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A Case Study of Societal Resilience in Israel (2006–2016)

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

Memorandum
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INSS
המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי
THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY אוניברסיטת תל אביב

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Institute for National Security Studies

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יישובים ב"עוטף עזה" –
מקרה בוחן לחוסן החברתי בישראל
(2016–2006)

כרמית פדן ומאיר אלרן

בהשתתפות
אלכס אלטשולר, דניאל אולדריץ', יובל צור, יעל אשכנזי־זלכה

Institute for National Security Studies (a public benefit company)
40 Haim Levanon Street
POB 39950
Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 6997556 Israel

Tel. +972-3-640-0400
Fax. +972-3-744-7590

E-mail: info@inss.org.il
http://www.inss.org.il

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Contents

Preface

The issue of societal resilience among the Israeli public during a security-related event has taken on critical importance in the civilian/defense discourse in recent years, due to the transformation of the military conflicts that Israel is embroiled in. Resilience is manifested in the capacity of any system under threat to adroitly contain the disruption thrust upon it and the diminished functioning that inevitably follows, and then to bounce back quickly, returning to full or even improved systemic functioning. This study presents a comprehensive analysis of the level of resilience found in Israel's "Gaza Envelope" communities during the decade that began with the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2006. The lessons learned in this comparative study can be applied in all communities in Israel, particularly those that are likely in the future to experience serious disruptions – be they security related, natural or manmade.

The goal of the research is to examine the phenomenon of societal resilience in the Israeli settlements in the western Negev, near the border with Gaza. All these settlements are exposed to similar security challenges; the period under review saw three rounds of intense fighting between 2008 and 2014 and a "routine of terror incidents" in the intervals between them. Ten years is a long enough time to develop the perspective required to gauge public efficacy and the organizational capacity of the communities during and following emergency situations. It is also long enough to allow the local residents to evaluate the physical and psychological resources available to them that are needed for coping with long-term instability and stress. Based on our rigorous investigation, the research also offers analytical tools for assessing the extent to which a community can return to normative functioning in its core missions following a major disruption and forecasting how long that process might take.

National resilience is one of the main strategic issues facing Israel. Its importance lies in the typology of conflicts in which Israel has been

involved in recent decades. These conflicts have two main characteristics: they constitute low-intensity belligerence between Israel as a state and non-state entities and they take place, to a great extent, in the civilian domain. In this last respect, the goal of Israel's adversaries is to disrupt the civilian population and civilian systems. The focus on the civilian home front is due to the fact that the Palestinians, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, are aware that their ability to directly confront the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is limited and that it is easier for them to target civilian localities, which are the weaker link in the Israeli system. In this way, the terror organizations achieve an additional important goal, namely, to generate fear and foment chaos and demoralization among the civilian population and thus to hamstring Israel's national ability to endure, hoping that this will induce decision makers to surrender to their political demands. In order to deal with the strategy of the terror organizations, there is a need for endurance by the public. The ability to endure is based to a large degree on the level of societal resilience.

The notion of societal resilience relates to diverse phenomena, such as quality of life, sustainability of values, strength of communities, as well as social capital and objective and perceived standard of living. As issues of national security are so prominent in Israel's public discourse, it is particularly important to find ways to accurately investigate, and if possible to measure, the societal resilience levels of communities both in concrete security contexts and in the broader nationwide framework over time. The investigation presented here is intended to position the principles of resilience in general, Israel's societal resilience in particular and systemic policy to enhance resilience at a higher rung on the national agenda. This is based on the assumption, substantiated in this study, that it is possible and also necessary to reinforce societal resilience among communities that are disrupted by terror, and perhaps also among the public at large.

Introduction

This paper presents comparative research that examines the societal resilience of the Israeli communities in the western Negev that are in close proximity to the border with the Gaza Strip (known as the "Gaza Envelope") with specific reference to three rounds of fighting in the region: Operation Cast Lead (December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009); Operation Pillar of Defense (November 14, 2012 to November 21, 2012) and Operation Protective Edge (July 8, 2014 to August 26, 2014).[1] This period was characterized by continuous terrorist activity comprising mainly high-trajectory fire (rockets and mortar shells) aimed at civilian localities, as well as raids through offensive tunnels.

The research is the continuation of a previous study which examined societal resilience among the residents of two regional authorities in the Gaza Envelope (Eshkol and Sha'ar Hanegev) during Operation Protective Edge.[2] That study presented findings based on the conduct of the residents there, as well as on interviews conducted with officials and local residents. Its conclusions indicated that although each locality reacted differently to the security challenge, a high level of resilience was registered among all of them, even as the level of psychological resilience of the residents was relatively less impressive.

In this paper, an in-depth study was made of six localities that represent different types of communities: one city (Sderot), two secular kibbutzim[3] (Nahal Oz and Nirim), two religious kibbutzim (Alumim and Sa'ad) and one secular moshav[4] (Netiv Ha'asara).

The six localities have three characteristics in common: they are Jewish communities, they are located within close proximity to the border (within 4 kilometers) and they all faced a similar security challenge. The research took into account three variables: the type of settlement (kibbutz, moshav or urban locality), the level of religiosity of the residents,[5] and the distance from the border with Gaza. The goal of the research was to explore the differences in societal resilience between the six communities and to see

whether and how each one's unique character influences its level of societal resilience. Although the research was limited to specific Israeli settlements, conclusions can nonetheless be drawn with respect to other communities in Israel and possibly abroad. Therefore, the study is relevant not only for Israel but also for other countries that face severe disruptions, natural or manmade.

Table 1: The communities included in the study[6]

Name	Regional Council	Type of community	Background	Distance from the border	Religiosity	Number of families	Number of residents
Sderot	Sderot	Urban	Founded in 1951. It was first established as a temporary camp for immigrants. Became a city in 1996.	3.7 km	Mixed		ca. 24,000
Nahal Oz	Sha'ar Hanegev	Kibbutz (privatized)	Founded in 1951, as a Nahal settlement (the first in Israel).	800 meters	Secular	80	377
Nirim	Eshkol	Kibbutz (agricultural; privatized)	Founded in 1946 by members of Hashomer Hatzair youth movement.	2 km	Secular	100	357
Netiv Ha'asara	Hof Ashkelon	Moshav	Founded in 1982 in Sinai; following the peace treaty with Egypt it was moved to its present location.	250 meters	Secular	140	805
Alumim	Sdot Negev	Kibbutz (communal)	Founded in 1966 by members of the Bnei Akiva movement.	3.5 km	Religious	90	400
Sa'ad	Sdot Negev	Kibbutz	Founded in 1947 by members of the Bnei Akiva movement.	3.5 km	Religious	200	760

The qualitative component of the research included in-depth interviews with officials and residents in the six settlements, including heads of regional councils, members of the settlement councils, community leaders, the heads of the Community Emergency and Resilience Teams (CERTs), kibbutz secretaries, spokespersons, social workers, educators, security coordinators, the directors of the Resilience Centers (RCs), officers of the Home Front Command (HFC) and others. In addition, sources such as newsletters published by the regional councils and information sheets issued by the settlements during and following the fighting were used.

The quantitative research looked at demographic changes: the number of residents who left each settlement during the fighting and the number of those who returned, as well as new residents who joined the localities subsequently. Additional data were gathered from the local RCs regarding the number of therapy sessions provided to residents of the studied settlements.

The authors also used the Sapir Barometer,[7] a survey of residents in the western Negev who live in localities up to seven kilometers from the border with Gaza, which aims to measure their feelings and their assessment of their own societal resilience. The Sapir College researchers who created the Barometer have conducted two surveys to date. The first, carried out in 2015 following Protective Edge, explored five domains: personal resilience, community cohesiveness, sense of security, the economic and employment situation and trust in the local leadership. The second survey was conducted in May-June 2016, and followed a similar format.

The current research endeavors to answer two main questions:

1. What characterized the societal resilience demonstrated by the six localities during and in between the three rounds of fighting?
2. What were the similarities and differences in the level of societal resilience between the six localities?

These questions relate to the notion of "societal resilience" often found in the literature,[8] as will be detailed in Chapter 1. Our study examines the characteristics of societal resilience according to four main domains of social functioning: evacuation during emergency situations; manifestations of the settlements' growth; the organizational capacity of the localities; and the level of trust in the local leadership. These domains are based on recognized criteria and are used here to evaluate the level of societal resilience of the discussed communities under severe consecutive disruptions.

The Security Challenge Faced by Communities in the Gaza Envelope

Already in the 1950s, Gaza was a locus of terror against Israel,[9] related to internal and external reasons, which intensified throughout the years. Recurring waves of terror were followed by periods of relative calm. Since 2001 (during the period of the Second Intifada) and particularly after Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (2005) and the building of the border fence, terror from Gaza has primarily been manifested by the use of high-trajectory weapons against civilian targets in Israel and particularly against the settlements

adjacent to the border.[10] While the rockets – those with longer ranges – have also posed a threat to more distant population centers, the shorter-range rockets and mortar shells, particularly when fired in salvos, became the most pressing threat to the region's communities.[11] The high-trajectory fire from Gaza killed 41 persons in Israel from 2001 until June 30, 2014 (prior to Operation Protective Edge). Of those, 27 were killed by rocket fire and 14 by mortar fire. During that same period, 1,673 individuals were injured by high-trajectory fire; that included anxiety-related disorders.[12] Apart from the casualties, the physical damage and the acute disruption of everyday routine, the high-trajectory fire also has serious psychological impact. It is intended to create enduring fear among civilians, a challenge that constitutes the main theme investigated in this research.

In recent years, the fear of high-trajectory fire has been accompanied by the underground threat in the form of offensive tunnels, in which Hamas has invested significant resources. The residents of localities near the border are fearful about the sudden emergence of terrorists from these tunnels, literally in their backyards. This fear is underscored in reports by residents that at night they are sometimes able to hear banging noises below the surface. Although none of the civilian settlements in the Gaza Envelope has ever been attacked by terrorists emerging from the tunnels, the potential risk and the capacity of Hamas to do so (which was demonstrated by the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit in June 2006 as well as in several attacks by Hamas during Protective Edge) is sufficient to stoke fear in the area.

In order to counter Hamas' capacities, Israel has invested massive resources in both passive defense systems (a sophisticated fence,[13] with an underground barrier against tunnels, public and private shelters and an advanced warning system) and active defense systems (primarily the air defense Iron Dome). Although these systems are able to significantly reduce the scope of damage, it is doubtful whether they can provide the Israeli home front with absolute immunity against terror. Terrorists will try repeatedly to overcome all such barriers, using new means and innovative tactics, and it can be assumed that from time to time they will be successful in their endeavors.[14] This is the main reason why, alongside the investments in passive and active defense systems, as well as occasional offensive moves, there is a real need to enhance the societal resilience of residents in the Gaza Envelope, as a complementary strategy, using the range of means presented in this study.

This research examines the decade from 2006 to 2016. There are two main reasons for choosing this time frame: First, it included both periods of calm and periods of tension, which makes it possible to assess the long-term implications of protracted terror. Second, it was a decade of intensive terror directed at the civilians in the region, including three rounds of actual fighting: Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge, in which more than 10,000 rockets and mortar shells were launched from the Gaza Strip.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the number of rocket falls – during the period of the three operations and over the entire decade of the study, respectively.



Figure 1: Number of rocket falls per month, January 2014-July 2016

The Structure of the Study

The study comprises seven chapters: Chapter 1 presents a theoretical introduction to the issue of societal resilience and includes a comprehensive survey of the professional literature on this subject. Chapter 2 discusses indexes of social functionalities that can be used to evaluate societal resilience, such as evacuation, demographic and economic growth, organizational efficacy and the level of trust in the community and its leadership, in each of the six localities reviewed. Chapter 3 addresses the functions and impact of Community Emergency and Resilience Teams (CERTs) as part of the local emergency preparedness and emergency management systems, which are



Figure 2: Number of rocket falls per year, 2006-16

designed to help the communities to continue to function during emergencies at the individual, family and community levels; it also looks at the relations between the CERTs, the local leadership and relevant associated bodies outside the settlements. Chapter 4 is devoted to the Resilience Centers in the Gaza Envelope, which were first established in 2006. Their spheres of activity and impact are examined on the same three levels mentioned above. Chapter 5 looks at the contribution of the State to the societal resilience of the communities in the region. In particular, the discussion focuses on the economic assistance provided by the government and the evolving relationship between the IDF and the communities prior to and during times of emergency. Chapter 6 offers, on the basis of the analysis, systemic recommendations to facilitate enhancement of the communities' emergency preparedness in general and the promotion of societal resilience in the face of diverse forms of disruptions – from manmade military conflicts to natural disasters – in particular. The concluding chapter summarizes the research as a whole.

Chapter 1
Conceptual and Policy-related Analysis of "Resilience"[1]

In recent years, the concept of resilience has won increasing attention in professional, academic and public discourse across the globe in the context of preparedness and coping with emergency situations. Resilience has scores of definitions which emphasize different aspects of the term and which originate in various scientific fields of study.[2] For instance, in the Social Sciences, the fields of social work, psychology, geography, public policy, sociology, urban development, emergency management, political science and others all deal with this concept. [3] However, and despite efforts by many professionals, there is no comprehensive "roadmap" that makes clear the differences between the various perspectives or that might help navigate the multidisciplinary and sometimes chaotic "world of resilience." Thus, for example, researchers are very far from consensus regarding the core meaning of the term "societal resilience" in contexts of homeland security.[4]

When there is a claim that a particular community (or organization or country) has a high level of resilience and a counter claim that resilience is low, it may well be that both claims are right, since each one is defining and measuring "resilience" in a different way and therefore reaching a different conclusion. The possibility of arriving at a single definition of the term that would be agreed upon by most of the scientific and professional community does not currently appear realistic. Nevertheless, in any discussion, the speaker (or the writer) must first present a precise definition of resilience and in this way establish clarity for the listeners (or readers) with regard to his meaning and exact intention when making a claim on this issue. Furthermore, it appears to be important to analyze the mutual relations between the diverse definitions of "resilience" in order to achieve a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the concept.

In the current research, resilience is defined as an expression of the ability of a system to flexibly cope with severe disruption (crisis, emergency or disaster), to flexibly contain the damage and the inevitable decline in functioning that it leads to, to recover from it and to return to normal functioning.

The recovery component is highly significant here. The basic assumption underlying the definitions of resilience is that a severe disruption will always lead to a reduction in the functioning of the affected system. If there is no real reduction in functioning, then neither is there any real damage and in such a case one cannot refer to the situation as an emergency or a major disruption. This implies that if the reduced functioning is prolonged and recovery is slow (or does not occur at all) then the system has relatively low resilience. In contrast, if the reduction in functioning is relatively controlled (that is, the system "decides" when to retreat and when to bounce back quickly), then it is viewed as having relatively high resilience. If the system not only recovers quickly but also manages to enhance its level of functioning relative to what prevailed prior to the emergency or the crisis (referred to as "bouncing forward"), then it is defined as having a high level of resilience.[5]

This definition reflects core characteristics present in more widespread definitions of resilience. For example, the term is defined by Resilience Alliance, an international multidisciplinary research body, as follows: "Resilience is the capacity of a social-ecological system to absorb or withstand perturbations and other stressors such that the system remains within the same regime, essentially maintaining its structure and functions."[6] A rather similar – though more comprehensive – definition is provided by the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) and includes the component of absorbing a disruption and recovering from it;[7] it also refers to preparedness and planning, and to potential events in the future.

There is a certain degree of similarity between this and the broad definition offered by the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR):[8] "The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management."

According to the UNISDR, resistance is part of a system's resilience. There is also a contrasting approach in which resistance and resilience are seen as opposite and contradictory paradigms. Thus, resistance is meant to

prevent or reduce risk, while resilience comes into play in the recovery from a disaster (which is sometimes unpreventable or the investment of resources needed to prevent it is not considered feasible).[9]

It should also be noted that although the discussion in this chapter (and in the rest of the study) primarily focuses on the resilience of systems rather than of individuals, the issue of individual resilience is highly relevant to community resilience. There is an extended body of literature, mainly in the field of clinical psychology, that deals with personal resilience and the possibilities of growth after a crisis and emergency.[10]

Both communities and individuals can – under certain conditions – recover from a disaster and even improve their level of functioning relative to before the disaster. The conditions for this are related, at least in part, to the level of social capital (prior to the disaster) of the members of the affected community.

Resilience, it is also worth noting, is a characteristic – of an individual or of society – that is always context-and-time-dependent. Therefore, it is possible that a particular community will deal successfully with one type of emergency but will have difficulty coping with another. Moreover, that same community may be able to deal successfully with a given crisis at one point in time but will have trouble dealing with the same type of crisis at another time. There can be many reasons for this, whether related to community solidarity, economic circumstances or other factors. The subject is a complex and dynamic one and therefore there is a need for caution and precision in drawing conclusions about the state of resilience.

Nor is resilience a concept that exists in a vacuum. The renowned Hebrew poet Shaul Tchernichovsky wrote that "Man is nothing but the reflection of his homeland's landscape" and indeed research has shown that there is a strong link between one's sense of attachment to a place and resilience. People tend to become attached to their home, their neighborhood, their community and their town. The strongest feeling of attachment is to their social environment, which is usually even stronger than the ties to their physical environment.[11]

The various definitions of the term "resilience" do not sufficiently emphasize its multidimensionality. It appears that underlying many of the definitions is a hidden assumption that resilience is a one-dimensional index and therefore discussions on the topic usually focus on quantitative questions: Is there or isn't there resilience? Is the level of resilience high or

low? But in reality resilience has many variations, dimensions and layers. For example, economic resilience does not necessarily guarantee community resilience, which in turn does not guarantee personal resilience. Therefore, an extensive discussion is needed on the complex and dynamic mutual relations between the various dimensions of resilience in different contexts, such as the type of emergency, the characteristics of the population, the nature of community relations, etc. Such a discussion can provide insights regarding the way in which we understand resilience, its meanings and its derivatives.

Many experts examine the level of a particular community's resilience according to the strength of the systems and infrastructures available to it, since in their view built-up environments and physical infrastructures protect communities and societies in various types of emergency situations. However, this approach misses an important finding from numerous empirical studies, namely, that the level of resilience is closely related to the quality and strength of non-physical systems – social systems, social ties, the degree of trust within the community and civic involvement and so on.[12] Therefore, in addition to considering the role of the physical environment in the development and strengthening of resilience, attention should be paid to the human characteristics of communities and societies. The relationships between individuals and the degree of mutuality and trust in their relationships are part of what is generally referred to as "social capital."[13]

Researchers generally distinguish between three types of social capital: bonding social capital, bridging social capital and linking social capital.

Bonding social capital is the connection between people who are similar to one another (ethnically, religiously, etc.). The strongest bonding social capital is usually to be found within the nuclear or extended family. Beyond that, people tend to have a core of close friends with whom they have deep ties of trust and mutual expectations. These are the most common ties, particularly in poor communities and countries, and they have the ability to support people during periods of both calm and emergencies. But these bonds cannot guarantee an opportunity to develop and improve quality of life.

Bridging social capital involves ties between people who are different from one another in many respects. They may come from different countries or belong to different classes. Frameworks such as schools, clubs, army units and places of employment are natural environments for the creation of bridging social capital. Thus, for example, it has been found that mothers connected through their children's kindergarten have greater ties and resources

than similar women who are not.[14] People who have contacts of the bridging social capital type are liable to find employment more easily than those with only bonding social capital.[15] Another instance can be found in the ethnic riots in India between Hindi and Muslim communities: clashes tended to be less violent in communities characterized by a high level of bridging social capital; in other words, the capacity to bridge between communities can have a positive impact even in situations of stress.[16]

Meanwhile, linking social capital connects people with less authority and power to people with more – a graduate student and the dean of a faculty is one possibility. In the current context, it can refer to the ties between residents of a development town in Israel and, say, an influential Member of Knesset (Israeli parliament). These ties are relatively rare but they bring with them the chance to reach resources well beyond the means of the locals.

The three types of social capital are essential to communities and societies for a number of reasons. For example, it has been found that countries characterized by a high level of trust and strong interpersonal ties experience periods of greater economic prosperity.[17] Another example can be found in developing countries with underdeveloped physical infrastructure, where a combination of social capital and active leadership has the potential to create an environment in which entrepreneurs and businesses can flourish.[18] Furthermore, communities that are characterized by greater interaction and sharing of information achieve better health outcomes than similar communities with a lower level of bonding.[19] These positive effects of strong ties of trust and interaction clearly exist under normal circumstances but there is increasing evidence that they also have a major effect on the functioning of the individual and the community during disasters.

A high level of social capital enables communities under pressure or experiencing shock to respond more efficiently and to mobilize collectively in order to mitigate the effects of the shock. To do so, communities employ three mechanisms:

1. Exit or voice
2. Collective action
3. Mutual aid / informal insurance.

Following a catastrophic event, such as an earthquake, flood, tsunami, terror attack or missile attack, survivors must decide whether to remain in the affected areas. A decision to do so can exact a high a price, be it economic,

psychological or a loss of opportunity. Economically, even if the survivors have insurance for their homes and businesses, there is no guarantee that the sum will cover the full cost of rehabilitation. In fact, it is possible that the survivors will have to foot at least part of the bill from their own pockets. Psychologically, in some cases, remaining in an area where loved ones or friends were killed can lead to anxiety and mental stress. The knowledge that another missile attack or earthquake is expected in the same location is also likely to be a significant motive for people to leave.

Research shows that people with a high level of bonding and bridging social capital and those attached to their place of residence tend to remain in the disaster area. This is due to their ties to others, sense of belonging and a desire to rebuild what they had. In contrast, people with few social ties will find it easier to move to a place that was not affected by the emergency. The first dilemma people face after a disaster is therefore whether to leave or to stay and rehabilitate, or in the words of the economist Albert Hirschman (1915-2012): exit or voice (i.e., leave or use one's voice to protest a situation in an attempt to change it).[20]

Close social ties between members of a community or a network can facilitate collective action. Many of the challenges facing communities in emergency situations and subsequent to them are on such a huge scale that they cannot be met or managed at the level of individuals or families. Rather than relying only on the action of individuals, a community must overcome barriers by means of collective action in its effort to minimize damage. For example, as a result of the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, law enforcement agencies and rescue workers were not able to assist inhabitants of Port au Prince, the capital. Faced, then, with the basic challenge of protecting life and property, the locals mobilized to create community patrols that would maintain order.

