

The Missile Defense Program: Tension between the United States and Russia

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Introduction

The current tension between the United States and Russia about the establishment of an anti-ballistic missile defense system in Europe is not new, rather another twist in a plot that has spanned more than four decades. Ever since the nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile made its first appearance as the primary strategic weapon of the two superpowers, two opposing mindsets about it have prevailed. The first held that it was necessary to accept the reality that each side could completely obliterate the other side, and that therefore it was necessary to anchor stability and national security on MAD – mutual assured deterrence.¹ The opposing notion (usually a minority position) did not find it acceptable to live in a state of affairs in which the nation's homeland and population were hostages to the other side. According to the proponents of this view, it was necessary to base national security on shutting off the skies to ballistic missiles by means of advanced technology defensive systems. This tension between a strategy of deterrence and a strategy of defense is still with us to this day.

Although throughout the Cold War both powers were hard at work developing anti-missile defenses – which at the time was a highly demanding venture – it was the United States that made most of the effort. At times this endeavor was shaped by technological progress, but at other times – as was the case with Star Wars – it was a deliberate strategic enterprise. For its part, the Soviet Union was an unwilling participant in this venture and preferred to leave MAD in place, for two reasons: first, the

tremendous expense involved in developing and implementing national defense systems, and second, its awareness that maintaining MAD preserved the USSR's status as the twin superpower of the US and that any undermining of MAD would challenge that status. Overall, then, the superpowers focused their efforts both on military steps to further establish nuclear deterrence and on diplomatic moves to limit and reduce nuclear and missile stockpiles.

To this day, Russia, the primary successor to the USSR, relies on strategic deterrence as the basis of its national security, a guarantee against further erosion of its international standing, and perhaps even a springboard for reestablishment of a sphere of influence in the region of the former Soviet bloc. Quite predictably, therefore, any American attempt to deploy anti-nuclear ballistic missile defense systems makes Russia edgy, arouses objections, and becomes the focal point of tension between the two countries.

This paper briefly surveys the history of strategic defense and its checkered course since the first attempts to intercept ballistic missiles in flight. The paper elaborates on recent moves by the present American administration to bridge the gap between strategic defense and strategic deterrence, and Russia's response to those moves. The conclusion from the survey is that we have not heard the last of this story: the present state of affairs will almost inevitably lead to further tensions between Russia and the United States about the nuclear balance of power.

Strategic Defense: The Never Ending Story

Russia's launch of the Sputnik satellite on October 4, 1957 shook American self-confidence to the core. It demonstrated before one and all that America's sovereign territory, hitherto secure from attack by two wide oceans, was no longer immune to Soviet nuclear weapons.² This prompted an overt arms race to amass nuclear ballistic missiles but also a covert arms race to develop anti-ballistic missile defenses. In the early 1970s, efforts by the superpowers reached initial technological fruition and both superpowers deployed strategic defenses. Russia deployed one system around Moscow to protect the Soviet leadership while the United States deployed its own system in North Dakota to protect its ballistic missile launch sites there.

At the same time, both superpowers were quick to develop the antidotes to means to crack open each other's strategic defense systems.

It soon became clear to both, however, that between strategic defenses and strategic deterrence the continued arms race would take an unbearable economic toll, and they therefore agreed to give up the defensive option. In 1972, they signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), barring the deployment of new anti-ballistic defense systems. The treaty allowed both sides to continue operating the systems that had already been deployed, on condition that they would be limited to one single site and not include more than 100 interceptors. The United States chose to dismantle its already deployed missile defense site in North Dakota (today the site is a museum and is open to visitors), while the Soviet Union decided to leave its Moscow defense system intact and operational, as it is to this day.

