

Between Vision and Reality: New START, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the Nuclear Security Summit

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In April 2009 in Prague, President Barack Obama presented his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. To that end, he contended, the United States must spearhead a process that will ultimately bring about the realization of this ideal, even if not in his lifetime. Obama presented three ways the United States would strive to implement this vision: nuclear disarmament; reinforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and strengthened security of nuclear materials and materials for nuclear weapons in order to prevent their falling into the hands of terrorist groups.¹

Obama's vision is not original. The aspiration to be rid of nuclear weapons has existed almost as long as nuclear weapons themselves, but in recent years a vibrant public discussion has been underway in the United States on the increasing threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear know-how to hostile elements, including terrorist organizations.² Against this background, Obama formulated his vision and a plan to translate this vision into practice.

In 2010, Obama (along with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev), signed the sequel to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I); published a review of US nuclear policy; and organized a summit meeting on the security of nuclear materials. The administration presented these three events as elements in the implementation of Obama's vision.³ The question arises, then, in what way and to what extent do these three

measures make a real contribution to disarming and reducing the nuclear arsenal of the United States, and thus serve as steps towards implementing the Obama vision.

New START: What is (and What is Not) Included

The nuclear nonproliferation regime includes wide ranging international treaties (such as the NPT); an element of taboo (a strong norm that decries the use of nuclear weapons);⁴ and other arms control and disarmament agreements, both bilateral and regional. Although there is a tendency to confuse and conflate concepts, disarmament agreements are distinctly different from arms control agreements. Disarmament agreements deal mainly with destroying certain categories of weapons; they are discussed mostly in international forums (like the UN), and the decisions made in these forums are uniform and incumbent on all states equally. In contrast, arms control agreements are an additional tool in a state's foreign and defense policy. Even though they also deal with reducing nuclear arsenals, their chief goal is to stabilize relations between states. Historically, these agreements were often formulated between countries in conflict as a means of promoting dialogue between them and reducing the danger of escalation and subsequent conflict.

The original START I treaty, which dealt with reducing the Soviet and American offensive nuclear weapons arsenals, was formulated as a bilateral arms control agreement. The talks about the treaty began in the early 1980s, during the Cold War, at the initiative of President Ronald Reagan. Nearly a decade passed before the sides reached an agreement and signed the treaty in 1991. Several months later the Soviet Union was dismantled, and the ratification process was thus delayed until 1994. The treaty included a verification and monitoring regime that from the US point of view facilitated monitoring of the Russian nuclear arsenal. The treaty expired on December 5, 2009, and in order for the monitoring and verification regime to continue, it was necessary to sign a continuation treaty.

On April 9, 2010, following long months of negotiations, the American and Russian Presidents signed the START I follow-on treaty, whereby the United States and Russia are required to reduce the number of nuclear missile delivery systems and warheads in their possession over the course

of the next seven years (from the moment the treaty enters into force). Each side is required to reduce the number of nuclear warheads positioned on intercontinental missiles, submarines, and bombers to about 1,550, and reduce the number of missile launching systems to 700 deployed and another 100 in storage.

Obama chose to sign the treaty in early April in Prague, exactly one year after his landmark speech.⁵ The choice of venue was a demonstrative gesture to prove that under the Obama presidency, the United States was marching firmly on the disarmament road and working to lower the number of nuclear weapons in the world. However, the new treaty does not in fact contain any unprecedented decision on reducing the nuclear arsenals of the two states. Moreover, the treaty discusses only the strategic nuclear arsenal and not the tactical nuclear arsenal, and it does not address the American nuclear bombs stationed in Europe, because they are not defined as strategic weapons.

Furthermore, the figures in the treaty on cuts in nuclear warheads and their launching systems – including intercontinental missiles, submarines, and bombers – raise several question marks. According to the treaty, warheads placed on missiles (on land or at sea) will be counted, yet not all the nuclear warheads that in practice each bomber is capable of carrying will be counted. According to the new counting rules, one warhead is counted for each bomber, while in practice, each bomber, Russian or American, can carry between six and twenty bombs. Thus, according to the counting rules of the treaty, the United States is in possession of only 1,650 operational warheads, and not 2,100, the true number of operational warheads in its possession. Russia, according to the treaty, is in possession of 1,740 warheads, not 2,600. The treaty does reduce the number of launching systems for nuclear bombs, but it allows the two countries to possess a number of operational nuclear bombs in a way that does not require them to implement a change in the structure of their current nuclear force.

