

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES



Demilitarization – Preventing Military and Terrorist Threats

*From Within and By Way
of the Palestinian Territories*
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STRATEGIC

Demilitarization – Preventing Military and Terrorist Threats From Within and By Way of the Palestinian Territories

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P E R S P E C T I V E S

- The Israeli demand for demilitarization of the Palestinian entity has been in effect since the 1993 Declaration of Principles, which served as the basis for the Oslo process and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. It is not reasonable for Israel to accept any agreement that involves a worsening of its security situation or that puts its citizens at permanent peril. Nor can it tolerate living alongside an entity honing its terrorist infrastructure and hosting hostile military forces.
- Israel's current military freedom of operation in the West Bank, which enables the IDF to reach every place where prohibited arms are manufactured or hidden, has thus far prevented terrorists there from being able to manufacture rockets and launch them at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It has also enabled the IDF to intercept suicide bombers before they are able to carry out their malicious missions.
- Israel can anticipate two main potential scenarios which are liable to unfold in the wake of the establishment of a Palestinian state. The first involves threats to Israel from within a failed Palestinian state that serves as a base for terrorist infrastructures, as happened in Gaza. The second involves threats to Israel from the east, via Palestinian territory.
- In Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to date, the heads of the PLO and the PA have refused to agree to a definition of a Palestinian state that would be demilitarized. They claim the right to have high-trajectory weapons (mortars), anti-tank missiles (RPGs), and armored vehicles equipped with machine guns, among other things, in order to be the dominant security force in their territory, with the ability to protect the central government and the borders of the Palestinian state.

- At the Camp David summit in 2000, initiated by Bill Clinton, the U.S. president tried to soften the term “demilitarization” by using a new word not recognized in international law – “nonmilitarization” – but the Palestinian side did not agree to this term either.
- Israel’s definition of demilitarization is that no security threat – whether symmetrical, asymmetrical, military, or terrorist – develop either within or by way of Palestinian territory, and that no Palestinian army or military capabilities will be established which could constitute a threat to Israel. The territorial and security dimensions are interdependent. The more territory that is transferred to the Palestinian side, the greater the Israeli demand for stronger security arrangements.

Background

The Israeli demand for demilitarization of the Palestinian entity has been in effect since the 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP), which served as the basis for the Oslo process and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA). However, the term “demilitarization,” as it is commonly understood, does not sufficiently cover the full range of Israel’s security needs. These include preventing the development of symmetrical and asymmetrical military threats against Israel – including terrorism and guerilla warfare – from and via the territory of the PA and the future Palestinian state. Demilitarization, then, is a means to safeguarding Israel’s security, not an end in itself.

The Israeli public cannot support an agreement which results in an increased security risk to its home front. Israel chose the path of peace for many reasons, among them peace, quiet, stability, and prosperity for its citizens. **It is not reasonable, then, for Israel to accept any agreement that involves a worsening of its security situation,** certainly not one that puts its citizens at permanent peril and disrupts their daily lives. Nor can it tolerate living alongside an entity honing its terrorist infrastructure and hosting hostile military forces.

The Security Challenges

Looking ahead, Israel can anticipate two main potential scenarios which are liable to unfold in the wake of the establishment of a Palestinian state, and in light of prevailing trends in the Middle East:

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- The first involves **threats to Israel from within the Palestinian state**. According to this scenario, the state-in-formation will be a failed one, and serve as a convenient base for the creation and development of terrorist infrastructures – which combine symmetrical and asymmetrical military capabilities – as happened in the Gaza Strip.

Such a situation would pose a permanent and ongoing challenge for Israel, which would frequently be attacked by terror squads penetrating the border, or by high-trajectory rockets and missiles launched into its heartland. This would lead to repeated confrontations of varying intensity, making it extremely difficult for Israelis to go about their daily lives, and severely hindering the implementation of peace agreements.

- The second involves **threats to Israel emanating from the eastern arena**, via Palestinian territory. This scenario is broader than the first, as it encompasses the entire region.

One worrisome trend across the Middle East is radicalization. On the verge of Iran’s acquiring nuclear capabilities – while serving as an “umbrella” for radical groups it operates as proxies – Iran will take advantage of its nuclear image to realize its ambitions for regional hegemony. To accomplish this, Iran might try to take control of Iraq – through its Shi’ite majority – following the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The consolidation

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of a radical, Iran-led Shi'ite axis that includes Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon would be likely to destabilize Jordan, and thus challenge Israel militarily from the eastern front. This could take the form of aerial attacks, surface-to-surface missiles, the deployment of military and/or paramilitary forces, and/or the use of proxies – via the Palestinian state. (This would certainly happen if the Palestinian state is taken over by Hamas.) In such a scenario, Israel would be forced to contend with incessant attacks, and would have great difficulty creating a secure environment for its citizens.

