

IDF Force Buildup since the Six Day War

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Background

In 2004, Moshe Ya'alon, then chief of the IDF General Staff, commented that “the processes of force buildup and operation are interconnected, both in day-to-day activity and in preparing the response necessary for the long term. The IDF must address the difficulties inherent in the need to develop multidimensional capabilities, in view of the multiple scenarios that it must be prepared for at any given moment (fighting on a number of fronts, a limited confrontation, the threat of high-trajectory fire, non-conventional threats, cyber threats, and other relevant threats). A process of force buildup that is not useful in day-to-day warfare but only in the long term reduces the IDF’s ability to develop an effective response to tasks that it must carry out in the present.”¹ This principle also applies today. However, it appears that in recent years the process of force buildup has focused more on the development and acquisition of weapons and technological abilities and less on the intellectual development of fighting doctrines that are based on creativity, stratagem, and daring.

1 Yaakov Zigdon, *Studies in the Theory of Military Force Buildup* (Holon: IDF Command and Staff College, 2004), p. 11 [Hebrew].

Military Force Buildup

The main challenge in force buildup is to create a military response to current and future threats, where the greatest challenge is the need to characterize future threats and, in turn, the manner in which to apply the necessary force. The starting point of military force buildup must be based on the national security strategy and the national security policy, from which the IDF strategy is derived. It is this strategy that governs the force buildup in light of the operational needs in the various theaters. The force buildup is a prolonged and continuous process and is based on the structure and capabilities of the existing army (both for reasons of cost efficiency and because the use of that force can also occur during the buildup). It is undertaken with awareness of opportunities, threats, and political risks and considers budget constraints (a good example is the peace agreement with Egypt, which made it possible, over the long run, for the IDF to significantly cut its forces). The endpoint of that process is, of course, the use of that force.²

Six principal elements characterize force buildup: combat doctrines and concepts; weapons; manpower; organization of the fighting force; military infrastructures; and training, preparation, and exercises.³ As technology developed, armies found themselves relying more heavily on technological means. Nonetheless, according to Douglas Macgregor, an American military theoretician who served for many years in the Armored Corps of the US army, the changes in military force and their modification to meet new challenges “are not the result only of technology; they are the result of joint development of new systemic thinking, new organizational structures, and new leadership behavior, accompanied by this new technology.”⁴

The Six Day War offers a unique perspective on the IDF’s force buildup prior to 1967 and the way that force was used during the war. The IDF has changed dramatically since then, and deciding on the direction force buildup should take, in view of the changing threats, constitutes a major challenge. Therefore, it is worthwhile examining what can be learned from the force buildup that preceded the Six Day War.

2 Ibid., pp. 33–37.

3 Allon Claus, “The IDF’s Force Buildup: Transition to Planning Initiative,” *Maarachot* 461 (June 2015): 19 [Hebrew].

4 Douglas Macgregor, *Transformation under Fire* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 2011), pp. 48–49 [Hebrew].

General Rupert Smith, who served in the British Parachute Regiment and commanded an armored division in the 1991 Gulf War, wrote that “armies do not prepare for the last war, but usually prepare for the wrong war.” Smith based this claim on the willingness of governments to allocate resources only to meet the principal threat, while the nature of the enemy is to identify the opponent’s weak points and avoid contact with its strong points.⁵ Smith contends that the IDF’s high level of preparedness for the Six Day War is an exception to the rule, since the buildup of force before the war correctly anticipated its characteristics and the needs of the army during the war.⁶

Force Buildup prior to the Six Day War

The buildup of land forces that preceded the Six Day War was initiated primarily by the General Staff as part of its responsibility for the operation of land forces, and was influenced by the lessons learned from the Sinai Campaign in 1956. These lessons were examined by a committee headed by General Haim Laskov, who concluded that “in the future, the IDF’s main destructive power should be composed of armored brigades . . . The days in which paratroopers and infantry fight alone are apparently over.”⁷ As a direct extension of this, in 1960, General Yitzhak Rabin, then head of the Operations Directorate, concluded that the commanders of the armored corps should be educated to become dynamic leaders who take initiative and are less dependent on their superiors in deciding a course of action.⁸

One of the main changes in the force buildup process had to do with the concept of operational plans. In the years before the Sinai Campaign, the IDF did not connect the operational plan directly to force buildup. This was due to many factors, including budget constraints, purchasing sources and manpower considerations, restrictions on acquisitions from various countries, and a lack of calm in the security situation.⁹ The change in approach occurred

5 Rupert Smith, *Utility of Force* (Tel Aviv: Maarachot Publishing, 2011), p. 10 [Hebrew].

6 Ibid., p. 227.

7 Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Ben Shemen: Modan and Maarachot, 2015), p. 164 [Hebrew].

