

Doron Matza

Patterns of Resistance among Israel's Arab-Palestinian Minority

A Historical Review and a Look to the Future

Memorandum
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דפוסי ההתנגדות של המיעוט הערבי־פלסטיני בישראל: – בחינה היסטורית ומבט לעתיד

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Foreword

This memorandum relates to one of Israel's main national security issues, namely, the charged relations between the State of Israel and its Arab-Palestinian minority. In recent years these relations have been high on the state's political and public agenda, and the issue has become more prominent with the deterioration in the security situation since fall 2015. The current wave of violence, which began in East Jerusalem and spread to the West Bank as well as to cities within the Green Line, has also highlighted what is happening among the Arab population. This insight emerges following the brief participation of young Arabs in grassroots protests in the towns of the Galilee and the Triangle and, in particular, the terror attack in the heart of Tel Aviv carried out by Muhammad Nashat, a resident of Arara in Wadi Ara, in which three Israeli citizens were killed.

The memorandum focuses on the pattern of resistance among the Arab minority in Israel: the methods, tools, and means they have chosen to express their dissatisfaction with the reality that characterizes their relations with the state and the Jewish majority and their aspiration to change this reality either partially or entirely. The choice of the term "resistance" is not coincidental and will be discussed in the first part of the memorandum, which establishes the theoretical framework for the analysis. This term was chosen because it is viewed in the academic literature as encompassing a broad range of social phenomena, from political violence to civil protest, and is used by national and other minorities to preserve their identity and to challenge the hegemonic political forces.

The historical discussion examining the Arab minority's pattern of protest since the establishment of the state is not, however, the sole purpose of this memorandum. The analysis also seeks to go beyond the historical dimensions and even beyond the contemporary dimension in its attempt to

prepare for future events; in other words, to identify the Arab minority's future resistance patterns to which the State of Israel will have to respond regardless of its political identity.

In order to understand the logic behind the development of resistance in the defined and unique contexts of time and of social and political processes, the research makes use of commonly used analytical historical tools. This method should facilitate an evaluation of future trends, present the subsequent dilemmas that the State of Israel will have to face and, accordingly, suggest a number of policy recommendations.

Introduction

Since the publishing of the Future Vision documents in 2006 and 2007 by a group of Arab-Israeli intellectuals under the auspices of the Council of Arab Mayors,[1] there has been a clear increase in the tension between the State of Israel and the Arab minority living within it. The manifestations of protest by Arab youth in 2015 occurred against the backdrop of what was defined in Israel as a wave of terror in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, which began in October of that year. They brought into focus the public and political discourse on the relations between the state and the Arab population. Unlike the events of October 2000 (which took place in the context of the Second Intifada and broke out in the previous month, during which Israeli Arab demonstrators clashed with the security forces), in 2015 public figures in the Israeli Arab community worked to contain the protests and to prevent an escalation; this effort did not, however, manage to eliminate the tension created in Arab-Jewish relations. The events, and in particular the terrorist attack carried out in the center of Tel Aviv on January 1, 2016 by an Arab citizen with the assistance of members of the Arab minority in Israel, reinforced the questions relating to two main aspects of the relations between the Arab population and the state.

The first is the future of relations between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel. Since 2007, various Israeli governments have adopted a dialectic policy toward the Arab minority. This policy is based on two main principles that, at first, appear to oppose but, in fact, complement one another and create a uniform strategic logic: on one axis, the various governments have acted, whether actively or passively, to exclude the Arab minority from the political and cultural mainstream, while along the other axis, they have implemented a series of measures to integrate the Arab sector within the Israeli economy.

The Knesset has become the arena for the main events along the first axis. Various laws have been proposed that have an anti-Arab element and seek to limit the collective rights of the Arab minority. One example is the initiative by members of Knesset from the Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu parties in the summer of 2014 to cancel the status of Arabic as an official language of the state.[2] The process to marginalize Arabs in Israeli politics culminated in raising the election threshold to 3.25 percent prior to the twentieth Knesset elections (which were held on March 17, 2015). This move aimed to reduce the number of Arab parties in the Knesset but, in fact, led to the unification of the Arab political camp for the first time in the history of Arab representation and to the creation of the Joint Arab List after many years of internal political rivalries.

The second axis consists of measures taken by Israel's governments to encourage the inclusion of the Arab sector in the national economy. These measures correspond to the neo-liberal approach of the center-right governments to increase national output by bringing weak sectors of Israeli society into the workforce. This was part of the effort to reduce subsidies to these sectors and thus reduce the burden on the state budget and on the middle class. It was directed at two main sectors: the ultra-Orthodox and the Arabs. The Netanyahu-Lapid government (January 2013–March 2015) tried to assimilate the former economically and socially by limiting the draft exemption for yeshiva students. With regard to the Arab sector, efforts were made to reduce socioeconomic inequality by increasing the level of government investment in specific spheres, such as the local authorities, education, and housing.[3] The main effort to include the Arab population economically came from the Prime Minister's Office and the Authority for the Economic Development of the Arab, Druze, and Circassian Sectors. The Authority was established by a government resolution on February 15, 2007 and has been headed ever since by Aiman Saif, who has worked to increase Arab participation in the workforce, particularly women, and to encourage the growth of small businesses in the Arab sector as a way of increasing the supply of jobs.[4]

Thus, government policy has headed in two opposing directions at the same time with efforts made to marginalize the Arab minority in the political and cultural domains, on the one hand, and to include it in the economy, on the other. Economic inclusion was, to a large extent, intended to offset the negative effect of the political and cultural exclusion. It also prevented ferment

in the Arab sector by creating an economic horizon that would improve the standard of living and increase employment options. This policy illustrates the basic government approach to the Arab minority since the end of the 1960s, whereby the state has tried to curb the development of Palestinian national sentiment by offering certain parts of the Arab population compensation in the form of individual self-realization. This was accomplished by opening up the government bureaucracy, particularly the various government ministries, to some of the young and educated members of the Arab sector.[5]

The policies adopted by Israeli governments since 2009 that were based on the exclusion/inclusion of the Arab minority have largely rested on the conceptual platform formulated after the establishment of the state, even if some of its components have changed somewhat over time. For example, the effort made by the early governments to prevent the transformation of the Arab minority into a separate national Palestinian minority was replaced by attempts to distance them from the political and cultural domain. The strategic goal, however, has remained almost identical: a public civil domain in which Jews have absolute domination. Furthermore, the effort to include educated Arabs in the Israeli government and bureaucracy—which characterized the 1970s—has been replaced in the past decade by attempts to include the Arab sector in the general Israeli economy. Here too, the strategic goal has remained the same: to create a domain in which the Arab population could develop while downplaying the significance of political exclusion.

At the time of the protests by Arab youth following the wave of violence in East Jerusalem and the West Bank in 2015, the question was raised whether these protests were related to the policy adopted by Israeli governments toward the Arab sector since 2009, and, more specifically, to what extent the protests could be viewed as an expression of the Arab minority's frustration with government policy over the previous decade.

The second aspect of the relations between the State of Israel and the Arab minority came to the forefront as a result of the terrorist attacks in the fall-winter of 2015–16 and relate to the Arab minority's pattern of activity and the connection between that pattern and government policy. Since 1948, when the Arabs became a minority in Israel, the rift between the two sectors has become one of the main sources of tension defining Israeli society.[6] The presence of a significant demographic minority[7] that is emotionally and historically tied to the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza has complicated the relations between the state and its Arab citizens. The

increasingly apparent permanence of the Arab minority, which was accelerated by the Six Day War, and the understanding of the Israeli government and the Arabs themselves that their political reality as a minority in a Jewish state is not reversible, as was hoped by some Israeli leaders and some of the Arabs, did nothing to reduce national tensions. Furthermore, Israeli attempts to weaken the Palestinian identity of the Arab minority, cut them off from the Palestinian system in the West Bank and Gaza, and transform the Palestinians citizens of Israel into "Israeli Arabs" did not bring about their full integration within the State of Israel.

In the decades since the Arab population was transformed from a demographic majority into a minority within the Jewish state, this sector has continued to express its unhappiness with the historical circumstances that brought this about. The 2015 protest itself was aimed at the policy adopted by all of Israel's governments, which marks the Arab population as a security threat and a potential fifth column and exacerbates their economic and civil inequality.

The ability of the Arab minority in Israel to express their discontent regarding the existing situation has been influenced by a variety of factors, among them the extent of government and security supervision. Since 1948, the Arab minority have developed various tools and adopted various forms of protest in order to express—somewhat passively—their dissatisfaction with the situation and their desire for change. These tools of resistance were intended to achieve one of two goals. The intent was either to partially alter the existing reality by, for example, changing the policy for awarding government compensation to the Arab population. Or, at the very least, the goal was to transform the conditions defining Arab-Jewish relations in Israel by, for example, changing the character of the state and its governing principles, which perpetuate discrimination against Arabs and create a glass ceiling that prevents their full integration into Israeli society.

Despite the range of resistance methods developed by the Arab minority, academic research has focused primarily on violent political resistance. Likewise, among the Jewish public and certainly the security and intelligence mechanisms, attention has concentrated on the violent component within the Arab minority's pattern of resistance. The main question that periodically arose in the public and security discourse was whether an outbreak of violence would take place in the Arab sector and most importantly when—questions that were also asked in the context of the Palestinian reality in the West

Bank and Gaza. This testifies to the Jewish view of Arab society in Israel as a security threat. This view is based on the memory of the roots of the Jewish-Palestinian struggle in the 1920s and 1930s (specifically, the events of 1929 and 1936–39) and also, it seems, of the deep psychological foundations characterizing Israeli society, the circumstances of its establishment, and the subsequent levels of national anxiety.

It is hard to ignore the fact that this analysis is one-dimensional with regard to the way in which the Israeli establishment and the Jewish public perceive Arab society in Israel. The adoption of such a narrow perspective does not allow for a more nuanced and holistic view of the Arab population. A renewed examination of the Arab minority's pattern of resistance not only sheds new light on Arab society in Israel and provides insight into the changes it has undergone, both socially and politically, since becoming a part of Israeli society, but it also illuminates the important transformation processes experienced by the Arab minority. Such a reexamination is particularly important for Israeli decision makers, since it can provide both the tools needed to analyze Arab society and the ability to identify—even by examining the patterns of resistance—the possible opportunities to achieve the government's policy goals among this population.

This memorandum considers the historical trends in the development of the Arab sector's patterns of resistance and identifies the factors that have affected them while also mapping and examining the various methods of resistance within the Israeli sociopolitical context from 1948 until today. Primarily, it attempts to predict and assess the characteristics of the next stage of the Arab minority's resistance. Chapter 1 identifies the boundaries of the research and the definitions necessary for the rest of the analysis. Chapter 2 describes the factors determining the Arab minority's patterns of protest. Chapter 3 presents the various methods of resistance from a historical and political context, and chapter 4 deals with the question of future patterns of resistance. Chapter 5 assesses the implications of the events and patterns studied and offers policy recommendations for confronting the challenges posed.

It should be noted that the memorandum does not deal with the Bedouin in the Negev. There have been phenomena of resistance among this community, some even of a violent nature. This is to be viewed against the background of the government programs to formalize the status of the Bedouin population in the Negev and the changes taking place in this sub-region, particularly

the transfer of IDF bases to the region. However, the Bedouin population is unique in its geographic, social, and cultural context and, despite the interest of many in the Arab sector to include them within the Arab-Muslim rubric, the boundaries separating the two populations have remained intact. It is, therefore, more appropriate to examine the patterns of resistance in the Bedouin sub-sector as a separate topic and not as part of the current study. Likewise, the Arab population in East Jerusalem is not part of this study. This, similarly, should not take away from the importance of studying this population, especially in view of the fact that the wave of terror ongoing since the spring of 2015 began in East Jerusalem.

Chapter 1

Concepts and Definitions

The term "resistance" forms the main axis of discussion in this memorandum, although, in theory, other terms could have been used, such as the word "protest," which is more frequently used in public and political discourse. However, the choice of the term "resistance" is not just semantic. It is a concept that facilitates an in-depth examination of the methods used by minorities, including the Arab minority in Israel, to express their dissatisfaction with the existing situation and their endeavors to fundamentally change it. The term "protest," on the other hand, tends to narrow the scope of the discussion. This point requires clarification, also because the term "resistance" is perceived in public and security discourse as synonymous with the Palestinian concept of *muqawama*, i.e., terror, political violence, and armed struggle.

The Concept of Protest

Protest is a term commonly used to describe expressions of civil and public dissatisfaction in democratic and even non-democratic societies. It is generally perceived as an act that is located on the axis between civil disobedience and political violence. In other words, protest is usually explicit and visible and characterized by the collective organization of individuals or groups that feel dissatisfied with their current situation and look to express their feelings and achieve a reordering of the agenda. It is thus possible to explain, for example, the social protest during the summer of 2011 in Israel, which was manifested in widespread nationwide demonstrations. This protest expressed the dissatisfaction of the Israeli middle class with the government's socioeconomic policies and their desire to change that reality.

Numerous theoretical studies have been conducted by researchers in the social sciences (political science and sociology) examining protest—its definition, the conditions under which it is generated, and its types and patterns. They have also dealt with the effectiveness of protest and its ability to bring about change in the social order. A major part of the academic discussion has taken place in the general context of functioning democratic states, and protest is therefore usually presented in the form of civil disobedience, demonstrations, media protest, and violent protest. Such a presentation can serve as a tool for examining the characteristics of protest among the Arab minority in Israel.

One of the main treatises on this subject was written by the political scientist Ian Lustick.[8] He tried to answer the question of why the Arabs in Israel are a quiet minority, both politically and socially, and why historically there have not been more episodes of political protest, as would have been expected given their unequal status and the political complexity of their situation. Lustick discussed the effectiveness of the state's supervision and control of the Arab minority, which, he claimed, reduces the potential for genuine, specifically violent, protest.

Indeed, from the establishment of the state until today, there have been only a limited number of violent events that were initiated by the Arab minority or into which they were drawn: for example, the Land Day events on March 30, 1976; the events of October 2000; and perhaps the smaller-scale events in the Arab sector in October 2015 against the backdrop of a broader outbreak of violence and terror in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. There have been other types of political behavior—such as demonstrations—in the Arab sector over the years, primarily in reaction to the deteriorating security situation in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[9] However, these patterns of protest are not common, and in recent decades, the scope of violent protests in the Arab sector has declined.

These basic facts raise various questions: is the Arab minority in the State of Israel a unique national minority, not only because it is torn between conflicting social and political identities but also because it is a compliant minority that has almost totally shunned the various types of protest? Is the government supervision of the Arab population in Israel so pervasive that it prevents their expression of dissatisfaction with government policies, as claimed by Lustick? Or, perhaps, there has been a dwindling of the national dimension that is rooted so deeply in what the Israeli sociologist Sammy

Smooha has called the Arab-Jewish rift in the State of Israel.[10] As might be suspected, the answer to all these questions is no.

The Arab-Jewish rift in the State of Israel opened up within the context of the intense struggle between the two national movements, Jewish and Palestinian, which emerged in the 1920s. The struggle reached its peak with the 1948 war, which transformed the Palestinian majority into a minority within a Jewish state. The rift has remained ever since. The decisive victory of the Zionist movement turned the Arab population into a demographically significant ethnic minority that is connected to its unique history, to the Palestinian identity, to the Palestinian struggle, and to events in the Arab world in general. This did not escape the attention of the Israeli leadership and the Jewish majority who view the Arab minority as part of the Arab-Palestinian domain that is hostile to Israel and committed to its uncompromising struggle and have thus continued to monitor all manifestations of political activity among the Arab population.[11] Added to this is the desire of the Jewish majority to secure geographical and political dominance, to distance the Arab minority from the main centers of power, and to limit the Arab minority's access to the resources of a country whose survival the early leaders labored to secure.[12]

The raising of the election threshold prior to the Knesset elections in March 2015 as well as the call by Prime Minister Netanyahu on election day for Likud voters to vote— since the "Arabs are coming out in droves"[13]— echoed the Jewish establishment's attitude toward the Arab minority since 1948. It demonstrated that the rift between the two populations since the establishment of the state has remained unchanged; it has not diminished in neither the political domain nor in public opinion, as can be seen in recent public opinion polls carried out in Israel that provide evidence of the Jewish sector's desire to limit its contact with Palestinian society and its broad support for the expulsion of the Arab population.[14]

On the Arab side, the situation is less pronounced, and it seems that more Arabs than Jews aspire to Arab integration within the State of Israel; however, it is hard to point to any significant progress in their situation. The Arab sector continues to claim that they suffer from political exclusion and greater socioeconomic gaps as well as civil inequality in areas such as housing, municipal services, and transportation.[15]

A clear expression of the Arab population's dissatisfaction was seen in October 2015. Thousands of young Arabs participated in a wave of demonstrations paralleling the wave of violence led by young Palestinians

in East Jerusalem, which overflowed into both the West Bank and Israel proper. These events, which originated in Wadi Ara, in mixed cities such as Jaffa and Haifa, and on the campuses of Haifa University and Tel Aviv University, demonstrated that protest is part of the Arab population's repertoire of political behavior. This is despite Lustick's claim that the protest events initiated by the Arab sector since the establishment of the state have been few and perhaps not entirely initiated by the Arab sector.[16]

Even if we accept the claim that the number of protest events was fairly limited during the decades of fragile coexistence between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel, the commonly accepted definition of sociopolitical protest still prevents us from seeing the full picture. This perspective focuses on familiar types of protest—i.e., demonstrations, media protest, political and parliamentary protest, with terror as the most extreme form. These are different forms of widespread grassroots protest in which violence used by protestors leads to a violent response. This perspective is derived from the security discourse that has come to dominate the outlook of the Israeli establishment and the general public on the Arab minority in Israel.

The Concept of Resistance

In order to extend the discussion and vary the perspective, we must adopt a new conceptual viewpoint and replace the concept of "protest" with a more appropriate concept, namely, "resistance." As mentioned above, in Israeli public discourse the term "resistance" is identified almost automatically with "armed struggle" and characterizes one of the main strategies adopted by the Palestinian national movement since the founding of Fatah in the late 1950s and since Fatah took control of the PLO in the mid-1960s. It is used to describe the Palestinian choice of violent struggle against Israel, which includes terror against Jewish civilians in Israel and abroad as a tool intended to serve political objectives and therefore serves to refer to both terror and terror attacks and to describe the characteristics of Palestinian activity against Israel in general.

