of the subsequent arrival of a new wave of refugees from the homeland.

Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky's article covers "The Civil Society Component of National Security in an Era of Civil Power: The Case of Israel in the UN Human Rights Council in 2016." The study examines the role that civil society agents play in diplomatic processes in a period characterized by increased civil influence. The case study explored here is the activity of the UN Human Rights Commission with regard to Israel during 2016. The author's major contention is that, given the current state of affairs, officials and civil society players share similar patterns of action, and that while engaged in military confrontations, nations are also required to conduct an effort to impact the mindsets of relevant players on the international stage.

In "The Role of Social Media in the Radicalization of Young People in the West," Yotam Rosner tracks how extreme jihadist movements, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, exploit the discourse in social networks to recruit young Westerners to their cause and deploy them in their missions. This phenomenon has implications for the national security of democracies,

because the nature of the social media discourse encourages polarization, extremism, and violence and therefore threatens the social order in liberal western societies, including their citizens' sense of identity and personal security.

Yoram Peri's article, "Conclusion: The Time Has Come for a New Security Paradigm," completes the volume. Peri surveys some of the transformations that have occurred in the social, state, economic, and political orders and links these global changes to transformations that have occurred in the sphere of warfare. His conclusion reinforces the major claims made in the memorandum: the complexity of the concept of "national security" as a social construct; the need to confront security dilemmas in a proactive and holistic fashion; and, above all, the necessity to examine national security through new analytical tools.

The articles compiled in this volume create a wide-ranging assessment of the challenges Western nations, and to a great extent also Israel, face in this age. These studies propose a unique and updated agenda as a solid theoretical basis for analyzing issues of security and strategy. This is precisely the contribution that the Neubauer Research Project has sought: the mutual enrichment of new ideas, approaches, and studies that is inseparable from academic and strategic research, including the research taking place at the INSS.

We would like to express our profound gratitude to all the writers whose articles appear in this memorandum. A special appreciation goes to the academics who shared their insights with us—Prof. Uriah Shavit, Dr. Limor Samimian-Darash, and Dr. Uriel Abulof—and all those who participated in the discussion that took place at various stages of the project. Special thanks to our project supervisors, Dr. Anat Kurz, the Director of Research at INSS, for her professional assistance, and Dr. Meir Elran, the Neubauer Program Coordinator at the INSS. Special thanks are in order also for the great help of Prof. Stuart Cohen, Prof. Zaki Shalom, and Prof. Gabriel Sheffer in promoting the project as guest scholars.

And finally, special gratitude is in order to the Neubauer Family Fund for its strong support of the PhD Fellows Program and this particular research project. Without their continuous and gracious backing, this effort would not have taken place.

Carmit Padan and Vera Michlin-Shapir, Editors
August 2019

Dangers, Risks, and "Unknown Unknowns": National Security in the Global Era

Vera Michlin-Shapir and Carmit Padan

This article seeks to bridge between sociological approaches and security studies in order to analyze how the characteristics of the current era—defined by sociologists as "late modernity"—construct the definition of the term "national security." The premise of this article is that the concept of national security is steeped in classical modernity; it is an inseparable part of the world order of nation-states; and it is based on the scientific and technological thinking that underpins national security decision making. Yet, since the 1980s, we have witnessed a rapidly changing world, typified by cross-border neoliberal economics, increased immigration that changes the demographic makeup of states, and information technologies developing at an unprecedented speed. This article asserts that these transformations are eroding the classical modern state structure, are changing the nature of the threats that states need to confront, and thus challenging the very concept of national security. This is true not only for the West but also for the Middle East. To substantiate this assertion, the article presents two case studies: the war on terrorism in the 2000s and the Arab Spring in 2010.

Keywords: Risk society, late modernity, Arab Spring, terrorism

Introduction

In 1989, American scholar Francis Fukuyama wrote: "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point

of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."[1] Fukuyama's hypothesis expressed the promise that the end of the Cold War seemed to offer—from that point onward, the world would stride toward a secure future of peace, liberty, and prosperity. But history did not play out according to Fukuyama's thesis. Recent decades, and the past few years in particular, have been rife with occurrences that have unsettled the once historical superiority of liberal democracy and the sense of security it projected. These events include the rise of global jihad; the retreat of democratization processes around the world; terrorist attacks in Western countries; global economic crises; the Arab Spring, which failed to result in a democratic transformation and led to wars that have only increased mass immigration to Europe and further challenged liberal democracy; and finally, what looks like a gradual erosion of global liberal democratic values in the West. In the midst of all this, the concept of "national security"—which, as any social concept, developed in a particular historical, political, and social context (in the sense of "a nation's ability to defend its internal values against external threats"[2])—is becoming increasingly an empty signifier. This state of affairs raises the following questions: What went wrong? What happened in recent decades to the side that won the Cold War? And how did these changes undermine our traditional definition of "national security"?

This article argues that recent changes in the global historical context have led to a situation in which the notion underpinning the concept of national security, which was structured as part of the modern tradition of nation-states, is losing its luster. Among these changes, defined by leading sociologists as "late modernity," we may include the retreat of the nation-states from producing national agendas; the acceleration of emigration by the international economic system; the erosion of power bases of nation-states by the increasing technological developments; and the transition from eradicating concrete **dangers** to calculating the probability of **risks**. These changes have deepened the sense that nation-states are failing at their primary mission, namely in providing security to their citizens.

Although some trends discussed in this article preceded the end of the Cold War, this article focuses particularly on the post-Cold War, which is considered specifically challenging as far as the concept of national security is concerned. The novelty of our approach is that it links sociological theory

with content from security studies, an interdisciplinary mode of research that to date rarely has been applied.[3] Moreover, this article makes use of two case studies—the war on terror in the 2000s and the upheavals in the Middle East in the 2010s—to examine how changes typical of late modernity have eroded the classical modern state structure of nation-states and have changed the nature of threats that states need to confront, thereby challenging the primacy of the concept of national security.

Historical Background: The Nation-State, National Security, and Classical Modernity

The concept of "security" is firmly entrenched in the modern era. Until the seventeenth century, traditional European societies framed war and government in religious terms and as part of the struggle over holy justice.[4] Henry Kissinger described Cardinal Richelieu, who steered French policy in the seventeenth century, as a pioneer in the definition of "national interest" and "national security." Until that time, the Christian concept of "divine" reigned supreme; even if it was often used for achieving political ends, religion was the foundation for decision making by European kings in their relationships with the pope in Rome and in managing the interrelationships among the royal houses. The Christian kings did not serve a particular nation but rather were the ones that God anointed to serve him and lead his believers. They, too, were obligated to comport themselves accordingly. Kissinger stressed the historic revolution that Richelieu generated in the international order of Europe: He separated individual Christian ethics from a state's geopolitical conduct and claimed that the national rationale (*raison d'état*) was the national interest, which differed from the individuals' conduct in society. At the center of this assertion was the state's right to use force and maneuver power relations with other states regardless of Christian morals. In the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), Richelieu, as a Catholic clergyman, had no compunction about signing treaties with Protestant princes. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which ended the war, for the first time, presented the sovereign notion underpinning the modern international state system, namely *Cuius regio, eius religio* (lit. "whose realm, his religion") that is, whoever is in power determines his state's religion).

This was the start of a long process of several centuries in which the modern state came into being, which later became the nation-states—political units

UN Security Council, June 20, 2013. Photograph: Eskinder Debebe / UN, https://bit.ly/2EOhZVZ

expressing the interests of national groups living in a particular territory and sharing a common language, religion, and history. Nation-states utterly and finally did away with divine will and instead sanctified a secular, scientific, and technological rationale. The classical modern era of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was characterized by the fundamental assumption of a dichotomous struggle between order and disorder, good and evil, truth and lies. This binary view reflected modern society's desire to arrange its physical and social spheres in a stable, rational manner that would continually and naturally improve upon itself.[5] Order was an absolute value, overriding contexts of time, place, and framing (that is, how it was structured). The modern statesman no longer represented the divine; instead, he represented the members of his nation, the national interest, and the need to ensure their security. The use of force was a central component in ensuring the national security interest. Thus, national security became a modern ideological expression and an inseparable part of the international state system. The theoretician Hans Morgenthau explained the idea most cogently when he noted that "The national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of 'national security,' and national security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and of its institutions." Preserving national

security is often accomplished using modern tools, especially scientific and technological ones, which have become central to international power relations, as was the case in the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Modern thought imbued the concept of national security with military capabilities (as well as technological superiority) and their use against the enemy, whether as deterrence or in the use of force. In doing so, nation-states applied modern dichotomous logic—victory versus defeat, enemy versus ally, war versus peace—to structure and express national security as a single-value, absolute concept. The classical modern definition of national security (described above as "a nation's ability to defend its internal values against external threats") has repeatedly been challenged. Many theoreticians have considered the modern, single-value definition to be problematic and insufficient to describe such a complex concept. For example, as early as 1950 and concurrent with the publication of Morgenthau's important theoretical writings, Arnold Wolfers noted that using national security without specifying what it entails left much room for confusion, and different groups within societies and nations would interpret it differently, evaluate the threat differently, and as a result would use force differently.[6] Wolfers was concerned with the subjective understanding of states with regard to dangers, which embodied tangible threats, with which states must contend.[7]

During the 1980s, with the ascent of neoliberal economics, technological development, and the end of the Cold War in 1989, the sociopolitical situation began to shift in several ways which challenged the concept of national security far beyond what Wolfers had indicated. Sociologists depicted this process even better than their security counterparts.

National Security in Late Modernity

Since the late twentieth century, the interconnectedness between the global economy, immigration, and technology has created a new global era, which historian Yuval Noah Harari has defined as one of peace and prosperity that has never before been experienced.[8] This was the promise of the end of the Cold War, what Fukuyama had called "the end of history." But, despite the post-Cold War euphoria and as a result of the accelerating globalization processes, it was soon clear that the new era was no less perilous than the one that preceded it. Leading political sociologists, including Anthony

Giddens, Zygmunt Bauman, and Ulrich Beck, felt that, at the end of the twentieth century, modernity had begun to change at an accelerated pace, challenging the modern conceptions of security. These theoreticians claimed that, since the 1980s, we have been living in a "late modernity,"[9] characterized by a global neoliberal economy, increased immigration, and enhanced technological development. While these three features erode the modern state order and render individuals freer, they have also increased individuals' sense of vulnerability.

The Decline of the Nation-State and the Destabilization of the Social Order

In terms of regulating national security, the task of nation-states in the late modernity is more complex due to the weakening of the state structure in comparison to the rising power of corporations. This process has generated a gap between state capabilities and citizens' expectations. Zygmunt Bauman called late modernity a "liquid modernity."[10] He claimed that its central feature has been the withdrawing of the nation-state from citizens' lives, which has included the weakening and even collapse of state institutions (such as welfare, the economy, and the state's monopoly on the use of force). He therefore opted for the "liquid" metaphor, which stresses the temporary nature of institutions, ideas, and fashions, and the fact that their form is constantly changing, in order to adapt to the needs of the global system. He further noted that in the same period, the state has ceased to be the only and leading player on the international arena.[11] The global economic marketplace has encouraged the blurring of national borders and has used new technologies to nourish itself. In this situation, market forces have dictated the need for moving the workforce around the world, with immigration becoming a very common phenomenon. Moreover, this "liquid modernity" is noted for not having a single truth but rather several frequently-changing "truths" and parallel "narratives," because there is no single central authority (religious or state) to decree which is the right one.

Anthony Giddens described the systemic nature of the late modernity, asserting that the processes described above have eroded the social and national structure and have enabled individuals in society to accumulate more power.[12] The perception of figures of authority (teachers, doctors, judges, politicians, and military leaders) has changed and state institutions' authority

over citizens' lives is increasingly being questioned. Individuals are now positioned to take more responsibility on themselves. While this has made some feel more independent and free, the lack of stable, efficient state (or international) institutions—on which people used to base their expectations and hopes—has increased feelings of uncertainty. In other words, in the late modernity, people have become freer but also more anxious and more vulnerable—even lost.

Given these socioeconomic processes, which have eroded the previous political orders, nation-states remain the only institution meant to provide citizens with security. While this state of affairs is not imposed on the nation-states—which participate in the global economy as players—nation-states are no longer the leading players they once were. Thus, given the weakening of the nation-state, people now feel disappointed or even averse to its institutions. This sentiment has grown more pronounced because of the synergic manner in which the global economy developed; the erosion of the social system Giddens mentioned; the information revolution fueled by the rise of the internet; and people's ability to move more easily from one country to another.[13] Therefore, the destabilization of the international state system serves as the background to a deep, more profound and philosophical weakening of the idea that formed the basis for the concept of national security.

From Danger to Risk

Another significant difference between classical modernity and late modernity lays in the distinction that sociologist Ulrich Beck made between dangers and risks. According to Beck, while classical modernity deals with the eradication of **dangers**, which were tangible, and it was the function of national security (the responsibility of the nation-state) to respond to them, late modernity deals with **risks**, which are man-made. While the probability of risks is relatively lower, the ramifications of risks, such as terrorism, nuclear arms, and climate change, are extremely destructive.

In 1995, US President Bill Clinton described the challenges the United States was facing: "As the Cold War gives way to the global village, our leadership is needed more than ever because problems that start beyond our borders can quickly become problems within them. We're all vulnerable to the organized forces of intolerance and destruction, terrorism, ethnic, religious and regional rivalries, the spread of organized crime and weapons of mass

destruction and drug trafficking."[14] The threats Clinton enumerated were mostly risks and not dangers. Nation-states had to defend themselves against new threats but were doing so using old tools and ways of thinking. Nations continued to relate to national security from the perspective of classical modernity through the use of military force and diplomatic tools and the employment of industry, science, and technology. But the socioeconomic changes of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and the transition from dangers to risks challenged the order of the nation-states and turned the effort to attain "national security" into an almost paradoxical endeavor.

Beck felt that the late modernity was characterized by the existence of risks that could not be overcome by more knowledge but rather were the result of more knowledge.[15] He therefore defined the twenty-first century society as a "risk society." According to Beck, the existence of risks and their nature stem from the political, historical, and social contexts in which they are "socially created."[16] Indeed, the risks are a direct outcome of late-modern society's attempts to control the future by scientific means of quantitative and probability-based thinking.[17]

Bauman also spoke of the difference between danger and risk. He likened addressing dangers in classical modernity to a situation in which we know there is a bear in the woods and in order to avoid it—that is, the danger—we avoid the woods. Hypothetically, to confront the danger, we could go into the woods and hunt the bear down (**eradicate the danger**). But if we want to confront climate change or terrorism, the best we can do in the late modernity is to **manage the risk** by calculating probabilities. This example expresses the difference between classical modernity's approach to national security, which ensures citizens' security with military force based on science and technology, and the late-modern approach, according to which it is possible to manage risk using probability tools.

If we apply this theoretical rationale of the concept of national security in the Israeli case, we can see that, in the past, Israel had three fronts it was prepared to defend: the northern (Syria and Lebanon), the eastern (Iraq and Jordan), and the southern (Egypt). In every case, the fronts consisted of nation-states. All branches and extensions of the security establishment tried to assess the dangers posed by the military capabilities and political intentions of these nations. By contrast, these days, most campaigns that Israel conducts consist of confrontations with non-state terrorist organizations that

function both as militias and as political parties with civil agendas and with phenomena such as lone-wolf terrorism. The organizations and terrorists exploit the asymmetry between them and the nation-state's institutions (such as Israel's defense organizations, led by the Israel Defense Forces [IDF]) to their own benefit. These non-state actors operate from within civilian population and blur the differences between civilians and combatants and between war and peace.[18] Terrorist organizations succeed in undermining the binary modern state order (war-peace, friend-foe) in which the IDF operates, and they use these means to exhaust the Israeli military and tarnish its image. In addition, while these organizations operate in low-probability fields, they manage to generate constant anxiety. For Israeli citizens, the probability of getting caught in a terrorist attack is relatively low (especially in lone-wolf attacks), but the ramifications of such events can be devastating. Therefore, terrorist attacks may be examined as risks rather than dangers. In the Israeli context, this results in constant challenges posed by non-state adversaries to a nation-state, forcing it to confront them by military means and requiring it to produce "national security" vis-à-vis near esoteric phenomena (from homemade rockets to kitchen knives) with the capacity of undermining its citizens' sense of security.

Israel is not the only state forced to deal with terrorism, and the phenomenon is hardly unique to late modernity. Nonetheless, after the end of the Cold War, asymmetrical warfare and terrorism became fundamental risks for nation-states, as their difficulties to eradicate these risks limited their ability to provide their citizens with adequate sense of security. This obstacle destabilizes the very idea underpinning the way we define national security. This is the case not only with Israel's struggle against terrorism, but also with the national security of a superpower like the United States, which defends itself with a robust and costly missile system, yet took a crippling blow from an improbable act according to any risk benchmark, when terrorists transformed civilian airplanes into missiles aimed to destroy the symbols of the American global might.[19]

The national security narrative in the new, global, and liquid context has become paradoxical, because, despite the advances in science and technology, nation-states have been unable to provide their citizens with the security they expect. This is the "risk paradox" according to Beck, manifested by the fact that past experience encourages a risk forecast (calculated on the

basis of probabilities) of the wrong kind. We believe we can calculate the probability of this risk's appearance, reduce it, and control it, in contrast to a disaster that we know nothing about and are incapable of predicting. This has led to a situation in which societies have started to manage the unknown, to prevent what they cannot forecast. That is to say, the paradox here lies in the claim of the establishment's security mechanism that it can control something (a future risk) it cannot predict; in other words, it can prevent a risk whose existence is uncertain or whose probability is very low.[20] The conclusion is that the claim that national security can be attained through more data and more technology (namely, that it is possible to eradicate terrorism by attaining more information about its modus operandi) now might be paradoxical. This is the case as this process refers deals only with the symptoms of terrorism and not its construct as a **risk**. Therefore, the "modern promise" of national security in the present era is questionable. Furthermore, it is important to clarify that the inability to prepare for and defend against the threats of the future is hardly new (see the popular saying about generals always fighting the previous war), but still, the current state of affairs has left more people keenly frustrated with nation-states failing to overcome the challenge of insecurity.

The destabilization of the state system that Bauman and Giddens described is connected to Beck's assertions about the problematics of probability-based thinking, namely that we define the risk in the present as linked to the way we view the future, while the future is mostly an outcome of how we perceive the present.[21] This is a tautological, circular argument that characterizes society in late modernity. Sociologist Niklas Luhmann described it well: A constantly changing present is characterized as elusive and fluid, while the future is similarly problematic, because it is seen as an outcome of the present. This is how the ongoing uncertainty that characterized the post-Cold War era came into being and how it challenges the ways that we define national security. Risk management in a world in which the state order is being destabilized leads society to create increasingly more risks, because the institutions of the nation-state cannot provide a sufficient response while the anxiety about the risks increases as a result of the relatively rapid exchange of information, money, goods, services, and people.[22]

A Liquid Middle East: From the War on Terrorism to the Arab Spring

Two defining events that occurred in the last few decades in the Middle East illustrate the effect of late modernity: the first is the war on terrorism in the early part of the millennium and the second is the Arab upheaval that began at the end of 2010. The first was mostly managed as an episode of risk management and the second as a social struggle, an outcome of the erosion of both the state and social orders in the Middle East. These two case studies will demonstrate how such phenomena have destabilized and challenged the classical definition of national security.

The war on terrorism as a construct of risk management in late modernity

Donald Rumsfeld, the former US secretary of defense, once proposed that in national security, "there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know."[23]

Rumsfeld was speaking about the war on terrorism led by George W. Bush following 9/11. This is not coincidental. Global terrorism undermined the dichotomous certainty of security versus insecurity, exposing a broad spectrum of diverse risks. On September 11, 2001, citizens of the world saw on TV the vast, almost unfathomable destruction that al-Qaeda terrorists wrought in the very heart of the global village. These terrorists had neither state nor army; in fact, they barely fit the definition of an organization. In practice, they represented a loose network, whose leader, Osama Bin Laden, lived in caves in the Afghani desert, far from the developed world of the global era. Nonetheless, the network seemed to have had the economic means and sufficient access to technologies (electronic money transfers, the skill to fly planes), enabling it to reach anywhere in the world and to attack anyone at any time.

The rise of global terrorism was closely linked to large-scale processes that actually began as early as the 1960s with the proliferation of civilian air travel. Beginning at the end of the next decade, the war in Afghanistan (1979–1989) became the first arena of global jihad, drawing thousands of Muslim fighters from all over the world. This new phenomenon reverberated

in the Middle East and beyond for many years after the end of the Cold War in 1989. During the 1990s, Osama Bin Laden and his supporters, whose worldview emerged from the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, built terrorist infrastructures to challenge the West and the leaders of the Middle East. These developments culminated in 9/11 and the subsequent US war in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), two regions that became arenas of global jihad and attracted Muslim combatants from many countries. They made use of information technologies and freedom of movement, both developed in the global system, which allowed them to move data, people, and funds more quickly and easily than ever before. At the same time, worldwide communications networks broadcast the events over and over again, making these into live broadcast wars. This was the case in the Middle East, too, thanks to Al Jazeera, which was established in 1996 in Qatar and gained fame in 2004 when it broadcast messages from Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. Global processes closed the distance between the Middle East and the West and closely connected them with late modernity.

The mission of confronting terrorism became extremely challenging for Western nation-states. Similar to the Israeli case, Western states had to face terrorism, and not as a "solid" concrete risk. Despite that the probability of a terrorist attack is low, its modus operandi—commonly unpredictable— forces large populations to sense a constant anxiety, fearing that even if is not probable, its consequences might be dramatically severe. This led to the "one-percent doctrine" of the administration of George W. Bush, as described in the book by the journalist and Pulitzer Prize winner Ron Suskind.[24] The book is based on the statement made by former vice-president Dick Cheney who proposed that "even if there's just a one-percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al-Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response."[25]

Cheney and the Bush administration tried to restore the sense of security among the American people, but, in fact, as the war on terrorism dragged on and images of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq were broadcast, the sense that jihadist terrorism posed a real challenge to the ability of the superpower to impose order and eradicate the risks grew increasingly acute. A sequence of incidents undermined the belief of the residents of the global village that nation-states could protect them given the consequences of globalization. Many exhibited traits typical of people living with insecurity

and uncertainty, such as anxiety, opposition to immigration, and a tendency to xenophobia.[26] Bauman and Beck dedicate a great deal of their theory to suggesting that defensive measures against threats actually create a greater sense of civilian insecurity.[27] Thus, the very declaration of the war on terror, using military force to defend territories and state institutions—a message intended to restore the public's sense of security—failed to do so and even increased the fear from "the things we don't know that we don't know."

A liquid Middle East—between the Arab Spring and the "Islamist Winter"

Toward the end of the first decade of the new millennium, the Middle East experienced unprecedented upheavals—even more than terrorism had wrought—that further destabilized the order in the traditional states in the region. While globalization penetrated the Middle East somewhat differently than in the United States or Western Europe, there too the consequent far-reaching changes left their mark. As President Clinton said in 1995, global prosperity also had its dark socioeconomic sides, manifested by the fact that it did not redress the gaps between the rich and the poor—and rather widened it—in both nation-states and geographical spheres. Resources were always distributed unequally between the periphery and the center and now, as Beck noted, risks were also distributed unequally as the peace and prosperity of late modernity did not reach the national or the global periphery.[28]

Following the end of the Cold War, the jihadi victory in Afghanistan, and the proliferation of the mass media in the region, leaders of Arab states were challenged on several fronts. The "reality" and the social system that they had presented were seen by the people as false and hollow. Mass media and new communication technologies repeatedly exposed citizens in these nations to the might and wealth of the West on the one hand and the global jihadists' charismatic calls for purification on the other. Given the new circumstances of globalization and late modernity, these messages, which were not new (the Muslim Brotherhood was established in the early twentieth century as a response to the gap between the Arab Muslim world and the Western nations), eroded the legitimacy of the traditional Arab leaders. As Giddens explained,[29] the process of erosion of social systems led to citizens' empowerment and directly challenged the authority of the old elites.

In the Middle East, these developments peaked in early 2011 with the Arab Spring. The unrest, which began in Tunisia in December 2010, quickly spread from one country to the next, thanks to the media. In Egypt, urban liberals and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood both gathered in Tahrir Square to demonstrate, collaborating to topple the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. The two ideological camps, the liberals and the Islamists, who were eroding the basis of support of the (old) political elites, represented two trajectories of future development. This was the reason for some to point at the democratic potential inherent in these events, thus dubbing them the "Arab Spring." Others saw the potential of the rise of jihadist Islam and therefore referred to the events as the "Islamic Winter." A few years later, when the protests disintegrated both Libya and Syria, Iraq's al-Qaeda extension broke off from its parent organization to form the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This break-away radical group threatened to destroy the state structure and to rebuild it in its own cruel, violent vision. ISIS's use of up-to-date technology, including the internet, to recruit combatants and disseminate videos containing horrific acts of savagery brought it—quite intentionally—closer to the global village.

At this stage, the forecasts of the end of the nation-states in the Middle East proved false, with the exception of Libya. At the same time, the post-Arab Spring world is even less safe than before. The waves of Syrian and African refugees arriving on Italy and Greece's shores (with many drowning in their attempts to cross the Mediterranean) and elsewhere in Western Europe may have survived the journey but did not arrive to safe haven. They have not been greeted with open arms but rather have been viewed as a new risk that the West must face and manage, to aggravate the economic crises that began in 2008. In one of his last interviews, Bauman explained the fear Europeans have of immigrants: "The people who arrive now as refugees are not hungry people without bread and water. They were yesterday proud [...] very well educated [...] and now they are refugees." [30]

Bauman emphasized that the refugees have raised the anxiety that is already embedded in the uncertainty that we have felt during late modernity. And indeed, the immigrants have introduced "bad news," as he called it, to the European continent, as the war followed them there. Terrorists who had ridden the waves of immigration have carried out attacks, practically shredding the last vestige of Europe's sense of security. The liquid Middle

East, where the state order has been shattered and normal, modern people have been turned into refugees likely to perish at sea, has clashed with fearful Europe that lives with a sense of constant risk and looks for ways to restore its sense of safety and order. This clash has been magnified many times by the international media coverage and the internet. These communication channels have provided a tremendous amount of information about the risks without any guidance that would mediate, contextualize, and explain the information. Consequently, they increased the sense of insecurity and continue to challenge the concept of national security.

Conclusions

The world in which we live is undergoing fundamental changes of global scope due to the transition from classical modernity to late modernity. This process requires a new definition of structures and ideas, including the concept of national security. As this article shows, without updating the definition and idea of national security, it will be difficult to continue to use this concept in the current era. The previous definition of national security as a nation's capacity to defend its domestic values against concrete external threats—that is, dangers—has lost much of its validity due to the growing number of risks, which are not concrete and are difficult to predict, and given the social, economic, and political changes that have already eroded the state order. This does not mean that military and security organizations cannot confront security threats; however, it does mean that the destabilization of the modern state system, in whose context national security was first defined, and the transition from eradicating danger to managing risk impede their ability to provide their citizens a deeper sense of security.

The continued use of the concept of national security in the emerging context without any conceptual reformulation, as was the case when the administration of George W. Bush entered the war on terrorism and when the upheavals began in the Middle East, exposes the concept's paradoxical and anachronistic nature. This, too, threatens the global state order that we have known and increasingly challenges the hegemony of liberal democracies, as it developed since the end of the Cold War. It is necessary to redefine national security so that nation-states can continue to provide a sense of security to their citizens. The liquid and paradoxical nature of risk calculation in predicting the future must be taken into account when addressing issues

of national security and the contemporary use of this concept must match the sociopolitical conditions that have formed around the world over the last few decades.

Notes

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The New Security: Trends in the Study of Security in International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era

Yaron Schneider

The study of security aspects in the discipline of international relations has grown immensely since the beginning of the development of this academic field, and especially following the end of the Cold War. This article examines the factors that led to its expansion since the 1990s. The key assertion is that with the culmination of the Cold War, the rapid changes within the international arena provided scholars of international relations with new raw material and with research questions that undermined the realist approach, which had dominated this field of study.

Given the emergence of security challenges within countries, especially ethnic strife and civil wars, which have often led to international humanitarian intervention to stop the bloodshed or outright genocide, and the appearance of terrorist threats and attacks by global terrorist organizations (such as al-Qaeda), researchers are now focusing on the activities of non-state players both in relation to individual countries and in the global arena, which previously were overlooked in the security literature.

Therefore, scholars of international relations now have more theories, as well as conceptual terms and analytical tools, to study security within the discipline of international relations than they had before the end of the Cold War. The greater depth and breadth of security studies was not the result of a scientific revolution or radical transformation in common research methods but rather was due to a lengthy process of exchanges

among different approaches to the study of international relations, emphasizing critique and debate between the realist approach and competing methodologies.

Keywords: Realist approach, liberal approach, constructivist approach, globalization, non-state players, Cold War

Introduction

Many of the security studies within the academic field of international relations originated with the Cold War (1945–1991). These studies generally concentrated rather naturally on the most relevant security issues of their time: patterns of enmity, competition, and tensions between the two superpower of the time, the United States and the Soviet Union; the superpowers' relations with their allies; international organizations and institutions through which the countries advanced their security objectives; the nuclear arms race and its implications for the international system, including security regimes and treaties to limit armament or disarm nations.