8 Ibid., p. 165.

9 Zeev Elron, *Toward a Second Round* (Ben Shemen: Modan and Maarachot, 2016), pp. 385–393 [Hebrew].

in early 1960, when Rabin decided that “there was a need to formulate an operational doctrine that would shape the force structure.”¹⁰ From that point onward, it appears that the IDF’s force buildup was derived from the operational plans. However, the first signs of this were already evident in the Bnei Yaakov multi-year plan in 1958, which characterized the next war as one that would be over quickly and would require the IDF to achieve a rapid and decisive victory, with an early switch from defense to attack (involving a calculated risk). In doing so, the IDF would exploit its advantage by means of speed and concentration of power. This plan required intense development of the air force’s attack capabilities, the armored corps, and the airborne infantry.¹¹

In 1964, Rabin was appointed chief of staff. Upon his appointment, he began to accelerate force buildup, equipment, and training, with the goal of preparing the IDF for the next war. Under his leadership, the General Staff attributed much importance to direct involvement in the preparation of the fighting force. Therefore, and as part of the force buildup, the IDF’s Instruction Directorate, headed by General Zvi Zamir, worked to revise the training of units according to the operational plans. This occurred after intelligence information led to the understanding that the Egyptian and Syrian armies had switched to defensive formations based on the Soviet doctrine, a development that required a revision of IDF strategy. Although these changes were opposed by some IDF field commanders, due to the central role played by the General Staff in determining the framework of training and in particular the Instruction Directorate’s control of training budgets, the necessary changes in training were successfully instituted.¹² The revision of the combat doctrine according to the strategy of the Egyptian and Syrian armies likewise continued during the tenure of General Ariel Sharon as head of the Instruction Directorate.¹³

The buildup of force essentially had two components: the buildup of power, which consisted of the acquisition of equipment and the training of

10 Yitzhak Rabin and Dov Goldstein, *Service Record* (Bat Yam: Sifriat Maariv, 1979), p. 101 [Hebrew].

11 Yitzhak Greenberg, *Budgets and Power* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1997), pp. 103–104 [Hebrew].

12 Zvi Zamir and Efrat Mass, *With Open Eyes* (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 2011), pp. 46–52 [Hebrew].

13 David Landau, *Arik* (Or Yehuda: Dvir, 2015), p. 53 [Hebrew].

the forces on the fighting platforms; and the development of commanders and of strategic thinking, i.e., the ability of the commanders to plan and carry out maneuvers while using strategies of “indirect approach” and undermining the equilibrium of the enemy. The IDF at that time was based primarily on the reserve forces as its main destructive power, while the regular army was intended primarily for ongoing security tasks, and more importantly, the training of the reserve forces in military skills. Since the IDF is not a professional army but rather is based on conscription and reserves, it did not then have a well-developed framework for training its officers. Therefore, the combat experience obtained by the commanders in the War of Independence and the Sinai Campaign played an essential role in the preparation for the next war.

The main effort was focused on the buildup of armored and mobile forces, particularly by increasing the number of tanks, especially those from France and Britain (but also those from the United States). In addition, it was decided to increase the size of the airborne units, which were viewed as a high quality force even when not airborne. According to Rabin, the forces were in practice divided “into two types: defensive and offensive, which are differentiated qualitatively by the allocation of manpower and resources to each.”¹⁴ With respect to the ground forces, emphasis was placed on training in an integrated format: armor, engineering, infantry, and artillery.