This, however, was not the end of the story for strategic defense – if anything the opposite was true. In May 1983, President Ronald Reagan, who had always loathed the idea that the security of the United States was based on the ability to kill millions of people and destroy the planet, announced his Strategic Defense Initiative and called on the scientists who had developed nuclear arms to come up with a way to intercept ballistic missiles in flight, thereby rendering nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.”³ The idea was to make use of a spectrum of futuristic technologies – with an emphasis on space-based energy weapons – to hit and destroy missiles in flight (the media called the initiative “Star Wars,” after George Lucas’ 1977 science fiction movie by that name). Yet despite the massive investment of billions of dollars, it became clear that the task was beyond the technology of the time (and most probably even that of today). The Soviet Union, fearful that its strategic deterrence might be neutralized, secretly launched a similar effort that yielded the same disappointing results. Many analysts, including some Russian thinkers, saw the Star Wars race as the straw that broke the USSR's back and brought about its fall, rendering Stars Wars unnecessary. The ambitious project was terminated once President Clinton took office, and the already allocated budgets went into developing tactical defense systems against short range missiles to protect American forces deployed around the world.

Yet this too was not the end of strategic defense, and it resurfaced during Clinton's second term in office. After a number of eventless years

regarding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a chain of events was suddenly unleashed in 1998 proving that the diplomatic efforts to control nuclear arms and missiles had not produced the desired results. These events began with North Korea launching a satellite by a three stage missile that overflew Japan,⁴ continued with India and Pakistan conducting nuclear tests, gathered momentum with the Rumsfeld Commission report determining that Third World countries could conceivably threaten the United States with surface-to-surface intercontinental missiles within five years, and peaked with Iran's first test of the Shahab-3 missile. The US Congress, at the time Republican, demanded that the President establish a national defense system that would protect the United States against the intercontinental nuclear ballistic missiles of rogue states. According to Republican Congressmen, MAD, which had maintained stability during the Cold War, would have no relevance vis-à-vis states with extremist ideologies. Moreover, accepting the situation of mutual deterrence between the only superpower still standing – the United States – and fifth-rate countries such as North Korea was unacceptable, as this would mean recognition, de facto and de jure, of the rights of marginal states to threaten the United States with nuclear weapons.

Consequently, President Clinton reluctantly signed the National Defense Authorization Act, which stipulated that the United States would establish a defense system against a limited attack of ballistic missiles on US territory. The formative idea was to develop a limited defense capability against rogue states whose long range missiles arsenals would presumably be small, in any case smaller than that of the USSR. This concept of limited defense made both Congress and the administration believe that they could have their cake and eat it too – to deploy a strategic defense system that would not affect Russia's strategic deterrence – an “Iron Sieve” rather than an “Iron Dome.” The bill authorized the development of a defense system based on a giant intercepting missile weighing more than 20 tons, an enormous fire control radar installed on a sea-going oil drilling barge, plus auxiliary radars and extensive command and control systems.⁵ It was decided to deploy the system in two West Coast sites, one in Alaska and the other in California. This deployment testified to the priority given to protecting the US against North Korean missiles.⁶

In order to legalize the system's deployment, President George W. Bush terminated the ABM treaty in 2002 following a 6-month advance notice as stipulated by the treaty, and instructed that the defense system become operational by 2004. Development of the system was erratic and seemed to strain even the seemingly boundless US R&D capacity, yet despite the limited record of success in interception tests, Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was declared in 2004, just as President Bush had instructed. The huge interceptors entered series production and started their deployment to their West Coast sites. What remained in question was the defense of the East Coast of the United States against Iranian missiles: Should the system be deployed to a third site, and if so, where?

The Third Site

The development of a new national defense system met with fierce criticism from America's European allies. One of their major complaints was that strategic defense of the American homeland would be tantamount to the decoupling of American national security from that of the rest of the Western allies, abrogating the basic principle of indivisible defense of the West.⁷ What the critics clearly wanted was for the US to desist from strategic defense and for the Western alliance to uphold the policy of pure strategic deterrence. The Bush administration, however, turned this argument on its head and decided to build the third site not on the East Coast – from where it could defend only the United States – but in Eastern Europe, from where it could defend both Europe and the United States against Iranian missiles. Following some preliminary studies, it appeared that a third site with radar in the Czech Republic and interceptors in northeastern Poland would be able to intercept Iranian missiles launched against targets in Eastern, Central, and Western Europe as well as targets on the US East Coast. Independent studies published in the open literature supported this conclusion.⁸

