Accordingly, engaging these critiques directly is vital to demystifying the issues at stake. And illustrating what land swaps would actually look like is essential to countering those who would wrongly invoke straw-man accusations. In short, a Palestinian state resulting from the scenarios discussed in this report would be contiguous, not broken up into cantons (see the "Methodology" section of this chapter for a discussion of contiguity between Gaza and the West Bank). And the fact that most Israeli settlers are concentrated near the 1967 boundary means that even a minimal land swap would allow the great majority of them to remain in their homes while becoming part of Israel proper,[10] without interrupting West Bank contiguity. The exact number of settlers to remain in their current homes would depend on which map the parties chose.

CORE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLES

As stated previously, neither the author nor The Washington Institute takes any position on which principles should govern a land swap if Israel and the PA decide to pursue that option. Instead, this study is based on principles that the parties themselves have apparently discussed with each other, namely:

1. A land-swap ratio of 1:1
2. Israeli annexation of areas that are home to approximately 70%–80% of settlers
3. Israeli annexation of a minimal amount of land acquired in 1967
4. No Palestinian dislocation
5. Measures that satisfy Israeli security concerns
6. A contiguous Palestinian state in the West Bank.

These principles are the basis for the first three scenarios (corresponding to maps 1–3) discussed in the next chapter.[11]

Regarding the 1:1 principle, full Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory was the basis for the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979, the Jordan-Israel peace treaty of 1994, and Israeli negotiations with Syria, so it is not surprising that the Palestinians want the same formula applied to them. After the 1967 war, however, the drafters of the operational part of UN Security Council Resolution 242 removed a word suggesting that the parties return to the status quo ante as part of a peace agreement. Therefore, Israel feels no legal obligation to cede territories equal to the amount of land that came under its control during that war, a stance hardened by the fact that there was no Palestinian state at the time (the West Bank and east Jerusalem were controlled by Jordan). Yet for political reasons that go beyond legal requirements, Israel may decide that meeting Palestinian territorial demands may be the only way to achieve final resolution of the conflict. In that scenario, territorial exchange options based on a 1:1 ratio may help satisfy each party's political needs and allow them to reach a permanent peace deal.

The Palestinians' objective is less achievable if they stick to their position of past decades, namely, that Israel must relinquish the exact same territory it gained in 1967. At the 2000 Camp David summit, Yasser Arafat accepted the idea of land swaps as a way to reconcile ostensibly contradictory ideas: a return to the pre-1967 lines and the retention of most Israeli settlements under Israeli sovereignty. Abbas has publicly and repeatedly endorsed this position, with various caveats (e.g., the swaps should be minimal, and the land Israel provides should be of reasonable quality).

A major issue for Israel is minimizing the political pain and societal dislocation that would result from displacing settlers. No matter how one draws the map, a West Bank land swap would involve dislocation several times greater than that of the 2005 Gaza withdrawal, which was traumatic for many Israelis. Hence the second principle listed above: each of the first three map scenarios in this report proposes a swap that, while consistent with the 1:1 principle, would maximize the number of settlers in the land annexed to Israel. Indeed, tens of thousands of settlers could be spared dislocation even as the Palestinians establish a state equal in size to one drawn according to the pre-1967 lines. Specifically, the three maps show how Israel could annex lands holding a minimum of nearly 70% of the settlers or a maximum of 80%.

The third principle—minimizing the amount of land swapped—aims to ensure that the proposed exchanges are acceptable to both sides, and that swapped land is of reasonable quality.

The fourth principle is illustrated by the maps as well: that is, no Palestinian villages would be annexed to the Israeli side of the border under any of the scenarios proposed herein.

Needless to say, no territorial deal can be reached without agreement on security principles, since the two issues are closely intertwined. Israel must be certain that its territorial concessions will lead to security, not increased vulnerability. Accordingly, the fifth principle focuses on key factors affecting security, such as protecting Ben Gurion Airport by maintaining an Israeli buffer zone on the western edge of the 1967 boundary, and ensuring that the land proposed for Palestinian annexation in Chalutzah does not fall too close to the Israeli military base in Zeelim. Similarly, maps 1 and 2 show Israel retaining the road between Maale Adumim and Kfar Adumim, which some consider a potential security benefit because it would afford Israel better protection in the event of an attack from the east.