The ability to anticipate future hurdles comes in large part from past experience. Indeed, since the signing of the DOP between the Israeli government and the PLO in 1993, which started the peace process, much has been learned from the events on the ground. The following is an overview of these lessons:

- During the years when the Oslo Accord and interim agreement were supposed to be implemented, the PLO failed to prevent terrorists from manufacturing and smuggling arms into the Palestinian territories. It even equipped itself (through local manufacturing and smuggling) with weapons that were prohibited in those agreements. In fact, on the day that Arafat entered Gaza for the first time, he took advantage of the opportunity to smuggle such weapons – as well as hide terror operatives – among his entourage, coming in from Egypt.
- While past agreements stipulated that the Palestinians would only be allowed to operate internal security forces such as police, with no military characteristics whatsoever, the PLO gave its national security apparatus all the trappings of an army (i.e., organizational structure, operational functions, unit names, ranks, etc.), and expanded it well beyond what had been agreed upon. Hamas, too, after taking control of Gaza, established openly military frameworks, with regional brigades, armed like military forces and functioning as part of the movement's military wing.
- The terrorist onslaught on innocent Israeli citizens waged by the Palestinians in the fall of 2000 (referred to by them as the "Al-Aksa intifada") heightened Israel's demand to prevent military and terrorist capabilities from developing in the area controlled by the PLO – and from the future Palestinian state.

- Throughout the years since the signing of the accords, terrorist organizations and PLO security forces attempted to smuggle arms and military manufacturing expertise from Egypt into Gaza via the Philadelphi Corridor, and from Gaza into the West Bank (at times even doing this through the use of Palestinians crossing into Israel to receive medical treatment). Only Israeli control of – and careful inspections at – the crossings have prevented such arms from flowing into the West Bank from Gaza.
- Israel's military freedom of operation in the West Bank, which enables the IDF to reach every place where prohibited arms are manufactured or hidden, has thus far prevented terrorists there from being able to manufacture rockets and launch them at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It has also enabled the IDF to intercept suicide bombers before they are able to carry out their malicious missions.

Confronting Terrorist and Military Threats

A threat exists when hostile intentions are matched with aggressive capabilities. After many years of contending with terrorism, one crucial lesson Israel has learned is that it is virtually impossible to alter those hostile intentions; the aggressive capabilities, therefore, must be neutralized. Thus, Israel has adopted the approach of maintaining a relentless effort to disarm the terrorist infrastructures within and along its borders. This endeavor necessitates high-quality, precise military intelligence and full freedom of operation, which includes the ability to enter Palestinian city-centers and villages to locate and destroy bomb-producing laboratories, lathes for the manufacture of rockets and other weapons, arms and ammunition caches, while arresting perpetrators and intercepting suicide bombers before and on the way to committing suicide attacks against innocent Israeli civilians. This is the situation regarding what are called “asymmetrical” threats by terrorist groups.

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With regard to “symmetrical” threats involving regular military forces, Israel cannot ignore past events in the region. These include attempts on the part of the Syrian and Iraqi armies to take control of Jordan and to use it as a platform from which to attack Israel, even without the consent of the Hashemite Kingdom. The risk of a radical Shi'ite axis from Iran via Iraq and Syria to Lebanon – and a uniting of forces – is liable to pose a concrete military threat from the east, while seeking to use Palestinian territory for access to Israel's home front.

Equally important is the strict demand that the Palestinians do not sign military or strategic pacts with Israel's enemies or with those entities that do not recognize its existence.

Thus, any agreement between Israel and the Palestinians has to guarantee that a Palestinian state will not allow the development of a terrorist entity – with symmetrical and asymmetrical military capabilities – that could attack Israel at any time. Nor can it permit any terrorist activity and/or deployment of foreign military forces there for the purpose of attacking Israel. Equally important is the strict demand that the Palestinians do not develop significant military capabilities under the auspices – or in the territory – of a third party, nor sign military or strategic pacts with Israel's enemies or with those entities that do not recognize its existence.

Understandings and Disagreements that Have Become Clear in Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations to Date

Over the years, understandings have been reached regarding the purpose of the Palestinian security forces, as envisioned by Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas – **“One authority, one law and one weapon.”** These forces are tasked with internal policing responsibilities, which include: establishing law and order; preventing terrorism and violence; dismantling terror infrastructures; disarming armed groups; and securing borders to prevent smuggling of weapons and infiltration of terrorists.

However, given the security challenge these forces pose to Israel, the heads of the PLO and the PA have so far refused to agree to a definition of a Palestinian state that would be demilitarized. In discussions, PA representatives said they would agree to having “limited arms.” For example, they agreed not to acquire combat planes or tanks (known in military terms as heavy weaponry). But the PA still claims the right to have high-trajectory weapons (mortars), anti-tank missiles (RPGs), and armored vehicles equipped with machine guns, among other things.

The Palestinians have explained that they need these weapons in order to be the dominant security force in their territory, with the ability to protect the central government. They have also pointed to their right as a sovereign state to have a military force, at least for self-defense, to secure borders from external threats, and to dismantle armed militias, which pose an internal threat.