The term "resistance" has acquired a much broader sociopolitical meaning—not unique to the Palestinian struggle—relating to the activity of sociopolitical entities that national, social, and cultural struggles face against superior forces. "Resistance" cannot, in fact, be understood in isolation from the term "hegemony." The terms complement one another, even though they are contrasting phenomena; there can be no resistance

without hegemony, and there is no hegemony that does not elicit resistance. Hegemony is a term developed by the Italian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci and other researchers, among them Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe[17]and Dani Filc,[18]who took Gramsci's insights[19] one step further by liberating them from his characterization of class struggle.

Hegemony is a process in which social groups seek to fashion a sociopolitical order around a system of ideas that corresponds with their interests. It is not necessarily synonymous with a ruling party but is rather the encounter between political entities and dominant ideas around which the social order organizes itself and allows tight control of the citizens and of the centers of political, economic, and institutional power. Hegemony is not static; it is a dynamic and changing situation, since the creation of a hegemonic arrangement involves an ongoing struggle with competing forces, each trying to advance conceptual alternatives to the existing hegemony. From this point of view, the hegemony aims to stabilize the social order but is, at the same time, challenged by the opposing, or resistance, forces. These resistance forces try to prevent the hegemony from organizing the social reality according to its principles and injecting them into all levels of society. Thus, while the hegemony attempts to impose its views, beliefs, and aspirations, the resistance is continually seeking to undermine the existing order and, if possible, to change it so that the resistance forces, along with the alternative ideas they represent, become the new hegemony.

A more clear-cut definition of the term "resistance" claims that is not just violent struggle but that it involves steps taken by politically inferior entities to express dissatisfaction with the existing order and offer an alternative. The literature on this phenomenon following the Second World War and during the period of decolonization, when research was focusing on the relations between subjects and their rulers, presents a complex picture of resistance to existing hegemonic initiatives. James Scott, in his studies of East Asian societies,[20] demonstrated the complex dynamic between resistance and hegemonic forces and stated that the resistance is particularly cautious in its social activity, since it is aware of its inferiority to the dominant forces. The resistance forces therefore conduct their struggle against the existing order in a variety of configurations, for example, by camouflaging it by using concepts, ideas, or platforms taken from the hegemonic world. They thus manage to balance between the need to express basic dissatisfaction with the existing order and the desire not to awaken the hegemony, which

may take severe and sometimes violent measures, even to the point of endangering lives.

Other researchers have shown that the hegemonic forces often show a willingness to co-opt resistance forces by partially acceding to their social and political demands and thus prevent shocks to the social order. One of the commonly used methods is to incorporate certain groups from among the resistance forces within the hegemonic, governmental, or bureaucratic establishment in an attempt to dismantle the resistance from within; in other words, "to divide and conquer."

Protest and Resistance in the Context of the Arab Minority in Israel

The political reality in Israel with respect to majority-minority relations is consistent with many of the theoretical traits discussed above. The geopolitical domain, which in Israeli-Jewish public discourse is referred to as the Land of Israel and in Palestinian discourse as Palestine, has since 1948 been the setting for a struggle between two national movements: the Palestinian national movement and the Jewish-Zionist national movement. Their struggle is essentially over hegemony, i.e., the ability to fashion this geopolitical domain in order to achieve conceptual, political, and demographic dominance. The struggle is multidimensional. Since 1921, it has been accompanied by political violence, which erupted in the 1929 riots, the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt, and the War of Independence in the decisive year of 1948, though it also took place on other levels. The Zionist movement accomplished far more than the Palestinian movement, such as, for example, creating an economic infrastructure for the nascent state, establishing independent civil and military institutions, developing the geographic domain, and achieving international legitimacy for the creation of a Jewish state as part of a strategy that was defined by Theodor Herzl as "state Zionism."

The Jewish state's declaration of independence by Ben-Gurion and the civil war that started a few months before, along with the invasion of the Arab armies, developed into the 1948 War of Independence and brought the struggle over hegemony to a head. From that point onward, the Zionist movement had the upper hand. Following the war, the Palestinian-Arab majority (numbering 1.2 million) of the British Mandate territory became a minority of about 150,000 in the new State of Israel. The Arab population was significantly weakened; not only had it suffered severe physical losses,

but the war had induced the flight or expulsion of about 700,000 Palestinians and caused deep psychological trauma among those remaining, now a minority in the new state.

It is no wonder that the term adopted by the Palestinians was the *Nakba* ("the disaster"), which was inspired by the Lebanese intellectual Constantin Zureiq. It describes the scope of the national crisis, which buried the hope of establishing a Palestinian nation-state according to the UN partition decision. This crisis was exacerbated by the fact that the remaining Palestinian-Arab population was perceived and treated as a fifth column affiliated with the hostile Arab world. The military rule that imposed severe restrictions on the movements of the Arab population immediately following the war was a clear manifestation of this attitude. It was only two decades later, in December 1966, that military rule was officially cancelled. Ben-Gurion had preferred to leave it in place, despite other opinions voiced in the political and military establishment.[21]

The results of the war in 1948 changed the rules of the game between the two national movements and shaped the struggle for hegemony. Instead of a struggle between two symmetrical movements with equal potential to act in the local and international arena, there was now a completely new set of rules. Hegemony over the territory now belonged to the Zionists, and the new political establishment sought vigorously to provide the new reality with genuine content, taking over the resources left behind by the fleeing Palestinian population. The first government of Israel worked in a variety of ways to solidify Jewish hegemony over the country by maintaining the military superiority demonstrated in the war; increasing Jewish presence territorially; renewing *aliyah* (Jewish immigration), which in the 1950s was focused on North African Jewry; and fashioning Jewish national symbols. From the perspective of the Jewish hegemony, the Palestinian-Arab minority had no role in the design of the new state. The Israeli establishment led by Ben-Gurion aimed to leave the Arabs in the State of Israel as a small, downtrodden, and supervised minority who would not interfere with the work of shaping the new state, particularly during the critical early stages. This was why Ben-Gurion maintained the military rule imposed on the Arab population, which was only cancelled only after he was replaced by Levi Eshkol.

The end of the struggle over hegemony created a new sociopolitical reality; the symmetry between the two nationalist forces in the struggle

for control was lost, and a new reality of clear hegemonic power over a defeated national minority was created. The asymmetric relations between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority were part of the new order; a reality contrary to that desired by the Arab population. From this stage on, relations between the State of Israel and the remaining Arab minority were those of hegemonic and resistance forces. The Arab minority resistance forces aimed to achieve one of two goals:

a. To change the existing order and the lack of symmetry between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority. This was not necessarily an attempt to reverse history and retrieve a lost past but rather to introduce major changes into the existing order that would expand the influence and political presence of the Arab minority in the State of Israel.
b. To preserve the presence and, in particular, the historical Palestinian identity of the Arab minority and to arrest what was viewed as a rather successful effort by the regime to blur their national identity, isolate them from their Palestinian past, divide them from the neighboring Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza, and weaken their identification with the rest of the Arab world.

The Arab minority's resistance ranged, therefore, from the passive preservation of the early decades to the active attempt to change the reality of minority existence and undermine the characteristics of the existing hegemonic Jewish order. The swings between preservation and change were influenced by a series of fixed variables, among them the power of the state, as well as unfixed variables, which are related to a broad group of contexts within which the Arab minority has existed since 1948. These include, for example, the Israeli sociopolitical reality, the security and geopolitical environment, the regional and global contexts, and the internal reality of Arab society itself. Variation in these contexts over time has also led to the adjustment of the behavior patterns chosen by Arab society in order to either express passive dissatisfaction with the existing situation or aspire to change it.

Arab society has always been highly heterogeneous. It is characterized by a variety of social affiliations, ethnic groups, geographic divisions, and political representations, and it can therefore be claimed that the attempt to identify the resistance patterns of the Arab minority is open to interpretation and overgeneralization and ignores the diversity of Arab society. Despite its multiplicity of identities, the Arab minority can still be viewed from an

overall perspective, not just by means of the conventional academic tools that separate the system into sub-groups and political entities but also by means of its overview as a holistic system. This is a system that is defined according to the common motivation of all its parts and the joint effect of that motivation, which is based on the aspiration to achieve shared goals as an ideological and political collective. Within this framework, Arab society has chosen, during the long period of relations with the Israeli establishment and the Jewish majority, to organize its resistance according to a specific type of activity that has been influenced directly by defined social and political forces and contexts.

Chapter 2

Factors Influencing the Character of the Arab Minority's Resistance and Methods of Protest

There are various factors determining the Arab minority's methods of resistance. The academic literature on this issue has pointed to various factors that play a role in this context, focusing primarily on those that affect the potential for political violence. The issue occupied the attention of quite a number of researchers in the late twentieth century, a period characterized by the weakening of the nation-state and the strengthening of non-state entities[22] including ethnic, lingual, and cultural minorities who attempted to undermine the existing state structures. This period also saw significant political shocks in various parts of the world such as Spain, Belgium, and the Balkan states. Most of these scholarly attempts were intended to provide a kind of generic map of determinants, which makes it possible to understand the behavior of minorities in various contexts and settings.[23] This type of analysis is unable to connect between generic and, allegedly, objective variables and the network of local contexts that are specific to each minority. However, it importantly provides a broad picture of the factors determining and motivating minorities, even if work remains to be done in fine-tuning and reconciling them with the historical, cultural, political, and other contexts that characterize the story of each individual minority.

The factors that determine minority resistance patterns can be classified as either external or internal. There is naturally a close relationship between external and internal factors, and they either reinforce or neutralize each other. Differentiating between them makes it possible to analyze the development of relations between the Arab minority and the Israeli establishment and Jewish society as a basis for understanding the principal modes of resistance

adopted by the Arab minority and their increasing intensity over time due to political, social, cultural, and regional developments.

The Nature of Leadership

Leadership is an important factor in a minority's choice of resistance. Their leadership plays a major role in representing them in discussions with the hegemonic agents. It also has the power to initiate processes, although it sometimes finds itself being dragged into them. Leadership is not homogenous, and while political leadership is the most familiar, there are many other types of leadership or elites—economic, social, grassroots, cultural, intellectual, and religious—each fulfilling their role in the minority's social system. In some cases, they cooperate with one another to create an elite core and a multidimensional control structure that can achieve positions of internal hegemony within the minority group; in other cases, particularly in the case of political leadership, there is friction between the various types of leadership and within each type.

A historical overview of the Arab minority in Israel makes it possible to identity transitions and changes in the character of their leadership, which largely dictated the resistance method used against the ruling establishment. The early decades of the state were marked by the flight of the Arab minority's political leadership following the 1948 war and, at a later stage, the imposition of military rule. During these years, the Arab minority remained without representative political leadership, and any leadership was provided by the heads of local clans who managed arrangements with the representatives of military rule and served to control the Arab population on behalf of the establishment. Alongside them was an intellectual leadership composed of poets, writers, and thinkers who played a central role in establishing the main patterns of resistance, in contrast to the traditional leadership, which represented a paradigm of collaboration with the establishment.

In the 1970s, the center of gravity shifted away from the traditional clan leaders to the political leadership of the young generation. The older generation had suffered not only from inequality and discrimination[24] but also from existing political practices in Israeli society. For example, the Arab political delegations of the Mapai Party, which had included the heads of the clans, were replaced by professional politicians with a political identity. Notwithstanding the early al-Ard Party, which was established in 1959 and declared illegal in the 1960s, it was the Rakah Communist Party and its

various incarnations that represented the new Arab politics in that period and played a major role in the ability of the Arab minority to express its demands.

In the 1980s, a new stage began with the founding of additional party lists, such as the Arab Democratic Party (in 1983) and the Progressive List for Peace (in 1984), which ran in the national elections for the Knesset. This process continued during the 1990s with the creation of Balad (in 1996) and the United Arab List (in 1996). A religious leadership also emerged during that same period, which grew out of the Islamic Movement and split into factions: the Northern Branch, which chose to stay outside the state's establishment frameworks, and the Southern Branch, represented by the United Arab List, which chose to run in the national elections as of the fourteenth Knesset in 1996.

The Arab sector's politicization did not just add weight to the political leadership in its presentation of the Arab position and in shaping the patterns of resistance (which were mainly political) but also created a national forum in the form of the Council of Arab Mayors in 1974. This forum brought together all the local Arab leaders and later, in 1982, also included the Supreme Monitoring Committee of Arab Israelis, which was created as an umbrella organization of the Arab political system and represented the political parties, the mayors, the non-profit organizations, and other entities. The creation of these two institutions, which were oriented toward the sector as a whole, represented an advanced stage in the Arab sector's process of organization and political institutionalization.

The 1990s saw the declining status of the political party and the strengthening of the social-intellectual leadership, which was part of the diminishing power of the state and the weakening of its institutions. This led to unprecedented growth in the number of non-profit organizations in both the Arab and Jewish sectors alike,[25] which emerged from increasing social and political activity. The leading figures in these organizations were academics from Israeli institutions of higher education, now regarded as a convenient platform from which to initiate sociopolitical activity based on more than just Arab representation in the Knesset. Indeed, Arab representation in the Knesset was largely viewed as facing a glass ceiling with regard to its ability to advance the aspirations and goals of the Arab minority.

The changing types of leadership over time have influenced the patterns of resistance. The character of each type of leadership and the tools available to them dictated the nature of the various resistance initiatives taken over

the years. These initiatives were seemingly tailor-made to the change in the character of Arab leadership, and, as discussed below, there was a close correlation between the character of the resistance initiative and the leadership. The leadership of the resistance shifted from being cultural and intellectual during the early decades of the state to being political in the 1970s, and finally to the reestablishment of an intellectual leadership in the 1990s. Each of these leadership types had certain tools available to them but not others, and this determined the toolbox that was available to the Arab minority in their challenge to the existing hegemony.

The Gaps Between the Majority and the Minority

The existence of a basic asymmetry between the majority and the minority and between the ruling hegemonic power and its subjects is undoubtedly the motivation of the minority to change the rules of the game or, at least, improve them. The socioeconomic gap has less of an influence on the character and pattern of resistance than on its very existence. In the particular context of the Arab minority in Israel, the asymmetry between Jews and Arabs was created in 1948. The UN partition in November 1947 assumed a reality in which the territory was divided between two states, one Arab and one Jewish; the Jewish state was supposed to have a significant Arab minority (numbering about one hundred thousand) under its jurisdiction. The results of the war caused a minority of 16 percent of the total population, a figure that has remained almost unchanged despite the absolute growth in the population.[26]

The formation of majority-minority relations, which involves a kind of internalization on both sides, reached maturity toward the end of the second decade of the state. In late 1966, the military rule that had been imposed on the Arab minority at the end of the War of Independence was cancelled; the lack of symmetry, however, remained. In addition to the demographic asymmetry, there were other dimensions of imbalance that highlighted Jewish dominance. Although in a political sense the Arab minority were granted civil rights in the Declaration of Independence, these rights were defined over the years according to the asymmetric relations between the two sides in a number of additional areas:

1. The national dimension. Although equal citizenship and collective rights, such as the right to a language and education, were granted to Arab citizens of Israel, the definition of Israel as a Jewish state limited

the presence of the Arab minority in the Israeli domain almost from the start. Two of the many manifestations include:

a. *The political level*. The Arab minority suffers from underrepresentation, which is manifested in the gap between its presence in the state's institutions, in particular in the legislature, and its ability to influence the decision-making processes in the state and determine the national agenda. Not only do the Arab minority and their representatives have no say on security issues—except as critics on the sidelines—but their ability to act on other issues is also dependent on the degree to which these issues affect groups in the Jewish sector, such as economic inequality, housing, and the cost of living.
b. *The symbolic level*. Despite the existence of civil equality, Jewish dominance in Israeli society leads to inequality in all aspects of the public domain. This is manifested in the state's national symbols, such as the anthem, the flag, national holidays, the calendar, and, of course, the Hebrew language; Hebrew is dominant over Arabic, even though both languages were recognized by the British as official languages (alongside English) in Mandatory Palestine. In recent years, there has been a visible, primarily legislative, effort to weaken the status of Arabic and to define Hebrew as the only official language in Israel.

2. The civil dimension. Another manifestation of the marginality of the Arab minority is socioeconomic inequality in almost every possible domain, including investment in education, infrastructure, urban development, transportation, and the allocation of land and housing. The Or Committee, which was set up to examine the circumstances of the violent clashes that occurred in the fall 2000 between Arab demonstrators in the Galilee and the Triangle and the police, reported on this inequality at length. However, despite government efforts to reduce the economic inequality, there has still been no significant narrowing of socioeconomic gaps between Jews and Arabs.[27] The connection between the national and civil dimensions is clear; the main components of civil inequality, such as in the allocation of land for construction, originate in the unwillingness of the Jewish majority to give up resources and assets that are perceived as having national importance.
3. The social dimension. Asymmetric relations also exist in the cultural domain, which is determined, on the whole, by the Jewish majority's system of symbols and ancient culture. Since 2009, there has been a

clear trend toward the exclusion of the Arab minority from the Jewish public domain. This is reflected in proposed legislation in the Knesset, such as the cancellation of Arabic's status as an official language and the Nationality Law, which both aim to reinforce the Jewish character of the state and thus emphasize the Arabs' lack of belonging. It is also visible in sporadic social phenomena such as racism against Arabs, which is expressed on the soccer field, in social media, and in acts of violence against individual Arabs and Muslim holy places. Recent opinion polls have shown the tendency of the Jewish public to separate themselves from the Arab public.[28] This is increasingly visible in public discourse and can be seen as a result of the expansion of mixed neighborhoods and the growing presence of Arabs in mixed cities, both old and new, such as Upper Nazareth, Karmiel, Beer Sheva, and Arad, a phenomenon that elicits resistance and dissatisfaction among the Jewish public.

It is the various dimensions of asymmetry between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority that determine the minority's willingness to protest and to strive for change using the tools of resistance. While the historical process shows a certain narrowing, although not total elimination, of socioeconomic gaps and civil discrimination against the Arab population, the political and cultural asymmetry has become more pronounced in recent years, and this is motivating the Arab minority to change their reality.

The Power of the State

Relations between minorities and majorities are delicate and fragile. This is particularly true in democratic states in which rights, both civil and collective, are granted to minorities, who can then participate in the political game and influence the state's decision-making either by means of representation in the ruling institutions or by political organization and protest. The delicate system of balances between the majority and the minority has two aspects: on the one hand, the minority must accept the democratic rules of the game, including the principle of majority rule and the acceptance of decisions made by the majority, even if they disagree with the decision; on the other hand, the majority must allow the minority to express their positions and aspirations freely and refrain from exploiting political power in a way that harms the basic rights of the minority.