During the years prior to the Six Day War, the Paratroopers Brigade under the command of Rafael (Rafal) Eitan held numerous integrated exercises together with armored forces, in which they trained for fighting deep in enemy territory, along the lines of the Sinai Campaign. According to Eitan, there was an effort to “nurture [in the Paratroopers Brigade] resourcefulness in situations when units are completely alone and cut off, since they are the paratroopers and that is their mission. They parachute in or are landed from the sea behind enemy lines, and are sometimes completely cut off from other forces, are cut off from any supplies of equipment and food, and must fight to achieve results even under these difficult conditions.”¹⁵ There was also emphasis on the development of commanders at all levels and training for

14 Rabin and Goldstein, *Service Record*, pp. 131–132.

15 Rafael Eitan and Dov Goldstein, *Story of a Soldier* (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Maariv), pp. 84–97 [Hebrew].

command over fighting formations, including brigades and divisions.¹⁶ Rabin, as a veteran of the Palmach, emphasized the importance of “quick decision-making and the ability to plan and execute orders on the move—capabilities required for mobile warfare and commanding a mission.”¹⁷

The air force, for its part, prepared to attain air superiority quickly, so that it could support the land and naval forces as soon as possible. Already in 1951, David Ben-Gurion, then prime minister and minister of defense, wrote to Chief of General Staff Yigal Yadin that the air force “immediately, with the start of fighting, had to be able to deal a decisive blow to the enemy where it is concentrated, and first and foremost its air bases.”¹⁸ The air force began preparing for an attack as part of the preparations for Operation Kadesh, but Ben-Gurion decided not to carry it out. In 1962, the air force prepared a report that concluded that Israel could not allow itself to sustain a major air attack, and therefore in the case of an escalation in the security situation it must launch a preemptive attack to eliminate the ability of the enemy to do so. On the instructions of General Ezer Weizman, then commander of the Air Force, a plan was put together for a preemptive strike that would paralyze the enemy’s air forces and focus on attacking their air bases. This plan, which eventually became known by its code name, “Moked,” was the blueprint for the air force’s force buildup. The air force determined which pilots were most suited to participate in the attack, and during their training emphasis was placed on air battles and attacks on airports.¹⁹ In addition, the air force received French fighter aircraft, including the Mirage.

The buildup of the air force focused on the need for multi-tasking, since the pilots would have to attack runways deep in enemy territory and then return to base to quickly rearm and support the ground forces. The air force’s ground crews were put together and trained accordingly, so that they could rapidly arm and equip a plane. Giora Romm, a fighter pilot, recounted that

16 From an interview with General Yeshayahu Gavish, INSS, Tel Aviv, September 3, 2015.

17 Eitan Shamir, *Commanding a Mission* (Modan and Maarachot, 2014), p. 100 [Hebrew].

18 Amir Oren, *Leader of the Air Force: Ezer Weizman and the Way to “Moked”* (Kinneret Academic College, 2015) [Hebrew].

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 20–23.

“although the enemy aircraft on paper had numerical superiority, in practice we could put more planes in the air.”²⁰

The IDF’s preparations bore fruit during the Six Day War, when it became clear that the forces were well prepared for the missions they had been assigned. A good example is Operation Moked, the successful attack by the Israeli air force on the air forces of Egypt and Syria.²¹ During the war, the air force for the first time fulfilled its designated mission when it decisively destroyed the enemy air forces and thus “brought the war to the threshold of a decisive victory and provided the ground forces with the freedom of action to achieve a decisive victory on land.”²²

The war was decided essentially in a series of land battles, particularly in the south, in which all of the IDF’s firepower and maneuvering ability were put to use. For example, in the battle of the breakthrough in Rafiah, General Israel Tal’s division, which included the 7th and 60th armored brigades and the regular army Paratroopers Brigade, encountered serious opposition from the Egyptian army that was positioned in fortified positions and built-up areas.²³ An even better example of the level of preparedness is perhaps the combined divisional attack to capture Umm Katef and Abu Ageila on the main road in Sinai, which was carried out by the 38th Division under the command of General Ariel Sharon. “The Egyptian force at Umm Katef found itself under attack starting at midnight from several directions: Danny Matt’s paratroopers who attacked the artillery batteries in the rear of the complex, the 14th Armored Brigade which attacked from the front, the 99th Brigade from the northern flank, and the 63rd Battalion which attacked from the rear.”²⁴ The battle lasted all night, and on the second day of the war, at dawn, the Egyptian formation and organization began to collapse.²⁵ The

20 Steven Pressfield, *The Lion’s Gate* (Rishon LeZion: Yedioth Sfarim, 2017), p. 44 [Hebrew].

21 Yiftah Spector, *Loud and Clear* (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Sfarim, 2007), pp. 106–107 [Hebrew].