Although this report takes security arrangements into consideration, all parties should understand that the Israeli government could theoretically decide to compromise the other principles laid out here—most notably, maximizing the number of settlers in annexed land—for security concerns that are beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, not all security considerations necessarily bear on the area near the pre-1967 lines, which would be most affected by swaps. For instance, one major Israeli concern centers on the Jordan Valley area that forms the eastern frontier of a potential Palestinian state (along with a few "listening posts," or military early-warning stations). Netanyahu has been careful to emphasize that his interest in this area lies in averting Gaza-like smuggling via the eastern border. In a March 2010 speech delivered in Washington, he stated, "Experience has shown that only an Israeli presence on the ground can prevent weapons smuggling. This is why a peace agreement with the Palestinians must include an Israeli presence on the eastern border of a future Palestinian state. As peace with the Palestinians proves its durability over time, we can review security arrangements."[12] This declaration essentially concedes eventual sovereign Palestinian control over the entire Jordan Valley, given that Netanyahu is insisting only that the parties negotiate the terms of Israel's long-term presence along the eastern border. Such a concession—which would have been unthinkable under previous Likud governments—means that the territorial differences between the parties are now fundamentally resolvable.

The sixth principle addressed in this study involves maintaining the contiguity and flow of traffic in both Israel and the future Palestinian state. A prefatory note is in order here: many previous works have already outlined options for resolving the core issue of Jerusalem's future, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet as the Methodology section later in this chapter will elaborate, certain aspects of the Jerusalem issue would necessarily affect any West Bank territorial proposals.

Indeed, the contiguity issue is particularly complicated in the areas surrounding Jerusalem because settlements annexed to Israel will need to maintain a direct route to the city without precluding the contiguity of Palestinian north-south transportation or access to east Jerusalem. These traffic flows can be maintained with existing overpasses and tunnels, the construction of a few new roads, and a degree of creativity.

For example, maps 1–3 show potential Israeli annexation of Route 60 from Gush Etzion to Jerusalem so as not to obstruct the most direct driving route between the two areas. When crossing the Palestinian town of Beit Jala, Route 60 becomes a 900 meter tunnel. If Palestinians were to gain sovereignty over the land above the tunnel—with Israel retaining sovereignty over the tunnel itself—traffic from Gush Etzion to Jerusalem would not be affected, and Palestinians living on the east side of the road would still have access to towns on the west side (e.g., Husan) via an above-ground route. Likewise, Israeli annexation of Maale Adumim and Route 1 would require a Palestinian overpass to avoid disrupting south-north traffic from Bethlehem to Ramallah.

Again, discussing traffic flows in Jerusalem proper requires its own study, and many good ideas have already been published. In any scenario, several new roads would have to be built; the parties should discuss this fact clearly in any bridging proposal.

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE WITHIN A YEAR?

In the event that the parties resolve their differences over security and borders, they will be left with two courses of action. The first is to hope that the political traction gained via progress on those fronts would build momentum toward resolving the conflict's thornier narrative issues: Jerusalem and refugees. Because these issues cut to Israeli and Palestinian religious, historical, and emotional self-definition, resolving them will require extensive public conditioning before negotiations. Ideally, resolving the easier issues first would produce enough such conditioning to build public support for the necessary concessions on the tougher issues. Alternatively, the parties could decide to reach agreement on borders and security while deferring other core issues to a future date.

The current approach adopted by the parties seems to favor the former, more comprehensive approach. In their September 2010 White House meeting, Abbas and Netanyahu stated their commitment to reaching a framework agreement on all major issues within a year, believing that it would not take long to determine whether the conceptual differences were bridgeable. If negotiators are in fact able to close the gaps within that timeframe, the parties could then tackle the detailed, intensive task of writing a treaty. This commitment to the comprehensive approach offers more room for diplomatic tradeoffs to counterbalance painful concessions—that is, by expanding the number of issues on the table, the parties would have greater space to maneuver, making concessions on some issues in exchange for achievements on others. Even if they fail to reach a grand deal, the parties could fall back to a modest strategy, focusing on a more feasible security and borders deal instead. Their intentions in this regard will become apparent in the coming months.

LAND SWAP IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

Whichever peacemaking route the parties take, they will face many practical barriers if they decide to negotiate land swaps. The most obvious issue is Israel's clear unwillingness to cede additional territory to a Hamas-run Gaza as long as the group remains committed to Israel's destruction. More likely, lands adjacent to Gaza would be swapped only if Gaza reverted to PA control, or if Hamas accepted international criteria for becoming a legitimate negotiating partner—neither of which is likely as of this writing.