At the theoretical level, these studies were influenced predominantly by the realist approach, which focused on the ramifications of anarchy in the international system on state conduct and phenomena linked to the division of power among them, such as arms races and defense treaties. Furthermore, during the Cold War, the theoretical arguments between realism and competing approaches—liberalism and Marxism—focused on the characteristics and modus operandi of states: the differences in their military and economic capabilities, regime types, decision-making processes of the leaders, all of which were examined in great detail and provided the bulk of the raw data for security studies in the discipline of international relations. In contrast, non-state players, such as non-governmental organizations operating at the sub-state and/or global levels and terrorist organizations, remained marginal to the debate in the field of security theory.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, new studies have broadened the scope and debate in studying the security aspects in the field of international relations. Three major trends reflected this development: first, increased reference to a range of non-state players as an inseparable part of security phenomena and challenges in recent decades; second, a more profound approach to security problems emerging within states at the regional and

global levels and not just between the superpowers in the international system; and, third, the definition of security as a multidimensional concept that relates not only to security's physical, military, and economic contexts but also to its ideological or cognitive dimensions, such as stability and continuity of identity components creating a sense of belonging to a group or state. The new analytical dimensions also differentiate between group security and individual security; that is, not violating individual universal rights or limiting individual freedom (as a result of either political or economic oppression).[1] These issues, which were also included in the category of security in the field of international relations toward the end of the twentieth century, are offshoots of liberal theories and theories applied from other research fields, such as constructivism in sociology.[2]

The purpose of this article is to examine the processes that led to the diversifying of security studies in the field of international relations after the end of the Cold War. The main assertion here is that for researchers who experienced the transition to the new era, security developments that characterized the post-Cold War era—domestic conflicts, civil wars, and international terrorist attacks—necessitated a changing focus in security studies. This shift led to growing criticism of the existing theories as they did not offer compelling explanations of contemporary phenomena. At the same time, international relations scholars were busy developing new research directions and delving deeper into research directions that previously had been marginal to the security discourse. In other words, the changing spirit of the times and the security phenomena that emerged following the Cold War diversified the research within international relations leading scholars to rethink the research methods and theories being applied to security problems. These changes also prompted historians to present new explanations for security phenomena of the past, partly by examining the influence of non-state players. Therefore, security studies as a branch of the field of international relations expanded greatly. Moreover, although relevant research topics had previously been incorporated into the field before and during the Cold War, they had been marginalized because of the prevailing realist approach.

Security Studies Until the End of the Cold War: Realism and its Competitors

Ever since international relations became an academic discipline in the mid twentieth century, it has been host to critical debate among several schools of thought or perspectives.[3] Notably, international relations is not only a branch of political science focusing on politics at the international level but also an eclectic field that has embraced many theoretical foundations and research methods from virtually all the social sciences and humanities disciplines (especially economics, sociology, psychology, history, and cultural studies). In an article published in 1981, Robert Cox claimed that the division of international relations according to separate units, such as the realist focus on the state, was rooted in convenience. According to Cox, the field of international relations touches upon human society in all its constellations, and not only states or nations.[4] Similarly, after the Cold War, international relations scholars criticized the certitude of the realist approach, which professed to determine, inter alia, what belonged to security studies and what did not.

The end of the Cold War and its far-reaching ramifications for international politics was an important milestone in the development of international relations. It intensified the essential debate about the rigid assumptions of realism, which till then had been the dominant approach, especially among international relations researchers who focused on security. When attempting to explain phenomena of war, strategy, or conflict management diplomacy, the realist approach focused on relations between superpowers and states as the framework for analyzing the dynamics in international relations. This approach assumed that states were not only the central players in international relations but also were expected to behave similarly based on the distribution of power among them, especially military power. According to the realist approach, this was due to the anarchy within the international system. In these conditions, states strive to improve their security and survivability by increasing their internal military power or by joining stronger nations or superpowers through military treaties or pacts. This approach avers that, to explain the security phenomena within the international system, it is first necessary to focus on the states holding the most power, i.e., the superpowers.[5]

Realism theories provided condensed explanations for a range of phenomena that occurred in the twentieth century and earlier, from the wars among the

European powers, through two world wars, to the Cold War, which began with the formation of two blocs of states allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. According to the assumptions of the realist theories, the Cold War was characterized by stability between the two superpowers, which sought to avoid direct conflict, even despite great tensions between them, the nuclear arms race, and their military involvement in regions where each wanted to increase their influence at the expense of the other (such as the US involvement in the war in Vietnam and the Soviet involvement in the war in Afghanistan).

As a result of the conduct of the United States and the Soviet Union, researchers published about the conditions for achieving deterrence or a nuclear "balance of terror" between the two as the basis for international security stability. A conspicuous example was the literature on MAD (mutually assured destruction), a form of deterrence resulting from both powers' nuclear ability to cause the other catastrophic damage. Therefore, the core of the security agenda during the Cold War consisted of attempts to maintain a balance between the superpowers or to curb them, as each strove to preserve its relative might and expand the bloc it was leading by "signing up" new member states. During this period, the superpowers, and the rival blocs in particular, were focused on mutual threats to security. The superpowers were only secondarily involved in security problems and in regional wars, such as those between Israel and the Arab nations. However, this involvement was clearly related to the Cold War itself; that is, the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union over regions of influence led them to involvement in regional conflicts.

Therefore, it is not surprising that between the end of World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union/end of the Cold War in 1991, the realist approach dominated security studies in the discipline of international relations, as this approach mirrored the security problems that were seen as most central and pressing from the perspective of the superpowers. It is noteworthy that competing theories and approaches during this period also focused on the conduct and interactions of states, although they refuted the realist approach's assumptions about the ramifications of anarchy.

The debate between the liberalist-establishment approach and the realist one focused the ramifications of anarchy for international security. Unlike the realist approach, competing approaches assumed it was possible to

reduce the tendency for conflict and increase cooperation among nations vis-à-vis international institutions and democratic regimes.[6] The English school, for example, distinguished between the "state system" and the "state society" to emphasize the common interests that encourage international cooperation, thereby mitigating anarchy's ramifications on the tendency toward war.[7] By contrast, the liberal-establishment approach championed the importance of international institutions and organizations as bonds that serve as intermediaries between states and increase cooperation among them.

In hindsight, realism's assumptions clearly reflected the international situation in those years whenever competitive patterns, arms races, and the establishment of opposing alliances between the superpowers came into play. In fact, the United States and the Soviet Union attempted, each according to its ability, to boost their power and improve their military capabilities—especially with regard to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons—to maintain the "balance of terror." This empirically validated the realist rationale regarding similar behavior of states in the international system (even when the ideologies of their leaders were different) due to the conditions of anarchy.

Indeed, researchers applying the realist approach answered their critics by saying that realist theories and assumptions best explained the security issues that were most relevant to understanding reality; therefore, competing approaches, based on the assessment that it was possible to mitigate anarchy's ramifications and incentivize cooperation among nations (e.g., through international institutions), either missed the point in their analysis of reality or focused on dimensions that did not have any impact on states' behavior in the realm of security (e.g., the liberal approach, which explains how the nature of a state's internal regime affects the conduct of other nations in the international arena).

Moreover, realist researchers intentionally avoided studying the activities of non-state players that destabilize international security (such as terrorist organizations, separatist movements, and transnational criminal organizations),[8] claiming that their impact on international security was minimal compared to that of the superpowers. According to such researchers, even international organizations did not have any significant influence on security, because they were merely an apparatus or arena by which the superpowers could advance their goals, such as for creating international coalitions; otherwise,

the superpowers would not support these organizations and they would collapse.[9]

New Research Directions after the Cold War: Manifestations and Meanings

The major change that occurred in the theories of international relations after the Cold War was an openness to new directions of thinking, which led to diversity in the research on security, in addition to engaging in state issues, with clear connection to the superpowers' military and economic might, as well as the wide range of issues on the international agenda.

The end of the Cold War posed a challenge to scholars of international relations. The mainstream of security theories and studies in the field until then had focused on analyzing the power relations between the superpowers, international institutions, and international security regimes and did not provide tools for analyzing the internal collapse of the Communist bloc and the revolutions and regime changes that occurred in quick succession in the states constituting that bloc.

Ethnic conflict was another issue that only gained researchers' interest in the years following the Cold War, with the ethnic strife that broke out in Eastern Europe and Africa in the 1990s. Thus, many problems and players—previously having been sidelined as relations between the superpowers and their military alliances had occupied center stage of the security studies and shaped the theories in the field—now appeared on the international agenda. In contrast, security issues in weak nations (such as the African states) did not gain attention in the international political arena nor in the Cold War-era security discourse and therefore also were not the focus of security studies. The rapidly changing international reality of the early 1990s provided scholars of international relations with new raw materials and research questions, which probed the established way of thinking about security in the international system. The critique of the realist approach on the one hand and the frequent changes in the nature of international security problems on the other led to range of research directions.

Scholars of international relations particularly wanted to focus more expressly on conflicts in the post-Cold War era: ethnic strife, international humanitarian intervention in zones of conflict and genocide, and the ascent of global terrorist organizations (such as al-Qaeda). In doing so, researchers

focused on the players that previously had not appeared in the literature about security: players operating within states (and conducting relations of cooperation or conflict among them), supranational players, and ideological dimensions of international relations that could explain the creation or emergence of political conflicts or resolutions. In relating to these aspects, scholars formulated new theories, having been inspired by the social science disciplines—such as sociology and anthropology—that have a clear thematic connection to international relations. In the 1990s, those disciplines influenced the development of the constructivist approach to the study of international relations. This approach stresses the role of social processes of structuring, such as the assimilation of common beliefs and concepts through social interactions among players, as background to prominent phenomena in international security, including conflicts and peace processes.[10]

These developments enriched both the professional literature dealing precisely with the non-state components of international relations—including the study of nationalism—and the debate over the impact of ideas and identities on international politics and especially personal security. In the post-Cold War years, the literature that addressed the effects of norms and identities on the division into areas of conflict and peace expanded greatly. Another notable research direction at that time was the focus on regional spheres where unique security phenomena took place, the connections between states' domestic security problems and their involvement in international conflicts, and security problems (such as cyberattacks) that gained momentum as a result of processes of globalization. With the rise of new terrorist and cyber threats, research in the current century has expanded into the fields of cyberspace, the global spread of terrorist organizations and international criminal gangs, and many other global security phenomena, where states may have some influence; but in most cases they are not the entities generating these phenomena, and certainly they are not the only players on the field.[11]

In this sense, the thinking that characterized the Cold War—that states and superpowers constituted the main focus for research on security issues in the field of international relations—was fundamentally transformed by including other players and phenomena in the debate. As a result, the analysis also became more diverse. The most conspicuous result was the transition away from focusing on one central arena ("the international arena"), which had a limited number of relevant players and variables, to a multidimensional

analysis of "international security," relating to a number of overlapping, interdependent arenas of analysis: security at the state or domestic level as well as within the regional and global arenas. Thus, scholars in the field are attempting to renew research methods and focal points in order to explain with greater efficiency the dynamics and changes that have occurred in the security field in the post-Cold War era.

The Development of Security Studies in the Formation of International Relations as a Research Discipline

Although the events at the end of the Cold War created the impetus to move in new research directions, the expansion of security studies within the discipline of international relations represented a long-standing process of crystallizing international relations as a research discipline based on debate between diverse schools of thought and approaches in the social sciences. For example, some approaches focused on environmental influences (or the international system) on player conduct versus approaches that emphasized the ramifications of the nature of regimes, ideas, and corporate processes on players in international relations.

The emergence of new branches of research in security studies maximized the potential that had been inherent in the field of international relations since the beginning. In the context of security, however, this potential could not be realized as long as the realist approach dominated the field and set the tone as it focused excessively on states and the power relations between them and ignored non-state components of international relations. By focusing on security phenomena that was not caused directly by states, scholars of international relations expanded its study, inter alia, by examining the connection between security problems typical of the post-Cold War era and the globalization phenomena.[12] In the post-Cold War reality, criticism of the realist approach and its determinism regarding the distribution of power among states and its influence on their patterns of conduct became much more valid than before. As international security problems transitioned from the inter-superpower level to the regional and even intra-state levels (with emphasis on weak states, which became the focus of security problems in the new era), it became clear that the research direction needed to be shifted.

Therefore, the new era posed a challenge to realist thought and led scholars of international relations to reexamine theories of security aspects and

formulate new security studies, informed by diverse theoretical perspectives that helped analyze a dynamic reality. Consequent to these processes, the predominance of realism in international relations started to wane in the 1990s and diverse research became a striking feature of security studies. New theories and research directions enriched the discourse among the schools of thought and the multiplicity of explanations for phenomena on the international security agenda. Among these were studies of global terrorist organizations, whose ascent became a concrete threat to security after 9/11.

At present, the realist approach no longer has the capacity to strongly determine or influence the issues that are at the core of security studies. In contrast, more studies are applying the liberal approach to understand the function of international institutions in confronting the current security challenges, especially state and non-state player relations, international intervention in local or regional conflicts, and so forth. Concurrently, security studies are also increasingly influenced by sociological analysis, such as comparing the international arena to human society, which is subject to processes of collective consciousness and identity formation, affected by ideas transmitted via social interactions among players. In the security context, constructivist studies (that is, studies taking a sociological approach) have emphasized the impact of ideologies and norms on the emergence of international conflicts and possibly more so on efforts of conflict resolution. In particular, studies acknowledge the norms of sovereignty, international borders, and non-intervention, which assist the international community in creating shared expectations, finding consensual solutions to security problems, encouraging cooperation, and preventing the outbreak of violent conflict.[13]

Research Topics in Security Studies in the Current Century

States as well as state-run international institutions and organizations, especially powers that can affect their establishment and functioning by economic or military measures, are still major subjects of security studies. New studies in the field, however, increasingly refer to a range of security issues that touch the state only indirectly, and instead emphasize the actions of non-state players, whether these are non-governmental organizations or violent non-state players at the sub-state or international levels.

Since the 1990s, these studies have attempted to clarify the current security challenges by incorporating diverse non-state players into the

theoretical framework of their analysis. As a result, they no longer focus on the analytical components of the state but rather examine players operating at the societal level—which previously had received less attention—and players operating globally beyond the limits of enforcement and control by states or international organizations.

As part of this trends, studies focused on non-state players with unique influence on international security, such as networks, have emerged. Unlike international organizations, the networks may be decentralized and lack a hierarchy of functions. The number of players (active or potential) in a network and its number of connections (to transmit necessary information to promote the common goal) increase its effectiveness.[14] Some networks operate within the borders of a single state, while others cross international borders (and are therefore described as supranational). This is significant in terms of how states deal with the security challenges posed by networks: Some networks cooperate with the states, even helping them combat phenomena that undermine their security, while other networks exploit state weaknesses and technology to undermine their sovereignty, thereby posing as security challenges (such as by smuggling and other phenomena). This category of non-state players includes criminal and terrorist networks but also include networks of human rights activists intent on advancing ideologies, norms, or ideas about security in the international sphere or within states (such as condemning regimes responsible for war crimes).

Another expanding research trend is the study of security cooperation between states and non-state entities. Within this context, security governance, referring to cooperation between states/international organizations and private players that are not part of any state institutions but are able to help improve the security situation within the state, as well as regionally and globally, is a prominent subject of research. These private players include militias participating in the reconstruction of states following the end of ethnic strife or civil war (for example, the attempts to reestablish the Libyan state after the revolution in 2011 through the cooperative efforts of several local military organizations). These players also include private security and cyber companies to which states are turning instead of their own armies for localized solutions to security challenges, such as fighting terrorism. The expansion of the phenomenon of security governance in recent years reflects the decentralized approach of international security cooperation: a

transition from security regimes or other settings coordinated by states to more complex structures of security cooperation in which non-state players are granted state authority.[15]

One must not forget that historians of international relations increasingly are paying attention to the role of non-state players in international security. Some historical studies on international relations in the twentieth century (including the Cold War era) published in recent decades have reexamined the effect of non-state players on central historical events. A notable example is the work by US historian Jeremi Suri, who looked at how the global social protests starting in the 1960s affected the détente between the superpowers and their blocs.[16] Suri studied the social protests of internal groups, specifically student demonstrations and other protest activities, both in Western democracies and in Communist states. He determined that the détente between the superpowers toward the end of the Cold War, which led, inter alia, to slowing down the nuclear arms race (the NPT, SALT, and START), was the response of the superpowers' leaders in the two blocs to internal pressure, namely the social protests against the economic and foreign policy of the Cold War. The protests, which spread around the world, were mostly led by young people, mainly students, and not so much by leaders of political movements.

Suri's research displays a unique perspective on Cold War events. Instead of focusing on the material and technological aspects of the arms race or the superpowers' competition in general, Suri concentrates on the fabric of the relationship between leader and society in each of the states taking part in the arms race and the ramifications of these relationships on international security. In this sense, Suri shifted the analysis of international security events from the level of relations between the superpowers or their leader, as was the case in previous studies of the topic, to the internal and cross-national levels, in relating to the social protest as a phenomenon that gathered momentum mainly in the West in the 1960s.

The most interesting conclusion of Suri's study is that internal political pressures brought to bear on the leaders of the superpowers as the protest movements and demonstrations prompted them to reverse relations between the two blocs before the end of the Cold War (reducing the scope military competition, especially the arms race). Suri's analysis further demonstrated that the power relations and capabilities gap between the superpowers during

those years did not provide a reasonable explanation for the détente. In other words, in the preceding period, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union faced an economic problem or military/technological challenge significant enough to have impeded the arms race. Therefore, the military data of the 1960s did not contain any explanation for the diplomatic reversal. Furthermore, the foreign policy of the two blocs before the détente also did not hint at any moderation or willingness to make any concessions in their competition and rivalry. According to Suri, the logical explanation for the détente then is to be found in the internal interactions between domestic pressure groups and the leaders in each of the states in the blocs. The public experienced economic difficulties because of the tremendous financial investments in the arms race, resulting in protests by populations that had lost their trust in their leaders' policies. This had far-reaching ramifications on the bilateral relations of the superpowers and the patterns of confrontation between them.

A Multidimensional Definition of the Concept of Security

Following the Cold War, the debate over different aspects of security led to new multidimensional definitions of the concept within the field of international relations. Prominent were economic security (or socioeconomic security), relating to a person or social group's economic status; ecological security, relating to the quality of the environment, and ontological security, addressing the stability and continuity of the components of one's identity that create a sense of belonging to a group or nation. This last category is based on a conceptual dimension related to a person, group, or nation (unlike physical dimensions, such as military might, which were the focus of the realist research). As the scholar David Baldwin has pointed out, the multidimensional nature of security is not a new revelation, nor is referring to different analytical strata (the state, the society, the community, the individual, and so forth). The various aspects of security in international relations did not suddenly emerge after the Cold War; rather, changes in international circumstances, especially the security problems of this time, left an imprint also on the discourse of security studies within the field of international relations, and this preoccupation with non-military security matters was characteristic of the post-Cold War era.[17]

Conclusion

Scholars of international relations currently have more theories and analytical tools for researching the various aspects of security than they did before the end of the Cold War. The field was enriched by an extended process mainly of dialogue between different approaches to the study of international relations, which was critical of realism and emphasized its debate with competing approaches in the field. Given the security developments that occurred following the Cold War, the ongoing critical examination of existing theories made it possible to expand the study of security within the field of international relations. Thus, as an academic discipline, international relations responded to changes in reality and avoided becoming immaterial. This also made the field more relevant for political leaders confronting the complexity of security issues in the new era.

In a period in which non-state players have become the major challenge to international security, they cannot be avoided when formulating a theory to explain reality as accurately as possible. Also, the developing of research methods specific to security phenome, such as comparing phenomena in separate regions, may improve the proficiency of current theories in providing explanations and the ability of scholars to identify unique security phenomena.

One also cannot ignore, however, the dominant influence of the large powers on international security even after the Cold War. In the Middle East, for example, we have witnessed a return to some of the patterns of competition for regional influence between the United States and Russia, leading to hypotheses about the renewal of the Cold War in the present era. Therefore, security studies within the field of international relations should not overlook the dynamic between the large powers in responding to security incidents and threats throughout the world, which consequently are liable to lead to confrontations and crises.

Moreover, states in general are, to a certain extent, still involved in conflicts within and beyond their borders, and they continue to intervene militarily in conflict zones by establishing international coalitions in the war against terror as well as other attempts to make their mark on international security. In addition, the large powers remain highly influential when it comes to the international security agenda. Therefore, the study of security within the field of international relations, which in the past focused on states and their interactions, now deals with a greater range of players and phenomena

within and between the states as well as in the global sphere. New security studies emphasize the interactions between states and non-state players, which have become key security challenges (such as the terrorist threats by the Islamic State) in parts of the world. These developments enrich the field of international relations. rendering it a dynamic research discipline subject to periodic criticism and new thinking. Furthermore, the new theories and definitions that have been added to the study of security are a clear demonstration of its complexity in the modern era.

Notes

1 Pinar Bilgin, "International and Societal Dimensions of Security," *International Studies Review* 5, no. 2 (2003): 209.
2 The constructivist approach places the conceptual dimension at the center of the analysis of phenomena in international relations: the sharing of ideas and social interactions (or social building processes) among players, including states, inspired by those ideas.
3 Piki Ish-Shalom, "The Study of International Relations: A Discipline on a Journey to Self-Awareness and Paradigmatic Pluralism," *Politika* 7 (2001): 105 (in Hebrew).
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Egypt's Challenge of Stateness After the Arab Spring

Khader Sawaed

The revolution of January 25, 2011 in Egypt, which constituted one of the many upheavals of the Arab Spring, resulted in a regime change but also challenged Egypt's stateness; that is, the state's monopoly on the use of force, the administrative effectiveness of its bureaucracy, and civil consensus in defining both its collective and state identity. This challenge led to another regime change in the summer of 2013 and the restoration of an authoritarian regime after a year of trying to transition to democracy, dealing Egypt's stateness yet another blow. Egypt's challenge of stateness has affected it economically, socially, and politically, and it has had ramifications for both internal and regional stability and security as well as for Israel's strategic interests.

Keywords: Egypt, Arab Spring, stateness, the monopoly on the use of force, administrative effectiveness, citizenship agreement, stability, regime change

Introduction

The events of the Arab Spring, especially the removal from power of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, brought hope to the masses in the Arab world as well as to academics, leaders, and communities all over the globe for a great wave of democratization. Many were convinced that the citizens of the Arab states would soon be liberated from the yoke of authoritarian rulers and regimes that had controlled and oppressed them (and most continue to do so) since these states had gained independence.

Al-Tahrir Square, April 8, 2011. Photograph by Jonathan Rashad / Flickr, CC by 3.0., https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=14896354

But, within a short period of time, the expectations for democracy, which would, in turn, lead to progress as well as social and economic welfare, were dashed.[1]

The Arab Spring magnified one of the most conspicuous problems in the Arab world since the Arab nations won independence from the colonial powers after World War II: the problem of stateness.[2] *Stateness* refers to "the state's capacity to impose law and order within its territory, to construct and implement policies, and to claim legitimacy as a political unit."[3]

The prominence and impact of the problem of stateness in the Arab world are evident in many ways. Among the states that experienced the Arab Spring, only Tunisia has become a stable state with democratic characteristics, and it is now facing more than a few challenges in its endeavor to become an established, stable democracy.[4] The other states have deteriorated to various degrees of state weakness and failure. Egypt, which underwent regime change and began a process of democratization, found itself internally divided; this led to a military coup in July 2013 and a return to authoritarian rule. Libya and Yemen have collapsed into civil war, leading to their dissolution, while their previous strongmen—Muammar Gaddafi and Ali Abdullah Salah—have

been executed by their opponents. Syria, too, has been riven by a bloody civil war, leading to the greatest humanitarian disaster of the twenty-first century. President Bashar Assad has survived only in part to external intervention (especially Russian, but also Iranian), although he lost sovereignty over large parts of Syrian territory to various rebel groups—armed, non-state players.

Egypt—the largest of the Arab nations sharing a border with Israel—had been the leader of the Arab world and its most powerful nation until the Arab Spring. It was considered a strong, stable state with a cohesive and coherent identity and a very high level of stateness. Fouad Ajami once described Egypt as a state with a central authority, a uniform population, and an independent nationality.[5] This is no longer true. The claim at the core of this article is that the stateness challenge, which skirted Egypt for many decades, finally emerged; it stopped the transition toward a democratic regime and resulted in a return to authoritarianism, undermining Egypt's political stability and social coherence, and damaging Egypt's status in the regional system. This article deals with the changes in Egypt's stateness, their ramifications for Egypt's national security and political stability as well as the regional ramifications of these changes, some of which also affect Israel and its national security.

To understand the Egyptian stateness challenge, the first part of this article presents the theoretical framework of the concept, the phenomenon of stateness and its three aspects, and Egypt's stateness before the 2011 revolution. The second part of the article provides an analysis of the changes in all three aspects of Egypt's stateness, their ramifications on Egypt's stability and its national security, and the strategical regional ramifications. The conclusion offers a response to the changes of stateness and their ramifications while relating to the strategic interests of the State of Israel.

Stateness: A Conceptual Framework

While the idea of the state is ancient and the notion of the modern state, the nation-state, and the concept of sovereignty developed in the seventeenth century (the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648), the concept of "stateness" was introduced by John P. Nettl only at the end of the 1960s.[6] The concept was meant to make it easier to assess the extent of the existence of the modern state, and enabling a comparative political analysis of states. After a slow

start, the stateness concept became extremely influential, and today it is considered the most notable concept in state-centered empirical studies.

For about four decades, research that focused on stateness concentrated on three aspects. Most scholars use at least one of these as their foundation for defining the concept and the phenomenon. The oldest of the three aspects directly relates to the Weberian approach of the state phenomenon; that is, the monopoly on the use of force. The second aspect also relates to Weber's conceptualization, especially of the state's establishmentarian, bureaucratic aspect, reflecting its administrative effectiveness, also known as bureaucratic effectiveness. The third and last aspect in the theoretical development of stateness is that of citizenship agreement.[7]

This article uses a definition that relies on all three aspects of the concept; that is, stateness is the ability of a state to impose law and order on its territory in order to conceive and implement policy and claim legitimacy as a political unit.[8] This definition, which incorporates essential and cultural aspects, is congruent with much of the literature's conceptualization that includes all three aspects. The significance of stateness is that the state, within its territory, can enforce the laws that it passed regardless of the nature of the regime or the content of that law (liberal or otherwise). Moreover, stateness specifically refers to a state's internal dimensions rather than to its external (or legal) dimensions and to its sovereignty, which focuses respectively on the understanding of the concept of "the state" within international law and the official recognition of a state's sovereignty by other states.[9] The monopoly on the use of force is considered the most fundamental component of the definition of the state and the cornerstone of stateness. It is defined as the state's de facto ability in practice to use physical force to make people comply.[10] Administrative effectiveness means the existence of a bureaucracy that functions efficiently according to the government, has the ability to execute the policy that the government articulates, generates the trust of the citizens, and provides the state with an image of legitimacy. Administrative effectiveness is the capacity of a bureaucracy to construct and implement public service policies and regulations throughout the state's territory.[11] The literature distinguishes between effective and autonomous bureaucracy. According to Fukuyama, a fully autonomous bureaucracy has a negative effect on administrative effectiveness because it is disconnected from the state and not under the state's political control.[12] By contrast, an

effective bureaucracy implements government policy accurately and quickly and is more loyal to the government than it is autonomous.[13] Fundamentally, administrative effectiveness "hinges on the professional competence of the bureaucrats, ensured by meritocratic recruitment procedures."[14]

Citizenship agreement is "the absence of profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community's state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state . . . It is thus a minimalist condition that entails that the people within the territory accept the supremacy of the state and communion with fellow citizens."[15] If the citizens are divided over who constitutes a citizen, then by virtue they are also divided over the definition of the state's borders, and thus, the state's identity is less pronounced or coherent and/or the state is socially weaker.[16] According to Benjamin Miller, congruence between the state's identity and the national identity of the majority group (coherent identity)—what he calls a high "state-to-nation balance"—is a key factor in both domestic and regional stability and peace, because the state is not threatened by different nations or ethnic groups within that state who seek independence or see themselves as belonging to a neighboring state. A state that has a high congruence between its national and territorial identities (a high state-to-nation balance) is stable to begin with. Moreover, it is even more stable if its borders are not disputed, its governing institutions are stable, and it retains its monopoly on the use of force.[17]

According to the literature, stateness refers to the basic means of authority and social control in a state—the factors underlying the most successful attempts to stabilize political regimes. A low level of stateness means that the state is unable to maintain control and stability, whether because of domestic reasons (e.g., loss of monopoly on the use of force and/or lack of citizenship agreement, either which is liable to lead to civil war) or because of external reasons (e.g., external intervention, invasion of foreign forces, war, occupation). This is closely related to concepts prevalent in political science and international relations: state failure, failing state, failed state, weak state, and fragile state. A low level of state functioning renders a weak state. A more serious situation—the lack of a functioning state system—usually leads to a failed state, which means a low level of state functioning, the lack of a strong central government (if it has a central government to begin with), the irrelevance of governing institutions, a poorly functioning economy,

a divided society, and anarchy due to the collapse of the mechanisms for enforcing law and order.[18]

Thus, stateness is a necessary pre-condition for the existence and stability of any state and political regime.[19] The international system in the post-World War II era was notable for the multiplicity of the territorial nation-states; this phenomenon helped raise the level of stateness in those states and assisted in creating internal and regional political stability in large parts of the world. The concepts of nationality and territorial nation-states were developed in Western Europe from the seventeenth century onward and were linked to central ideas, trends, and developments in European history, such as sovereignty, modernization, and secularization. These ideas then spread to the rest of the world, leading to parallel developments to those that occurred in Europe.[20] In the Middle East, Egypt was one of the only states in the region where these ideas were cultivated in a similar manner.[21]

Egypt's Stateness until the 2011 Revolution

State-building in most of the Arab region generally served as a response to domestic and external challenges to the very idea of the state's existence, due to a lack of correlation between the power structure and the social structure following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the division of the spoils among the victorious great powers—Great Britain and France—on the basis of the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916). The treaty organized the Middle East differently from the order that had prevailed for the preceding four hundred years.[22]

Following Sykes-Picot, most Arab states suffered from having a weak national identity. The modern state and national ideas were new to the tribal Arab societies and totally alien to their way of thinking. The peoples within Arab society, having lived together for so long, were unified around a shared culture, folklore, customs, or religion and not around a common national history. They also lacked experience in running state and state institutions. Moreover, those tribes and ethnic groups, who, without being asked, were suddenly subjects of newly established states were not convinced of the justifications for establishing nation-states.[23] This meant that loyalty to the state and identification with it were not a given. In this sense, Egypt was the outlier among the Arab states: It had a long history of a separate existence,

defined borders, a central and consensual capital city, and already had a tradition of compliance with a ruling central government.[24]

Following its defeat in the Six-Day War (June 1967), Egypt abandoned Pan-Arabism, which had called for the political, social, and economic unity of the Arab peoples and states in the Middle East.[25] Instead, President Anwar Sadat adopted an "Egypt first" policy, which gave precedence to an Egyptian national identity and Egyptian interests over any other,[26] a policy later continued by Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian population's basic loyalty to the state indeed is much greater than that in any other Arab country. In the Arab world, Egypt is unusual for its thousands of years of independent existence—to varying degrees—within defined borders, with a homogeneous population consisting of a strong Sunni Muslim majority and a Coptic minority of only 10 percent, and with very few ethnic or national reservations about the state's fundamental national identity.[27]

According to Miller[28] and other scholars,[29] for many decades, Egypt was notable for its high level of stateness. Under Sadat and Mubarak, Egypt enjoyed a high state-nationality ratio; that is, the state identity and national identity of the majority group (coherent identity) were congruent, which helped make it highly stable and safe compared to most Arab states. Its coherence kept it from getting embroiled in conflicts with its Arab neighbors over minorities and territorial and border issues. In the decades prior to the Arab Spring, Egypt's high level of stateness was an important factor in legitimizing its leadership of the Arab world. However, based on various indexes, such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)[30] or the Fragile States Index (FSI),[31] Egypt's level of stateness has been trending downward since Mubarak's removal from power. According to the BTI, both the aspect of the monopoly on the use of force and that of civic consent have dropped considerably.[32] These changes in stateness in Egypt have ramifications for its political stability, economy, social relations within the state, and domestic security as well as regional implications.