The third mechanism employed by communities with a high level of social capital after a disaster is mutual aid. Members of communities and networks that built strong relationships before a crisis can obtain assistance, information and scarce resources from other community members during or following a disaster. Such mutual aid is essentially a kind of informal insurance that is created not by paying premiums but rather by investing time and effort in fostering local relationships. After Hurricane Katrina (in New Orleans in 2005), for example, many residents suffered from a shortage of tools, expertise, essential products, etc. In contrast, other members of the

community had those needed components and they readily shared them. The mutual assistance was made possible by the fact that the communities had accumulated experience in shared activity, since even before the disaster they had worked together seeking solutions to various problems.

Based on growing empirical evidence, it is now known that social capital can save lives during emergencies and accelerate the rehabilitation that follows them. To illustrate: research on the coastal communities in the Tohoku region in Japan following the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster there in March 2011 indicates that there was a correlation between the level of internal/community relations and the death rate in the natural and nuclear disasters. Thus, a higher level of trust between residents corresponded with a lower level of crime and relatively lower casualty rates in this series of disasters (all the rest of the variables for these coastal Japanese communities were identical).[21] Moreover, during the evacuation of the regions near the afflicted Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant it was found that residents with closer social ties were more successful in maintaining their mental health and a lower level of anxiety relative to others from the same area.[22] Finally, communities with better vertical ties with decision makers in the central government (linking social capital) experienced faster recovery after the disaster.[23]

In view of the importance of social capital in preparing and coping with emergency situations, non-profit organizations, governments and international organizations have begun to develop and strengthen social ties in the most vulnerable communities. In Boulder, Colorado, for instance, a group of local government, community, and non-profit representatives established a program for strengthening community ties and resilience after massive flooding in the area displaced many people. Beyond the area's vulnerability to flooding, it has also been affected by large-scale forest fires. The program, known as BoCo (Boulder Colorado) Strong, includes infrastructure (re) building and awards ceremonies and grants programs that help spread the word throughout the county.

Another program, the Neighborhood Empowerment Network (NEN), was launched in earthquake-prone San Francisco to strengthen internal ties within the city's communities and neighborhoods. As part of the program, residents put together a series of projects in collaboration with the municipality, one of which was called the Neighbors Festival. This was a happening for the whole family in areas where neighbors did not know each other very well.

It was assumed that an event where residents would spend time together would help in reinforcing community solidarity. At a later stage, NEN disseminated informational material on emergency preparedness and held workshops on the topic.

Yet another interesting and unique program, involving the elderly, was implemented in Japan. Based on the premise that the elderly are a major asset that should be nurtured, the Ibasho program (meaning "a place where one can feel at home" in Japanese) focused initially on the communities affected by the 2011 tsunami. The program, which was designed by architects, scientists and local non-profit organizations, created a new physical space to be managed by local elderly volunteers. In this space, people met, mingled and participated in a variety of activities. The associated research indicates that participants have more social ties and a stronger sense of belonging to the place relative to non-participants.[24] The success of the program led to its adoption in other countries, such as Nepal and the Philippines; there too it was found that the elderly were able to contribute to developing community resilience, if given the appropriate tools.

The aforementioned research suggests that resilience is in greater evidence on the local rather than regional or national levels. In other words, resilience can develop in homes, on the street and in neighborhoods, since it is largely connected to shared ties, ongoing interactions and social relationships; and since human interaction primarily occurs at the local level, resilience cannot be built up ahead of time at the national level. Nonetheless, a collection of communities with resilience can build up regional and national resilience. Government has the important strategic function of encouraging and expanding effective resilience programs in the field, such that they will serve as a significant catalyst and force multiplier when dealing with emergency situations.

Up to this point, we have discussed various aspects of the concept of resilience, including its definition, what determines it and which programs and policies are implemented in different countries in order to nurture it. In the Israeli context, much has been written about the resilience shown by the public in the face of terror and war. However, it is important to closely address the question, what is the price of resilience, namely, faced with almost-continuous stress, what price does Israeli society pay to demonstrate resilience? Clearly the continuous exposure to emergency situations that characterizes the Israeli reality exacts a heavy price in psychological, economic,

ethical, cultural, social and psychological terms. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the social aspects of resilience must recognize the implications of the prolonged exposure to stress that make resilience necessary in the first place. Further interdisciplinary comprehensive research is required on this highly important topic.

Chapter 2

Functionality Indexes for Gauging Societal Resilience

The present study applies four recognized indexes of functioning[1] to evaluate the levels of societal resilience in communities experiencing serious disruptions and stress. They are indexes of evacuation, growth, organizational efficacy and social trust. These can also be used as tools to examine the level of preparedness of different localities for emergency situations and, as a consequence, their level of resilience. The data collected for this and the following chapter are based on in-depth interviews with residents and staff in the six localities[2] conducted during 2016. Another source of data is the Sapir Barometer, constructed to assess the impact of severe security events since the summer of 2014 on the local population in five social spheres: personal resilience, community cohesiveness, sense of personal security, economic and employment status and the level of trust in the local leadership.

Let us look at the four functionality indexes in greater detail:

1. **Evacuation:** This index measures the level of flexibility of the residents and communities under stress, based on the assumption that a willingness to temporarily relocate when necessary demonstrates a capacity to cope with stressful conditions. An important feature of flexibility is also represented in the decision and timing of the return home and the resumption of normal functionality once the disruption is over.[3] Flexibility and coping with stressful circumstances are considered to be essential components of societal resilience.
2. **Growth:** This index is used to identify the longer-range impact of disruptions on the community as a reflection of resilience. A community which manifests rapid growth following a disruption, demographic or economic, as monitored in this study, is considered more resilient as it proves itself to be better equipped to deal with the emergency and to return to normal and even improved functionality.

3. **Organizational efficacy:** This index monitors the factors that contribute to the capacity of a community to prepare itself for an emergency and to function adequately for its duration, facing the challenges it raises. The index covers the organizational structure of the communities, in particular concerning preparedness for disruptions, relations with external stakeholders, the nature and scale of volunteer activity in the community and the manner and scope in which individuals and families organize in order to adapt to the changing circumstances of an emergency.
4. **Social trust:** This index measures the extent to which individuals in the community believe that they can depend on others to assist them and to be helpful to the community's needs in time of disruption.[4] It can also be used to monitor the residents' level of trust in their local and national leadership, primarily during an emergency.

Evacuation

Unlike Cast Lead (2008/09) and Pillar of Defense (2012), in which residents left their homes independently (assistance was only provided on a specific and ad hoc basis in some settlements to those who requested it), during Operation Protective Edge (2014) there was variation between the reviewed settlements with respect to evacuation. The leadership of Sderot and Kibbutz Alumim adopted an approach according to which their residents would not evacuate during the emergency, due to what they perceived as their communal strength and ability to endure, even in particularly difficult circumstances. In contrast, the two secular kibbutzim – Nahal Oz and Nirim – opted for an entirely different message, according to which only the essential workers needed to carry out the vital chores of the kibbutz and volunteers from the CERT would remain, while all other residents would leave their homes and collectively move to other designated kibbutzim. The leaders of Kibbutz Sa'ad and Moshav Netiv Ha'asara did not make any prior decision regarding an organized evacuation, but at the same time did not place any pressure or restrictions on residents to stay while their communities were under attack. The residents decided independently whether or not to leave and organized their own departure and, later, their return.

During Cast Lead, about 8,000 residents (more than a third) left Sderot. In Pillar of Defense, a larger number left, despite the shorter duration of the conflict and the relatively lower number of rockets which targeted the city. Sderot suffered from numerous unpleasant collective memories from

past episodes, but one in particular stood out for many: the large gloomy tent city that was constructed in May 2007 in Yarkon Park in Tel Aviv, to accommodate evacuees from Sderot when it was under intensive rocket fire. The tent city was a private initiative set up by the oligarch Arcadi Gaydamak as part of his campaign to further his personal and political ambitions. In the atmosphere of fear and weakness that prevailed at the time, about 40 percent of Sderot residents left their city and quite a few of them did not return. In clear contrast, during Protective Edge (2014), less than 10 percent of residents left.[5]

The decision of the Sderot Municipality to refrain from a large-scale organized evacuation during Protective Edge was based on the assumption that the existing shelters – both private and public – together with the IDF's defense systems, provided sufficient protection against the threat from the Gaza Strip and that earlier municipal preparations enabled residents to have access to essential services during an extended period of emergency. The decision reflected the value-based position of the newly elected mayor that if residents remained at home it would signal that they were granting the government and the IDF the moral backing they needed to allow them freedom of maneuver against Hamas without exerting any political pressure, despite the dire circumstances. It was in this spirit that, later (in April 2016), Sderot Mayor Alon Davidi made the following statement: "The soldiers (in Operation Protective Edge) provided us with a victory based on their military might; we, the citizens, provided a victory of the spirit. Only together was a genuine and meaningful victory achieved, raising morale among both civilians and soldiers. Therefore, I believe that talk of evacuation of citizens is a wrong decision and that talking about fear does not help morale. We need to be talking about heroism, about strength and about civilian and military capacities. We need to present a picture of victory and of moral strength in the face of the terrorist threats and attempts to sow fear."[6]

Interviewees from the religious Kibbutz Alumim described a feeling of cautious optimism, based on their sense of confidence and safety during the three rounds of fighting. They pointed out that the shelters of their kibbutz were expanded and improved between 2000 and 2015, during which period the residents of the western Negev were subject to a prolonged security threat. This process included the construction of fortified rooms in all private homes as well as the reinforcement of the public shelters and "sheltered spaces" dispersed throughout the kibbutz. This situation made it possible to remain

on the kibbutz "knowing that at any given moment there is a safe place that one can get to in case of a rocket attack." The kibbutz members viewed each round of fighting as a temporary situation that would eventually pass: "The members understood that this was a challenge that could be dealt with and that it would soon be over and things would go forward from there." Such a pragmatic interpretation of a security-related emergency strengthened the residents' resolve and enhanced their capacity to cope. It also buttressed the position of the kibbutz leadership and of most of its members that there was no need to evacuate, since this was a "temporary situation that could be handled."

The decision not to evacuate is closely related to Alumim members' faith and religious lifestyle. The kibbutz members believe in the connection between "Torah and Avodah," or between faith in God and practical Zionism through collective work. Evacuation under fire and under pressure is, in their eyes, indicative of a lack of faith, both in God and in the Zionist enterprise, which is embodied in the settlement of the Land of Israel. Looking at it from the other side, standing firm in the face of an external threat, such as intensive warfare and serious risks to their lives, is itself a test of faith in God and in Zionism. These principles provided the members of the kibbutz with the confidence that shaped their basic narrative.[7] "The decision not to evacuate provided us, as a kibbutz, with a different and unique narrative [from that of the other kibbutzim]," suggested one. "If in the future a compulsory organized evacuation will take place, we will have to change that narrative."

Alumim has enjoyed a positive balance of migration since its founding. It is considered to be a kibbutz with strong ideological values and tight community and social cohesion. Since it adheres to an orthodox lifestyle, it is hard to know – even for the kibbutz members – to what extent the kibbutz's determination is due to religion or whether it is due to social cohesiveness: "I am not sure if it is religious faith that is keeping us together here. I think that what is holding us together as a community is related to our narrative, that we are strong, that we are united and that is what contributes to our strength."

Although the kibbutz as a whole viewed the decision not to evacuate as one of the strong points of the community and as a source of empowerment in dealing with the threat of rockets, mortar shells and tunnels, there were differences of opinion between the individual members. Apparently there were a few families who considered leaving at the time of the attacks, but

decided not to do so. The kibbutz leadership did not force anyone to stay, but leaving would have been considered a deviation from the collective line and hence socially flawed. Consequently, even those who contemplated evacuation did not act on it, despite their fears, especially when delivery of basic supplies and mail was interrupted due to rocket attacks.

In contrast to Alumim, whose residents stayed put through the three rounds of fighting, Nahal Oz was evacuated on all three occasions. In Pillar of Defense (2008/09), the kibbutz gave assistance to members who wished to leave; in Cast Lead (2012), residents who wished to leave did so on their own; and in Protective Edge (2014), the kibbutz and the CERT were involved in the practical facets of the evacuation. The fact that the fighting continued for 51 days gave the kibbutz time to organize for evacuation, which facilitated the management of its complex logistics and other aspects. As we have seen, most of the families with children were evacuated; those who stayed were older members, individuals with essential jobs and the CERT members. The evacuees found refuge in four different locations around the country.

The localities which absorbed the evacuees became known as the "diaspora." These included other kibbutzim in Israel that were not exposed to the threat from the Gaza Strip. The Kibbutz Movement helped coordinate the hosting project, and in so doing demonstrated its political support and moral solidarity with the kibbutzim under attack. It is worth noting that the term "diaspora" in Hebrew has connotations of dispersal, of separation, and of people without a permanent home, those who are not firmly connected to their "place" and therefore are considered to be defenseless. These connotations might have been interpreted to imply that the evacuees did not have full control of their lives, due to their remoteness from home. Exercising control over one's life is an important component of societal resilience; this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

Despite public statements by the government and the IDF during the final week of Protective Edge that the evacuees could return home, many declined to do so immediately. They knew from previous rounds that Hamas tends to continue firing, sometimes up to 48 hours after a ceasefire goes into effect. The early return of evacuees to Nahal Oz resulted in a tragedy that remains with the community until today – 4-year-old Daniel Tragerman was killed by a mortar shell fragment launched after the announcement of the ceasefire. This incident shaped the issue of the return as an extremely

sensitive one. Indeed, harsh criticism is still voiced aimed at those responsible for encouraging the members to return home ostensibly prematurely.

Due to the partial evacuation of the kibbutz for the duration of the fighting, two sets of social spaces emerged: the "diaspora," where the women and children relocated, and the kibbutz home. Those in the diaspora had not only uprooted themselves from their homes but also found themselves facing the challenge of being far from their daily routine and under unfamiliar circumstances. Although those who remained on the kibbutz – mainly men – were exposed to the risk of Hamas' repeated attacks, they were busily engaged in their necessary chores, at home, which dovetailed with the traditional kibbutz narrative. The division between the two camps created an additional difficulty for the community that required attention both at the family and community levels, raising profound questions concerning the social price of the evacuation.

Kibbutz Nirim was the first in the challenged region to decide collectively to evacuate. This was the case in all three rounds of fighting. In all instances, kibbutz members left on their own, although the decision on whether or not to evacuate was made by the kibbutz leadership. In practice, some support was provided by the kibbutz for the logistic necessities, as well as for the social needs of those who left. For example, coordinators were appointed to maintain contact between the evacuees and those who stayed. Also, the kibbutz handled the contacts with the hosting kibbutz and helped to coordinate cultural and recreational activities for the evacuated families.

Many of the members of Nirim, again, mostly families with children, left during Protective Edge. Kibbutz spokesperson Arnon Avni recalled: "None of the families stayed behind. It was very dangerous here. You could be killed." Those who did remain were those with key positions in the kibbutz economy, including the kibbutz factories, and those who had responsibilities for managing emergencies, such as the members of the CERT. A number of others stayed for ideological reasons or personal ones, notably the older members of the community.

All of Nirim's evacuees returned to their homes as soon as the operation was over. The interviewees acknowledged that another round of fighting could erupt at any time and would likely require them to leave the kibbutz again. Therefore, the kibbutz leadership and the CERT decided to formulate a new evacuation plan for emergencies that included agreed-upon arrangements with the selected hosting kibbutzim. As suggested by Avni: "I think that in

the next war the only safe place for us will be the place to which we are evacuated."

The collective decision to evacuate the kibbutz in the next flare-up was made not only in recognition of the expected risks but also because the government, as a result of lessons learnt following Protective Edge, is presently more prone to adopting a favorable policy of actively providing assistance to the residents of settlements in high-risk areas during a conflict. This represents a revision of earlier government policy on the issue of evacuation in times of concrete threat. It in fact grants those close to the border, like Nirim, with the public legitimacy to plan all evacuation procedures in advance. The plan takes into account, inter alia, the special needs of kibbutz members, as well as their inclination to keep the community together by choosing for themselves the settlement to which they would temporarily move. Thus, instead of the families leaving separately in private vehicles, the kibbutz decided that in the next crisis members would be evacuated together by self-organized public transportation. With the support of the Kibbutz Movement, Kibbutz Sde Boker was chosen to accommodate all 350 residents of Nirim if the need arose again.

The leadership of the religious Kibbutz Sa'ad did not instruct its members to leave or to stay in the three campaigns – the message being that each individual and family should do what is right for them. Interviewees reported that consequently there was "a continuous trickle of departures." Some members chose to leave as early as the first day of fighting, while others waited until the situation was perceived as intolerable before doing so.[8] Many of those who left found refuge with relatives in other parts of the country; others found different solutions. The evacuation from Sa'ad was not organized, logistically or otherwise, which reflected the absence of a prior decision-making process within the community. As the fighting continued, pressure from below called for a comprehensive solution, mostly as living with relatives during the summer months became a challenge, and because the members were looking for a way to reassemble the scattered parts of the community. The final decision to take collective action was made when the IDF closed the gates of the kibbutz (allegedly without prior notification) for its own logistical use. That was the time to find several (religious) localities to host all the families that had moved to different places and to regroup the dispersed members. Simultaneously, an information center was established for maintaining ongoing contact with the member families in

the "diaspora." Still, some less considerate moves took place, such as the kibbutz's insistence that older members who were in need of assistance should leave and be attended by their relatives outside of the community, or instances when younger and independent families were urged to leave. For those who stayed on, an effort was made to maintain a daily "emergency routine." The collective dining hall was open during the week days (but not on weekends), prayer services were conducted in an improvised shelter and school operated on an improvised and partial level for four days a week.[9]

As on Kibbutz Sa'ad, the residents of Moshav Netiv Ha'asara also mostly left during the three rounds of fighting, to live with relatives or friends or in guesthouses, but again, not as a result of an official decision by the moshav. Interviewees said that the government agencies refrained from declaring an official evacuation in Protective Edge, despite its long duration, allegedly because it would have had major organizational and budgetary implications for the government. Members claimed that by not assuming responsibility and taking action, the government had in fact abandoned them.[10] They even had to pay for their stay outside the moshav from their own pockets. They might have been able to shoulder their departure expenditures, but, they lamented, due to the prolongation of the campaign the economic burden became increasingly overwhelming; consequently, some members opted to return home despite the acute threat.[11]

The most difficult and complex aspect of the evacuation issue raised by the Netiv Ha'asara interviewees was the relocation of the children and the elderly. Unlike the previous two rounds of fighting, which were shorter and during which the children generally remained on the moshav, the long duration of Protective Edge and the new threats, primarily the offensive tunnels that were discovered near the moshav, left the residents with little choice but to evacuate the children and the elderly.[12] This implied for them that home was no longer a safe place[13] and underscored the fact that on occasion they would have to find another place of refuge until they could return home.[14]

Growth

Residents and officials in the six studied localities highlighted three main factors that helped their communities deal with the emergency situation and return to normal and even enhanced daily routine in the aftermath: the social entrepreneurial nature of the communities, which entails educational and cultural initiatives, large-scale construction projects and unprecedented

population growth. These three spheres illustrated the impressive capacity of the communities to bounce back and forward following and despite the perilous circumstances.

In the first stage, there was a seeming return to normal functionality. On Kibbutz Nirim this meant a return to full economic productivity, including in the kibbutz factory, and also a return to day-to-day routine by the kibbutz members in all other areas of life. The second stage involved the psychological processing of the experiences during the fighting. This was undertaken on both the individual and group levels, and included an analysis of the most effective ways of dealing with the stress brought on by the rockets and the threat of the tunnels. The local Resilience Center, which is affiliated with the kibbutz, usually takes part in these processes, assisting with a professional "basket of therapeutic provisions" for the residents, from kindergarten and school age through to the adults, in addition to organizing joint activities for parents and children.

The kibbutz supportive social embrace – the sense of "togetherness" in the words of the members – consists of the elements of partnership, solidarity, social cohesion and mutual responsibility that together bind the members and reinforce their feeling of community and attachment. This "togetherness" means to them that their community is concerned about what happens to them and that they are never alone. According to Kibbutz Nirim interviewees, the "togetherness" is what grants the kibbutz its unique substance, which translates to the expectation that someone will be there for them and tend to their physical and psychological security needs in times of emergency.[15] On Nirim and Nahal Oz it was said that the sociocultural activity during and following Protective Edge helped to amplify the social ties between the members. Cultural events in the evenings, communal parties, movie nights, joint dinners, "Friday night soup" or developing a new communal gardening project on the kibbutz are just a few examples of local initiatives begun to elevate the shared morale.

On Nahal Oz kibbutz members suggested that the emergency situation and the resulting personal and group distress, with their psychological and physical underpinnings, created a desire within the community "to return to the kibbutz as it once was," particularly to the common sense of belonging. They claim that this urge was among the main factors that accelerated their return to normal routine and subsequently led to their social growth. Since Protective Edge, they said, there have been considerably more communal

activities on the kibbutz, with the goal of creating, among other things, spiritual and psychological defenses in the face of security threats, both old (mortar shells and rockets) and new (offensive tunnels). They added that informal education activities also played a central role in the swift return to routine and the social growth that followed.

Nahal Oz experienced a major crisis in Protective Edge following the death of young Daniel Tragerman and the serious wounding of another kibbutz member. Seventeen families left permanently, which put into question the very existence of the kibbutz. Interviewees emphasized that the signs of the crisis could have been identified even before the end of the last round of fighting. This perilous context urged several members to open a discussion on how, together, they might find the right way to overcome the dire domestic crisis. Some of the ideas raised at the meetings were implemented even before the fighting ended: a new one-year pre-military educational program (mechina) was established for high-school graduates from outside the kibbutzim as part of the effort to create a younger and more vibrant environment and a new economic project was launched – a therapeutic center for parents and children. Another example of the renewed spirit was the communal "seder" (Passover ritual feast) which was held for the entire community for the first time since 2000. A new kibbutz leadership was elected and overall the atmosphere has been reported to be improved. Although the events of Protective Edge still induce strong emotions, there is nonetheless a feeling of growth, of hope and a common future throughout the kibbutz.[16]

On Moshav Netiv Ha'asara too it was understood that supportive community services could contribute significantly to the settlement's social resilience.[17] The interviewees described a community tapestry that produces mutual responsibility, solidarity and a feeling of togetherness. Some acknowledged that having relatives who also lived on the moshav provided added strength and encouragement. "One thing remains from all three rounds of fighting and that is the feeling of togetherness. If we don't decide and act together, it just won't work."