At the Camp David summit in 2000, initiated by President Bill Clinton to determine the parameters of a permanent-status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, the U.S. president tried to soften the term “demilitarization” by using a new word not recognized in international law – “nonmilitarization” – but the Palestinian side did not agree to this term either.

Defining to what extent a Palestinian state should be limited in its military capabilities is one essential issue in which the two sides have had difficulty in bridging their differences. Other such key security-related disagreements include:

- Special security arrangements in the Jordan Valley (up to and including the Allon Road) to prevent arms smuggling and terrorist infiltration (of the kind that occurs in the Philadelphi Corridor along the Egypt-Gaza border); and guarantees to enable an Israeli operational response to a military threat from the east, so that any force that crosses the Jordan River and enters the Palestinian state will be stopped before it reaches the central mountain ridge of the West Bank and Israel's capital, Jerusalem.
- A unified airspace, controlled by Israel, to prevent aerial terrorism and aerial military attacks on Israel.
- Control of the sea off the coast of Gaza, including the Gaza port, when built, to prevent weapons smuggling into Gaza and attacks from the sea against Israel.

The Principles of Israel's Position on Demilitarization

Israel views the term "demilitarization" as encompassing a wider definition than is normally accepted or spelled out in international law – since the common term does not take into account the changing nature of military conflicts and threats. According to Israel's definition, demilitarization is a means to an end: that **no security threat – whether symmetrical, asymmetrical, military, terrorist, or any other disruption to daily life in Israel – develop or come to fruition either within or by way of Palestinian territory.**

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The Military Dimension

For Israel, demilitarization means that no Palestinian army or military capabilities will be established which could constitute a threat to Israel. The following is required to ensure this concept of demilitarization:

- The maintenance of police and internal security frameworks, not military ones or those with obvious military characteristics.
- The possession of weapons that are specified in the agreement as permissible, whose purpose is for internal security and policing alone.
- An absence of military pacts or cooperation between Palestinian security forces and foreign armies. This includes having no foreign military or other armed group in the territory of the Palestinian state.
- A commitment that no military forces of the Palestinian state will be kept outside of the state, as such forces have the potential to operate against Israel during emergencies and other unforeseen situations.

- An absence of military infrastructures, such as defense industries; and supervision of the manufacture of dual-use components supposedly not intended for military purposes.
- Effective control, supervision, inspection and verification of the security perimeter along the borders and international border crossings to prevent the smuggling of prohibited arms and dual-use materials.
- An effective apparatus for supervision and verification, which relies on international observers whose role it is to ensure that the Palestinian side lives up to its demilitarization commitments.

The Terrorism Dimension

No threats from the Palestinian state and/or through it can be allowed to develop or be realized, and it is first and foremost the duty of the Palestinian state to prevent terrorist activities and the creation of terrorist infrastructures inside its borders. The following is required to guarantee this:

- The Palestinian police and other security forces must engage in “ground up” security force building: This includes guaranteeing internal security – law and order, terror prevention, dismantling of terrorist infrastructures, dismantling of armed militias, and preventing the smuggling of arms and the infiltration of terrorists.¹
- Prevention of armed or ideological interference in the correct workings of the Palestinian state on the part of radical extremists and opponents of peace, particularly with regard to the abetting of extremists, terrorist organizations, and armed groups, as well as attempts to disrupt the Palestinian government’s activities, structure, and ability to govern.
- Prevention of incitement to terrorism and building a “culture of peace.” This will entail forming joint structures for the prevention of incitement in media and indoctrination in other state institutions; neutralizing all channels of support for terrorist organizations (such as the transfer of funds and activities conducted by associations funded by extremists disguised as organizations established to help the needy); and eliminating school curricula that encourage violence, martyrdom and suicide. This will also require a commitment on the part of the Palestinian state to prevent hostile sermons in mosques and other religious and cultural institutions.

A supervision and verification apparatus must be established and tasked with monitoring and assuring that the Palestinian side lives up to its commitment to prevent terrorism and the formation of terrorist infrastructures.

Over the course of time, the level and intensity of the IDF presence in the territory of the Palestinian state will be reduced, according to the performance of the Palestinian security forces.

- There must be cooperation between Israel and Palestinian security forces in the areas of military intelligence and operations to obstruct terrorism and prevent the establishment of terrorist infrastructures inside the Palestinian state.
- A supervision and verification apparatus must be established and tasked with monitoring and ensuring that the Palestinian side lives up to its commitment to prevent terrorism and the formation of terrorist infrastructures. International monitors can be incorporated into this effort to assist the Palestinian security forces to build the necessary internal security capabilities – even mentoring Palestinian security forces in executing operations in the field.

The Implementation of Demilitarization

The approach to achieving the strategic objective of preventing the development of threats to Israel from a Palestinian state will require a number of “**performance cycles**.” the performance of the Palestinian security forces.