Consequently, in 2007 the Bush administration entered into negotiations with the Czech Republic and Poland to deploy elements of the third site on their territories – a radar installation near Prague and a launching site with ten interceptors in the northeastern Polish town of Morag. Despite some domestic opposition, the Czech and Polish governments welcomed the American request, as they viewed the permanent deployment of American

forces on their soil as an American guarantee of their security against the rising might of Russia under President Putin. Other European allies, however, took it badly, partly because of the bilateral nature of the direct negotiations between the US and the two European countries involved, circumventing both “Europe” as a whole as well as the NATO institutions.⁹

However, the most profound – and perhaps most unexpected – opposition to the plan came from Russia. In 2007, then-President Vladimir Putin equated the deployment of the third site with “a rekindling of the Cold War.” Official Russian spokespeople followed suit with other harsh denunciations. Russia threatened to deploy surface-to-surface missiles against third site assets were they to be positioned in Poland and the Czech Republic and hinted that it might withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which prohibited the development and deployment of intermediate range surface-to-surface missiles. The Russians claimed that a third site at the selected locations was really aimed against them, not Iran, because the paucity of Iran’s capabilities in missile development did not represent a real threat against Europe, and even less so against the United States, and that America’s public rationale was merely a pretext. In addition, the heavy, high velocity interceptors of the third site were capable of intercepting Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles fired at the United States from Russian bases, thereby lowering Russia’s deterrence. The issue was portrayed as an American plot to undermine Russia’s stature of a superpower. Thus the attempt to craft a limited defense approach aimed specifically against the “axis of evil” that would not be perceived by Russia as an attempt to erode its strategic deterrence did not succeed, and relations between the two countries reached a new low.

President Obama and the Phased Adaptive Approach

Since the beginning of his term, President Obama has viewed relations with Russia as one of the crucial building blocs of his foreign policy to advance his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. As the third site was one of the major obstacles in these relations, Obama needed to defuse the situation by selecting another option, whether by replacing the third site with even more modest defense systems that would be incapable of threatening Russia’s ICBMs or by giving up the entire concept of deploying US defense systems in Europe. The second option was unpalatable, given

the European dissatisfaction with President Obama's focus on domestic issues and his apparent neglect of the Atlantic alliance. Therefore, the administration chose the first option and announced it with much fanfare in mid 2009.

Underlying the new approach was an updated intelligence assessment presented by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on September 17, 2009, estimating that Iran's progress in intermediate surface-to-surface missiles (i.e., missiles capable of threatening Europe) was faster than previously envisaged but that its progress in intercontinental range missiles (i.e., missiles that could threaten the United States) was slower than expected.¹⁰ The inherent paradox encapsulated within this statement¹¹ did not prevent the administration from outlining the new program as follows:

- a. The size of America's national defense system deployed on the West Coast would be frozen at its present level.
- b. "Proven" systems based on the US Navy's tactical defense system (the Aegis system with Standard Missile 3 interceptors) would be deployed in Europe.
- c. The deployment would be implemented in phases linked to the rate of threat increase. In the first phase, defense of southeastern Europe would be deployed by the permanent stationing of Aegis ships in the eastern Mediterranean. In the second phase, a ground based version of the naval system would be deployed in Romania. In the third phase, the ground version would be deployed in Poland but with more advanced interceptors. Up to that point, the deployed systems would be able to defend Europe but not the United States. Finally, *should a threat develop against the United States* (author's emphasis), even more advanced interceptors, capable of striking Iranian intercontinental missiles aimed at the United States, would be deployed in Poland.