22 Avi Kober, *Decisive Victory* (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1996), p. 269 [Hebrew].

23 Eitan and Goldstein, *Story of a Soldier*, p. 84.

24 Yeshayahu Gavish, *Red Blanket* (Or Yehuda: Zmora-Bitan, 2015), pp. 181–182 [Hebrew].

25 Kober, *Decisive Victory*, p. 271.

victory in the battle eventually came to be attributed to military thinking, and it is taught around the world as a model of an integrated battle.²⁶

Yet although the force buildup prior to the Six Day War could likely have been improved, an examination of the military outcome shows that the process was highly successful. Since then, there have been key changes in the nature of IDF force buildup. The first was the acceleration of the process following the Yom Kippur War and the increased priority it received, primarily in the form of larger scale acquisition of weapons. The General Staff took the leading role in the planning process, and all the corps took part.²⁷ The acquisitions following the Yom Kippur War were primarily motivated by the disturbing images of long lines of tanks assaulting the country's borders. The creation of the GOC Army Headquarters and, at a later stage, its assigned responsibility for building up the ground forces was the beginning of a slow but uninterrupted process that removed the General Staff from involvement in that buildup. This process was later initiated in the other IDF entities involved in force buildup and thus led to the completion of the process to decentralize force buildup in the army as a whole.

Force Buildup in the IDF Today

Starting in 2000, the conventional threat to Israel from the armies of the Arab states began to recede, accompanied by the growing non-conventional threat from military organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas and other terror organizations. The threat of a large-scale invasion of Israel, which was real in 1967, became almost anachronistic. In contrast, there was an increased threat from non-state military organizations, which accumulated significant quantities of arms and primarily various types of high-trajectory weapons.

The changing threat to Israel required an ability to deal with conventional threats, i.e., classic threats from armies; sub-conventional threats, i.e., from military organizations and terror organizations; non-conventional threats, i.e., nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; and cybernetic threats, i.e., attacks on computer systems and communication networks.²⁸ As a result, the IDF's force buildup over the last two decades to some extent lacked

26 Pressfield, *The Lion's Gate*, p. 239.

27 Interview with General Herzl Shafir, December 15, 2016.

28 *IDF Strategy* (IDF: Office of the Chief of the General Staff, August 13, 2015).

an overall perspective and was clearly biased toward technology and the acquisition of weapons, with only limited oversight by the General Staff.

The Locker Committee, which examined the process for constructing the defense budget and its management on a national level, concluded in its report of 2015 that the process is flawed at all levels and in several dimensions and that it unfolds without any overall management. According to the members of the committee, long-term planning has been replaced by a continuous battle over the size of the budget, which does not include an organized process to plan the long-term force buildup but rather involves patchwork solutions sewn together according to immediate need.²⁹ Moreover, it appears that the system has chosen, time after time, to rely on technological solutions rather than developing doctrine, tactics, and operational knowledge.

Despite the evolving threats, the General Staff has become increasingly less involved in force buildup. On the level of the General Staff, this process has become a collection of projects, initiated by the various branches of the IDF and the bodies involved in the force buildup. Since the General Staff Branch of the IDF was dissolved, the Planning Directorate has essentially become the army's project manager. Furthermore, the General Staff, which was always responsible for the activities of the land forces, has abandoned this role, and it was given to the GOC Army Headquarters.³⁰ In addition, the exaggerated reliance on technology and the neglect of "intellectual effort" led to a dramatic increase in investment in high precision firepower and intelligence and the persistent neglect of ground maneuvering. The flaws in this approach became particularly evident during the Second Lebanon War.³¹

With the appointment of Gadi Eisenkot as chief of staff in 2015, this trend changed direction. Since then, emphasis has been placed on the element of ground forces maneuver, with respect to both acquisition of equipment and training.³² Nonetheless, the main flaw, i.e., that the General Staff is cut off from the ground forces, has yet to be rectified. In order to deal with

29 *The Report of the Committee to Examine the Defense Budget* (the Locker Committee), June 2015, p. 11.