The willingness of minorities to participate in the democratic game is, therefore, largely dependent on the willingness of majorities to maintain the

hope of achieving change. When minorities live under tyranny, they can be expected to overturn the rules of the game and to adopt tools of resistance that involve political violence and may undermine stability, even to the point of civil war. The use of violent resistance is an extreme scenario, partly because minorities in any political framework tend to pursue a peaceful existence and are loath to use extreme methods that may elicit reactions of force from the state. This is particularly true in non-democratic states where the authorities are more likely to apply severe sanctions and to use violence in response to the demands of minorities, particularly those who are ready to use violence against the state, its institutions, and its representatives.

When, on the other hand, minorities have a measure of sociopolitical freedom of action, they adopt more sophisticated types of resistance and seem to be satisfied with more modest goals than radical changes in the asymmetric relations. More restrained patterns of resistance comprise civil protest, which aims to do no more than express dissatisfaction with the existing situation. These expressions of resistance are more sophisticated in the sense that they are downplayed and camouflaged by, for example, the use of hegemonic raw material that does not openly challenge the hegemony or elicit the use of force. It can therefore be concluded that the more powerful the state and the more pervasive its presence in the social domain, the more difficult it is for the minority to express their resistance directly. They are more likely to adopt patterns of resistance that allow them to express their dissatisfaction with the existing situation while, at the same time, protecting them from harsh state responses that may harm their vital interests.

In the Israeli context, the concept of the state's power has clear historical relevance.[29] The Arab-Israeli conflict has left its mark on the Jewish public who view the Arab side as hostile and suspicious from a security perspective. One famous example is Ben-Gurion's statement that the Arabs should be judged not by what they have done but rather by what they will do. The intense encounter with the State of Israel in 1948 was a traumatic experience for the Arabs and its effect has been felt for many ensuing years. Although the Arabic term *Nakba* is used to describe the outcome of that encounter, it has also had the effect of inculcating a fear of the state and, particularly, its security mechanisms—be that the IDF, the police, or the General Security Service. These were, and to a large extent still are, perceived as maintaining close surveillance of the Arab minority and prepared to use any means in

order to penetrate Arab society, monitor its activity, and, if necessary, impose severe sanctions against those suspected of hostile activity.

Fear of the state's mechanisms has left its mark on Arab society and even has led to self-censorship. Charged encounters with the security forces that often ended in blood spilling and Arab fatalities, such as the Land Day protests in March 1976 and the events of October 2000, only confirmed the fears of the Arab sector and their implicit and explicit assumptions about the functioning of the state's mechanisms and its attitude toward the Arab population. These constitute a barrier to the adoption of certain types of resistance, primarily violent, and have led the Arab minority to adopt other methods of resistance that comply with the democratic and civil rules of the game and reduce the potential cost.

The Arab minority in Israel live with the traumatic memory of the Nakba, which receives renewed expression from time to time. They have, nonetheless, navigated their way through a reality in which the power of the state and its presence within the social and civil domain have diversified, thus affecting their ability to maneuver and their choice of methods of resistance. These variations in the power of the state are not, of course, characteristic of the State of Israel alone but are global processes, the most central being the erosion of the nation-state and the subsequent dispersion of political power. This process has been described by many scholars[30] as the combination of processes of globalization—through which, in the current century, some political influence has shifted from states to non-state actors—with localization, according to which small groups have become more powerful and the political activity of individuals (e.g., Edward Snowden) has grown in importance due to their effect on large systems.

Any discussion of the history of the Arab minority in Israel must focus on the fragmentation of Israeli politics since the end of the 1960s, which was reflected in the erosion of the political and cultural homogeneity of Mapai and the Labor Party. One of the manifestations of this process was the diminishing involvement of state institutions in society, which subsequently became more autonomous, and the visible expansion of other power centers. One of these is multiculturalism, which is reflected in community empowerment, particularly among certain sectors such as the ultra-Orthodox, the religious Zionists, the Sephardi sector, the settlers, the secular liberals, the gay community, and the Arab sector. Another power center is individualism, which is reflected in the emphasis both on the status of individuals/citizens and their self-realization

and on neo-liberal economic policy, which is based on the idea of personal economic freedom.

These changes created new sociopolitical frameworks in Israel. Political power shifted from central government to civil society, the legal system, and the private sector. The transformation in relations between society and state led to political changes among the Arab minority, whose presence was bolstered as a result of the aforementioned process of multiculturalism. This is the primary reason for the Arab sector's internal politicization that started in the 1970s and gained momentum in the 1980s and was characterized by the growth of a new generation of leaders and political parties and the shaping of a national Palestinian identity. In other words, the political mobilization of the Arab minority mirrored the more general transformation of Israeli politics. As Israeli politics became more divided and fragile, the Arab minority became more active and more inclined to adopt clear patterns of resistance to the state, initiatives that showed a greater daring to formulate their demands.

This increasing boldness culminated in the publication of the Future Vision documents in late 2006 and early 2007. These documents were a byproduct of the declining power of the state and presented a conceptual alternative to the current regime, based on the dismantling of Jewish hegemonic status. The documents were an expression of the fact that boundaries that excluded the Arab minority from the center—i.e., the gaps in the national, political, and cultural domains—remained intact and had even widened. The documents could also be seen as the result of processes of change in Israeli society since the 1970s, which not only created opportunities regarding the management of Arab resistance to the state but also reflected an opposite trend, according to which the minority became further distanced from the Jewish majority. Alongside the fragmentation of Israeli society and the undermining of the model of the mobilized republican society, which characterized the first three decades of the state, there was a conflicting parallel process taking place in which Jewish identity was strengthened.

We are not using the term "Jewish identity" here in the sense of religious identity, although the results of surveys and research in recent years have indicated a growing trend toward religiosity in Israeli society[31] and the strengthening of a national Jewish identity. Jewish cultural sources, both religious and secular, serve as an inventory of building materials that facilitate the creation of the social glue that connects the different parts of the Jewish

collective. As Israeli society abandoned its collective traits, Jewish identity became a more critical component of the production engineering of Jewish society in Israel. This process left the Arab sector outside of the collective hegemonic framework and preserved the boundaries between the minority and majority societies, affecting not only Arab society but also, in more recent years, foreign workers and, particularly, African refugees. These latter groups have become another community whose presence in Israeli society has made it possible for the Jewish collective to define itself according to its Jewish identity in the wake of the social fragmentation processes.

It is therefore possible to observe a fascinating dialectic process. On the one hand, social processes and the reduced power of the state have transformed the Arab minority into a social "sector" that stands alongside other sectors in Israeli society, thus enabling it to express itself with greater ease. On the other hand, these social processes, which in fact strengthen Jewish national identity as Israeli society experiences fragmentation, have placed more rigid boundaries between Jewish and Arab society and thus helped to catalyze Arab attempts to undermine the existing structure and replace it with a new one that will ensure their full integration within Israeli society.

The Minority and the Majority Society

It is not only the power of the state that influences the method of resistance chosen by the minority but also the location of the minority within the majority society. Tensions in the relations between the majority and the minority notwithstanding, the fact that they live together creates a mutual process of learning, in which the two sides sometimes become similar to one another. Research into the relations between colonial societies and their colonial rulers showed that people under foreign occupation adopt patterns of behavior that are characteristic of the rulers against whom they are fighting.[32]

In the current context, the presence of Arab society within the State of Israel was not always an accepted fact. The military rule imposed on the Arab minority immediately after the War of Independence reflected the reservations of the new leaders about the presence of the Arab population within the territory of the Jewish state and their hope to correct the situation. There were also many in the Arab community who viewed the new reality as reversible, hoping that another round of fighting would bring about a strategic change that would recover their lost homeland. The geopolitical reality, however, dictated otherwise. The two sides—Jewish and Arab—

gradually internalized the reality of an Arab minority within a Jewish state, a process that was influenced by the Six Day War with the expansion of Israel's borders and hegemony, which dashed Arab hopes for change.

This recognition channeled the energy of Arab society toward political endeavors to improve its conditions within the existing Israeli reality, preserving the memory of its past and its own sense of identity. Thus, starting from the late 1960s, a process began that has been defined by some scholars as "integration" and by others as "Israelization." A leading proponent of this approach was Sammy Smooha who in 1980 was the first to point out that Arab society in Israel had become part of the overall Israeli social milieu. He also highlighted a deep-seated process in which the Arab minority viewed Israeli society as its main arena for political effort with respect not only to its formal laws but also its rules, its logic, and part of its culture. According to Smooha, this "Israelization" did not, however, involve the shedding of the Arab minority's ethnic and cultural identity. On the contrary, as the Arab population became more involved in Israeli-Jewish society, its national identity became more pronounced, as if attempting to protect Arab society from a blurring of its past and the erasure of its primordial identity. Arab researchers and public figures, including former Member of Knesset Azmi Bishara and political scientist As'ad Ghanem, warned repeatedly of this risk of "Israelization" and tried to moderate it.

The historian Elie Rekhes merged the two phenomena of "integration" and "Israelization" and defined them using the concept of "localization" of the Arab minority in Israel. He thus described the complex interaction between the transformation of the Arab minority into an integral part of Israeli society and their aspiration to shape the characteristics of their Palestinian nationalist identity.[33] The Arab minority had not, it seems, backed away from their demands on the state and Jewish society based on their national otherness, even if they had accepted the existence of the framework of the Israeli state of which they were a part. In this sense, the desire of the Arab minority to change the status quo regarding their national position was based on seeing the State of Israel as their frame of reference and their acknowledgment of the existing geopolitical reality between the Mediterranean and the Jordan, in which Israel is a given fact.

Some of the Arab minority's patterns of resistance drew their content—ideas, elements, and even historical definitions and components—from Israel's political culture by virtue of their proximity, which also implies

mutual learning. For example, an examination of the Future Vision documents shows their similarity to the founding documents of the national Zionist movement, in particular the Declaration of Independence, and their adoption of the civil democratic framework as a platform for organizing resistance and expressing demands for a major change of Arab status. In the last five years, an additional learning process has been revealed through the Arab minority's tendency to deemphasize the national discourse and to adopt patterns of social discourse when presenting their demands. This is a discourse that has become dominant in Israeli society since the social protest in 2011 and that enables the Arab population and its representatives to demand solutions from the state for problems in areas such as housing, education, transportation, and infrastructure, some of which are also relevant to other groups in Israeli-Jewish society.

External Conflicts

The regional context, and some would say the security context, are the main factors influencing the Arab minority's patterns of resistance. Israeli researchers, including the political scientist and sociologist Hillel Frisch[34] and the historians Yitzhak Reiter[35] and Dan Schueftan,[36] have described the close mutual relationship between the characteristics of the Arab minority's behavior and development and both of these contexts. These researchers have responded to Palestinian researchers such as Nadim Rouhana[37]and As'ad Ghanem,[38] who have emphasized the ethno-Jewish character of Israel as the exclusive determinant of Palestinian reality and the ensuing civil and political inequality in the system. While this particular discussion is beyond the scope of this memorandum, a discussion of the relationship between the regional environment and the Arab population in Israel is most relevant in the examination of the minority's patterns of resistance, as indicated by various political scientists. Ted Gurr, for example, looked at focuses of instability in states characterized by internal rifts and claimed that neighboring states and national groups in other countries influence the behavior of minorities, even to the point of adopting methods of political violence. Such methods endanger the internal stability of nation-states that are in the midst of national-cultural conflicts.[39]

In the Israeli context, the duality of the Arab population since the founding of the state—its presence in the Israeli domain alongside its nationalistic, cultural, and linguistic ties with the Arab-Palestinians beyond the boundaries

of the state—has influenced its behavior and strategic choices as well as its patterns of resistance. Their ties are in fact twofold: on the one hand, they have ties to the neighboring Palestinian entity in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem (which is, in essence, home to an integral part of the Arab population in Israel from which it was separated in 1948, reunited in 1967, and again separated by Israeli policy that aimed to place a barrier between the Arabs of the state and the neighboring Palestinian populations) that are based on a shared ethnic and national identity; while, on the other hand, they have ties to the regional Arab entity that are based on cultural kinship.

Developments in the neighboring Palestinian entities have had implications for the Arab minority in Israel, who, as part of the Palestinian people, are basically sympathetic to those entities. Similarly, the Arab minority identifies emotionally with the Arab world, most of which has been in conflict with the State of Israel for many years (though the level of this conflict reduced somewhat during the 1990s). This identification is not just sentimental; the Arab minority in Israel has been influenced by the social, political, and conceptual transformations experienced in both the neighboring Palestinian domains and the larger Arab region. For example, the development of political Islam among the Arab minority in Israel cannot be understood without analyzing the religious transformations in the Arab world during the 1980s. Likewise, Arab communism and socialism in the 1970s influenced the development of the Communist Party in Israel, the party that became the standard bearer for the Arab minority's demands for civil equality.

Mutual influences have also been evident in the diffusion of methods of protest and resistance, in particular between the Arab minority in Israel and the neighboring Palestinian entities, which have experienced ups and downs in their conflict with Israel. The activism of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza has always been greater and more widespread than that of the Arabs in Israel; however, the latter learned much from their neighbors about resistance strategies, even if they implemented these strategies on a much smaller scale. The reason for this is the unique sociopolitical context of the Arab minority in Israel, which enjoys far more civil and political rights than the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is sufficient to mention the Land Day events of 1976, which occurred during a time of political ferment and violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, or the events of October 2000, which were sparked following the visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount. Even then, the Arab minority's learning

process did not involve a blind adoption of the methods of resistance seen in the Palestinian territories and the Arab countries but rather their adaptation to the unique sociopolitical context of the Arab minority in Israel.

A helpful illustration is the influence of the Arab Spring, which began in the winter of 2009–2010. The Arab minority in Israel did not automatically adopt the methods of political violence observed in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere. Rather, they channeled their energy into social protest—including even an unsuccessful attempt to join the protest of the Israeli middle class in the summer of 2011—and, later, into social discourse at the initiative of the Joint Arab List led by Ayman Odeh. This example demonstrates that the concept of "localization" is relevant to the willingness of the Arab minority to both define their unique identity within the Israeli domain and modify the concept of resistance to fit this unique status.

Global Influences

The globalization processes that have blurred national boundaries and facilitated the broadening of social, economic, political, and conceptual ties have influenced the patterns of political relations between minority groups and nation-states since the late twentieth century. This was an outcome of two specific characteristics of the globalization trend: the weakening of state frameworks and the diminishing power of the modern state, many of whose mechanisms, such as the exclusive control over knowledge and its dispersal, were made irrelevant; and the processes of democratization, which led to a number of revolutions, including those in the 1990s, such as the "color revolutions" in the republics of the former Soviet Union and the revolutions in the Arab world since 2010.

The weakening of states on the one hand and their democratization on the other has been reflected in the development of a discourse on self-definition among minorities in Europe and elsewhere, whether as part of existing national entities or through their dismantling and the creation of a new order. The latter scenario was evident in the conflicts in the Balkan region and in other locations in Europe, such as Spain. This discourse manifests itself in the increased interest in issues relating to the various minorities, in the legal language used to formulate and define the rights of minorities, and, above all, in the political struggles of minorities to achieve their demands for self-definition and recognition of their unique identity. All these created political shocks in those nation-states which must routinely deal with the

tension between their interest in preserving the nation-state framework and their recognition of the otherness of the various minority groups that are seeking to change the existing agenda.

The Arab minority in Israel has not remained unaffected by globalization. Among the effects of this global discourse on the demands of the Arab minority is the effort to transform the Supreme Court into a platform for advancing their interests, primarily in the area of civil equality, by using legal concepts drawn from the wider discourse on the rights of minorities. Most prominent in this context are the activities of Adalah, a non-profit organization for the advancement of the legal rights of the Arab minority in Israel. Private individuals in the Arab sector have also had legal successes; for example, the Katzir-Qaadan case in 2000 in which Chief Justice Aharon Barak ruled that:

> The state did not have the right according to law to allocate state land to the Jewish Agency in order to establish the Katzir community settlement on the basis of discrimination between Jews and non-Jews . . . the state must consider the request of the claimants to purchase a plot of land in the Katzir settlement in order to establish their home.

The Arab minority in Israel thus adopted civil modes of resistance to the existing agenda, as learned from other national and ethnic minorities in, primarily, Western democratic nations.

Chapter 3

Characteristics of the Arab Minority's Resistance and Its Development over Time

This chapter analyzes the patterns of resistance adopted by the Arab minority in Israel in each specific period and discusses the connection between the particular pattern and the various contexts (political, social, civil, and global) within which it operated. These connections are not static but rather vary according to the circumstances, and it is therefore important to consider each of the models within their relevant time and context. This examination is thus conducted according to what the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure called synchronic and diachronic structures; in other words, analysis of the relevant content and time dimension of each model and use of the following axes:

1. The overall conceptual characterization of each pattern of resistance.
2. The time period in which the minority adopted each type of resistance from the start of its relations with the State of Israel in 1948 until today.
3. The unique conditions that facilitated the growth of each type of resistance.
4. The main centers of power within the Arab minority that led the resistance initiative.

Violent Resistance

Political violence was and still is an important tool in the struggle between the Palestinian national movement and the Zionist national movement, and later on the State of Israel. The creation of the state was not the historical starting point for political violence; its roots are much deeper. They first appear during the period of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel, specifically at the beginning of the 1920s following the First World War. This was a key point in time from two perspectives: first, the legitimacy granted the Zionist

movement by the British agreement to create a Jewish national home in the Land of Israel, which led to the expansion of Jewish settlement; and second, the emergence of the Palestinian national movement as a result of the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the collapse of the pan-Arab national aspirations in the early 1920s.

From this point forward, the struggle between the national movements began to take on violent characteristics. The academic approach, particularly from the Zionist viewpoint, identified the violent events of 1921, 1929, and 1936–1939 as expressions of a conscious and proactive Palestinian effort to use violence to resist Jewish settlement and foil the efforts of the Zionist movement.[40] These three violent encounters between Jews and Arabs were, therefore, a precursor to a much larger violent struggle, namely, the civil war that broke out immediately after the UN General Assembly vote on partition (Resolution 181). This became the first stage of the 1948 war, in which the struggle between the two national movements for the Land of Israel was determined. Many researchers have therefore viewed the three skirmishes that preceded the 1948 war as part of a Palestinian strategy to destroy Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel and convince the British to reverse their decision to grant a state to the Jews in the partitioned Land of Israel.[41] These events could perhaps be considered as prototypes of the intifadas of 1987 and 2000.