Egypt Since 2011: A Challenged Stateness

In January 2011, inspired by the revolution that began in Tunisia against the tyrannical rule of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and especially after his overthrow, Egypt witnessed mass protests against President Mubarak and his regime for their social, political, and economic failures. Dozens of civilians were killed

by the security forces during the demonstrations. As a result of the riots, Mubarak dismissed the government and formulated a new one, appointing Omar Suleiman as vice president. On February 1, Mubarak announced he would conclude his term in office in September 2011 and would not seek reelection. On February 10, as the demonstrations had only intensified, Mubarak announced he was transferring presidential authority to Suleiman. The next morning, Vice President Suleiman announced that Mubarak had transferred all his authority to the army and had thus effectively resigned as Egypt's president. On February 11, 2011, Egypt was liberated from the rule of Hosni Mubarak who had assumed the presidency almost thirty years earlier, in October 1981.[33]

While Mubarak had represented the continuation of the regime of the so-called "Free Officers" who had seized power in the military coup of July 1952, the demonstrations of millions of Egyptians, especially in Cairo's Tahrir Square at the height of the Arab Spring, gave many hope for a civil democratic revolution that would liberate Egypt from dictatorship, poverty, and oppression, and result in democracy, freedom, and prosperity. With Mubarak's resignation, governance shifted to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces; the constitution was suspended, and both houses of parliament were dismissed. Within less than a month, a new government had been established, and in March 2011 a "constitutional declaration" was issued, which included a timetable for shifting power from the Supreme Council to an elected parliament and president. It seemed as if Egypt was beginning a process of democratization that would lead to the establishment of a stable democratic regime. The transition included a process of writing a new constitution, the holding of parliamentary elections at the end of 2011, and a presidential election in 2012 won by the Muslim Brotherhood—largely due to its already having a solid organizational infrastructure in place—much to the disadvantage of the architects of the revolution, who were mostly young, secular, and liberal.[34]

Muhammad Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, was sworn in as Egypt's first democratically elected president in the summer of 2012. But Morsi was removed in a military coup after only one year into his term when the army exploited a popular civil protest staged by the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood, which was perceived as having hijacked the January 2011 revolution. Once again, Egypt

came under authoritarian rule, this time led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who had been defense minister and commander of the armed forces during Morsi's term in office and who had led the revolt against the new president. In May 2014, after another presidential election, al-Sisi became Egypt's official ruler and, in March 2018, he was elected to the second term in office. Both elections were far from being democratic.[35]

In the Mubarak era, Egypt was the leader of the Arab world, one of the strongest states in the Middle East, and, in terms of identity, it was one of the most cohesive states, notable for its high level of stateness. Data from BTI reports from 2008–2018 reveal a significant drop in the level of stateness, from a grade of 7.8 in 2008 to one of 6.3 in 2018.[36] This decrease is the result of changes in two of the three aspects of stateness: the state's monopoly on the use of force within the state and citizenship agreement. The changes in each of the three aspects of stateness and their effect on Egypt's national security and stability as well as the strategic ramifications of these changes for regional security are discussed below, beginning with the fall of the Mubarak regime in early 2011 until the middle of 2018.

Monopoly on the Use of Force

The Egyptian state's monopoly on the use of force largely stabilized toward the end of 2012 and in early 2013 after having experienced a serious regression in the previous two years. The domestic security apparatus collapsed in January 2011, the police did not function, and the security apparatus was preoccupied with managing the process of the state's transition instead of maintaining security. This process of state transition was marked by ongoing mass demonstrations against the different governments, which were deemed inefficient and opposed to the revolution's goals. The challenges to the governing authority often escalated into violent confrontations, such as the clashes around Tahrir Square (known as the events of Mohammed Mahmoud Street) in November 2011[37] and the protests against President Morsi's attempt in November 2012 to make a constitutional change that would expand the president's power and constrain the power of the Constitutional Court to dismiss the constitutional committee and the Shura Council.[38] Throughout Egypt, especially in the large cities of Cairo and Alexandria, crime increased, as did sectarian violence. In terms of sectarian violence, hate crimes by

extreme Islamists against Copts and their homes, businesses, and institutions were especially notable.[39]

In the Sinai Peninsula, the authority of the central government—both politically and socially—was undermined, especially in the northeast area of Rafah, where Egyptian security forces, as well as the multinational force stationed there, were attacked numerous times; on occasion, the fire was also directed at nearby Israeli border troops. In some of the northern Sinai attacks, dozens of Egyptian soldiers were killed. Thus, the ongoing challenge facing the Egyptian government in Sinai reopened the argument about the ongoing demilitarization of the Sinai, an article in the 1979 peace agreement with Israel. The Egyptian public praised then-Prime Minister Hesham Qandil's declaration that his government's overarching goal was to impose order and security in most parts of the country. Toward the end of 2012, the Egyptian government had succeeded in restoring the country's security control and the state's monopoly on the use of force had stabilized, especially in outlying areas. 2012 also had the lowest number of fatalities due to terrorism over the past decade, with twenty casualties in 2012, compared to hundreds of dead per year between 2013 and 2016.[40]

At the end of 2012 and in the first half of 2013, the security establishment and Egyptian society began to pose a challenge to the state's monopoly on the use of force. The growing polarization between the supporters of Morsi (that is, the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood) and his opponents and the public's dissatisfaction with the lack of real progress in realizing the goals of the revolution—especially social justice and better socioeconomic conditions—returned people to the streets. The struggle between the supporters of Morsi and his opponents escalated and turned violent. Many protestors were killed or wounded during the rounds of violence that continued through most of 2013.[41] The violence peaked after Morsi's removal, with riots erupting throughout the country as Morsi supporters confronted the security forces, leading to the deaths of more than 1,150 demonstrators.[42]

At the same time, the challenge facing the governing forces in Sinai intensified, especially after Morsi was deposed in July 2013. Starting that summer, attacks on security forces in the peninsula multiplied. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis expanded its military activities, declared its allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS) on November 14, 2014, and changed its name to Wilayat Sinai (the Sinai Province) of the Islamic State. Along the Egyptian-Libyan

border, security increasingly deteriorated and a rising number of attacks took a heavy human toll on both sides of the border.[43]

The number of deadly terrorist attacks in Egypt, including in the capital of Cairo, rose significantly. Following Morsi's removal, the number of casualties also increased sharply (179 in 2013; 184 in 2014; 663 in 2015; and 293 in 2016).[44] At the end of Morsi's year in office, the public's sense of security had waned, and the trend continued after the coup in July 2013. At the end of 2014, a community police force was established to deal with the phenomenon. Despite the efforts of the Egyptian regime to confront terrorism and face other security challenges throughout the nation, 2015 was a significant failure for the al-Sisi regime: 582 terrorist attacks leaving hundreds of dead and more than 1,300 wounded.[45] Terrorist attacks were aimed at the security establishment and its members (such as the assassination of Egypt's Prosecutor General Hisham Barakat on June 29, 2015),[46] government, economic, and diplomatic institutions (for example, the bombing of the Italian consulate in Cairo on July 11, 2015), transportation and communications infrastructures, tourist sites (such as the bombing of Metrojet flight 9268, a chartered Russian passenger plane, on October 31, 2015),[47] and holy sites, especially Christian ones.[48] During an attack on one of the Christian holy sites, Pope Tawadros II of Alexandria had been present; in addition to being the leader of Egypt's Coptic minority, he has been considered a symbol of unity between Muslims and Christians in Egypt and among the prominent leaders supporting the 2013 coup.[49]

According to media reports and intelligence assessments in Egypt and elsewhere, these attacks were carried out by militant Islamists factions, some identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, which was outlawed after the coup, some with Wilayat Sinai, and some with ISIS members operating in Egypt at the organization's behest to expand the battle against Egypt's security forces from the Sinai Peninsula into Egypt proper. The security challenges that the various organizations posed to al-Sisi's regime embarrassed the president, the regime, and the security services, as they repeatedly highlighted the regime's weakness and its inability to ensure security and stability. In other words, al-Sisi's regime was failing in its attempt to subordinate the nation's territory to its authority, evident of the regime's failure to preserve its monopoly on the use of force in all parts of its sovereign territory (true as of 2018). During 2016, and even more so in 2017, terrorism turned downward,

largely consequent to consistent suppression and more intelligence activity. In the Sinai Peninsula, however, the regime has been less successful against Wilayat Sinai of the Islamic State.[50]

As of 2018, it seems that Egypt has succeeded in expanding its control of Sinai. In practice, however, Egypt had to take two steps in which it conceded its monopoly on the use of force: the first involved recruiting the Bedouin tribes in Sinai to fight Wilayat Sinai in exchange for military aid (weapons and fighting methods) and economic aid earmarked for the tribes. The second step was military cooperation with Israel. It was obvious that the regime was uncomfortable doing this and viewed it as a necessary evil given the circumstances and its own inability to independently regain its monopoly on the use of force in Sinai.[51] Egypt has tried to maintain a low profile on its military cooperation with Israel lest the legitimacy of the regime be called into question. In an investigative piece on the topic published by the *New York Times* in February 2018, Israel revealed it had carried out more than 100 attacks in northern Sinai in 2016 and 2017. Israel's missions, using fighter jets, helicopters, and UAVs bearing no Israeli insignia, were carried out with President al-Sisi's authorization.[52] Although the publication included detailed descriptions of the Israeli raids shared by American and British sources, Egypt denied that anything like that had ever happened.[53] Presumably, Egypt's denial stemmed from its concern that this cooperation might cause additional damage to the regime's legitimacy and to al-Sisi, who was preparing for the new presidential election, which took place in March 2018. As noted, the regime's legitimacy was already in doubt and the election highlighted this further.[54] One of the causes of the destabilization of a regime's legitimacy is the failure of the state to impose its monopoly over all of its territory and of the security forces to provide security and stability.

It can be said that Egypt under al-Sisi acted against the classic notion of state logic in which the state preserves its monopoly on force within its borders. The willingness to arm the Bedouin tribes in Sinai (and taking the risk that the weapons they now possess might one day be turned against state forces, as critics have pointed out) and, to some extent, to allow Israel to operate on Egyptian sovereign territory indicates that the regime recognizes its own weakness. Conceding its monopoly on force within its borders signifies weakness in one of the fundamental components of Egyptian stateness and has negative ramifications for the nation's security and stability.

Administrative Effectiveness

According to the BTI and FSI, Egypt's bureaucratic administrative system has always been characterized by its low to moderate performance. This was true both before and after the 2011 revolution. While the BTI refers to Egypt's stability of basic public administration and services over the last decade (a score of 6 on a rising scale from 1 to 10), the FSI score revealed a slight improvement in the level of public services during the same period (scoring 6.4 in 2009 to 4.6 in 2018, on an inverse scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being the worst score). In any case, both indexes indicate that the country's administrative system is performing at a low level.

Both before and after the revolution, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces played a dominant role in Egypt's public administration. In addition to being the command staff of the Egyptian army, the Supreme Council is also a central player in the public sector. In the decades preceding 2011, former senior figures of the Supreme Council, their relatives, and cronies occupied key positions in organizations and companies—including civilian ones—subordinate to the army. Many provincial governors, mayors, and boards of directors of public sector companies were members of the Supreme Council, formerly military men, or their relatives and friends. The Egyptian army controlled one-third of the Egyptian economy, so that the Egyptian military, and especially the Supreme Council, enjoyed the privilege and wielded a great deal of influence in Egypt.[55]

The demonstrations of the youth in Egypt were instrumental in Hosni Mubarak's resignation on February 11, 2011. But no less instrumental—and perhaps even more—was the Supreme Council's decision to avoid a confrontation with the protestors and not defend the president, which many think was the factor that led to his resignation. Immediately thereafter, the Supreme Council issued a constitutional declaration to the effect that it was assuming governing authority until the election of a new parliament and president. Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, then the chair of the Supreme Council, became Egypt's de facto president while retaining his position on the Supreme Council. This remained the case until Morsi was sworn in as president on June 30, 2012.[56]

During the rule of the Supreme Council, it made decisions and took actions to preserve its status and authority at the expense of the yet-to-be-elected president. For examples, two days before the second round of voting, the

Constitutional Court dismissed the House of Representatives (the lower of the two houses of Egypt's parliament) and assumed its powers. On the day of the election, the Supreme Council issued a document with constitutional validity ("a complementary constitutional decree") that provided it with great authority while significantly reducing that of the intended president. The decree, issued on June 17, 2012, stated that the Supreme Council had the right to appeal sections of the planned constitution if they failed to please the council and the right to dismiss the constitutional committee. Furthermore, the decree forced the incoming president to receive the approval of the Supreme Council before declaring a state of war or responding to violations of public order. In other words, the Supreme Council sought to shore up its spheres of influence prior to Morsi's election as president.[57]

This pattern of conduct of the Supreme Council, a remnant of Mubarak's regime, made many Egyptians suspicious that the members of the Supreme Council really sought to seize control of the state and its governing institutions. The Supreme Council continued to be a dominant player in Egyptian politics even after the establishment of the first democratic regime of its type in Egypt and it ultimately succeeded in leading the military coup in the summer of 2013, bringing an end to the budding democratization process, which had had no opportunity to flourish.[58]

Morsi's single year as president was marked by power struggles against the bureaucracy, led by the Supreme Council and the security apparatus, all of which remained loyal to the previous regime, although not to Mubarak personally as he was viewed as someone who had tried to relieve them of their power and shift control of Egypt into the hands of his son, Jamal.[59] Morsi tried to replace the vestiges of the old regime: Early in his term in office, in August 2012, he dismissed Supreme Council Chairman Tantawi and Chief of Staff Sami Anan and appointed al-Sisi, who was then head of intelligence to the position of defense minister and chief of staff. Ten months later it was al-Sisi who led a military coup to depose Morsi and return Egypt to authoritarian rule under his helm.[60]

Egypt under al-Sisi's rule continued to face administrative challenges and an inefficient bureaucracy, but in contrast to Morsi's presidency, the challenges did not involve the Supreme Council, which was fully under al-Sisi's control; rather, they were the result of problems with the army as well as fundamental struggles that had characterized Egypt for decades. Egypt's

economy has suffered from unemployment, rising prices, and decline in the value of the Egyptian lira compared to the dollar (from 6 Egyptian liras to the US dollar at the end of Morsi's term to 18 Egyptian liras in June 2018). Since 2013, the public sector debt has doubled, reaching $80 billion by 2017, while the local debt tallied $176 billion.[61]

To confront its economic challenges, Egypt sought help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF's financial aid program was approved in November 2016 and led to some important successes, but it also posed complex economic and political challenges to the state. In September 2017, the IMF issued its first critical report on the pace of the program's implementation. Although the report praised the professionalism and political courage marking the economic reforms, the economic and political incidents that occurred in 2017 and a close reading of the report indicate that the program's achievements were fragile and that Egypt was still facing a long, arduous journey toward economic and political stability.[62] The economic reforms that al-Sisi has implemented have yet to curb the steep rise in the cost of fuel, electricity, gas, and public transportation. A new value-added tax has been imposed and subsidies on basic goods have been cut. Consequently, the rate of inflation has hit record highs: in 2017 alone, inflation rose by 30.7 percent.[63]

The economic decrees imposed over the last two years, in addition to the political repression and violations of human and civil rights, have undermined the legitimacy of al-Sisi's regime. This crisis was evident during the presidential election in March 2018, even though al-Sisi won the race by a wide margin as expected. The worsening decrees since the election—including a rise in the metro fare—resulted in a wave of protests and demonstrations, some of which deteriorated into confrontations between young people and the police.[64]

In mid 2018, it seemed that the public system in Egypt had still not managed to resolve the public's day-to-day challenges, see to its wellbeing, or provide an adequate response to unemployment, inflation, and the cost of living. The ongoing failure and lack of administrative effectiveness pose a challenge to the stability of the Egyptian regime as well as to the regional and international systems. This will make it difficult for the regime to implement the next steps in the IMF's program of economic reforms, which can be expected to include painful new decrees, including further cuts to

subsidies and price hikes of goods and services; this will also impede the regime's efforts to enlist local civilian cooperation in the war on terrorism in northern Sinai.[65]

Citizenship Agreement

Among scholars and in many other circles, the common conception of Egypt has been of a state with a uniform population, a coherent and collective identity, and a high degree of consent regarding its identity, unlike most of the other Arab states and peoples. The toppling of the Mubarak regime in early 2011 only reinforced this view at a time when it seemed that the Egyptian people were unifying to oust a dictator, while Syria, for example, had split into two—between supporters and opponents of President Assad—and had disintegrated into a civil war.

The Muslim Brotherhood's success in the parliamentary election in late 2011 and later in the election of the movement's candidate, Morsi, to the presidency revealed an unexpected and distressing truth of discord over Egypt's identity as a state and as a people. Two camps quickly emerged: the Islamist, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, and a camp consisting of an unnatural coalition in the Egyptian sociopolitical landscape, which included the military-security sector, the al-Azhar religious establishment, the Coptic church, together with movements and political parties representing the secular left, the civil society organizations, and associations of the youth of the revolution.

The successes that the Muslim Brotherhood reaped in the parliamentary and presidential elections polarized Egypt's political system and led to profound discord over shaping the state's identity in the post-revolutionary era. This divergence was prominently manifested in the establishment of a new Egyptian constitution. Soon after Mubarak's ouster, during the debates over changing the old 1971 constitution before the referendum scheduled for March 2011, the entire Islamist stream, with all its constituents, demanded that parliamentary elections be held before establishing a new constitution and prior to holding the referendum required for its ratification, while the secular, national, liberal, left, and the coalitions of the young people demanded to establish a new constitution prior to parliamentary elections. Due to this disagreement, the rift between the two blocs over essential issues—chiefly, the new Egyptian constitution—deepened. One of the chief sources of tension

and instability was the extreme polarization over the relationship between religion and state, creating a dangerous situation in which religion had been politicized, with the religious discourse entering into the political one and the combing of the two.[66]

In January 2012, the three rounds of voting for the lower house of the Egyptian parliament ended with the bloc of Islamic political parties winning about three-quarters of the seats: The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice party won 237 of the 498 seats and the Salafist party al-Nur secured 120. At the end of spring 2012, there were two rounds of the presidential election, which Mohamed Morsi, the Freedom and Justice party candidate, won with a majority of 51.7 percent. As a result, many Egyptians began to express growing concern about Egypt's identity shifting toward Islamization, religious law, and of being a state of the Muslim Brothers. Morsi's own decisions and actions did nothing to dispel these concerns; on the contrary, they provided proof that this was the direction that the state was taking.

The government, upon which the independent Hesham Qandeel had been entrusted with the job of putting it together, sidelined the Salafist party al-Nour, the second-largest party, which held a quarter of the seats in parliament and was the Muslim Brotherhood's chief ally. This sparked a crisis in relations between the two parties and led to protests against Morsi from al-Nour's leaders and supporters. In response, Morsi ordered that newspaper editors be replaced with ones that supported him, but this failed to garner the support of the other journalists who were unsparing in their criticism of the president. Reports on the replacement of thousands of civil servants with members of the Muslim Brotherhood strengthened the public feeling that Morsi was closely following a script written for him by the supreme leader of the Muslim Brothers to Islamicize Egypt, despite his pre-election promises to the contrary.[67]

The debate over the character of the new constitution was a key factor that contributed to Egypt's instability and lack of citizenship agreement. In March 2012, before the presidential election, the "100-Committee"—consisting of fifty parliament members and fifty others—was established to formulate a proposed constitution.[68] The committee proposed to reduce the president's power and expand the sections on freedoms and liberties. Nonetheless, some claimed that the draft of the new constitution left the president with too much power; did not include a commitment to international human

rights conventions; allowed for the closing of civil society organizations and newspapers; provided broad authority to the army; and enabled the possibility of trying civilians in military courts. In addition, the predominance of Islamists on the committee resulted in a draft that was more Islamic than before, giving credence to worries that the new Morsi-led regime would work to Islamize the state.[69]

Morsi paid no attention to public criticism of the draft constitution and, on November 21, 2012, just before the Constitutional Court was to rule on a claim filed to dismiss the constitutional committee, Morsi issued a complementary constitutional decree that provided immunity to the constitutional committee and the Shura Council, in effect denying the court the ability to dismiss them, i.e., coopting the court's authority. Morsi also provided immunity to all of his own decisions and made it impossible to appeal them until a new constitution was approved and parliament was elected.[70] These decisions and actions drove hundreds of thousands to stage demonstrations across from the presidential palace. This, in turn, led to counter-protests and eventually to violence between the two sides. In response, Morsi issued a new constitutional decree on December 8, 2012, revoking the immunity he had provided for his own decisions, although he continued to engage in efforts to accelerate the referendum over the draft constitution,[71] which was held during December 15–22, 2012. While a majority of 63.8 percent approved the new constitution, only 33 percent of the public had participated in the referendum. The low voter turnout indicated that the public was skeptical over the process of approving the constitution and that there was no broad consensus over the new document, which reduced freedom of religion and limited the activities of civil organizations and the press.[72]

In addition, Morsi also curtailed the authority of the security establishment. Following an attack on Egyptian military forces in Sinai on August 5, 2012, Morsi deposed the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, and Chief of Staff Sami Anan. He abolished sections of the constitution that granted extensive authority to the army while curtailing that of the presidency and appointed a vice president who was not a member of the security establishment.[73] These actions—interpreted as changes to institutionalize and establish the first democratic regime of its kind in Egypt[74]—resulted in a direct confrontation between Morsi and the security elite, especially the Supreme Council. The Security Council was

considered the heir to the Free Officers' Council, which in the second half of the twentieth century had formulated Egypt's image and identity as a state where Islam was part of the daily lives of individuals but did not have any part of its collective or national identity.

Moreover, Morsi strengthened Egypt's ties with the Shiite Muslim regime in Iran; the Turkish regime, whose ideology is close to that of the Muslim Brotherhood; and Qatar, whose leaders have supported the Palestinian Hamas movement, which identifies ideologically with the Muslim Brotherhood; in addition to giving direct support to Hamas. The army's leadership and security elite perceived these ties as being harmful to Egypt's economy and security as well as to its relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia.[75]

During Morsi's year as president, the government failed to confront Egypt's post-revolutionary problems. This failure, coupled with fears of Islamization, helped the Supreme Council, the remnants of the previous regime (led by figures such as Mohamed El-Baradei and Amr Moussa), and the old establishment institutions (most prominently al-Azhar) to recruit the Salafist al-Nour political party and the secular, liberal, and left-leaning political parties, as well as the "Youth of the Revolution" and some civil society organizations. An ad hoc coalition called Tamarrud (Arabic for rebellion) was formed with the aim of collecting fifteen million signatures by June 30, 2013—the first anniversary of Morsi's presidency—in order to force him to declare a new election and by that day, it had already collected more than 22 million signatures.[76]

The mass gathering of a broad spectrum of institutions, organizations, and political parties against Morsi's rule, calls for his resignation, and a new presidential election were significant markers of a lack of citizenship agreement. Morsi, however, continued to defend his regime's legitimacy based on the broad public support for the Freedom and Justice party. Morsi's refusal to resign led throngs of people to take to the streets throughout Egypt at the end of June 2013. Soon thereafter, on July 3, Egypt underwent a military coup, which installed a new authoritarian regime, led by al-Sisi.[77] Morsi's deposal generated clashes between his supporters, on the one hand, and military and police forces, on the other, in which hundreds were killed. The violence climaxed with the massacre at al-Nahda Square and the Raba'a al-Adawiya Mosque on August 14, 2013, in which the security forces shot dead at least 815 civilians.[78] The political polarization and lack of citizenship

agreement about Egypt's identity and the clashes between the Muslim Brotherhood and their opponents created a conflict in which the opponents were successful, mostly because of the concern over Egypt's Islamization; this fear bound together many different groups despite their diversity.

Under al-Sisi's rule, a new constitution was established in 2014. It stresses the cultural pluralism of the nation to a far greater extent than the 2012 constitution, which was abrogated after the military coup. The question of Egypt's national identity came to the fore in 2016 in the context of debates and arguments over a new citizenship law, which includes a clause that seeks to abrogate the registration of religious identity in Egyptian citizens' identification cards. While the legislative process is not yet complete, Cairo University has already deleted the religious identity line from all staff and student forms after complaints were leveled that it was unconstitutional.[79]

Consequent to the 2013 coup, the Egyptian political system sustained a severe blow reflecting the rift and ideological disagreements in Egyptian society. The parliament now numbers 596 members, and most are independents. The rest are splintered into nineteen political parties, most of which have fewer than five seats.[80] The Muslim Brotherhood, whose electoral power is assessed at about one-fourth of the voters, has been outlawed under al-Sisi's rule. The remaining Islamic party, the Salafist al-Nour party, is careful to maintain a tight alliance with the regime to ensure its continued existence and scope of activity. The old-time religious establishment of al-Azhar and the Coptic church have also honored the alliance with al-Sisi and have provided unconditional legitimacy to his rule. Al-Sisi plays his part by promoting policies that are opposed to atheism, thus placating the conservative majority in the country. Egypt has retreated to the citizenship agreement over religion and state that had prevailed before the 2011 revolution, by which the Egyptian people continue to be religious mostly at the individual level, while the collective and state identity corresponds to the "Egypt first" approach.[81]

The social rift created in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 and its lasting ramifications have damaged the state's internal security and public security, led to confrontations between governing systems that were supposed to be working together, and quickly ended what seemed like the beginning of democratization or, at least, the democratization process, which tens of millions of Egyptian citizens had awaited.

Conclusion

The Egyptian revolution of 2011, which was part of the wave of protests during the Arab Spring, placed the challenge of stateness before modern Egypt, successfully having addressed this question decades earlier. Consequent to the January 25 revolution, which ended a dictatorship dating to the revolution on July 23, 1952 by the Free Officers, Egypt's level of stateness dropped steadily. In terms of the aspect of the monopoly on the use of force, Egypt lost control of Sinai and its ability to ensure public order and security. As for the aspect of administrative effectiveness, Egypt continues to suffer from problems of a dysfunctional bureaucracy, an economic crisis and an inability to resolve it successfully, and the dominance of the public sector by the military, which has continued to benefit from full bureaucratic autonomy without any political control during Morsi's term in office, to the point that it led the military coup that toppled him. In terms of the aspect of citizenship agreement, especially during Morsi's year as president, Egyptian society clearly was deeply divided between the Muslim Brotherhood and its many supporters on one side and its opponents from various sectors and segments of the Egyptian public on the other. This rift brought about the military coup that put an end to Egypt's transition to democracy, instead preserving the division in society and the weakness of Egypt's political system.

The decline in all three aspects of stateness signifies the weakening of the state and its institutions since Mubarak's deposal in early 2011. Internally, Egypt faces challenges of domestic security, a profound economic crisis, social rifts, a political crisis (with the parliament composed of splintered parties), the failure to transition to a democracy, and the return to a dictatorship, as well as a crisis of legitimacy of the new authoritarian regime, lending further cause for internal destabilization.

Egypt's domestic weakness has damaged its regional standing as well. It lost its status as the leader of the Arab world, a position now occupied by Saudi Arabia. This was especially conspicuous in April 2016, when Saudi Arabia's King Salman was given an ostentatious reception during his visit to Egypt.[82] On that occasion, Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed economic agreements that cost Saudi Arabia about $2 billion, in exchange for which the kingdom received the islands of Tiran and Sanafir,[83] despite the opposition within Egypt's political system and by the public. Egypt's postponing of the transfer of the islands led Saudi Arabia to threaten to turn to the International

Court, especially after the Egyptian Supreme Court ruled that the islands were Egyptian sovereign territory.[84] Saudi Arabia punished Egypt for the delay in the transfer by stopping its oil supply[85] and further threatened Egypt that it would withdraw its investments in Egypt and deport the million Egyptian workers employed in Saudi Arabia if it did not comply with the agreement.[86] In response to President al-Sisi's uncompromising stand to honor the agreement with Saudi Arabia, the kingdom provided its reward,[87] and in July 2017, Saudi Arabia finally took possession of the islands, symbolizing Egypt's relinquishment of its status as the leader of the Arab world.

The decline in Egypt's stateness, especially in its monopoly on the use of force, has affected both domestic and regional security. The Sinai Peninsula has become a no man's land where a terrorist organization with sworn allegiance to ISIS operates with impunity, thus turning Egypt into one of the states hosting—albeit unwillingly—an extension of the organization that has fought the very idea of the nation-state and nationality and has undermined the national security and stability of several states in the region.