More perplexing is how the Obama administration has cast the new treaty, confusing arms control and disarmament. On the one hand, Obama presented the treaty as a disarmament treaty that contributes to reducing the nuclear arsenals of the two countries, and thus advances his vision of a nuclear free world. On the other hand, throughout the negotiating

process the President portrayed it as a tool to “reset” relations between the two countries. In the subsequent debate on ratification, the administration also justified the treaty as an answer to American fears of Russia. Thus it appears that arms control reasoning underlies the treaty far more than disarmament aspirations.

Indeed, in spite of the many declarations about changes in threat perceptions since the end of the Cold War, at least regarding the United States vis-à-vis Russia, the treaty renewal negotiations revealed the suspicion that exists between the two countries. It was only about four months after the original treaty expired and following prolonged negotiations that the sides were able to sign a new treaty. The delays in signing resulted from a dispute between the parties over two main issues. One dealt with Russia’s claims regarding the intrusive means of verification in the original treaty. The second issue concerned the American missile defense program and Moscow’s suspicion that this defense system was also aimed at Russia. Moscow demanded to link the decisions in the treaty concerning offensive nuclear weapons with the missile defense program. Ultimately, the missile defense program was not mentioned in the body of the agreement, but in the preamble only. Legally the preamble is not binding, but it does provide Russia with the possibility of claiming a violation of the treaty in the future if it concludes that implementation of the American missile defense program violates the strategic balance between the two countries.⁶

The US Senate ultimately ratified New START on December 22, 2010. The treaty was ratified by Russia in the subsequent weeks, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011. The debate in the US over ratification of the treaty was marked by the disagreement between supporters and opponents of the treaty, primarily conservative Republicans, who were not satisfied with the administration’s policy regarding the continued role of nuclear weapons in United States national security policy. Primary concerns were that the new treaty might limit the American missile defense program, which could endanger United States security; that it does not include a satisfactory verification and monitoring regime (especially compared to the one established by the original treaty); that it does not limit tactical nuclear power, where Russia has an advantage over the United States; and that it is liable to harm the modernization of this power. Furthermore,

the authors of the treaty did not take China and its nuclear arsenal into consideration when they concluded the agreement.⁷

In contrast, supporters claimed that treaty's main importance is the preservation of the monitoring and verification regime, which makes the Russian nuclear arsenal transparent to the United States. Although the United States had the capability to monitor the Russian nuclear infrastructure for over twenty years, this monitoring had not taken place for over a year (since the original treaty expired). Thus in urging ratification Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, "Perhaps most importantly . . . when the prior treaty expired we lost the ability to have inspectors on the ground. We need to get our inspectors back into Russia."⁸ Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) also urged similar support of this treaty: "We are deeply concerned about North Korea and Iran and other programs in which there are maybe one, two, five, twenty. But we're talking about thousands of warheads that are still there, an existential problem for our country."⁹

The dispute over the treaty underscored that the problematic issue is less the number of nuclear warheads and launchers stipulated by the treaty and more the level of fears and threat perceptions of the United States towards Russia. Ratification of the treaty and institution of a monitoring regime are likely to diminish American fears of Russian activities in the nuclear realm, thereby increasing international stability.¹⁰ Furthermore, the administration's commitment to significantly increase the budget earmarked for preserving and modernizing the nuclear force helped would-be opponents of the treaty vote for ratification.¹¹

The fact that Obama viewed the signing of the treaty as a tool to help rehabilitate the United States-Russia bilateral relationship reinforces the assessment that this is an arms control treaty. It was also hoped that this process would have additional diplomatic ramifications, such as, for example, on the issue of Iran and the United States efforts to form a coalition to pressure Tehran. Moreover, the American internal dispute over ratification of the treaty shows that the question of relations between the United States and Russia is still at the heart of the issue, even if the fear of Russia and the need to ratify the treaty in order to revive the monitoring and verification regime took center stage. Indeed, during the treaty ratification process, supporters spoke about the threat that the relationship between the United States and Russia would be harmed if the treaty was not ratified.