30 Ofer Shelah, *The Courage to Win* (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Sfarim, 2015), pp. 183–185 [Hebrew].

31 Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *Spider Webs* (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Sfarim, 2008), pp. 76–85 [Hebrew].

32 Gal Perl Frankel, "Chief of the General Staff Eisenkot and the Next War," *Walla News*, January 18, 2016 [Hebrew].

this problem, the chief of staff decided in early 2017 that the General Staff would itself draw up a doctrine for ground tactics and would also oversee the buildup of ground forces, while its execution would continue to be the responsibility of the GOC Army Headquarters. This undoubtedly constitutes progress on the way to reducing the scale of the problem, although the picture will not come full circle for some time.

To meet its specific needs and challenges, the IDF has acquired hi-tech capabilities, such as high precision guided weapons, advanced control and command systems, and state-of-the-art aircraft (both manned and unmanned). In contrast, the army has not invested effort in reshaping its forces to meet the continually evolving challenges.³³ An even more serious problem relates to the element of manpower, its level of quality, and its development. Thus, “the element of quality established by Ben-Gurion as the essential foundation of the IDF began to be identified with technological superiority more than quality of thinking, creativity, and military doctrine. Furthermore, the loss of operational experience acquired by IDF commanders on the battlefield, with the cessation of ‘regular’ wars, contributed to widening the gap that opened in the doctrinal-professional domain.”³⁴

In contrast to the IDF, the US army, which found itself at the end of the Vietnam War in a serious organizational crisis (“the hollow army”), chose to deal with the problem by means of force buildup that began with long-term planning based on an appropriate doctrine. To this end, the Training and Doctrine Command was established (headed by William DePuy and Donn Starry). It developed the air-ground battle doctrine,³⁵ but did not stop there. Inter alia, the US ground forces created the 75th Ranger Regiment, an elite infantry brigade for complex missions, upgraded the professional level of non-commissioned officers (“the backbone of the army”), and created advanced schools for teaching the profession of war and centers for combat training, such as that at Fort Irwin.³⁶ This process reached its peak in the

33 Shelah, *The Courage to Win*, pp. 161–162.

34 Yuval Bazak, “The Shaping of the IDF’s Buildup of Force: Past, Present and Future,” *Bein Haktavim* 9 (December 2016): 71 [Hebrew].

35 Elwin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War* (Or Yehuda: Sifriat Maariv, 1994), pp. 20–41 [Hebrew].

36 Robert Skyles, *Certain Victory in the Desert* (Or Yehuda: Doctrine and Training – History Department, 1997), pp. 20–41 [Hebrew].

success of the 1991 Gulf War, which included the particularly successful combination of command control technologies, firepower, and ground tactics.³⁷

The IDF chose to imitate the American model in the acquisition of technological abilities but invested much less in developing the doctrine that would define their use.³⁸ A perusal of the doctrinal document drawn up in recent years by the Training and Doctrine Command of the US ground forces shows that even now it is clear to its commanders that there are limits to technology and that it alone cannot solve the complex problems on the battlefield. Furthermore, the American doctrinal document claims that technology also constitutes a risk, since America's enemies are developing the means to disrupt it. The solution, according to this document, involves the development of a comprehensive operational concept.³⁹

Over the last two decades, the IDF has given preference to the buildup of firepower at the expense of ground tactics. Thus, without the IDF senior command being aware of the problematic nature of this approach, the IDF's ground forces have been neglected and since then are perceived as part of the problem rather than the solution. The preference for firepower is primarily manifested in the buildup of the air force and intelligence (which is needed to create the target bank in support of air force operations). This preference is due to the air force's availability for immediate and defined use (which can be stopped at any time), with almost no significant logistic effort. This activity is carried out far from the public eye, without requiring the initiation of an actual war. Airpower also makes it possible to exploit technological and military superiority and to use precision guided weapons, which reduce the risk to IDF forces and non-combatants.⁴⁰ This is in contrast to the use of ground forces, which requires time and involves risks to those forces, the most serious of which is the risk of prolonged fighting, as in the case of the Iraq War (2003–2011).