If Israel does not give Palestinians control over areas near Gaza, the PA may have trouble agreeing to recognize Israeli annexation of an equivalent amount of West Bank land. This issue is not paramount to the Israelis—in their view, short-term legal designations are less important than acknowledgments that a given area is slated to become part of Israel and is not under dispute. Abbas and President Barack Obama have both made clear publicly that once a border is demarcated, they would not object to Israeli construction in settlements that will fall within Israel. Therefore, even if land swaps are agreed to but not immediately completed, there should no longer be cause for controversy regarding Israeli construction in West Bank areas that are to remain in Israeli hands.

METHODOLOGY

Some notes on the data are required before turning to the study's detailed swap scenarios and conclusions. The baseline used for land calculations is approximately 6,195 sq km, or 2,392 sq mi—this is the amount of territory Israel occupied in the 1967 war, including the West Bank, Gaza, the northwest quarter of the Dead Sea, and all of the formerly Jordan-held part of Jerusalem (commonly, if inaccurately, referred to as east Jerusalem) except Mount Scopus. This figure excludes the Golan Heights, the Sinai Desert, and half of the 26 sq km "No Man's Land" where the 1949 armistice was applied.[13] (Although the *CIA World Factbook* includes all of No Man's Land in calculating the territory occupied by Israel in 1967, this area was never under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty; accordingly, this paper includes only half of No Man's Land in the baseline figure. And

while the maps propose that all of No Man's Land come under Israeli control, only half is counted in the figure for annexed land.)

Both the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and the number of Israeli Arabs living in the Triangle region (northwest of the West Bank in the Galilee; see maps 5 and 5a) are based on figures from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS). These figures are current for all settlements containing more than 2,000 residents as of September 30, 2009. For settlements with fewer than 2,000 residents, the latest ICBS data is from either 2007 or 2008, depending on the community in question. The population figures do not include unauthorized outposts, or areas where some Israelis have settled without formal permission from the Israeli cabinet. Although much has been written about the problems created by such outposts, the total number of illegal settlers appears to be around 1% of the total settler population.[14] In any event, both Israel and the PA appear to assume that such outposts would fall outside the settlement blocs incorporated by Israel in any territorial agreement.

Jewish residents of east Jerusalem are not included in the settler population calculations used for this study either. Israel does not refer to such residents as settlers, and the United States has left the issue ambiguous, referring to east Jerusalem construction as "housing." In terms of land, however, the total area calculated in this report is based on all the relevant territory occupied by Israel in the 1967 war, including Jerusalem. One could argue that it is inconsistent to count the land but not its residents. Therefore, the study includes a second set of potential calculations in which the Jewish residents of east Jerusalem are factored into the total number of Israelis living in swap areas outside the 1967 lines.[15] More important, however, readers should note that the total area of east Jerusalem is only 66 sq km, or 1.06% of the West Bank and Gaza. Therefore, whether or not this area is included in overall swap calculations does not appreciably change the numbers. (See the east Jerusalem map, which delineates the relevant neighborhoods.)

Finally, in calculating potential swaps, this study is guided by three elements articulated by one or both of the parties. First, although negotiators understand the importance of ensuring territorial contiguity for a future Palestinian state—a key principle in determining the swaps suggested herein—this does not currently include contiguity between Gaza and the West Bank. Accordingly, this study's calculations do not factor in a possible sunken-road or elevated highway corridor between the territories (sometimes referred to as "safe passage," a term used in the original Oslo Accords) because it is difficult to envision Israel yielding sovereignty over such a route due to security concerns. That is, if terrorists launched attacks from said corridor, Israel would likely close it down. These sovereignty concerns could also be heightened by perceptions that the corridor would, at least symbolically, cut Israel in two. Yet the parties have discussed a variety of options for such a corridor, including sunken roads and tunnels. Any of these options would involve a relatively small amount of land, constituting only a fraction of 1% in any overall territorial calculations (e.g., a corridor from northern Gaza to the point on the 1967 line intersecting the West Bank town of Tarqumiya would be only 36 km long).