Thus, on the question whether the follow-on treaty makes a real contribution to reducing the nuclear arsenal of the United States, the answer right now is no. The follow-on treaty is, in fact, an arms control treaty intended to increase stability between the two countries, and the ratification process testified to latent tensions and fears that lie below the surface. Nevertheless, it is possible that with time the treaty's contribution to increasing stability and cooperation between the two countries will also advance Obama's vision of reducing the international nuclear arsenal.

The US Declared Nuclear Policy: The Nuclear Posture Review 2010

In April 2010, after much anticipation (including a four month delay) and extensive public discussion, the Obama administration published the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the American doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons. The doctrine was published against the backdrop of negotiations with Russia on the follow-on treaty to START I and the request by Congress and the Pentagon for a document that decides on force structure and the number of warheads needed to allow progress in negotiations with Russia on possible cuts in the nuclear arsenal. In addition, there was a need to establish priorities in the framework of the defense budget drafted by the Pentagon, which was also scheduled to be published in late 2009.¹² The NPR, which summarizes the declared nuclear policy of the United States, establishes US nuclear policy for the coming five to ten years.

The document should be examined in three contexts: the dispute in the United States about the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy; its role as a deterrence document, in which the United States specifies when and against whom it will launch a nuclear attack; and Obama's vision. The discussion below focuses primarily on the first and third of these contexts: the internal American dispute and the document's compatibility with the Obama vision.¹³

The Public Debate Prior to the Doctrine's Publication

Before the NPR was published, a vibrant debate was underway in the United States on several interrelated issues that have been on the agenda since the end of the Cold War, in the wake of the transition from a bipolar world where American nuclear weapons served mainly to deter a nuclear

attack on the United States or its allies by two nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and China.

The first issue dealt with the definition of the threat. What is the main threat that the American nuclear arsenal addresses? Given the changes in the strategic threats against the United States following the Cold War, would the acquisition of nuclear capability by terrorist groups rank at the top of the threat pyramid defined in the document? In this context, attention focuses on the meaning of “nuclear deterrence” in the post-Cold War world. Is the classic model of deterrence appropriate for deterring terrorist groups in possession of nuclear weapons? Perhaps not, as the means for dealing with this kind of threat are not nuclear weapons, but international cooperation, with the goal of identifying and attacking terrorist networks and stemming nuclear proliferation.¹⁴

The second issue focused on the purpose of the nuclear arsenal: for the first time would there be a declaration that the purpose of the arsenal is only deterrence against a nuclear strike, that is, not against a chemical or biological attack or a large scale conventional attack? During the George W. Bush administration, nuclear weapons were assigned two additional roles beyond deterring a nuclear attack: deterrence against a chemical or biological attack, and use of nuclear weapons in order to destroy hard and deeply buried targets that cannot be destroyed with conventional weapons.¹⁵ Prior to publication of the 2010 document, Obama claimed that the emerging document would reduce the role and the quantity of nuclear weapons in United States national security strategy.¹⁶

The third issue dealt with the question of no first use. Would the document include a declaration that the United States will not be the first country to use nuclear weapons in the event of escalation? For years, the US has deliberately maintained ambiguity on the situations in which it would make use of nuclear weapons.

A fourth issue dealt with the number and types of nuclear weapons. The public discussion of the document coincided with the debate regarding the negotiations between the United States and Russia on New START. Both documents engage in mapping and ranking the threats, and defining the goals of the nuclear force and the size of the force needed to realize the goals implies the possible reduction in the number of weapons in the follow-on treaty. There were also rumors that for the first time, Obama

would declare that one of the three means used to launch nuclear weapons (planes, submarines, ground missiles) would be eliminated.¹⁷

A fifth issue focused on the question whether it is necessary to develop new nuclear weapons, or whether it is possible to make do with modernizing the existing arsenal. President Obama declared that the United States does not need to develop new weapons. The discussion of this issue did not touch only on the question of the threats against the United States and whether the existing response is sufficient, but also on how reducing the extensive military nuclear industry will affect the economy and employment.¹⁸

The last issue dealt with the forces' level of alertness and preparedness. The United States and Russia each have some 1,000 warheads ready for launching at any given moment (hair trigger alert). Obama described this as an anachronistic vestige of the Cold War period. There were those who claimed that in order to change this situation, the United States must make a commitment in its doctrine to reduce as much of this arsenal as possible.¹⁹

What is in the Published Document?