37 Herbert Raymond McMaster, "Company E in the Gulf War," *Maarachot* 346 (February 1996): 26–39 [Hebrew].

38 Ofer Shelah, *The Tray and the Silver* (Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, 2003), pp. 38–44 [Hebrew].

39 *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World*, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), October 31, 2014, pp. 8–9.

40 Gershon HaCohen, *What is National in National Security?* (Moshav Ben Shemen: Modan and Ministry of Defense Publications, 2014), pp. 95–97 [Hebrew].

The problem is that the enemy facing the IDF in recent years, i.e., non-state organizations, has not adopted this approach but rather operates from within crowded population centers and ignores the norms of international law. Thus, it operates in tunnels, while using high-trajectory weapons on a large scale, which enables them to deal with the air threat and to lengthen the fighting.⁴¹ This is apparently the reason that technologically based aerial warfare with non-state entities usually lasts longer, is more expensive, and is also more frequent, though less efficient.⁴²

A document written by a commander in the IDF in 2005 claims that the main lesson is that “firepower abilities from the air or from afar have not provided a fully effective solution to the challenge of short-lived targets, which often are hidden under bushes or fired from the opening of a shaded cave. The ability to switch between firepower on the one hand and ground tactics and close combat on the other is a condition for decisively defeating Hezbollah’s guerilla force. Hezbollah cannot be defeated without close contact.”⁴³ Nonetheless, various considerations, including also the preparedness of the forces and, as a direct result, the fear of casualties have led Israel’s political and military leaders to prefer, both in the First Lebanon War and thereafter, warfare that is based more on firepower and less on tactics. Tactics have been employed on a limited scale, if at all, and often hesitantly and not in full.⁴⁴

Conclusion

The buildup of ground forces prior to the Six Day War was carried out directly on the instructions of the chief of the General Staff and the Instruction Directorate and in coordination with them. The separation of the General Staff from its role as the supreme command for the use of ground forces and the decentralization of the buildup of force from it to the GOC Army Headquarters, along with the hesitant use of ground forces in the confrontations over the last thirty years, have created a feeling among decision makers that

41 Amos Harel, “Putin Fans the Flames in the Middle East in Order to Conceal his Domestic Problems,” *Haaretz*, December 24, 2016 [Hebrew].

42 Aharon Haliva, “More of the Same,” *Bein Haktavim* 9 (December 2016): 17 [Hebrew].

43 The document was written by Lt. Col. Amir Baram, commander of the elite Maglan unit. See Harel and Issacharoff, *Spider Webs*, p. 116.

44 Shelah, *The Courage to Win*, pp. 28–53.

the ground forces are less relevant to the challenges facing the IDF both in the present and in the future, in contrast to the air force and intelligence. The IDF has invested increasingly in these branches, and as a result, the ability of the ground forces to carry out large-scale maneuvers on the front and deep in enemy territory has been reduced, as is also the case with the reserve forces.

The IDF's operations ethos has emphasized the spirit of its fighters, the tactical ability of its commanders to destabilize the enemy, and the drive for contact without compromise until complete victory. It appears that during the fifty years since the Six Day War, the IDF has shifted focus to physical power and weaponry, while searching for a technological response to operational problems. It is sufficient to look at the structure of the General Staff today in order to see the neglect of intellectual effort in the IDF. Thus, the Instruction Directorate was dissolved and replaced by the Doctrine and Training Division, which itself has been reduced over the years to dimensions that put the relevance of doctrine in the IDF into doubt. In contrast, the frameworks that are technologically oriented (and those involved in technologically based intelligence) have experienced an unprecedented expansion.

The *IDF Strategy* document, which was published in 2015, signaled the beginning of a change, such that the centrality of ground tactics was again emphasized in response to the evolving threats. At the same time, processes were initiated in the IDF to restore the responsibility of the General Staff, in its role as the supreme command, for the use of ground forces. Despite these steps, the continued reliance of the IDF on technological abilities on the one hand and the relatively low weight (in terms of resources and high quality manpower) given to the development of intellectual effort on the other perpetuates the major gap in the IDF's overall response capabilities. Moreover, technological solutions are not applicable to all of the operational problems faced by the IDF.