JCSS BULLETIN

JAFFEE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY

The IDF in the 1990s



Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Shomron seated next to JCSS Head Aharon Yariv at the Syrkin Memorial lecture.

The fourth annual Simon Syrkin Memorial lecture was delivered by IDF Chief of Staff Dan Shomron on February 26, 1989. Lt. Gen. Shomron began his lecture with an overview of the strategic conditions in the Middle East as we enter a new decade, turned to look at Israel's concept of national defense and national defense goals, and concluded with a discussion of the IDF force buildup for the 1990s.

A basic factor that Israel's security concept must take into account is the fundamental asymmetry between Israel and the Arab countries in area and strategic depth, military size, population, and economic resources. Moreover, because Arab military might is based primarily on regular forces, whereas the IDF depends mainly on mobilization of reserves, Israel must make quick battlefield decisions. In this regard Shomron stressed that while on the strategic level Israel's security concept is essentially defensive, as it does not aim to initiate political processes through military action, on the operative level it is necessarily offensive, aiming to terminate hostilities as quickly as possible.

On the Arab side, the situation is the exact opposite: on the strategic level, the concept is offensive, while on the operative level the Arab armies aim to utilize the asymmetry in force numbers to fight an extended battle of attrition against Israel.

While the numbers favor the Arab countries, Shomron pointed out that the outcome of war is not necessarily determined by numbers alone. With an offensive military doctrine on the operative level, Israel can utilize its relative strengths in quality of manpower in order to bring about swift termination of a future war. Moreover, as a means for gaining the initiative in battle, Shomron argued that a preemptive strike is both moral and legitimate if it is clear that Israel is on the brink of war.

Shomron assigned particular significance to the great military potential of Iraq, and the experience it gained in the Iran–Iraq War. Iraq's decision whether to join the pragmatic or extremist camp in the Arab world will undoubtedly be a key development in the Middle East in the coming years; Syria's military buildup is another key factor for Israel. Shomron discussed the possibility of the Syrians exercising a military option in the hope of stimulating political processes that might bring about a return of the Golan Heights.

6 June 1989

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- **Awards for JCSS researchers p. 6**
- **Tactical missiles p. 7**



JCSS Head Aharon Yariv and Deputy Head Joseph Alpher present Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin with a copy of the JCSS report on Israel's options for peace.

Israel's Options for Peace

SEE PAGES 4–5



Offense and Defense in Israel's Military Doctrine



Israel's founding fathers left a dual heritage in the realm of security thinking: a security doctrine composed of guiding principles and specific rules of conduct, and an imperative to reexamine this doctrine constantly in light of changing circumstances. Following the second principle, Dr. Ariel Levite's new book, entitled *Offense and Defense in Israel's Military Doctrine*, seeks to reevaluate Israel's traditional security thinking in order to assess how it has stood the test of time and changing circumstances. Levite attempts to examine whether the great measure of consistency that has traditionally characterized Israeli security thinking stems from continuity in the actual conditions that underlay the original articulation of the security doctrine, or whether it is in fact the result of excessive military conservatism. Specifically, the focus is on one single, but central, element of Israel's national security doctrine: the defensive and/or offensive military posture.

Since 1948 Israel has, on the *strategic* level, adhered to a defensive doctrine, emphasizing the preservation of the status quo through deterrence of Arab aggression. On the *operational* level, however, the IDF has found itself compelled to adopt an offensive doctrine that rests on two basic principles: transfer of the war to enemy territory as rapidly as possible, and a thrust to take military initiatives, i.e., preemptive strikes and possibly even preventive wars.

Over the years, IDF force building, training, and indoctrination have been oriented toward an offensive doctrine; this conception was put into practice with astounding success in the Six–Day War. That very success, however, spurred the Arab forces to introduce far–reaching changes in their own military doctrines and force structures. These changes, along with other political and military developments in the region over the past two decades, have effectively undermined some of the elements on which the IDF's traditional offensive doctrine has rested.