The published document stresses Obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons, with the declared vision constituting the *raison d'être* of the decisions included in the doctrine itself.²⁰

The first goal defined in the document deals with preventing proliferation and nuclear terror. For the first time, the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorist elements was placed at the top of the United States formal nuclear agenda. The second element in the document is the reduced role of nuclear weapons. The United States, it was declared, will not make use or threaten to make use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are members of the NPT and honor their commitments in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency's verification agreements. The document also states that the United States will consider using nuclear weapons only in extreme cases with the goal of defending the essential interests of the United States, its allies, and its partners. In the meantime, the United States will continue to strengthen its conventional capabilities and will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the goal of deterring a nuclear attack against the United States, its allies, or its partners as the sole purpose of the nuclear weapons in its possession.

A third issue deals with the New START I treaty, and the goal of preserving strategic deterrence and stability and at the same time reducing the nuclear arsenal. The focus here is the American commitment to renew the process of arms control and cooperation with Russia and subsequently reduce the nuclear force without harming strategic stability.

A fourth goal is to strengthen regional deterrence and strengthen the United States' allies. The document states that as long as there are regional nuclear threats against the United States, its allies, and its partners, deterrence for them will have to depend on nuclear capability.

The final point is that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe and effective nuclear force. An increase in the investment in the existing nuclear force is justified, according to the document, against the backdrop of the need to confront nuclear proliferation and terrorism, reduce the nuclear arsenal, and extend the life of the existing warheads rather than developing new weapons. The document also states that the United States will not conduct nuclear tests, will act to bring about the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its entry into force, and will not develop new warheads.

Critics of the NPR lamented that there were no reductions in any of the three platforms on which the American nuclear force is based. That is, Obama decided that there was still a need to rely on bombers, submarines, and ground missiles. Second, the state of readiness of the nuclear forces was not changed, despite Obama's declarations and his promises to this effect in his election campaign. Third, a decision on the future of the tactical nuclear forces stationed in Europe was postponed pending discussion in the framework of NATO.²¹ Fourth, the United States retains the possibility of threatening a nuclear state with nuclear weapons or even of launching a preemptive nuclear strike against it. It can also still threaten to use nuclear weapons in order to deter, and if necessary, respond to a non-nuclear attack, such as a large scale conventional attack carried out by a nuclear state. In addition, this document maintains the ambiguity that characterized the declared nuclear policy in the past,²² since the only clarification in the document is that the United States will not commit itself not to use nuclear weapons to attack a non-nuclear state that attacks it with chemical or biological weapons if the attacking state does not honor its

commitments to the NPT. With this declaration, the United States sent a deterrent message to North Korea and Iran.²³

Finally, retaining the option of first use of nuclear weapons was not essential and was even dangerous, since it could well lead to instability in crises and to escalation, which would likely increase the chance of accidents or unintended use of nuclear weapons.²⁴ Furthermore, since the United States has the largest conventional capability compared to any other state, it has no need to threaten to use nuclear weapons in order to respond to a large scale conventional attack. Michael Gerson, who wrote about the risks involved in retaining the first strike option, emphasized that ironically, the threat to use nuclear weapons to deter a conventional attack by an adversary with greater capability is one of the reasons the United States is concerned about nuclear proliferation to rogue states or terrorist groups.²⁵