Members of Kibbutz Sa'ad reiterated that the community factors are what strengthens the kibbutz's societal resilience and makes it a desirable place to live for new residents, young or old. Alumim interviewees concurred, adding that the connection between the members of the community during each round of fighting was very strong and there was a feeling that it is easier to deal with the threats together rather than alone. "[As a] community, we

are very close and feel strong together and that is what allows us to remain calm and to deal with the threat," according to one interviewee, echoing the feelings of many on Alumim. Others noted that since the last round of fighting, the community has been very active socially, with the younger and older residents being provided with high-quality accessible educational, cultural and public health services.

The construction boom and demographic growth were also raised by the interviewees. They suggested that both signified a clear resilience trajectory, evidence of a return to normal, and even improved, functionality of their disrupted communities.

In this context what emerged in Sderot is striking. The city has been faced with rocket and missile attacks from the Gaza Strip since the early 2000s and especially since Hamas came to power there in 2007. Sderot's is a remarkable story of vulnerability and failure turned into success, of an extraordinary transition from decline to growth. During the years covered in this study the city witnessed various types of local leadership, characterized by a wide disparity of perceptions and policies. Unlike past mayors, Alon Davidi, the current municipal head, who was elected to his position just three months before Operation Protective Edge, has demonstrated clear inclusive and pro-active leadership that takes responsibility for the fate and development of his city. He and his associates are well aware of the serious problems facing the city and they know how to tap the internal and external resources needed to lead Sderot on a path of growth. He has created a growth-oriented community narrative. He also knows how to manage emergency situations during all of their stages: preparation, coping and recovery.

The transformation in the management of disruptions in Sderot was particularly apparent in the case of Protective Edge, as the mayor and his leading team had only been in power for a matter of weeks, as noted.[18] During the long operation, they demonstrated a firm stance that inspired the residents and when the attacks stepped up they centered on encouraging recovery and rapid growth. All these contributed directly to resilience in Sderot.

The firm resolve that the residents of Sderot demonstrated throughout the crisis, with the support of the city's leaders, created a feeling of self-efficacy, local pride and a strong sense of optimism, among the public at large as well as within the municipal agencies. Staff members reported with gratification that Sderot had been experiencing unprecedented growth in recent years, relative to the past and to other localities in Israel. The most

impressive evidence is the upward trajectory in housing prices: in April 2017, Sderot was ranked first with respect to rising housing prices, experiencing an average increase (for a four-room apartment) of 5.8 percent, more than any other city in Israel.[19] Since 2014, 2,500 units have been sold in Sderot and the goal for the coming years is to sell 6,000 new units, some of them subsidized by the "Buyer's Price" program of the Ministry of Finance, which enables first-time buyers to purchase a home at below-market prices.

The construction boom in Sderot can also be seen in the population figures: in November 2013, there were 21,400 residents; that figure swelled to more than 26,000 by May 2017.[20] The municipality's target is to reach 35,000 residents by the end of 2018 and 50,000 by 2030. The impressive demographic growth results from several transformations that took place in Sderot, all of which helped the city effectively overcome its unstable security situation during the past decade.

Demographic growth can also be monitored in other localities in the region. Nahal Oz, which suffered from the exit of families around the time of Protective Edge, has absorbed new families since then. The 17 families that left have been replaced by 22 new families to date, and more are waiting.[21] In fact, for the first time since the 1980s, Nahal Oz is experiencing a construction boom to accommodate the influx. Also, the new pre-army mechina program mentioned above has reinforced the younger generation and beefed up the kibbutz population. The presence of younger people provides the kibbutz with a renewed vitality.[22]

The difference between Sderot and the other localities discussed here lies in its socioeconomic ranking of level four in the National Index, in contrast to level six for all the others. There are several factors behind Sderot's success in generating significant growth, despite its inferior starting point. These include the economic development of the region, of which Sderot is the commercial center, and the large-scale economic assistance received by the government (see Chapter 5 below). It appears that the new Sderot has taken full advantage of the government's assistance program, thanks to, among other things, the direct and close personal association between the mayor and many of the government ministers. These relations support the theory of connection between mayors and senior decision makers that contributes directly to growth in general and growth following severe disruptions in particular.

Nirim also saw impressive growth after Protective Edge. The population has grown by 20 percent since then, as a result of the absorption of new families and the construction of about 30 new housing units for both old and new members. According to the manager of the building works, "The new neighborhood is a direct outcome of the kibbutz's resilience and its recovery after Protective Edge."[23] The following appeared on the kibbutz website: "In recent years, the kibbutz has undergone a change in its way of life and a transformation from a communal community to a community of mutual support, based on a 'security net' model. The main goal of this process of change is to encourage demographic growth and the re-absorption of the kibbutz's sons and daughters, in order to maintain a flourishing and multi-generational community."[24] Nirim's long-term plan foresees an addition of 30 new young families, an important step forward for a kibbutz that until recently held a relatively large number of older members.[25]

Similar development has taken place in Moshav Netiv Ha'asara, where a new neighborhood of 71 housing units was constructed after Protective Edge. The same is true for the two religious kibbutzim, which have enjoyed a similar influx of new families, and more have registered to join when housing will be available. The members of the religious kibbutzim, like the residents of the secular settlements, contend that the community components constitute the primary attraction for the young families that have joined, which in turn leads to more construction and demographic growth.

The high level of interest to join Sa'ad has allowed the kibbutz to be selective in the absorption of new members, some of whom are attracted to the economic benefits granted to the Gaza Envelope localities by the government's assistance program, which includes financial aid, development of the kibbutz infrastructure and enhanced social provisions. An example here is the establishment of a new factory for the processing of carrots that was built on the kibbutz in 2015 with government assistance worth NIS 30 million ($8m.). The Barkai Center ("Rabbis Creating a Community") awarded the kibbutz a monetary prize for being a model community and for demonstrating a high level of societal resilience during Operation Protective Edge.[26]

The building momentum extends to Alumim as well. It too has a waiting list of potential applicants interested to join the kibbutz despite the security threat. In fact, demand is greater than supply here, and because Alumim did not undergo the process of privatization, there are further opportunities for new construction.

Alongside accounts of expansion and resilience, local interviewees also nominated a number of prohibitive factors that delay the return to routine and, consequently, the prospects of growth following fighting. Interviewees from Nahal Oz and Nirim suggested that the first two rounds of fighting – Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense – were relatively short and therefore less disruptive than Protective Edge in 2014, which lasted more than seven weeks. Following the first two rounds, children were quickly able to return to school, which made it easier for parents to return to their routine. After Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense, the residents were provided with individual counseling and associated activities for the youth, which facilitated the return to normalcy. In contrast, Protective Edge was unique due to its duration, its occurrence during the country's summer vacation and the new danger that emerged with the offensive tunnels. These transformed the threat into something more complex and more acute, leading to greater mental stress, which, according to some Nirim interviewees, was compounded by already-accumulated stress from the previous rounds. In fact, during the last round more members of the localities surveyed here admitted their mental distress, noting the "the barriers (of silence) have been removed."

Indeed, the psychological hardship reported by the interviewees was partly the result of the economic damage caused by the strikes during Protective Edge. Thus, employees could not get to their workplaces as many of the women had to stay home and watch their children whose summer organized activities were put on hold and farmers could not get to their land near the border or the IDF deployment areas. Furthermore, cultivated fields were damaged by the movement of IDF troops and heavy armored vehicles. Another negative factor mentioned by the Nirim and Nahal Oz interviewees was the damage to their infrastructure. There were emergency teams in the settlements whose job it was to quickly repair the damaged facilities. The rush to do this was the background to the tragedy in Nirim, where security officer Zeevik Etzion and Shahar Melamed, the operator of the kibbutz garage, were killed while repairing the electricity network which had earlier been hit by a rocket.

Interviewees from Netiv Ha'asara talked about their psychological stress emanating from the long-term security threats. From one round of fighting to the next, they said, not only was there accumulated economic damage, but also accumulated "mental discomfort." As this phenomenon grows, there is a greater psychological difficulty in coping with a security situation.[27] The

threat of the offensive tunnels in Protective Edge added a new dimension of anxiety which the residents did not know how to cope with and consequently made them feel unsafe in their own homes. If in the past the fortified shelter rooms granted them a sense of security, in the last round these were not perceived to be sufficient and therefore the only option was to leave home, to evacuate.

Nahal Oz members recall that no one left in the first two rounds and that in the third round the massive evacuation was indeed a traumatizing experience, even though it was followed by rapid recovery and impressive growth, as described above. The continuum between these contradictory yet complementary trajectories, of diminished functionality and then bouncing back to the previous level of functionality – and then bouncing forward, to a higher level of functionality – is quite outstanding in the community landscape of the Gaza Envelope. However, it also accurately reflects the two components of societal resilience: a significant reduction in functioning following a severe disruption – according to its scale, severity and how it is perceived by the members of the community – and then a rapid upward swing toward recovery and social growth. Contributing to this growth was a high level of awareness among the kibbutz members who, already at an early stage, understood and internalized that they must take their fate into their own hands and that they need to make difficult systemic decisions in order to deal with the crisis. The processes that Nahal Oz went through clearly reflect a high rate of recovery, a sign of a robust societal resilience.

Organizational Efficacy

The central feature that stands out in Sderot's organizational capacity to prepare for a security disruption is the effort invested by its local leaders in empowering their residents. From this perspective, it appears that Sderot has learned the lessons of past conflicts and today understands the advantageous social assets enjoyed by the neighboring kibbutzim which are based ideologically on the notion of collective action. As a result, the mayor and his staff have placed strong emphasis on organizational preparation that takes into account the fluid situation that can rapidly change from normal routine to severe emergency. The preparation includes the establishment of independent municipal units that can operate without external assistance. These units emerged as a combined effort by the municipality and local residents, particularly the younger population. Consequently, Sderot demonstrates –

mostly to its own citizenry – that it is in control of its own fate and needs with its own independent means. This is a vocal narrative of success that feeds itself and thus ensures a higher level of societal and community resilience. It boosts the probability that the city and the residents will successfully meet the challenges of the future, including the security threats.

Even prior to Protective Edge, back in 2011, Sderot created a "Youth Center" as an incubator for young leadership. The participants – all volunteers – fulfilled the hopes for its success by providing for the needs of the city's children during the last operation. They were engaged inside the public bomb shelters, where they initiated and conducted diverse activities for children and youth, with the goal of providing them with a "sane environment" amidst the pandemonium created by the rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. The incubator members were assisted by about 300 youths, primarily from the local youth movements, in a remarkable demonstration of local self-management of human resources working in line with municipal policy. It demonstrated that youth can be a leading and highly effective force in tough times. They were accessible, available, showed their maturity and above all a desire to contribute to the communal resilience. Their presence in the public domain during Protective Edge was highly visible and had a major impact on public morale.

They were not the only volunteers working around the city. Women were active in the community centers, sharing information and explaining how to prepare and respond to the security challenges, helping to allay fears, and later aiding the public to return to normal functionality.

Still, it should be noted, the municipal preparations in Sderot during Protective Edge were far from perfect. For one thing, the city had no neighborhood emergency teams as existed in the other localities. This changed after the last campaign: as a result of the lessons learned from experience, the city was divided into four districts; for each one a community chief was appointed with the responsibility for, among other things, the preparedness and operation of the Neighborhood Emergency Team. The four chiefs must coordinate with each other, and they are subordinate to the director of the local Association of Community Centers who oversees all the city's social and volunteer activity in times of routine and emergency. This put into effect an important organizational principle, according to which a continuum is maintained between the various municipal organs to ensure a smooth and swift functional shift in gear if and when an emergency situation abruptly arises.

The organizational capacity in the smaller localities, that is, the kibbutzim and moshavim, is seen primarily in the activity of the local volunteer CERTs. They provide assistance during an emergency on three main levels: to individuals in need, to families and to the community at large. In addition, they monitor the evolving situation and keep channels of communication open with the local leadership, the regional council and other organs outside the locality.

The impressive capacity of the kibbutzim to organize for emergencies has proven itself during the three rounds of fighting and beyond, and was fully manifested in two main domains: a) providing logistical support for the complex processes of evacuations, as well as information and moral support; and b) facilitating the quick return of the evacuated families to normal routine with respect to work, education and other spheres.

The regular organizational structure of the kibbutzim contributed immensely to their ability to manage their agendas during the disruptions and beyond, as well as granting the members the needed support for a quick return to routine. This basically voluntary organizational structure is composed of, on one hand, the elected kibbutz or moshav leadership, the secretariat and its staff members, such as the community's spokesperson, and, on the other hand, the Community Emergency and Resilience Team, which focuses specifically on emergency preparedness and maintenance. As the kibbutzim and moshavim are small, tightly-knit communities, with strong social affiliations, they have in common a better foundation to operate under stress. This could be seen in their group digital networks for messaging updates and instructions, weekly local newsletters, and a "daily message page" published and disseminated by the regional council for the whole area.[28]

While in the two earlier campaigns, Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense, the organizational capacities of the kibbutzim were tested primarily after the disruptions, the situation was different in Protective Edge (2014) due to its long duration and the fact that it took place during the summer vacation. These circumstances forced the kibbutzim to forge unique responses, which required special organizational efforts. In Nahal Oz, for example, it was decided to evacuate the members to four other kibbutzim, which necessitated special organizational effort. The CERT took a leading role in this, to the extent that it in fact assumed overriding responsibility, beyond that of the kibbutz secretariat. The team set up a "situation room" which became the focal point of all kibbutz activities. The CERT team issued daily updates

and other information to the evacuated members via email, WhatsApp messages and special bulletins. In fact, their active role continued also after the fighting ended, which was manifested, for example, by them taking the lead in drafting an independent evacuation plan and preparations for its implementation.

Thanks to such organizational skills, Nahal Oz was able to anticipate the emerging crisis at an early stage and to quickly mobilize its resources to deal with it. Even before the end of the last round of fighting, a special meeting of the kibbutz was convened to discuss the causes and ramifications of the social crisis that had emerged out of the broader security crisis and decide together on the best ways of dealing with it. In hindsight, the meeting became a defining episode in the life of the kibbutz, sparking its subsequent revitalization and growth. One of the more dramatic decisions made at the time was to replace the kibbutz leadership (the secretariat) due to its disappointing record during the course of Protective Edge. This was yet another example of the kibbutz's capacity to swiftly and resolutely respond collectively to a domestic crisis, and it was followed by an equally rapid voluntary social mobilization to execute the recovery and rehabilitation mission. This internal organizational capacity is no doubt a central contributor to the kibbutz's societal resilience. The new leadership is well aware of this asset and has come up with plans to further enhance it.

Kibbutz Nirim also developed independent community mechanisms, to foster their own self-management skills as well as to be able to provide specific responses to individuals and families in need. Nirim members were determined to be less dependent on government institutions and other external providers, such as the IDF Home Front Command or the Israel Electric Corporation, due to past disappointments. As an example, they were the ones to decide when and where to evacuate their members. This independent approach, according to the residents, was in part due to their sense of deep anxiety stemming from the threat of the offensive tunnels. "We were scared to death" was a sentiment voiced by many interviewees of the kibbutz, which suffered fatalities during the fighting.

The families with children on Nirim, as well as some others, were evacuated to other kibbutzim (Mishmar Ha'emek and Sde Eliyahu). Remaining on the kibbutz were the essential agricultural and factory workers, members of the CERT, and some of the older members. Again, this split between those who left and those who stayed created two different experiences, with each

group developing its own unique narrative of events. In fact, the interviews revealed that there was no real sharing of the different experiences or feelings concerning fear, the future or the airing of personal grievances, even among the peers of the same group.[29]

As a moshav, the structural construct of Netiv Ha'asara is quite different, less collective by nature. Hence, it should be of no surprise that during the period of the fighting, the CERT was the main local body to maintain contact with the residents, most of whom had left, by diverse digital means. The CERT disseminated news updates, a periodical survey of the situation on the moshav and in the region, as well as lists of localities where members could find refuge if needed.

In the first two shorter rounds of fighting, Netiv Ha'asara suffered sporadic rocket attacks. The residents' response was commonly to take cover in the fortified shelters. There was also a partial evacuation, but only at a family's initiative. The moshav's organizational capacity was not severely challenged. In contrast, the length and timing of the third campaign, Protective Edge, created greater and more numerous challenges for the members, the leadership and the CERT. These included the wide-scale evacuation, conducted by the individual families, maintenance of continuous contact with the residents – those who stayed and those who left, and providing assistance to those who remained, in particular attending to the needs of the children who remained home even when the school was not open.

After Protective Edge, Netiv Ha'asara's leaders were informed that they needed to prepare for the eventuality that in a future military disruption an evacuation of the moshav would take place. This meant that before the next round they must organize all the logistics, including the transportation and evacuation options, seeking out potential host localities, ensuring protective means and purchasing insurance so as to make certain that members would be compensated for any damage and possible losses. To do so, the CERT formulated an emergency plan, established procedures and chose the individuals to execute it. This turned out to be a confidence-building activity. Becoming familiar with the details of the scheme, and knowing that there are solutions in place for them for any forthcoming emergency, helped assuage fears. As one said with a certain renewed confidence, "Next time we face an emergency, we have at hand all that we need here. Even an ambulance..."[30]

Overall, Netiv Ha'asara has improved its organizational capacity to manage the next disruption, based on its previous experience of fighting, as well as

the understanding that the local residents have to take care of themselves since no one else is going to do it for them. Correspondingly, the moshav began developing independent community practices that would facilitate their devising solutions that could be tailored to their needs in case of a future emergency: from social, cultural and educational activities for the children (some with parental involvement), to the establishment of procedures for the next probable evacuation. There were calls by some in the moshav to limit outside intervention in their needs and plight, even when dealing with their personal and collective grievances, which, they said, should be carried out independently, without professional-therapeutic assistance. In the words of one of those members: "Leave us alone at the table that everyone sits around and where they tell their stories. This is worth more than a thousand psychologists and focus groups."

The organizational capacity of the religious kibbutzim manifested in somewhat different ways than for their secular counterparts, particularly with regard to the issue of evacuation. Alumim members did not evacuate, while in Sa'ad there was no consensus regarding the issue. The narrative of Alumim, that they constitute a robustly productive community based on hard work even in the face of difficult challenges, framed their construct of preparedness for an emergency. According to several members, their preparations were so effective that the kibbutz could maintain its normal routine even during the repeated rocket attacks. That ability, they added, gave them a sense of "sweet victory," highlighting their resolve and clout.

Perhaps Kibbutz Alumim would have reacted differently had it suffered casualties or severe damage in the fighting; an interviewee concurs with this supposition. But whether or not that is so, by and large the kibbutz members demonstrated a high level of organizational capacity during the hostilities.[31] In the interviews, they described how they resolutely carried out day-to-day tasks and stubbornly maintained their normal routine, which was their way of standing up to their feelings of fear. They also reported that the organizational structure of the kibbutz contributed a great deal to its stability and to the members' sense of confidence, of being in control of their lives. In addition, they indicated that their leadership and the CERT, drawing on older experience, knew exactly how to respond to the threats. Every evening, the emergency team met to plan what they and the kibbutz members need to do the following day, allowing the community to define its needs and its expectations from the outside, namely their regional council;

the meetings turned out to be instrumental in securing the assistance they requested in a timely and efficient manner.

Alumim members were regularly updated by messages sent their cell phones concerning the gamut of issues pertaining to the precarious security situation and any pertinent instructions from the CERT. The open and frequent communication process helped to elevate the community's trust in the emergency team, which was believed to function in the best manner under the dire circumstances.

In contrast, as we have seen, most members of Sa'ad, the other religious kibbutz, were evacuated to other localities around the country during Protective Edge. The kibbutz leadership assumed the responsibilities of the CERT and added a "contact team" in a broad effort to uphold the principle of continuity and deepen the sense of solidarity between those who stayed and those who left. They too issued a daily bulletin with updates on the hostilities and the situation at home and in the "diaspora." The motto of the kibbutz at the time was "Each of us is a small light and all of us together are a resolute cliff" (the literal translation of the campaign name in English and a play on words in Hebrew), which was intended to emphasize that even though the kibbutz is composed of individuals, the feeling of unity, solidarity and cohesion between all the members was upheld. A year after the war, it emerged in workshops held in the community that many of the evacuated members had in fact had mixed feelings about leaving home. Some spoke of guilt about not staying, while others said that the separation created an uncomfortable feeling of division, in direct opposition to the stated narrative of unity and mutual accountability. This was the case despite all the measures taken to keep the "diaspora" in touch as far as possible with the kibbutz, as discussed above.

Social Trust

The index of social trust is designed to benchmark the level of credence the public bestows on its local, regional and national leadership in normal periods and in times of disruption. The research findings indicate that when residents have a higher level of trust in their local leadership, they usually also express trust in its ability to handle emergency situations and, at the same time, they trust their peers to stand up to the challenge together. Mutual trust among the residents and between them and the local leadership serves as a recipe for increasing social cohesion. The leadership in Sderot, for example, wisely created a narrative of functional community assets which contributed

to the trust of residents and thereby enhanced the societal resilience of the local population.

The findings of the Sapir Barometer indicate that residents' trust in the Sderot municipal leadership was greater than their trust in the national leadership, though it was lower than was found in the neighboring kibbutzim. These differences are not surprising if one takes into account the high level of support among Sderot residents for the parties comprising the coalition government at the time, as opposed to the almost complete support for the opposition parties found on the secular kibbutzim.[32]

In the interviews, members of the two sampled secular kibbutzim affirmed their high level of trust in their fellow members of the community. Interviewees from Nahal Oz expressed – after Protective Edge – a rather high level of trust in the abilities of both the newly elected officials and the kibbutz members to handle emergency situations. The accumulated experience, the newly elected officeholders, together with the sense of social unity, led them to believe they could effectively manage future security challenges, let alone relative tranquility. They also noted that they expect the Kibbutz Movement, the embracing organizational umbrella for all the kibbutzim in Israel, to continue to assist them in future times of trouble, as was the case in past events.

Simultaneously, some members of Nahal Oz expressed concerns about their ability to function during a prolonged period of emergency. Dominating this discussion were the threat of the offensive tunnels and the psychological difficulty of coping with the death of Daniel Tragerman towards the end of Protective Edge. More than three years later interviewees felt that their kibbutz was still in a uniquely perilous position due to the security risks, and were quite divided on their level of confidence that their local leadership can effectively cope with future major disruption. Nevertheless, confidence was certainly greater in the kibbutz leadership that had taken over following Protective Edge than in its predecessor. Regarding the role of the regional council, Nahal Oz interviewees thought that its tangible assistance was quite marginal, being manifested only in the context of the allocation of lodging as part of a future evacuation plan and in financial support for the kibbutz's resilience plan implemented with the support of the regional Resilience Center.