The establishment of the State of Israel and the decisive victory of 1948 did not end the struggle between the national movements; neither did it end the use of political violence by the Palestinian national movement. The two intifadas of 1987 and 2000 as well as the undeclared intifada that has been going on since the autumn of 2015 signify the use of violence as a method of Palestinian resistance. Even if the current discussion does not include the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza but only the Arab-Palestinian community within the State of Israel, the question still remains about the historical place of political violence as a pattern of resistance in the context of the Arab minority and the extent to which the latter have been influenced by the violent methods of resistance used by Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The concept of violent resistance relates to two types of phenomena that need to be analyzed in the unique context of the Jewish-Arab national conflict: terror and grassroots or semi-grassroots wide-scale uprisings or outbreaks of violence. Terror has a variety of similar definitions. Ehud

Sprinzak, for example, defined terror as an act that uses extreme violence against non-combatant civilians as a symbolic act and as a tool for instilling fear in the public. Others have described terror as the purposeful use or threat of violence against civilians or civilian targets with the goal of achieving political ends, such as replacing the regime or changing policy. The second type of violent resistance, namely grassroots or semi-grassroots uprisings, has similarly political and strategic goals, as in the case of the intifadas or the outbreaks of violence prior to the founding of the state. In between these two forms of political violence, there are other types of civil protest, such as demonstrations, gatherings, strikes, and even acts of civil disobedience, which are not part of this chapter's discussion. It should, however, be mentioned that some of these types of protest, specifically demonstrations and gatherings, have become one of the main tools of the Arab minority in Israel, in particular since the 1970s and more sporadically prior to that. For example, during the period of military rule (1949–1966), there were acts of Arab public protest initiated by the Communist Party, demanding the easing of restrictions on movement, which were imposed by the military governors.

A historical overview shows a positive correlation between the politicization of the Arab community in Israel and the increased use of non-violent protest by the Arab parties, with the goal of advancing the two main causes pursued by Arab politicians since the 1970s: the national cause, which identified with the struggle led by the PLO and later the Palestinian Authority to realize Palestinian national aspirations; and the civil cause, which aimed to reduce discrimination and establish equality between Jews and Arabs in the allocation of resources.

In the absence of official data on this subject, it seems that the trend among the Arab minority to take to the streets to protest has diminished, as is largely the case among the Jewish majority. In public discourse, this has been seen as passivity, a lack of interest in politics among the general and the Arab public, and a greater focus on daily existence. One exception was the social protest of summer 2011, which brought hundreds of thousands of Jews out into the streets, particularly in the central areas of Gush Dan and Tel Aviv, as well as a few Arab activists, who joined the national protest out of a genuine sharing of interests. However, the attempts of the Arab parties to encourage their constituents to join the 2011 protests had limited success. Clear evidence of this is the fact that the number of participants in the gatherings to mark the anniversaries of the October 2000 events and

Land Day has never exceeded several thousand. The Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement does manage to recruit thousands of participants in its annual mass gatherings; however, this can be seen less as a result of the public's desire to take part in political protest and more as a product of the social and communal nature of the events.

The more interesting question is not, therefore, related to civil protest but rather to violent resistance, namely terror and mass outbreaks of violence, and its place among the Arab minority's other types of protest. It is not only the theoretical discussion that is critical here but also the fact that political violence has become the main starting point of the Israeli establishment and the Jewish public's discussion about Arabs in Israel. This discussion has solid historical roots; the 1921 and 1929 riots as well as the period of the Arab Revolt are embedded in the collective historical memory of the Israeli establishment, seen as unexpected security events, which, due to the lack of preparedness on the part of both the Jewish population and the security establishment, had tragic consequences for the Jewish population. These events became the cornerstone of perceptions of the Arab security threat and a model for preparation. And the intifadas only reinforced this viewpoint. It is, therefore, no wonder that since the events of October 2000, the attention of the General Security Service has focused on estimating outbreaks of violence not only in the West Bank but also among the Arab minority in Israel.

Furthermore, political violence, whether it involves terror or outbreaks of violence, has different implications in the internal Israeli context than in the occupied territories. While the West Bank is perceived by the Israeli public as nationally contested territory where acts of violence can be expected, in the sovereign territory of Israel there is a different conception. Here, political violence with a national motivation is regarded as a grave and unusual development, capable of endangering the foundations of state order on which there is a consensus within the political system and among the Jewish public; a phenomenon that must be nipped in the bud with restrictions placed on those seeking its initiation.

Violent resistance from the Arab minority is therefore an integral part of the perspective of the Israel establishment and of Israeli society as a whole. However, an important paradox arises from this issue, namely, there is no correlation between the scope of the threat felt by Jewish society and the Israeli establishment—relative to the possibility that the Arab population will

indeed use political violence—and the reality of the relations between the two sides. The use of political violence can be said to be the exception that proves the rule. This was first identified in the early 1980s by Lustick, who, as previously mentioned, pointed to the gap between the Arab minority's inferior status in civil and national domains and their nature as a "quiet" minority who rarely adopt political violence in an attempt to undermine the status quo. Lustick investigated the establishment's method of controlling the Arab minority, illustrating its efficacy and its reliance on the "triangle" model, with the triangle points representing separation, segregation, and inclusion.

While Lustick's book could not, of course, have been relating to the later events of October 2000, which were perceived as a new peak of Arab activism and readiness to use political violence, his claim has withstood the test of time. Even taking into account the events that have occurred since October 2000, political violence of either type—terror or outbreaks of violence—would seem in the long term to be relatively insignificant phenomena with respect to both their absolute location on the time axis and their weight relative to other types of resistance used by the Arab minority. This does not mean that the Arab minority have come to terms with their situation; on the contrary, since 1948, they have been increasingly active and assertive in expressing dissatisfaction with their status and constructing their national identity as a native Palestinian minority, using resistance methods not necessarily based on terror or widespread outbreaks of violence to demand a change in Israel's existing reality. There are a number of explanations for these chosen resistance methods. First is the aforementioned process of "integration" and "Israelization" of the Arab minority, a process that is reflected in the adoption of non-violent methods of protest and consistent with the character of Israel's civil democracy. Second, the choice of more extreme methods of resistance might perhaps expose the Arab minority to a firm response from the authorities, which could harm their long-term goals and interests. Gurr provided a long list of conditions and circumstances that must develop before a minority decide, as a last resort, to adopt violent methods of protest that might endanger their situation. The third explanation is the historical perspective of the struggle between the two national movements and the Palestinian memory of the Nakba, which left not only deep psychological and social scars in Arab society but also a deep fear of the iron hand of the Israeli establishment and the security apparatus, especially the General

Security Service. The harsh outcome of the Land Day events and the events of October 2000, in which Israeli Arabs were shot by soldiers and policemen, evoked distant historical events and confirmed the Arab minority's hidden fears of the establishment's policy toward them in situations where lines and boundaries are crossed.

Based on these explanations, it is possible to understand the limited place of terror as a tool of resistance for the Arab minority. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the phenomenon of terror was mostly reflected in the assistance provided by Arabs in Israel to infiltrators entering the country and their involvement in the mass terrorist attacks within Israel, which were part of the armed struggle initiated by the terror organizations that emerged after the 1967 war. During this period, dozens of Arabs were arrested for security violations. Forty- eight Arab citizens of Israel participated in terror activities in 1968 and 155 in 1969; in total, 320 Arab citizens were arrested and convicted of security offenses during the period 1967–1973.[42] While these may appear to be large numbers, neither the Arab minority nor the state crossed any red lines during this period. In the media, representatives of the establishment made sure to differentiate between those they defined as "weeds" and the passive, quiet majority within the Arab public. The establishment also sought to reduce what appeared to be local Jewish violence, primarily in the mixed cities such as Jaffa and Jerusalem, which was directed at Arabs and took place in response to the involvement of young Arab citizens of Israel in terror incidents within Israeli cities.

The involvement of Israeli Arabs in terror, reflecting the mutual influences between Palestinians in the occupied territories and the Arab minority in Israel, peaked in the early 1970s and has become less common ever since. The terror carried out by young Arabs was directed less at changing the reality of the Arab population within the state than at expressing national solidarity with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. This solidarity was reinforced as a result of the reunification process and the removal of barriers between the two populations which had existed prior to 1967. Other manifestations of terror carried out by the Arab minority in Israel were evident in the creation of the Usrat al-Jihad group of the Islamic Movement in the early 1980s, which was part of the Islamic awakening in the Middle East. A wave of arrests of members of the movement by the General Security Service in 1983 caused them to shift their focus toward social activity (*dawa*),

and since the 2000s they have concentrated on the protection of holy sites, including the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

These exceptions aside, the involvement of Israeli Arabs in terror has been limited. In 1998, there were four such incidents and in 1999 only two. The second intifada saw another peak, a development that supported the claim of a connection between the level of Palestinian violence in the occupied territories and in the Arab sector within Israel. In 2000, twenty-five terror cells exposed in which Israeli Arabs were involved were exposed. In 2001, fifty-six cells were exposed, and fifty-six Israeli Arabs were arrested for involvement in terror attacks. In 2002, the number of arrests rose to seventy-eight but declined in subsequent years with twenty-seven terror cells and forty-five Israeli Arabs arrested in 2003, twenty-six terror cells and fifty-one Israeli Arabs arrested in 2004, and fourteen Israeli Arabs arrested in 2005.[43]

According to a report by the General Security Service, 104 terror cells were uncovered during the period 2001–2004, involving about 200 Israeli Arabs. These terror cells were responsible for the deaths of 136 Israelis. During 2005–2006, thirty-eight additional terror cells were exposed, involving forty-six Israeli Arabs. The report stated that "those who are involved in terror among Israeli Arabs are on the fringe and constitute a very small proportion of this population," also emphasizing that 40 percent of Israeli Arabs involved in terror were Palestinians from the West Bank who had received an Israeli identity card and a permit to reside in Israel as part of family unification, namely, marriage to an Israeli citizen.[44] The sharp increase in the number of Israeli Arabs involved in terrorist attacks against Israeli Jews within the Green Line during the armed Palestinian Intifada that began in September 2000 shows the degree of their solidarity with the Palestinian struggle.

Over the past decade, there has been a significant drop in the involvement of Israeli Arabs in terror, due partly to the decrease in violence and the stable security situation in the West Bank following the consolidation of Abu Mazen's leadership of the Palestinian Authority and, partly, the close cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian security mechanism. The General Security Service's data indicate the involvement of only a few individual Israeli Arabs in terror during this period; in fact, their report on terror since 2008 has not reported any attacks carried out by Israeli Arabs, except for the attack carried out in Tel Aviv at the beginning of 2016 by an Israeli Arab in which three Israelis were killed. It is still unclear, however, whether this represented a turning point and the beginning of a new trend.

According to the General Security Service's reports, solidarity with the Islamic State (ISIS) among young Israeli Arabs is in evidence alongside the phenomenon—though not widespread, with only thirty-six such cases since 2014—of young Israeli Arabs leaving the country to join the ranks of the rebels in Syria who are fighting against the Assad regime. In addition, Hezbollah has become interested in Israeli Arabs and has made attempts to recruit them for terror attacks or intelligence gathering; for example, a resident of Tira was arrested in 2009 on suspicion of gathering information on Gabi Ashkenazi, the former chief of staff.[45] Nonetheless, these reports stated clearly that the overall involvement of the Arab minority in terror is "insignificant" and that "the vast majority of Israeli Arabs are law-abiding citizens who behave according to the existing rules in a democratic state."[46]

As with extreme terrorism, violent grassroots protest has also proved an uncommon type of resistance by the Arab minority since the founding of the state. Since 1948, there have been two such dramatic events involving a violent encounter between Arab citizens and the security forces. The first took place on Land Day in March 1976, when the Arab sector protested against the Jewish Agency's 1975 plan to develop the Galilee (called in Palestinian discourse the "Plan for the Judaization of the Galilee"). The second comprised the riots that broke out in October 2000 following Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount and the ensuing violence in the West Bank and Gaza. This occurred against the backdrop of the failed negotiations between the government of Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat.

Between Land Day 1976 and the October 2000 riots, there were other protests by the Arab minority that involved a certain amount of violence but not on the same scale. For example, as a result of the massacre in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon in September 1982, there were clashes between Arab demonstrators and the police and the border guard in Nazareth, Wadi Ara, Jaffa, Rahat, and other locations. The demonstrators blocked roads and threw stones, while the police responded with tear gas and, in some cases, fired on the demonstrators. There were dozens of injuries on both sides and numerous arrests. In December 1987, following the report of Palestinian deaths in the first intifada, which began in the Gaza Strip and spread to the West Bank, there were solidarity demonstrations in the Arab sector, which included clashes with the police in places such as Nazareth, Umm al-Fahm, Akko, Jaffa, Lod, Ramla, and Rahat. Young Arabs set up barricades, threw rocks and Molotov cocktails at police, set tires on fire,

and attacked buses and cars. As a result of the murder of seven Palestinian workers by a Jew in Rishon LeZion in May 1990, protest demonstrations that became riots took place in a number of locations in the Galilee and the Triangle, reflecting the inspiration provided by the first intifada in the occupied territories. Similar events occurred as a result of the massacre in the Cave of the Patriarchs in February 1994 and the opening of the Hasmonean Tunnel in Jerusalem in September 1996.

All of these protest events were reactions to developments in the neighboring Palestinian entities. Events with a different motivation occurred in Akko in 2008 following tension on the eve of Yom Kippur, which led to confrontations between the Jewish and Arab populations. The repercussions of these events were limited geographically and time-wise, and, no less importantly, with respect to their outcomes.

The Land Day events of 1976 and the October 2000 riots can thus be seen as exceptions in the context of other violent grassroots patterns of protest. In the former, six Arab citizens were killed and about fifty injured; in the latter thirteen Arab citizens were killed and dozens injured by live and rubber police bullets during the violent confrontations in the Galilee and Wadi Milek. These were dramatic events due to the lines that were crossed in relations between the Israeli establishment and the Arab population, creating deep rifts between the two populations. Many researchers have perceived them as an indication of the lowering of inhibitions and the removal of psychological barriers among the Arab population, which led to their open opposition to the state. There is general Israeli consensus that these two events were an expression of activism on the part of the Arab minority.

The Land Day events are presented in the academic literature as an expression of the politicization of the Arab minority and the growth of a "stand-tall" generation of young Arabs who are free of the inhibitions of the previous "hunched-over" generation who had experienced the Nakba. Frisch viewed these events as a watershed moment in the resistance of the Arab minority—particularly in Rakah, the Arab Communist Party—to the state and in the approach of the PLO to the Arab minority in Israel.[47] The political geographer Oren Yiftachel viewed the increased activism and protest among the Arab minority as an expression of the changing character of their demands. He claimed that following the Land Day events the Arab minority began to express anti-government feelings and to generate political resistance, which led to the creation of entities such as the Supreme Monitoring Committee

of Arab Israelis.[48] Rekhes also viewed these events as an expression of the radicalization of the Arab minority and a shift from passivity to activism.[49]

The October 2000 events are similarly presented in the literature. The Or Commission, which was established on November 8, 2000 by the then prime minister Ehud Barak, devoted a major chapter of its conclusions to the reasons for the outbreak of violence.[50] This chapter, written by Shimon Shamir, placed the responsibility for the events on the Arab minority, specifically their leaders, and accused them of "stirring the pot," while at the same time accusing the government of neglecting the Arab minority and their problems and the police commanders of being trigger-happy in their efforts to restrain the demonstrators and achieve control of the situation. The Or Commission defined the processes in the Arab sector that led to violent protest as "radical politicization," including the historical process that established the Arab political frameworks, the formulation of their increasingly extreme demands, and their radicalized expression through, for example, the Balad Party, which aims to undermine the principles of the Israeli political regime. The report also pointed to the ever more extreme statements made by Arab leaders, the growing strength of political Islam among Israeli Arabs, and their rising identification with the Palestinian issue. Moreover, the report highlighted the increased activism of Israeli Arabs in the two years prior to the October 2000 events, which comprised a growing number of demonstrations accompanied by acts of violence and clashes with the police. While there had been seven such events in the two decades following Land Day, the report claimed that there had been nine such events in the two and a half years prior to October 2000 and no less than fifty in that very year.

Violent grassroots protest became a component of the Arab minority's pattern of resistance, and a significant proportion of the protests were an echo of what was happening in the neighboring Palestinian entities. It is important to mention the high levels of tension in the West Bank and the unrest in East Jerusalem as background to the events of October 2000. The picture is not, however, as clear as it seems at first glance; the conventional view of events such as Land Day and the October 2000 riots ignores nuances that make it possible to present these situations in a way that alters the conventional story and thus changes how the Jewish public and the Israeli establishment relate to the violent resistance of the Arab minority.

Both the Land Day events and the October 2000 riots signified the climax of sensitive periods from the perspective of majority-minority relations in the

State of Israel. The Land Day events occurred at the height of government preparations to implement the plan for increasing Jewish settlement in the Galilee; while the October riots were preceded by a similar period of increased tension between Jews and Arabs and between Arabs and the establishment as a result of home demolitions, such as in Umm al-Sahali near Shfar'am, and the confiscation of land, such as in al-Ruha in September 1998. These measures led to an economic strike and protest demonstrations in the Arab sector, which also spilled over into Wadi Ara and Nazareth. Added to this was the demolition of houses in Lod in June 1999, the protests to halt discrimination against Arab municipalities in November–December 1999, and the protests on anniversaries, such as Land Day, which in March 2000 escalated into violent confrontations in the vicinity of Sakhnin between the border guard and the police and young Arabs. Protests also took place on the campuses of Haifa University and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The Or Commission noted that the October 2000 events were preceded by "clear escalation" in which protests on "regular" civil issues deteriorated into violent confrontations.

Indeed, both the Land Day events of 1976 and the October 2000 events resembled intifadas and occurred after periods of escalation and deterioration in relations between the Arab population and its leadership and the Israeli establishment. In both cases, Arab youths were responsible for serious acts of violence against the security forces. While it is questionable whether these events were thought-out initiatives, this does not detract from the responsibility of various entities within the Arab minority for the resulting violence. But it is neither the question of legal responsibility nor even social and ethical responsibility that is the subject of the current discussion but rather the nature of the Arab minority's pattern of resistance. The question of whether Arab entities initiated the events is therefore important and testifies to the presence or absence of violent resistance in the Arab minority's toolbox.