Perhaps, then, the changes to the US nuclear doctrine are mainly cosmetic in nature. Is it true, as the administration stressed repeatedly, that the new doctrine reduces American dependence on nuclear weapons? After all, the document recognizes that both the United States and Russia have a nuclear arsenal that is significantly larger than what they need for deterrence. It appears that out of his desire that the Senate ratify the New START agreement, Obama avoided making far reaching decisions that would constitute an additional political obstacle. Some might even say that the published document indicates that although the United States and Russia have not been strategic adversaries for some time, they both still adhere to a Cold War strategic concept, which holds that the weapons possessed by each country are aimed against the other.²⁶

The Nuclear Security Summit

One of the three tools for implementing the vision that Obama touched on in his Prague speech is strengthening the security of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons in order to prevent their falling into the hands of terrorist groups. In April 2010 the President convened an international summit, attended by over forty heads of state or their representatives, on the topic of international efforts to confront the threat of proliferation of nuclear materials (separated plutonium and enriched uranium) to terrorist groups.

The goal was defined as finding ways to secure all the nuclear materials in the world within four years.

The summit was designed to bypass subjects of contention between various states. The conference achieved widespread agreement on the subject of improving the security of locations where nuclear materials are stored (military facilities, civilian research reactors, and other infrastructures). Furthermore, the summit produced a document of understanding and a working paper, although critics claimed that the documents ultimately repeated the existing diplomatic understandings on the subject and were not binding.²⁷ Nevertheless, during the meeting, several states, such as Ukraine, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam, acceded to United States requests and agreed to destroy large quantities of enriched uranium in civilian facilities. For their part, the United States and Russia announced that each would destroy thirty-four tons of plutonium (an amount sufficient for some 17,000 bombs).²⁸

Beyond those gestures, the importance of this summit appeared mainly to lie in strengthening Obama's narrative on implementation of his vision. Indeed, the actual importance of the meeting departed from its declared goals. Obama used the summit to hold face to face meetings with state representatives, with the goal of promoting the formation of a coalition to impose harsher sanctions on Iran²⁹ and to prepare the infrastructure for the NPT Review Conference the following month.

Conclusion

To what extent have the three developments surveyed above made a recognizable contribution to the reduction and dismantlement of the United States nuclear arsenal, and thus to what extent do they constitute steps in implementing the vision Obama presented in Prague? The Nuclear Security Summit did not produce significant binding results, but made a contribution to Obama's vision through the gestures made by the various states. In contrast, the contribution of the two other actions is far more questionable. Although New START was presented by the administration as a contribution to reduction of the world's nuclear arsenal, and during the dispute over its ratification it became a milestone in Obama's policy, the treaty responds to the mutual threat perceptions of the United States and Russia more than it contributes to global disarmament. In an attempt

to bring about its ratification, the administration even made a commitment to significantly increase the budget for modernizing the nuclear arsenal and allotted more than \$180 billion over the next decade for this purpose.³⁰ The debates in the United States on ratifying this treaty and on the NPR emphasized the lack of agreement within the country on the continued purpose and modernization of the nuclear arsenal, and thus Obama's inability to bring about substantive changes in this direction.

In practical terms, therefore, the vision of significantly reducing the American nuclear arsenal has as yet advanced little. Indeed, the very measures intended to advance global disarmament have exposed the debate, ambivalence, and reservations, both within the administration and within the US government, towards this goal. Thus in spite of the aspiration of Obama and many others to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, this day does not appear to be close.

Notes

- 1 See the emphasis on these three measures in the speech by Ambassador Susan F. Burk, appointed by Obama as special representative for nuclear nonproliferation: "Addressing Today's Nuclear Threats," Address to the Alaska World Affairs Council, Anchorage, Alaska, October 19, 2010.
- 2 In this connection, see the seminal article by George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," *Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 2007.
- 3 This essay does not deal with the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, even though it is clear that the Obama administration's conduct prior to and during the conference is an important part of this agenda in the nuclear context. Issues raised in the conference's final document are discussed elsewhere in this collection; see Emily B. Landau, "Obama's Nuclear Disarmament Agenda: Blurred Aims and Priorities," pp. 15-26, and Yair Evron, "Israel and the Nonproliferation Regime," pp. 119-26.
- 4 Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 114-52.
- 5 See Tamar Malz-Ginzburg, "The Importance of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)," *INSS Insight* No. 172, April 11, 2010.
- 6 For an expansion on this issue, see Uzi Rubin, "The Missile Defense Program: Tension between the United States and Russia" in this collection, pp. 55-70.
- 7 For strong criticism of the treaty, see Mitt Romney, "Obama's Worst Foreign-Policy Mistake," *Washington Post*, July 6, 2010, and Mitt Romney, "Eight Problems with the New START," *National Review Online*, July 26, 2010.