The decline in Egypt's stateness is not in Israel's best interest. In the last few decades, Egypt has been a major strategic ally of Israel, especially in the Middle East; Egypt helped advance the political process between Israel and the PLO and later the Palestinian Authority; Egypt has mediated between Israel and the Palestinians during crises and has helped to resolve them; and Egypt has also assisted in settling internal Palestinian crises, with their assistance being critical for maintaining tranquility in areas under the Palestinian Authority and consequently also in Israel. The decline in stateness has dealt Egypt a profound blow to its ability to fulfill these functions and take similar actions, thus harming Israel's interests as well.

Notes

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The Proliferation of Autonomous Weapons Systems: Effects on International Relations

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The battlefield of today has entered a new era in which the use of advanced robotics-based autonomous weapon systems is steadily growing. Given current international circumstances, the United Nations will, in all likelihood, find it difficult to effectively ban or limit their use in tandem with their technological development. Autonomous weapon systems are likely to become the mainstay of combat within the next two decades or so precisely because of the difficulty in restricting them and due to their advantages for any army that deploys them. Given this possibility, this article examines the possible effects of the widespread proliferation of autonomous weapon systems on the future battlefield and on the international arena, particularly its political, economic, and even civil aspects, while referring to fundamental concepts in international relations and security studies. The article stresses that these autonomous weapons systems will have a far greater impact on the world than has been discussed in legal and moral contexts, which, to date, have formed the core of the contemporary discourse on the subject.

Keywords: Autonomous weapons systems, robots, future battlefield, autonomous devices, arms control

Introduction

The battlefield is entering a new era. The development of technologies, their miniaturization, their dropping costs, and widespread proliferation have

transformed what just a few years ago seemed like science fiction into the prevailing reality. Among these technological trends, the proliferation of autonomous weapons systems—robots capable of applying lethal force and killing people autonomously, without the involvement of another human—in the hands of combat troops is growing. The ability to apply lethal force without human involvement raises many issues, including changes in the battlefield, warfare, and in the entire international arena.

The UN committee dealing with the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons has discussed the development of such systems since 2013, but the discussion is still in its infancy. Furthermore, the ramifications of these systems in realms other than arms control are still unclear. Given this lacuna, this article seeks to highlight the possible effects of this technology on international relations, especially power relations and the use of power to apply force. This article also will contribute to the knowledge base being constructed on the subject, which currently relies on extensive writing about technology, especially information technology, and international relations.

Will the expanding use of autonomous weapons systems in general change the international arena, given the effect of various phenomena that were and are still common in the era of warfare with manned weapons and even ranged weapons? This article will seek to answer this question, first by defining the concept of autonomous weapons systems, describing their development, and forecasting their future use in the defense arena. Afterward, the article will present the difficulties in limiting them and the future ramifications of the extensive use of such systems on the international arena and on the use of force. The article asserts that autonomous weapons systems will affect not only the battlefield itself and phenomena usually associated with the use of force, but they will also potentially affect the broader concept of power and the international arena as a whole. Thus, we need a more broad-ranging discourse on the topic than we have at present, especially in the context of international law and arms control.

Autonomous Weapons Systems

In recent years, the discussion about autonomous weapons systems has expanded significantly in scientific, military, academic, and diplomatic circles, and at times even in certain political circles. But, despite the widespread debate, the definition of autonomous weapons systems is still complex and

depends greatly on who does the defining, what their objectives are, and what their concerns are. An autonomous weapons system can be defined as an unmanned or robotic systems, which has the ability to function with no or little human involvement by means of sensors and processors and carry out military missions, including the use of lethal force. The use of sensors and processors allows the system to operate in a previously unknown environment and to make decisions in real time based on previously written algorithms and commands provided by its operators, but the action is adapted to the conditions that prevail in the system's environment.

The use or even development of these systems has generated a great deal of opposition due to legal and moral reasons. Despite this opposition, however, it will be very challenging to limit them using the usual international treaties and committees. In fact, their use is likely to greatly expand in the coming decades, because of their inherent advantages of removing human combatants from harm's way and reducing the reliance on people in warfare; increasing the speed, accuracy, and rate of fire; being absolutely obedient to commands; lacking human needs and emotions, such as hunger, fear, fatigue, and so forth, and the fact that several systems can be operated in perfect coordination and synchronization.

The definition of an autonomous weapons system (AWS), also referred to as lethal autonomous weapons system (LAWS), has caused significant debate within the scientific and legal communities. The core of the argument seems to be over the level of human involvement needed (or not needed) in operating these systems and that, technologically speaking, the differences of opinion are relatively minor. Most scholars agree that an AWS is characterized by its ability to carry out a task or a series of tasks without the involvement of a human operator. Its behavior is result-oriented, based on an interaction or mutual response between the programming of the computer (part of the system) and the environment.[1] According to a more simple definition by the International Red Cross, which is one of the organizations that seeks to limit them, AWS are capable of searching, identifying, and destroying targets independently, without human intervention.[2]

Given the complexity of the issue, the different levels of autonomy already embedded in unmanned devices and robotic systems of various types should be differentiated. The US Department of Defense classifies these systems according to four categories: (1) systems are operated entirely

by a human from a distance and are therefore not autonomous at all; (2) systems are delegated and are capable of carrying out certain actions with relative independence; (3) systems are capable of carrying out a range of actions independently while under the supervision of a human operator; and (4) Fully autonomous systems that, other than being turned on and initially programmed, do not require any involvement of a human operator in carrying out their tasks (although the human operator may intervene and affect what happens if necessary, such as command that a mission be aborted).[3] Another way to define the autonomy of a system is by the type and level of human involvement needed in relation to the system's operating loop.[4]

Of all the components of the system, the factor most responsible for the autonomous operation of the system is the computerization capacity of the processor. Algorithms (that is, the computerized instructions on how to carry out a task or series of tasks) enable the system to use its various components to autonomously carry out a task. Given the fact that this comes down to software, the capacity is fundamentally computer-based, although hardware is needed so that capacity can be translated into kinetic action (with the exception of cyberwar systems, which will not be discussed in this article). Any discussion of the topic should also differentiate between autonomous and automatic tools. An autonomous system can carry out any desired task in a previously unfamiliar environment without the involvement of a human operator. By contrast, an automatic system requires the presence of computer controllers that allow something to function or occur without that occurrence being directly controlled by humans.[5]

Automatic tools have been a common feature of the battlefield for generations, such as automatic weapons that can rapidly fire without being reloaded when the trigger is held down, or landmines that automatically explode when weight is placed on them. Both automation and autonomy require human involvement, but they differ, inter alia, in their level of distinction and decision making. Despite the differentiation between these characteristics, however, systems may be simultaneously both automatic and autonomous. That is, situations are defined in the system that automatically lead to action, but the action itself is carried out autonomously and includes the ability to relate and respond to changes in the environment. The distinction between automation and autonomy can be demonstrated in the difference between a landmine operated on the basis of a single parameter—weight—automatically

and indiscriminately, and an autonomous system capable of opening fire without human involvement based on more advanced parameters, such as temperature or motion, and done selectively in relation to other parameters defined for it.

Unmanned and Autonomous Devices for Security Uses in the Early Twenty-First Century

Since the beginning of the 2010s, many countries have identified the inherent potential of unmanned systems for security purposes and have been taking various steps to acquire or independently develop them. Other than the leaders in the field—the United States, Israel, the United Kingdom, and France[6]—China, Brazil, Iran, Russia, and others have also entered the field.

At present, despite the clear trend, most systems used on the battlefield and in the security field are unmanned, but require a high level of human involvement, from planning and carrying out missions to safeguarding and maintaining. These needs leave the contemporary battlefield relatively manned and do not make it fully possible to avoid exposing humans to the dangers of combat. Furthermore, because of various constraints, such as public opinion and even technical issues (distrust of new systems that have yet to prove themselves over time), the few systems capable of simple autonomous action are not used autonomously; forces armed with such systems equip them with human operators who are required to approve the action (usually firing). However, according to research and technological forecasts, it is highly likely that this state of affairs will change.

A study published in 2016, which included extensive data-gathering on AWS, describes 256 autonomous systems already in use by military forces or in the final stages of development or testing. Based on this data, most of the AWS operate today in the air. Moreover, only 130 are capable of target acquisition without human involvement, and, of those, only 27 can autonomously make an engagement decision. The data also indicates that not even one AWS is currently capable of learning on its own or adapting to a new environment without human involvement.[7] Based on this study as well as a review of new systems that have appeared in the last few years, most of the AWS seem to run into trouble in target acquisition and autonomous engagement decision; furthermore, even systems already capable of doing so are generally aerial defense systems, such as the US Patriot and the Israeli

Iron Dome. These represent few of the active systems in today's battlefield, and most of them—despite their high level of autonomy—operate in a way that requires the approval of a human operator before opening fire, as based on guiding principles of the nations using them.[8]

In addition to the aerial defense systems, the majority of autonomous systems currently in use are neither fully autonomous nor lethal, such as land-based vehicles with autonomous travel capabilities (the weapons they carry are operated from a distance by human operators);[9] autonomous naval[10] and underwater vehicles (some with autonomous engagement capacity);[11] and aerial vehicles with autonomous capabilities for take-off, landing, and refueling, such as the X47-B.[12] There are also loitering systems, such that the Harop, capable of identifying targets, locking onto them, and attacking them without human involvement, by means of homing in on radar signals and attacking the vehicles that emit these signals on land or at sea.[13]

The Future of Autonomous Systems in the Coming Two Decades

Based on the various studies seeking, inter alia, to predict the technological feasibility of autonomous systems, all types of AWS should become technologically possible within less than twenty years and most likely will become the mainstay of weapons in modern, technologically-oriented armies.[14] This is likely to dramatically reduce human involvement in operating devices for security purposes as these devices will be capable of autonomously planning currently known tactical military missions.[15] Autonomous systems will also be able to perform these tasks at a much higher level of sophistication than is currently possible. Moreover, it seems that these systems will be able to function in groups or swarms, allowing far greater efficiency and survivability than of single systems.[16]

Experts also say that within the same time frame, these systems will generate a fundamental change in the nature of the battlefield itself. Given the autonomous capabilities of planning and performance as well as swarming capabilities, warfare in general and firing, maneuvering, and logistics in particular are expected to become much faster and more precise. In other words, the battlefield will undergo comprehensive change.[17] The emerging trend is that human deployment will become increasingly rare and will occur only when the deployment of human combatants has a clear advantage. Most tasks will be performed exclusively by systems operated from a distance, most

of them autonomous.[18] This technological development brings up many issues, in addition to the need to adapt the operational environment to the new era, which has implications for doctrines of warfare and international law. Some of these developments also cause concern and have led to resistance within certain circles in the international arena, such as human rights organizations, which are already active in limiting the use of AWS on moral, ethical, and legal grounds.[19]

International Reservations about AWS

Historically, the appearance of new technologies has often aroused antagonism and time must pass before they become an inseparable part of our daily lives. This tension, however, is exacerbated when the new technologies are lethal, especially when they are intended for military needs, as is the case of AWS. The more that technology develops, becomes more complex, and widespread, the legal and ethical concerns about it become even greater. While such debates are relevant to all fields in which robotic and autonomous systems operate, the military is a pioneer; in addition to being one of the leaders of integrated technological development, the military, more so than any other field, involves decision making that affects human lives.

In November 2012, Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School published jointly a paper entitled "Losing Humanity," which calls for banning the use of "killer robots"—in effect, to render illegal the use of AWS on the battlefield.[20] The paper was published in coordination with a well-covered international media campaign called "Stop the Killer Robots,"[21] first launched just before the first session of the UN's Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) on the topic. The authors and others in the field claim that, within two to three decades, completely autonomous weapons will be able to select their targets without human involvement, despite assertions by senior military sources that people will always remain involved in the process.[22] According to the authors, preventing human involvement in decisions on using lethal force in an armed conflict will strip civilians of non-legal safeguards that are inherent in such conflicts and are characteristic of human nature—such as compassion and sensitivity—which prevail among human combatants but are absent from robotic devices.[23] As the UN committee was debating the topic, other reports and organizations also called for the limitation and strict

supervision of robotic weapons.[24] Despite the extensive activity, no legal restriction on the development or use of these systems currently exists, and, as of the end of 2018, these weapons are legal as long as they are used in a manner consistent with the accepted law of war.

The UN debates on this issue, which have been running since 2014, are conducted among the signatories to the CCW, but their pace lags behind the rate of technological development.[25] By virtue of its definition, the CCW is limited to weapons systems. However, limiting the use of autonomous weapons without limiting autonomy in other arenas may be not only problematic but also ineffective, because autonomy is a factor of computer abilities that can easily "leak" into other areas and/or be broken into. As it is a dual purpose field (military and civilian), the limiting of armed systems without restricting and supervising the civilian side might be pointless.[26]

The key challenge of AWS stems from the fact that these systems must make decisions about human lives without any humans involved in the process. This raises both legal and ethical questions and has many layers of complexity that may be revealed as the technology develops. A major discussion focuses on the legal difficulty in applying criminal accountability to AWS. The assertion is that combatants, commanders, and political decision makers all bear criminal liability for committing war crimes, which is meant to serve as a deterrent. However, the same accountability cannot be attributed to autonomous systems, leading to a situation in which, on the one hand, trying in court and punishing a robot is absurd, while, on the other hand, there is not one single entity that can assume accountability according to the current method: Today, no engineer or tech company that developed an autonomous system can be taken to court years later for the harming or killing of innocent civilians by that system.[27]

These assertions from a human rights perspective are not the only criticism of AWS; other opponents claim that the possible dangers of AWS include encouraging a global arms race, which will lead to the exponential proliferation of AWS because the infrastructures needed to build them are much more accessible and available than infrastructures for building nuclear weapons, for example; their proliferation on the black market, allowing AWS to make their way to terrorist organizations; and the potential for effectively using these systems for the sake of ethnic cleansings, assassinations, destabilizations of nations and peoples, and other nefarious purposes.[28] These are only some

of the various claims—both legal and philosophical—raised by opponents to the development and use of AWS.

Limited International Ability to Prevent Proliferation

Despite the anti-AWS claims, the organizations active in the field, and the UN debates on the topic, the ability to impose and enforce an effective AWS ban (an international weapons control regime) is limited for two reasons. First, the mandate of the CCW permits it to deal only with conventional arms. The CCW is shaped by international humanitarian law and it is difficult to include other subjects. Therefore, any reference to the dangers inherent in artificial intelligence is out of bounds. The second reason nations considered leaders in the field, such as the United States, Israel, Russia, China, and others do not support the limitations. From the minutes of the debate held at the CCW in 2015, many nations do not relate to the possibility of an international regime to limit AWS, which may also be indicative on how they would vote on the issue.[29]

Moreover, despite the fact that both the superpowers and the smaller—and even weak—nations have an equal say in the decision of the CCW, it is impossible to ignore the traditional role of the large nations within the framework of international security regimes. History teaches us that in order to establish an international, long-lasting security regime, which will attain its objective, it is necessary to have the support of most, if not all, the major superpowers.[30] Thus, when examining the superpowers' stance, one quickly learns that, sweepingly, they do not unequivocally support establishing a limiting regime. Assuming that their support is needed to ensure the effectiveness of such a regime, one can safely say that the probability of establishing such a regime—and, more importantly, an effective one—is next to zero. Furthermore, to ensure that limitations within the framework of an agreement or treaty are indeed effective, parties specifically designated to supervise and mete out penalties for violations are necessary. This is problematic given the nature of the international arena and the lack of a sovereign. Sovereign nations could choose not to cooperate, as the chances that the international community would impose sanctions are low, given the state of today's international arena.

This dissonance—between the fast pace of technological development of AWS and the increasing demand for them, on the one hand, and the slow pace

of international action in limiting or banning them, on the other—suggests that AWS for military and security ends will indeed be ubiquitous in the international arena within the next two decades. We must therefore examine the possible effects that they might have on various spheres, including the nature of the international arena itself.

The Proliferation of AWS and Its Possible Effects on the Battlefield—Money, Pace, Human Involvement, and Human Life

The probability that, in the future, we will see the proliferation of AWS and their use in military and security settings around the world means that we must consider their impact beyond the legal and moral issues currently debated. AWS will not only change considerations made in life-and-death decisions but also will affect warfare and the entire international system. This section seeks to highlight several areas that could be affected and additional features associated with these systems.

At the most fundamental level, AWS will transform an aspect of warfare that has characterized it since the dawn of history: the need for human involvement, whether directly, by being present in the battlefield itself or indirectly, by operating a weapon or weapons systems from afar. Operating weapons from a distance—whether primitive ones such as traps or cannons, which has prevented face-to-face combat only to a limited degree, or more advanced weapons, such as standoff fire, used extensively since the RMA (revolution in military affairs) of the 1990s—still leaves people deeply involved in fighting, even if it has, at times, kept the danger at bay.

Even today's most advanced warfare requires people to use their cognitive capabilities as well as their decision-making skills. This involvement gradually diminishes as systems have become more autonomous; in addition to protecting soldiers' lives and preventing physical harm, these systems protect soldiers both mentally and emotionally, as the systems make decisions without requiring any human involvement. Although autonomous systems do not necessarily protect humans against lethal physical threats of all sorts—as civilians in the rear are often harmed during violent confrontations—the removal of people from the battlefield is the greatest change in military history.

The removal of people from the battlefield and the capabilities of the AWS have rendered the pace of performance beyond human ability. A

contemporary example is the Iron Dome system: It can autonomously calculate the flight path of a rocket and the right location for intercepting a missile faster than is humanly possible, no matter how skilled, trained, or gifted any person is.[31] These systems are also capable of operating jointly with other systems in groups or swarms, communicating pieces of data necessary for cooperation, with inhuman speed and accuracy. These capabilities makes it possible to perform tasks effectively and efficiently, without affecting the pace of implementation. Also, given that these systems are unmanned and even autonomous, when operating in groups or swarms, they may "decide" to sacrifice some of the parts so that the mission will succeed, done without feeling and free of ramifications beyond the success of the mission itself. This greatly enhances the effectiveness of operating in groups, as compared to other solutions that cannot be implemented in the era of human warfare, or only rarely, but at the cost of human lives.

In parallel, the cost of warfare may also change drastically. On the one hand, the cost of development and acquisition of future systems could be high, not unlike the current cost of equipping armies with today's most advanced technologies, such as the F-35 stealth plane, various aerial defense systems, and advanced ground or naval systems. But, on the other hand, it is worth remembering that the cost of unmanned systems (including autonomous ones) is lower than the cost of manned systems, because they do not necessarily have to be fitted with defensive systems. When it comes to swarms, it seems that the cost of the individual parts will be relatively low as part of these systems' concept of their development and operation. Thus, generally speaking, despite the initial development and acquisition costs, in the long term, they have the potential to keep costs at present rates or even less.

The three changes presented herein are not the only ones that AWS will bring to the future. Those three changes, however, have the potential to radically affect key areas that relate to violent confrontations in the international arena as well as in other areas that have experienced minor evolutionary changes slowly over hundreds of years. Here we must ask how these changes might go beyond the battlefield and affect the international arena.

Possible Effects of AWS on the International Arena

Given the unique features of AWS and the description of the probable battlefield of the future, we must ask if—beyond the battlefield—these systems have the potential to affect the international arena as we know it today and as dictated, inter alia, by the way in which contemporary violent confrontations are conducted. While AWS have the obvious potential to dramatically affect the battlefield and warfare in general, the proliferation of AWS could also have influence aspects of the international arena as well, as discussed below.

Power relations in the international arena

Based on the realist approach in the study of international relations, power and the desire to acquire and preserve power are thought of as the central motivations in the international arena. Joseph Nye claims that realists come in all sizes and shapes, but all tend to think that global politics are power politics.[32] And, although power is a concept that is difficult to define, people experience it in their daily routines; even the fact that it cannot always be accurately measured does not detract from its importance in many aspects of life, including international relations.

One scholar who tried to break the concept into its constituent parts is Hans J. Morgenthau who considers power not only as the ability to make use of military force but in a broader sense. In his book *Politics Among Nations*, he enumerates the components of power and divides them into immutable ones, such as geography and population, and mutable ones, such as the quality of a given governance. The widespread proliferation and increased use of AWS could affect some of these components. The first is population. Without considering the effect of population size on state power, Morgenthau distinguishes between quantity and quality and claims that a nation that has a majority population in the twenty to forty age bracket will be more successful than a nation that is composed mostly of older people, even though the latter country may be larger.[33] The twenty to forty age bracket represents the majority of the workforce and also of any combat force; in a battlefield consisting mostly of AWS, however, it would be possible to amass power without the population factor or with far fewer humans than in the past.

Autonomous systems are developing in fields other than the military and that they, too, may enable a state with a small or older population to possess relatively great power. Also as the military becomes based on autonomous systems, other areas will too. Therefore, much wider changes in achieving power may occur, because of the effects that these systems will have on manufacturing, services, and more, which will be completely independent of population size.

These same aspects affect another essential component—military readiness—which Morgenthau discusses as influencing state power. According to Morgenthau, this component gives real importance to a state's geography, natural resources, and manufacturing capabilities in relation to its power. For Morgenthau, readiness is highly dependent on technological innovation, leadership, and the quality of the armed forces.[34] As for AWS, technological innovation will play a greater role than ever and will help overcome other challenges that have characterized the need to maintain military readiness. Military readiness through technological means may carry a hefty financial price tag, but the demands are less than those of a human force. In other words, technological innovation may affect the ability to amass power regardless of the population and by not relying upon humans. Both examples here indicate that the proliferation of AWS bears the potential to undermine the accepted power relations between nations, which have been based on certain principles and components for the last centuries, because of the indirect impact of AWS on those very same principles and components.

The growing gap between developed and underdeveloped nations in the ability to go to war

Historically, a nation's economy and technological development have affected its ability to go to war and to be victorious, but now it seems that the gap between economically and technologically developed and underdeveloped nations is only growing. If, in the past, advantages in certain areas (such as quantity and courage) may have compensated, to some extent, for economic and technological disadvantages, this has radically changed since the industrial revolution and certainly since the RMA in the 1990s. In fact, some claim, for example, that the same gap between the United States and Iraq was among the factors that led to the wave of global terrorism and expressed

the inability of certain nations to confront others on the battlefield because of the enormous gap in their respective conventional capabilities.[35]

The transition to an era of AWS—in which the pace of warfare will outstrip human capacity and basic warfare concepts, such as decisive victory, will change—could radically widen this gap even more than it is today. The gap is expected to grow in two ways. The new era could make it even more difficult for sub-state organizations to operate in the international arena, thus sending them to seek out even more desperate measures than they have used to date. Some states, which in the past were capable of confronting their enemies, may also find themselves in an inferior position, thus forcing them to take desperate measures, such as terrorism or other means, even more so than in the past.

Similar challenges are also liable to serve as an incentive—although hardly the only one—for the appearance of an AWS black market where, presumably, those who fail to develop or acquire higher quality systems, out of desperation, could purchase inferior ones, in terms of safety, reliability, differentiation capacities, and more. An AWS black market could have extremely negative ramifications for the international arena and undermine its stability as a whole. This phenomena could even pose more risks to peace and international stability than the general arms race, which will undoubtedly occur.

Shifting considerations regarding violent conflicts, apathy to politics, and trigger-happy warfare

In the long term, two additional changes may affect economic and political aspects of warfare and violent conflicts. First, reduced human involvement in the battlefield most likely will significantly lower the cost of war. This could have far-reaching consequences, especially for nations that have had to call up reserves or divert large parts of the workforce to fighting. This could also dramatically reduce the cost of treating wounded combatants and supporting the survivors of combatants killed in battle.

Second, in the nations that will extensively use AWS, civilians may express apathy to politics, which will allow leaders to act without considering public opinion. If conflicts cease to pose a risk to human life, then the major interest in pursuing war will become financial. However, if conflicts continue to threaten civilians in the rear and on the other side of the conflict (as is the

case in current asymmetrical warfare), both civilian involvement and public opinion will still be important. For the same reasons, upon deciding to get involved in a conflict, leaders may reach the point of becoming trigger-happy. But, here too, if conflicts continue to affect human life, whether they are civilians in the state that operates the AWS or on the opposing side, this phenomenon will be limited, despite the changes that AWS will generate.

Conclusion

Within two decades, autonomous weapon systems could become widespread and could constitute a key factor in the future battlefield, given developments in technology and the difficulty in creating an effective international security regime to limit their proliferation. Based on this assumption, this article sought to engage in a theoretical analysis of the possible effects the proliferation of AWS could have in the future battlefield and in the international arena.

The article argued that the AWS will lead to changes in the various parameters currently applied to warfare. Three key parameters were described here: the financial and economic factors consequent to extensive AWS proliferation; the pace of fighting; and human involvement and human lives. In the last parameter, we can expect far-reaching changes. Based on these changes, it has been argued that the possible effects on the international arena could include the ability to amass power even in the absence of factors, such as population, which were indispensable in the past; a growing gap between developed and underdeveloped states/non-state organizations in the ability to participate in armed conflicts and defend themselves; and the set of considerations likely to guide leaders and states as they decide upon getting involved in a violent confrontation or going to war. Based on the above, it has been claimed that, theoretically, AWS have the ability to influence the international arena at a level beyond which the battlefield and warfare themselves currently do. Given these claims, it seems these systems will have much greater potential to influence the legal and moral context than the contemporary discourse on the subject has suggested.

The possible changes outlined herein and the future impact of AWS indicate an increase in the importance of technology over other factors that used to be more significant in relation to warfare and the international arena. Furthermore, as in the past—in the case of the technological revolution on whose edge we currently stand—nations that fail to bridge the technological

gap and consequently suffer from inferiority in the international arena might turn to different directions with possibly catastrophic results. As long as effective limitation on the development and use of AWS seems unlikely in the near future, it is imperative that we be prepared to deal with them while it is still feasible to do so.

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The State as a Double Agent:
National Security Versus Privacy and the State's Role in Cyberspace in the United States

Ido Sivan-Sevilla

How does legislation and regulation in the United States structure the relationship between national security and privacy in the digital era? To answer this question, a database was created, consisting of all relevant federal laws and regulations (86 in all) issued between 1967 and 2016. Each one was classified by the degree to which it represented a contradiction or congruence between national security and privacy. The findings reveal changes favoring national security over privacy in three different timespans before and after the digital era and indicate significant gaps in promoting national security and privacy in the civilian business sector. These findings may be due to three factors: 1) the changing role of business in promoting national security and privacy in cyberspace, including the lack of overlapping interests between the business sector and civil society; 2) asymmetrical power relations favoring the executive branch of government over that of Congress; and 3) the decisive effect of security agencies and technology monopolies hindering the advancement of cyberspace policies that would strengthen both national security and privacy. This article empirically tracks the dual and paradoxical role of the state in cyber issues; on the one hand, the state goes to great lengths to promote cybersecurity, safeguard privacy, and protect national security. On the other hand, the state exploits cyberspace to gather information while it violates privacy in order to attain "higher" national security goals.

Keywords: National security, privacy, cybersecurity, regulation, risk management

Introduction

This article focuses on the way the federal government in the United States structures the relationship between national security and privacy in the digital era. On the one hand, technology allows a country to undertake mass surveillance and deepen the conflict between national security and privacy. On the other hand, technology provides an infrastructure through which it is possible simultaneously to promote national security and privacy by strengthening the cybersecurity of federal government systems and sensitive systems in the financial and healthcare sectors, which contain massive amount of private, personal information. This article finds that national security and privacy both clash and complement one another, thus making it possible to expose the state's dual role, which, in the digital era, promotes and violates privacy at the same time. A review of the literature indicates that state efforts to promote privacy protection in cyberspace and the measure of control over the executive's power in the digital era have yet to be studied in-depth and empirically. This research strives to fill some of this lacuna and examines when there is congruence or contradiction between the two objectives over time. The purpose of this article is to clarify how two complementary yet contradictory objectives relate to one another over time in public policy processes within a democratic nation.

Methodologically, the article tracks federal legislation, executive orders, state agency instructions, state strategies, and important court decisions in the US federal arena between 1967 and 2016 (86 manifestations in all), classified by the degree to which each one represents a contradiction or congruence between national security and privacy. The article then explains the definitions of national security used herein and the methodology for measuring congruence and contradiction. It should be clarified that the article examines both state efforts in promoting cybersecurity and privacy as important factors in advancing national security as well as information gathering at the expense of privacy ostensibly carried out in order to increase national security. The findings indicate that since the 1990s, policy changes have placed greater emphasis on national security than on privacy. These changes in policy have been observed in each branch of the federal government. In the 1990s, the executive branch, which was significantly restricted by Congress in the 1970s, began allowing state surveillance to the detriment of privacy thanks to controversial court decisions in camera and by means of

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intervening in the architecture of technological products to allow constant state surveillance while the checks and balances were ineffective.[1] The executive branch changed its role from being a balancing party trying to mediate between national security and privacy in the 1970s and 1980s to one that passes laws encouraging the state to gather data without adequate enforcement in the business sector, which also relies on the same gathering of data. The judiciary, whose rulings in the 1970s and 1980s led to important laws strengthening privacy, has not had any fundamental impact since then.

The literature on policy and regulations related to cybersecurity and security in general and information gathering designed for national security in particular is surprisingly sparse and does not track decision making on the subject. Some researchers refer to the state's contradictory role, although their explanations of the factors affecting this trend in policy are limited.[2] Other researchers deal with only one state function, either in the field of cybersecurity[3] or cybersecurity and national security,[4] and provide limited explanations covering a short time frame of decision making on the issue. By contrast, the present research considers national security and privacy as important parts of the whole and tracks policy processes that shape the contradiction and congruence over a period of five decades. Furthermore, it contributes to an understanding of the role of the state in the digital era

and provides an analytical framework through which one may understand the wealth of regulations and laws structuring the relationship between national security and privacy in society. Despite the repeated claims of the retreat of the state in the neoliberal era, we can see, in fact, significant state intervention in the shaping and regulating of this important relationship.