There is some doubt as to whether the leaders of the Arab minority had planned the confrontations with the security forces. Coincidence, the dynamics on the ground, and the actions of an individual or group—be they Arab demonstrators or Israeli policemen—had a significant effect on the circumstances that sparked the violence. Rekhes, who wrote about the Land Day events in 1977 soon after they occurred, noted that the developments in the twenty-four hours preceding the events led to a "loss of control," particularly on the part of "radical nationalistic groups with an extreme

militaristic philosophy." His words could likewise be used to describe the October 2000 events, which also lost control as a result of police violence that was unprecedented in its intensity and characteristics, according to the Or Commission. Although the report stated that the events were preceded by incitement on the part of the Arab leadership, which "did not understand that riots, blocking of roads, and solidarity with enemy activity against the state and its citizens constitute a threat to the Jewish citizens of the state," it avoided the conclusion that the Arab leadership was responsible for the unfolding of events.[51]

Both of these dramatic events, namely the Land Day and the October 2000 events, started as protest demonstrations by the Arab public. In the case of the latter, these demonstrations were succeeded by violent events in the plaza of the al-Aqsa Mosque and in the West Bank and were perceived by the Arab leadership as justifiable expressions of support for the Palestinians in the territories.[52] The Land Day events also involved a civil protest that was planned by the Committee for Land Protection. The committee was created in 1975 in response to the government's decision to confiscate 20,000 dunams of land in the Galilee and to completely close Fire Zone 9 near the Arab towns of Sakhnin, Deir Hanna, and Arraba to Arab farmers. On February 21, 1976, the decision to hold a strike and civil protest was announced. The plan included, among other things, a demonstration at the Knesset and an economic strike in the Arab sector on March 30. The plans did not include violent protests. Between February 21 and March 30, Arab leaders debated whether to hold the protests and the strike, and finally, under pressure from the Rakah party, which was pushing for a more activist approach, they decided to go ahead. The events began on March 29, when military trucks carrying soldiers in the area of Arraba-Deir Hanna encountered roadblocks of stones and burning tires that had been placed there by Arab youths. This was the catalyst for the violent confrontations that took place the following day. The two events—both the strike and the demonstration—were originally planned as non-violent civil protests but at some point, they became violent, a development for which both sides shared responsibility. The Jewish establishment, as previously mentioned, viewed the events as the outcome of Arab activism. While academic research has not paid much attention to the contribution of Israeli leaders and security forces to this negative unraveling of events, it is, nonetheless, part of the overall picture. For example, the then prime minister Yitzhak Rabin took a hard

line against the Arab leaders' intention to demonstrate against the planned land confiscation, viewing it as a clear challenge to the state. This view was manifest in the security forces' preparations for the events, which included the deployment of soldiers in the Galilee, and influenced the final outcome.

Likewise, the October 2000 riots, which broke out around the same time as the Palestinian violence in East Jerusalem and the occupied territories and in the general context of the breakdown of the Oslo process. It is fair to assume that this context was connected to the way in which police forces were deployed in response to the protest of Arab youths and the decision to use live weapons to deal with the demonstrators, as hinted at by the Or Commission:

> The failure was reflected in the clearly defined policy for dealing with the events on those first two critical days. It was reflected in the lack of sufficient training, both operational and psychological, given to the police forces for handling civil disorder in general and for the type of events that occurred in particular. It is reflected in the fact that the police lacked the appropriate means to disperse the demonstrations. It was reflected in the overemphasis of police strategy on the use of rubber bullets, whose numerous risks were not sufficiently known to the users, and it was reflected in those who decided on making it the main means, sometimes the only one, for dealing with civil disorder.

The analysis reveals that the Land Day events and the October 2000 riots were complex, multifaceted incidents that cannot be understood according to the conventional interpretation that views them as part of the Palestinian uprising or, in other words, as a method of resistance chosen by the minority as part of its struggle to change its relations with the Israeli establishment and the Jewish majority. The events were the exception rather than the rule in relations between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority. Despite what Schueftan has described as a zero-sum game that has existed for generations between the Arab minority and the State of Israel as a Jewish majority state,[53] the Arab minority is fully aware that the choice of violent means to advance its cause is liable to cause damage not only to security but also to the strategic efforts to achieve full integration within the state

and to improve the Arabs' civil and social status while emphasizing their separate nationality.

Cultural Resistance

Cultural resistance is a type of protest, which, while aiming to change the majority-minority status quo and the relations of the minority with the establishment, is also directed at expressing the minority's dissatisfaction with the existing reality. In the case of Israel's Arab sector, this pattern of resistance looks to preserve, strengthen, and shape the historical memory of the Arab population in Israel in response to what is often perceived as the establishment's effort to erase Palestinian identity.

Cultural resistance has characterized the Arab minority in Israel since the founding of the state. It is reflected in cultural initiatives that emphasize the heritage of the Nakba—the lost past and the historical memory—by, for example, research, the gathering of testimonials, and museums. While an ongoing and fixed part of the Arab minority's landscape, the first two decades of the State of Israel (1948–1966) can be seen as the period when cultural resistance became an exclusive tool in their struggle. This period coincides with the military rule that was imposed on the Arab population immediately after the War of Independence. Military rule was imposed due to the establishment's view of the Arab minority as a fifth column and a risk to the security of the new state. This led to an operational approach that advocated the isolation of the remaining Arab population, the imposition of restrictions on their freedom of action, and the exploitation of the resources left behind for the benefit of the new state. From the viewpoint of the Arab population, these two decades represented the trauma of the Nakba and the results of the military confrontation. The Arab political leadership had fled the country, and about 700,000 Arabs had become refugees within the territory of the West Bank and in the neighboring Arab countries. The Arab population also suffered a deep economic crisis due to the loss of a major portion of their land and a severe psychological crisis due to the division of extended families when the Arabs in Israel were cut off from those remaining under Jordanian control in the West Bank and from those who had fled to the neighboring Arab states. Their emotional burden was accompanied by a fear of the military authorities who were responsible for the new order in areas populated by Arabs.

The Arab minority viewed this new enforced reality as a temporary crisis, assuming that the situation was reversible, unlike the assumption of Jewish political leaders that the presence of around 150,000 Arabs within the state was a short-term problem that would be resolved in the next round of military conflict. The combination of the lack of Arab political leadership, the mood following military defeat, and the fear of the military authorities and the state led the Arab minority to adopt a prudent and restrained line in their relations with the government, which shaped their cultural patterns of resistance. This can be seen in the works of poets and writers who sought to express the weight of the national disaster and the dramatic gap between the previous reality of Arab dominance in Mandatory Palestine and the reality following the war. In light of their new reality, the Arabs in Israel clung onto historical memory—a glorious past which became an object of longing—and the expectation that the situation would be reversed.[54] The Palestinian cultural elite attempted by means of poetry and literature to limit the marginalization that had become their lot following their physical separation from the Arab world and the nearby Palestinian population. In response to their civil and national erasure, the Arab minority sought to revive and preserve their past, filling the bleak present with symbols, memory, and pictures and thus reestablishing the old order.

The cultural elite, in particular writers and poets such as Mohamed Nafa, Mahmoud Darwish, and Samah Kanaan, created a Palestinian narrative and thus became leaders of the cultural resistance. This was neither a violent type of resistance nor a resistance in the political or civil sense, but rather one that could be described as modest in its overall goals. This was, in fact, the only strategy available to the Arab minority in the years following 1948, and it has been largely overlooked by academic research.

The sociologist Huneida Ghanem described the post-1948 Arab elite's cultural resistance in her book on the role of Arab intellectuals in Israel in constructing the Arab minority's national identity. Ghanem analyzed the cultural endeavor that developed in the 1950s and 1960s, noting that the activity concentrated primarily on poetry, short stories, and op-ed pieces. Most of the writers had rural roots and a high school education, and only a few had academic degrees. Their work was written almost entirely in Arabic and was aimed at the Arab public; in fact, according to Ghanem, Arab writers had absolutely no presence in the Jewish cultural domain. The content of their writing focused on the lost homeland and on nostalgia for a glorious past

compared to the present days. The poets and writers showed their opposition to the hegemony of the establishment by blocking its attempt to deprive the defeated Arab minority of their remaining national Palestinian identity and erase their past completely. Cultural resistance was a tool for halting the establishment's efforts and preserving the potential for the renewal of Arab society. The cultural elite who survived the Nakba were looking, Ghanem claimed, "to undermine the establishment's Zionist narrative, reject it, and replace it with an alternative 'native' narrative, as they experienced it."[55] While poetry emphasized the feelings of loss, prose focused on life in the shadow of the occupier. The op-ed columnists, in contrast, concentrated on the struggle of Third World peoples against colonialism, which Israel represented, and the role of the Soviet Union in realizing the independence of oppressed peoples.

The Arab intelligentsia therefore used culture to conceptualize the post-Nakba reality and to map out their way to victory, which entailed shaking off the Israeli occupation and building an Arab collective identity. They had one aspiration: total national liberation. Consequently, they did not rely on developing methods to improve the status of the Arab minority within the existing situation but rather on the hope of total deliverance from that situation. At a later stage, the younger generation would turn their back on this intellectual resistance, which had focused on the hope of going back in time, while also looking to bring about fundamental change in the existing political framework.

Political Resistance

Political resistance began to develop in the late 1970s. Already toward the end of the second decade since the founding of the state, after almost two decades of military rule, a process of change was taking place in the status of the Arab minority in Israel. In both Jewish and Arab societies, it was increasingly acknowledged that the presence of the Arab minority was not a passing phenomenon but rather a permanent reality. The hopes for fundamental change held since 1948 by both the Israeli establishment and the Arab cultural elite were gradually dissipating.

The Jewish establishment and the majority society felt more secure at this point, and their security anxieties had also diminished. The state's existence was no longer in doubt, and this change was reflected in the questions emerging regarding the necessity of military rule. Voices calling for its

termination became even more predominant after the massacre carried out by the border guard in Kafr Qasim in 1957. This trend was accompanied by a public campaign in the Arab sector for greater freedom of movement. The Israeli establishment gradually reduced the severity of military rule, once Levi Eshkol replaced David Ben-Gurion as prime minister and minister of defense.

Arab expectations of a radical transformation of the situation gradually evaporated, and the Arab minority internalized the permanence of their presence in the State of Israel. This recognition had major implications for their chosen methods of resistance. The cultural resistance, which had developed since the establishment of the state and which was based on the model of restoration, preservation, and nurturing of the past, was emptied of content and became less and less relevant in the new sociopolitical context. The Six Day War in 1967 between Israel and its Arab neighbors also put an end to the Arab minority's hope of a transformation of their reality. Their expectations of an overwhelming Arab victory over Israel, which would promote Palestinian independence, were shown to be unrealistic.

What was defined in both Palestinian and Israeli discourse as a "reunification" of the Arab minority in Israel with the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza following the Israeli occupation was perceived by the former as an opportunity to reconnect the two populations that had been separated by the strategic circumstances of 1948. However, the elimination of the barriers actually emphasized the separateness of the two populations—those within the State of Israel and those who had been under Jordanian and Egyptian rule—as a result of the unique political processes that each had undergone. The differences in their outlooks and in the sociological and political processes they had experienced were exploited by the Israeli establishment, which looked to separate the populations once again as part of a "divide and conquer" policy meant to reduce the security risk implicit in their unification.

Thus, during the late 1960s, the Arab minority stood before a reality in which the State of Israel and Israeli society were the primary decision makers in determining its fate and its future. Cultural resistance did not disappear completely, and historical memory continued to be the focus of the Arab cultural and academic elite, but it had lost its potency as a method of resistance that could turn back time. It was now, primarily, a means of defense against the process that eventually became known in both internal

Palestinian discourse and general academic discourse as "Israelization"; in other words, the minority's self-recognition of their permanent presence and "integration" within the Israeli domain. This "integration" was not an indication that the Arab minority had detached themselves from their past and their identity, nor did it influence their dissatisfaction with the paradigm of a democratic Jewish state that dictated its subjugation to Jewish hegemony. "Integration" applied both on the national level—i.e., the effect on the shaping of the cultural and symbolic domain, the control of national resources, participation in decision-making processes, and determination of the national agenda—and on the civil level—i.e., equality between the two populations with respect to the allocation of state resources. The Arab minority's frustration was also the result of a clear understanding of the glass ceiling that blocked their path to becoming an integral part of the Israeli system. The Israeli establishment rejected any possibility of full Arab assimilation into the hegemonic domain and, likewise, ruled out the possibility of providing the Arab minority with the option of self-definition as a unique national minority. All that it was prepared to grant the Arab population was existence in a liminal reality under the definition of "Israeli Arabs."

The reality of the Arab minority, located somewhere between greater presence in the Israeli domain and integration, on the one hand, and dissatisfaction with the limits on their freedom of action, on the other, led to a renewed definition of resistance, which included a revision of their goals and content. The previously dominant cultural resistance was now replaced by a new type of resistance that operated in the political domain. The first manifestation of this political resistance was the Communist Party, which had survived the crisis experienced by Arab political frameworks during the period of the 1948 war and continued through the 1950s to express Arab unhappiness with the reality of their existence within Israel. The Arab public tended to identify with the Communist Party due to its criticism of Israel's policies (including military rule), its pro-Arab platform regarding issues that were relevant to the Arab public in Israel, and its parliamentary activity, all giving it the status of "guardian" of the Arab population. The split that occurred in the party in 1965 between the Arab wing (Rakah) and the Jewish wing (Maki) signaled the beginning of an historical process that developed further throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in which the Arab minority's resistance became primarily political. Another precursor was a brief episode involving al-Ard, a political party that was active in the 1950s

and represented the first attempt to create a political organization separate from the Communist Party that would express the national aspirations of Arabs in Israel. The al-Ard Party was banned in November 1964 following a prolonged legal battle and a Supreme Court ruling.[56]

Political resistance became dominant in the 1970s, made possible by the changes undergone by Arab society since the events of 1948. The younger generation, who had grown up in the Israeli reality, had taken over from the generation of the Nakba. They were more liberated in their behavior, were familiar with the Israeli system, and had developed intellectually within Israel's institutions of higher learning. The 1970s were therefore characterized by this new generation led by several hundred educated Arabs who represented the trend toward integration. This generation was the basis for the first Arab student organizations on the campuses of Israeli universities and, later, for the new Arab political parties.

Over time, the political focus shifted to the new Arab parties and away from the veteran Communist Party and the "satellite lists"—ad-hoc groups created prior to the elections at the initiative of the Mapai Party. These groups were formed around the leaders of the local clans, whose power rested on their connections with the Israeli establishment during and after the period of military rule and on their ability to mediate between the government authorities and the Arab population. The new Arab parties created during the 1980s and 1990s were based on a completely different approach. Cooperation, which had guided the traditional politics of the clans, was replaced by a more oppositional and nationalistic type of politics. This kind of politics did not look for a common denominator with the establishment or to find favor with it for the sake of sectarian benefits but instead emphasized the lines of separation between the two sectors: demanding an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories; insisting on the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination; and requesting recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

While the Arab national parties highlighted the national aspirations of the Arab minority and their solidarity with the Palestinians, their willingness to operate within the Israeli parliamentary framework reflects the tension regarding their status in Israel. This also explains the intensification of their demands for a change in their civil status with respect to the allocation of resources and reduction in discrimination and civil inequality. The new Arab parties tackled both the nationalist and civil discourse, a unique mixture that

expressed the tension of the Arab minority within the Israeli system and the localization of the struggle of the Arabs living in Israel. The political arena became the main setting for their resistance with political tools as their main means of resistance.

The growth of the new Arab parties should, therefore, be viewed as a more important phenomenon than implied by the academic literature, which discusses it in a very narrow way as an internal development in Arab society reflecting the Arab minority's process of politicization. The appearance of the new parties had institutional significance and reflected a dimension of internal and sectoral development that was in many ways similar to the broader political process that characterized the Jewish sector with its growth of new political entities. These emerged against the backdrop of a weakened Labor party and its political dead heat against the Likud party, which had been voted into government in 1977 in its first elections. More than anything else, however, this new trend symbolized the ability of the Arab minority to modify their tools of resistance and main patterns of behavior to suit changing social circumstances.

There was a close connection between the characteristics and types of these tools of resistance. In the new Arab political world, the "Arab satellite lists" were replaced by parties such as the New Communist List (Rakah) which was created in 1965; the Bnei HaKfar Party (Abnaa el-Balad) which was established in 1972; the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) which was founded in 1977; the Progressive List for Peace (Ramal) which was created in 1984; and the Arab Democratic Party (Mada) which was formed in 1988. These entities embodied political resistance which aimed to express, on the one hand, national aspirations by supporting the PLO and the struggle of the Palestinians for self-determination in a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and, on the other hand, civil aspirations through the demand for equal rights in the State of Israel. Some of the new parties, such as the Arab Democratic Party, did not even rule out the possibility of being part of a government coalition.

The trend of political resistance was reflected not only in the creation of national Arab parties but also in the establishment of representative bodies of the Arab sector as a whole. The Forum of Arab Mayors was created as early as 1974, and in 1982 the Supreme Monitoring Committee was founded as an umbrella organization representing all political groups in the Arab sector. The formation of these two bodies demonstrated resistance to the spirit of

state policy, which had, since 1948, tried to prevent the creation of Arab national representative bodies for fear that they would provide expression for the collective aspirations of the Arab minority and encourage national and political secession from the State of Israel (a state within a state).[57] The 1990s saw the creation of the United Arab List (Ra'am) in 1996 as a joint list of Mada and the Southern Branch of the Islamic Movement, the National Democratic Alliance (Balad) in 1995 as a union of political, academic, and student movements that was basically the successor to the al-Ard party, and the Arab Movement for Renewal (Ta'al) in late 1995, which brought together Arab intellectuals and academics.

As in the case of cultural resistance, the idea of political resistance, in both its institutional aspects and its content, largely faded in the 1990s, though it did not disappear completely. There were two main reasons for this. First was the widening gap between the degree of Arab representation in the Knesset and the limited activity and effectiveness of the Arab parties. The claim has often been made, from both the Arab and the Jewish side, that while the Arab parties have made progress on issues with a national dimension, they have been less successful in advancing equality and other civil issues that concern the Arab population. There is some truth in this claim, but the whole picture needs to be considered. Apart from a short period during Yitzhak Rabin's government (1992–1995), the civil activity of the Arab parties has proved itself ineffective due to their limited access to decision makers. Frustration with this ineffectiveness found expression in the October 2000 riots and, even more so, in the intellectual resistance evident in the Future Vision documents, which hoped to initiate a revolution in the character of Arab politics and beyond.

The second reason for the decline in the status of the Arab minority's political resistance was the collapse of the Oslo accords between Israel and the Palestinians in late 2000. This dashed Arab hopes for a negotiated settlement that would force the Israeli establishment to determine the status of the Arab minority. The second intifada put an end to this expectation and forced the Arab minority to reshape its priorities. The Future Vision documents reversed these priorities for the first time: no longer would the Arab minority wait for an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a condition for a deep and meaningful discussion about their issues. Rather, they would present their demands to the state and the Jewish political establishment immediately, with full knowledge of the unlikelihood of a resolution to the

larger Palestinian issue and an awareness that the Arab minority in Israel could wait no longer.