- 8 Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Remarks on the New START Treaty," November 17, 2010.
- 9 Senator Richard Lugar, "Remarks on the New START Treaty," November 17, 2010. See also Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin L. Powell, "The Republican Case for Ratifying New START," *Washington Post*, December 2, 2010.
- 10 For a thorough discussion of the claims made by critics and supporters of the treaty, see Brent Scowcroft and Jake Garn, "Ratify New START Now," *Washington Times*, September 22, 2010. See also Peter Brooks, "U.S. Needs to Consider China in New START Discussions," *China Post*, September 23, 2010.
- 11 Greg Bruno, "Foreign Policy and the 2010 Midterms: New START and Arms Control," Council on Foreign Relations, November 10, 2010; Tom Z. Collina, Daryl G. Kimball, and the ACA Research Staff, "The Case for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty," Arms Control Association Brief, December 2010, p. 5.
- 12 David E. Hoffman "Obama's Atomic Choices: Inside the Making of U.S. Nuclear Policy," *Foreign Policy*, April 28, 2010.
- 13 On the second issue, see Jonathan Schachter, "The Obama Administration: Caught between Disarmament and Deterrence" in this collection, pp. 27-38.
- 14 Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "U.S to Make Stopping Nuclear Terror Key Aim," *New York Times*, December 19, 2009.
- 15 Noam Ophir, "The Core of the Matter: US Doctrine on Nuclear Weapons Use, 1998-2008" *Strategic Assessment* 10, no. 4 (2008): 77-84.
- 16 Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear Posture Review to Reduce Regional Role of Nuclear Weapons," FAS Strategic Security Blog, February 22, 2010, <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/02/nukemission.php>.
- 17 Bryan Bender, "Obama Presses Review of Nuclear Strategy," *Boston Globe*, January 3, 2010.
- 18 Travis Sharp, "Local Priorities vs. National Interests in Arms Control," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August 28, 2009.
- 19 John Mueller, "Think Again: Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2010.
- 20 US Department of Defense, *2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Fact Sheet*, April 6, 2010.
- 21 David E. Hoffman, "Obama's Atomic Choices: Inside the Making of U.S. Nuclear Policy," *Foreign Policy*, April 28, 2010. At the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010, it was decided to maintain the forces.
- 22 Michael S. Gerson, "No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy," *International Security* 35, no. 2 (2010): 7-8.
- 23 For an extensive critique of this clause of the doctrine, see Emily B. Landau and Jonathan Schachter, "World Has Mixed Messages on Nuclear Arms," *Haaretz*, April 15, 2010.
- 24 Gerson, "No First Use," p. 9.
- 25 Ibid., p. 18.
- 26 Hoffman, "Obama's Atomic Choices."
- 27 Mary Beth Sheridan, "Obama Secures 47-Nation Pact at Nuclear Summit,"

Washington Post, April 14, 2010; Mary Beth Sheridan and Scott Wilson, “In Nuclear Summit, Obama Seeks Global Help in Sanctioning Iran,” *Washington Post*, April 13, 2010.

- 28 “A Summit Goal: Making Plutonium and Uranium Harder to Get,” *Washington Post*, April 14, 2010. Seven months after the summit meeting, Belarus also announced that it would destroy all its reserves of enriched uranium by 2012.
- 29 On June 9, 2010, the UN Security Council imposed a fourth round of sanctions on Iran (Resolution 1929).
- 30 Hillary Rodham Clinton and Robert M. Gates, “We Can’t Delay this Treaty,” *Washington Post*, November 15, 2010; Collina, Kimball, and ACA Research Staff, “The Case for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty,” p. 5.