Close reading reveals that the fourth phase of the plan differs perhaps in its details but not in essence from Bush's third site, the major difference being that it is not a deterministic phase but one that seemingly depended on the evolution of the threat. Moreover, the time allotted for implementing this phase, about ten years, does not leave much room for deliberation. If the administration wants to have the means to defend the United States from the European continent within a decade, it does not have that time to examine the evolution of the threat; rather, it must start to build the new

and more powerful interceptor right now. This second inherent paradox also did not prevent the administration from presenting its plan as a technological and diplomatic breakthrough.

Indeed, this is precisely how the new plan, dubbed the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), was received both in the United States and in Europe. The PAA was greeted with much enthusiasm all around and hailed on account of the (mis)understanding that it had succeeded to square the circle, so to speak, and to provide the magic formula that would recouple the security of the United States to that of the entire West, guaranteeing American commitment to Eastern Europe while at the same time assuaging Russia's fears. Reality, however, proved otherwise.

Russia's Reaction and the New START Treaty Negotiations

At the outset, Russia greeted the new plan coldly. As time passed and details of the plan emerged and as the US administration began to negotiate in earnest with East European countries (Bulgaria) to station defense systems on their soil, Russian criticism mounted until its rhetoric reached the level of the third site controversy. Senior Russian spokespersons characterized the new plan as being "as bad as its predecessor or worse."¹² Vladimir Putin, now serving as Russia's prime minister, attacked not just the new plan but also the very idea of strategic defense, i.e., not just the deployment in Eastern Europe but also the deployment of national defense systems on the US West Coast.¹³ Russia's objections thus expanded from the immediate cause of deploying missile defense in Europe into the wider cause, similar to that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the ABM treaty, i.e., a sweeping objection to strategic defense, no matter where deployed or for what reason.

The Russians demanded the incorporation of this principle – a ban on strategic defense – in the text of the New START treaty, which was being negotiated at the time and was viewed by President Obama as one of the most significant expressions of his foreign policy: a combination of his "reset" policy vis-à-vis Russia with the reduction of nuclear weapons to realize his vision of a nuclear free world. Obama, already committed to the US national missile defense concept and to the deployment of defenses in Europe, refused outright. When the situation appeared headed for a crisis, President Obama telephoned President Medvedev and told him that the

United States' position on the issue was "take it or leave it." The United States was not prepared to agree to make the reduction of nuclear weapons contingent on any limitations on strategic defense.

In the end, a compromise was reached: the main text of the agreement would not contain any reference to anti-missile defense, but the US negotiators agreed that it would be mentioned in the preamble. Formally, the preamble is not binding, and this gave the semblance that President Obama's stubborn line prevailed. In reality, this is not clear at all. The eighth paragraph of the preamble reads as follows:

Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.¹⁴

Like all preambles, the words convey the spirit of the agreement, so to speak, and are not operationally binding. Nonetheless, this paragraph gives Russia the room to object and claim violations of the spirit of the treaty should the United States implement its phased adaptive approach in full. The paragraph states that *current* strategic defensive arms do not undermine the strategic balance, i.e., Russia is willing to accept strategic defense systems already in position in the United States and the tactical defense systems planned to be deployed in the first three phases of the PAA. At the same time, the fourth phase involves the deployment of powerful interceptor missiles not currently deployed and that still need to be developed and tested.¹⁵ Russia, then, maintains the right to oppose it should the United States implement the fourth phase – for all practical purposes, a ticking time bomb in terms of American-Russian relations – or decide to enhance the defense system already deployed in the United States by adding interceptors or deploying another site on American soil.

The US' own interpretation is obviously very different. As far as the US administration is concerned, the paragraph in the preamble does not commit it to any limitation in the present or future. This is not how it is seen in Russia. The general satisfaction expressed in Russia following the signing of the treaty is evidence that for the government there, the

paragraph of the preamble resurrects the ABM treaty, if not in word then in spirit.