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The **first cycle** includes demilitarization and security arrangements: limiting the ability of the Palestinian state to form an army, and limiting the weapons of the Palestinian security forces. Here, demilitarization takes on a broader definition, to include the prevention of terrorism and a ban on terrorist infrastructures in the Palestinian state. These security arrangements must not hamper Israel’s self-defense capabilities to react to potential threats posed by and emanating from the Palestinian state.

The **second cycle** includes implementation arrangements that rely on the involvement of international monitors, preferably led by the Americans, which will ensure and oversee that all clauses of the security agreements are met, while simultaneously providing assistance to the Palestinian security forces in executing tasks related to internal security, terror prevention, and dismantling of terror infrastructures. The use of monitors should in no way detract from Israel preserving its own self-defense capabilities by means of the IDF.

The **third cycle** involves the guarantees and means of leverage for implementing the agreements. The purpose of international and inter-Arab guarantees, apparatuses and means of leverage is to ensure that the cost of the Palestinians’ not living up to their commitments in the agreements is higher than what they would gain by violating them.

Over the course of time, the level and intensity of the security arrangements' intrusion on the Palestinian side will be reduced, according to their performance. There is room for phasing in the implementation arrangements and, hence, lower the profile of Israel's security activity and thus reduce the IDF presence in the territory of the Palestinian state.

The implementation of this approach could proceed as follows:

In the first performance cycle, responsibility will be placed on the Palestinian state for preventing the emergence and actualization of threats against Israel, in the following framework:

The Obligations of the Palestinian State

- Limitations will be placed on arms and on their use by the police and security forces of the Palestinian state.
- Engaging in "ground-up" security-building that expands on the current "Dayton forces" concept of U.S. and Western-trained internal security forces. These forces must prove more capable of actively fighting and preventing terrorism, terror infrastructures, and terror-supporting activity without the current assistance of the IDF, which has been responsible for the vast majority of anti-terror operations in the West Bank. The order of forces and structure of units will be for the purpose of policing and internal security, not to suit military forces with military missions.
- Creating a "culture of peace" by enforcing the prohibition on educating school children to armed struggle and suicide, preaching armed struggle in mosques, and other incitement aimed at Israel from within the Palestinian state.

Security Arrangements

A Unified Airspace Controlled by Israel

A single, unified airspace will need to be controlled to a greater degree by Israel in order to prevent hostile military and terrorist aerial activity from the skies over the Palestinian state, or through it, aimed at Israel. In light of the limited time and space resources, it is not possible to divide the airspace over Israel and the West Bank, the width of which is a mere 60 km. (approximately). This unified airspace requires consolidated control, with greater responsibility on Israel due to its higher vulnerability to potential military threats, and its need to identify and intercept unidentified and hostile planes before they enter Israeli skies. Within this framework, an apparatus will be established for cooperation in civil aviation.

In the face of a possible military threat from the east, Israel must have the capability to stop foreign armies from crossing the Jordan River into the Palestinian state.

Special Security Arrangements in the Jordan Valley

Special security arrangements are required in the Jordan Valley in order to block terrorism, and prevent prohibited arms smuggling and terrorist infiltrations via the crossings and entire length of the border.

In the face of a possible military threat from the east, Israel must have the capability to stop foreign armies from crossing the Jordan River into the Palestinian state, and prevent a hostile foreign military takeover of the area of the eastern slopes of the central mountain ridge. The preferred alternative is Israeli security control, including the deployment of forces and means for detection and information-gathering in the Jordan Valley.

Proposals for deploying international forces would be risky for the State of Israel to adopt. (A full treatment of the question of international forces in an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Israel's past experience with international forces that were tasked with preventing weapons smuggling has been extremely disappointing, as in the case of UNIFIL in South Lebanon, which failed to prevent the rearmament of Hizbullah after the 2006 Second Lebanon War.) Another option entailing mixed control of the Jordan Valley by Israeli and international forces, coordinating with the Palestinians and Jordanians, would also pose security risks for Israel. In this scenario, the international forces would serve as a "tripwire" if attacked by forces from the east seeking to cross the Jordan River. However, if the international forces fail, the IDF would have the legitimacy to act against regional threats. Given the alternatives, an Israeli force deployment mentioned above is the most reliable option for defending the Jordan Valley.

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Additional Israeli Security Requirements

- Protection from attacks on international aviation at Ben-Gurion Airport, and preventing the interception of planes by anti-aircraft missiles fired from Palestinian territory during takeoff and landing.
- Supervision of the seas by Israel or an international naval task force to detain suspicious boats, prevent hostile activity and terrorism by sea, and block the smuggling of weaponry and prohibited materials into the Palestinian state. In the

event that a seaport is built in Gaza, there will have to be an effective supervision and inspection mechanism in place to prevent arms smuggling. The only way for effective inspection of goods and containers unloaded from ships is to have the port situated at sea rather than on the coastline, and for its operation to be handled by a third party suited to the task.