At the same time, they expressed a high level of confidence in the army and described strong personal connections that have developed with commanders in the field. They did not criticize the army's conduct during Protective

Edge, despite the damage caused to the kibbutz during the operation by the deployment of heavy military vehicles in their fields. The director of the kibbutz's emergency team said that "it wasn't their [the soldiers'] fault."

Nirim interviewees concurred that the strong social bonds in the kibbutz and the feelings of partnership, solidarity and mutual responsibility generated a high level of trust between the members. The reference to the feeling of "togetherness" was a common theme, representing a guarantee for the kibbutz members that their societal resilience would be sustained both in times of emergency and in periods of calm. That "togetherness" also empowers them to cooperate effectively in times of stress. Furthermore, they hold, "there is a place here for everyone," i.e., as the kibbutz is "home" anyone who lives there is like a family member.[33]

Still, they did express concerns that even though the kibbutz "togetherness" serves as an inclusive social mechanism, at times it was also restrictive in nature. In this respect some of them alluded to the lack of social discourse among the kibbutz members vis-à-vis psychological stress, as members were reluctant to speak openly about their separate and different experiences, which, it emerged, did not follow one single narrative.

In contrast to their counterparts on Nahal Oz, the Nirim interviewees were displeased with the damage caused by the army in their fields. They complained that the IDF did not consult with them to find alternative routes for the heavy vehicles, which intensified their feeling of being invisible to the army. In addition, they claimed, the IDF brought bodies of dead soldiers into the kibbutz without prior notification, did not coordinate with the kibbutz about the hosting of soldiers, and quickly left the kibbutz following the ceasefire without waiting to see whether Hamas would respect it.[34]

On Nahal Oz, all interviewees were critical of the government and its functioning. This attitude can be attributed to the fact that the kibbutz members are affiliated mostly with the opposition parties, but also to the challenging security circumstances they face regularly. Several said that "unfortunately" the rounds of fighting constitute almost the only way to obtain financial allocations or other kinds of support from the government. They hold that even after politicians and government bureaucrats visit the area and promise support, the aid is slow in coming. One example given was the government's approval of only NIS 30,000 (approx. $8,000) for the kibbutz's resilience plan, a fraction of the NIS 170,000 ($45,000) requested. It should be noted that from the perspective of the regional council, which

is the conduit for government support, the picture painted is more positive (see below).[35]

The disappointment with and lack of confidence in the government was attributed by the Nirim interviewees to its inability to initiate a political process that would lead to a long-term ceasefire with Hamas.[36] For many members of the kibbutzim such a process should not be the result of another round of fighting, but rather of a political track that includes confidence-building measures. This desire to see Israel enter into a political initiative with the Hamas regime in Gaza is, naturally, consistent with the political "leftist" alignment of the members.[37] This makes it easier for the right-wing government to ignore the kibbutz members' criticism by claiming that their lack of confidence in the current national leadership stems only from political considerations. And indeed, members do openly express their political views, protesting that there is no justice and no logic in the management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict exclusively by military means and endless confrontation. Furthermore, they openly voice empathy for those who are suffering on the other side of the border.

On the other hand, members of Alumim and Sa'ad expressed full confidence in the government. They even stated that they were impressed by the government's support for them and its commitment to respond to their needs. They acknowledged the financial assistance they had received from the government and the moral support granted by the RC during and after the last round of fighting. They also mentioned the encouragement, support and identification expressed by many Israelis, which contributed to their own standing.[38] The right-wing parties that composed the coalition government during Protective Edge won broad political support among the members of Kibbutz Alumim; many of them expressed an affiliation with the government, fully supported its decisions and functioning and voiced very little criticism against it. In contrast, the interviewed members of Kibbutz Sa'ad were spread across the political spectrum, so that their high level of confidence in the government was not the result of political identification. Indeed, the members of Sa'ad did not express a uniform narrative with respect to the security threat. While some recalled feeling danger and fear during Protective Edge, others said that they had felt relatively secure. Still, they did refer to a sense of security that got stronger from one round of fighting to the next, primarily due to the improvements in the fortified sheltering options on the kibbutz.

The interviewees on the religious kibbutzim were also very pleased with the conduct of the army. For example, the accidental fall of an Israeli air-defense missile near Alumim did not arouse negative reactions.[39] Soldiers who were deployed nearby were seen daily in the collective dining hall. Many families made special efforts to embrace them, noting that they had great respect for the military.[40] On Alumim they spoke about their strong ties with the regional council too: "We felt that the regional council functioned very well. We have almost no complaints. Perhaps this is because this is a national-religious kibbutz (as is the council)."

Interviewees from Sa'ad, in contrast, were dissatisfied with both the government and the regional council for not issuing clear instructions regarding civilian evacuation. The result was that it became the responsibility of the local leadership, which had to make crucial decisions without a guiding arm. Some did see a positive side to the government's and the regional council's lack of clarity on evacuation during Protective Edge: it allowed the kibbutz members to make their own decisions without being obligated to act in one way or another. Apart from this issue, most members expressed support and appreciation for their regional council, agreeing that it gave them the support it needed and had labored for the benefit of its constituents.

To conclude this chapter, it is worth reiterating that the six localities reviewed all suffered from similar threats and similar damage as a result of the repeated attacks from the Gaza Strip during this period. Also their physical private and public defense protection infrastructure was similar, and this issue remained high on the State's order of priorities.[41] The large-scale fortification and sheltering, the deployment of the active defense Iron Dome batteries, developed and deployed on the border with Gaza at a cost of NIS 3 billion ($800m.),[42] and the robust presence of IDF forces in the region, all these created a solid basis for effective – if not perfect – preparedness of the localities against the Hamas threat.

Yet despite these similarities in threat and physical response to it, their actual modes of reaction to the emergency situation were not identical. The differences stemmed primarily from the ideological, social and economic disparities between them. The main differences in approach and conduct were represented in the issue of mass evacuation. Other dissimilarities were found in their attitudes towards the government and the army. Notwithstanding these differences, the overall level of societal resilience all of the localities demonstrated was similar. According to the latest Sapir Barometer survey,[43]

the index of resilience of the western Negev settlements (up to 7 kilometers from the fence between Israel and Gaza) stands at an average of 3.42 (out of 5). This represents a medium-to-high rate of societal resilience.

Chapter 3
The Contribution of the Community Emergency and Resilience Teams to Societal Resilience

"The community looks after itself."

In each of the Gaza Envelope communities, there is a Community Emergency and Resilience Team (CERT).[1] The members of the team are local volunteers who have undergone basic professional training in order to provide assistance to individuals, families and communities in times of emergency.[2] The CERT – in contrast to other frameworks in the locality (such as the secretariat) – is a professional body whose only function is to prepare for and respond to an emergency situation. Thus, it serves as the professional arm of the locality's leadership, to the point that during an emergency the line between the two entities may become ambiguous. In some instances the CERT operates in a manner that essentially positions it as the leading authority of the locality.

Alongside its main designated mission, the CERT is also commonly engaged in assisting residents who are struggling with stress resulting from the disruptions. This involves, among other things, the provision of medical, psychological and social assistance.[3] The overall goal is to help the locality and the people cope with the consequences of the emergency situation until it is over, hence enhancing the community's societal resilience. The creation of the CERTs in the western Negev was a result of a government decision[4] made in early July 2004, which provided special assistance to Sderot and the Gaza Envelope settlements in the domains relating to the advancement of their societal resilience. The basis of this decision was that the resilience of a community is built on the joint effort of the elements that operate within it, and that these elements need to be organized, trained and fully exploited. Accordingly, the initial and most important assistance to the community during an emergency should be provided by the residents themselves, based

on their own and the locality's capacities.[5] The Department of Social Services in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services is the central body engaged with the establishment, training and maintaining of the CERTs, in cooperation with the local authorities. The latter are responsible for maintaining the professional skills of the teams, which typically comprise at least eight staff members in a locality with up to 100 families and at least 12 team members in a larger locality.[6]

The Department of Social Services defined which authorities can activate the CERTs during a disruption: the regional council (through the head of the council, the security officer, the director of the department of social services or a community social worker), the chief of the CERT or the deputy, the local security coordinator or the IDF Liaison officer, and the secretariat chair of the settlement.[7] The CERT is designed manage all types of disruptions, including natural disasters. In this chapter we focus on the security domain.

The CERT's spheres of responsibility in the studied localities include:[8]

1. To open and operate an information center.
2. To assist the secretary and the security coordinator of the locality in the emergency management.
3. To map the local population, with special reference to those who are expected to be in need of particular assistance during a disruption. This includes individuals with special needs, such as the elderly, the ill and families with small children.
4. To coordinate the provision of initial care – medical, physical and logistical – to victims and others in need.
5. To maintain contact with the residents during an emergency in order to disseminate information relating to the consequences of the disruption.
6. To organize and facilitate therapeutic intervention for individuals and families.
7. To coordinate activities and cooperation with other organs within the locality and outside it.
8. To initiate and organize cultural and social programs and events during the emergency.

The CERT commonly has a three-tier structure (see Figure 3)[9]: first, the team's leadership, which includes the chief, the deputy/assistant and a secretary; the second is composed of up to six groups of designated representatives of the security team, the spokesperson and information

team, social services team, education team, health team and logistics team; the third tier comprises a local network of volunteers. The second and third tiers are coordinated by the CERT leadership. Apart from providing assistance to the community in need, one of the key missions of the CERT is to manage the ties between the community and the regional council and other neighboring organs, particularly the Home Front Command, the IDF's Regional Division and civilian assistance organizations, governmental organizations and relevant NGOs.



Figure 3: Structure of the Community Emergency and Resilience Teams

Providing Assistance to Individuals, Families and the Community as a Whole

The mapping and monitoring of the residents' needs is the basis for the provision of the required assistance. For instance, on Netiv Ha'asara the CERT periodically held meetings with parents to enable them to voice their needs and concerns. It also organized cultural evenings during Protective Edge, which included film screenings and performances by entertainers.

In settlements where members wished to evacuate, such as Nirim[10] and Nahal Oz, the CERTs provided the necessary assistance, from locating host communities to organizing transportation to get there through to initiating educational activities for the evacuated children and ensuring contact was maintained with their teachers. In places where the population did not evacuate, such as Kibbutz Alumim,[11] or where the evacuation was only on a small scale, such as Kibbutz Sa'ad, the CERT organized activities for the children during the course of the fighting.

In settlements where the population did evacuate, such as Kibbutz Nirim, a representative of the CERT accompanied the members to their host community and continued to provide assistance for the duration of their stay there. This assistance might have included the organization of cultural and recreational activities and helping the families in matters associated with welfare and health and so on. The Nahal Oz CERT offers a good example of the team's professional skills. During Protective Edge, it was constantly occupied – managing the kibbutz and those who remained as well as updating the evacuees with regard to the situation at home via text messages and a digital daily newsletter. In fact, the CERT became the dominant actor on the kibbutz, ultimately overshadowing the elected leadership.

As noted earlier, the older community members often do not leave during emergencies for a range of reasons. Some refuse to be evacuated for ideological (national or religious) reasons or because they simply believe that hostilities represent an integral part of the challenge of living in the region. The CERT monitors their situation around the clock, aware that they may require special assistance. When necessary the team delivers food and medications to their homes, paying particular attention to those who may be unable to get to a shelter in time (this is usually a matter of seconds).

Capably managing and providing necessary assistance to individuals, families and the community as a whole is a complex and sensitive task, especially in times of disruption and when the community is divided between

"home" and the "diaspora." In the Gaza Envelope, this task became increasingly complex from one round of fighting to the next, in part because the number of families that evacuated increased significantly. The lion's share of the burden of managing the ramifications of the disruption, and caring both for those who stayed and those who left, fell on the CERTs.[12]

Assessing the Community's State of Affairs

Another key function of the CERT is to gather all relevant information regarding the state of affairs of the community and its residents in order to understand their varied needs and to allocate the often-limited resources as appropriately as possible. In Protective Edge, the CERTs operated in different ways to gather the information, assess it and crystalize a correct and updated picture of the evolving situation in the community, so as to be able to disseminate updated information in real time to the residents and others who needed to know. For example, in Netiv Ha'asara the CERT used a WhatsApp group to ascertain how many residents were present on the moshav at any given time and what their needs might be. Elsewhere, the CERTs used other electronic means to determine similar situations, to disseminate information and to update the members on the security developments and the community matters. The weekly, or sometimes daily, bulletin referred to earlier was another means of keeping in touch and apprising community members on current and future events.[13] There were also, whenever possible, face-to-face meetings, such as the ones in Nahal Oz, for the few who remained on site and regularly took part in the evening meetings of the CERT.

The Color Red early warning sirens (operated by the IDF) – urging residents to immediately seek shelter, is received by the entire population simultaneously on their cell phones. After staying in the shelters for 20 minutes they are permitted to return to normal, unless otherwise advised. Immediately afterwards, the CERTs conduct a tour of the locality to determine if there were any hits, and whether there is any damage to life or property. The tour is usually followed by a quick telephone survey to check that everyone is alright. These enquiries, repeated after every incident, allowed the teams to quickly form an up-to-date picture of the situation and quickly set priorities for next steps.

The CERT is also responsible for updating members with regard to imminent problems or threats, large or small. These might include expected electricity outages (due to, e.g., the need to repair damaged power lines),

planned IDF moves, defensive or offensive in nature, or news of an approaching ceasefire going into effect. It might also include urgent warnings about approaching attacks by rockets and mortar fire or the infiltration of terrorists by means of offensive tunnels or penetration of the border fence. These kinds of information are likely to be accompanied by detailed requests to the residents, such as to remain in protected rooms at home or to prepare for rapidly changing circumstances.

One of the features that stood out in interviews with the CERT members was their expressed frustration at the fact that they themselves did not receive sufficient updates from the IDF on the threats and risks during Protective Edge, and that the updates they did receive were not always precise or reliable. Thus, for example, in early August 2014, prior to the declaration of a 72-hour ceasefire, the army informed residents in the Gaza-area settlements that they could return home, as the IDF surmised that the ceasefire, if initially temporary, would ultimately hold and become permanent. That assessment was also publically proclaimed by then-Chief of Staff General Benny Gantz on August 5th, when he called on the residents to return to their homes.[14] Many did indeed return, based on this optimistic declaration, but it quickly became clear that the assessment was premature. The ceasefire did not last and the fighting continued for another three weeks, forcing residents to re-evacuate. As already mentioned, one family that returned home to Nahal Oz, based on the IDF's green light, paid a huge price when their son Daniel, aged 4, was killed at home by a mortar shell fragment. This tragedy aroused feelings of guilt among the volunteers of the CERT who had acted in accordance to the instructions of the military. Even if it is clear that mistakes of this type can happen, the entire elected leadership of Nahal Oz was replaced following Protective Edge as a result of this grave incident, apart from the CERT chief, signaling recognition of his outstanding role during the campaign.

Internal and External Relations Management

Every CERT maintains working relations with other agencies which also deal with emergency management, including the IDF, the national police, the fire brigade, Magen David Adom ambulance service, the Israel Electric Corporation and numerous others in the diverse domains of education, health and welfare. Similarly, the CERTs maintain close and continuous contacts with the respective regional councils. As mentioned, every CERT is manned

by volunteers who are responsible for security, health, education and social services, and they are in direct contact with their professional counterparts in the regional councils. Thus, the CERT member responsible for welfare issues will be in contact with the head of the department for social services in the respective regional councils.

The interviews conducted as part of this research made it possible to examine the management of these important professional relations in practice. It became apparent that they followed no single format; rather, the model varied from one locality to the other: on Nahal Oz there were those who argued that their regional council (Sha'ar Hanegev) was "present only in name" during the campaign, or that they could turn to the council, but felt that its actual participation in their emergency management was quite marginal. In contrast, Alumim members expressed satisfaction with the functioning of their regional council (Sdot Negev). Thus, it appears that each regional council operated differently during the emergency. Although it is perhaps technically possible to set down general rules and standards to be applied in all regional councils, the Gaza Envelope experience suggests that in times of emergency, it is more effective for each situation to be addressed in line with the needs and culture of the particular localities.

Similarly, there were differences of opinion between interviewees from the various localities with regard to their relations with the IDF. On Nirim, there were expressions of open disappointment with the conduct of the military units ("We thought that the army cares about us"), and with that of the government too. Other interviewees also pointed to the lack of coordination with the army, particularly regarding implications of the repeatedly interrupted ceasefires. In contrast, on Netiv Ha'asara and Nahal Oz there was a high level of support for the IDF. Interviewees from these two settlements, like their counterparts on Sa'ad and Alumim, expressed satisfaction with how they were treated by the military at the time.

Among the CERTs' more important contacts are the Resilience Centers, which provide them with professional guidance on issues of emergency preparedness and help them process their experiences following an emergency. The RCs also run specialized workshops with the CERTs during and between emergencies, together with the range of professionals who work in and with the community, such as kindergarten teachers, school counselors and teachers in formal and informal education. Similarly, the CERTs provide the

RCs with information on individuals and families that need psychological assistance during or after an emergency.

Summing up, it seems there is general agreement that the CERTs performed well during the drawn-out fight against terror in the Gaza Envelope region during the discussed period. This success can clearly be attributed to the professionalism of the teams of volunteers and to the fact that they are part and parcel of the communities they serve in times of stress. This is not to say that their performance was without fault and their level of functioning varied from one case to the other. Furthermore, it is worth exploring how the CERTs might be improved in the future. Some have suggested paying the volunteers or granting them the same status as reserve soldiers during an emergency (they do not lose their income when called up suddenly). Integration of the CERTs within the IDF Home Front Command in some way might also contribute to their professional enhancement.

Lessons of the CERTs' success are now being learned in other localities where no such teams existed, including neighboring Sderot. One outcome is that Sderot recently decided to create four Neighborhood Emergency Teams – one for each quarter of the city (see Chapter 2).[15] Another conclusion that can be drawn here is to encourage the establishment of CERTs elsewhere in Israel, primarily in areas prone to the risks of terrorism, including high-trajectory fire. Government agencies, like the National Emergency Management Authority and the IDF Home Front Command, need to consider this matter seriously and to encourage and support the CERT model on a large scale.

Chapter 4
The Resilience Centers in the Gaza Envelope

"Walking alone will get you there quickly. Walking together will get you farther."[1]

The Resilience Centers (RCs) play an important role in the network that works in the field for the enhancement of societal resilience in the Gaza Envelope. The Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Health and the Israel Trauma Coalition[2] have been cooperating since 2006, under the professional guidance of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services, to create and run the five regional RCs.[3] The centers operate in Sderot and in the regional councils of Hof Ashkelon, Sdot Negev, Sha'ar Hanegev and Eshkol. They provide psychological and social welfare services to a combined population of about 60,000 that has been under a continuous security threat since 2000.[4] Each center is headed by a director who is typically a certified social worker, and who is responsible for the therapeutic, community and administrative activities during emergencies and between them, in times of relative calm.

An RC is a multi-task non-government organization that utilizes the skills of professionals, activists and volunteers, mostly from the communities it serves. The centers' work focuses on three domains: the enhancement of preparedness for emergencies, reinforcement of community resilience and individual treatment for anxiety victims. The centers initiate, develop and run programs and services to improve the quality of life of the community members, to promote sustainable communities and to provide support and assistance during emergencies and crises.

Their main activities can be summarized as follows:

1. **Treatment** – Area residents benefit from the services of social workers, psychologists and therapists for a nominal fee.[5] In 2016, more than 14,000 residents[6] were treated at the five regional RCs. Since their

establishment more than 25 percent of the Gaza Envelope population has received treatment or participated in RC workshops to help them cope with emergency situations.

2. **Training and community work** – The RCs organize and lead courses for a diverse array of professionals, including therapists, social workers, psychologists, educators, physicians, nurses, CERT volunteers, parents and regular volunteers. These courses are usually conducted before, but sometimes also during, emergencies. Special training seminars are provided for groups such as kindergarten and school teachers, security coordinators, school bus drivers and pupils.
3. **Preparing communities for emergencies** – The RCs work together with the five regional councils to prepare them for emergencies in fields associated with the social aspects, such as how to facilitate the return of families and the community at large, following the disruptions, to routine. An important part of the work is based on feedback from the treated communities.

Table 2: Summary of Resilience Center services (2008-16)[7]

		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Preparedness for emergencies		400	1,360	1,212	1,657	2,489	3,812	2,080	2,790	2,648
Individual and family treatment	Children and youth	434	1,806	417	797	1,784	954	4,480		947
	Adults	902	1204	464	488	1504	526	2309		634
	Total	1,336	3,010	881	1,285	3,288	1,480	6,789	2,807	1,581
Community resilience and reinforcement of coping mechanisms		1,100	2,240	5,119	7,495	4,586	5,816	6,949	6,489	8,891
Training and courses		400	1360	645	802	712	1,254	931		903
Total		3,236	7,970	7,970	11,239	11,075	12,362	16,749	12,086	14,023

The data illustrate a significant increase in the activity of the RCs in the western Negev between 2008 and 2016 in the area of emergency preparedness. However, in 2014, when Protective Edge was underway, a temporary reversal of the trend is seen – this was when many residents were forced to evacuate their homes and were therefore unable to access the RC services. After the operation ended, there was again a dramatic rise in emergency preparedness activity in the region, due in considerable part to the range of programs offered by the RCs.



Figure 4: Number of those receiving services in the Resilience Centers in the area of emergency planning



Figure 5: Activity of the Resilience Centers in the field of therapy

Figure 5 shows that in the domain of individual and family therapy, there were, as might be expected, three peaks that correlate with the three military operations: Cast Lead (2008/09), Pillar of Defense (2012) and Protective Edge (2014). Although the demand for treatments at the RCs rises during emergencies, the figure shows that between the bouts of fighting, therapy services are provided to anywhere between 1,000 and 2,000 clients each year. The highest level of demand was recorded after Protective Edge, as the locals began to understand the severity of the challenges they had been facing and their heightened stress levels.