The NATO Summit in Lisbon

The issue of territorial missile defense in Europe, with all its complexities and sensitivities, assumed center stage in the preparatory discussions for the NATO summit, took place in Lisbon in November 2010. The summit's objective was to approve a new, updated definition of the goals, policy, and strategy of the Atlantic alliance in view of the far reaching global developments since the previous reassessment in 1999 – in fact, to redefine afresh the purpose and the mission of the alliance. The issue of European missile defense received intense attention, both in the summit discussions and in the summit's concluding statement, in which no less than five (out of fifty-four) paragraphs were devoted to the subject. There is no doubt that the Russian perspective played a significant part in the preliminary discussions and concluding statement. Presumably the declarations were by and large acceptable to Russia, as President Medvedev was invited to address the summit plenum.

The Lisbon summit declaration includes the following principles:

- a. Missile defense will henceforth become a third pillar of NATO's military capability, side by side – and with equal standing – with conventional and nuclear capabilities.
- b. The NATO alliance is obligated to defend the populations and territories of its European members against the threat of ballistic missiles (though no mention is made of the source of the threat).
- c. The alliance will develop and deploy a territorial missile defense system that will offer protection to its European members. President Obama's PAA plan will form the core of this system.
- d. Russia is invited to cooperate with NATO in this endeavor and to integrate its own missile defense assets with those of NATO.

There is no doubt that this conclusion is a significant achievement for President Obama's policy of engagement with the US European allies and his policy of "reset" vis-à-vis Russia. This achievement, which the Obama administration will undoubtedly portray as one of its major diplomatic successes, was achieved at the cost of the linkage between the security of the United States and that of Europe, at least as far as the threat of

missiles from rogue countries is involved. The controversy with Russia was resolved by the ingenious expedient of committing NATO to defend only the territory and populations of its European members. The result was the nearly surrealistic situation whereby the NATO alliance, with full American blessing, had in fact undertaken to forego the defense of the national territories of two of its founding members – the United States and Canada. In more concrete terms, the limited commitment of NATO's territorial missile defense will make redundant – and in all probability will not deploy – those powerful interceptors of the fourth phase in the PAA needed for defending the US from European sites, the selfsame missiles that so incensed the Russians. Instead, the interceptors that will defend Europe only will be primarily tactical missiles with limited capabilities and will not pose a threat to Russia's ICBMs. The fourth phase of the PAA – the phase in which the powerful interceptors are supposed to be deployed in Poland – has thus lost its *raison d'être* and may well be cancelled at the end of the day. With this apparent American concession, the ticking bomb buried in Obama's PAA has been seemingly neutralized.

Limiting NATO's commitment to defend only the European homeland leaves the US national defense system outside the umbrella of the Atlantic Treaty, outside the consensus with the allies, and outside the tacit agreements with Russia. An interesting situation has been created in which it is not inconceivable that the European system will not be linked to the American one, and in which Turkey, for example, could veto the transfer of data from the European system's radar to the US system and thereby obstruct America's self defense against Iranian missiles. Moreover, deleting the US system from the Lisbon summit understandings will encourage Russia in its objections against any expansion of that system, not the least against deploying a third site on US territory to replace the defunct third site in Europe.

Russia has every reason to be satisfied with the Lisbon summit declaration and regard it as another success in its uncompromising policy against US strategic defense. Indeed, Russia has wasted no time in taking advantage of this achievement and is already leveraging it into even more ambitious political goals. The ink on NATO's invitation to Russia about cooperation in the defense of Europe was not yet dry before President Medvedev called for dividing Europe into "defense zones." According to Medvedev's

suggestion (made in closed forums), NATO's defense systems cannot be linked to Russia's because of concerns over secrecy and information security. Therefore, the best way is to divide Europe into two zones – one that would be protected by Russia and the other by NATO. Where is the border of the “Russian zone”? Obviously, the Russian President did not go into details but it is possible to decipher his vision. It seems that the objective of contemporary Russia to return to the previous Soviet zone of influence in Eastern Europe remains steadfast, and the cooperation Russia was offered on anti-missile defense is liable to be used to promote it.