- Electromagnetic coordination for the prevention of mutual disruptions and jamming of Israeli radio, military, and civil communications. The future Palestinian state will be located topographically in an area that dominates Israel's strategic and civil home front – a situation which could enable the disruption of all wireless communication activity. Thus, there has to be coordination, with a joint body for distributing frequencies (and ranges), and the ability to immediately correct violations and enforce obligations. As Israel will be the more vulnerable of the two parties (topographically, technologically and security-wise) – certainly as compared with its situation today – it will be Israel that must have priority in the distribution of frequencies and ranges, as well as in the prevention of jamming and disturbances.
- Strategic sites for early-warning stations in the West Bank, to be used by Israel to provide it with sufficient time to respond to military and terrorist threats from the east. Israeli military positions deployed in areas of Palestinian political control are apt to be eroded over time – a consideration which must be taken into account by Israeli negotiators in the future.
- Special understandings and arrangements which enable emergency deployment and action by IDF troops against military and irregular forces infiltrating into the Palestinian state, in violation of the agreements. (Examples of such arrangements would include keeping strategic transportation axes clear and obstacle-free, and maintaining emergency deployment areas that are free of construction and other obstacles.)

In the second performance cycle, structures will be required that reflect the lessons learned over the years when the Palestinians did not adhere to previous bilateral agreements. There will be a need for the involvement of a third party for the inspection and verification of Palestinian implementation of their security obligations, and for Israeli deterrence (through public exposure and taking action) against Palestinian violations of the security arrangements. The structures for implementation should include:

- A structure for supervision and verification, based on international observers under American or other auspices, that will be agreed upon by the parties. Its task will be to ensure that the Palestinians uphold their obligations in the agreement; that they do not build military forces and capabilities; that they do not have prohibited weapons; that they fight terrorism; and that they act to dismantle terror infrastructures. This will require a team of professional supervisors, with freedom of movement and action, who are able to perform inspections any time they see fit – based on intelligence (from Israel, as well).

- Proper supervision and inspection at the international border crossings into the Palestinian state to prevent the smuggling of prohibited weapons and dual-purpose materials, infiltrations of terrorists, and the transfer of funds and other forms of aid to terrorist groups in the Palestinian state. This will require creating an effective mechanism, with the involvement of a third party committed to the task, and equipped accordingly with advanced inspection capabilities. For Israel, this means having monitoring capability to keep track of whether the crossings are being handled according to the agreements, and even to weigh intervention, if needed.
- Supervision of the external perimeter along the borders of the Palestinian state to prevent the smuggling of prohibited arms and materials, infiltrations of terrorists, and the crossing or infiltration of military and irregular forces hostile to Israel into the Palestinian state. This means having the involvement of an effective force with round-the-clock lookout capabilities to cover the entire length of the Palestinian state's external borders with Egypt and Jordan.

In the third performance cycle, international guarantees and means of leverage will be instated to spur the Palestinian side to meet its obligations in the agreement, and to provide Israel with guarantees in the event that the Palestinian side violates the security arrangements. For this, the following is required:

- International recognition of a security addendum to the agreement, and international sanctions against countries that violate the agreements by signing military pacts with the Palestinian state, or by training and providing equipment to Palestinian groups to enhance capabilities that are prohibited by the agreement.
- Guarantees on the part of the international and inter-Arab systems to fulfill Palestinian obligations and not to commit acts that endanger Israel's security.
- Making international aid to the Palestinian state conditional on its fulfilling its obligations in the agreement.
- International assistance to establish effective supervision and verification structures, alongside the training and education of Palestinian forces in the performance of their duties.

Time-Frame

This approach to bridging the gap between Israel's security requirements, and Palestinian demands for full sovereignty and an absence of an Israeli military presence in its territory, will require a series of stages and steps in the implementation of the security arrangements. Some of the arrangements mentioned above – such as deployment of IDF forces in Palestinian state territory – will expire, moderate, or alter with time, according to the performance of the Palestinian security forces and their willingness and determination to uphold their obligations in the agreement. IDF involvement will be reduced according to agreed-upon benchmarks, according to developments on the ground, with an eye to safeguarding the demilitarization of the territory and preventing

terrorism. The main test will be the willingness and capability of the Palestinian security forces to take full responsibility for their commitments to prevent terrorism, smuggling and infiltrations, and to dismantle terrorist infrastructures.

A time-line can be envisioned for the major stages of evolving Palestinian security responsibility:

- In the current stage, Israel bears all responsibility for security, with the Palestinian security forces bearing limited responsibility in specified areas.
- In the first stage of the proposed plan, an international body will be commissioned to carry out tasks necessary for safeguarding Palestinian demilitarization and preventing terrorism and the existence of terror infrastructures inside the Palestinian state.
- In the second stage, Israel will transfer territorial responsibility for most of the areas (with the exception of the Jordan Valley). At this stage, it will already be possible to agree on areas of Palestinian responsibility (either independently or in conjunction with the IDF or with an international force), such as: law and order, the chain of handling terror suspects, the dismantling of armed bodies, the prevention of incitement, and others.
- In the third stage, an international body will train, commission, and operate with the Palestinian forces to dismantle terror infrastructures and armed groups, and see to it that the Palestinians live up to their obligations in the agreement. An effective force also will operate along the Philadelphi Corridor at the Egypt-Gaza border, in coordination with Egyptian forces.
- In the fourth stage, responsibility for everything connected to internal security and combating terrorism will be gradually transferred from the international body to the Palestinian security forces, after Palestinian performance has been tested.
- In the fifth stage, full responsibility will be transferred to the Palestinians, and international involvement in the supervision and verification of the Palestinians in fulfilling their security agreements inside the Palestinian state will be reduced. While Israel does not see an international presence as a substitute for the self-defense capability of the IDF, such a presence could have utility as a “tripwire” in the event a hostile force approaches to cross the Jordan River and penetrate the Palestinian state from the east. In case regional peace agreements prove powerless against such threats, Israel must retain the right to deploy IDF forces in the area and to reinforce them. All this will be done in accordance with agreements between Israel and the Palestinian state. Similarly, an effective force will continue to act along the Philadelphi Corridor, separating Palestinian Gaza from Egyptian Sinai.

Limitations on Arms

Israel and the Palestinians will need to formulate an agreed-upon list of permitted capabilities and arms with which the Palestinian security forces will be equipped and which will be suited to their tasks. Based on Israel's experience with the Military Addendum to the Peace Treaty with Egypt, and the Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights, Israel knows that it is crucial to specify the capabilities and arms that are permitted – not just those that are prohibited – because it is impossible to anticipate all future military technologies. In the event that the sides agree on detailing only those that are prohibited, a joint structure should be created to examine the list and update it according to shifting needs and capabilities.

The following are examples of arms and military capabilities on which limitations can be placed:

- Heavy weapons: military planes, helicopters, drones, tanks, and sea vessels.
- High-trajectory firing capabilities, particularly surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-surface rockets, heavy mortars, and artillery.
- Anti-aircraft firing capabilities, particularly surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft artillery.
- Guided missiles fired at tanks and armored vehicles, people, and ships.
- Stand-off capabilities of attack, deep penetration, and fire beyond the horizon.
- Equipping and employing advanced explosives and mines, particularly those which can be scattered or dropped from the air.
- The erecting of jamming systems capable of disrupting Israel's civil and military communications, as well as its military infrastructure systems.
- Electronic intelligence capabilities that could include sensitive targets in Israel, which could involve the transfer of information to hostile groups or countries.
- Acquisition and deployment of radar that covers Israeli skies at low altitudes.
- Capabilities for the development or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

Based on its experience with Egypt and Syria, Israel knows that it is crucial to specify the capabilities and arms that are permitted – not just those that are prohibited – because it is impossible to anticipate all future military technologies.

Summary

Contrary to the common Palestinian claim that a peace agreement will bring security, Israel has learned that a stable peace can only be based on first safeguarding Israel's security. Any agreement requires minimizing the security elements that could encourage hostile forces to challenge Israel with greater intensity.

Israel's chief security aim in relation to the Palestinians is to prevent the development of symmetrical or asymmetrical military threats, and to prevent terrorism and guerilla warfare against Israel from within and by way of a Palestinian state.

Addressing the possibility of such threats in the framework of a bilateral agreement involves Israel taking controlled security risks. The proposed demilitarization plan involves three mutually reinforcing cycles:

- **The first cycle** – demilitarization, security arrangements, and Palestinian responsibility. Demilitarizing the Palestinian state includes imposing limitations on the capabilities, weapons, and arming of Palestinian security forces. Demilitarization also includes the prevention of terrorism and prohibition of terror infrastructures inside the Palestinian state. The security arrangements are intended to allow Israel to maintain the ability to defend itself against potential threats from the area of the Palestinian state. To achieve long-term stability, it is crucial that the Palestinians fulfill their responsibilities to prevent terrorism and the formation of military threats to Israel from their territory, and to uphold their commitments in the agreement.
- **The second cycle** – arrangements for implementation and supervision may include the involvement of international monitors, preferably led by the Americans, which will ensure and supervise adherence to all clauses of the security arrangements, while simultaneously providing assistance to the Palestinian security forces in meeting their responsibilities to perform internal security tasks, prevent terrorism, and dismantle terror infrastructure.
- **The third cycle** – guarantees and means of leverage for implementing the agreements. International and inter-Arab guarantees, structures, and means of leverage are required to ensure that the cost to the Palestinians of not living up to their obligations will be higher than any anticipated gain from violating them.

A process of stages for implementation of the agreements is proposed, which would result in a lowering of the profile of Israeli security activity and presence inside the Palestinian state, according to the performance of the Palestinian side.

The territorial and security dimensions are interdependent. The more territory that is transferred to the Palestinian side, the greater the Israeli demand for stronger security arrangements. For example, it is crucial for Israel to retain control of the Jordan Valley. However, if, due to political considerations, Israel relinquishes parts of that territory, long-term security arrangements will be required nonetheless, including the deployment of IDF forces in the area. Meanwhile, Israel will require control of the airspace for early detection, identification, and interception of aerial threats from the east.