The findings presented herein challenge the assumption that the 9/11 terrorist attack was the major reason why national security was given priority over privacy in the United States. Even though the US Department of Justice announced a change in its policy strategy after the attacks—from the minimizing of criminal damage to overall prevention through systematic surveillance and information gathering[5]—the trend to prioritize national security over privacy had already emerged in the 1990s. While the war on terrorism certainly supported this trend, other factors, such as business interests, power struggles between the executive and legislative branches of government, and the rising influence of intelligence agencies and the technology monopolies on the privacy of citizens from the mid-1990s, affected this imbalance.

This article is divided into four parts. The first offers a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between privacy and national security by conceptualizing privacy, security, and surveillance. The second part surveys the theoretical literature about the state as a risk manager that structures the relationship between national security and privacy, including a discussion of the methodology for measuring this relationship over time. The third part presents the findings themselves and discusses the state's dual roles in using cyberspace for promoting national security at the expense of privacy and for defending cyberspace, thus promoting both privacy protection and national security at the same time. The fourth part discusses the findings and gives recommendations for the future.

Defining Basic Concepts

Security, privacy, and surveillance are fundamental concepts for structuring the article's analysis and discussion. As these terms may be understood in different ways, this section aims to clarify the definitions used. Let us begin with the term "privacy." In stark contrast to the insufficient way in which privacy is promoted in US public policy[6] —that is, in a sectorial manner, using models of self-regulation with only partial enforcement—privacy as a

right appears in the Fourth Amendment of the US constitution and much has been written about it. Some conceptualize privacy through the importance of the physical location that allows it to be obtained; that is, privacy is a function of location. According to this definition, people are entitled to absolute privacy in their homes. Others view privacy as the measure of control people have over their own private, personal information. Some feel that privacy is a matter of freedom over one's body and thoughts rather than an individual's location or private data. Bygrave tried to make sense of these different definitions of privacy by putting them in four major groups. The first group focuses on non-intervention, determining that privacy is the ability to respect the desire of an individual not to be exposed (the first to state this were Warren and Brandeis in 1890).[7] The second group define privacy by addressing how much control the subjects of the information have over their own data.[8] The third group conceptualizes privacy by the way of access to an individual, claiming that privacy has to do with bodily intimacy and freedom of thought. Gavison defines these ways of access using three parameters: the confidentiality of personal information, the level of isolation matching the individual's desire, and anonymity.[9] This group broadly conceptualizes the term so that it also extends to mental health, autonomy, growth, creativity, and individuals' ability to create meaningful relationships. Based on this definition, individuals cannot, in the absence of privacy, control their ability of self-presentation or the ways they manage social relationships. The fourth group conceptualizes privacy through intimate information. Innes claims that privacy is the ability to control intimate decision making at the individual level.[10] This article focuses on the second group, which conceptualizes privacy through control of private information. Nonetheless, as a concept, privacy has a much broader framework when the above definitions are not independent of one another. For the sake of simplification, it will later be claimed that the violation of privacy is the illegal or non-transparent gathering of personal data and does not require proof of damage by the subject of the information collected.

"Security" is no less elusive or broad. Unlike privacy, security is traditionally understood as the goal of the dominant policy around which the domains of public policy, public opinion, power relations, and public budgets are shaped.[11] The political philosopher Thomas Hobbes viewed security as the sovereign's uppermost objective. Waldron expands the definition to include

more than just physical safety. He claims that security allows certainty, freedom from fears, and mental peace and quiet for individuals. According to Waldron, security is the infrastructure through which individuals may enjoy other rights.[12] The political philosopher John Locke may have been the first to define the tension between security and liberty. Ensuring liberties, he wrote, is insufficient unless there is a sense of security that makes it possible to enjoy them. But if security itself violates liberty, the rationale for its promotion in the first place is undermined. Waldron goes on to distinguish between two types of security. The first is security at the individual level, which he defines as human rights generally attained by state intervention. In this case, in order to ensure state and social structures that safeguard their security, individuals understand that they must pay some sort of tax. This type of security goes beyond physical safety to include both cultural and social security and the individual's ability to lead his life as he wishes. The second type of security is at the group level and refers to the security provided by the state, its institutions, and the distribution of security among the population. This type of security raises questions about the constraints an individual is willing to accept for the purpose of collective security. Individuals may be forced to pay a price that does not necessarily improve their personal security but rather enhances the security of others in the population. This article adopts the definition of security at the group level, as this distinction between personal and collective security is useful and will reappear in the conclusion.

Having covered privacy and security, we now turn to surveillance, which, in practice, is one of the routine methods for increasing national security at the expense of privacy. The widespread approach links surveillance to modernity and uses the concept to explain the problems of privacy in the digital era.[13] Surveillance is not necessarily connected to personal information in the private sphere but rather to systematic information gathering and analysis of individuals' behavior in order to predict their future actions. In the technological era, surveillance has become a tool for states and private players to discipline citizens and create new forms of governance. Justifications for surveillance include personal and collective safety and security in the face of terrorism and public disorder. Surveillance of citizens affects not only their privacy but also their opportunities and the lifestyle they choose. When it comes to surveillance, privacy suddenly seems to become a limited

concept that does not properly describe the systematic information gathering that occurs now. The concept of privacy was more suitable to the era when society shifted from paper to computerized databases but irrelevant to an era in which systems are amassing data about all of our daily activities. The concept of surveillance in this article reflects the systematic violation of privacy by state institutions and private companies without the consent of those subjected to surveillance.

Literature Review and Methodology

The complex relationship between security and privacy is a function of the broader theoretical literature on security and liberty in the West.[14] The distinction between personal and collective security reveals only some of the complexity. While collective security is the infrastructure through which individuals may enjoy liberty, state systems are aggressive in dealing with threats to collective security, which is the antithesis of liberty and also contradicts security. Therefore, security and privacy are not independent of one another, and both are of social and collective value to society.[15] With the expansion of cyberspace and modern society's dependence on the digital sphere, the challenge of preserving and safeguarding privacy has only intensified. In terms of physical safety, the traditional threats simply have adapted themselves to the new environment. Cybercrime, commercial hacking companies, and state espionage have all contributed to insecurity in the new sphere. At the same time, governments and commercial companies exploit technological abilities to gather information and surveil, as well as promote security, efficiency, and commercial interests at the expense of privacy. This article tracks these clashing and complementary objectives and tries to understand the dual role of the state as an entity that promotes both national security and privacy through cybersecurity and cyber data while also gathering information for the purpose of national security at the expense of privacy.

The state's dual role as society's risk manager in the field of public policy during the digital era surprisingly has barely been studied. These two objectives of the state have not been properly conceptualized nor are the decision-making processes understood. Deibert and Rohozinski refer to this contradiction and distinguish between risks to "security cyberspace," which are handled by standards and protection of data integrity and reliability, and risks related

to "use of cyberspace" for promoting other aims. They describe how states tend to commit political oppression and violate privacy and data security of individuals in order to ensure stability and the preservation of the existing social order and point out an important distinction about the contradiction in the different roles of the state in the digital era.[16] Nonetheless, this distinction does not help us understand the source of the contradiction in policy processes and regularization of these issues. Mendez and Mendez provide more concrete explanations about policy processes behind the conflict in the state's role.[17] They consider laws and regulations that simultaneously promote and threaten privacy, claiming that both roles manifest the concentration of state power. In their explanations, they emphasize the commercial threat to the United States posed by European privacy laws, seeing it as the incentive for changing the permissive privacy policy in favor of restraint and enforcement in the form of the Federal Trade Commission. They then try to explain privacy violations in the name of national security by referring to new threats, such as the war on terrorism, which led to solutions that violate privacy without any congressional oversight. While the focus on the contradiction inherent in the state's role is important, their work relies on a limited empirical study. They do not refer to changes in the federal arena over time and they do not examine cyberspace policy as one that promotes both privacy and national security. This narrow perspective prevents the authors from considering factors other than the 9/11 terrorist attacks that led to violations of privacy, and they fail to deal with the role of commercial interests in the digital sphere. If the terrorist attacks in 2001 were, in fact, the primary factor in disrupting the balance between national security and privacy, why do we observe the dominance of national security over privacy already in the mid-1990s? What was the role of the various federal authorities in instituting policy on the issue?

In addition to these studies that focus on the dual roles of the state as safeguarding privacy and national security on the one hand and gathering information to protect national security on the other, a lot of research focuses only on one aspect of the state's role in the digital era and not on a more comprehensive relationship. Those who study privacy and data protection explain the lack of privacy by claiming that decision makers understand privacy as an individual value rather than a public one or as a result of the institutional inability to promote privacy at the federal level.[18] Although

these studies have contributed to our understanding of policy processes, they are now dated, as they focus only on the 1970s and 1980s. What these researchers viewed as insufficient data protection is understood now as being the golden era of privacy protection in the United States, as it was followed by serious privacy violations by both the state and the commercial sector. A later study, by Newman and Bach, analyzes the incentives for establishing self-regulation of data protection in the United States.[19] They claim that the lack of significant threats and the high cost of regulation led to frequent partnerships in industry in order to avoid state regulation. While Newman and Bach shed light on US market access, it is not clear why the approach was adopted in the first place. The researchers do not address the serious ramifications that the self-regulatory model by commercial companies had on privacy, which led to the commercialization of personal information that we are witnessing today.

Finally, researchers dealing with cybersecurity as a means of promoting privacy do not advance our understanding of the related policy processes. Etzioni explains the ramifications stemming from the private players' unwillingness to assume regulatory commitments.[20] Hiller and Russell provide a vague explanation for the self-regulation model by referring to the US regulatory culture, which traditionally tends to favor businesses.[21] By contrast, Bamberger and Mulligan's important study, which tries to study what lies behind the regulatory directive, discovers that, in practice, the regulatory flexibility and the vacuum even in information protection has led to a fascinating discourse and the protection of data by Data Protection Officers that goes beyond state requirements.[22] Still, the subject of that study is the state and the research approach advocated is the attempt to understand how a state, as an entity unto itself, structures the relationship between national security and privacy. While some companies may take advantage of regulatory flexibility to impose more stringent directives, others exploit this flexibility to invest the bare minimum in their customers' information protection and privacy. Therefore, examining the state directives and regulations is the basis for understanding the state's role in cyberspace.

A review of the literature shows the lack of studies about the state's dual function in the digital era over time. Absent is any reference to national security and privacy as two pieces comprising the whole, contradicting and complementing one another at the same time. Therefore, in order to

track the relationship between national security and privacy at the federal level in the United States, this article is based on original data containing 86 policy manifestations, defined as the sum total of all relevant legislation and regulation documents from 1967 to 2016, including primary legislation, secondary legislation, executive orders, important court decisions, decisions by the National Security Council, and strategy documents. Each policy manifestation refers to data gathering by the state for the intent of national security at the expense of privacy; limitations on the way states can gather information because of privacy protection; and possible ways to promote information and cybersecurity, which would advance both national security and privacy in the digital era. Therefore, the article's methodological approach is broad and includes issues of national security, law enforcement, and cybersecurity, which together comprise the way the state structures the relationship between national security and privacy in the digital era. This approach allows a wide understanding of the dynamics between national security and privacy and the state's dual role. The starting point selected for examining the relevant events is the Supreme Court ruling of 1967 (Katz v. the United States), which, for the first time, granted constitutional protection to the right to privacy.[23] The decision created a chain reaction leading to the establishment of policy on national security and privacy that has shaped the regulatory landscape as we know it today.

Every policy manifestation in the database was classified according to three different categories reflecting the relationship between national security and privacy, as shown in table 1 below. The first category consists of 33 policy manifestations between 1984 and 2016 that simultaneously strengthened national security and privacy in the digital era through cybersecurity and information protection. These are primarily laws and regulations promoting cyberspace and information protection in government, healthcare, and financial systems. The second category consists of 31 policy manifestations between 1976 and 2015 that expanded the state's ability to gather information for the purpose of national security at the expense of privacy. These are primarily directives and laws helping security and intelligence agencies exploit cyberspace for other security needs. The third category consists of 21 policy manifestations between 1967 and 2016 that limited the state, representing a compromise between national security and privacy. More precisely, they mainly are policies from the 1970s and 1980s that limited the

Table 1: Classification of policy events according to the conceptual relationship between national security and privacy

		Privacy	
		+	-
National security	+	**Congruence between national security and privacy (33 manifestations):** Regulation and policy dealing with cybersecurity and information protection, which strengthen national security and privacy simultaneously (e.g., setting standards for protecting healthcare, financial, and government systems).	**National security at the expense of privacy (31 manifestations):** Mostly national security and law enforcement policy promoting data gathering, which weakens the technological infrastructures for the sake of national security at the expense of privacy (e.g., the 2001 Patriot Act, permitting extensive information gathering in the name of national security at the expense of privacy).
	-	**Compromise between national security and privacy (21 manifestations):** Policy manifestations limiting state information gathering for the intent of national security (e.g., a 1978 law creating a system of checks and balances for intelligence agencies' information gathering).	

way national security and intelligence agencies could exploit cyberspace. Despite what was said in the literature, these policy manifestations are not on the same axis or level. Each category is important for understanding the overall relationship between national security and privacy in the digital era in which the state is both the solution for strengthening regularization in cyberspace and privacy protection and also the problem, as it represents a constant threat to privacy as it seeks to strengthen national security.

Findings

The State's First Function: National Security ≠ Privacy

The state exploits cyberspace for information gathering for the sake of strengthening national security at the expense of privacy
Figure 1 below describes the change affecting the relationship between national security and privacy as it is structured by the state before and after the digital era. Starting in the mid-1990s, it is possible to identify a clear trend at the federal level of preferring national security over privacy. By

counting the policy manifestations each year, figure 1 presents the quantitative difference between policy that limits information gathering by security and intelligence agencies for the sake of protecting privacy and policy that encourages information gathering for strengthening national security at the expense of privacy. Restrictions on information gathering include new arrangements and laws creating accountability, reporting obligations, and limiting criteria that must be considered when information is gathered for the purpose of national security. Encouraging information gathering includes reducing or bending these limits or demanding technological changes, such as reduced encryption for information gathering by intelligence agencies. The key weakness of this figure is that it only describes quantitative change in the trend and ignores the significance of each of the regulations and laws examined. Nonetheless, a bird's-eye-view of the federal regulations can indicate a changing trend. In the 1970s and 1980s, the federal arena was characterized by many more policy manifestations that struck a compromise between national security and privacy (the line above the X axis), but, from the mid-1990s, the line has been generally below the X axis, representing a quantitative preference for national security over privacy.


Figure 1: (Policy promoting privacy) – (policy promoting security) every year, 1967–2016

In order to understand and explain what was behind the post-1990s trend evident in figure 1, it is necessary to examine the functioning of the relevant federal authorities and business groups. From the mid-1990s, the executive branch began to remove obstacles to information gathering and

successfully used its political clout to exploit cyberspace for its needs. During the 1960s and 1970s, the executive branch had lost its public legitimacy to violate privacy for the purpose of national security, following the discovery of espionage cases for political purposes that involved American citizens. Congress appointed investigating committees, such as the Church Committee, which, by the time they had completed their hearings, recommended imposing significant limitations on information gathering in order to increase privacy. These recommendations turned into legislative bills that became law in the 1970s and 1980s and greatly limited information-gathering methods. Even the executive branch itself, by means of executive orders issued by Presidents Ford and Carter in the late 1970s, imposed limits on information gathering due to privacy concerns.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, the legitimacy for information gathering changed. Public protest over privacy protection had died down and the war on terrorism gradually took center stage, justifying violations of privacy for the sake of national security. The executive lifted constitutional obstacles and rendered mechanisms for supervising information gathering irrelevant. This trend started as early as 1981 when President Reagan issued a controversial executive order (No. 12333), which authorized information gathering beyond US borders, including information about American citizens, without any significant oversight. While the directive applied to events outside the United States, it had a major impact on the privacy of American citizens in the global internet environment that grew exponentially in the mid-1990s.

The digital era blurred sovereign borders. Companies such as Google and Yahoo began storing personal information wherever it was economically most convenient for them, without regard for their customers' sovereign nations. Thus, information about American citizens may be stored in Asia or Europe and therefore—based on that executive order—be subject to search. The permissive nature of the executive order granted the National Security Agency (NSA) the legitimacy to create internet surveillance programs and to gather information about many American citizens. In practice, that executive order allows unsupervised information gathering also by Congress and the judiciary, without requiring the consent of the commercial company that originally had collected the information. The information gathered includes not just headlines but also content, without requiring that the intelligence agencies provide any evidence indicating the need for intelligence gathering.[24]

Furthermore, the attorney general's directives of 1983, 1989, and 2002 expanded the states' mandate to gather information without any orderly state discourse or procedure and without the necessary checks and balances. An extreme example of preferring national security over privacy was the surveillance programs that operated between 2001 and 2007 under President George W. Bush. On his own initiative, the president decided to approve and execute surveillance of US citizens in stark contravention of existing privacy laws. The programs were secretly operated by various intelligence agencies and were partly stopped only after the *New York Times* exposed them in 2005.[25] Over the years, the US administration also expanded the use of the so-called National Security Letters, unique policy tools that could gather information from civilian companies during emergencies. As is often the case, the use of "emergency" tools became almost routine in state information-gathering efforts, exceeding the legislator's intent that established them within the context of financial information through the Financial Privacy Act of 1978.

Since the mid-1990s, the legislative branch has also been an important player in the changing trend of privileging national security over privacy. In the 1970s and 1980s, the US Congress actively limited information gathering on US citizens for the purpose of national security. Most activity was carried out through specially appointed committees, such as the Church Committee and the Pike Committee, and the important legislation that followed their recommendations, such as the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). However, starting in the mid-1990s, Congress started passing laws that breached the limits imposed in previous years. Only in 2015, for the first time in three decades, Congress passed the USA Freedom Act that limits information gathering for the sake of national security. Over the last twenty years, those who championed privacy in Congress were weakened and subordinated to national security decision makers. Congress shifted from mediating between privacy and national security to backing the administration by supporting information gathering at the expense of privacy. For example, starting in the mid-1990s, Congress allowed very aggressive legislation on surveillance and green-lighted "temporary" practices that rapidly became permanent. The Patriot Act following 9/11 may have been the most conspicuous of such laws, but it was not alone. The amendments to FISA in 2007 and 2008 also

reflected the trend of weakening the limitations on information gathering and preferring national security over privacy. The trend is manifested, inter alia, in a blurring of boundaries between information gathering for national security and information gathering for crime prevention. While the latter used to be closely supervised and required good reason demonstrating that the information would help an ongoing investigation, the former was never subject to such limits and had always been conducted more freely. But, starting in the 2000s, the boundaries between the two were blurred by the Patriot Act, leading to privacy violations for the sake of national security. Information gathering on behalf of national security in order to enforce the law allows surveillance of US citizens without appropriate checks and balances.

Finally, since the mid-1990s, even the judiciary in the United States has preferred national security over privacy. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the courts paved the way for several laws through important rulings that either promoted or violated privacy. One key example is the precedent-setting 1967 decision (Katz v. the United States 389 US 347), which determined that the right to privacy is embedded in the Fourth Amendment and applies to any person regardless of physical location. This ruling was the basis for the first privacy protection law, passed in 1968, and was binding during the gathering of information in order to prevent crime (The Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control Act). A second ruling from 1976 (The United States v. Miller 425 US 435) harmed privacy, which in turn led to legislation that reigned in that violation. The ruling stated that people are not entitled to privacy protection by a third-party supplier if they provided them with information on their own free will. In response, in 1968, Congress passed the ECPA to strengthen privacy in the emerging tech-based communications channels.

In contrast, by the 1990s and 2000s, the role of the court had been marginalized. Through a number of cases, the judiciary imposed limitations on information gathering using practices reserved for emergencies, such as the National Security Letters, but these limitations were few. Most of the time, the courts were unsuccessful in limiting privacy violations or stopping intensive state information gathering during the onset of the war on terrorism. On the contrary, through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts (FISC)—courts specifically designated to approve information-gathering orders—the judiciary helped the state in its surveillance efforts. In these discussions, the judges—lacking the technological knowledge

needed to understand the issues at hand—approved unusual and controversial NSA requests for information gathering. These approvals allowed other intelligence agencies to further expand their own surveillance. Looking at the last four decades through a wide-angled lens, one can sweepingly conclude that the judiciary shifted from delivering important decisions that affected legislation to advance privacy in the 1970s and 1980s, to issuing marginal rulings or those that encouraged surveillance to advance national security in the 1990s and 2000s.

Beyond the actions of the various branches of government in structuring the relationship between national security and privacy, the business interests of data communications companies had a decisive effect on the new trend. In the 1970s and 1980s, privacy protection by these companies was considered a commercial advantage in a developing market. Lobbyists for the communications companies worked with civil society representatives to help pass legislation that would limit surveillance and protect customer privacy. Privacy protection laws that passed with the support of these groups included the Financial Privacy Act of 1978 and ECPA in 1986. Starting in the 1990s, however, the partnership between civil society representatives and company lobbyists dissolved as their interests diverged. The turning point was in 1994, when Congress, led and pressured by the FBI, passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). The law demanded that commercial companies allow law enforcement agencies to gather information from their communications infrastructures by changing working interfaces so that states now had access to all US citizens' communications data. The legislature provided business owners with handsome compensation, and they fell in line and acceded to state demands for information. The close relationship of the security establishment—including the intelligence agencies—with business owners in the United States intensified through the 1990s and 2000s. Most of this cooperation is not done openly. What we do know is the high number of joint ventures around the use of the National Security Letters for information gathering and the mandate that internet providers were given thanks to the Patriot Act to surveil their customers based on minimal justification.

In recent times, thanks to Edward Snowden's revelations, we have seen the emergence of a new trend. The interests of commercial companies and civil society over privacy are once again aligning. For example, we can

point to Apple's refusal to crack the encryption on the cell phone belonging to the San Bernardino terrorist and Microsoft's rebuff of law enforcement demands to reveal customer information stored in servers in Ireland, outside US jurisdiction. In both instances, privacy considerations outweighed state desire to gather information on behalf of increasing national security. In 2013, there was an attempt to pass CALEA II, named after the first law on the subject from 1994, but it encountered fierce opposition from the communications industry, as privacy has once again become a business and competitive advantage for commercial companies and a way of winning over consumers.

The State's Second Function: Congruence Between National Security and Privacy

The state promotes cybersecurity and privacy protection, simultaneously strengthening national security

Parallel to the state's efforts to exploit cyberspace to gather information for the purpose of national security while also violating individuals' privacy, the state has also carried out extensive regulation and legislation to jointly promote national security and privacy through the strengthening of cybersecurity. This work is limited and only partly advanced, however, due to the predominance of business interests in this field. From a broader perspective based on three decades, three key components can be discerned: First, national security and privacy protection efforts through the strengthening of cybersecurity are focused on very specific sectors. As part of the traditional American approach of regulatory non-intervention in business, commercial companies and communications services are bound only by voluntary guidelines that do not sufficiently strengthen neither national security nor privacy. Second, the administration's attitude to the internet economy, since its inception, has been one of non-intervention, making it possible to gather private information for commercial purposes. This generated the institutional conditions for today's massive commercialization of private information by the giant data monopolies, such as Google and Facebook, and the mortal blow dealt by commercial companies to consumer privacy. Third, some examples of regulation whose purpose is to strengthen cybersecurity also violate privacy. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) of late 2015 permits information gathering without a court order in order

to concentrate information about cyber threats in the business sector and generate a defensive response ahead of time.

The following section is divided into two parts, explaining the limited protection of privacy and national security through data system protections and the inherent contradiction between cybersecurity and privacy in the role of the state.

Preserving national security and privacy by sector and in a limited fashion

The need to secure computerized systems and digital data has been a major concern for federal decision makers in the United States since the mid-1980s.[26] Despite the tremendous growth of the internet economy, however, the state promotes national security and privacy on a sector-by-sector basis limited to healthcare, financial services, and the federal government itself, while increasing society's dependence on a stable, functioning cyberspace. While most regulatory obligations imposed by the state affect the sectors viewed as critical to state functioning, the other industries—representing the bulk of cyberspace—are handled by self-regulation and a policy that does not pose a hardship to industries. Figure 2 below describes the federal government's ineffectiveness to promote a robust cross-sector cyberspace, which would in turn ensure better national security and greater privacy. While the government does a great job protecting itself, it abandons industry and commercial companies to their own voluntary protective practices.[27]


Figure 2: Federal policy on privacy protection and cybersecurity (1974–2016)

Business owners managed to avoid being included in binding data protection regulation at a very early stage. The Privacy Act of 1974 was passed by Congress based on the understanding of the importance of preserving personal information in state hands. During the debates preceding the passage of the law, commercial companies claimed there was no real evidence that they had committed privacy violations. Their working assumption was that they were already collapsing under the burden of regulatory demands; the bill was not needed and would only further add to that burden.[28] Their strategy was to urge commercial companies to adopt self-regulation, thus reduce the burden of government regulation on business owners. The business sector also opposed the establishment of a federal agency to enforce customer privacy. In fact, the Senate bill, which included the establishment of such an enforcement agency, was shelved. Finally, the law that was passed in 1974 included minimal privacy protection discussed at the time. The trend continued until the mid-1990s, when the federal government responded to the growing internet economy by establishing regulation for the protection of privacy and cyberspace—and thus also national security—in only some of the branches of the business sector (healthcare, finances, and so forth), leaving most of it without any binding regulation. In 1997, President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore issued their policy paper, "Framework for Global Electronic Commerce," in which cyberspace was described as critical for economic growth and should not be subject to regulatory limitations that would impede economic development. The paper called for adopting self-regulatory models and left the process of decision making about privacy protection in the hands of commercial companies. Since that framework was issued, commercial companies have been the sole decision makers of their customers' privacy level, paving the way to the unbridled practice of commercializing customer information for profit.

Over the years, Congress has looked at dozens of bills aimed at increasing supervision and protecting citizen privacy, which has long been at the mercy of business interests, but only a few in healthcare and financial fields were passed into law. Personal health information, which was deemed sensitive, was assured protection by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996. It was the first time that any sort of privacy was enshrined in law. The private sector was adamantly opposed, as it worried about costs and regulation not aligned with reality. But, after seven

years, in 2003, compliance to the law became obligatory. In the financial sector, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was passed in 1999 to protect financial systems and citizens' privacy. And, in 2002, after the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed to tighten control of commercial companies, which included various information protection practices. In 2010, after two decades or so of selective attention, the US Department of Commerce began to take an interest in cybersecurity and privacy protection in the private sector. But rather than change the voluntary approach of regulation to one that is fully binding and enforced, two policy papers were produced, advocating for the implementation of information and privacy protection strategies that exempt private companies. The first paper suggested adopting federal standards that are binding upon federal agencies and were passed into law in 1974 and applying them to the private sector. The paper also called for the establishment of a federal privacy protection agency as part of the Department of Commerce. In a certain sense, the policy papers sought to revive failed bills from the 1970s, while also exempting the business sector from protecting customer privacy. The second paper defined a new sector, the Internet and Information Innovation Sector (I3S), and it contained technical recommendations for companies facing threats to privacy and cyberspace. Nonetheless, despite that the papers offered much needed remedies, the level of customer privacy protection in commercial companies continues to be at the mercy of the companies themselves and are only subject to fair trade principles enforced retroactively by the Federal Trade Commission.

Since 2013, the regulatory agencies have themselves become quite active in cybersecurity and privacy protection. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a strategy paper with practical recommendations for system and user privacy protection. Moreover, in 2015, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has enforcement authority also when it comes to cybersecurity and not only in cases of privacy violations (FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation). The ruling was significant because prior to it, the FTC's enforcement authority had been focused on privacy violations and relied on fair trade practices. Now, thanks to the court, the FTC had a new institutional standing. The increasing influence of regulatory agencies was again evident in 2016, when the FCC shifted from recommendations to action and issued a binding law requiring

internet service providers to protect their customers' data and privacy. The new law also requires full transparency on how ISPs use personal information. However, with the current US administration, in January 2017, President Trump appointed Ajit Pai as the FCC's new chairman who hurried to strike the new laws off the books.

In the state's attempt to promote both privacy protection and national security by enhancing cybersecurity, we witness only sectorial actions, an absence of a central, independent enforcement agency, and the creation of conditions that allow companies to profit from private information and violate privacy even further. Binding cybersecurity regulation is not adopted, because it is seen as being costly to business. Thus, privacy protection regulation is adopted only sporadically so as not to impact the earnings of those who have based their business model on making money from private, personal information.

Cybersecurity, the right to privacy, and the contradiction between the two

Beyond the limited capacity of promoting privacy protection and national security by applying binding cybersecurity regulation, the state, paradoxically, sometimes promotes cybersecurity while violating privacy. Recently, a new concept—SIGINT cybersecurity—has come into vogue and it describes the use of gathering information about cyber threats in order to defend cyberspace.[29] While the term is new, the practice has been in use for very many years, with state support, especially since 9/11.