Second, the Palestinians have insisted that the land Israel cedes to them be equal in quality to the land Israel gains. It is not precisely clear what that formulation means to them; for the purposes of this study, "quality land" is assumed to mean land that is arable as well as useful for industrial purposes. Accordingly, none of the maps presented in this study envisions Israel ceding territory in the area southeast of the West Bank, an approach that has been suggested in other studies. Although geographically convenient, this land is composed of hard rock and is not arable.

Third, Gaza's greater population density compared to the West Bank should be factored into any swap. Specifically, in the scenarios outlined in this study, more of the land that might be ceded to the Palestinians is adjacent to Gaza than to the West Bank.

Three Land Swap Scenarios

ANY RESOLUTION TO the territorial component of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be based on both the Palestinians' desire for a contiguous state and Israel's desire to annex settlement blocs largely adjacent to the 1967 boundary. The 1:1 land swap scenarios outlined in this chapter would create a contiguous Palestinian area in the West Bank, limit the exchanges to a small amount of territory, maximize the number of settlers absorbed into Israel without dislocation, appear to satisfy Israeli security concerns, and guarantee that no Palestinians will be displaced. The aim of these scenarios is to provide reference points for policymakers grappling with the tradeoffs between demography and geography in the West Bank.

During the 2000 Camp David negotiations, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak called for Israeli annexations incorporating 80% of the settlers. As in 2000, the large majority of settlers continue to live in a minority of the settlements, and these blocs take up a small fraction of West Bank territory that is largely—but not exclusively—near the pre-1967 boundary. Many settlers moved to these blocs because they believed that they would still be in Israeli-controlled territory even in the event of partition. In other words, many of the settlers recognize in practice that partition may occur, even if most tend to hold hawkish views regarding such a development. A peace settlement would guarantee that they are living in Israel and not on land whose status is questioned internationally; without a territorial deal, their status will remain in limbo.

From the Israeli government's perspective, a massive withdrawal from the West Bank would be gut wrenching. No Israeli administration could evict a large majority of settlers—the prospects for social unrest would be too high, as presaged by the problems accompanying the much more modest Gaza disengagement in 2005 (see the "Comparison to Geneva" section that follows for more on that issue). But a territorial deal that allowed Israel to annex the most heavily populated settlements would make the political costs more bearable.

In addition, if 80% of the settlers were brought into the tent and accepted a land swap deal that allowed them to remain in their homes, the remaining settlers would be more likely to soften their opposition. That is, they could come to realize that resisting the most commonly proposed solutions (e.g., receiving compensation for their lost land) without the support of the full settler community would be politically difficult and could isolate them from the bulk of the Israeli population. Understanding that the settlers are not monolithic in their outlook or circumstances is central to finding a viable solution.

SCENARIO 1

The scenario presented in map 1 would allow Israel to annex lands holding 80.01% of the settlers. These "bloc settlers" are distributed among forty-three settlements; the remaining settlers live in seventy-seven communities defined herein as nonbloc settlements. Map 1 includes four areas that are likely to be the most contentious in any territorial negotiation: Ariel, the zone north of Ariel, the area north of Jerusalem (referred to here as Expanded Ofra/Bet El), and Kfar Adumim. Other areas included in this map are settlements that the Palestinians do not greatly contest, either because they are obviously adjacent to the 1967 lines or because they would meet clear Israeli security needs. This scenario involves Israel annexing all of the most-contested areas, so implementing it would require Israel to cede more land to Palestinians than other scenarios.

The city of Ariel is contentious because of its location: 17 km from the 1967 lines, which is significantly farther than blocs such as Maale Adumim (immediately east of Jerusalem) and the more populated parts of Gush Etzion (just south of Jerusalem). Yet Israelis will bargain hard for Ariel because of the more than 19,000 settlers residing there.[16] Additionally, more than 11,000 settlers live in the bloc north of Ariel.[17]

Like Ariel, Kfar Adumim is contentious because of how far it extends into the West Bank. Yet some—but

not all—Israeli security officials believe that annexing it is necessary for defending against potential attacks from the east.

The area north of Jerusalem includes two contentious settlements: Bet El and Ofra. Bet El holds biblical resonance and, along with Ofra, is home to the national settler movement leadership. This has led many to speculate that annexing these two large communities is pivotal to reaching an overall agreement on the settlements.