Figure 6: Activity of the Resilience Centers in reinforcing community coping mechanisms

Figure 6 shows that the RCs' assistance with the reinforcement of shared coping mechanisms has over the years become increasingly important for the residents of the Gaza Envelope. The upward trajectory, clearly seen in the figure, is also substantiated by the accounts of their clients, who verified their need for the RCs' professional care during and between disruptions. This need was acknowledged equally by the groups that evacuated the communities and those who stayed home; both groups were trying to meet the challenge of (re)uniting their communities and renewing a common narrative.

The response of the Gaza Envelope residents to security threats in between the rounds of fighting is defined as "emergency routine." During the period under review, at various times the local population experienced not just a sense of threat, but also actual physical harm[8] and property damage. The mental toll has affected all age groups, from children to the elderly.[9] It was not only the targeted shelling by the enemy, accompanied by Color Red warning sirens that generated anxiety, but also the massive cacophony created by the activity of the IDF, particularly its artillery and tanks, compounded by the unsettling noise of the hovering planes that were bombing enemy targets in the Hamas positions close by.

Beyond the risks emanating from the high-trajectory fire during Protective Edge there was also the threat of the offensive tunnels, which diminished the capacity of the residents to uphold the principles of the "emergency routine," namely, to maintain their regular activity during disruptions. The feeling of vulnerability was underscored by one interviewee who said, "There is no Iron Dome to answer the risk of the tunnels." The threat of

terrorist infiltration "under the floor of our home," real or perceived, directly corresponds to a person's most primal fears, particularly children.[10] Hence, the prolonged period of tension challenged the level of mental resilience and sense of personal security for many people.

The feeling of pressure grew and adversely impacted the way residents of the Gaza Envelope viewed their lives. The RC directors interviewed for this study[11] described how the convergence of emergency and routine led many residents to depict their lives as an assemblage of "hell" and "paradise." Or, as one person described it: "We live in a paradise that occasionally transitions to hell." This quote reveals the civilians' perception of life between physical and psychological spaces – moving swiftly from relative stoic calm to an explosive environment rife with danger and the threat of war.[12] The use of the term "paradise" is an acknowledgement that they indeed live in a supportive and inclusive community, characterized by social cohesion and mutual solidarity, enjoying high-quality education for their children, the economic benefit of low-cost housing and a clean environment. The use of "hell" here refers to the psychological price they pay when confronted repeatedly by high-risk terrorist activity.

The reports by the RC clients and providers indicate that the fighting has created two simultaneous and contradicting trajectories: on the one hand, the degrading psychological resilience from one round of fighting to the next and, on the other, an accumulation of emergency experience which contributes to the enhancement of their endurance and steadfastness.

Local residents report that their psychological resolve to deal with the ongoing challenges is diminishing, i.e., that their resilience seems to be waning. Following Protective Edge, the longest and most severe round so far in years, people started to raise questions in therapy sessions and mull over, whether they would continue to live in the region, even though almost all of them had returned to their homes as soon as the ceasefire had stabilized. Among them were those who claimed that after Protective Edge, "paradise" was not restored. Residents still claim on occasion that they continue to hear the sounds of tunnel digging, which corresponds with media reports that Hamas is rebuilding the terror tunnels.[13] Indeed, the IDF periodically uncovers such tunnels, which raises the question as to how many have not yet been discovered.

As mentioned, the opposing factor that stands parallel to the diminishing of psychological resilience is the civilian experience throughout the rounds

of fighting and the many years of living under an emergency routine. This experience brings greater knowledge and understanding of the characteristics of the emergency situation and ways to organize in preparing for disruptions, to survive and live during crises and to quickly bounce back and bounce forward to an improved functioning following acutely adverse episodes. The emergency routine therefore creates two opposites: paradise and hell, calm and feverish activity, resilience and vulnerability. This contrast reflects the psychological mood of the residents who claim – primarily close to the height of tension – that "they can't endure it any longer," as they – both citizens and functionaries – are exhausted,[14] while at the same time they are motivated by the challenge to energetically reorganize for the next disruption. Thus, paradoxically, the communities' capacity to organize, and their high level of preparedness for another emergency, is constantly on the rise, as is their impressive economic and demographic growth in the face of the ongoing disruptions.

The RCs also assess the level of societal resilience in the settlements they are responsible for in line with several physical and conceptual parameters:[15] social cohesion, interpersonal relations, community infrastructure and preparedness for an emergency. Based on evidence provided by Meirav Ben Nissim Weidel, the director of the RC in the Eshkol Regional Council,[16] a distinct trajectory of growth within each of these parameters has been identified in the Eshkol localities and is being monitored. This implies that, in an emergency, severe disruptions commonly reinforce the societal resilience of the settlements, forcing them to improve their community assets and to better organize and prepare for the next emergency. In fact, evidence from the RCs indicates that the closer a community is to the border, the better equipped it will be to cope with an emergency. Thus, paradoxically, the prolonged emergency situation in the Gaza Envelope settlements has become an engine of growth for many of them, while the strength of that engine varies in relation to each community's resilience-building factors.

The growth that emerges from the emergency situation in the six discussed localities is seen in all dimensions – physical, economic, demographic, community, moral and personal. Growth is both a product and promoter of societal resilience. For example, kibbutzim that have gone through a privatization process (e.g., secular Nirim and Nahal Oz), which weakened their community cohesion and apparently frayed the social fabric and members' sense of solidarity, found themselves working hard to restore community

togetherness during and following the crises. This was done through a slew of cultural and social activities, which helped increase the interpersonal contacts between the members and generally enhanced social cohesion. Religious kibbutzim, which felt that the emergency situation was undermining their values – Zionism, religious faith or both – chose to consciously strengthen that spiritual base to reinforce their community resilience.

The head of the RC of the religious regional council of Sdot Negev, located on Sa'ad, suggested that the emergency situation is viewed by the local inhabitants as a kind of Zionist challenge. A symbolic expression of this is the way in which the acronym (in Hebrew) for the CERT has been reinterpreted as Social Settlement Zionism. By relating to the disruptions as Zionist challenges, the members are transforming the notion of societal resilience in the community into a benchmark for their commitment to Zionism and its values. This Zionist-oriented approach is not found only in the religious settlements. In the secular communities too, as well as in Sderot, the idea of growth, manifested by the economic and construction boom, is seen as a Zionist response to the stress of the security risks.

The heads of the RCs suggest yet another factor that promotes societal resilience: the need in perilous collective circumstances to help others, be it a neighbor left behind, a family that was evacuated, or outsiders, such as soldiers serving in the region or residents of other nearby settlements. Studies that have examined the volunteer activities of individuals in an emergency indicate that the situation strengthens the social resilience of the helpers.[17] As more individuals fulfill more functions in the emergency frameworks, mostly in a voluntary capacity, they are increasing their personal resilience and that of the entire community.

The promotion of societal resilience is therefore both a result of coping with an external peril and serves as a guarantee of success for communities responding to prolonged crises. Individuals and families, the bedrock of the communities, play a major role in the creation, preservation and reinforcement of societal resilience. Current research suggests that societal resilience is built layer upon layer: the resilience of individuals promote family resilience, which in turn contributes to the resilience of the community and the surrounding localities. This is not a one-way process. The community is also an anchor of support for its members and families and for the other communities, the regional council, the IDF troops, and NGOs that work as first responders.[18]

There is ample evidence that the capacity of a community to organize itself for an emergency corresponds to the level of voluntary spirit and activities among its members, to its organizational ability and leadership, mutual responsibility, partnership and cohesion. A key role in the shaping of a functioning community in a time of crisis is played by the local leadership. It needs to be capable of creating meaning[19] for the public under stress, of mobilizing the residents to respond to the challenge and providing them with mental and physical support. All of these are resilience-building components not only during emergencies but also in times of calm, as they are ensured to prevail in the next crisis, to enable the community to quickly bounce back. Enhancing these components of resilience necessitates significant investment, economic and other.

The RCs help the communities to boost these components of societal resilience. The multilateral cooperation between the individual, the family and the community, on the one hand, and the RCs, on the other – based on trust – significantly contribute to the communities' capacity to build up their societal resilience and to maintain it.[20] The capacity of the individuals, families and communities to accept the services provided by the RCs and to believe in the first responders is a meaningful expression of a successful and synergetic connection between the RCs and the communities they serve.

To conclude this chapter, the Resilience Centers that operate in the western Negev provide the residents and the communities with an essential and professional service, which is undoubtedly making a significant contribution to the high level of societal resilience in this security-challenged area. The clients of the RCs also attest to their major contribution. This is a public service facilitated by a non-profit NGO, the Israel Trauma Coalition. It receives government financing and contributions from Jewish organizations in the US and works in the field in close cooperation with the regional councils and the residents. RCs fulfill their missions by means of professional, close and long-term cooperation with all of the entities working in the field on behalf of the residents and the communities, under the very challenging circumstances of ongoing terror. They represent a remarkable response that should be adopted by all threatened localities in Israel, whether by terror or by natural disasters. The lessons learned by the RCs should be applied at the national level and scale.

Chapter 5
The Contribution of the State to the Resilience of the Communities

The main claim of this study is that the level of societal resilience is primarily dependent on the internal resources of the pressured community, subject to acute disruption. Nonetheless, it is incorrect to ignore the contribution – whether positive or negative – of external factors' role on the level of resilience of the localities in the Gaza Envelope during the last decade. This chapter will deal with external contributing factors: the economic support provided by the Israeli government to the settlements of the western Negev and the changing attitudes of the IDF towards these settlements and their residents during this period in the context of the three rounds of hostilities.

Government Support to the Communities in the Gaza Envelope

The security threat faced by the residents of the Gaza Envelope, which has intensified since Hamas came to power in 2007, is also a major challenge to the State of Israel as a whole. This repeated threat by Hamas has led the IDF – with the State as a whole – to take large-scale military actions in response. It can be argued that these military operations, as well as the political steps taken with them, represent the boldest expression of the State's backing to the threatened border localities. At the same time, also the opposite can be argued, namely that the military operations, as well as the prolonged siege imposed by Israel (and Egypt) on Gaza exasperated the tension which in turn brought the hostilities which affected the civilian domain. There is an ongoing debate in Israel on this issue which has not received broad public attention, but that the residents of the Gaza Envelope are a major part of, which focuses on the question of what is the correct strategy for Israel to adopt in response to the challenge of Hamas: Should it be the purely military strategy, which is supported by the majority of the Israeli Jewish citizens, or the political

strategy, intertwined with humanitarian aid to the Gazans, as recognition of their socioeconomic plight, or should it be perhaps a combination of the two? Taking an active part in this debate is the Movement for the Future of the western Negev,[1] which came into being during Protective Edge with the vision to "demand that the government achieves calm and security in the region." As argued by a vocal group of citizens from the Gaza Envelope who claim that military confrontations have failed to provide stability, they are "no longer willing to accept living between "trickles" and demand that the root causes of the conflict with Gaza must be dealt with."[2]

Essentially, the government's policy towards Hamas has hardly changed. It primarily consists of publicly ruling out negotiation with Hamas on the future of Gaza and the continuing security-related economic siege, while occasionally granting measured humanitarian concessions that vary with the changing security circumstances. The government still relies primarily on the concept of deterrence, which is supposed to enable longer periods of calm between the rounds of fighting. The IDF is repeatedly called on to respond harshly, mostly in order to send the message to Hamas that it will pay a high price for its attacks. This approach was clearly expressed by then-Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman in a speech given on January 24, 2017 at a conference of the Institute for National Security Studies. In the case of another round of conflict in Gaza, he stated, the IDF will be instructed to "to use all of its force, until the other side cries outs '*gevald*' (an interjection of alarm in Yiddish) and raises a white flag (of surrender)."[3]

Even though the Israeli policy of promoting deterrence and its practical manifestations certainly have an important part to play in determining the length of intervals between the rounds of fighting with Hamas, it is unclear and has not been investigated to what extent this policy is also reinforcing societal resilience in the Gaza Envelope localities. The inhabitants themselves are divided on this issue.

On a more practical domain, as a consequence of Protective Edge, the government decided to construct a new robust barrier, at a cost of over NIS 3 billion ($800m.), on the border with Gaza. The barrier is meant to also provide a solution to the offensive tunnels, a threat that has been hovering over the residents of the settlements located in close proximity of the border fence. This new sophisticated wall, and other means of fortified shelters in the settlements, certainly serve to promote societal resilience. However, it appears that the direct wide-scale economic assistance granted by the

government in recent years contributes no less – and possibly even more – to societal resilience. It appears that the government has gradually come to realize the significance of financial support, and consequently, in the period of 2003-14, passed 38 resolutions with regard to economic assistance to the settlements located close to the border at a total accumulated budget of more than NIS 2 billion ($530m.).[4]

These assistance programs, tailored mostly with representatives of the settlements, through the regional councils, gave clear priority to settlements in close proximity to the border, to include the city of Sderot. They included, first and foremost, allocations for special civilian projects associated directly with security needs, such as the building of private and public shelters of various types (at a total cost of NIS 1.3 billion, or some $340m.) as well as for the Resilience Centers (at a cost of NIS 38 million, or over $10m.). Significant budgets were also allocated to the domains of social welfare, education, housing, employment, agriculture, and infrastructure, repair of damage from the attacks, and tax exemptions to the settlements within the declared National Priority Regions.[5]

Not surprisingly, the decisions to provide aid led to repeated criticism and protests from localities farther away from the Gaza border, which also suffered from the Hamas attacks. They demanded similar benefits, at least to compensate them for damage caused by assaults from Gaza. It is here suggested that the government's decision to provide assistance to the settlements bordering Gaza was correct, as it was indeed necessary to enhance their resilience and to provide them with the means to confront the dangers they were exposed to for so many years. Lessening the societal resilience of these communities might have adversely affected their sustainability, which could have generated a negative chain reaction to negatively impact resilience nationwide.[6]

According to Alon Schuster, at the time of the research the head of the Sha'ar Hanegev Regional Council,[7] the rate of implementation of government decisions is about 75 percent per annum on average, though in 2017 it was estimated to reach about 90 percent. This is in spite of familiar bureaucratic entanglements that often thwart such moves. Government support facilitates and promotes, among other things, the demographic growth[8] of the settlements (see Figure 7), which is critical to the trajectory of prosperity the region has experienced and attests to the residents' societal resilience.



Figure 7: Demographic growth in five communities in the Gaza Envelope (2003, 2008 and 2015)

The IDF's Changing Approach and Its Effect on Societal Resilience

The considerable IDF deployment and activity in the vicinity of Gaza are highly visible and have multifaceted impact on the lives of the residents, their conduct and their societal resilience. It is demonstratively evident that the residents' sense of security is a central component shaping their resilience, as are the relations between the military and civilians and how the commanders and soldiers relate to the locals – as passive bystanders or as actual partners in the defense area and in shaping regional military policies.

Significant changes took place in the period under discussion in the context of the military-civilian relationship in the Gaza Envelope. These changes were defined by the head of the Sha'ar Hanegev Regional Council as a "turnaround."[9] Previously, there was a common feeling among many residents, as well as among the local leaders, that the military did not really take the civilians into account. There were even complaints that the army treated them as if they were "transparent." The officers, the gripe continued, did not take into account the civilians' needs and their deployment was rather disruptive, often unnecessarily. However, this changed after Protective Edge. The inhabitants of the region now acknowledge that the IDF, and particularly the headquarters of the Regional Division, has undergone an in-depth process of rethinking its relations with the local civilians and that it

appears to comprehend the strategic importance and contribution of societal resilience to the overall mission of boosting the civilians' sense of security.

It thus seems that the IDF commanders have learnt and internalized the two faces of the resilience concept: the way the civilian population interacts with a disruption, and how their conduct can in turn impact their bouncing back to normal functionality following the disruption. These traits have implications beyond the local context, as the capacity of the local residents to successfully stand up to the challenges and their ability to expeditiously return to normal life are closely observed both by the Israeli population at large and by the enemy in the region, the perpetrator of the disruption. The general Israeli mindset is also shaped by the way people perceive their capacity to face the security challenges, which in turn influences the strategic maneuverability of the decision makers at the government level in managing the conflict. Simultaneously, the enemy is keenly observant of the level of resilience among the Israelis and draws conclusions as to its own ability to create a new reality in Israeli society and politics, and whether that can best be achieved through attrition or by military pressure, or both. In other words, a civilian population that demonstrates societal resilience can in fact influence the perception of its own army and the enemy's and the strategic outcome of a conflict.

If the civilian population and communities return to normal functionality soon after the conflict, it implies that the enemy, which was able to temporarily disrupt day-to-day activity while the hostilities went on, was unsuccessful in defeating its adversary or in creating a systemic lasting disruption. Furthermore, the huge gap between the apparent prosperity on the Israeli side of the border and the dire situation in Gaza is widely thought to depict which is the winning side. Hence, even when there is no clear military victory on either side, the evident resilience of the Israeli player serves as a striking benchmark also for the Gazan population and leadership as they try to advance their interests by use of force against a civilian population.

The lessons learned by the IDF following Protective Edge resulted in a major transformation of its approach to protecting the Gaza Envelope settlements. For years, the military did not attribute much significance to the civilian fortifications and shelter system, as illustrated by the limited budget allocated for passive defense purposes. Commonly, decisions to construct physical fortifications for individual families (a reinforced-concrete safe room in the home) and public shelters and other facilities were forced upon

the reluctant military. However, over the years, there has been a growing understanding and recognition concerning the importance of such fortifications (even if sometimes it was the result of the Supreme Court's intervention)[10] as part of the defensive deployment in regions under threat (including in the north of the country). This understanding matured gradually, and came to fruition following the hostilities of 2014, when the army displayed a new approach to civilian-related issues, such as the evacuation of civilians from localities in peril adjacent to the border.[11]

The evacuation issue became critical for the area's communities due to the length of Protective Edge – 51 days. Under the circumstances, it soon became clear that an organized evacuation of non-essential residents should be advanced, with a small core remaining to attend to the absolutely necessary functions of the settlements. The approach of the military since that time has been that the presence of civilians in a perilous zone does not help it to optimally carry out its operational missions. In fact, since then the IDF has formulated general guidelines for dealing with the civilian home front:

1. Protection of settlements on the border is given higher priority than in the past. It requires direct and broad involvement of the military in issues that are central to the civilian communities under risk.
2. Direct responsibility for the civilian home front is belongs to the military. This requires, in actual terms, raising civilian issues higher on the IDF agenda.
3. In an emergency situation, additional military units might be deployed for defense purposes within the settlements near the border. This implies more sensitive interface between the military and the civilians.

The active participation of the military with civilian defense missions in the communities has become a recognized core responsibility of the IDF Regional Division; this encompasses planning and preparedness, as well as military activities in the civilian sphere during emergencies.

These guidelines have operational and organizational implications that are already being introduced in the field and which positively influence the civilian perception of the IDF. Knowing that the military is more involved now in the security affairs of civilians in itself contributes to their societal resilience. This is manifested in several important domains:

1. **Civilian evacuation:** As mentioned, the current reconsidered approach sees advantages for the military in the evacuation of civilians. It is

believed to provide safety, but also contributes to the army's freedom to maneuver by reducing the scope of protective missions in the case of enemy infiltration through the border fence or tunnels. Presently the IDF recognizes that the superficial and wrong narrative of "No civilian evacuation under enemy fire"[12] is no longer pertinent and that it needs to properly prepare for the rapid and well-organized evacuation of settlements, should the need arise.[13] This policy now applies in principle also to the Northern Command, which recently devised a new plan – "safe distance"[14] – applicable to several settlements in direct proximity to the border at the top end of the country. Still, it appears that the need for large-scale evacuation has not yet won across-the-board agreement and it requires further processing, planning and allocation of resources. Hence, a comprehensive planning process is underway, with the participation of the settlements and the relevant government agencies, including the IDF Home Front Command and the National Emergency Management Authority. These developments indicate that things are moving in the right direction but there is still a long way to go. Detailed plans need to be drafted that will include a principled decision on the criteria for evacuation, with specific reference to who will be evacuated and who will not. In this context, it is imperative to address the evacuation of larger localities, such as Sderot, or similar towns in the north of the country, which are presently not included in the list of smaller communities close to the border. In any case, the willingness of the military to be active in evacuating citizens from the border area when they are at risk is in itself significant and bolsters relations between the IDF and the civilians, which definitely contributes to their societal resilience.

2. **Construction of the barrier on the border with the Gaza Strip:** Since Protective Edge, the threat of the offensive tunnels risen to the top of Israel's security agenda, and dealing with it is certainly a top priority for the residents of the area. This threat is was one of the main compelling reasons for the construction of a new robust barrier at a cost of over NIS 3 billion ($800m.).[15] The new barrier is intended to augment the civilians' defense infrastructure and help restore their sense of security which was challenged by the exposure of the tunnels. In fact, some of the interviewees expressed outrage at not being updated in advance about the (known) existence of the tunnels and hence were not able to prepare for the risk.

3. **Reorganization of the IDF's Regional Division to aid local residents and settlements:** Alongside the incorporation of the CERTs in the military exercises, the role of the Home Front Command's officers has been reshaped. The HFC Center at the division level has become a key player, while the regional brigade also assumes direct responsibilities for the strengthening of the civilian communities and their emergency response squads. At the same time, the contacts between the liaison officers, the HFC and the local authorities have been bolstered and the distinction between the functions that deal with the military defense and protection of civilians has been redefined. This realignment has tightened the operational ties and facilitates the vital dialog between the civilian localities and the military units and headquarters, the latter being responsible for overall preparedness and the military operations in the region. It also clarified and advanced the connection between the settlements and the tactical units deployed in the region. The new structure is designed to promote two main goals: To enhance the working relations under emergency situations between the military and the civilians, while clarifying the much-needed interaction between the IDF's offensive and defensive activities. An open question remains as to how the new structure will operate in a future major emergency and whether civilians will have the "address" they need in the military local command. Furthermore, it is still unclear what the effects of these changes will be within the military local units on the societal resilience of the communities. One can expect that the very recognition by the military of the need to improve and maintain a dialog with the civilians will promote their sense of security and will in fact enhance both their preparedness for an emergency and their societal resilience.

These steps represent significant and important progress with respect to the civilian home front, though they do not constitute a full and systemic response to a future threat from Gaza, as there is no "hermetic" solution to the military threat and the expected (and unexpected) risks that it entails. Therefore, flexible preparedness – both military and civilian – is needed, based on the assumption that the civilian localities will remain under serious threat for the foreseeable future.