Intellectual Resistance

The year 2007 was viewed by those who study Arab-Jewish relations in the State of Israel as the year of the visions. It was marked by intense, sometimes even stormy, political discourse, which led to the publishing of four Future Vision documents. The first was entitled "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel."[58] It was published by the Council of Arab Mayors in Israel—then headed by Shuki Khatib who also served as head of the Supreme Monitoring Committee of Arab Israelis—in December 2006, several months after the end of the Second Lebanon War (July–August 2006). Three additional documents were subsequently published one after the other. The document of the Mossawa Center entitled "An Equal Constitution for All: On a Constitution and the Collective Rights of Arab Citizens in Israel" was published in January 2007 and written by Yousef Jabareen;[59] a proposed democratic constitution for the State of Israel was published by Adalah (the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel) in February 2007;[60] and the Haifa Declaration was published in May 2007 and written as an intellectual and political initiative by the Mada al-Carmel: Arab Center for Applied Social Research headed by Professor Nadim Rouhana.

Of the four, the first document received the most attention in public and political discourse, because it was the first but also because it was published by a representative political body in Arab society. The four documents are, however, similar not only in their content but also in that they were produced not by the Arab political parties but rather by groups of Arab intellectuals and activists in social non-profit organizations. A total of about ninety people were involved in the writing of the documents, which began after the October 2000 events. This intellectual convergence implied an examination both of themselves and of the lessons learned from those events. The various groups worked separately and together on the four documents.

All of the documents presented a detailed conceptualization of the place of Arab society in Israel both internally and externally (i.e., their relations with Jewish society and the establishment). They proposed a vision for the next twenty years and detailed the tools with which Arab society could bridge between what is and what ought to be. These documents and the work that preceded them reflected a whole new stage in the Arab minority's

methods of resistance; a product of both the long-term historical process, within which the national collective identity of Israel's Arab citizens had taken shape, and, from the social perspective, the growth of the "stand-tall" generation. This integrated process was reflected in the willingness of the Arab minority to undertake initiatives to refashion their political reality and their relations with the state. There were similar initiatives by Arab political leaders prior to this, such as the attempt to create a similar document by the Communist Party in 1980 and its call for a mass gathering of Arabs in Nazareth (which was banned by the Begin government). However, unlike these attempts and others (see Ozacky-Lazar and Mustafa Kabha[61]), the Future Vision documents were not written by purely political figures but rather by members of non-profit organizations, academics, writers, and members of the cultural elite. The diminished involvement of political representatives indicated both a challenge to the existing order from the standpoint of the status and place of the Arab minority within the state and Jewish society and also a challenge from within, namely a challenge by Arab intellectuals to the veteran Arab political leadership.

The internal challenge was the result of feelings that the veteran Arab politicians had failed to bring about the desired changes. Even if not explicitly stated, these feelings seemed to rest on the assumption that Arab politics had not only failed in its task of advancing Arab society by its involvement in the representative bodies of Israeli politics but had been drawn into the atmosphere of violence that had led to the October 2000 events and the deep chasm that had opened between Arab society and Jewish society as a result. In this sense, this diverse group of Arab intellectuals was looking to position itself in the vanguard of the effort to create a new sociopolitical reality that would provide an alternative conceptual direction to that offered by the Arab political establishment.

The dominance of Arab intellectuals in the writing of the Future Vision documents was thus notable within the context of the seeming failure of the old politics, which had emerged from the political resistance of the 1980s and 1990s. The failure of old politics also led to the strengthening of civil society and the third sector, a phenomenon that occurred in both Arab and Jewish society. The 1990s were characterized by the growth in the number of non-profit organizations registered with the Registrar of Non-Profit Organizations in the Ministry of Justice, reaching approximately 33,000 by 2015. This phenomenon reflected a process of social empowerment, on the

one hand, and frustration with the political parties and the functioning of parliamentary politics, on the other, alongside the desire to advance a variety of social issues. In the Arab sector, some of the non-profit organizations managed to influence the state to act on certain civil and social issues. In contrast to the Jewish sector, they looked to take a leading role in internal social processes and also to leverage their activities in order to advance issues better described as national or sectoral (i.e., issues that concern the position of the Arab minority in the State of Israel). Thus, for example, the Mada al-Carmel, Adalah, and Mossawa non-profits, which produced three of the Future Vision documents, were established to generate such change, each according to its specific agenda, either by means of empirical research that examined the causes of inequality in Israel or the ways to preserve Arab-Palestinian identity, as in the case of Mada al-Carmel, or by means of legal activity to advance the civil interests of the Arab minority, as in the case of Adalah. The fact that Arab intellectuals had taken a leading role to effect change was therefore an outcome of internal sectoral processes, and it is no surprise that their efforts were criticized by political entities in Arab society, including the veteran politicians, both secular and religious, who viewed this phenomenon as a challenge to their leadership.

But the Future Vision documents challenged not only the veteran Arab leadership but also, and primarily, the Israeli establishment, and their publication can thus be considered a resistance initiative. Despite the differences between them, the four documents were all visionary and secular in character and combined theoretical concepts with practical political proposals. Their content was based on similar basic principles that were acceptable to the so-called heart of Arab leadership in Israel. The innovation in the documents was twofold: first, they constituted a clear and organized collection of the narratives and viewpoints that had dominated Arab discourse since the 1980s, and second, they were organized as programmatic and representative documents, the basis of a practical plan of action.

The consensual viewpoint, from the perspective of the Arab-Palestinian narrative, and as expressed in the Future Vision documents, holds that Zionism is a colonialist and invasive movement which forcibly occupied the Land of Israel, expelled its inhabitants, and set up a state within it. This involved the destruction of Arab-Palestinian society, the confiscation of its land, the exploitation of its economic resources, and the oppression of its national culture. The documents accused the Zionist movement of responsibility for

the Nakba and of a systematic policy of discrimination against the Arab public with the purpose of ensuring ethno-Jewish hegemony at the expense of the Arab minority while perpetuating their structural marginality in the state and in society. The essence of the documents is not the presentation of the Arab-Palestinian narrative but rather the demand to correct the situation or, in other words, to change the existing reality. This correction needs, according to the documents, to include Israeli recognition of the Nakba and of the injustice of its actions toward the Arab-Palestinian- people and, a fundamental change in the existing sociopolitical reality and the character of the Israeli political regime. Although the Future Vision documents accept the geopolitical division of the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River and basically adopt the framework of the State of Israel as a platform for creating change, they demand a change in the state's political format, which is based on the paradigm of a democratic Jewish state as defined in the Declaration of Independence. According to the Future Vision documents, the Declaration of Independence is based on asymmetric relations and on civil and national inequality.

On the basis of an examination of political models in countries where relations between the majority and the minority are on an ethno-national basis, the Arab intellectuals advocated that the model of a democratic Jewish state be replaced by a consociational democracy. Consociational democracy, as it exists in Belgium where there is a Flemish majority and a Walloon minority, would be based on Arabs having equal status to Jews. The Arabs would be recognized as a collective national minority and, as such, would be given the right to veto decision-making that affects them and cultural autonomy. Resources would be divided according to the size of each group, and the Arabs would have the right to establish representative political bodies as part of a future arrangement. These changes would be carried out alongside changes in Arab society's priorities and steps to improve society, such as a battle against corruption, a strengthening of internal solidarity, reforms in the Arab municipalities, a change in the status of women, and so forth.

The Future Vision documents are thus a rejection by the Arab minority of the Zionist and Jewish hegemonic interpretation of the State of Israel. The willingness of the Arab intellectual leadership to take such a step rested largely on the internal Israeli social context of the 1990s that was characterized by a struggle between two sociopolitical approaches.[62] The first was the ethno-national approach, which placed its hope on the definition of Israel

in Jewish ethno-national terms and gained prominence as a reaction to the Oslo accords and their subsequent breakdown and against the backdrop of the second intifada and the collapse of the idea of a negotiated settlement. The second was the civil and liberal discourse, which also developed in the context of the high hopes for a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians and the Arab nations. This approach expressed the desire for the normalization of life in Israel and the establishment of an Israeli society that sanctifies human and civil rights. This aspiration was reflected in the "constitutional revolution" led by the president of the Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, and in legislation of the Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty in 1992 and the Basic Law of Freedom of Occupation in 1994.

The Future Vision documents were based on this civil and liberal discourse. The writers worked according to the basic assumption that in the ongoing internal debate over the character of Israeli society—a debate that illustrates the shrinking power of the state and the growing weight of civil society in Israel—the Future Vision documents would be viewed as a call for discussion about Arab-Jewish relations in the context of a general discussion about the character of the State of Israel. Thus, on the opening page Shuki Khatib declared that the goal of the documents was to "create the spark," namely, to start an internal Israeli discussion about the character of the state. It is important to mention that the writing of the document was not disconnected from earlier efforts to create a new vision for the State of Israel, for example, the Kinneret Declaration (2001) and the attempt initiated by the Kadima party and led by then Member of Knesset Professor Menahem Ben-Sasson, the head of the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, to write a constitution for the State of Israel on its sixtieth anniversary in 2008.[63]

The Israeli establishment and Jewish society perceived the Future Vision documents as the crossing of a red line and a complete undermining of the paradigm of a democratic Jewish state, and they inspired vehement criticism from all parts of the political spectrum. The fact that this method of resistance was based on the written word and used the civil domain as a platform for dialogue—a reflection of the Arab minority's internalization of the civil and democratic rules of the game—did nothing to reduce the tension. The writers' belief that Israeli society and the establishment were ready and willing to enter into a discussion of the type they had envisioned turned out to be unrealistic. This was mainly because the content of the Future Vision documents had dared to undermine the internal Jewish consensus in the State

of Israel, and therefore even the supporters of civil Jewish discourse within Jewish society were critical of the documents and their writers. The timing of the documents' publication—several months after the Second Lebanon War, which ended with a sense that its objectives had not been achieved and that the war had been a failure—presumably did not add to the popularity of the documents among its Jewish readers.

This intellectual resistance thus met with serious reservations on the Jewish side and was ultimately dismantled by the Israeli establishment. The criticism was reinforced by other developments that accompanied the public anxiety stemming from the outcome of the Lebanon War, such as Iran's progress toward nuclear capability, the strengthening of Hamas as the ruling party in Gaza in place of the traditional PLO leadership, and the threats of global jihad. This anxiety was also responsible for reintroducing the image of a fifth column into the hegemonic discussion of the Arabs in Israel and placed a new "iron wall" before the initiators of Arab resistance. The Israeli establishment reacted to the documents by redefining the issue of civil equality and creating the Prime Minister's Committee for the Arab Sector under the auspices of the Israel Democracy Institute in May 2007.

At the same time the Future Vision documents also received a cool response from the Arab sector and, particularly, from the veteran politicians who boycotted the documents and made efforts to minimize their importance. The great hope of the Future Vision documents to initiate a discussion with the Israeli establishment and to rally Arab society to form an internal sociopolitical movement quickly dissipated.

Chapter 4

The Future Character of Resistance in the Arab Sector

Arab Society After the Future Vision Documents

The intellectual resistance embodied in the Future Vision documents was the last trace of resistance that has grown from within the Arab minority. Since 2006–2007, the state has successfully stifled any resistance initiatives by the Arab minority using a combination of methods. It has, on the one hand, redrawn the boundaries of Arab discourse and, on the other hand, proposed alternatives to the direction in which the initiators of the documents wished to channel the discussion of the Arab minority with the state. They have accomplished this by various means, including the blatant disregard of Arab demands by the government. The government related to neither the existence of the documents nor their content. The cold shoulder given to the Arab effort to generate a discussion about the basic parameters that define the state's identity and values was an explicit statement regarding the boundaries of permissible and impermissible discussion from the establishment's viewpoint.

The Israeli establishment used a number of channels to voice its resistance to the Future Vision documents in both the Israeli-Jewish domain and in the public and bureaucratic domain that executed the campaign against the initiative. Thus, for example, the General Security Service was brought in to examine the relationship between the Future Vision project and its inherent "political subversion." An article in *Maariv* in 2007, reporting that the prime minister had consulted the head of the General Security Service about the Arab minority in light of the Future Vision documents, sent an implicit message to the intellectual elite, as well as to the rest of the Arab leadership,

about how the initiative was perceived by the establishment, namely, as a security risk.[64] Other Israeli public entities joined in the controversy via conferences organized on the subject, some of which were sponsored or supported by academic institutions, and op-ed columns in the press and internet media sites. This produced clear and categorical statements from Jewish spokespeople on both the left and the right of the political map opposing the Future Vision documents and their messages.

At the same time, the establishment quickly produced an alternative to the Future Vision initiative. In view of the writers' demands to focus the discourse on the fundamental definition of the state, the state attempted to return the focus to a discussion of the civil issues that concern the Arab minority. In May 2007 Prime Minister Olmert initiated a roundtable conference with the leadership of the Arab sector under the auspices of the Israel Democracy Institute but without the presence of the Future Vision initiators, apart from Shuki Khatib, the chair of the Supreme Monitoring Committee. The conference became a platform for discussing issues of equality and Arab participation in the civil life of the state in areas designated by the state as either open to discussion or out of bounds.

The boundaries of the discussion reduced the role of the Future Vision intellectuals in the discourse and created a new conceptual framework for relations with the Arab minority that relied less on the idea of achieving equality and more on the idea of Arab inclusion or integration within the economy. Thus, from 2009, an explicit change in the character of the discourse between the state and the Arab minority was evident. After the (fairly peaceful) neutralization of the political energy of the Future Vision enterprise and the obstruction of Arab attempts to transform the Future Vision documents into more than just a project of dialogue with the establishment and the Jewish public, the idea of advancing the economic integration of the Arab minority was given new momentum.

The idea was based partly on the solid foundations that accompanied the establishment's policy toward the Arab minority, namely, the effort to achieve cooperation, among other things. In other words, this was an attempt to promise feasible change to certain groups in Arab society, such as employment in the Israeli establishment and an option for individual self-realization in exchange for the blurring of national aspirations. From the establishment's viewpoint, the idea of economic inclusion became relevant during the last ten years not only because of the need to neutralize the Future Vision project

but also because it fit into Israel's neo-liberal socioeconomic context and structuring. The integration of the Arab minority in the country's economy became an important part of the attempt to increase the GNP and reduce the burden of less productive sectors such as the Arab and ultra-Orthodox populations. Various projects were developed within the Prime Minister's Office by the Policy Planning Department, headed by Ehud Prawer and the Authority for the Economic Development of the Arab, Druze and Circassian Sectors, which was established in February 2007 and headed by Aiman Saif.

Alongside the acceleration of economic integration, there was also an opposite trend to exclude the Arab minority from the political and cultural domain. This change was led by Prime Minister Netanyahu in the context of the Arab activism reflected in the discourse around the Future Vision initiative and in contrast to the line taken by his predecessor, Ehud Olmert. While the Olmert government intentionally ignored Arab national activism, the Netanyahu government adopted since 2009 a more proactive and assertive approach, based on the desire to reduce the involvement of the Arab minority in Israeli political and cultural life. This approach was expressed in the government's alacrity to allow a series of legislative initiatives, such as cancelling the status of Arabic as an official state language and prohibiting the study of the Nakba in schools.

Alongside such legislative activity in what can be defined as the cultural domain, there has also been activity on the political level, which peaked with the Yisrael Beiteinu Party's proposal to raise the election threshold to 3.25 percent prior to the Knesset elections in March 2015. This initiative was intended to reduce the number of parties in the Knesset in general as well as the number of Arab parties that benefited from the low threshold. The assumption was that these parties would not be able to cooperate within a common framework and that some of the Arab parties, such as Balad, would disappear from the political map. A straight line can be drawn between the raising of the election threshold and the Israeli cabinet decision in November 2015 to ban the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement, a decision that was taken due to deterioration in the security situation and the alleged connection between the activity of Sheikh Raed Salah, head of the organization, and the outbreak of violence in East Jerusalem at the time.

Seeds of Change and the Growth of the Idea of Social Resistance

Since the end of the 2000s, the Israeli establishment has succeeded in suppressing a major resistance initiative by the Arab minority—i.e., the Future Vision documents—and implementing an alternative strategic policy of economic inclusion combined with political exclusion. This new reality has had two main outcomes. The first was the inability of the Arab minority to put forward a resistance initiative to replace that which collapsed. All initiatives that succeeded the Future Visions documents—such as idea of the one state that was advanced by the Adalah organization—will remain historical footnotes. The second was the confusion within the Arab sector over how to deal with the new boundaries restricting the national discourse and the government's inclusion-exclusion policy that manifested itself in expressions of racism against Arabs as well as in incidents of violence and physical harassment.

The gradual trend toward exclusion was an indication of the deepening gap between the two extremes of political exclusion and economic inclusion. Greater effort was invested in edging the Arab minority out of the Jewish sociopolitical domain than in their economic inclusion. From the Arab minority's perspective, this dissonance increased the tension between the elements pulling them into Israeli society and those pushing them out. This tension reflected the dilemma facing Arab society: how to change the existing reality when their space for political maneuvering was becoming narrower as a result of the growing intolerance of their presence in politics and among the Jewish public; and what kind of change was possible in the contemporary political reality. Two significant events had great impact on the Arab minority following the failure of the Future Vision initiative: the first was the start of the Arab Spring in the winter of 2009–2010, which affected all the players in the Middle East, including Israel, and the second was the raising of the election threshold in the Knesset and the subsequent formation of the Joint Arab List.

The Arab Spring began in Tunisia and spread like wildfire to the squares of Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and, of course, Syria. It advanced the idea of resistance in its most general sense, namely, the rejection of the existing situation and a desire to change its fundamental conditions, and provided new content and ideas that served as the focus for various resistance initiatives in the Middle East, including the social protest that erupted in Israel in the summer of 2011 (the first since the Black Panthers protest at the start of the 1970s).