Ratification of New START Triggers another Controversy

Following his success in the Lisbon summit, President Obama turned his time and energy towards persuading the Senate to ratify the New START treaty. The language of the preamble that links strategic deterrence to strategic defense with its implied limitation of the United States' freedom of action in missile defense drew intense criticism from conservative senators. The Democrats' losses in the midterm elections of November 2010 implied that if the New START treaty were not ratified by the incumbent Senate, it would probably be rejected by the next Senate, thereby delivering a serious blow to the President's policy and personal prestige.

In an effort to persuade Republican senators to ratify New START before they recessed, the President sent them a letter explicitly committing himself to full realization of the phased adaptive approach. President Obama declared that “as long as I am President, and as long as the Congress provides the necessary funding, the United States will continue to develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners.” He further affirmed, “My Administration plans to deploy all four phases of the EPAA.”¹⁶ To be sure, this was a reaffirmation of the obligation to deploy in essence an Obama version of Bush's third site – the selfsame third site that irked the Russian government so much in the first place. One could say that the President was being clever and that limiting his commitment to his term in office – “as long as I am President” – emptied it of all meaning, since by 2020 when the fourth phase is scheduled to be implemented, Barack Obama will no longer be the president of the US, even if reelected in 2012. Nevertheless it was impossible to

dismiss such a presidential commitment, and some of the key opponents to the treaty's ratification changed their minds, citing the President's commitment as a condition for supporting ratification. The Senate had the necessary majority, and New START was ratified on December 22, 2010. As anticipated by several senators, the final ratification document includes caveats that makes this ratification contingent on the US freedom of action concerning strategic defense.

As far as the Russian government was concerned, the idea that the Senate's ratification was contingent on freedom of action in strategic defense undermined what it saw as one of its major achievement in the treaty. Thus, the Russian media immediately reacted with vehemence, and the Russian Federation's legislature came out with fierce criticism. Some argued that if the Senate's ratification were made contingent on the President's promise, Russia for its part should not ratify the treaty. On the other hand, Prime Minister Putin, still the power in Russia, congratulated President Medvedev on the Senate's ratification, thereby ensuring that even if the Senate decision included a contingency clause, the Duma would ratify it, as in fact occurred. Thus, the New START treaty has indeed come into being, but with opposing interpretations of its implications to strategic defense. The controversy is far from over, and the treaty has at most papered over the chasm between the two sides rather than bridge it.

Conclusion

The tension between Russia and the United States over strategic defense dates back to the Cold War and stems from fundamentally opposing views on strategic deterrence and strategic defense. The current flare up of this tension involves not merely the bilateral nuclear balance between the two powers but also the multilateral balance that now includes rogue states already armed with nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, and incipient rogue nuclear powers such as Iran. The United States is striving to base its policy vis-à-vis such rogue states on a mix of deterrence and defense, while Russia refuses to allow the United States freedom of action in this regard. The Russian stance is that any American strategic defense is unacceptable even if meant to defend against a third party. The American approach is that the world has changed and is no longer bipolar. For its part, Russia maintains that nothing has changed and that the nuclear balance between

Russia and the United States has always been and still is the only game in town.

The ratification of New START eased this tension somewhat, and NATO's new policy, as announced at the Lisbon summit, will almost certainly ease it further. On the other hand, the controversy over the ratification of the new treaty indicates that the embers are still glowing under the seemingly cold ashes. It would be only prudent to assume that this is merely a time out and that the tension will resurface with full force if and when a new, less compromising US administration takes office. The growing missile and nuclear capabilities in North Korea and Iran are likely to accelerate plans for deploying strategic defenses against them. Even without such external players, the very existence of an American national defense system will continue to flash a red warning signal to Russia, and any US administration that will plan to modernize or expand it is bound to encounter intense Russian objections. As long as this unbridged gap between the Russian and American worldviews about bilateral and multilateral nuclear relations exists, the question of strategic defense will remain a constant bone of contention.