To conclude, both the government and the IDF are more aware today than ever before of the importance of societal resilience in the Gaza Envelope and

are engaged in enhancing it by a series of concrete steps, some of which are rather costly. Still, these steps may not in themselves lead to the necessary level of preparedness for the next conflict. The former head of the National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA) described (in 2016) the level of preparedness as "average plus," [16] while the former HFC commander defined it (in 2017) as "better than is generally thought, but still lacking… The cup is more than half full."[17] In light of this, the question is to what extent the aforementioned changes will influence the societal resilience in the region when the next conflict, which is expected to be more intense than the previous ones, occurs? In any case, the more comprehensive the investment in resilience, the better prepared the communities will be to demonstrate a higher level of resilience, even during a longer and more challenging disruption.

Chapter 6
Recommendations to Promote Societal Resilience in Israel

Social Capital[1]

Notwithstanding the importance of local and national institutions that need to demonstrate integration and connectedness[2] so as to promote the civilians' societal resilience, it is the residents themselves who stressed that their experience of "togetherness" is the one main factor giving them the fortitude needed to cope with the difficulties created by the conflict. "Togetherness" has two core manifestations: first, it is vital to coping during a disruption ("to take care of ourselves and to be together"); and second, it represents a community's uniqueness, reflecting its members' solidarity, commitment and mutual responsibility. This was underscored in the interviewees' repeated declarations that "here we never feel alone" and "everyone has a space." The feeling of togetherness is reinforced by multiple activities and social gatherings initiated by the communities, all of which are in peril. In the case of the religious settlements, there are additional rituals on Sabbath and Jewish holidays and other joint activities, while the secular communities tend to organize social and cultural events. These events, held also during emergencies, are used as an opportunity for updates and for sharing experiences and concerns, to grant the members the feeling that they "have an address" and that they benefit from mutual support.

Social capital entails community cohesion and the functional organization of the community, manifested through its collective capacity to provide suitable responses to the needs of the population in an emergency. A settlement's organizational framework includes its institutions in times of calm and

during an emergency, as in the usually rapid transition between them, and the local leadership's collaboration with the CERT. The optimal functioning of such an organization in an emergency strengthens the sense of efficacy and helps residents to overcome the challenges they face, thereby reinforcing their perception of their own resilience. It also contributes to an expeditious return home to normal life and recovery. It provides the residents with the basis for determining their own fate in high-risk circumstances and, offers them a strong sense of control over their own fate.

The Power of Leadership

The professional literature emphasizes the central role of leadership in building and maintaining societal resilience in the face of natural or man-made disruptions.[3] The complex reality in the Gaza Envelope during the extended period of emergency between 2006 and 2016 created numerous dilemmas concerning the need to preserve functional continuity and the fabric of life, alongside imperative security requirements. Such dilemmas prompt the questions of whether to encourage residents to determine for themselves whether they should evacuate under conditions of risk, what needs to be done to maintain community cohesion during a prolonged emergency, and how to provide the residents with short respite options outside their targeted communities. Such issues highlight the centrality of local – and national – leadership in prolonged disruptions and consequently touch on the question of public trust in their leaders.

This study looks at three types of leadership: community, regional and national. According to the Sapir Barometer, the residents' confidence in the national leadership is moderate, with an average score of 2.80 on a scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high). In contrast, confidence in the local leadership was much higher (average score of 3.61). This was the case particularly among the kibbutzim, which tend to place more confidence in their local leadership than do the moshavim and the towns. The residents of Sderot also trust their local (i.e., municipal) leadership more than the national one, but with a smaller gap (see Figure 8). The survey showed that people viewed their local leadership as being part of their community, which might suggest that in future disruptions and tension the public will rely more on local leaders than on the institutions and leaders of the State.

Even though all three types of leadership play a significant role in the risk management of disruptions, the present study shows that the region's

residents view the community level of leaders as the dominant formative factor in determining the capacity of their own community to face the emergency and to foster its societal resilience. This conclusion is based on the data gathered from interviewees from all of the sampled settlements and the city of Sderot, where a new leadership was voted in just three months before Protective Edge. It swiftly launched a process that successfully reshaped Sderot's self-image as a capable, dynamic community. Drawing on the literature regarding the power of positive inclusive leadership, it is also possible to ascertain the effects of negative (sometimes referred to as "toxic")[4] leadership – which amplifies the fear of terror, reduces community cohesiveness and consequently diminishes the potential of the community to properly prepare for emergency situations.



Figure 8: Residents' level of confidence in the local and national leaderships

Community Cohesion

"Bonding capital" is defined as a system of connections *within* a group characterized by high levels of similarity which enables it to achieve common goals.[5] Bonding capital therefore reflects the strength and significance of ties between equals within horizontal networks (and is liable sometimes to hinder the development of mutual relations with other groups and organizations, if it does not already have basic ties with the outside players. During an emergency, this can constitute a serious problem).[6] For example, one of the challenges faced by the communities under discussion here was found to be the difficulty in maintaining continuous contact between those who left home and those who stayed. The physical distance and different experiences

of the evacuees (primarily families with children) and those who stayed (vital workers, position holders and older individuals) upset the effort to create a shared emergency narrative. Similar disparities were found when the evacuees returned home and went through a therapeutic process, which revealed the gaps between the different perspectives and consequently created divisions within the communities. This led community members to lessen their inclination to share their own (different) experiences with the diverse manifestations of the disruption because open discussion was perceived as potentially harmful to the community's social bonding. "I couldn't describe to them what I had experienced, how difficult it was… because it was like telling them that it was a mistake for them to leave," recounted a member of Nirim. Consequently, some communities concluded that if a need arises in the future to evacuate, the entire community should leave so as not to create a set of different experiences, which they now know to be detrimental to the community's cohesion.

Community cohesion is not a social trait that develops by itself. In order to benefit from its fruits during a disruption, it has to be created and cultivated, taking into consideration the community's need and unique fabric, as well as the attendant risks that might hurt the community. This entails a range of activities prior to the disruption, upon receiving a warning signal of an approaching disturbance, during the disruptive events and subsequent to them.

It is incumbent on the community leadership to be cognizant of the need for cohesion and to practically promote it. The attainment of community cohesion is based on two main factors: a shared sense of belonging to and identifying with the group, with its unique objectives, as well as with the special relations that connect its members within their own space of living;[7] it also entails the active involvement and interaction of the members within the group. The second factor is the community's control over its members and over the developments that arise from emergency events. The local leadership is judged by its capacity to maintain social cohesion and to promote it over time, despite the disruptions, and sometimes even by exploiting them to benefit the community.[8] The positive nexus between successfully preserving and developing social cohesion and the level of the community's resilience is obvious.

Control over Life in the Community

A key characteristic of resilience, it has been noted, is the capacity of the community to have control of its own conduct during a disruption. In the case of the settlements in the Gaza Envelope, the one major challenge appeared to be the splitting of the communities during the hostilities. There are numerous references in the literature to the concept of "control in stress situations." Nati Leor proposes that "control" prevails when an individual (or a group) can in fact manage his/her emotional setting and determine his/her behavior even at the height of a disruption, and even in the case of failure or loss.[9] In contrast, in a situation of lack of control one is often unable to shape one's emotional setting or conduct, but is rather controlled by the circumstances and reacts to them automatically. This is essentially the default reaction, the natural tendency in perilous situations, when anxiety creates helplessness and adversely affects the rational choosing between various alternatives.

The main challenge of the disruptions of the Gaza Envelope emerging from the repeated terror attacks has been to maintain "functional continuity" of the community as far as possible, so as to enable recovery and move quickly towards growth. This matches the generic definition of societal resilience. "Control" is a key factor in maintaining the "functional continuity" of the communities under stress. It represents the fundamental characteristics of the community (socioeconomic status, culture, faith and heritage), the typology of its leadership (exclusive or inclusive) and the level of the community's preparedness for emergency situations.

A community that is properly prepared for an emergency is one that can control its fate better than a community with a lower level of readiness. An example of this can be found in the rate of preparations for mass evacuation under an external security threat. The formulation of a detailed plan for self-evacuation, combined with other pro-active measures, cultivate a culture of readiness and encourages the called-for control over the community's conduct. This would involve, apart from planning, using existing connections with outside entities (such as the Kibbutz Movement), which would account for the social asset of "bridging," joint learning of the community's needs and how best to meet them, devising a support system for families and therapeutic activities, etc. All such efforts will make the residents aware that they need not feel helpless in the face of an emergency that their fate does not depend solely on the enemy's whims or on the State's institutions, but rather on themselves and their community leadership. All this enhances

societal resilience. The mechanisms of control help the residents create a level of confidence in a perilous situation by structuring frameworks for normal behavior in an abnormal environment. The study clearly shows that settlements that were able to maintain control demonstrated a heightened ability to cope with disruptions, which is one of the more central features of resilience.

Legitimacy to Evacuate

The issue of evacuation during a security crisis has been a source of controversy among the residents since the beginning of the security deterioration. There is a wide spectrum of opinions about whether it should be totally ruled out, based on ideological considerations – as expressed by members of Kibbutz Alumim and the new leadership in Sderot – or whether each individual or family should decide for themselves. The position of the government as of Protective Edge was not to intervene, or at least not to oppose evacuation. In fact, until then the government refrained from supporting massive evacuations and certainly did not finance them.

The settlements reviewed here underwent significant change on the issue of evacuation during Protective Edge and subsequent to it. Although there are still opponents to the idea, as noted, particularly in Sderot and Alumim, for most people evacuation in an emergency is becoming increasingly legitimate and accepted. This change rests on the lessons learned in 2014 and the conclusions of the IDF's senior command and NEMA.

Most of the residents reached the conclusion that remaining at home during a period of conflict means taking unnecessary risks and that evacuation – primarily of family members and children – for a short period is rational and appropriate behavior. The benefits, notwithstanding the high costs involved,[10] are considered by the majority as greater than the disadvantages (mostly related to national values).

The Israeli security establishment has also concluded that the safety of civilians is paramount in the decisions regarding if and when to evacuate and when to return home. This represents a major revision in the military's approach and provides with a legitimacy to evacuate, thereby inherently reducing the emotional burden they bore in the past, when many believed that evacuation represents cowardly conduct and contradicts given nationalistic and ethical values. The security establishment presently supports evacuation when necessary from settlements near the border, and is in fact involved

– together with representatives of the residents – in the formulation of the evacuation plans.

Interestingly, despite the fact that evacuation currently enjoys greater legitimacy, the residents are still quite divided on the issue. The 2016 Sapir Barometer survey (see Figure 9)[11] shows that average support for evacuation stood at 2.31 (out of 5) that year, just below the average of 2.51 in 2015. Also interesting is the internal division of the respondents on this issue: more supportive of evacuation are women, secular folk and the less educated, whereas men, religious people and better-educated individuals are less supportive. And those who feel more threatened by enemy tunnels and mortars favor the notion of evacuation more than others.



Figure 9: Support for evacuation in the event of another round of fighting, by category

Systemic Recommendations for the Enhancement of Societal Resilience

Several systemic recommendations can be submitted on the basis of this study. They are oriented primarily – though not exclusively – to scenarios of severe security disruptions. The scenarios presented by the IDF Home Front Command predict that the scale of the disruptions and the level of damage in future conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah will be much greater than in previous conflicts, including the Second Lebanon War of 2006. This stems, among other things, from the foreseen change in the mode of

attacks, now expected to involve also "blows on urban centers,"[12] which might combine the use of long-range rockets, improved firing capability, larger warheads and possibly also greater accuracy, enabling the enemy to hit vital infrastructure facilities.[13]

In response, Israel can make use of its robust defense mechanisms, primarily the newly deployed active defense systems, but they are yet to be tested against intense multiple and simultaneous projectile salvoes. Therefore, it must be considered that at least a portion of these large-scale barrages of missiles and rockets will penetrate the IDF defense systems. This would necessarily demand a higher level of societal resilience from the targeted Israeli public.

Under these foreseen circumstances it is imperative for Israelis to fully understand and appreciate the virtues and components of societal resilience and to translate them into operational guidelines, rigorous systemic planning and practical national and local response undertakings. Lessons should be learned from the successful practices of promoting resilience in the communities and implemented countrywide, while paying attention to each community's unique characteristics. Following are our key recommendations:

1. Organizing a locality for when a situation of disaster arises represents a primary leverage for the enhancement of societal resilience. Kibbutzim signify an advanced example of an organizational structure; this enables them to maintain a relatively effective and reasonable real-time decision-making mechanism that works under stress. Inclusive and pro-active leadership, as a prominent part of the mechanism, provides the community with needed solutions to acute challenges, securing its vital functional continuity under peril and demonstrates that its conduct can contribute to the community's sense of self-efficacy and its capacity to overcome the difficulties brought on by the disruption. Indeed, the example of the kibbutzim – mostly smaller in scope and more homogeneous in their social fabric – does not easily translate to other larger and more complex localities. However, the basic universal principles of disaster management do apply to any locality in the context of preparing for an emergency and successfully surmounting it. Each locality should adopt procedures and practices to be ready for a disruption in a manner that fits its own population and unique features. As is illustrated in this study, it is feasible and greatly beneficial to create an effective local disaster management regime all around the country, in line with each place's

specific demographic, social and economic characteristics. Larger cities will naturally need a different construct from small towns, and could possibly base their establishment on the model of the municipal quarters in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Also, community centers can serve as focal points for social activities in times of stress, involving the citizens, NGOs and other groups in jointly standing up to the challenges and promoting the societal resilience of the community.

2. The organizational model of the settlements in the Gaza Envelope can and should serve as an example for other small- and medium-sized localities in Israel. The model of the Community Emergency and Resilience Team can be applied as a construct that is based on the pre-disruption period, gradually preparing the residents for a time of disruption, through the crisis and then the return to routine after the emergency. This cycle ensures the necessary functional continuity by implementing the principle of having the same position holders manage routine and emergency situations. In instances where there is a separation between management in routine times and in emergencies, there appears to be a duplication of roles, which adds to the public confusion concerning who is responsible for the response functions. Also, the division of labor between the State, the local authority and the public at large has to be kept in balance. It must be determined in advance what exactly are the responsibilities of the State (e.g., vis-à-vis the operation of vital infrastructure and services), the municipality and the residents (stockpiling essentials for a few days, keeping the younger children busy, etc.), so as to ensure maximum functionality in a time of stress.
3. Mass evacuation under perilous conditions is now a major issue. A decision might have to be taken on whether evacuation is indeed warranted, how it is to be carried out, where the evacuees should be referred, who will provide for them while evacuated and how and when they should return home. When each individual family decides by itself, as was the case in Tel Aviv in the First Gulf War of 1991, or when the decision is made on the basis of a lack of alternatives, it shows a low level of social resilience. In contrast, when the decision comes as a result of a formal process of consideration by the local authority, it reflects a higher level of resilience. As we have seen, the decision of Kibbutz Alumim to stay home under fire represented a high level of social resilience, as for them ideology and faith frame a sense of meaning, which provides

a robust foundation to functioning in times of emergency. At the same time, a community decision to evacuate the entire population, based on seriously calculated considerations (e.g., the level of an immediate security risk) can also represent high social resilience. Hence, the overriding question regarding evacuation is *how* the decision is taken, and to what extent the decision-making process was participatory and transparent, and not simply *what* the final decision is. This question assumes critical significance when the government refrains – as it has done to date – from making a decision on the matter, whether due to budgetary considerations or for political reasons that are based on an ethos (which historically has been shown to be false). Such has been the case in all the recent conflicts. Only after Protective Edge and its lessons did the IDF begin to speak about the need and legitimacy of evacuation under fire and formulate limited evacuation plans for settlements at risk next to the border.

4. In this last context it is suggested the following guidelines be adopted:
   a. It is imperative to refer to the issue of evacuation-under-fire as a legitimate and appropriate phenomenon in a way that does not infringe on the image of the population that finds shelter away from home.
   b. Detailed plans and the appropriate logistical preparations should be made for the evacuation of both large and small localities, not only the ones situated in direct proximity to the border. Preparations should also include medium-sized and larger communities that may be targeted, despite the administrative hardship that this might entail, as more distant localities might well be exposed to rockets attack in the future conflict with Hezbollah in the north or Hamas in the south.
   c. Civilians should be involved in the planning and simulating of evacuations by means of disseminated information and increasing public awareness of the option of mass evacuation. The absence of a government decision on mass evacuation should also be considered and responses should be planned, because it still may take place based on collective (or individuals') decisions. Conversely, the government might find itself obligated to provide for a large number of evacuees.
5. Communities with a high level of social capital, such as the kibbutzim explored in this study, should make sure that they maintain and enhance such assets during periods of calm. Preserving these advantages can help to ensure that future challenges and disruptions will be dealt with

adequately. These resources may vary from one community to another, but in most cases they do promote societal resilience that can be tapped in times of peril. It has been well demonstrated that robust social networks in localities can provide vital support during times of emergency.

6. Localities that are short of such social assets, such as larger cities or weaker communities, should pointedly invest as much as they can in enhancing their social capital. This is certainly a major challenge, but one that can and should be met with, not only for the sake of enhancing their capacity to stand up to major disruptions. To this end, it is possible to incentivize the promotion of active social connections at the sub-local level (in and by municipal quarters, community centers, community clubs and schools) by introducing vigorous social activities that promote bonding and mutual trust. The example of Sderot in recent years certainly demonstrates that it is possible to strengthen social and volunteer foundations in urban localities with a relative low socioeconomic standing. This requires a major effort on the part of local leadership, which needs to be aware of the need and be capable of making a difference through inclusive social measures. The message should be loud and clear: Enhanced social leveraging of the inhabitants in each locality contributes lavishly to its growth, both in times of crisis and calm. Local politicians might well adopt this message for their own political advantage.
7. Leaders have an important function to play. This entails the following tasks:
    a. Crystallizing the narrative of preparation for an emergency. The study found that different leaders in neighboring localities might choose to mold different messages, in accordance with their own philosophy and constituency. But they need to construct a unifying message on the central issue of security disruptions and rally the public accordingly. Again the example of Sderot shows how significant the message is in terms of uniting the public for action and preparing for the next disruption.
    b. Activating the community in emergency. The functioning mode of the community in peril and its ability to emerge from it into recovery and growth are closely related to the role of the local leadership.
    c. Increasing the level of trust of the residents. Local leaders who nurture the public's sense of confidence prior, during and following a disruption can better win its trust for themselves, as leaders per se.

Confidence in the leadership contributes not only to the community heads but extends to the residents themselves, by reinforcing the feeling of efficacy to stand up to the disruption.

d. Looking forward to the post-crisis recovery stage by reaching out to decision makers on the national level. The goal here is to solicit support for recovery and growth of the locality following the disruption.[14] The study clearly shows that Sderot and the regional councils in the region adopted this strategy fully, which resulted in significant allocations for their settlements. Indeed, large-scale budgetary assistance is a major stimulant of growth

8. Regarding public trust in the national leadership, which was found to be less than in the local leaderships,[15] we offer two conclusions:
   a. The local perception towards the national leadership is largely shaped by the residents' basic political affiliation. This has bearing on the array of issues related to the security emergency. Still, all of the residents – whatever their political leanings – expressed approval of the economic support given by the government. The nexus between the budget allocations and resilience is apparent. This should be considered in other threatened regions that deserve government support, according to their needs.
   b. Despite the respect for the IDF in the region (as in the rest of the country), there were signs of dissatisfaction and criticism, which brought significant modifications in the military's conduct vis-à-vis the local communities. These lessons should also be applied in other regions, in particular those close to the border in the north.
9. The public's capacity to control its life during a crisis has a major impact on its societal resilience. Therefore, any advancement of this feeling of control should be encouraged before and during disruptions. Being permanently updated on security developments also contributes to the sense of control and functional efficacy.
10. Resilience Centers play a major role in the region under stress. Therefore, the establishment of new RCs in other regions is highly recommended, particularly in areas where future conflicts can be expected. RCs do not need to follow one model. On the contrary, they should be modified to fit the diverse localities on a case-by-case basis. It is also recommended that the centers' scope of missions be expanded to include, for example, the development of local leadership and of tools for working with diverse

populations. Also, relations between the centers and the HFC and civic organizations should be fostered and formalized. They should strive to establish horizontal and vertical networks to spread the message and essence of societal resilience.

Conclusions

This study examines the societal resilience of small communities in the western Negev, which for years have been facing major protracted security challenges due to their close proximity to the border with the hostile Gaza Strip. It incorporates the findings of previous research published by the Institute for National Security Studies in 2016. The present study analyzes and monitors the level of resilience in six localities – one city, four kibbutzim and one moshav. All endured three major rounds of fighting between Israel and the Hamas regime in the last decade (2006-16) as well as repeated clashes in the interim. The research is intended to yield practical lessons on the complex and dynamic relationship between terror and societal resilience.

Despite the fact that the six localities were exposed to similar security threats, each one responded differently to deal with the associated challenges. And yet, there are several important similarities in their conduct which might shed light on the phenomenon of societal resilience in the context of severe manmade disruptions:

1. The communities were found generally to demonstrate a high level of resilience in the face of the security challenges. This evaluation is based on a quantitative and qualitative investigation of their actual conduct during the rounds of fighting and subsequent to them. We also used detailed data collected through in-depth interviews with residents and position holders in the settlements, the regional councils and various organizations, such as the Resilience Centers and the IDF's HFC.
2. The level of societal resilience was found to be particularly high in the kibbutzim. However, this was found primarily in the framework of the actual *conduc*t of the residents and the communities. In contrast, resilience in the psychological indexes told a different story, indicating lower levels; this was corroborated in the interviews with residents who generally reported on a common sense of anxiety, albeit at varying levels. Higher levels of stress were found, as expected, during the fighting and these

decreased after and between rounds. Most of the interviewees' narratives pointed to a fairly high level of societal resilience.