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This monograph was translated and edited by Ruthie Blum Leibowitz.



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Defensible Borders Initiative – A major security and public diplomacy initiative that analyzes current terror threats and Israel's corresponding territorial requirements, particularly in the strategically vital West Bank, that Israel must maintain to fulfill its existential security and defense needs. (www.defensibleborders.org)

Global Terrorism – Using previously unpublished documents, Jerusalem Center President Dore Gold explored the influence of Saudi Wahhabism on 9/11 in the *New York Times* bestseller *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (Regnery, 2003).

Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA) –

A diplomacy program, founded in 2002 jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation, that presents Israel's case on current issues through high-level briefings by government and military leaders to the foreign diplomatic corps and foreign press, as well as production and dissemination of information materials.

Global Law Forum – A ground-breaking program that undertakes studies and advances policy initiatives to protect Israel's legal rights in its conflict with the Palestinians, the Arab world, and radical Islam. (www.globallawforum.org)

Anti-Semitism After the Holocaust – Initiated and directed by Dr. Manfred Gerstenfeld, this program includes conferences, seminars, and publications discussing restitution, the academic boycott, Holocaust denial, and anti-Semitism in the Arab world, European countries, and the post-Soviet states. (www.jewishaffairs.org)

Jerusalem in International Diplomacy –

Dr. Dore Gold analyzes the legal and historic rights of Israel in Jerusalem and exposes the dangers of compromise that will unleash a new *jihadi* momentum in his book *The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City* (Regnery, 2007). Justus Reid Weiner looks at *Illegal Construction in Jerusalem: A Variation on an Alarming Global Phenomenon* (2003). Researcher Nadav Shragai assesses the imminent security threats to Israel's capital resulting from its potential division, and offers alternative strategies for managing Jerusalem's demographic challenge in his monograph *The Dangers of Dividing Jerusalem* (2008).

New Models for Economic Growth in Israel –

This comprehensive, 10-year project has studied the application and impact of privatization policy and other financial innovations in Israel. Sponsored by the Milken Institute, the project includes nine published volumes in Hebrew and English.

Jerusalem Center Serial Publications:

Jerusalem Viewpoints – providing in-depth analysis on changing events in Israel and the Middle East since 1977.

Jerusalem Issue Briefs – insider briefings by top-level Israeli government officials, military experts, and academics, as part of the Center's Institute for Contemporary Affairs.

Daily Alert – a daily digest of hyperlinked news and commentary on Israel and the Middle East from the world and Hebrew press.

Post-Holocaust and Anti-Semitism – a monthly publication examining anti-Semitism after the Holocaust.

Jewish Political Studies Review – a scholarly journal founded in 1989.

Jerusalem Center Websites

www.jcpa.org (English)
www.jcpa.org.il (Hebrew)
www.jcpa-lecape.org (French)
www.mesi.org.uk (United Kingdom)
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Disengaging from the West Bank Short of a Permanent Agreement: Tenable Security-Wise?

Gilead Sher and Avner Halevi

During his visit to Washington earlier this month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke about possible Israeli unilateral action vis-à-vis the Palestinians, stressing that such action “would have to meet Israeli security criteria” and “would also require broader international understandings than exists.” Subsequently, the Prime Minister retracted his statement and issued explanations. Either way, however, it is important to consider whether it is possible to ensure security in the context of an independent Israeli disengagement from the West Bank without a permanent status agreement in place. The underlying condition is that any withdrawal from all or part of the West Bank and any separation from the Palestinians would not compromise the personal safety of Israel’s citizens and national security as a whole. These would have to be ensured for such a move to be possible.

Any withdrawal from the West Bank could occur in the absence of a permanent agreement and would represent an alternative to a situation in which it became patently clear that a full two-state agreement with the Palestinians is impossible to achieve in the foreseeable future. The purpose of such a withdrawal would be to implement a temporary border that would create a reality of two nation states without undermining the possibility of continuing negotiations, while also improving the daily lives of the Palestinians until an agreement is reached. An independent withdrawal, as well as a partial or an interim agreement, would in all probability involve the evacuation of some 100,000 people from the Jewish settlements located beyond the security fence or on the eastern mountain ridges, out of a total of some 380,000 Israelis living east of the Green Line, and would preserve the large settlement blocs that are home to the vast majority of this population.