As early as 1984, there was concern about privacy violations for the sake of information protection. Thanks to National Security Directive No. 145, President Reagan granted the NSA the authority to protect all government databases. The decision, made after the discovery of surveillance by US security services—especially by the Church Committee in 1976—worried many legislators; in response, Congress passed a law granting the National Institute for Security Standards (NIST), a civilian agency, the authority also granted to the NSA. Still, the institutional standing of NIST compared to that of the NSA was weak. In 1989, both agencies signed a memorandum of understanding according to which the NSA would not lose any of the authority that it had been granted by President Reagan. These circumstances continued until 2001, when the Patriot Act allowed law enforcement agencies to surveil the communications data of possible suspects in order to root out

cybercrime. The law allows judges to impose sweeping orders on suspects anywhere in the United States and to gather extensive information—including technological data—needed to identify and track suspects. The tension between protecting privacy and protecting data was also manifested in the Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative (CNCI) issued in 2008. The strategy was published to ensure that federal authorities are impenetrable to cyberattacks. The way to do so was, in part, by encouraging information gathering and using the intelligence agencies' encryption breaking capabilities (which obviously involved privacy violations) for the purpose of defending federal data. In 2015, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) was passed, making it possible to gather information from the private sector in a non-transparent manner for the sake of promoting cybersecurity, increasing the tension between privacy protection and cybersecurity. According to CISA, commercial companies that previously chose to share information with the state have no third-party accountability in the case of a cyberattack. This represents a significant incentive for the state to gather information without a court order or clear justification.[30]

Conclusion

Over the last five decades, the United States has played a dual, contradictory role when it comes to promoting national security and protecting privacy in the digital sphere. In the state's first role—exploiting cyberspace to gather information for the purpose of national security but at the expense of privacy—all federal authorities foster and promote a trend privileging national security over privacy. Since the mid-1990s, there has been an asymmetrical balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of government on the one hand and close cooperation between the state and private commercial companies possessing vast amounts of personal data on the other. In the state's second role of promoting cybersecurity to increase both national security and privacy, we are witnessing the fierce opposition of commercial companies to binding regulation for promoting cybersecurity. These trends have created a digital sphere that is not only exploited by the state while violating privacy but is also insufficiently secure against external threats to privacy. Cyberspace came into being as dependence on technological systems in all economic branches expanded. It was a completely new sphere that the state had to police. But thanks to a neoliberal regulatory culture

and the state's supposedly hands-off approach, the public interest has been subsidiary to the power of both intelligence agencies and the business world. While the United States is guilty of many violations of its citizens' privacy in order to promote its goals of national security, it has failed to promote regulation that would secure cyberspace itself and thus also both national security and privacy, just as it secures public assets in other areas of life.

After several decades of public policy structuring the relationship between national security and privacy, this article has highlighted the urgency of changing the discourse and actions of the current policy. The framing of the discourse on cyberspace policy—i.e., referring to cybersecurity as a systems component rather than a component of the security and privacy of individuals—must change. While the traditional definitions of cybersecurity deal with securing systems against hackers and grants intelligence agencies, security institutions, and the business sector the mandate to gather information, the emerging discourse expands the surveillance capabilities, limits encryption, and allows backdoors to be installed without appropriate accountability. These practices significantly harm individual security and privacy and present the social dependence on cyberspace as a factor that weakens society.

Based on the empiric examples in this article, state actions in cyberspace are cause for concern. The discourse must change so that the security of individuals is emphasized. This means giving subjects of personal information full ownership over that information, the sweeping use of encryption, and the establishment of supervision and accountability mechanisms over state information gathering in order to rein in the power of the state and of business monopolies. We must consider civil interests, and not only security or intelligence ones, and make sure that the public interest promoted appropriately in cyberspace.

Using the literature on regulation as a tool for managing risk and analyzing the findings in cyberspace enables us to discern the flaws stemming from the state's role as society's manager of such equivocal risks. In reviewing the literature, the article asked the key question that has preoccupied scholars who have adopted the approach that the state's function is to act as society's risk manager: Are state actions of risk management a consequence of new risks emerging around us, which make it necessary to ensure that the public interest is promoted given the new circumstances? Or is the state, first and foremost, interested in its own institutions and less careful about ramifications

of its risk management policy on the public? Findings from cyberspace indicate that both are true to an extent. When the state exploits cyberspace to its own ends, it significantly violated privacy in a way that ensures the promotion of security and intelligence agencies' goals at citizen expense. When the state tries to promote cybersecurity, it does so in a way that fails to promote the public interest; beyond the sectors defined as sensitive, the state is subject to pressure from business. Risk management in two partially congruent regimes—national security and privacy—challenges the existing literature and sheds lights on the complexity of the role of the state as society's risk manager.

The limitations of this research are primarily the result of its broad perspective and the conceptualization of a new analytical framework for studying public policy across five decades. Given the far-ranging description, this article did not address the mechanisms that are behind national security and privacy preferences in every area of policy and did not analyze in-depth the public policy processes that affect a single case. Therefore, future research focusing on a single area of policy in the context of the relationship between national security and privacy could allow a better understanding of the state's risk management in a given sphere.

Notes

1   The checks and balances of the executive branch of government include specially designated courts established to handle state surveillance requests by state and the congressional committees to which federal intelligence authorities must periodically report. Still, despite the long-established institutional ability, the 2013 papers leaked by Edward Snowden revealed how these mechanisms are generally a rubber stamp, failing to carry out effective monitoring and control of the government's bulimic appetite for data. The limited and slanted interpretation of the NSA of the regulatory infrastructure supervising it is especially troublesome. For the lack of effective supervision of information gathering, see some 3,000 cases in which the NSA admitted its "mistakes" at https://goo.gl/hFGmsj; for the inability to supervise complex NSA technological requests, see a judge's testimony at https://goo.gl/XEWHCZ.
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When the House is on Fire: Ethnic Diasporas During Flare-ups in Their Countries of Origin

Gallia Lindenstrauss

In the last few decades, interest has increased in ethnic diasporas and their influence on conflicts and peace processes in the countries or regions from where they came. Although studies show that the impact of ethnic diasporas varies in different conflicts and at various times, there is sufficient evidence suggesting that a diaspora community can have a significant role. Research indicates that the existence of a large diaspora in the West can feed a conflict and exacerbate it (inter alia, by providing finance, supplying weapons, and by sending volunteers to participate in the fighting) but can also mitigate it (for example, through unofficial contact between diaspora representatives of the warring factions). The aim of this article is to examine the way that conflict in the country of origin influences diasporas, and more specifically how renewed flare-ups affect them. The innovation here is the emphasis on the period of renewed flare-ups as the time frame examined and on the changes within the diaspora itself, as a result of the developments in the homeland. The article discusses aspects of the diaspora community's identity, the sense of personal safety vis-à-vis rival diaspora communities, and the significance of the arrival of a new wave of migrants fleeing the conflict zone in the country of origin. Examining the diaspora is important as changes within it may serve as a yardstick for how the diaspora will continue to affect the conflict in the future. The article's case study is the ethnic Kurdish community in Germany and the renewed round of violence between Turkey and members of its Kurdish minority in 2015.

Keywords: Turkey, Kurds, diasporas, PKK, Germany

Introduction

Since the beginning of the new millennium, research concerning ethnic diasporas has flourished in different disciplines, especially in the field of international relations. While there are several types of diasporas,[1] the literature tends to emphasize ethno-national ones, because of the importance of nation-states in the international system. According to Sheffer, an ethno-national diaspora possesses certain features: It is a socio-political phenomenon created by a voluntary or involuntary migration, whose members view themselves as having the same ethno-national origin. They reside permanently as a minority in one or more host countries. Members of a diaspora are in regular or sporadic contact with what they perceive as their homeland and with individuals and/or groups from the same background living in other host countries. Despite the decision to live permanently in a host country, they maintain a shared identity, identify themselves as having a shared identity, and show solidarity with their group and nation as a whole. Diaspora members form ethno-national organizations and are active culturally, socially, economically, and politically. Among their activities, they build transnational networks that reflect the complex interrelations among the diaspora, host countries, the homeland, and international players.[2]

The importance of studying ethno-national diasporas within the context of the field of national security is that these groups are prominent transnational players. Researching this phenomenon also helps us understand how other transnational players—such as criminal and terrorist organizations—come into being and operate. Furthermore, diasporas and these organizations are often connected. For example, a terrorist organization may have a dominant influence on a diaspora (as is the case with the Kurdish underground, the PKK and the Kurdish diaspora). In other cases, entities in the diaspora join forces with criminal organizations to finance fighting in the country of origin. Moreover, researchers increasingly understand that national security also involves intra-national and extra-national legitimacy for policies pursued by various players. As Shain notes, governments and leaders in the country of origin who fail to pay attention to the diasporas could find members of the diaspora perceiving them and their actions as illegitimate, which could conceivably lead to their downfall.[3] Finally, by discussing diasporas, we are not bound by some of the notions about the importance of a person's physical presence in a specific territory as a requisite for preserving one's national

Demonstration in Munich, Germany against the invasion of the Turkish army into Afrin, Syria, February 10, 2018.
Photograph: Alexander Paul / Getty Images, NurPhoto

identity. At the same time, this discussion further strengthens the fact that for many, the ethno-national dimension is a key component of their identity.

This article focuses on the Kurdish diaspora in Germany and its response to the collapse of the peace process between Turkey and the PKK, in 2015. The Kurdish diaspora is one of the most studied groups in the literature on diasporas, particularly because it is portrayed as having a negative role on the continued conflict in the country of origin. Therefore, a study of this diaspora and a relatively new period of analysis can help confirm or refute some of the existing assertions in the literature about diasporas and their function in extending the conflict in their countries of origin. Although Kurds are dispersed elsewhere as well, the center of the Kurdish diaspora is in Germany. An analysis of the responses of the Kurdish diaspora in Germany to the renewed fighting in Turkey in 2015 shows that this diaspora community reacted powerfully to the new developments because it had been greatly skeptical of the peace process and that the renewed fighting confirmed previously-held negative attitudes toward the Turkish authorities.

Diasporas and Conflicts in the Country of Origin

The literature dealing with diasporas tends to stress the negative role a diaspora might play vis-à-vis a conflict in the country of origin—for example, by financially aiding militant groups; shipping weapons to group members fighting in the country of origin; expressing political support for radical factions in the country of origin; and even participating in acts of violence and terrorism. There is also another side, however, manifested in attempts by diaspora members to support moderates and encourage negotiations by "exporting" liberal values to the country of origin, with emphasis on dialogue. Moreover, a diaspora can strengthen civil society organizations in the country of origin, help reframe the conflict, and aid in reconstruction once the battles are over.[4] Studies indicate that diasporas resulting from conflict and involuntary flight tend to hold more radical stances than diasporas that arrived in their host countries for economic reasons. It has also been shown that diasporas tend to hold more extreme positions if their homeland is not a sovereign state than diasporas that are connected to one.[5] While the literature referring to the impact of diasporas on peace processes and conflicts in the country of origin is growing, researchers still have not yet paid sufficient attention to how various stages of a conflict influence the diaspora community and, in particular, to the ramifications that renewed violence after a period of calm might have on it.

One striking characteristic of the diaspora is its connection to the homeland. It poses a dilemma, however, as to why members of the diaspora do not reside in their country of origin or homeland. One solution that members of the diaspora take to deal with this dilemma is to emphasize the importance of maintaining their identity. Other than working to prevent assimilation of group members, members of diasporas (especially those who lack a nation-state) feel that their main task is to preserve their ethnic group identity.[6] In this sense, key events (a peace process or a violent conflict) cause the diaspora to engage in greater introspection than before. Moreover, as Demmers claims, while the groups in the homeland who are physically involved in the conflict may experience fear, hunger, pain, and tension, certain members of the diaspora will experience anger, frustration, and alienation.[7]

The renewal of violent conflict in the country of origin may have implications for diaspora members. First, a violent conflict will accentuate aspects of their identity. In many cases, especially when the diaspora is

the result of conflict in the country of origin (that is, flight or involuntary migration), renewed hostilities will strengthen existing attitudes and feelings of "it is the same old story" and will confirm negative perceptions about the opposing side. The current threat will become part of the general narrative of the overall threat facing the diaspora group and will be compared to previous threats.[8] Moreover, the renewed sense of threat will mobilize diaspora members and they will be more willing to provide economic aid, engage in lobbying efforts, and even volunteer as fighters in the country of origin. A minority among the diaspora members may rethink or reinforce their previous attitudes about the futility of continuing the conflict. Second, renewed violence in the country of origin might also lead to confrontations with members of rival diasporas in the host country and could impact the personal safety of members of the diaspora community. Fearing such clashes, the authorities in the host countries may become more aggressive toward demonstrations held by the diaspora group to express solidarity with those in their country of origin and could limit the diaspora community's activities. Third, renewed conflict could result in a new wave of migration to the diaspora, with social changes and differences between the waves of migration having the potential to cause tensions within the group and affect its modus operandi.

Empirical Background

The Kurdish diaspora in Germany is the result of several waves of migration. It is difficult to attain precise data on its size, in part because group members are often labeled by their country of origin rather than by their self-identification. However, the number of Kurds in Germany is estimated to be between 600,000 and 1.2 million,[9] of which some 85 percent is from Turkey and a minority from Iraq. Some came to Germany for economic reasons and over the years have been able to express their Kurdish identity, which was not possible within Turkey.[10] Others migrated to Germany because of the violent conflict between Turkey and the PKK, which erupted in the late 1970s, and because of the oppression experienced in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, peaking in the Anfal campaign in the late 1980s. The Kurdish diaspora is viewed as a classic example of an ethno-national community that plays a negative role in the conflict in the country of origin. This view is congruent with the theoretical literature, which asserts that diasporas created as a result of

conflict and diasporas lacking a nation-state tend to have more radical stances than diasporas connected to sovereign states. Nonetheless, and as Nielsen stresses, the Kurdish diaspora also encompasses organizations supporting a pluralistic approach and non-violent means such as dialogue to end the conflict in their country of origin.[11]

The violent conflict between Turkey and the Kurdish PKK was particularly severe between 1984 and 1999. After the arrest and incarceration of the leader of the PKK in 1999, the conflict waned, but worsened again in 2004. Between 2008 and 2011, secret talks were held between the heads of the Turkish intelligence service and high-ranking members of the PKK. The existence of the process, also called the Oslo process, was leaked in 2011. Due to the leak, it was decided to hold the process in the open, which led the PKK to declare a unilateral ceasefire in 2013 and withdraw some of its troops to northern Iraq. The ceasefire ended in July 2015, however, as the result of an attack by the Islamic State in a town located on the Turkish-Syrian border, which targeted a group preparing its travel to help the Kurds in Syria. For the PKK and many in the Kurdish minority, Turkey has not done enough to protect the Kurds of Turkey and even helped the Islamic State in its war against the Kurds in Syria.

The Kurdish Diaspora and the Renewal of the Violent Conflict in Turkey

The renewal of the violent conflict between Turkey and the PKK occurred when the Kurdish diaspora as a whole was doing relatively well. Several factors contributed to its prosper. First, the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq successfully had strengthened its position, especially since the Second Gulf War in 2003, which helped to strengthen the entity's state-like manifestations. Second, the upheavals in the Arab world were seen as an opportunity for a "Kurdish Spring."[12] And finally, the first-time success of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) to cross Turkey's high electoral threshold (10 percent) in June 2015 also contributed to the sense of unprecedented accomplishments. In 2015, in speaking about the strengthening of the diaspora, a veteran member of the Kurdish community in Germany stated that "if there is going to be any peace with Turkey, it will be down to the diaspora. And that's true for conflict too. We are becoming as strong as the Armenian and Jewish diaspora. Assimilated Kurds in Turkey cannot

make peace—or war—without us. We [diaspora Kurds] have suffered. And we [diaspora] will be a part of the decision-making process, if there are going to be any decisions."[13]

An analysis of statements made by members of the Kurdish diaspora shows great skepticism about the peace process with Turkey. A typical response is that the peace process was not truly a peace process and that the Turkish side was never honest about it. For example, "Of course, we [diaspora Kurds] want peace. Who would not want peace? . . . But Turkey is not serious about making peace. Erdoğan is just playing with us. He needs Kurdish votes and he has used us to stay in power since 2002."[14] In response to the question if he was surprised by the collapse of the peace talks, the secretary general of the Kurdish community in Germany wrote that, "Given the strong electoral success of the HDP, we were not surprised by the failure of the peace process, since a power hungry individual such as Erdoğan would never tolerate a strong opposition party . . . [We were surprised] by the political and military brutality preformed right in front of the eyes of the world" Moreover, "even during the peace process, the Kurdish community in Germany as well as other Kurdish organizations maintained a critical view of the Islamist and neo-Ottoman policies of Erdoğan's government."[15] It was also said that the Turkish president renewed the fighting because his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), did not win the majority it had expected in the June 2015 elections.[16]

The Kurdish diaspora community in Germany saw the failure of the peace process and the terrorist attacks by the Islamic State on Kurdish targets as a Turkish conspiracy against them and even as part of a systematic policy of the different Turkish governments over decades, of which the outcome would inevitably be more bloodshed and death.[17] Officials in the Kurdish diaspora explained Turkey's attacks on Islamic State targets only as a cover to attempts to prevent the establishment of autonomous Kurdish cantons in northern Syria and as a diversion from what was, in practice, an attack on the PKK strongholds in northern Iraq.[18] These sentiments evidently strengthened the Kurdish diaspora's lobbying efforts, which included turning to the German government, the European Union, and NATO.[19] While it is more difficult to find evidence of increased financial support for the PKK or volunteer fighters from the Kurdish diaspora, it is estimated that money, in fact, has been transferred to the PKK.[20] Nonetheless, some have suggested

a different solution. For example, it has been said that "to keep Erdoğan from being victorious, the Kurds must take care not to fall into the trap of violence and to continue the peace process at all costs."[21]

Some of the distrust can also be attributed to the fact that half of the time in which there were peace talks, these talks were held in secret. Consequently, few in the Kurdish diaspora knew of their existence. A leading Turkish journalist and writer claimed that "what was called the 'peace process' was never transparent. Meetings between the Justice and Development Party and the Kurdish underground were always held behind closed doors and civil society was never included. Even the reasons for the breakdown of the process were never revealed to the public. How can you trust something about which you know nothing?"[22]

The renewal of violent conflict in the country of origin also increases the risk of violent clashes between rival diasporas in the host countries. Addressing this risk, the secretary general of the Kurdish community in Germany said, "We are very concerned by the developments. More than anything, we don't want the conflict to spill over into Germany. We appeal to all Kurds in Germany to keep the peace. Non-violent protest is a democratic right, but our political rival is in Ankara, not Berlin."[23] One German newspaper noted that "the Kurdish conflict is coming to Germany."[24] This concern led German opinion leaders to call for greater state involvement to reduce tensions between Turkey and the PKK.[25] Conflict fatigue was also evident. A journalist from a German-Turkish background wrote, "The PKK is once again showing its old terrorist reflexes and the state is going back to its authoritarian reflexes."[26] In this context, parties supportive of the PKK and who have opposed the German government's labeling of the PKK as a terrorist organization are facing difficulties in challenging this classification because of the renewed fighting in Turkey. Being defined as a terrorist organization means that using the PKK leader's picture at rallies in Germany is banned, as is the use of other symbols of the organization, which angers some in the Kurdish community.[27] Local German newspapers have claimed that by using the PKK symbols, the Kurdish diaspora seeks to provoke the rival Turkish diaspora.[28] A German-Turkish political scientist even defined the Kurdish problem as the Achilles heel of Turkish-German relations.[29] Thus, the conflict in Turkey has an affect that goes beyond the internal hostilities

between ethnic groups in Germany and even leads to tensions between Germany and Turkey.

It is still too early to assess the influence of the 2015 wave of migration on the Kurdish diaspora. However, it is worth noting that, in addition to Kurds who fled Turkey, there are also Kurdish refugees who came to Europe because of the Syrian civil war. Furthermore, after the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016 and the subsequent widespread purges of the civil service, the number of political asylum seekers increased. Thus, both the Germany authorities and diaspora organizations are facing a range of challenges associated with the new migrants from Turkey and Syria (and even Iraq). Some feel that this trend will only increase. For example, it has been said that "the reason for the Turkish government's attack and use of military and police forces is that these regions voted for the HDP, which received more than 90 percent of the votes. The people in these regions do not feel safe. They are afraid for their lives. The outcome will be another wave of migration to Europe."[30] In the diaspora it has also been commonly claimed that Erdoğan wants to settle Syrian Arab refugees in Kurdish-majority regions in order to drive out the Kurds who will eventually leave Turkey altogether.[31] The fact that since 2012 the Turkish diaspora has had the right to vote in Turkish elections and in referendums also has increased the politicization of the Turkish and Kurdish diasporas. Before every election cycle, Turkish politicians come to speak to voters in diaspora centers. Kurdish diaspora members have even depicted attempts by Erdoğan and other Turkish politicians to hold political rallies in Germany as endeavors to undermine the country's social stability.[32]

Conclusion

The members of the Kurdish diaspora in Germany did not have a chance to accept the existence of the peace process before violence erupted anew, leading some to stick even more than before to their distrust of the Turkish establishment and its intentions. Therefore, diaspora representatives were not surprised when the talks collapsed, attributing malicious motives to the other side. However, despite the skepticism about the peace talks, they have still been surprised by the intensity of the violence since 2015. The diaspora also has shown signs of involvement (rallies, lobbying Western politicians, shipping material aid) because of the new difficulties facing the Kurdish minority in the country of origin, especially what has been seen as

a combined threat of the Turkish state and Turkey's supposed support of the Islamic State. At times, it seems that some have exaggerated the intensity of the threat, such as the accusation—to date unfounded—that Turkey intends to settle Syrian refugees in Kurdish-majority regions in order to drive out the original inhabitants. Amplifying the threat from Turkey can be destructive, and it will only make it more difficult to return to the negotiations table. The main influence of the renewed conflict in Turkey on the Kurdish diaspora in Germany was the reinforcing of the Kurdish diaspora's separate identity as well as the underscoring of the level of threat emanating from Turkey. There are also indicators that the conflict has affected the Kurdish diaspora's feeling of personal security while the new wave of migrants have also influenced the community. If the Kurds hoped that the Arab Spring would result in the West rethinking the Kurdish question, it would seem that, at least in Germany, the renewed fighting between Turkey and the PKK has not led anyone to reconsider the definition of the PKK as a terrorist organization. Thus, this has implications for the diaspora, because the authorities may read any expression of support for the PKK as support for a terrorist organization.

Statements by diaspora representatives that key events in their country of origin cannot take place without the involvement of the diaspora emphasize the diaspora's importance for both the country of origin and the host countries, as well as for relevant actors in the international community. While dialogue between all relevant parties and representatives of the diaspora may add another layer of complexity, it is highly significant in terms of reaching sustainable solutions. A dialogue with the diaspora (compared to one only with representatives from the country of origin) will almost certainly raise more concerns about identity and other non-material questions, which are seen as more difficult to resolve and thus are often postponed to later stages of negotiations; it is precisely such questions that are profoundly linked to the legitimacy of the proposed solutions as well as to generating support for the leaders conducting the talks. Hence, the very awareness of these dimensions of the conflict and to the identity-related threat perceptions may significantly contribute to formulating long-term sustainable solutions. Even if their implementation takes a long time, they may be preferable to other solutions discussed among a limited number of parties who are incapable of relating to all relevant aspects. It is important to note that the diaspora is hardly homogeneous and consists of many streams and organizations. Therefore,

it is critical to reach out to representatives of several organizations and not just to ones that are more inclined to dialogue. On the contrary, engaging in dialogue with the most hawkish factions of the diaspora may contribute to identifying the best solutions to the conflict.

In terms of national security, the increased importance of ethnic diasporas represents both an opportunity and a risk. On the one hand, as many state actors discover, diasporas can serve as a country of origin's soft power and help them advance their objectives in the international arena. For more than a decade, this has been Turkey's own starting point with regard to the Turkish diaspora in Germany.[33] On the other hand, rival diasporas can represent a complex challenge, having ramifications for both the country of origin and the host countries, as is the case the Kurdish diaspora in Germany and the challenge it poses for Turkish-German relations. Because of these two contradictory directions, it is worth emphasizing that a discussion about transnational players in general and diasporas in particular renders the national security discourse more complex and questions the practice of relating only to state actors. At the same time, the discussion about diasporas shows that the reference point continues to be primarily on how these actors generate and/or respond to state policy (in the Kurdish context, this relates mostly to Turkey, Iraq, and Syria), and thus in practice entrenching the existing structure of the international system as an inter-state system.

Notes

1   The literature refers to religious diasporas (for example, the Muslim diaspora), diasporas from a particular continent (such as Asian-Americans), and diasporas from a particular city (for example, Hebronites). The literature also refers to diasporas from a gender perspective and to the attempt to break down nationality as a framework, such as the Queer diaspora.

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4   Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics,* pp. 215–218.

5   For more on diasporas created because of conflicts, see Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 2–4.

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The Civil Society Component of National Security in an Era of Civil Power: The Case of Israel in the UN Human Rights Council in 2016

Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky

What role do civil society agents play in diplomatic processes in an era defined by increasing civil power? The current paper analyzes civil society action in the UN Human Rights Council vis-à-vis Israel during 2016, as a case study to assess civil society action conducted by activists who venture into diplomatic processes once reserved solely for professionally trained, official diplomats. The paper's central claims are that official players and civil society actors share the same spheres of activity, and that alongside any military confrontation, states face a battle of ideas in the international arena. The paper begins with a theoretical introduction addressing changes in diplomacy, the rise of global civil society non-state actors, the UN Human Rights Council as a hub for civil society action, and the evolvement of national security discourse. This is followed by an analysis of the Israeli case study, which consists of two parts: the first deals with the importance of Israel's standing in the international arena to Israel's national security, and the second comprises an empirical analysis of statements (n=52) submitted to the Human Rights Council by civil society organizations with UN consultative status vis-à-vis Israel during 2016. The paper ends with a discussion and policy recommendations.

Keywords: UN, civil society, diplomacy

Introduction

In the 1970s, leading English School researchers differentiated between two forms in which states are organized in the international arena: an international system and an international society.[1] An international system, whose minimum condition is the presence of sovereign states,[2] is typified by a situation in which two or more states have contact between them and impact each other's decisions, causing them to behave—at least to some extent—as parts of a whole. This is manifested in trade relations between states with minimal (and at times under-the-radar) diplomatic relations. An international society, however, is typified by states that identify with common interests and values and regard themselves bound by certain rules and institutions in their dealings with one another (e.g., being subject to limitations in exercising force against one another). One current example is states belonging to the European Union,[3] and another is states belonging to the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).[4]

This theoretical setting lays the foundation for perceiving the international arena as partly comprised of a "club" of states, currently epitomized by Western-led powers such as the United States and Europe, which possess the ability to either strengthen or weaken claims made by other states of belonging to this desired societal club. States can potentially belong to the Western-led international society should they align their conduct, norms, standards, and expectations with those of states already inside the same society.

Against this backdrop, diplomacy plays an increasingly important role in showcasing states' adherence to international Western-led standards, and in brokering agreements and cooperation treaties between states across the globe. While traditional diplomacy was highly formal, institutional, interpersonal, slow, and usually protected by secrecy, progress in information communication technology (ICT) has encouraged broader public participation in foreign affairs and in diplomatic processes.[5]

More specifically, technological progress facilitated the movement from localized settings that are easily monitored and controlled to the current setting in which human activities owe little or nothing to geographical location or time of day. This technological set-up, which is easily accessed and operated, enables virtual communities to take their cases to the international court of public opinion[6] and integrate new, particularly non-state, actors into the foreign policy-making process. Hence, while in traditional diplomacy states

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From the website of the HRC: www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Home.aspx

reigned unchallenged in the management of international politics, nowadays non-state actors such as civil society groups play an increasing role in the diplomatic arena and reduce the power asymmetry between state and non-state actors. This process poses a challenge to the very ontology upon which official diplomacy has stood for more than three centuries.[7] Thus, the current paper asks, "**What role do civil society agents play in diplomatic processes in an era defined by increasing civil power?**" To assess this, civil society action in the United Nations Human Rights Council vis-à-vis Israel during 2016 is analyzed.

The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) is an example of an official body that has integrated civil society actors into regular working processes, both on the formal and the informal level.[8] This 47 member-state body is the principal intergovernmental body within the UN system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of global human rights issues and for acting on human rights violations worldwide.[9] Formally, non-government organizations (NGOs) with an official consultative status are entitled to voice their opinions within the framework of the HRC. Informally, civil society agents and NGOs transmit information on special procedures, draw the attention of state representatives to particular situations or issues, and submit proposals in the context of negotiating resolutions. As such, intergovernmental organizations, national human rights institutions, and NGOs participate actively in the Council's sessions.

While the HRC's resolutions are not legally binding, they are instrumental in provoking debates among states, civil society actors, and intergovernmental organizations; establishing new standards of conduct; and reflecting existing normative codes. In most cases, resolutions are a means of gauging the

international community's level of political commitment and degree of willingness to discuss a specific question regarding human rights or related fields, having indirect and long-term repercussions. Resolutions of the HRC may also serve as triggers for action by other institutions, such as the Security Council.[10] Importantly to the subject matter of this study, the negotiation process on resolutions is often open to interested NGOs, which may attend informal negotiations, voice an opinion, and submit proposals for wording of resolutions.

Although official diplomats remain vital to the pursuit of national interests, when populations identify more with transnational concerns (like global warming and human rights) than those defined by the state, they "relocate" authority to non-state figures or organizations, which, in turn, amass moral legitimacy and influence the behavior of states from outside.[11] This competition over setting the international agenda undermines state primacy. Thus, the resulting relative decline of states in global governance potentially places civil society actors as new diplomats and in an opportunistic position often dictated by relational power dynamics.[12] It therefore becomes clear that nowadays states face a battle of ideas in the diplomatic, media, and legal fields,[13] among others.

The recognition that some threats (e.g., environmental problems) transcend state-borders—which was incorporated into the international discourse as a result of intensive work carried out by civil society actors—resulted in a call to redefine the elements that comprise national security.[14] This trend came on the heels of a long period—from the end of World War II, through the Cold War era, and until globalization in the 1990s—during which matters relating to military force were considered a security issue, and all other matters were relegated to some form of low politics. Nowadays, however, and due to the involvement of non-state actors in the diplomatic arena, the focus on safeguarding a state from military threats emanating from outside its borders suffices only as an initial starting point for a far more comprehensive discussion.[15] Thus, this paper claims that **in the current era, typified by an increase in civil power, official and non-state actors share the same spheres of activity and that, alongside any military confrontation, states face a battle of ideas in the international arena.**

To shed light on the role that civil society agents play in diplomatic processes in the current era typified by increasing civil power, the following

section delves into the Israeli case study, beginning with a short background about the elements that are said to comprise Israel's national security, followed by an empirical analysis of civil society action in the HRC vis-à-vis Israel in 2016.