The ideas for which the Tahrir Square demonstrators took to the streets—the call for liberty, equality, and fraternity, to parallel the motto of the French revolutionary masses more than two hundred years earlier—were restated in new forms. These were expressions of resistance not only to the centralized regimes in the Arab countries but also to the neo-liberal structure that characterized many of these countries. This resistance was most apparent in Egypt where, during President Husni Mubarak's regime, social gaps had widened significantly between the small group of wealthy citizens and the middle class, consisting mostly of the young and educated. As in Israel, there had been significant economic transformations in Egypt, Tunisia, and even Libya, which were reflected in impressive macroeconomic performance and growth rates.[65] However, the micro data regarding the welfare of the country's citizens, who had not benefited from the economic prosperity and who were subject to ongoing political oppression, revealed a very different reality. What particularly characterized the inconsistency between the trends of economic growth and the process of depoliticization was the attempt by the Mubarak family to ensure their survivability by transferring power to Husni Mubarak's son, Gamal, who represented the neo-liberal philosophy.

The revolutions in the Arab world reflected the attempt not only to replace one regime with another but also to create a new social agenda based on the dismantling of the socioeconomic system. Following the economic crisis in 2008, the socioeconomic discourse criticizing the capitalist model became widespread throughout the world; in the Middle East it was translated into an active political initiative in the form of mass revolutions. The social protest in the summer of 2011 in Israel was a similar reflection of both the regional spirit of resistance and the global discourse, expressing the desire for fundamental social change that would end the conflict between the dominant political and economic establishments, on the one hand, and the frustrated middle class, who felt they were not benefiting from the fruits of economic growth, on the other.

The social protest in the Arab world triggered reactions among the Arab minority in Israel as well. They were inspired, in particular, by the idea of political partnerships between groups with different worldviews and by the creation of a broad social context as a new common denominator uniting all groups. In addition, they were drawn to the concept of defining resistance in social terms, which would create a broad common base on which Jews and Arabs could agree and thus blur the national boundaries between them

as well as an agenda that would be relevant to the Arab population and based on efforts to achieve self-renewal and to deal with sociopolitical ailments such as internal crime, the low status of women, and so forth. Apart from providing inspiration, the revolutions in the Arab world, which were characterized by activism and violence, demonstrated to the Arab minority in Israel that violence was only relevant to a limited extent in their context as a minority and that a shift to active and violent activism would involve a not insignificant risk.

The second event that influenced the behavior of the Arab minority was the general elections in Israel in March 2015. The raising of the election threshold in order to reduce the representation of the Arab parties had the opposite outcome. After many years of failures to unify the Arab list in the Knesset due to the major ideological differences between the parties, cooperation was finally achieved with the establishment of the Joint Arab List, headed by attorney Ayman Odeh, a member of Hadash. The Joint Arab List became the unique political manifestation of the Tahrir Square idea in Arab politics in Israel, namely the readiness of political and social forces to overcome their differences and create a basis for cooperation. This was a historic change, which ushered in a new way forward for the Arab parties. Their status had diminished in recent decades due to their inability to offer any visible progress in changing the Arab minority's reality. The creation of the Joint Arab List can be seen as another attempt by the veteran Arab political establishment, consisting of Arab parliamentarians and political parties, to rise to the challenge presented to them by the leadership of the two main groups in Arab-Israeli relations: the Islamic Movement, in particular the Northern Branch led by Sheikh Raed Salah, which had distanced itself from representation in the Knesset; and the civil non-profit organizations alongside the Arab intellectuals, which, since the 1990s and with greater intensity since the October 2000 events, had taken a leading role in the struggle to change the asymmetric reality in Arab-Jewish relations by both legal and public means.

The adoption of the idea of political partnership went beyond the willingness of the parties of Hadash, Balad, Ra'am, and Ta'al to create a joint political platform. It was also accompanied by a necessary and complementary conceptual shift, namely, the creation of an ideological platform as a basis for the joint activity of the Arab parties in Israel. It is clear that the spirit of

revolution in the Arab world, alongside the changes in the internal Israeli public discourse, had a significant influence here.

The social protest in Israel in the summer of 2011 was a sign of the transformation of the public discourse in Israel from a one-dimensional discussion based on national security to a two-dimensional discussion in which the domestic and social elements played a major role in determining the public agenda and the relations between Arab society and the state and its leaders. The cost of living and the cost of real estate, which had soared dramatically during the years 2007–2011, were now part of the public discourse. This can be seen from the inclusion of social discourse within the campaigns in the March 2015 elections of political parties such as the Likud, the Zionist Union, and even the ultra-Orthodox parties as well as the new parties established following the social protest, Yesh Atid (in 2012) and Kulanu (in 2014). The achievements of the latter two parties in the nineteenth and twentieth Knesset elections reflected the changing balance in the internal Israeli discourse and the increased weight of the social over the national dimension.

The Arab sector seems to have been conscious of this development. The social protest of summer 2011 was in many ways an opportunity to create a common denominator for discussions with the Jewish public on similar or parallel social problems in the areas of housing, education, municipalities, transportation, and crime. In the Arab sector, as in the Jewish sector, these problems had been exacerbated by insufficient public investment, a fact supported by the Or Committee, established following the October 2000 events. And, indeed, when the 2011 protest began, groups in the Arab sector joined in and protests took place in Arab towns, demanding improved conditions with regards to the cost of living and housing.

The social protest in Israel was, nonetheless, a Jewish phenomenon and preserved the longstanding components of the internal Israeli discourse, while the Arab sector remained on the margins. Despite the common denominator between Arabs and Jews on social issues, the national divisions remained in place, and the new sociopolitical melting pot, which was based on the social discourse, was therefore not exploited. In addition, the developments that accompanied the revolutions in the Arab world, in particular the lack of stability and violence that had replaced the high hopes for freedom, limited the ability of the social protest in Israel to include the Arab minority and to view it as part of the new Israeli Tahrir Square. The ability to affect the

discourse remained closed to other significant groups in Israeli society as well, primarily the weak socioeconomic sectors that did not belong to the middle class who were leading the protest.

Nevertheless, there were groups among the Arab minority who identified the process of change and its political potential. The social discourse became the cornerstone, though not the only one, of the Joint Arab List's platform and provided the common factor necessary to unite the individual parties. A major advocate of this approach was Ayman Odeh, the leader of the party. Odeh originated from the Hadash Party, which during its long history had successfully combined diverse political approaches and positioned itself as the leader of the Arab minority's struggle. He identified the social discourse as a platform that would help advance two issues simultaneously: the laying of a political foundation for the creation of the Joint Arab List as a political umbrella framework, whose members would adopt the social discourse as the glue binding them together despite their ideological differences; and the determination of an agenda which would enable the organization of internal Arab politics and the management of the struggle to change the existing reality. This was to be a social agenda which would be shared by many in the Jewish sector.

Odeh's new strategy sought to place itself in the space between the two axes of the discourse: the national axis, led by the Arab intellectuals and some of the political parties, dominated by Balad; and the religious Islamic axis, led by the Islamic Movement, in particular its Northern Branch. The social discourse was intended to blur the national rift lines and to define Arab issues by establishing a platform based on a broad consensus among the Israeli public as a whole. This platform would not alienate the Israeli establishment, which, as mentioned, had attempted to reduce the presence of Arabs in the Israeli parliamentary domain and viewed the formation of the Joint Arab List as an unwelcome byproduct of raising the election threshold.

The strategy of the Joint Arab List thus signified the beginnings of a new type of resistance, using social issues as a primary platform for advancing the demands of the Arab sector. In this sense, Odeh distanced himself from the demands of the Future Vision documents to fundamentally change the foundation of the State of Israel and the basis of its political regime, the demands of the Balad Party to transform Israel into a state of all its citizens, and, even more so, the religious Islamic demands of Sheikh Raed Salah, who had focused on the issue of al-Aqsa and Jerusalem as a basis for the discourse

confronting the state. Odeh's social resistance was also disconnected from the traditional focus of Arab politics. A manifestation of his success was the government decision in January 2016 to approve an unprecedented NIS 15 billion in aid to the Arab sector.

In theory, the social resistance initiative embodied by the Joint Arab List was intended to present a third way that was less ambitious in its strategic goals. This initiative duplicated, to a large extent, the pattern of relations that had developed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which were based on a tight symbiosis between the sides. This symbiosis provided the Palestinians with the ability to maintain sustainable socioeconomic autonomy, on the one hand, and the possibility of continuing to express their national aspirations, on the other, even if this delayed the realization of Palestinian independence and sovereignty.

The social discourse was not, it seems, intended to totally replace the demands of the Arab sector. Evidence of this was Odeh's first decision as head of the Joint Arab List to hold a march to Jerusalem on the issue of the non-recognized settlements in the Negev. This is an issue that Odeh had already tried to advance in 2009 and was now returning to, marketing it anew as an expression of the housing crisis among the Bedouin in the Negev.[66] This step turned out to be problematic from the viewpoint of the Israeli establishment. More than being an issue that emphasized the social discourse, it in fact exposed the national element and Odeh's eagerness to use the social platform to advance issues that the establishment viewed as national issues. The status of the non-recognized settlements in the Negev had become a contentious issue in recent years following the Prawer Report and its various offshoots (the Begin Plan and the Amidror Plan) and touched on one of the deep-seated foundations of the Jewish-Arab conflict, namely the struggle over possession of the Land of Israel.

Odeh, who adopted the dialectic style of the Hadash Party, had no desire to detach from the national dimension of the discourse but rather was looking to use the social discourse to rebrand it. Therefore, the deterioration in the security situation that began in fall 2015—the escalation in Palestinian terrorist attacks in the West Bank and Israel proper—eroded the ability of the Joint Arab List to manage the tension between the national-Islamic discourse and the social discourse, particularly in view of the ongoing tension between its members (some of whom, such as Haneen Zoabi, continued to emphasize the connection with the national discourse). While Odeh's first initiatives

as a member of Knesset for the Joint Arab List were socially oriented, the overall Palestinian context of the security escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian domain very soon positioned the Joint Arab List as the flag holder for the Palestinian national issue and its members became the targets of the Jewish sector's criticism. This criticism reached a peak when members of Balad visited the families of Palestinian terrorists in February 2016. This visit led to the introduction of the Impeachment Law, which enables a majority of ninety members of Knesset to remove a member of Knesset whose activities are seen to support terror in some way.

Prior to this, on November 17, 2015, the Israeli cabinet decided to ban the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement due to the deterioration in the security situation and the incitement activities of Sheikh Raed Salah in Jerusalem. This decision illustrated most clearly the problem facing the Joint Arab List. Odeh, who had positioned himself as a pragmatic and level-headed leader representing a new generation of Arab politicians according to both Israeli and foreign public opinion (as can be seen from his inclusion in the prestigious list of "100 Leading Global Thinkers in 2015" published by *Foreign Policy*[67]), had no choice but to participate in a demonstration held in the Galilee against the government decision. A "strategic" terrorist attack in the center of Tel Aviv by an Arab resident of Ar'ara on January 1, 2016 revived the classic view of the Arab minority as a fifth column and raised questions as to the government's commitment to a full implementation of the assistance plan to the Arab sector. The approval of the plan had run into difficulties and was finally approved only after Prime Minister Netanyahu linked it to measures to enforce the law in the Arab sector and the collection of illegal weapons.

The escalation in the security situation put into question the future of the Joint Arab List and its political potential, which was based on what can be defined as "soft" social resistance. The fragile situation that Odeh found himself in would worsen if the security situation continued to deteriorate; all the more so, if the establishment took measures that would spark Arab resistance, such as an attempt to expand police activity in Arab towns, or if additional steps were taken to reduce Arab involvement in Israeli politics. The banning of the Balad Party, which was perceived by the establishment as an extreme secular movement in Arab politics, could not be ruled out following the banning of the Islamic Movement and would make it difficult

for the Joint Arab List to continue to walk the tightrope between the national and social discourses and to maintain itself as a united political entity.

Prologue to the New Social Resistance in the Form of Internal Sectoral Convergence

The ability of the Joint Arab List to maintain the new political strategy that is based on the idea of social resistance is dependent on three main factors: an escalation in the security situation, which would shift the focus of the discourse to the national dimension; the differences in members' conceptual and political approaches, which challenge the necessary cooperation; and the policy of the right-wing government elected in the March 2015 elections to block the Joint Arab List's social strategy as part of the political and cultural exclusion of the Arab minority that it supports.

An important question relates to the way in which the Arab sector will revise its resistance strategy in light of the existing barriers to the social resistance advocated by the Joint Arab List. While numerous variables and the complexity of the situation make it difficult to answer this question, an attempt can be made to predict the future based on an examination of the logic that will guide the relevant players. It should be assumed that the next resistance strategy to be used by the Arab minority will relate to their ability to deal with the tension between the two basic trends of government policy: the political exclusion and economic inclusion of the Arab minority. The government is signaling its intention to continue with its policy of economic inclusion following the approval of the assistance program to the Arab sector. At the same time, it seems intent on maintaining and even intensifying the policy of political exclusion. The cabinet decisions regarding the Islamic Movement and, particularly, the law enabling the impeachment of members of Knesset are evidence of the continuing policy to distance political elements in the Arab sector from the parliamentary domain.

In a situation of simultaneous exclusion and inclusion, a reality is being created in which the efforts of the Arab minority to translate the fruits of economic integration into political and cultural empowerment and integration within the Israeli domain are met with an "iron wall." This is likely to lead to unfulfilled expectations, as in the case of the Arab Spring. A glass ceiling that blocks the political and cultural integration of the Arab minority and reduces their presence and influence will channel the Arab minority toward the only domain left open to it—the internal sectoral domain. In other

words, in the absence of a real alternative to political integration within the Israeli system, which would make the Arab minority an active partner in the national decision-making processes, and of any possibility of nurturing separate political institutions, the only option available to the Arab minority will be to adopt a strategy of "convergence."

The idea of convergence as a type of resistance is the result of a lack of options due to restrictions and constraints. However, at the same time, it creates the possibility of leveraging the restrictions on activity in order to fuel internal communal empowerment, concentrating on communal reform, and beginning with a process of introspection to identify the various ills—such as crime, transportation, the status of women, municipal government, corruption, education, housing and, at a later stage, the allocation of resources needed to independently deal with these issues—which are the ongoing focus of the Arab minority's political and public discourse.

Convergence as a strategy inside the Arab community is not unrelated to the strategy of social resistance; however, it "corrects" the Joint Arab List's strategy in light of the difficulties faced, in particular, the dissonance, which is expected to worsen, between economic inclusion and political exclusion. The social domain will thus continue as the main strategic center of gravity for the activity of the Arab minority, such that attention paid to the idea of internal convergence will focus on the advancement of civil, communal, and social issues that are of concern to the Arab population.

This new mode of resistance will differ from social resistance in two main aspects. First, the idea of convergence relates to the social domain as the main target for action rather than simply as a tool for the advancement of traditional demands. Furthermore, unlike the Joint Arab List's political strategy, which views social discourse as an opportunity to create contact and connection between the Arab minority and Israeli-Jewish society and as a means of ensuring an Arab presence in Israel's parliamentary politics, the idea of convergence implies the abandonment of this continued presence in parliamentary politics and a further distancing from Jewish society.

Convergence was already conceptualized in the Future Vision documents and was a part, albeit not a central one, of that project. Chapter Five, written by Aziz Haidar, a researcher at the Van Leer Institute, emphasized the importance of Arab society becoming involved in self-improvement efforts. Haidar defined a number of basic goals: creating an environment that promises the social solidarity necessary to raise the status of Arab women; expanding

public participation in community affairs; dealing with social problems afflicting Arab society and its fabric of relations, which are turning it into a collection of alienated individuals; establishing consistency between the rate of growth and development on both the collective and the local and individual level; and achieving a balance between individualism in the sense of both self-realization and collective interests. One of the main claims of this chapter is that the Israeli establishment is not interested in the social development of the Arab population but rather seeks to keep it in a backward state so that it lacks the ability to organize itself, and the internal divisions are continually widened.

The array of solutions proposed by Haidar are based on community-level initiatives: neighborhood councils to ensure clean and well-maintained neighborhoods, law and order enforcement, and attention to environmental issues; committees to create and nurture public institutions, such as schools, and resolve local conflicts; funds and social organizations to provide humanitarian and financial aid for the physically- and emotionally-challenged and for the rehabilitation of drug addicts and alcoholics; frameworks for volunteering in public institutions, such as municipalities and schools, as well as civil society organizations; institutions and programs for social, cultural, and educational activities for all ethnic groups, the religious and the secular, men and women, and all age groups; organizations for mediation and conflict resolution as well as tools for dealing with violence within the family and between families and various institutions, particularly schools; educational curricula to teach values and ethics and the subjects of civics and history in order to strengthen the collective and national identity; specially designated units within various institutions, in particular the Supreme Monitoring Committee and the different municipalities, in order to strengthen the status of women; additional institutions like the Supreme Monitoring Committee for monitoring the municipalities and other official institutions; publication of a magazine covering local affairs and serving as a platform for critical debate, including reports on the activities, performance, and level of transparency of organizations and institutions and articles on social and civil organizations, professional individuals, and the bureaucrats serving in the institutions of Arab society. Throughout the Future Vision document, there are statements regarding the need for the social and communal empowerment of the Arab minority, whether by developing its cultural heritage (in a chapter written

by the writer Salman Natour) or by strengthening the education system (in a chapter written by Dr. Khaled Abu-Asba).

Other explicit statements of communal convergence as the possible next social resistance initiative were provided at a later stage, in 2010, by Dr. As'ad Ghanem, another writer of the Future Vision documents. He presented the idea, whether explicitly or implicitly, of social resistance in a broad historical context, connecting between the discourse surrounding the Future Vision documents and the appearance of the new type of resistance:

> The basic prerequisite for the success of our struggle against the institution of the state and the Jewish majority is our ability to bring about radical changes in the internal structure of Arab society. What is called for is a bold confrontation in which certain boundaries are not crossed, one that looks forward to achieving internal changes in society: the status of women; the economy; education; local governance; culture; and so forth.[68]

Unlike the Future Vision documents, which attempted to generate fundamental change in the regime by means of a dialogue with the Israeli establishment and with the Jewish majority, the new social resistance initiative is not expected to seek fundamental change in the structure and character of the Arab minority's relations with the State of Israel. It is assumed that this reality is not subject to change; in the current sociopolitical context of Israeli society, for which the strengthening of the Jewish determinants of its identity is the basis for constructing a common national denominator in the state, it is impossible to imagine that the hegemonic Jewish majority will be willing to give up assets in favor of a softer definition of Israeli citizenship. The recent reality, which has been characterized by a distancing of the Arab minority from the Jewish majority as a result of their institutional and public exclusion, reduces the chance of any dramatic changes in the character of the state and its regime.