To achieve its 80% demographic objective, Israel would have to annex only 4.73% of the overall territory under consideration. This is a rather surprising finding, contradicting the popular assumption that Israel would have to incorporate far more territory in order to keep such a large percentage of settlers in their homes. In fact, this percentage of land is well within the range suggested in the Clinton Parameters of December 2000. It is also worth noting that if one raises this figure above 5%, identifying areas Israel could cede that are of equal quality to the lands it would gain becomes much more difficult.

In terms of population, this scenario would allow Israel to annex lands containing 239,246 settlers, or 80.01% of the total settlement population. The remaining 19.99% of the settlers (59,782 people) are scattered throughout the remaining 95.27% of the relevant territory. Of course, the number of residents in annexed lands jumps to 428,457 if one includes the Jewish population of east Jerusalem. In that case, the portion of Jewish residents living outside the 1967 boundary who would be permitted to retain their homes and become part of Israel proper would increase to 87.76%.

Regarding the territory Israel would cede under this scenario, map 1 shows six potential land swap areas totaling 293.1 sq km: one northeast of the West Bank, one northwest of the West Bank, two on the southwestern edge of the West Bank, and two more adjacent to Gaza. This distribution is in line with the principle that more of the ceded land should be adjacent to Gaza than to the West Bank, as discussed previously. Moreover, all of the areas are potentially arable—indeed, one of this study's novel findings is that the parties could further reduce the number of dislocated settlers by considering viable land swap areas beyond those discussed to date. Two such areas are the excellent farmlands northeast of the West Bank and the unpopulated zone southeast of Gaza, referred to herein as northern Chalutzah. The area adjacent to Chalutzah is already irrigated, and there is no reason why Chalutzah itself could not be irrigated as well. The area could also serve as an industrial site rather than farmland. After all, more Gazans are currently employed by industry than agriculture; according to a 2006 census, 18% of the territory's 267,000 residents work in industry, compared to 12% in agriculture.

SCENARIO 2

In this scenario, Israel would not annex Ofra or Bet El, or even some of the smaller settlements in that area. As a result, the number of settlers in annexed lands would be around 73.31% of the total settlement population, including those in and north of Ariel. As shown in map 2, Israel would annex thirty-eight settlements, leaving eighty-two outside its jurisdiction.

Compared to scenario 1, the number of settlers permitted to remain in their homes while becoming part of Israel proper would decrease from 239,246 to 219,223. These settlers currently live on 4.31% of the total land under consideration; accordingly, the amount of territory Israel would be required to cede in return would drop to 267.0 sq km. Meanwhile, the number of settlers whose lands would be left outside Israel would increase to 79,805.

These figures change sharply if one includes the Jewish residents of east Jerusalem in the calculations. In that case, the number of people in the lands that would be annexed jumps to 408,434, or 83.65% of Israelis currently living outside the 1967 lines.

SCENARIO 3

In this scenario, Israel would not annex the settlements in Expanded Ofra/Bet El, the bloc north of Ariel, or the contentious Kfar Adumim, which collectively hold 34,444 people. As a result, the proportion of settlers in annexed lands would be around 68.49%, including Ariel. Israel would annex thirty-two settlements in all, leaving eighty-eight outside its jurisdiction (see map 3).

Compared to scenario 2, the number of settlers permitted to remain in their homes while becoming part of Israel proper would decrease from 219,223 to 204,802. These settlers currently live on 3.72% of the total land under consideration; accordingly, the amount of territory Israel would be required to cede in return would drop to 230.2 sq km. Meanwhile, the number of settlers whose lands would be left outside Israel would increase to 94,226.

If Jewish residents of east Jerusalem are included, the number of people on the lands that would be annexed jumps to 394,013, or 80.70% of Israelis currently living outside the 1967 lines.

A FOURTH SCENARIO?