The Israeli Case Study

The international component of Israel's national security

Israel is a state with multiple challenges; it has been involved in several wars and extensive military operations since its establishment in 1948. Israel's original national security paradigm was coined by the state's first prime minister, David Ben Gurion,[16] in 1953 in what has been recognized as a comprehensive and remarkable document.[17] Since 1953, several official state-led initiatives have been taken to reformulate Israel's national security paradigm, the most recent of which is the "IDF Strategy," published by the IDF's chief of general staff in 2015, and again in an updated version in 2018.

These recent documents present a comprehensive and bold attempt to relate to the different and multifaceted dimensions of Israel's national security. As such, in addition to dealing with elements of Israel's classical military doctrine, the documents address legitimacy issues, recognizing the impact that international legitimacy has on the IDF's ability to fully utilize its military capabilities—in adherence with international law which the document also clarifies.[18] As such, in the 2018 document, the word "legitimacy" appears nine times,[19] and in the 2015 document, one of the sub-sections in the third chapter is entitled "Obtaining and Maintaining Legitimacy."[20] These references demonstrate the IDF's recognition of non-military activity targeting Israel in the international arena with the aim of diminishing its military leeway in responding and operating against Israel's targeted rivals.

In 2017, the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) issued a special memorandum proposing an updated national security doctrine for Israel.[21] This document too reinforces the importance of multiple factors, in addition to the hard-power military dimension, in fortifying Israel's national security. Thus, current thinking on Israel's national security attributes greater attention than ever before to non-military issues—two of which are central to this paper's area of focus.

The first is the importance related to Israel's strategic relations with a world superpower: In the first years of Israel's existence, France fulfilled

this important role, and since the 1967 War, it has been filled by the United States. This principle is crucial for Israel due to the inferiority of the state's physical size and population in comparison to her neighboring (and more distant regional) rivals. The second issue is the increasing importance related to "soft power," viewed as a state's ability to shape the preferences of other international players through attraction rather than coercion.[22] As such, should Israel's policies and conduct be perceived favorably in the international arena, its legitimacy, moral authority, and ultimately its soft power will increase.[23] Nowadays, when borders are becoming more porous, state and non-state players can use soft power to build coalitions and develop networks to address shared challenges.

The coupling of these two tenets render Israel particularly vulnerable to soft, non-military attacks launched against the state in the international diplomatic arena.[24] In other words, apart from moral and ethical considerations, the importance that Israel relates to being part of the international community of modern, democratic, and liberal states in general and the significance of Israel's strategic relations with the United States specifically demands strict adherence to the highest standards of human rights and international law. This poses a two-pronged predicament for Israel: First, the occupation of the Palestinian territories in general and the policy of expanding West Bank settlements in particular is perceived as contrary to international law and norms.[25] Second, while Israel certainly strives to uphold international law, her rivals do not consider themselves to be bound by the same standards.

Thus, Israel's ongoing occupation of the Palestinian territories, coupled with military operations against Palestinian militias that entrench their soldiers in densely-populated civilian areas, continuously subject Israel to international scrutiny. A crucial link, however, tying Israel's conduct vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has been raging for decades, and international public opinion, which is increasingly critical of Israel's democratic character,[26] is the activity of a dedicated civil society operating against Israel in international forums. The following section assesses a case in point.

Empirical Analysis: Civil Society Action vis-à-vis Israel in the HRC in 2016

In 2016, a total of 530 statements were submitted to the HRC by civil society organizations with consultative status to the United Nations. Of these, 52 documents mentioned Israel, i.e., 10 percent of all documents. A total of 45 statements were submitted by a single organization and seven statements were jointly submitted by several different organizations[27]—in some cases as many as eight organizations and from different regions in the world.[28] The total number of civil society organizations that submitted statements to the HRC relating to Israel in 2016 is 29, according to the following breakdown: four located in Israel; thirteen based in the Arab world (including Egypt, Iran, Sudan, and the Palestinian territories) and twelve based internationally (including India, Greece, France, Britain, and Switzerland). See table 1 below for more detail.

Table 1: Breakdown of statements submitted to the HRC during its three regular sessions in 2016 by civil society players

Total number of statements submitted	530	
Number of statements mentioning Israel	52 (10%)	45 statements submitted by one organization
		7 statements submitted jointly by two organizations or more
Number of civil society organizations that submitted statements	29	4 organizations based in Israel
		13 organizations based in Arab countries
		12 organizations based internationally

In analyzing the content of the 52 statements, only seven statements sought to defend Israel against claims made by other civil society actors within the framework of the HRC. These were submitted to the Council by either one of two civil society organizations ("Amuta for NGO Responsibility" and "United Nations Watch"). In other words, only 13 percent of statements submitted by civil society organizations dealing with Israel in the HRC during 2016 made the case for Israel. Such statements called out European funding of civil society organizations which "are inconsistent with Europe's declared values and objectives, and are closely linked to anti-peace campaigns of demonization and boycotts";[29] criticized the lack of transparency in

the HRC's Commissions of Inquiry (CoIs) (e.g., "Lack of transparency permeates almost every phase of HRC CoIs, starting with the appointments process, through the writing, publication, and promotion of resulting CoI reports");[30] complained against human rights organizations whose staffers divert international funding to militias; and condemned the appointment of "the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967" due to the fact that this person "played an undisclosed leadership role in three separate pro-Palestinian lobby groups."[31]

Statements aimed at condemning Israel in the HRC were submitted by a total of 27 different organizations, including two Israeli-based organizations.[32] Criticism of civil society players against Israel centered on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, most notably on Israel's occupation in the West Bank and on Gaza's dire humanitarian situation (e.g., "in the Occupied Gaza Strip: 80% of the population currently receives international aid, while 73% suffer from food insecurity and 95% of the water from the Gaza aquifer is unsafe for human consumption").[33] In criticizing Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories, issues that received most attention were Israel's policy of demolishing Palestinian structures in Area C and in East Jerusalem (e.g., "Between 1 October 2015 and 21 April 2016, Israel demolished or sealed 37 apartments, displacing 149 people, 65 of whom are children. Fourteen of the homes were not subject to demolition orders but were damaged because of their proximity to others demolished");[34] and the repercussions of the occupation on Palestinian children (e.g., "UNICEF estimated that in the West Bank IDF and Israeli security services annually arrest around 700 youths between 12 and 17 years old, often from their homes at night").[35]

Other issues that surfaced in statements submitted to the HRC by civil society organizations with respect to Israel in 2016 are Israel's discrimination against Palestinian Israeli citizens and maltreatment of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, specifically on medical issues. Of note is the harsh tone adopted by civil society activists toward the international community for having failed to effectively address the situation (e.g., "Instead of unraveling and de-constructing the logic behind the ruthless force of a de facto Apartheid State, the international community, and the UN are becoming collectively stagnant").[36] In this respect, the United States is particularly criticized for "vetoing any resolution in the name of their [the United States and Israel] over half-century-long alliance."[37]

While a minority of statements make far-fetched claims against Israel, bordering on hateful and inciting language, most statements present information backed by research of UN bodies (such as OCHA and UNRWA)[38] and civil society organizations (Israeli and Palestinian alike) and support claims with statistics and figures (e.g., "The Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR) in Gaza has documented 71 incidents of Israeli attacks on land and at sea during January and February, including 45 shootings, and seven military incursions").[39] Common to most statements is their ending in recommendations calling states to "review their trade with settlements to ensure they are consistent with their duty not to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Palestinian territories";[40] and to exert pressure on Israel as a means to achieving different ends. These include enabling "the Special Rapporteur on Palestine to visit the Occupied Territories freely";[41] refraining "from all acts of intimidation or reprisal against NGOs";[42] and bringing Israel's "actions in line with its obligations under international humanitarian law and UN resolutions."[43]

It is worth noting that during the research period, the HRC was not utilized by civil society activists to promote the grassroots global BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) campaign against Israel. Although the same call—to exert international pressure against Israel, including in the economic sphere—was stipulated in the concluding "recommendations" section of many statements, these fell short of endorsing the BDS campaign or measures.

Discussion

In considering the research question relating to the role that civil society agents play in diplomatic processes in an era defined by increasing civil power, the Israeli case study—whereby 29 civil society organizations leveraged their special consultative status to the United Nations to submit a total of 52 statements concerning Israel over the course of one year (2016)—is illustrative of two primary developments. First, that diplomacy in the current era anticipates, caters, and, indeed, builds upon the active involvement of civil society agents; and second, that civil society agents, in turn, are aware of their growing power in the international arena and are able to successfully mobilize across borders so as to penetrate the global

diplomatic sphere. As such, this paper demonstrates the claim that official and non-state actors share the same sphere of activity.

Findings demonstrate the ability of civil society agents to organize across borders and, in some cases, their dedication to protest an issue that is external to them. This is exemplified in statements relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict submitted by NGOs who are based in different corners of the world (e.g., in Egypt, India, and Greece), as well as by organizations that deal with a broad issue and choose to focus their work on this particular conflict (e.g., "the World Peace Council," and "the International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination").[44] This assertion can be further substantiated by the fact that seven statements submitted to the HRC were collectively endorsed by a number of organizations based in different geographical areas (e.g., Lebanon, Switzerland, Iraq, and India), thus displaying the ability of the civil society agents to support each other's work and cooperate in rallying for a joint cause. Given these transnational collaborations, it is safe to assume that technological progress and ICT play an important role in enhancing the organizational ability of civil society players to work together and that such global cooperation is likely to grow alongside increasing accessibility of technology-based communications.

Most statements submitted to the HRC appear to have been well-researched, relying on a number of public sources and substantiating their claims in statistics and figures, which attests to the professional and skilled nature of the work of these organizations. In other words, even though civil society agents are not appointed by their respective states nor do they officially represent them and are not obligated to undergo state-training, their work in the international diplomatic field appears to mostly uphold professional standards.

It is worth noting that only 10 percent of all documents submitted to the HRC by civil society players in 2016 dealt with Israel; that is, 90 percent of documents submitted were not concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in any way. On the other hand, a clear majority of the statements submitted to the Council vis-à-vis Israel made claims against the state. Thus, although global attention by no means focuses exclusively on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this issue does generate extensive interest that is mostly negative toward Israel. Furthermore, civil society activists making the case for Israel clearly lag in comparison to the action undertaken by

activists advocating against Israel. The involvement of international NGOs and the action taken by non-Israeli and non-Palestinian NGOs vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also indicative of the fact that the conflict has become internationalized and no longer remains confined to its local, or even regional, setting.

While Israel has little control of action taken against it in international forums, much can be done to encourage civil society action in order to balance the situation through engagement in these forums. This includes shedding light on institutional biases against Israel and conducting polls and empirical research to produce fact-based knowledge to refute or balance claims made against Israel. In cases where claims against Israel are found to be true, the Israeli establishment should take responsibility, rectify the situation, and provide evidence of progress amending and reforming the conduct and facts in question. In addition to Israel's moral obligation and need to do so, leaving researched-based accusations unanswered creates a vacuum that can be utilized later by additional players (including states and official governments) to make similar claims against Israel in more influential forums. In this respect, combining the findings of this research with those of an earlier study,[45] illustrates that two themes (concern with Gaza and with demolitions of Palestinian structures in Area C) repeatedly surfaced both in the Human Rights Council and in the more powerful UN Security Council.

The finding that civil society organizations refrained from directly supporting BDS measures could signify that the movement is perceived as radical and toxic and is thus not instrumental in furthering the Palestinian cause in this arena. On the other hand, the finding that statements ended in calls for official governments to "review their trade with settlements"[46] provides evidence that international civil society's desire to exact a toll from Israel due to the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not waned. This last point is further reinforced by the finding that in their statements, civil society activists harshly criticize the official international establishment in general and the United States in particular, regarding inaction on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. As such—and given this paper's collective findings regarding the official establishment's formal and informal integration of civil society players into diplomatic processes, the activists' ability to successfully mobilize across borders to penetrate the global diplomatic sphere, and the battle of ideas in the current international arena—civil society efforts dedicated to

eroding Israel's relations with leading Western democratic powers should not be underestimated.

Future research should focus on global civil society input to the UN Human Rights Council pertaining to other conflicts, to better assess the proportion of civil attention attributed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in comparison to other—and perhaps bloodier—conflicts raging across the globe. Similar research over a larger stretch of time could also lead to interesting findings regarding the trends of civil society engagement in the HRC as well as to the ability of NGOs to organize transnationally. Finally, these findings could also be examined in relation to demonstrated engagement (and potential influence) of civil society activists in other diplomatic processes both inside and outside the United Nations.

Notes

1   Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Hedley Bull, "The Emergence of a Universal International Society," in *The Expansion of International Society* ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester University Press, 1977).

2   Bull, *Anarchical Society*.

3   Ibid.

4   The OECD was founded in 1960, when the United States and Canada along with 18 European countries joined forces to create an organization dedicated to economic development. At the time of writing, there were 36 member states in the OECD, including many of the world's most advanced countries but also emerging countries like Mexico, Chile, and Turkey.

5   Eytan Gilboa, "Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 12, no. 2 (2001): 1–28; John Robert Kelley, "The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 21, no. 2 (2010): 286–305.

6   Kristina Plavsak, "Communicative Diplomacy for the 3rd Millennium," *Journal of Political Marketing* 1, no. 2–3 (2002): 109–122.

7   Kelley, "New Diplomacy."

8   The HRC is one of the principal human rights institutions along with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the bodies that monitor implementation of human rights treaties. All these entities have their headquarters in Geneva.

9   Members are elected by secret ballot by the members of the UN General Assembly for a three-year term of office. Seats are allocated in accordance with a geographical distribution corresponding to the UN regional groups. To date, Israel has never been an HRC member-state. See the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United

Nations Office and to the other international organizations in Geneva, *The Human Rights Council: A Practical Guide* (2014).

10 Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations Office, *The Human Rights Council;* Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Human Rights Council" (2017).

11 Gilboa, "Diplomacy in the Media Age"; Kelley, "New Diplomacy."

12 Kelley, "New Diplomacy."

13 Moran Yarchi, "Terror Organizations' Uses of Public Diplomacy: Limited Versus Total Conflicts," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 39, no. 12 (2016): 1071–1083.

14 David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 5–26; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," *Mershon International Studies Review* 40, no. 2 (1996): 229–254.

15 Krause and Williams, "Broadening the Agenda."

16 In his dual role as prime minister and minister of defense.

17 Itamar Rabinovich and Itai Brun*, Israel Facing a New Middle East. In Search of a National Security Strategy* (Hoover Institution Press, 2017).

18 IDF, Chief of Staff, *The IDF Strategy* (2015), Chapter 1, clause 2: https://tinyurl.com/ybes7z23 [in Hebrew].

19 IDF, Chief of Staff, *The IDF Strategy* (2018): https://www.idf.il/media/34416/strategy.pdf.

20 Ibid., Chapter 3.

21 Udi Dekel and Omer Einav, *An Updated National Security Concept for Israel* (Tel Aviv: INSS, 2017).

22 Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 2 (2004): 255–270; Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

23 Nye, "Soft Power"; Joseph S. Nye, Wang Jisi, Richard Rosecrance, and Gu Guoliang, "Hard Decisions on Soft Power: Opportunities and Difficulties for Chinese Soft Power," *Harvard International Review* 31, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 18–22.

24 Dekel and Einav, *An Updated National Security Concept for Israel*, and the 2015 IDF Strategy document.

25 "The establishment by Israel of settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law." UN Security Council Resolution 2334; Clause 1, p. 2.

26 Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky, "Israel and Apartheid in International Discourse," *Strategic Assessment* (INSS) 18, no. 3 (2015): 105–116.

27 N=29 represents non-government organizations with consultative status to the UN only. In some of the statements, the names of additional NGOs without this status were written on the statement as endorsing it.

28 For example, A/HRC/31/NGO/224; February 25, 2016; Joint written statement submitted by International-Lawyers.Org (Switzerland); the Arab Organization for Human Rights (Egypt); the General Arab Women Federation (Iraq); the Indian Movement "Tupaj Amaru" (India), the International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Switzerland), the Union of Arab Jurists (Lebanon), and additional non-governmental organizations in special consultative status.

29 A/HRC/31/NGO/153; February 22, 2016; Amuta for NGO Responsibility.

30 A/HRC/31/NGO/152, February 22, 2016; Amuta for NGO Responsibility.

31 A/HRC/33/NGO/82; September 6, 2016; United Nations Watch.

32 Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, and the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD).

33 A/HRC/32/NGO/43; June 2, 2016; Palestinian Return Center Ltd.

34 A/HRC/32/NGO/93; June 7, 2016; Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies.

35 February 2016; the Child Foundation.

36 A/HRC/33/NGO/2; September 1, 2016; the International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (EAFORD).

37 Ibid.

38 OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine.

39 A/HRC/33/NGO/15; September 1, 2016; Organization for Defending Victims of Violence.

40 A/HRC/33/NGO/103; September 9, 2016; the Palestinian Return Center, Ltd.

41 A/HRC/31/NGO/224; February 25, 2016; Joint written statement submitted by International-Lawyers.Org, the Arab Organization for Human Rights, the General Arab Women Federation, the Indian Movement "Tupaj Amaru," the International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Union of Arab Jurists, non-governmental organizations in special consultative status, International Educational Development, Inc., the World Peace Council, non-governmental organizations on the roster, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status.

42 Ibid.

43 A/HRC/32/NGO/43; June 2, 2016; Palestinian Return Center Ltd.

44 the names of which allude to the fact that they are active in promoting a global cause, refraining from confining their activity to a specific region or conflict.

45 Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky, "The UN Security Council, Israel and 'The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question,'" *Strategic Assessment* (INSS) 20, no. 1 (April 2017): 83–95.

46 See A/HRC/33/NGO/2; 1 September 1, 2016; the International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (EAFORD).

The Role of Social Media in the Radicalization of Young People in the West

Yotam Rosner

Recent years have seen a growth in the public's awareness of how radical jihadist movements, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, exploit the social media discourse to radicalize, recruit, and deploy young people in the West in service of their terrorist causes. This article traces the roots of these radicalization processes and explains the mechanisms that motivate young people, raised as citizens of democratic nations, to choose radical ideologies and serve organizations operating against those nations. The article claims that a broad spectrum of ideological, economic, and psychological factors—amplified because of the technological features of social media—have created a rich petri dish for sowing radicalization among normally law-abiding people. This has ramifications for the national security of democratic states, as the social media discourse is liable to generate polarization, violence, and permanent undermining of the social order, which threatens their citizens' identity and personal safety.

Keywords: Social media, radicalization, Islamic State, globalization

Introduction

In March 2017, Khalid Masood, a 52-year old former convict, massacred four pedestrians and wounded dozens more on London's Westminster Bridge with his car. He then proceeded to the Palace of Westminster, where he stabbed a policeman to death, before he was finally apprehended by other police officers. Later it emerged that Masood, a native of Kent, England,

Image by tigerlily713 from Pixabay

drew inspiration from the Islamic State (ISIS). The obvious question—why someone would commit such an atrocity in the name of radical Islam—has been asked repeatedly after similar incidents, such as the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, the attack in San Bernardino in 2015, and the Orlando nightclub shooting in 2016. In all these cases, the perpetrators declared allegiance to global jihadist organizations despite having very few personal connections with them outside the internet.[1]

The success of radical movements such as the Islamic State to attract normal, law-abiding people is partly attributed to their skilled use of social media platforms—Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. These infrastructures provide a public forum where individuals and groups can have discussions

without significant supervision by the authorities and can disseminate their messages to audiences around the world. In recent years, appeals have been made to allocate resources to monitor and prevent the spread of radical content on the internet.[2]

The concern in the democratic West over radical organizations has grown, and although most of the activities of the global jihad is executed in Middle Eastern nations, their reach is not limited to that part of the world. Using well-oiled recruitment and propaganda mechanisms, they have succeeded in drawing supporters from all over the world. One of the reasons for the concern is the lack of understanding about the factors that bring young people to adopt radical perceptions.

Much has been said about the role of social media in the radicalization processes,[3] but not much has been written about the ways in which the social and technological contexts promote radicalization. Although personality traits and the persuasive abilities of radical Muslim preachers promote radicalization, there is the equally significant effect of social, economic, and technological circumstances, and to a large extent a growing social critique of political and economic trends rooted in the era of globalization. This critique, transmitted via the polarizing, toxic discourse typical of social media, generates a new sense of victimization and the dehumanization of both individuals and groups, which in turn has generated a sense of legitimacy in belonging to violent groups and personally engaging in acts of violence.

Changes in the Global Era

The era of globalization, in which national borders have been breached by commercial, political, social, and cultural connections due to technological changes, is not a new phenomenon.[4] International communications and trade have existed for hundreds of years. In the era of globalization, however, trends that started to emerge earlier have been amplified, and these changes are manifested in five major aspects:

1. **Scale:** The number of political, economic, and social connections among societies is greater than ever before.
2. **Speed:** Globalization shrinks the dimensions of space and time and creates an atmosphere in which events happening on the other side of the globe reach our doorstep almost instantaneously.

3. **Consciousness:** Globalization has led to a sense that the world is a global village, i.e., a shared space where all citizens of the world are interconnected in a web of shared interests, worldviews, and concerns.

4. **The economy:** The era of globalization can be described as one in which the neoliberal ideology has conquered almost every corner of the world. This process is manifested by nations edging out the idea of the welfare state and transitioning to a monetary economy with reduced regulation and greater international trade.

5. **Politics and society:** Globalization is a facilitator of democratic values, a catalyst for social mobility, and a factor in giving disadvantaged populations center stage in the sociopolitical and economic arena.[5]

Despite its inherent benefits, a growing criticism of globalization from governments and organizations, both in the liberal West and beyond, has contributed to an increase of anti-global sentiment. Its supporters are active in preventing the opening of new markets and are opposed to reducing the state's traditional functions. They believe that the globalization process has led to the loss of economic security for many people who have failed to adapt to the new global economy. Furthermore, the social mobility that helped marginal groups move to the center has destabilized previous social hierarchies and stripped power from the groups that used to have exclusive control. In parallel, these trends also have uprooted old norms that were based on racist or patriarchal views. Above all, globalization has discouraged nationalism while promoting universal cultural values such as pluralism and multiculturalism.

For many, the global world is an uncertain place where old, familiar ways of living are the objects of ridicule. For them, globalization, which generates new challenges all the time, undermines simple definitions, such as "who am I and who the other is," i.e., the binary structure by which social identity is defined. This state of affairs, as well as the government's decreasing role in people's economic and social lives, has created a vacuum which new groups and leaders have rushed to fill. These are borne aloft by the masses' desire for economic security and for reaffirming their social identity—two key socioeconomic aspects that have become unsettled by globalization. The loss of employment security, the change in social and national status, and the questioning of traditional institutions, the army, the church, and

even the traditional nuclear family, created a rift filled by two new forces: anti-establishment political movements and social media.

Social Media in an Era of Changing Identities

The end of the Cold War signaled the victory of the Western, liberal, democratic ideology. Still, for many, it generated more hardship and questions than solutions and answers. The era of globalization has been an era of troubled souls, of people who fail to find a sense of belonging or communal destiny. The disruption of their national identity has led them to search for an alternate identity, in order to provide—as part of a physical or virtual community—a sense of security that is no longer dependent on a territory. In a world in which the significance of a territory has diminished, the search for a permanent, lasting identity becomes a coping strategy.

For many, the answer to the lack of communal identity is found in social media networks. A social media network is an arena that provides informative, emotional, and experiential needs. It allows people to make contact with others across different continents and share information—from music and videos to ideas and ideologies. Therefore, the perceptions, feelings, and norms of conduct of individuals are influenced by the contacts and information to which they are exposed on social media. The sense of solidarity among members of a virtual community grows stronger over time as does their willingness to act together. In this situation, the communal solidary in cyberspace could motivate people to act in order to attain their shared social and political goals in the physical world.

The connection between technology and political action is the foundation of the theory of "technological determinism." The theory, as conceptualized by Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan, refers to socio-historical trends as products of significant technological innovations.[6] Researchers who have adopted this theory think of social changes, such as the rise of nationalism, the Protestant Reformation, and introduction of democratic modern regimes, as outcomes of social actions motivated by a technological constraint.[7] According to this approach, the development of social media has greatly affected the growth of social movements around the world. People posts on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other forums to call for action, and others respond in real time. This potential was realized by protest movements such as Occupy Wall Street, the Tea Party, and the movements that launched

the Arab Spring, such as the April 6 Youth Movement. In every one of these protests, social media—especially Facebook and Twitter—served as a platform in the virtual sphere to disseminate information and promote demonstrations and other actions in the real world.

Social Media and Radicalization

> What is interesting is the power and the impact of social media . . .
> So we must try to use social media in a good way.
>
> –Nobel Peace Prize winner Malala Yousafzai

The concept of radicalization describes a process in which people are exposed to transformative ideological messages that result in replacing their moderate stances with radical ones. Radical thinking that undermines the existing order is not necessarily problematic in and of itself. On the contrary, it contributed to many positive historical developments. However, when radical thinking leads to violence or other criminal behavior, society could find itself under real, concrete threat.[8]

Despite the public interest in the radicalization of young Muslims, the process is hardly limited to members of any ethnic group, religion, ideology, or political party.[9] Radical groups are well aware of social media's inherent potential and exploit it to recruit young internet users. Radical right-wing political parties, such as PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident) in Germany and the Britain First party in the United Kingdom, have amassed influence via social media where they are far more popular than the regular establishment parties.[10] This raises the question: What factors have helped radical, anti-global, hermetic movements to flourish primarily on social media platforms, ironically considered the locus of global, pluralistic, democratic values, and indeed, the epitome of the global village?

The function of the internet and social media in disseminating radical ideologies and values has been the subject on plethora of studies.[11] Researchers refer to social media platforms as an internet environment (or milieu) that adapts to users' needs based on their previous web browsing history and to content that they have marked as relevant by clicking "like." This adaptation (also known as filter bubble) identifies the user's personal tastes

using advanced algorithms. To make the user experience as pleasant and welcoming as possible, the filter bubble steadily provides people with content and message that suit their worldview, while concurrently hiding contradictory stances. This algorithmic feature traps users in very narrow positions and creates a Hermetic sphere that screens out challenging voices.

This hermetic spheres reverberating with radical ideas have the potential to lead to collective radicalization of community members and provide legitimacy to ideologies, positions, and types of behavior generally considered taboo. This leads to a honing of political ideas that were formerly considered marginal and increases their popularity. This is how the features of social media create a "bubble" in which people "naturally" become more extreme in their beliefs.

Another explanation relates to internet hate speech called "othering." Othering is a rhetorical method in which the narrative is dichotomously divided between "us" and "them." This is a familiar feature of a hate speech on the internet, such as stressing the region of origin of a social group in a dispute between veteran and new immigrants. This type of speech might lead to justifying malicious and even violent conduct toward the "others."[12] In extreme cases, "othering" takes the form of dehumanization.[13] While the traditional media is supervised by the state, which limits an us-them discourse, social media enables antagonistic rhetoric to flourish. This is how the internet has become a crucial sphere for creating and spreading antagonizing messages, while turning normal people into propaganda machines spreading disinformation, anxiety, and hatred.[14]

Ignoring the negative ramifications of the discourse of social media networks would be justifiable if they had remained a safety valve for blowing off steam. However, there is a reasonable concern that the way a person operates in the virtual sphere is similar to the way that same person behaves in the physical world, as the process of socialization that occurs on the internet does not necessarily stay there but gradually spreads into the physical realm. Thus, internet bullying is copied from the virtual sphere to the real world..[15]

An example of this phenomenon is demonstrated by the spread of the "incel" (involuntary celibates) movement. Incels, primarily active in social media, are men suffering from sexual frustration who blame their condition on women. The common monikers in communications between incels and their "opponents" are "Chads" for handsome men having sexual relations

and "Stacys" for pretty women having sexual relations while "Norms" are all those who are not incels. The community began in the early 2000s, as a forum where men with difficulties in finding a romantic or sexual partner shared their experiences. Gradually, the group began to change, in large part thanks to "masters of seduction" who saw the platform as providing an opportunity to hawk methods of seduction to frustrated men. After discovering that they were still incapable of attracting members of the opposite sex despite these methods and techniques, their rage grew, and the contents of the platform became increasingly and violently misogynistic.[16] David Futrelle, a journalist who has followed the incel movement, explained that the members of the movement take all the bitterness and sadness sometimes felt when facing sexual or romantic frustrations and turn them into a state of existence. Instead of urging young men to shake off their disappointment, the incel subculture encourages them to wallow in their grief.[17]

The most horrifying expression of this internet community made headlines in April 2018 after Alek Minassian, a young Canadian man, ran over dozens of people on a Toronto street, killing ten and wounding fourteen. Shortly before his rampage, Minassian wrote a post on his Facebook page where he expressed his support for the incel community: "Private (Recruit) Minassian Infantry 00010, wishing to speak to Sgt 4chan please. C23249161. The Incel Rebellion has already begun! We will overthrow all the Chads and Stacys!"[18]After the attack, researchers started to compare the radicalization between young, sexually frustrated men active in incel forums and that of young Muslims enlisting in ISIS. According to one article in the *Atlantic*, "Now they can come together online and find others to validate their grievances and encourage them to action. Dating is harder when you spend a lot of time being bitter online. Murder is easier when someone is whispering at you every few minutes, telling you the rest of the world deserves what it gets. These communities become, like ISIS, instruments of conscience-annihilation, and the lonely losers within them become desensitized and, ultimately, morally inverted."[19]

Social Media and the Global Jihad

Dozens of published studies show how terrorist organizations, such as ISIS, use social media to recruit activists. Their most conspicuous finding is that much of the radicalization occurs among people whose main connection

with the extreme ideology takes place through the computer rather than any physical encounter; in other words, these are people being radicalized via the internet. This was true of Osman Hussain, the British citizen found guilty of the 2005 London tube station bombings; this was also true of Colleen LaRose, a US citizen who tried to assassinate a cartoonist who had portrayed the Prophet Muhammad in an unflattering light;[20] and it was also the case for some German citizens who were planning to attack a train in Germany in July 2006. All testified that their radicalization happened as a result of being exposed to content on the internet.[21]

Studies on the radicalization of people who join extreme jihadist movements as a result of being motivated by the internet stress the fact that these are normal-seeming, law-abiding individuals. Often, radicalized people are educated and employed, have a family, and seem to be involved in their communities. At the same time, it has also been found that there is a tendency toward violence among young people, especially members of ethnic minorities who, in most cases, are second- or third- generation immigrants. The professional literature on the subject suggests that two main factors are responsible for increased likelihood of violent tendencies: socioeconomic inequality and an identity crisis.