Therefore, this new mode of social resistance, based on the internal communal convergence of Arab society, will attempt to reverse the order of the priorities set out in the Future Vision documents rather than focus on the effort to achieve overall systematic change in the existing order and the character of the regime. The Arab minority's social resistance will be channeled into a theoretically more modest goal, namely, reform from within Arab society; for example, social self-correction, which was given

low priority as reflected by its relegation to the fifth chapter in the Future Vision documents after the chapters dealing with political dimensions, will be given high priority. It will be defined, if not formally, as the principal mechanism whose short-term goal is the reform of Arab society and whose long-term goal is political empowerment. This will improve the negotiating power of the Arab minority in the discussion that may one day take place with the establishment and with Jewish society on a variety of issues, including political ones, which relate to the character of the State of Israel, as described by the writers of the Future Vision documents.

This change of priorities relies on its not being met by resistance from the establishment, which may even view it in a positive light as consistent with its policy of exclusion. The new social resistance initiative may, if and when future conditions allow, present the goal of reforming and empowering Arab society as the basis for renewed discourse with the state on disputed political issues. This initiative can be seen as a sort of rectification based on lessons learned from the previous resistance initiative, i.e., the Future Vision documents, which voiced the demand for political change and triggered a forceful response from the Israeli establishment. This previous attempt left the Arab minority without an Israeli partner—neither on the left nor the right—and probably provided the government with a pretext for excluding the Arab minority from the cultural and political domain in Israel and for pushing the current proposed legislation looking to reinforce Israel's status as a Jewish state in the face of the challenge to its fundamental character and values from the Arab community.

Convergence as a mode of social resistance is also connected to the Arab minority's lack of alternative strategic modes of resistance, including the option of violent resistance. The idea of violent resistance did gain a foothold regionally against the backdrop of the revolutions in the Arab world as reflected in the outbreak of violence in the spring of 2010. Nonetheless, the unique context of the historically charged relations between the Arab minority and the Israeli establishment greatly reduces the likelihood of the Arab sector adopting violence due to their feelings of vulnerability to the regime's use of force. There are two main reasons for this. First, Arab historical memory, both long-term and short-term, teaches them that past acts of political violence, such as the Land Day events and the October 2000 riots, led to formal and informal punishments from the establishment and from Jewish society. Second, there is great awareness among the Arab

minority of the current sociopolitical context, which is characterized by an increasingly powerful political right; the diminishing tolerance of the Israeli-Jewish public toward the Arab minority; and a growing fear of a backlash in the event of repeated acts of violent resistance and of the import of the Palestinian model of violence from the West Bank and East Jerusalem to within the Green Line. This is allegedly one of the reasons that the protest that developed in the Arab sector following the wave of terror and violence in Jerusalem and the West Bank was limited in scope.

According to the model of social convergence, the Arab minority have drawn into themselves, into the only domain open to them, as a result of the increasing height of the barriers placed between them and Jewish society in recent years. Although this alternative is expected to widen the chasm between the two sides, it does not necessarily involve a complete cutoff between the two societies. Despite the widening sociopolitical gap, there will remain points of contact between the Arab and Jewish sectors based on the idea of economic integration and Arab participation in the national economy via the employment of Arab women, the integration of Arabs in various hi-tech industries, an increase in the productivity of the Arab sector, and other outcomes in the social domain.

These points of contact are critical not only as part of the establishment policy to transform the Arab minority into a productive component of the national economy but also for the Arab minority themselves. First and foremost, they allow Israeli Arabs to continue to reap the benefits of living in the State of Israel with respect to the standard of living and quality of life. Second, they ensure that the Arab minority will have functional significance within the state and within the neo-liberal economic framework, a factor that has both social significance and provides the Arab population with a certain amount of protection. Third, integration within the Israeli economy will allow the various elements in Arab society to achieve internal social reform. This reform requires not only a political decision but also the economic resources for social goals, such as improving the transportation infrastructure, investing in educational institutions, supporting for social organizations, and reducing crime.

In order for the Arab minority to be able to implement a process of social renewal, economic symbiosis with the state must be continued, and, even more importantly, the Arab sector must continue to enjoy the advantages of economic integration and the willingness of the state, as part of its policy of

economic inclusion, to offer them significant budget resources. The interesting point in relation to the implementation of social resistance lies, therefore, in the ability of the Arab minority to realize the strategy of internal convergence, which is essentially based on the reverse logic of self-segregation.

The process of social convergence will also emerge from the internal political context. In recent years, the Arab political system has experienced one failure after another in its efforts to formulate a relevant course of action. Arab politics in the 1980s and 1990s was largely unable to advance the goal of social and civil equality and, in the absence of any alternative and in an attempt to gain local prominence, chose to position itself as the torchbearer of the national discourse. Religious leadership followed the lead of the secular politicians in their anti-establishment and anti-Jewish politics when it adopted the "al-Aqsa discourse" in recent years. The limitations of the religious leadership were subsequently exposed when the state took decisive steps against the leaders of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement. The non-profit organizations attempted to lead the national struggle and entered into the vacuum that resulted from declining confidence in the political parties and the Arab members of Knesset during the 1990s; but they too failed to create an effective agenda. The most resounding failure was, as discussed, the resistance initiative based on the Future Vision documents.

The social resistance project that is based on the idea of convergence does not require a central leadership. On the contrary, as in the regional and global contexts, which are characterized by the weakening of classic leadership models and the empowerment of the masses alongside the creation of network collaborations based on a defined discourse, social resistance offers a new model of leadership that rests on the network paradigm in two aspects. First, social resistance is an undertaking in which all existing players can participate. Activity for the sake of social reform is not alien to Islamic groups who, as early as the 1980s, were advancing the idea of an autarchic economy in the Arab sector and for whom social assistance and *dawa* are an inherent part of their activity. Neither is it alien to the secular politicians who are also looking to advance the interests of the Arab population regarding the allocation of resources and civil equality. And, it is, of course, not alien to the social leadership of the Third Sector, which is anyhow focused on the advancement of social issues. In other words, this process constitutes a kind of conceptual Tahrir Square and a discourse in which all Arab players can participate, based on the understanding that each of them can retain

their own unique political and ideological platform alongside their activity on the social level to reform Arab society.

The second aspect underlying the new model is the fact that no real political coordination is required in order to have a joint effect. The social initiative allows each of the players to be involved in social activity in their own sphere without the need to coordinate or formally organize within a joint political framework. While this is a difficult task to accomplish, particularly in view of the diversity of approaches, it is likely to produce a unified outcome. Furthermore, additional players, who are not part of the old Arab politics, such as business people, members of local councils, motivated citizens, and even members of the Jewish sector who are likely to view such activity as a business opportunity, can be expected to join the endeavor. Social resistance therefore offers a new political model based on the idea of flexible collaboration, which allows all the players to participate while preserving their uniqueness and separate identities.

Chapter 5

The Implications for Israel and Recommendations for Action

Implications

The Arab minority's social resistance initiative is likely to be a sophisticated undertaking that will provide a solution to their problems. It will connect with their unique sociopolitical context and, even more so, with the broader regional and global contexts. It will present the State of Israel with a difficult dilemma: whether to applaud the advantages of the social resistance model as concurring with the current government policy of political exclusion or to fear the long-term risks implicit in this model of Arab-Jewish relations within the state, namely, the risk of creating a "state within a state" or a "society within a society," which thus reinforces the national separation of the Arab minority.

The social resistance initiative is likely to serve Israel's strategic goals in several ways:

1. It is aligned with the existing policy of reducing the presence of the Arab minority in Israel's political and cultural domain. From this perspective, it is based on the Arab minority's deep internalization of the government's policy.
2. It will allow the state to continue the Arab minority's sociopolitical marginalization alongside their economic integration. This is because the process of internal reform does not involve rigid barriers between the Arab and Jewish domains but rather barriers that are semi-penetrable, thus allowing the continuation of the economic symbiosis needed for the process of convergence.

3. It does not involve political violence—the nightmare scenario of the Israeli establishment. On the contrary, the social resistance initiative is based on an approach that rejects political violence and recognizes its limits. Therefore, from the establishment's point of view, this initiative symbolizes the Arab population's adoption of the democratic and civil rules that prevail in the State of Israel.
4. It is a long-term endeavor as opposed to a one-time event. This provides the Israeli establishment with significant breathing space without having to frequently intervene in the affairs of the Arab population. This conforms with the establishment's policy since the founding of the state, which gave low priority to the Arab minority in the national agenda.
5. It shifts responsibility for the rehabilitation of Arab society from the state and the Israeli establishment to the Arab minority themselves. This will thus provide support for the government policy to reduce its socioeconomic involvement in the Arab sector and the state input in what goes on there.

However, the social resistance initiative also includes some major disadvantages for the government in the long term:

1. It contradicts the long-term principles of Israeli policy toward the Arab minority held since 1948, in particular, the supreme effort to prevent them becoming independent and separate from the Israeli domain. The social resistance initiative has the potential to transform the Arab minority in a collective national sense, even though this will be accomplished by means of an internal social platform.
2. It is likely, ultimately, to create the reality of a "state within a state," since, in addition to dealing with internal problems, it will enhance the Arab minority's independence and reduce its dependence on the state in a number of ways. The Arab sector can be expected to turn the process of reform and social empowerment into a renewed encounter with the state, which will include demands for a change in relations been Jews and Arabs in the spirit of the Future Vision documents. In other words, the social resistance initiative may, ultimately, enable the Arab minority to leverage economic resources and the symbiosis with the state to advance national initiatives that will nurture Arab separation and transform the Arab sector into a determined and forceful minority.

While the social resistance project may have several advantages for Israel in the short term, in the long term it does not seem to serve the interests of the state. Israel is likely to find itself in a reality that it has long sought

to avoid, namely, a strong Arab minority with a sophisticated collective identity, achieved by means of a social platform. This platform, which will be based on internal empowerment, will provide the Arab minority with the tools to demand, in the next stage, state recognition of their rights, and, later, a change in the structure of the regime and the constitutional basis of the state. The social model can thus be regarded as a new model of secession.

Recommendations

Given the trends described above, the difficulty in determining the correct path for the State of Israel and the Israeli establishment is that there are no correct or incorrect answers to questions relating to the strategies of governments and political establishments (unless these are based on principles that are manifestly unethical). The question, "What is the correct thing to do?" will always be dependent on the politician's individual point of view. While one can certainly disagree and point out the main faults in the policy, this will always be a subjective argument that rests on the critic's political and moral viewpoint.

Our recommendations are thus located in the tension between the strategic viewpoint of their source and the strategic viewpoint of the politician, and their validity will be limited by the ability of the politician to adopt them. In fact, because of this, the recommendations below do not suggest policy measures that contradict the types of policies currently being implemented by the State of Israel. On the contrary, the starting point is the actual policy currently being implemented—a policy, it should be noted, that is not entirely unreasonable. It should also be stressed that the principles of the Israeli establishment's policy toward the Arab minority have not undergone any fundamental changes over the years, as stated throughout this memorandum. The changes that have been made relate more to the manner in which the policy has been implemented and less to the policy itself. The policy of recent governments has been remarkably similar to the policy of all Israel's past governments. It is, therefore, no wonder that the policy of the center-left government of Ehud Olmert and the Kadima party toward the Arab minority following the publication of the Future Vision documents—a policy which rested on the idea of economic inclusion and the blocking of any discussion of national demands—served as a solid basis for the policy later adopted by the right-wing Likud governments led by Benjamin Netanyahu.

Therefore, the policy of political exclusion and economic inclusion is the starting point for the discussion of the scenario in which the Arab sector advances toward the adoption of a new strategy of resistance based on the idea of social convergence. The question is how Israeli policy should be managed in order to enable the establishment to both live with the Arab minority's social resistance strategy and monitor what is happening and prevent less desirable scenarios.

The key component in making these recommendations is the continuation of the trend of Arab economic inclusion. It would seem that the effort invested in recent years in political exclusion has exceeded that invested in economic inclusion. Exclusion attempts peaked with the proposed anti-Arab legislation, namely, the attempt to thin out the presence of Arab representation in the Knesset, the banning of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement, and the advancement of the "impeachment law." Much less has been done to take "positive" steps toward economic integration. The imbalance between these two trends has undermined the basis of this complex policy model and is likely to cause its total collapse. As described above, the gaps revealed in neighboring Arab countries between the trends of economic growth and political non-participation fueled revolutions, and it can be assumed that greater exclusion, in the absence of a corresponding positive vector or a worthwhile alternative for self-realization, will accelerate the Arab minority's trend of secession and even push it to extremes.

Therefore, efforts to achieve economic integration must be accelerated and, with that, the implementation of the recently approved plan for economic assistance to the Arab population. It would be mistaken to make clearing the Arab sector of weapons a condition of this process, since it will not create an alternative to the exclusion of the Arab sector from the cultural and political domain and will harm the dialectic of the government policy and violate, once again, the balance between its inclusion-exclusion components. It should be remembered that previous aid plans to the Arab sector have not been fully implemented, even those drawn up following the Or Committee, which was established following the October 2000 events, and the Lapid Committee, which was created in order to implement the Or Committee recommendations.

The government's program should be implemented in a way that will realize the objective of narrowing socioeconomic gaps between the Arab and Jewish sectors. The definition of socioeconomic equality as an objective is

highly important given the years of neglect, in particular, because it provides compensation from the perspective of the Arab minority for their political marginalization. The government thus needs to translate its aid plan into more defined objectives and to decide on a set of priorities for the allocation of funds. This should be accomplished in collaboration with players in the Arab sector, including non-profit organizations, business people, and public and community figures. The definition of priorities is critical also from the government's point of view in order to ensure that the funds are channeled to the correct destinations and not used to achieve objectives of political and national significance.

Another important step is the creation of a dialogue with Arab players in order to prevent the convergence strategy from eliminating any contact between Jewish and Arab societies and to preserve a type of "coexistence." Dialogue networks are critical for creating a balance, which will enable the Arab minority to engage in their internal reforms without losing contact with the broader Israeli framework. The government should encourage this contact through both the implementation of the economic aid plan and the exploitation of the non-government social domain, for example, the fostering of relations among non-profit organizations in both the Jewish and Arab education systems and among the different municipalities. Moves in this direction will create a basis for discourse on local and social issues while deemphasizing the national discourse.

Notes

1 The main text was a document outlining the future vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel. It revealed how Arab intellectual leadership viewed the fundamental problems of the Arab minority, defined its objectives, and recommended actions to achieve them. This document, like the others that followed it, called for a new arrangement for majority-minority relations in Israel by changing the 1948 paradigm based on the idea of a democratic Jewish state to a consociational democracy in which the minority and the majority agree on the way in which political power and the state's resources are divided between them and which provides the Arab minority with a veto over the decision-making processes on a national level.

2 Jonathan Lis, "Legislative Proposal: Cancellation of the Status of Arabic as an Official Language in Israel," *Haaretz,* August 26, 2014, [in Hebrew], http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.241620.

3 See, for example, the text of the Program for the Economic Development of the Arab Sector published by the Prime Minister's Office in January 2009, [Hebrew], http://bit.ly/2cFL21E.

4 See the official site of the Prime Minister's Office for information on the Authority's activity.

5 Eli Rekhes, *Survey of Graduates of Higher Education among Minorities in Israel (5721-5731)* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Shiloah Institute for the Study of the Middle East and Africa, 1973) [Hebrew].

6 Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

7 For up-to-date analyses, see the website of the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel.

8 Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority* (Haifa: Mifrash, 1985) [Hebrew].

9 For example, the demonstrations in fall 2015 against the backdrop of the outbreak of violence in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. See Hassan Shaalan, Roi Yanovksy, and Ilana Curiel, "Burning Tires, Clashes, and Arrests: Angry Protests in the Sector," *Ynet*, October 10, 2015, [Hebrew], http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4709042,00.htm.

10 Sammy Smooha, "Class, Ethnic and National Rifts and Democracy in Israel," in *Israeli Society: Critical Elements,* ed. Uri Ram (Tel Aviv: Breirot, 1993), pp. 172–202 [Hebrew].
11 Uzi Benziman and Atallah Mansour**,** *Sub-Tenants: The Arabs of Israel, their Status, and the Policies toward Them* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1992), p. 16 [Hebrew).
12 Ibid., p. 70.
13 See clip of Netanyahu's call to the voters on YouTube.
14 This is a recurring result of the surveys carried out in recent years by Professor Sammy Smooha as part of the Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel. See, for example, the survey carried out in 2012 in collaboration with the Israel Democracy Institute and the fascinating findings in the context of the distancing between Jews and Arabs. Sammy Smooha, *Not Breaking the Rules of the Game: Arabs and Jews in Israel Index, 2012*, pp. 30–44, [Hebrew], https://www.idi.org.il/media/4891/lo-shovrim.pdf.
15 Ephraim Lavie, ed., *Palestinian-Arab society in the State of Israel: A Time for Strategic Change and Processes of Inclusion and Equality* (Tel Aviv: INSS and the Tammy Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, 2016), [Hebrew].
16 In this context, see the critical analysis of the Land Day events in Doron Matza, "Characteristics of the Political Hegemonic Discourse in the Ruling Establishment Regarding the Palestinian Minority in Israel 1966-1976," PhD. diss., Ben-Gurion University, 2013, pp. 298–332, [Hebrew].
17 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (Verso: New York, 2001).
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Ever since the Palestinian Arabs became a minority in the State of Israel, the built-in tension between the majority and the minority has been maintained. The processes of civil integration did not cloud the Arab population's interest in expressing its national distinction opposite the attempts by Israeli governments to blur its national identifying features. The author points out a process in which the establishment's policy—which was accompanied by sustaining the gaps between the two populations and the reality of an Israeli-Palestinian conflict— served to further heighten the minority's interest in developing opposition strategies.

Violence was indeed included in the Arab minority's set of opposition strategies, but it had been the exception—contrary to the popular impression. The minority's involvement in terrorist attacks over the years of the state's existence have been minor, and the two violent clashes, in 1976 (Land Day) and in 2000 (the October 2000 Events) did not start as Arab initiatives. On the contrary, as this research elaborates and analyzes, the Arab minority instituted a variety of political, civil, cultural, and intellectual opposition strategies that, on the one hand, expressed its interest in changing the current reality and, on the other hand, reflected the processes of integration in the state and its lack of interest in provoking confrontations with government authorities.

Over the last two years, the Arab minority has been working to formulate a new opposition initiative focusing on the social opposition strategy, based on harnessing the social discourse in Israel for the purpose of promoting the spectrum of desires of Arab society. Its political expression was the establishment of the United Arab List. This approach is currently being taken despite the robust national discourse and the government tendency to exclude Arabs from the political-cultural space in Israel. In this reality, the social strategy is liable to mutate and develop into a strategy of communal convergence of the Arab society as a new type of national-social isolationism.

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