3. The national and especially the local leaderships were found to play a crucial role in enhancing societal resilience. The heads of the localities were called on to create and strengthen their communities' confidence in them, to demonstrate a high level of visibility, to decide on a broad spectrum of issues pertaining to the emergencies in a timely manner, and to navigate their communities toward recovery and growth following the disruptions. They play a major role in creating vertical connections – bridging – with decision makers on the national level in order to receive support and financial allocations, which are vital for building needed physical infrastructures, for upgrading the level of the communities' preparedness in advance of the next disruption and to ensure rapid physical and psychological recovery.
4. Overall it can be concluded that the actual risks to the residents on the line of confrontation, as was manifested in the number of civilian casualties, remained rather low, notwithstanding the tragedy associated with each fatality. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the residents' significant psychological stress. The repeated disruptions have had – and are still having – a serious psychological impact, which was exacerbated by the exposure of the offensive tunnels. Understandably, any disruption of routine life generates uneasiness for a civilian population. Hostilities in the midst of one's space necessarily raise the level of anxiety, which might turn into sheer fear even at the sound of excessive noise, as has been the case with IDF artillery or aircraft, even when the actual disruption is less than overwhelming. Informing the community as to the real level of the threat to civilians – notwithstanding the imaginary threat – is essential for analyzing the impact of the disruption on societal resilience. The greater the magnitude of the disruption and its resultant damage, the greater the impact on societal resilience and the capacity of the individuals and communities involved to rapidly bounce back. Admittedly, the subjective perception of the severity of the disruption is the one that mostly affects civilians psychologically, as well as their level of functioning, and this in turn influences societal resilience.
5. The duration of the disruption also has major consequences on resilience. Two parallel typologies have been monitored in this context: The first shows that continuous disruptions over more than a decade create a

growing sense of attrition among the population, sometimes to the point of questioning the utility of staying in the beleaguered region. It may manifest even when occasional projectiles are launched from the Gaza Strip not in the context of a round of fighting, leading immediately to stressful symptoms, primarily among children and the elderly. Thus, despite the generally high level of resilience, individuals do pay an emotional price for living in a threatening environment. Second, the study shows that the success of the communities to meet the repeated security challenges contributes to its sense of empowerment and recognition of the citizens' capacity to endure, even under stress. This positive phenomenon raises communities' societal resilience.

6. The most important contributor to the attainment and sustainment of a high level of community resilience is social capital. The studied localities represent a wide range of social groups, economically, ideologically, structurally and more. Still, they mostly share the vital component of social capital, manifested in their unique common history of recurring and prolonged security challenges and their growing capacity to endure them. Exceptionally high socioeconomic capital can be found in the kibbutzim, mostly rooted in the tightly woven network of social horizontal and vertical bonds. These traits, together with the ideological background, mutual responsibility, organizational collective/volunteer structure, and ties with external strong and supportive entities, help the kibbutz communities cope successfully with the security challenges. Clearly, the picture is not always as idealistic and it has not insignificant flaws, but it can be generally suggested that the social features of the kibbutz do encompass significant assets that promote their high level of resilience.
7. Sderot's revitalization too is evidence that social capital can be acquired, and perhaps even in a relatively short period of time, if local leadership presents itself as a force that ignites the processes of social empowerment. The example of Sderot during and following Protective Edge is both exceptional and indicative, considering its arduous history and its relatively low socioeconomic status. If Sderot is able to enrich its capacities and become a city with remarkable growth and social resilience, then other urban centers can also rise from crisis given similar impetus. This should be adopted as a singular lesson for other communities that do not enjoy robust social capital and might find themselves looking for ways to bounce back from major crisis.

8. Building societal resilience from the "bottom up," within the community, through pro-active initiatives and entrepreneurial volunteerism has been found to be a constructively promising process. Still, laying the primary responsibility for the promotion of community resilience on individuals would be ill-advised as it is liable to encourage creeping privatization of security management. Repeated severe disruption might encourage better-off groups to finance their own protection needs, as was the case regarding evacuation costs when the government refrained from assisting them. Others, who could not afford the evacuation-related expenses, had to stay behind. Such a trend foments inequality and a sense of alienation and could even undermine the basic commitment of the State to provide for the safety of all citizens, regardless of their economic status.
9. Societal resilience as demonstrated by the communities on the southern border has a strong bearing on the broader perspective of Israel's national security, and its effect goes beyond the regional realm of the conflict. The ability of the population – both local and peripheral – to successfully cope with a major security disruption and to rapidly return to normal functioning is closely monitored by the Israeli public at large and by the adversaries as well. A clear demonstration of resilience has an effect on both. The Israeli public might be inclined to conclude that it too possesses a similar capacity. Its foes can be discouraged by the demonstration of Israeli resilience in a way that might cast doubts as to their ability to be victorious over Israel through continuous attrition. When the targeted communities manage to quickly bounce back to normative functioning and to flourish, it should serve as a message that terror does not ensure victory. This becomes even more obvious when the Palestinian perpetrators see the dire consequences of their attacks on their own people in Gaza. It appears that presently, in an environment of no victory/no defeat – in contrast to the classic military-to-military confrontations – societal resilience and what it signifies is gradually emerging as a major criterion of success. Stretching this point further, one could assert that the positive changes taken by the Palestinian Authority concerning the use of wide-scale terror against Israelis also emerged as a result of lessons learnt in the Second Intifada.[1] In this defining episode, Israeli society demonstrated a high level of resilience in the face of high-magnitude severe terror that lasted more than four years, which brought no tangible progress for the Palestinians in the realization of their strategic objectives, while Israel

returned to full functioning shortly following the crisis and even started a new phase of accelerated growth that has continued until today.

Societal resilience is not a given. In a settlement or a community it is dependent on its initial situation and the intensity of the disruption and its aftermath. Nonetheless, this is an ability that can and should be developed on a continual basis. The research findings indicate that even in settlements with high initial societal resilience, such as Kibbutz Nirim, intensive preparations were made for more than a decade to further reinforce it, in case of emergency. The starting point, as well as the components of the process, are major factors in building societal resilience. This is primarily a "bottom-up" process, which begins with the residents, continues with the community and ends with the local authority. It is built layer by layer, such that the resilience of each layer is a guarantee of the resilience of the layers above. The process of building societal resilience has great potential and it can positively affect many facets of life – not only during an emergency. It can strengthen social cohesion and at the same time increase the community's social capital. This also has implications on day-to-day community functioning on the personal, social and economic levels.

It is important that resilience-building processes be backed up by "top-down" measures, by the organized supportive actions of state institutions that provide the means for self-protection (physical, financial and others) and for the reinforcement of resilience. Organized activity "from above" also broadcasts a message of strength to residents and communities and provides them with a feeling that they are not being neglected, that their security is not being removed from the agenda of decision makers and that those decision makers are indeed working for their security and safety. This recognition has a positive influence that boosts the belief among residents and communities that they are capable of dealing with emergency situations and encourages them to continue to strengthen their societal resilience. Thus, the building of societal resilience is the result of a combined ability to harness inner community strength and external strength. Societal resilience, then, is far from being only a metaphor for the ability to endure disruptions. It can and should serve as a leading national strategy and as a solid base for dealing with terror and with a host of other potential disruptions.

Notes

Notes to Introduction

1 From the perspective of the residents of the western Negev, Operation Protective Edge started about 10 days earlier, when they were attacked by dozens of projectiles during Operation Brother's Keeper, which was carried out in the West Bank to find three Israeli youths who had been kidnapped and killed by Hamas operatives.

2 Meir Elran, Zipi Israeli, Carmit Padan and Alex Altshuler, "Social Resilience in the Jewish Communities Gaza Envelope in Operation Protective Edge," *Military and Strategic Affairs* 7, no. 2 (2015): 5-31, http://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/MASA7-2Eng%20Final_Elran%20et%20al.pdf.

3 Collective community.

4 Private, mostly agricultural community.

5 Jews in Israel define their religiosity in terms of their commitment to Jewish Law, to the commandments, and to Jewish customs. See Larisa Fleishman and Yury Gubman, *Level of Religiosity in Residential Neighborhoods: Residents' Perception vs. Reality*, Central Bureau of Statistics, February 2014, https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/pw/pw82/pw82.pdf [Hebrew].

6 The data on the number of families and of residents in each settlement are taken from the Central Bureau of Statistics database.

7 The Sapir Barometer was developed by Uri Rost, of the Department for Multidisciplinary Studies at Sapir College, Yuval Tsur and Uri Bibi, both of the Department for Human Resources Management at Sapir College. It was developed as a quantitative index within a broader study to measure the resilience of the residents in the Gaza Envelope region.

8 The Roundtable in the Prime Minister's Office, "Strengthening of Societal Resilience in an Emergency," Background Paper (June 2016), https://bit.ly/2E8RPcT [Hebrew]. See also Roundtable in the Prime Minister's Office, in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, "Strengthening of Societal Resilience in an Emergency: Summary," June 29, 2016, https://bit.ly/2GsAeyF.

9 There are numerous definitions of terror. See, for example, Yuval Noah Harari, "What is Terror? From the Middle Ages until the 21st Century," *Zemanim* 108 (Autumn 2009), https://www.openu.ac.il/zmanim/zmanim108/download/zmanim108-harari.pdf [Hebrew].

10 *The Threat of Rockets from Gaza 2000-2007*, Intelligence and Terror Information Center, December 14, 2007, https://bit.ly/2J6ZMCS [Hebrew].
11 *The Threat of Rockets from Gaza – Status Report*, Intelligence and Terror Information Center, July 8, 2014, https://bit.y/2pU52BP [Hebrew].
12 "Summary of Data on High-Trajectory Fire from Gaza at Israel in Recent Years," GSS website, July 15, 2014, https://bit.ly/2E9IJwv [Hebrew]. See also Jewish Virtual Library, "List of High-Trajectory Attacks from Gaza on Israel from January 2009: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/palestinian-rocket-and-mortar-attacks-against-israel.
13 Tal Elowich, "Fence against Terror: The Example of Gaza and Judea and Samaria," *Maarachot* 458 (2014): 10-17, https://bit.ly/2nOgGhu [Hebrew].
14 Yossi Langotsky, "The Tunnel Barrier in Gaza – The Maginot Line 2018," *Haaretz*, March 31, 2018, https://bit.ly/2Eagn5a [Hebrew]. Examples of the deficiencies of the barrier Israel created to block terror from Gaza are the incendiary kite and balloon assaults, which have caused millions of shekels of damage in the Gaza Envelope. See, e.g., Matan Tzuri, "The Burning Kites: Hundreds of Acres of Be'eri Forest Are on Fire," *ynet*, May 2, 2018, https://bit.ly/2GcmvL4 [Hebrew].

Notes to Chapter 1, Conceptual and Policy-related Analysis of "Resilience"

1 This chapter was written by Alex Altshuler and Daniel P. Aldrich.
2 See, for example, David Chandler, "Beyond Neoliberalism: Resilience, the New Art of Governing Complexity," *Resilience* 2, no. 1 (2014): 47-63, https://bit.ly/2JbsKl5.
3 Michael Ungar, "Resilience across Cultures," *The British Journal of Social Work* 38, no. 2 (2008): 218-35, https://bit.ly/2GNM9dI.
4 Jerome H. Kahan, "Resilience Redux: Buzzword or Basis for Homeland Security," *Homeland Security Affairs* 11, Article 2 (2015), https://bit.ly/2q08IkG.
5 Johan Rockström et al., "A Safe Operating Space for Humanity," *Nature* 461 (September 23, 2009): 472-75, https://go.nature.com/2ng7BMo.
6 See their website: Resilience Alliance, https://bit.ly/2pZszAy.
7 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, *Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative*, National Academies Press, Washington DC (2012), https://bit.ly/2H3gjqU.
8 UNISDR, Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, https://bit.ly/2Gv99eb.
9 See, for example, Meir Elran, "Societal Resilience: From Theory to Policy and Practice," in Igor Linkov, José Manuel Palma-Oliveira, eds., *Resilience and Risk*, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series (2017): 301-11, https://bit.ly/2uER9wd.
10 Glenn E. Richardson, "The Metatheory of Resilience and Resiliency," *Journal of Clinical Psychology* 58, no. 3 (March 2002): 307-21, https://bit.ly/2Gv6u8g.
11 M. Carmen Hidalgo, Bernardo Hernandez, "Place Attachment: Conceptual and Empirical Questions," *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 21, no. 3 (2001): 273-81, https://bit.ly/2pZNTad.

12 Daniel P. Aldrich, *Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
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14 Mario Luis Small, *Unanticipated Gains: Origins of Network Inequality in Everyday Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
15 Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 6 (1973): 1360-80, https://bit.ly/2gvPOzY.
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18 Anirudh Krishna, *Active Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Democracy and Development* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
19 Ichiro Kawachi, S. V. Subramanian and Daniel Kim, eds., *Social Capital and Health* (New York: Springer Press, 2008).
20 Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
21 Daniel P. Aldrich and Yasuyuki Sawada, "The Physical and Social Determinants of Mortality in the 3.11 Tsunami," *Social Science and Medicine* 124 (2015): 66-75, https://bit.ly/2kQFq8s.
22 Keiko Iwasaki, Yasuyuki Sawada and Daniel P. Aldrich, "Social Capital as a Shield against Anxiety among Displaced Residents from Fukushima," *Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards* 89, no. 1 (2017): 405-21, https://bit.ly/2HdiY1z.
23 Daniel P. Aldrich, "It's Who You Know: Factors Driving Recovery from Japan's 11 March 2011 Disaster," *Public Administration* 94, no. 2 (2016): 399-413, https://bit.ly/2HaUyp2.
24 Daniel P. Aldrich and Emi Kiyota, "Creating Community Resilience through Elder-Led Physical and Social Infrastructure," *Disaster Medicine Public Health Preparedness* 11, no. 1 (2017): 120-26, https://bit.ly/2EgxH8x.

Notes to Chapter 2, Functionality Indexes for Gauging Societal Resilience

1 See, for example, *Disaster Resilience* (endnote 6 in Chapter 1).
2 Following is a short profile of the six localities investigated in the study:
Sderot was founded in 1951. The first settlers arrived from Iran, Iraq, Kurdistan and North Africa and were first housed in the Gavim Dorot camp. Over the years, Sderot absorbed many waves of immigration and in 1996 it was awarded municipal status; today it has over 25,000 residents. Many of them commute to work in the large cities in the center of the country, while others earn their livelihood in the local Sapirim Industrial Park and the factories on the nearby kibbutzim. For more than

a decade Sderot has been defined as a confrontation-line city due to the Qassam rockets that have been launched at it from Gaza during the three rounds of fighting and in the intervals between them.

Nahal Oz is a kibbutz located east of the city of Gaza, near the border. It was founded (in 1951) as a Nahal settlement (the first ever). Currently it has about 400 residents, including members, non-member residents and children. In 2007, the kibbutz was privatized, but its members decided to maintain a large degree of mutual responsibility. The products of the kibbutz include agriculture, dairy farming and chickens. Located on the security fence, it is eligible for special economic incentives.

Nirim is a kibbutz in the western Negev within the Eshkol Regional Council. Founded in 1946 by a group of Hashomer Hatzair it was joined over the years by various groups from Israel and abroad. Its economy is based primarily on agriculture, much of which is organic – an avocado orchard, greenhouses and a dairy farm. It is a partner in the Nirlat paint factory. Many of its members earn their livelihood outside the kibbutz in education, academia, agriculture, welfare, mental health, engineering and technology. It is home to about 400 residents, of whom 200 are members.

Alumim is a religious kibbutz in the western Negev. It was founded in 1966 by two Nahal groups from the Bnei Akiva youth movement. Its population is 500, about 25 percent of whom immigrated from GB. Income is based primarily on agriculture (including organic) – fruit, avocado and jojoba.

Sa'ad is a religious kibbutz in the western Negev. It was founded by graduates of Bnei Akiva in June 1947. The members maintain a large number of unique educational frameworks for various populations (young girls, including preparation for matriculation; elementary-age children who have had to leave their homes; and a Tsabar group of youth who made aliyah in order to serve in the IDF). The kibbutz has a State Religious school for Grade 1-9 which teaches according to the values of "Torah and Avodah." The school is shared with Alumim and nearby Moshav Tekuma. The kibbutz's income is agriculture based (mainly carrots, potatoes, citrus fruit, wheat, avocado, corn, vegetables for seeds and flowers, as well as dairy farming and chickens). The kibbutz has a population of more than 800.

Netiv Ha'asara is a moshav in the western Negev, located on the northern border of Gaza. It is part of the Moshavim Movement and falls under the jurisdiction of Hof Ashkelon Regional Council. It was founded as a settlement in northern Sinai (1973), near Yamit, and moved to its present location in 1982, following the peace agreement with Egypt and the evacuation of Sinai. It is the closest settlement to the border with Gaza and therefore it is eligible for special economic incentives.

3 Judith C. Kulig and L. Hanson, *Discussion and Expansion of the Concept of Resiliency: Summary of a Think Tank* (Alberta: University of Lethbridge, Regional Center of Health Promotion and Community Studies, 1996).

4 John T. Cacioppo, Harry T. Reis, and Alex J. Zatura, "Social Resilience: The Value of Social Fitness with an Application to the Military," *American Psychologist* 66, Issue 1 (2011): 43-51, https://bit.ly/2GxTqek.

5 School attendance (schools operated during the summer vacation in an expanded format) reaches about 85 percent. Also, matriculation exams were taken on time, teachers were available (even though some of them lived outside the city and commuted to work), and summer camps operated as planned. The municipality organized trips outside the city for pupils, as well as for residents and municipal workers, for "stress relief," under the responsibility of the community center. Each trip included about 2,500 individuals.

6 Naama Angel Mishali, "Sderot Mayor: We Will Not Evacuate in a Time of War," *nrg*, April 20, 2016, https://bit.ly/2EnbiXo [Hebrew].

7 The decision not to evacuate was also related to the distance of the kibbutz from the security fence. Alumim does not border the fence and in between Nahal Oz is located. Also, no projectiles landed in Alumim and it faced a lesser risk of penetration by terrorists. According to local interviewees, the only significant episode was that an IDF missile landed in the center of the kibbutz during Protective Edge.

8 "The roar of the artillery was deafening. We understood that it was preferable not to remain on the kibbutz in such an atmosphere" (kibbutz resident).

9 Based on previous experience and in view of the government's call to prepare a formal evacuation plan, the kibbutz formulated a plan to facilitate orderly evacuation to a number of destinations.

10 "Clearly we should have been evacuated. But the State did not help us. We had to do it on our own. There was no State evacuation, because that would have made it official and the government would have had to pay compensation for it" (head of the local CERT).

11 "People could no longer pay for staying in a hotel or some other arrangement outside the moshav, so they decided to return to their pillow, to their bed, to their Qassam" (D., resident of Netiv Ha'asara).

12 The evacuation of families with children created a number of problems: "In Protective Edge, it was clear that we could not leave our children here. There wasn't a decision. That was the situation. And it wasn't long before the problems started. To be far from home, far from friends. The separation between families weakened and wore down the community" (resident). Another moshav resident said that essentially "not all of the families could leave, as some of them had to continue working, which made the situation more complex. In such cases parents left their children on the moshav under the supervision of an adult, which caused tension among parents and anxiety among the children, who were afraid that something would happen to their parents on the way."

13 "The symbol of Protective Edge from our point of view was the plastic shopping bags. The implication was that we had to pack quickly and leave our homes. The implication was that we are at war" (resident).

14 The experience of Protective Edge and many official statements led the residents of Netiv Ha'asara to understand that a detailed emergency evacuation plan should be prepared by the secretariat and the CERT, who are also responsible for its implementation. The plan includes the names of those who will make the decision on the evacuation, a list of localities where the residents can be transferred in an organized manner and also the conditions for their return, based on the level of safety. It was concluded that the moshav alone (not even the regional council, let alone the government or the IDF) will make the decision. In addition, unlike previously, any future evacuation will be organized and collectively financed for the moshav as a whole, using public transportation.

15 "On our kibbutz, each individual has a place. You are never alone" (secretary of Nirim).

16 The story of Nahal Oz is one of impressive bouncing forward following a severe diminishing of community functionality. Elran et al., endnote 2 in Introduction.

17 An interviewee: "The question of why we are here is a simple one. We have been living here for 40 years already. We have a youth movement, Jewish festivals, a high standard of living, excellent education." Another interviewee added: "The community here is very close. We [celebrate] all of the Jewish festivals together and share in cultural activities too."

18 The director-general of the Sderot Municipality: "We do not need massive donations during an emergency. You want to contribute? You're welcome to. Send it to us (the municipality) and we will know how to channel the donations to where they are most needed and where the money will be used wisely." This was stated in reference to previous rounds of hostilities and primarily Cast Lead, when the oligarch Arcadi Gaydamak dispatched buses to transport residents to the Center of Israel for a few days of rest. This unpleasant image of anxious masses flocking to exit their city was burned into the mindset of Sderot residents. Gaydamak was depicted then as a savior for his gesture, but still an outsider who eventually did a disservice to local resilience. The new leadership of Sderot decided that such images would no longer be part of crisis management; rather, they would promote a narrative of local empowerment.

19 See the article by Arik Mirovski in *The Marker* on April 14, 2017 on the rise in housing prices in Israel: https://bit.ly/2qdcjMB [Hebrew].

20 Below is a graph of the city's population from 1955 (four years after its founding) until 2014. The number of residents in Sderot exceeded 26,000 in 2017 and the forecast is for continued rapid growth in the coming years.



21 "We chose Nahal Oz a year ago with open eyes," explained a recently absorbed resident of the kibbutz. "We recognized both the advantages of the situation and the security risks. The children expressed some fears at first but we dealt with that and today, a year later, there are no fears that control our lives." He added that what keeps them on kibbutz, among other things, are the community and the sense of solidarity. "The tragic case of the late Daniel Tragerman was devastating. Families left, but the community as a whole, which for months was left wondering where it was heading, decided to take a stand and to make a difference. This is a great place to live… people love life. They are not looking to prove anything to anyone – they simply love the kibbutz. This spirit keeps us here and it is what connects dozens of new families. We are one of them." See also Yanir Yigne, "'there Is Terror Everywhere – Here There Is a Community': Rise in the Number of Families Moving to the Gaza Envelope," Walla, July 25, 2016, https://bit.ly/2GJ4tW8 [Hebrew].

22 For further details about the *mechina* at Nahal Oz, see Matan Tzuri, "The New Pioneers: The Journey to the *Mechina* in Nahal Oz," *ynet*, October 27, 2014, https://bit.ly/2ErNC3S [Hebrew].

23 Avi Yophe, "Dozens of New Homes Are Being Built in Nirim," *Mynet* Kibbutz, August 20, 2017, https://bit.ly/2HfjoEk [Hebrew].

24 Kibbutz Nirim website, https://bit.ly/2qd5f3j [Hebrew].

25 "Exclusive Interview with Drora Kochavi, Secretary of Kibbutz Nirim," on the blog *The Kibutz at Rockville, MD*, August 28, 2015, https://bit.ly/2FXTpnm [Hebrew].