Given the short distance between the West Bank and Israel’s large population centers and its strategic rear, the country is very vulnerable to fire and other attempted attacks from the West Bank. Therefore, as long as there is no bilateral security arrangement with the

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Palestinians, the IDF would remain responsible for security in the West Bank. Unlike the Gaza Strip, the model for maintaining security must be constructed for the most part on preventing terrorism before it happens and fighting terrorism as needed rather than on deterrence. It must prevent terrorist infrastructures from being built and prevent the development of manufacturing and/or smuggling capabilities of weapons, munitions, and/or dual-purpose materials as well as assistance from outside advisors. To that end, the IDF must continue to isolate the West Bank envelope, i.e., maintain security control of the Jordan Valley, the Jordan crossings, West Bank crossings to Israel, and the aerial space above the West Bank. In this framework, Israel maintains intelligence capabilities for foiling terrorism and freedom of movement in the West Bank needed by the IDF and the general Security Services. At the same time, the IDF would be prepared to combat terrorism and violence whenever necessary. Should the security situation deteriorate and Hamas attempts to seize control of the West Bank, Israel would be able to stop such a takeover; Israel would have to make its intentions clear ahead of time.

Beyond the imperative of preventing West Bank terrorism, Israel would have to place the political instability in the Middle East and the security challenges liable to develop in the future from Jordan at center of its strategic security considerations. Strategic security requires maintaining Israeli control of the Jordan Valley and operational flexibility, as long as no appropriate security arrangements with the Palestinians and/or satisfactory regional security arrangements have been achieved, and as long as there is no fundamental change in the region's level of stability.

An inseparable part of the required security outline consists of non-military moves necessary to help the Palestinian Authority establish a stable government and effective control, weaken the roots of terrorism and the security threat *emanating* from the West Bank, and thereby help promote negotiations for a permanent settlement. The main moves include reducing army and Civil Administration involvement in the fabric of Palestinian life, transferring most authority for civilian matters still in Israel's hands to the PA in coordination with it, preventing an economic crisis in the West Bank by providing maximal economic freedom of action and movement to the Palestinians, encouraging economic initiatives involving Palestinians and partners abroad, and offering Israeli partnership and help in constructing economic infrastructures for the future Palestinian state.

As long as there is effective security coordination with the PA and there are no renewed waves of terrorism from the West Bank, the IDF would have to develop, gradually and in a controlled fashion, greater flexibility in the methods it uses to ensure routine security in the West Bank; this, in order to strengthen the PA's legitimacy vis-à-vis its own public. The IDF in the West Bank must gradually and carefully adopt a lower profile, especially in Palestinian populated areas. According to an operational program to be developed by

the IDF, it would be necessary to concentrate to the extent possible the deployment of army bases near central traffic arteries and the security envelope and to transition, in a controlled manner, to long distance command and control. These steps must be taken while considering all the elements involved in disengagement, such as the stages for the evacuation of the civilians and the conditions of routine security, while retaining the operational ability to return and operate deep in the heart of the West Bank should it prove necessary.

If, despite Israel's wishes, the PA ceases security cooperation in response to a withdrawal, implementation of the move would be more difficult and require the security outline to be stricter. To the extent the security framework proceeds well, it would be possible to incorporate other steps, such as transferring security responsibility in Areas B and Areas C to the PA where there are no more Israeli settlements, restoring some civilian supervision at the Jordan border crossings to the Palestinians, and incorporating foreign supervisors in security checks at the crossings, while leaving highest security control of the crossings in Israel's hands.

An internal security challenge lies in confronting the deep rift in Israeli society over the division of the land and the future of the West Bank. There is a not unfounded concern that some Israelis would react violently to a withdrawal or the evacuation of land and/or settlements, especially if this comes as a unilateral step rather than *as* part of a bilateral permanent agreement. Such actions could be expected to occur from the moment there is talk of a withdrawal or the initiation of a partial agreement in the public sphere or in the government, and continue until the start, during, or even after an actual evacuation. Violence might be aimed at Jews or Arabs, occur in Jerusalem, within the *Green Line*, or in the West Bank, and target public figures, individuals, public groups, or the IDF. Building the right response to such a danger requires preliminary planning with comprehensive staff work *by* all the security establishments involved.

From a security perspective, in the security framework described above, any disengagement from the West Bank and the Palestinians is feasible; an appropriate, balanced response to the security issue is doable, and is relevant as well to scenarios of partial or interim agreements that do not amount to a full and comprehensive resolution of the conflict. In addition, it would be highly desirable to try to include an effort to achieve a long term period of calm in the Gaza Strip by taking steps to attain a long term ceasefire and a controlled reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, two aims that are in Israel's best political and security interests.

This security framework does not refer to a comprehensive and overall security arrangement that would be required in a permanent status agreement, which, by its very nature, requires completely different types of arrangements. However, in this plan, a

withdrawal from the West Bank would be fundamentally different from the disengagement from the Gaza Strip. On the civilian level, the evacuation from the West Bank would be partial and the main settlement blocs where most of the population lives would stay in place. On the political level, the PA would continue to be a partner and the negotiations with it for a bilateral agreement could continue, if the PA is interested, but would have to exclude Hamas. Regional dialogue with actors such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf states would likewise not be negated by this option. On the security level, the IDF would remain in the West Bank and continue to be responsible for security, despite the political cost this entails in the international arena, especially the expected refusal of many to recognize the fact that Israel will in fact have withdrawn from much of the West Bank and the occupation in those areas will have ended.