The three scenarios outlined above seem to have the best chance of being accepted by both parties. Yet other scenarios could be put forward as well. For example, one could propose an iteration of the maximalist scenario with the addition of Kiryat Arba, located on the outskirts of Hebron. (Religious access to Hebron's Tomb of the Patriarchs, which both Judaism and Islam consider the burial place of biblical Abraham and other patriarchs and matriarchs, may be one of the thorniest nonterritorial issues.) According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, this community is home to 7,100 settlers, making it by far the largest nonbloc settlement not included in map 1. A fourth scenario could allow access to Kiryat Arba via an Israeli-annexed route that would begin southeast of the West Bank and avoid Israeli annexation of any Palestinian villages.[18]

COMPARISON TO GENEVA

Each of the first three maps would entail a much larger land swap than envisioned in the 2003 Geneva discussions conducted by private Israeli and Palestinian citizens—individuals who had served in previous administrations but whose views often varied from those of the two governments (see map 4).[19] The Geneva Initiative's smaller swap proposal would have allowed only 166,429 settlers—barely more than half of the total settlement population—to remain in their current homes and be annexed into Israel. This would have required uprooting 132,599 settlers—a full 38,373 more than the number called for in map 3, and 72,817 more than in map 1.

To put these numbers in context, the entire 2005 Gaza disengagement required Israel to move only 8,000 settlers, a process that convulsed the country for months. Even now, several years later, many of the settlers are still living in temporary housing and have not received all of the promised government compensation. Proposals modeled on the Geneva approach of uprooting much larger numbers of settlers could prompt serious social unrest in Israel, in addition to giving far fewer settlers a stake in supporting a peace agreement. In short, compared to the dislocation suggested by other plans, any of the scenarios outlined in this study could drastically decrease Israel's societal turmoil while maintaining the same 1:1 land swap ratio that characterized the Geneva exercise.

VOTING PATTERNS

As discussed previously, the scenarios outlined in maps 1–3 are aimed in part at minimizing the pain for Israeli decisionmakers, thereby making a solution more likely. Interestingly, recent voting behavior indicates that the bloc settlers who would be annexed under these scenarios may be amenable to such land swaps. In fact, the correlation between where the settlers live and how they vote is remarkably strong. In the 2009 Knesset election, for example, bloc settlers felt comfortable voting for the Likud Party and its presumptive prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, largely shunning the more radical National Union (NU) settlement party, which opposes any form of territorial partition with the Palestinians. In contrast, nonbloc settlers clearly did not believe that Netanyahu would represent their interests.

According to published electoral figures, approximately 26,451 of the 94,477 bloc settlers who voted in 2009 chose Likud.[20] The second-most popular choice was NU, which received less than half as many votes in the forty-three bloc settlements (12,972). This contrasts sharply with voting patterns in the seventy-seven nonbloc settlements, where NU received approximately twice the number of votes as the second-place Likud (a margin of 10,886 to 5,016). In other words, the Israeli electoral map in the West Bank essentially

presages the West Bank territorial map. That the bloc settlers voted for Netanyahu while the nonbloc settlers voted for NU reflects the latter's resistance to territorial swaps. One could debate the bloc settlers' intentions in choosing Netanyahu, of course. Perhaps they believed that voting for him would achieve the same result as voting for NU (i.e., continued opposition to partition), but with more finesse. Or perhaps they wanted to ensure that any partition would protect their interests. In either case, most of the nonbloc settlers apparently did not wish to gamble on Netanyahu's intentions.

In addition, the total number of nonbloc voters raises a noteworthy demographic point. Just 24,794 of the nonbloc settlements' 59,782 residents voted. Since settlers are generally believed to vote in high numbers, this tally indicates that the number of adults in those settlements might be low. In other words, if most of the adult population voted, then more than half of the nonbloc settlers could be children—an assumption strongly supported by anecdotal evidence.

FATE OF NONBLOC SETTLERS

Theoretically, the parties could pursue an alternative scenario in which nonbloc settlers are not displaced at all, but rather remain where they are under Palestinian sovereignty. On paper, this approach has surface appeal because it would eliminate the need for coercive dislocation. Perhaps the two sides will agree on such an approach, but there are several reasons to be skeptical of such an eventuality.

First, virtually all of the 300,000 settlers in the West Bank moved there not to live under Palestinian sovereignty, but rather to live under Israeli control. More likely than not, only a small fraction of them would choose to remain in lands ceded to the Palestinians, resulting in major dislocation regardless of whether it was imposed by the state.

Second, for the small number who chose to remain in a Palestinian-run West Bank, it is unclear whether they could live there harmoniously. For example, they would likely lose all of their social services (e.g., free schools, health care). Moreover, the Palestinians view settlers as the people who stole their land. Assuming the Palestinian Authority permitted settlers to remain in their homes, it is far from certain that they would be able to keep their land, let alone own it.