26 Kibbutz Barkai website, http://www.barkai.com/.

27 The interviewees did not put up a show of strength and were quite frank in referring to their grievances: "We have no problem saying that we are traumatized, post-traumatized or stressed," said an interviewee from Netiv Ha'asara. Another one added: "This is a war that works on us using psychological warfare. So yes, people here are scared to death."

28 One example of the content found in a bulletin of the Eshkol Regional Council is seen to encourage the expression of feelings and emotions, even when they reflect hardship: "It is possible and desirable to talk about fears and worries, but it is important to balance this with the statement that this is our home and we are waiting for a period of quiet and genuine security…[It is okay to talk about] the feeling of being a refugee [for those who have been evacuated] and the difficulty of living in a wartime atmosphere [for those who stayed]…Our communities are

strong and we believe in our ability to recover and to take care of ourselves… and to find the way back to normal life."

29 "I haven't told this story [before]. I wasn't able to. I couldn't describe what I had experienced, how difficult it was and what exactly happened to me and to those who were evacuated, since it is like telling them that it was a mistake on their part to leave [the kibbutz]" (A. from Nirim). It seems that not sharing experiences in the end creates distance between the members, and that has the power to fracture the feeling of togetherness.

30 Members of the CERT operate in the event of an emergency (such as a Color Red alert). The first thing to do is to clarify who is in the settlement, where exactly they are and whether they are safe. In this way, it is possible to quickly judge whether there are casualties and, if so, where they are located. After the announcement that it is safe to leave the shelters, the CERT inspects the settlement to verify that indeed no one has been physically or psychologically hurt and whether or not there is physical damage. It should be noted that every home in the settlement has a fortified room or a shelter and the children are well trained in what they are to do in a Color Red alert.

31 "It wasn't easy to function and continue operating here. It was hard for a lot of people. You hear the boom. You have to run to find shelter. It is a tough situation" (resident of Alumim).

32 The Sapir Barometer of 2015-16 indicates that the resiliency index of Sderot residents *rose* by 2.5 percent relative to an increase of only 1 percent in the adjacent kibbutzim, which puts their respective level of resilience on an equal footing. This represents a remarkable social achievement for Sderot, despite its distinct lower socioeconomic standing.

33 "We are here because this is our home. People here never feel alone" (member of Nirim).

34 Said one kibbutz member: "We were Zionists. We thought that the army cared about us. But they violated our trust. That's the way you feel when the institution that is meant to protect the State isn't interested in protecting you."

35 Interviewees did mention the National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), but suggested that its role was marginal since it mainly worked with the regional council, rather than the localities.

36 The website of the Movement for the Future of the Western Negev, https://www.facebook.com/negevfuture. See also Carmit Padan, "The Movement for the Future of the Western Negev: An Attempt to Redefine the Relations between Boundaries, Security and the Periphery," *The Institute for National Security Studies*, June 7, 2015, https://bit.ly/2vropYn [Hebrew].

37 Carmit Padan, "Social Protest in Operation Protective Edge: A Civilian Attempt to Challenge the Political-Security Discourse," *Military and Strategic Affairs* 7, no. 2 (2015): 55-71, http://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/MASA7-2Eng%20Final_Padan.pdf.

38 "We received letters of support from people in Israel and abroad and that was very moving" (member of Alumim).
39 The fact that a senior IDF commander chose to live on the kibbutz and was part of the community during the period leading up to and during Protective Edge contributed greatly to the feeling of security and pride among its members and reinforced their identification with the military.
40 "We set up a stand with hot drinks and pastries for the soldiers. We invited an entire platoon into our homes so they could have a hot shower and relax before returning to the warzone. There were always soldiers in the dining hall. They knew they had somewhere to eat. We never asked for any compensation from the government for this" (member of Alumim).
41 Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis, "The Strategic Balance of Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip 2005-2016," *Molad* (2016), https://bit.ly/2HLylyt [Hebrew].
42 Matan Tzuri, "The Barrier on the Border with Gaza will cost NIS 3.34 billion," *ynet*, January 9, 2017, https://bit.ly/2HbJHKN [Hebrew].
43 Sapir Barometer survey, 2016.



Notes to Chapter 3, The Contribution of the Community Emergency and Resilience Teams to Societal Resilience

1 "Community Emergency and Resilience Team (CERT)" is the English translation of the volunteer organization known in Hebrew by the acronym "Tsahi."
2 See Gidon Zaira, *Community Emergency and Resilience Teams in the Regional Authorities of the Gaza Envelope* (Jerusalem: Knesset Research and Information Center), December 9, 2015, https://bit.ly/2qJcCjn [Hebrew] and the Israel Trauma Coalition for Response and Preparedness et al., *Community Emergency and Resilience Team File*, https://bit.ly/2EZHYpW [Hebrew].
3 Moshe Brender and Avi Sender, *The Emergency Team and Settlement Resilience*, Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services, Branch for Social and Individual Services, Service for Community Work (2015): 56, https://bit.ly/2s6IDVD [Hebrew].
4 Government Decision 2173. See Baruch Sugarman and Avi Sender, "Policy for Developing Community Resilience," in *Survey of Social Services*, Ministry of

Social Affairs and Social Services, Branch for Social and Individual Services, Service for Community Work (2011): 591-619, https://bit.ly/2J8elFu [Hebrew].

5 Ibid., p. 596.

6 Ibid., Brender and Sender.

7 Ibid.

8 Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services, *The Community Emergency and Resilience Team*, https://bit.ly/2HbNc44 [Hebrew].

9 Ibid.; the organizational chart is taken from Brender and Sender, p. 35.

10 "None of the families stayed. It was very dangerous here. You could have died here" (Arnon Avni, spokesperson of Nirim, May 10, 2016).

11 None of the residents of Alumim were evacuated. In the interviews, they said: "It is easier to get through this together than each family on its own." "We are very close and feel strong together. That is what allowed us to stay calm and to deal with the threat."

12 See the findings of a study in 2015 of community resilience in the settlements of the Eshkol Region conducted jointly by the PREPARED Center and the Mashabim Center. The proportion of respondents who suggested that evacuation was preferable to staying in a future escalation was 45 percent.

Operation	**Interviewees**		**Members of the interviewee's family**	
	Number of evacuees	**Proportion of evacuees**	**Number of evacuees**	**Proportion of evacuees**
Cast Lead	133	25.8%	189	36.7%
Pillar of Defense	172	35.3%	243	47.2%
Protective Edge	224	43.5%	301	58.4%

13 Immediately following Protective Edge, the Elixir Research Institute surveyed the residents in the Sha'ar Hanegev regional council. The results indicated that the most popular method for updating the residents on the security situation was by text messages to the members' cell phones (71.95 percent).

14 The "Anemone Speech" was given by Chief of General Staff Benny Gantz when the 72-hour ceasefire went into effect (the name refers to the seasonal anemones that carpet the Negev in late winter). He declared the end of the operation and called on the residents of the Gaza Envelope to return safely to their homes. Two days later, Hamas renewed the fire. The speech included the following: "It is a hot summer here. Autumn will follow, rain will wash off the dust of the tanks, the fields will turn green and the south will turn red in the positive sense – the red of anemone flowers – and stability will endure here for many years to come." Rubik Rosenthal, "The Metro, Denial and the Anemone Speech," *Hazera Haleshonit* (July 10 2015), https://bit.ly/1CrNujh [Hebrew]. See also Gantz's speech on YouTube: https://bit.ly/2qNzIVV [Hebrew].

15 Interview with the director-general of the Sderot Municipality, May 7, 2017.

Notes to Chapter 4, The Resilience Centers in the Gaza Envelope

1 Quote from a slide show presented at the National Steering Committee of the Resilience Centers in Sderot and the Gaza Envelope, December 20, 2016.
2 See the website of the Israel Trauma Coalition: https://bit.ly/2F50T1f.
3 Ibid., Sugarman and Sender.
4 Ibid., see the site of the Israel Trauma Coalition.
5 The users of the Resilience Centers are of all ages and come from all segments of the population. Every Israeli resident has the right to receive between 12 and 18 treatments that are financed by the National Insurance Institute.
6 According to the figures of the Israel Trauma Coalition. The figures were presented at a meeting of the Steering Committee of the Coalition that took place on January 20, 2017 in the Eshkol Regional Council.
7 Ibid., according to the figures of the Israel Trauma Coalition.
8 During Protective Edge, four civilians were killed – three in the western Negev and one in the north. See "Protective Edge: From Day to Day, Hour to Hour," *Haaretz*, August 10, 2014 (last update: November 5, 2014), https://bit.ly/2JgaPt [Hebrew].
9 Residents described their children wetting the bed and adolescents who refused to participate in their school's annual field trip so as not be far away from home. The older children were wary of the continual need to be on alert that leads to mental exhaustion and anxious parents who try to show a strong façade for the sake of their children.
10 The feeling of helplessness and lack of control among the residents was intensified by the lack of clarity with respect to the nature of the threat. Meirav Ben Nissim Weidel, one of the RC directors: "The matter of the offensive tunnels is very frightening as… it is real, but on the other hand there was no official admission that there is a problem. When a tunnel was discovered the military said that it was not targeted at civilians and that everything was under control…; but at the same time, they asked that the CERT be on alert." See Oded Shalom, "We knew, we were afraid, we warned, we were fooled," *Yedioth Ahronoth*, weekend magazine, January 26, 2017, https://bit.ly/2JhbEld [Hebrew].
11 We interviewed five directors of Resilience Centers in the western Negev, November 15, 2016.
12 "The pastorality facilitates a rapid return from hell to paradise…If you go today to one of the settlements, you will see that everything is green, people are riding bicycles…Everything is renovated and repainted… but the notion of "hell" appears immediately with the return of the threat." Anat Sarig, professional counselor to the directors of the Resilience Centers in the western Negev, January 20, 2016.
13 According to a report of the Intelligence and Terror Information Center of the Israeli Intelligence Heritage Center dated September 7, 2016, during the two years after Protective Edge, 36 rocket landings have been identified in Israel, most of them short range. The rockets fell in open spaces or near settlements in the western Negev. Thus, in spite of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, which went

into effect on August 26, 2014, there is still sporadic fire by the "splinter" terror organizations, which disrupts the routine of the western Negev residents. [In 2018 another widespread escalation took place in the Gaza region].

14 This is manifested by the fact that four CERT chiefs were replaced following Protective Edge.

15 The physical factors included fortification, hardening of infrastructure and services. The conceptual factors include quality of leadership, a sense of community cohesion, quality of interaction between members of the settlement, the sense of place attachment among the residence, and the level of trust between the members. The sum of these parameters creates a unique structure for each community and reflects its degree of resilience. Taken from Goral, Ben Nissim Weidel, Lahad, Aharonson and Daniel, *Community Resilience in the Settlements of the Eshkol Region* (Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University, Eshkol Regional Council and Tel Hai College, 2015) [Hebrew].

16 November 15, 2016.

17 Shai Ben Yosef, *There is a Solution for Every Settler – Community Aspects of the Rehabilitation of the Gush Katif Evacuees*, doctoral thesis, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Bar-Ilan University (2010). Kelson, who quotes Ben Yosef, came to the conclusion that those who were actively involved in the community have a better chance of successfully dealing with emergencies than others.

18 Ibid., Ben Yosef.

19 Karl E. Weick, *Sensemaking in Organizations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995).

20 This is consistent with Milti's conclusion (quoted by Ben Yosef), according to which disasters are optimally managed when the affected community works jointly with external first responders.

Notes to Chapter 5, The Contribution of the State to the Resilience of the Communities

1 Padan, "Social Protest in Operation Protective Edge."

2 See the Facebook page of the Movement for the Future of the Western Negev: https://www.facebook.com/negevfuture.

3 Reut Reimerman and Tova Tsimuki, "Lieberman: 'In the Next Conflict, We Don't Stop until the Other Side Raises a White Flag'," *ynet*, January 24, 2017, https://bit.ly/2Hw4vRp [Hebrew].

4 See, e.g., Government Decision no. 2017: The Long-Term Strategic Plan for the Development of Sderot and the Gaza Envelope Settlements, September 21, 2014, https://bit.ly/2I3CGNs [Hebrew].

5 See the Kibbutz Industry Association, Highlights of the Government Decisions on the Gaza Envelope, Sderot and the South – Summary Table, https://bit.ly/2r3XaP0 [Hebrew].

6 Meir Elran and Eran Yashiv, "The Real Victory is Social and National Resilience," *The Marker*, August 17, 2014, https://it.ly/2HD8JD6 [Hebrew].

7 In an interview on January 2, 2017.
8 Knesset Information and Research Center, *The Year of Protective Edge – Demographic Growth in the Settlements of the South and the Relevant Government Decisions*, July 6, 2015, https://bit.ly/2JzTFGV [Hebrew].
9 In an interview on January 2, 2017.
10 See, for example, the Supreme Court rulings 8397/06 and 8619/06, http://bit.ly/2rc5Frp [Hebrew].
11 Yonatan Shaham and Meir Elran, "Evacuation of Israeli Communities during an Emergency: Dilemmas and Proposed Solutions," *Strategic Assessment* 19, no. 3 (2016): 45-57, http://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/adkan19-3ENG_3_Shaham%20and%20Elran.pdf.
12 Tomer Simon, "My House Is (No Longer) My Castle – On Evacuation of the Population in an Emergency in Israel," website of the Promotion of Awareness and Readiness for Emergency Situations, January 1, 2017, https://bit.ly/2FpfgPH [Hebrew]. The article includes a list of settlements that were evacuated in Israel's history.
13 Nurit Cohen-Levinovsky, "There's No Shame in Evacuating Settlements," *Haaretz*, August 25, 2014, https://bit.ly/2HBX0IL [Hebrew]. Cohen-Levinovsky's book, *Jewish Refugees in the War of Independence*, was published by Am Oved in 2014.
14 Nitzan Shor, "From 'Safe Distance' to 'Self-Defense Company': This Is How the Southern Command Is Protecting Citizens on the Home Front," IDF website, https://bit.ly/2HVEc6N [Hebrew].
15 Matan Tzuri, "The Barrier on the Gaza Border Will Cost NIS 3.34 Billion," *ynet*, January 9, 2017, https://bit.ly/2HbJHKN [Hebrew].
16 Yoav Zitun, "Senior Official in the Ministry of Defense: The Level of Preparedness of the Israeli Home Front – A Score of Mediocracy," *ynet*, May 29, 2016, https://bit.lly/2HzWtXI [Hebrew].
17 Yoav Limor, "Iron Dome Has Put the Home Front to Sleep," Yoel Strick, outgoing commander of the HFC, in a farewell interview with *Israel Today*, February 9, 2017, https://bit.ly/2jhSuAt [Hebrew].

Notes to Chapter 6, Recommendations to Promote Societal Resilience in Israel

1 Daniel P. Aldrich, Michelle A. Meyer, "Social Capital and Community Resilience," *American Behavioral Scientist* 59, no. 2 (2015): 254-69, https://bit.ly/2HAyrrK.
2 Shai Ben Yosef, "On Connectedness, Social Capital and Social Resilience," Shahaf Fund – A Philanthropic Partnership for Promoting Young Mission-Driven Communities in Israel," June 11, 2014, https://bit.ly/2r7wUmO.
3 Leonard J. Marcus, Isaac Ashkenazi, Barry C. Dorn, and Joseph Henderson, *The Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership* (Cambridge, MA: National Preparedness Leadership Initiative, Harvard School of Public Health and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2007), pp. 1-41, https://bit.ly/2jjzS35.

4 A "toxic leader" identifies anxieties, barriers and desires that people are unaware of and creates for himself an image of savior. The people are thus motivated to support him without being able to judge him in a rational manner. For further narration of "toxic leadership," see Jean Lipman-Blumen, *The Allure of Toxic Leaders: Why We Follow Destructive Bosses and Corrupt Politicians – And How We Can Survive Them* (Oxford University Press, 2006).
5 Robert D. Putnam, Lewis M. Feldstein and Donald J. Cohen, *Better Together: Restoring the American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).
6 Shai Ben Yosef, Moshe Brender, Amir Reisman and Adi Tov, *Community Resilience in the First Circle Institutions – A Review of the Literature*, Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services, November 2015, https://bit.ly/2wakjV0 [Hebrew].
7 Orit Nutman-Schwartz, "Living in the Shadow of Qassam Rockets," *Dorot* (2009), https://bit.ly/2rdCVNW [Hebrew].
8 Mark Galkopf, *Community Intervention in a Period of Emergency* (Haifa: Department for Community Mental Health, Haifa University), https://bit.lly/2rf0CpT [Hebrew].
9 Netanel Laor et al., *Resilience – The Day After*, Cohen and Harris Resilience Center, https://bit.ly/2IuLwXo [Hebrew].
10 According to a local resident: "People can't pay anymore for a hotel or some other accommodation outside the settlement; so they return to their pillow, their bed, to their Qassam." It is presently more hopeful in the Gaza Envelope that the costs of evacuation during a future conflict will be borne by the government.
11 Sapir Barometer 2016, https://bit.ly/2wcJWUY [Hebrew].
12 Meir Elran and Carmit Padan, "An Assault on Urban Areas: A Revised Reference Scenario for the Civilian Front in Israel," *INSS Strategic Assessment* 20, no. 2 (2017): 63-72, http://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/adkan19-3ENG_3_Shaham%20and%20Elran.pdf.
13 Dan Weinstock and Meir Elran, *Securing the Electricity System in Israel: Proposing a Grand Strategy* (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum 165, 2017), http://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/memo165.pdf.
14 Daniel Aldrich, *Building Resilience*. Ibid.
15 The Sapir Barometer (2016) indicates that among Sderot's residents there is a higher level of confidence in the national leadership, while the moshavim and particularly the kibbutzim have the lowest regard for the national leadership. This correlates with their political tendencies. There is particularly low trust in the national leadership among the "tunnel and mortars" settlements (as they define themselves). The trust in the IDF is monitored at a regional average of 3.92 and is quite similar in the all the communities irrespective of their proximity to the Gaza Strip.

Note to Conclusions

1 Meir Elran, *National Resilience in Israel: The Effects of the Second Intifada on Israeli Society* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum 81, 2006), https://bit.ly/2rogVkn [Hebrew].

Authors and Contributors

Daniel Aldrich is the head of the Security and Resilience Studies program and professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Northeastern University in the United States. Prof. Aldrich has published more than 45 scientific papers, as well as many opinion pieces which appeared in publications including *The New York Times*, CNN, and *The Washington Post*. Prof. Aldrich has likewise published four books: *Fist Fights* (2008); *Building Resilience* (2012); *Resilience and Recovery in Asian Disasters* (2014); *Healthy, Resilient and Sustainable Communities after Disasters* (2015). His fifth book, *Black Wave*, will be published in 2019. Prof. Aldrich heads the working group on disasters and crises at the American Political Science Association and is a member of the National Association of Science Writers.

Alex Altshuler heads the first research department at the Israel National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA). In this role, he is responsible for strategic development of research on national emergencies. Prior to joining NEMA, Dr. Altshuler was a Fulbright Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University; during his stay there, he was involved in the current research. Dr. Altshuler has received many awards and published dozens of research papers dealing with all aspects of emergency preparedness, from the individual, community, and organizational levels through to strategic preparedness in the national and international arenas.

Meir Elran is a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, where he heads the research projects on The Civilian Front, Army and Society and Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel. During his service in the IDF, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Elran served in the Directorate of Military Intelligence. His last position was deputy director of the DMI. Dr. Elran is the founder and head of the MA program on national security in the department of Public Policy at Sapir Academic College.

Carmit Padan is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies and a lecturer in Bar-Ilan University's special programs for IDF officers. She holds a PhD in Organizational Sociology from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Dr. Padan's research interests include social and national resilience, leadership, military leadership and civil-military relations. Dr. Padan is a member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Military-Society Researchers in Israel.

Yuval Tsur is a research fellow at the Dan Shomron Center for Society, Security and Peace, Kinneret College, and a lecturer in the Master's program in Counseling and Organizational Development at the College of Management. Lt. Col. (ret.) Tsur served as a researcher and organizational advisor in the Air Force. His doctoral thesis, from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, was on the integration of women into the Israeli Air Force pilot course. Dr. Tsur's areas of interest and teaching are military psychology and sociology, civil-military relations, organizational culture and gender, and positive psychology.

Jael Eskenazi-Zilcha is a research assistant on the Institute for National Security Studies' Civilian Front research team. Jael holds a Master's degree in Israel Studies, Society and Politics from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is currently a PhD student at the University of Haifa. The topic of Jael's PhD research project is "Migrant Integration: The Case of Sudanese and Eritreans in Israel."

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No. 188, February 2019, Carmit Padan and Meir Elran, *The "Gaza Envelope" Communities: A Case Study of Societal Resilience in Israel (2006–2016).*

No. 187, February 2019, Dan Meridor and Ron Eldadi, *Israel's National Security Doctrine: The Report of the Committee on the Formulation of the National Security Doctrine (Meridor Committee), Ten Years Later*.

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No. 176, June 2018, Udi Dekel and Kobi Michael, eds., *Scenarios in the Israeli-Palestinian Arena: Strategic Challenges and Possible Responses* [Hebrew].

No. 175, May 2018, Yotam Rosner and Adi Kantor, eds., *The European Union in a Time of Reversals: Challenges, Trends, and Significance for Israel* [Hebrew].

This memorandum presents a case study on societal resilience in Israel by exploring the experiences of six communities in the security-challenged Gaza Envelope: one city, four kibbutzim and one moshav. On the basis of this comprehensive analysis, important strategic recommendations can be proposed, including:

1. Residents' ability to determine the course of their own lives in emergency situations significantly affects their capacity to cope with the consequences of severe disruptions and to rapidly return to routine. A public self-sense of control during emergencies is found to enhance societal resilience at individual and communal levels.
2. The advancement of communal social capital and organizational resources during periods of relative calm will result in the community's increased societal resilience in periods of tension. Close public cooperation and social cohesion testify to empowered social networks, which constitute important support constructs during emergencies.
3. Evacuating communities in time of peril should be considered as a legitimate option. It does not impede societal resilience and should be prepared in advance with the vision of a rapid return home to normal and enhanced communal functionality. This pattern of conduct represents a high level of resilience.

Though the study centers on specific communities, its findings can be applied in a much broader context of natural and manmade emergencies and localities.

Carmit Padan is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies and a lecturer in Bar-Ilan University's special programs for IDF officers. She holds a PhD in Organizational Sociology from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Dr. Padan's research interests include social and national resilience, leadership, military leadership and civil-military relations. Dr. Padan is a member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Military-Society Researchers in Israel.

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