Notes

- 1 "MAD" was revamped by the media to stand for mutual assured destruction.
- 2 Great Britain suffered a similar shock in 1910, after the first successful flight from Calais to Dover, which meant that the English Channel could no longer ensure Britain's imperviousness to hostile attacks from the air.
- 3 President Reagan presented the initiative in a speech broadcast on May 23, 1983. This was perhaps one of the best demonstrations of his impressive ability to convey popular messages. In order to clarify the notion of exchanging second strike strategy with a strategy of defense, he asked rhetorically, "Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them?"
- 4 The satellite did not in fact begin orbiting earth because of a malfunction during the third phase of the missile, but it functioned perfectly during the first two phases. The fragments apparently fell to earth in or near Alaska.
- 5 According to current American custom, the system does not have its own name. Its official moniker is the acronym GMDS – Ground-based Midcourse Defense System. The intercepting missile is called the GBI – the Ground Based Interceptor, while the radar is called the SBX – Sea Based X-band radar.
- 6 Because the weapon system under discussion is not constructed of separate batteries but is rather a global system of interceptors, warning satellites, and long range radars, the proper term is "site."

- 7 See Bradley Graham, *Hit to Kill: The New Battle over Shielding America from Missile Attack* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), pp. 165-68.
- 8 Detailed research on the expected capabilities of the third site was presented by Dean Wilkening of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, in May 2009 at the Royal United Services Institute in London. The conclusions supported the American administration's assertions that the third site would have the capacity to defend both Europe and the US East Coast against Iranian missiles. See <http://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4930106FE7696/info:public/infoID:E4A38B59475CF7/>.
- 9 See, e.g., CRS Report to Congress, "Long Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe," September 3, 2008, p. 2, <http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL34051.pdf>.
- 10 For the full transcript of Secretary of Defense Gates' speech, see <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4479>.
- 11 All states that develop ballistic missiles start with short range missiles. On the basis of cumulative experience, they then develop mid range missiles, and from these they develop intercontinental ones. This sequence is necessarily rooted in basic engineering logic, and it is unreasonable to assume that Iran would be an exception. It then stands to reason that faster than expected development in short and mid range missiles means, perforce, faster than expected development in intercontinental ranges missile capability, rendering Gates' statement paradoxical.
- 12 In an article entitled "Mr. Nyet" published on March 5, 2010 in the Russian English-language daily *Moscow Times*, Michael Bohn quoted Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov (the former defense minister) as saying that Obama's alternate plan (i.e., the phased adaptive approach) was "just as bad [as the Bush plan] or even worse."
- 13 At a news conference in Vladivostok on December 29, 2009, Prime Minister Putin said: "What is the problem? The problem is that our American partners are building an anti-missile shield and we are not building one....By building such an umbrella over themselves, our [US] partners could feel themselves fully secure and will do whatever they want, which upsets the balance." See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8433352.stm>.
- 14 See <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf>.
- 15 The Obama administration is intentionally obscuring the issues by calling all types of missiles to be deployed in Europe by virtually the same name – "Standard Missile 3" (SM3). The difference is "only" in its sub-versions. Standard Missile 3 Version Block IA, which has been in operational service for about three years, will be used in the first phase. The version called Block IB, which is fairly similar to its predecessor only with a more advanced sensor now in development, will be deployed in the second phase. The version called Block IIA, which is actually a new missile currently in joint development by the United States and Japan, will be deployed in the third phase. The "version" misleadingly called Block IIB is an altogether new missile with much higher performance than its predecessors, similar to the performance of the GBI missile, which was planned for deployment in Bush's third site, located in the same geographical spot in Poland as Phase 4

of the PAA. The first version certainly fits the definition of a “current” system. The second and third versions, presently under development, could perhaps be squeezed in as “current.” Under no circumstances, however, could the fourth version – actually a brand new missile - be described as “current.”

- 16 Obama’s Letter to Senate on Missile Defense and New START, December 18, 2010, <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/December/20101220112111su0.6327565.html?CP.rss=true>.