From an economic perspective, radical Islam was—since its inception—the product of a class struggle. Muhammad Kattib explains, for example, that "North African immigrants felt trapped in the lower classes of French society. They realized they were outside the mainstream of society and had been robbed of opportunities. This understanding and their poverty were the fuel that inflamed the disgust they experienced with French society and its symbols of wealth. The radicals succeeded in harnessing this anger to create a conflict between Muslims and the 'kuffars.'"[22]

Several models explain a person's transition to an ideology that justifies terrorism. For example, Randy Borum's model includes four stages: The first "it's not right," in which people feel that a certain state of affairs is inappropriate; the second stage is "it's not fair," when people compare the state of affairs to better situations or to other people's situations and determine that the inequality is illegitimate or unjustified; in the third of "it's your fault," people point fingers at an external group whom they consider responsible for situation (and often the group will consist of "others"), and gradually they become subjected to dehumanization; and, in the last stage, "you're

evil," people generate negative stereotypes of the external group, applying these stereotypes to all members of the group and legitimizing violence against them because it is aimed at the "evil group" seen as responsible for all acts of injustice.[23]

Relatedly, the jihadist rhetoric exploits the psychological frustration experienced by people with economic and social difficulties and amplifies their sense of injustice by using imagery and symbols related to a general message of "holy war" against the oppression of Muslims.[24] Colleen LaRose, for example, who was active in jihadist groups using the name "Jihad Jane," described her process of radicalization by noting that she had watched videos of Palestinians being killed by the Israeli army and of Iraqis who were killed by the US military, which had motivated her to act. She claimed that, for a long time, she had been frustrated with her relatives' apathy toward these acts of injustice until she herself felt compelled to take action. Similar to LaRose, some young people see jihad as a "just" cause and over the years, are increasingly drawn into extreme movements and organizations, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.[25]

Another feature that may lead young people down the path to radical Islam is the identity crisis experienced by those who lack a sense of belonging.[26] For example, a French study of young people suspected of being al-Qaeda members found that as they matured—even though they did not grow up in strictly religious families—Islam provided them with a source of identity and self-esteem, having been rejected by French society.[27] Furthermore, many radical youths are motivated by a desire to be superheroes who rise up one day to exact revenge of their enemies, and many others are enchanted by the idea of belonging to a brotherhood of such heroes who seek vengeance on behalf of all Muslims. Others are motivated by the desire to make a name for themselves, and while "routine" crimes and murders generally do not attract much media attention, terrorism is granted a great deal of media coverage. It is interesting to note that such youths tend to have little or no connection with the greater Muslim community. In fact, some have even cut ties with their families and view the mainstream Muslim communities that promote integration as "betraying" the pure Islam.[28]

Movements and organizations such as the Islamic State identify the vulnerability of young people with these sorts of problems as having potential for recruitment and promote what is known as the "virtual umma"—a

communal idea spread by the organization's propaganda machine. These organizations address young people who are not only seeking answers in religion or ideology but also want adventure, a sense of personal empowerment, and belonging. These organizations therefore use identity and community as their main recruitment engine. The violence of jihadist terrorist organizations draw the attention of people living in the community's social, economic, and cultural margins, and this violence slowly but surely moves them to action. Because the young people are not always able to meet their peers in the virtual umma, the internet thus becomes an imagined community. Virtual umma members achieve a sense of spiritual unity nurtured by their participation in shared rituals, regardless of their physical location.[29] The recruiters make them feel needed while also feeding their frustrations with political, economic, and social issues and structuring their Islamist identity as the most important signifier of identity in their lives.[30]

The Chicken and the Egg: Does the Internet Cause Radicalization?

Another question of interest for internet researchers is the direction of causality: Does the internet radicalize people, or are we looking at people who have already been radicalized in the physical world who then seek out internet content that suit their worldview? In other words, do young people commit terrorist attacks because they were exposed to jihadist propaganda on the internet, or do they consume jihadist propaganda on the internet because they have already decided to commit attacks of terrorism?

The case of Roshonara Choudhry, the first British subject convicted of Islamist violence, gives credence to the hypothesis that the internet is, in fact, the factor motivating young people to such action. In 2010, Choudhry, then a student, stabbed a British MP after having watched videos featuring Anwar al-Awlaki, a Muslim cleric, on YouTube. Radicalization theories would refer to her as a pure lone-wolf terrorist, indoctrinated on the internet, lacking any direct connection to a religious institution or extremist group.[31] Choudhry testified that the videos al-Awlaki had posted were the only factor leading to her decision. Importantly, Choudhry is not the only young person to have been affected by the charismatic al-Awlaki: his sermons are among the most popular jihadist contents viewed on the internet.[32]

Nonetheless, most researchers question the significance of exposure to internet content. The skeptics claim that the idea that violence is motivated by extremists online does not pass any empirical test, since only a few of those exposed to this type of propaganda become radicalized. Moreover, it may be that exposure to extreme content increases viewers' resistance to extremism and violence, quite the opposite of what the producers of this content have in mind. According to these researchers, people who become active terrorists are not recruited online. Rather, they are affected by social connections with others in the physical world and only then do they become actively involved, consuming extremist content on social media.[33]

At the time of this writing, researchers have yet to determine if the internet is the cause for young people's radicalization. Seemingly, the internet reaches audiences that are impossible to access by other methods, yet very few studies have shown a direct link between the internet and the radicalization of terrorists. Research demonstrates that the internet is not a substitute for face-to-face encounters and only plays a complementary role in communications and actions in the real world.[34] Instead of thinking of social media as the infrastructure for disseminating the content that is the sole cause for radicalization, social media perhaps should be seen as a tool for ingraining and amplifying violence by transmitting and repeating ideological messages. Even if most terrorist organization members are radicalized though physical encounters with propagandists, members of virtual communities make it possible to entrench radical ideologies.

Furthermore, even if one doubts the importance of disseminating recruitment materials of radical organizations through social media, one cannot deny the effect of the polarizing, toxic, and inciting discourse flooding social media, manifesting people's willingness to adopt extreme social ideas based on hatred and dehumanization of groups and individuals in their communities and legitimizing violent political action against them.

Conclusion

The development of the internet from a platform of static websites to an interactive, multi-channel medium connecting billions of people has been a communications revolution. One unexpected drawback has been the increased spread of vitriolic, racist content, which bypasses the censorship mechanisms that still exists in the traditional media. One's personal internet

sphere can encourage an extreme discourse and provides a refuge for young people with racist inclinations where they can nurture their hatred and violent tendencies and can express positions calling for violence and political acts that, until quite recently, were considered illegitimate. The results can be incitement, violence, and participation in terrorist organizations.

Is the internet guilty of being the cause of radicalization? It seems not. The internet may help to establish such a process and allow it grow, but there is no decisive proof supporting the idea that the internet substitutes for encounters with people in the real world during the radicalization process. However, we must bear in mind that the internet's process of reinforcing, supporting, and amplifying radical positions is significant, as it brings people a step closer to being willing to participate in violent acts and prevents them from being exposed to other influences capable of stopping the radicalization process. This type of support from social media is especially important because the internet serves as a platform for young people's socialization. Therefore, the socialization of young people in more moderate climates is being replaced by political socialization that is much more extreme and inciting.

The concern of the Western security establishment with radical content transmitted on social media has led to many means of trying to filer the most toxic content but with little success. Former Mossad Chief Tamir Pardo noted the futility of these means, when he said that "social media creates new challenges that, to date, no statesman has been able to face or resolve."[35] Indeed, studies on government countermeasures to fight online radicalization indicate that censorship and filters are ineffective as they deal only with the symptoms of radicalization and not its causes. Censorship and filters can be bypassed via the deep web, VPNs, and even gaming platforms. Blocked content reappears online with barely any time lag and the social media giants—Facebook, Twitter, and the like—find it very difficult to filter them out. Recently, hate speech on the internet has become a legal issue in many nations, and prison terms have been meted out to people who have used the internet to spread hate based on religion, race, or sexual orientation. The United Kingdom, France, Denmark, and the Netherlands are leaders in the field of neutralizing some of the toxic discourse online,[36] but to date, there is no evidence that these tools are successful at rendering the internet discourse any less harmful.

Extreme, violent organizations have posed a threat to national security for many decades. But in the modern era—notable for its easy access to lethal weapons, global mobility, and improved global media—the potential of these organizations has grown from regional to global.[37] These developments are the result not only of the availability of radical content but also of changing perceptions of identity as a result of globalization and the information revolution. In a neoliberal era that sanctifies individualism at the expense of communal cohesion, organizations preaching communal ideologies have a tremendous opportunity to attract activists, including those groups preaching hatred, violence, and social polarization. The dissemination of messages of victimization and radicalism is particularly effective when done skillfully via attractive communications platforms. Through the prism of constructivism and national security, a better understanding of technology and especially of the social conditions where technology is assimilated and developed is critical for comprehending the security threats of the twenty-first century.

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Conclusion: The Time Has Come for a
New Security Paradigm

Yoram Peri

A Fluid, Fluctuating World

It has been precisely thirty years since Eastern Europe experienced the Velvet Revolution, first in Berlin, then Prague, and finally Bratislava. Throngs of people flocked to the squares and a new spirit of freedom filled the air. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, offering dramatic evidence of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the implosion of the Soviet bloc, and the end of the struggle between the two major ideologies of the second half of the twentieth century.

The excitement in the West was so great that Francis Fukuyama attributed Hegelian significance to these events, penning *The End of History*. The world, including the former Soviet Union and even China, he wrote authoritatively, would now undergo a process of "convergence" and all nations would adopt the principles of liberal democracy. Indeed, consequent to the fall of the Iron Curtain, we witnessed "the third wave of democracy," as Samuel Huntington called it, with no fewer than sixty nations across the globe joining the democratic club. The rush of optimism about the future reminiscent of the late industrial revolution in the nineteenth century, when social evolutionists—such as Herbert Spencer, Auguste Comte, and Henri de Saint-Simon—were sure that the change in human history was so dramatic that there would be no more wars.

But what was true then remains true today. Not long after the initial outburst of optimism following the collapse of the Iron Curtain, it became clear that a belief in the "the end of ideology" was naïve. At the end of the

previous century, and, even more so, at the beginning of the present one, the pendulum started swinging in the opposite direction. The principles of liberalism started to weaken and the number of democracies fell. According to Freedom House's annual 2017 survey, the protection of human rights has weakened in at least 71 nations over the last twelve years. In 2017, only 39 percent of the world's population lived freely. Formerly democratic nations had adopted illiberal, authoritarian, populist patterns, even proto-fascist models. Pessimists are now referring to this as the post-democratic era.

This phenomenon is not unique to Central and Eastern Europe—Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Baltic states are prime examples—but is happening elsewhere too: Brexit in Great Britain, the ascent of Trump to the US presidency, and the gains made by extreme right-wing political parties and leaders in Western Europe (Italy and even Sweden are two examples of many). Leaders who were clearly neo-authoritarian or became so during their terms in office now rule, such as Modi in India, Erdoğan in Turkey, and, of course, Putin in Russia. In South America, which is well-versed in suffering under repressive military dictatorships, millions are again starting to believe that only the army can save their countries from economic crises, political chaos, and deep-seated corruption.

In the midst of all this, China's sun continues to rise in the East. Accelerating economic growth and significant military and political expansions remain an intellectual challenge to anyone who continues chanting the old mantra: A capitalist economy can develop only in open societies and in political democracies. In the meantime, China is nipping at the heels of the United States, and it is all but certain that within a decade China will replace it as the greatest superpower in the world.

One should not downplay the importance of the phenomena happening right before our eyes—the weakening of the democratic model and the rise of authoritarian regimes, the toppling of the United States from its hegemonic standing, and the geostrategic challenge posed by China.[1] Rarely does the world undergo such expansive, deep, and all-encompassing changes as the ones occurring now. The international order changed and was redesigned after World War I when the only existing empires crumbled and a new international system replaced them. This happened also after World War II, when a bipolar world—a democratic West and a communist East—emerged, while the southern hemisphere was decolonized and became the "third

world." Already two decades now, we have again found ourselves part of a fluid, flexible global society that is breaking down and being shaped anew.[2]

The reasons have been amply documented and analyzed: reactions to globalization; greater economic disparities between the top ten percent—or even the top 1 percent—and all the rest of society; the most serious economic crisis since the 1930s that occurred in 2008; and other shocks that have led to developed nations being inundated with refugees from less developed countries. Since the beginning of the new millennium, these factors have led to drastic changes all over the world, within democratic societies, in relations between nations, and in the international system as a whole. Toward the end of the second decade of this century, we are facing the classic question: *quo vadis*?

Even more worrisome is that accepted views, conceptual systems, and even old analytical tools have lost their validity. It is no coincidence that in recent years, both social scientists and journalists—two kinds of professionals who are supposed to have a finger on the pulse of social processes, understand what is happening, and also be able to identify future trends—failed to accurately foresee the outcomes of the Brexit vote, the last US presidential election, and the cracking of the Europen Union. In our fluid world, the concepts used to understand "reality" are outdated as are the analytical tools that go with them.[3]

Here and there, however, new conceptualizations, relevant to the way the world is now, are being formulated. Thomas Wright, for example, a researcher at the Brookings Institute in Washington DC, wrote an interesting document in which he sketches the outline of the new world order that has been developing over the last few years. The emerging picture diverges from that of the post-World War II era when the West worked hard to establish a liberal world order based on the values of liberal democracy, a market economy, and free trade.

Today, says Wright, we are witnessing the construction of a very different world order with two political ideologies: the neo-authoritarian camp versus the neo-liberal camp. And where is the United States in all this? One would be hard describe Donald Trump's United States part of the free world that supports the rule of law, fosters an open society, and encourages a free press; on the contrary, the United States is becoming increasingly similar to the other members of the neo-authoritarian club.[4]

Unlike Wright, others take a more optimistic view, such as the British magazine, the *Economist*. In a special issue published in the summer of 2018 marking its 175th anniversary, the magazine surveyed not only liberalism's accomplishments during that time but also presented a fairly rosy picture of the rebirth of liberalism in a different guise.

The New Wars

Similar to the global reality described above, warfare is also changing. Military researchers and practitioners have noted the transformations happening right before their eyes, but so far have not been able to create a complete, cohesive picture. Some of the pieces were covered in the eight chapters of this memorandum and will be briefly mentioned below.

The players: The main players in security used to be states, especially nation-states and, above all, the superpowers. Today, the range is much greater and includes not only non-state players but also (as described by Yaron Schneider in his article here) supra-state organizations, sub-state organizations, civil society organizations, pressure groups, interest groups, ethnic diasporas and their organizations (such as the Kurdish ethnonational diaspora in Germany, as Gallia Lindenstrauss analyzes here), trans-government networks, and more. Such civil society organizations also play as important a role as that of the state in arenas that were not meant to serve them to begin with (as Michal Hatuel-Radoshitzky writes in her analysis of the case of Israel at the UN Human Rights Commission).

The scope of the arena: The scope of the arena has changed. Added to land, sea, and air are new dimensions: the underground, space, cyber, and social media. Social media has played a significant role in mobilizing youth in Europe to join international terror movements (as Yotam Rosner discusses in his article), and this is just one of the expressions of how social media has joined the world of war. Cyber, even more so, has had an immense, revolutionary effect on the future wars and already now it raises new questions that still do not have answers (some of which Ido Sivan-Sevilla addresses in his article).

The global and regional dimension: The changes in the international order in recent decades have led to the fragmentation of the global political system, replete with new combinations, alliances, and regional zones of cooperation. An example is the bloc of Shiite states versus the Sunni states

in the Middle East; the Central and Eastern European states versus Western Europe; the new regional zone of cooperation among Cyprus, Israel, and Greece, and between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan specifically in the field of energy. The importance of nation-states, which served as the foundation for the international system in the twentieth century, is waning (one example is the decrease in Egypt's stateness, as discussed by Khader Sawaed).

For some years now, geopolitical competition has become heightened, as reflected, for example, by Russia's aggressiveness in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Above all, one must not underestimate the significance of China's growing strength and influence over dozens of nations through its One Belt, One Road initiative, connecting China with Western European nations in a modern silk road thanks to investments of one trillion dollars. The repeated warnings about Australia and New Zealand becoming China's vassals would, not too long ago, have sounded wildly delusional.

Technology: One does not have to belong to the technological school thought in order to understand the depth of the impact of technologies on contemporary wars and, to an even greater extent, on future wars. Cyberspace, artificial intelligence, interconnectivity in all of its dimensions, unmanned warfare devices, robotics, and autonomous weapons to replace the sacrifice of soldiers—all concepts that nobody even imagined two decades ago, with the possible exception of science fiction writers. But, in the very near future, these will take center stage in military planning and practice, and even now, they raise new moral and ethical questions (such as those noted in Liran Antebi's article, which deals with AWS based on advanced robotics).

The type of warfare: Throughout the twentieth century, we witnessed "third generation" wars, in which the militaries of nation-states faced each other on physical battlefields. By the end of the century, these industrialized wars had all but vanished, replaced by "fourth generation" wars, which—depending upon the component considered most important—include cognitive warfare, narrative warfare, lawfare, mediatized warfare, and more.[5]

In the twenty-first century, we can already speak of the "fifth generation" of war; that is, hybrid wars, which are characterized by threats from diverse coalitions of sub-state or trans-national groups, or subversive entities using revolutionary guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The style of Russia's involvement in Ukraine, in the Crimean Peninsula, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the Middle East is a good example of hybrid warfare. Russia uses a combination

of combat troops, civilian fighters residing in the zone of conflict, soldiers masquerading as civilians, information warfare, sophisticated cognitive warfare using social media, cyberwarfare, and who knows what else.[6]

A New View of the Concept of "Security"

In tandem with the transformations in the physical, concrete world, significant ideological shifts have also taken place. In Europe, multiculturalism has collapsed; at the start of the current decade, the Socialist Party in the Netherlands was the first to erase the concept from its platform, while Germany under Angela Merkel announced it was abandoning multiculturalism as the organizing principle of government policy.

Concurrently, religion as a political phenomenon has strengthened. Religious groups and organizations have made tremendous gains in societies that were, until now, secular. This phenomenon has received support from intellectuals and academics who disagreed with the modernist school of thought, which distinguished between traditional society—in which religion played a respectable role—and modernity and secular enlightenment. In contrast, today's academic approach views religion as an essential component of the new world and of late modernity.

Academic and theoretical disciplines have also changed. One dramatic example is what happened to the postmodern school of thought. At the end of the previous century, postmodernism was at its peak, but it has already now receded from the limelight. The discipline of international relations has been affected as well. The realist school lost its hegemony, while others, notably constructivism, have gained in strength. But despite the real world changes and the transformations in theoretical and academic fields, the theoretical field of security lags behind. There has not yet been an updated, cohesive conceptualization of national security. Although some interesting attempts have been made, they are only at the beginning. In Israel, the gap is still tangible.

In a 1997 article that has since become a classic, David Baldwin expanded the concept of security, which had narrowly focused on states and armies in the spirit of the realist approach and had characterized it until the end of the twentieth century. Thanks to Baldwin, security is now accepted as extending beyond ensuring the nation-state's existence against the physical, existential threat looming from the army of an enemy state. Instead, security is now

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defined as a broad and diverse concept encompassing many issues, including the economy, human rights, environmental concerns (such as desertification, climate change, water shortages, food security), the international drug trade and human trafficking, transmittable diseases, and so on.[7]

Furthermore, unlike the realist approach, which viewed security as a Hobbesian phenomenon—an expression of collective anxiety, meaning fear but also pride and honor—today, the concept of security is much wider. Anthony Giddens has called it "ontological security," referring to citizens' sense of security, which is rooted in their need to preserve their collective identity. This situation is destabilized when players in the international arena lose a sense of security in their identity, future, and the context in which the live and function, or, in other words, when they are incapable of telling their story—where they came from and where they are going.[8] The reaction of American whites to Hispanic immigration, or of European Christians to Muslim newcomers are classic examples. Extremist populist right-wing leaders speak explicitly of the danger of losing their identity. In the United States,

even Judaism has been hijacked for the cause, as the new nationalists and supremacists speak of the danger posed to "our Judeo-Christian heritage."

A major innovation in the new theoretical developments is the idea of security not as a given, objective, external, and essential reality but rather as a structured concept; that is, a social creation. For example, when Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, spoke of Israel's security in the early 1950s, he included agriculture and education in the concept and this was seen as obvious. It enabled him sending female soldiers to teach in schools in the immigrants centers (Ma'abarot), or to commend army units to grow tomatoes.

The statement that security is a structured concept is far-reaching, because, if it is true, we must ascertain when and in relation to what the concept of security is used, what the field of security consists of, and when does an issue considered "security" cease being such. It also means we must ascertain who has the power, ability, and authority to determine that an issue has security significance. And especially important, we must ascertain what interests motivate those who presume to make these determinations, and who gains and loses as a result.

Among those who first started examining these questions were researchers of securitization theory, also known as the Copenhagen school. Since its establishment, theoretician have questioned the validity of this theory, which stresses the linguistic dimension of securitization; that is, what gives security significance to any topic is actually its definition as such. Even among its proponents, opinions differ as to the theory's components and especially its methodology. Nonetheless, the widespread use of security reasons, whether justified or simply pretexts, demands fresh critical thinking of the securitization theory.

The need to expand the concept of security emanates from the growing recognition that, in late modernity, the public's sense of security has diminished. Changes in all aspects of life are fundamental and occurring much faster than they did in the past. "Reality" has become more fluid and the main function of social institutions—to create and preserve the social order—has become more difficult than it was. This disorder causes anxiety among many people and longing for the "old world" of the past, which created order and promised certainty (as Vera Michlin-Shapir and Carmit Padan write in the opening article of this volume).

A new school of thought, which is critical of the securitization theory, relies on the work of political sociologists such as Ulrich Beck, who named contemporary society "risk society," and Zygmunt Bauman, who used the phrase "liquid fear"—also the name of his 2006 book—to describe the new state of affairs.[9] According to Bauman, current reality is a "liquid modernity"; unlike the previous modernity, which created order and promised stability, the new modernity adds uncertainty, creates chaos and confusion, and increases anxiety.[10]

But anxiety does not affect all in the same way, and some are more anxious than others, such as white Americans who feel the American dream of continuous upward mobility has been shattered and fear that their children's economic situation will be worse than their own. This is also true of the extremist Christians in Europe, who are terrified that foreign values will replace traditional Christian European beliefs. And there are others: In 2014, these anxious classes were renamed "precariat"; that is, a new social class consisting of people who, even if they are employed, lead economically precarious lives and lack the tools to foresee and predict their future. This causes them great insecurity—both material and psychological. The term, made famous at the beginning of this decade by Guy Standing, is a portmanteau of "precarious" and "proletariat." According to Standing, people in this class are responsible for the growth of the new populism.[11]

This brings us back to the description at the onset of this article: What is the social and political response to this anxiety and fear that have characterized millions of people for the past two decades? The answer is not new as humanity has known similar situations in the past, most dramatically in the 1930s, which witnessed tribal, nationalistic divisions; greater faith in a supreme power as well as in various conspiracy theories; building walls and fences to keep out "the other" portrayed as a dangerous enemy; the fostering of separatism and economic defenses. All are techniques familiar from the days when democracies collapsed and authoritarian and totalitarian regimes took their place.

Like then, we are now witnessing phenomena of restricting liberty and harming individual and civil rights; the weakening of regimes' checks and balances systems; labeling criticism "treason"; the revering of hegemony; and the delegitimizing of opposing views. This ends in conceding the principles and procedures of representative democracy and supporting the

new authoritarianism and the populist strongman. As has been true of leaders since the dawn of time, and certainly of those regimes that have cast off the oversight of gatekeepers and the threat of watchdogs, a range of strategies will be used to entrench their status, weaken their rivals, reduce the scope of the discourse, and oppress their opponents. One of the most convenient and effective tools of these regimes is the use of "security." Harping on imaginary threats and exaggerating real ones, while labeling them all "existential," has always been the most common tool used by political leaders to rally citizens around the flag.

But security consists of more than just physical security in the face of a military threat. Necessary and even essential components of national security, which must be considered, are environmental dangers and climate change; foreign intervention in the national decision-making process by means of cognitive warfare; control by technological corporations, such as Google and Facebook, of the day-to-day activities of almost every human being on earth, and so on. National security also includes Israel's standing in the international community, the future of our relationship with diaspora Jewry, the moral force of the Zionist project, and the younger generation's sense that they are facing an exciting, brilliant future in which the biblical question "Shall the sword devour forever?" is answered with an emphatic "no."

The Israeli Context

Planning Israel's future cannot start with Israel alone. First, one must identify global processes and construct scenarios of far-reaching global changes (the rise of China is an important example that has yet to receive the attention it deserves from Israel's security community). Second, it is necessary to surmise the regional developments and only then focus on "us" in the "here and now." The realization that security is not an externally imposed concept but rather one that we have created demands that we assume a proactive stance and develop an initiated strategy, while also considering the non-military components of security—what Joseph Nye calls "smart power."

For example, the equation of "land for peace" fundamentally asks what will provide Israel with more security. The concept of security is being invoked in its old style as physical security in the face of a military danger from external enemies that can be confronted only by military means. One cannot ignore this critical component, but given the changes in the concept

of security presented here, it is obvious that the equation must include other components too, such as the social dimension. One must examine which solution will mitigate—if not stop—the current processes in which the divisions within Israeli society are deepening and the liberal democratic mechanisms are being weakened, as well as the dangers we face by continuing a state of non-decision. It is no coincidence that in recent years, it was actually the former chief of staff, Gadi Eizenkot, who noted the social problems of Israeli society and their effects on the IDF as a threat of the highest order, even more than the external military threats. This approach, however, has not been given the appropriate attention within Israel's political and public discourse.

This kind of social consideration shaped the policy of the French president, Charles de Gaulle, when he confronted the Algerian security issue in the 1960s. Unlike the platform he had presented during the election campaign, he decided to concede Algeria and support independence for the strip of land that had been considered an inseparable part of *la patrie*. Indeed, with this courageous decision, de Gaulle managed to heal the deep rift in France that had led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic and several attempted military coups. The end of the "cold civil war" in France allowed de Gaulle to begin a new chapter in the nation's history and build a new Europe. Germany, which had been France's most bitter enemy for centuries, turned into a close partner and ally. Algeria—once considered an existential security problem—vanished as if it had never existed.

Of course, no two historical situations are ever identical and there are many differences between France of the 1960s and Israel on the verge of the 2020s. But the story of Charles de Gaulle supports the major assertions made in this memorandum: The concept of national security is complex; it is socially constructed; we must confront security dilemmas in a proactive, comprehensive fashion; and above all, the story shows that we must examine the concept using new analytical tools.

Notes

1   Zbigniew Brezinski, "Toward a Global Realignment," *American Interest* 11, no. 6 (April 17, 2016), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/17/toward-a-global-realignment/.
2   See the article by Vera Michlin-Shapir and Carmit Padan, "Dangers, Risks, and Bears in the Woods: National Security in the Global Era."

3 Ibid.
4 Thomas Wright, "The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable," *The Atlantic*, September 12, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-return-to-great-power-rivalry-was-inevitable.
5 Yoram Peri, *Mediatized Wars: The Power Paradox and the IDF's Strategic Dilemma* (Tel Aviv: Institute of National Security Studies, 2017) [in Hebrew].
6 Rafi Rodnik, "The Evolution of the Military Campaign: The Link Between the Use of Military Force and the Features of the War Environment," *Bein Haqtavim* 2 (July 2015): 125–175 [in Hebrew]. See also Jerrid K. Allen "Cognitive Depth and Hybrid Warfare: Exploring the Nature of Unique Time, Space, and Logic Frames," School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2017.
7 David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 5–26, https://goo.gl/WBL2Ds.
8 Laura Schelenz, "Ontological Security Theory: What's Behind this New Theory Trending in IR," *Sicherheitspolitik* (blog) August 28, 2017, https://www.sicherheitspolitik-blog.de/2017/08/28/ontological-security-whats-behind-this-new-theory-trending-in-ir/.
9 Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Fear* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006).
10 Olaf Corry, "Securityzation and 'Riskization': Two Grammars of Security," (working paper prepared for Standing Group on International Relations, Seventh Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, September 9–11, 2010). Consequent to Beck and Bauman, the concept of "reflexive security" was also developed. See, for example, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2001): 285–309, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298010300020901.
11 Guy Standing, *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class* (Bloomsbury, London, 2011).

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No. 195, October 2019, *National Security in a "Liquid" World*, Carmit Padan and Vera Michlin-Shapir, Editors.

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No. 183, October 2018, Meir Elran, Carmit Padan, Roni Tiargan-Orr, and Hoshea Friedman Ben Shalom, eds., *The Israeli Military Reserves: What Lies Ahead?* [Hebrew].

Since the 1980s, we have witnessed rapid changes in a world characterized by a neo-liberal economy, increased human migration, and information technologies developing at an unprecedented pace. These transformations are putting stress on modern state structures and have allowed non-state players to enter the heart of global consciousness. These new entities pose new security challenges, including ethnic conflicts, civil wars, the use of robotics-based autonomous weapons, and terrorist attacks both in the physical sphere and cyberspace.

The articles in this memorandum, authored by former and present Neubauer research associates at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), assert that the political, economic, and social changes, as well as the challenges to security now faced by the West (including Israel), converge to create a different agenda for analyzing security and strategy issues, forcing us to redefine the very concept of "national security."

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