Third, once Israel withdraws its military forces from nonannexed portions of the West Bank, Hamas elements and other extremists could decide to take advantage of the situation and settle longstanding scores with remaining settlers. The settlers would in turn seek to defend themselves, resulting in potentially grave escalation and perhaps forcing Israel to return to the areas from which it had withdrawn. Some have even speculated that the most hardline settlers could initiate a confrontation that forces the Israeli military to return and demonstrates that the PA is unwilling or unable to provide proper protection against extremists.

For these and other reasons, allowing nonbloc settlers to remain in the West Bank might complicate the implementation of any peace agreement. Accordingly, the parties must consider the fate of these settlers very carefully.

In planning a smooth relocation of nonbloc settlers, creative thinking would be necessary to avoid the problems that followed the 2005 Gaza disengagement, many of which stemmed from a lack of sufficient Israeli governmental planning. A U.S.-Israel panel devoted to this key issue would be extremely helpful in determining how to avoid potential problems. One idea that has gained broad support inside Israel is offering increased compensation to nonbloc settlers who agree to relocate voluntarily, thus reducing the scope of forced evacuations.

LAND SWAPS IN THE GALILEE?

Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman has proposed another, more controversial type of land swap. According to his Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) Party, any swaps should involve people, not just land; that is, Israel should give the Palestinians both the land and the people who inhabit it. During a September 28, 2010, UN General Assembly speech, he argued that "the guiding principle for a final status agreement must not be land-for-peace but rather, exchange of populated territory. Let me be very clear:

I am not speaking about moving populations, but rather about moving borders to better reflect demographic realities."[21]

Lieberman's plan centers on the Triangle (see maps 5 and 5a). The idea has led to charges of racism against him because it would change the borders in a manner that pushes Israeli Arab citizens out of Israel. The mayor of Umm Al-Fahm, the largest Israeli Arab city, has declared that he would petition the Israeli Supreme Court to avoid any such denaturalizing, which he considers highly immoral.

Even if one sets aside moral issues, there is considerable debate as to whether Lieberman's plan would have its intended effect of significantly altering the ratio of Jews to Arabs inside Israel. According to an August 2010 Central Bureau of Statistics report, Israel is currently home to 1,555,700 Arabs.[22] This figure includes 263,500 Arabs living in east Jerusalem, most of whom are not Israeli citizens.[23] A Triangle land swap—which would encompass only Arab towns in the area, not Israeli towns—would affect approximately 218,865 Arabs,[24] or 14.07% of the Israeli Arab population and 2.87% of Israel's total population. Viewed another way, the Arab percentage of Israel's total population would decrease from 20.40% to 18.04%. And Israel's Jewish-to-Arab ratio would change from 3.7:1 to 4.3:1.

If east Jerusalem Arabs were included in such a swap, Lieberman's plan would affect 482,365 people, and the Arab percentage of Israel's total population would decrease from 20.40% to 15.02%, with two-thirds of Israel's Arab population intact. Some would view this as a major decrease, while others would argue that it is not an appreciable change to the demographic landscape.[25]

SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to demystify the territorial dimension of Israeli settlements in order to facilitate peacemaking. As discussed previously, analyzing the intersection of demography and geography shows that the parties could feasibly implement a land swap that meets six key goals:

1. A 1:1 land swap ratio
2. Israeli annexation of areas that are home to approximately 70%–80% of settlers
3. Israeli annexation of a minimal amount of land acquired in 1967
4. No Palestinian dislocation
5. Measures that satisfy Israeli security concerns
6. A contiguous Palestinian state in the West Bank.

Even the smallest swap proposed in this study—scenario 3, which calls for the exchange of roughly 3.72% of the total land under consideration—would allow Israel to annex territory containing nearly 70% of the settlers. Such territorial options have been facilitated in no small part by Netanyahu's concession regarding the future of the Jordan Valley.

Of course, Israelis and Palestinians must decide whether they are interested in land swaps and, if so, what principles will guide their negotiations toward that end. Outside parties cannot shoulder the responsibility of proposing such principles. They can, however, illuminate the ground on which the two parties stand. Specifically, the Palestinians could gain the equivalent of 100% of the land Israel acquired in 1967, while Israel could annex the relatively small portions of the West Bank that contain a large majority of the settlers. Careful analysis of the realities on the ground and the maps in this study shows that these two objectives are reconcilable if the parties choose to make them so.