Levite finds that the totality of strategic changes that have taken place since 1948 in the Middle East (including factors such as political alliances, revised Arab military doctrine, the technological revolution, Israel's geostrategic disposition, and certain changed social realities in Israel) point to the need for a profound overhaul of Israel's security conception, and a rethinking of its grand strategy. His major conclusion with regard to Israeli conventional military doctrine is that a transition is required—from a doctrine based primarily on offensive principles, to one that reflects a balance between both offensive and defensive components.

History provides ample evidence of the military's inherent preference for an offensive doctrine over any other. Military

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JCSS BULLETIN

Maj. Gen. (res) Aharon Yariv, Head of JCSS
Joseph Alpher, Deputy Head of JCSS

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The Implications of the Iran–Iraq War

JCSS International Conference



TAU Rector Prof. Yehuda Ben-Shaul opens the conference on the implications of the Iran-Iraq war. Seated (l. to r.): President Chaim Herzog and Deputy Head of JCSS Joseph Alpher.

The Iran–Iraq War ground to a halt in July 1988 with the acceptance by both parties of UN Security Council Resolution 598; yet it is not clear that the Iran–Iraq conflict has come to an end. There seemed to be broad consensus on this assessment by participants in the September 1988 three–day international conference on "The Implications of the Iran–Iraq War" held at Tel Aviv University.

The conference was organized by JCSS and was cosponsored by the US Naval War College Foundation; Dr. Efraim Karsh of JCSS was conference coordinator. Sessions of the conference were devoted to the direct impact of the war on the two belligerents; the regional implications of the war for the Arab world and for non–Arab Middle East actors (including Israel); superpower and Western European reactions to the war; and the economic, strategic, and military implications of the prolonged state of belligerency.

The President of Israel, Chaim Herzog—a distinguished military historian—presented in his keynote address an overview of the Iran–Iraq War in which he stressed that the lessons and implications of "one of the bloodiest and longest conflicts to rage since the outbreak of World War II" could not be ignored, especially in the Middle East. Israel, in particular, must take into account the military capability demonstrated by both Iran and Iraq, the extensive use of chemical warfare, and the consequences that international isolation (such as that which Iran experienced) can have for a country in a state of conflict.

In the opening session on Iran and Iraq, Dr. David Menashri (Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University) examined the impact of the war on Iran's political and social system, while Dr. Efraim Karsh (JCSS) focused on the quest for regional hegemony during the reign of the Shah and under revolutionary Iran, emphasizing the sobering impact of the Iran–Iraq War on the revolutionary zeal of the Islamic Republic. Dr. Charles Tripp (University of London) examined the reasons why the narrowly based Iraqi Ba'ath regime was successful in organizing the armed forces and maintaining internal stability in Iraq during wartime. Dr. Amatzia Bar'am (University of Haifa) pointed out that a key to understanding Iraq's politics is ambiguity: with regard to the superpowers, Iraq tried to steer the middle course between East and West in order to secure maximum assurances; nevertheless, Bar'am noted a desire in Iraq's "inner soul" to draw closer to the moderate West.

As for the regional implications, Prof. Itamar Rabinovich (Dayan Center) pointed out that the war made the Egyptian–Israeli peace more palatable to a number of Arab states, thus easing Egypt's return to the Arab world. The war also underscored the importance, in the final analysis, of military power, which Egypt possesses. Dr. Barry Rubin (Johns Hopkins University) discussed the war's effect on the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. One ironic outcome of the war was

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To Rose

Upon the occasion of her retirement from USIS, the Jaffee Center would like to express its profound gratitude to Rose Toeg for her vital contribution to the Center's activity since its founding.

Guest Speakers





Right: Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin addresses the JCSS Defense Forum (February 1989) on the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza. Seated next to Rabin is JCSS Head Aharon Yariv. Left: forum participants (seated l. to r.) A. Ahituv, A. Ya'ari, M. Zippori, E. Peled, and M. Hod.

Israel, the West Bank and Gaza
Toward a Solution
and
Israel's Options for Peace


Newly published by the Jaffee Center in Mar

Israel's Optic

Academic Alices in the Land of Politics?...

In embarking upon its investigation of options for a Palestinian settlement, JCSS was well aware of the need to ensure academic objectivity for its conclusions and assessments. Clearly the Palestinian issue, as Israel's primary strategic concern, warranted a comprehensive study group research project. But by the same token, the explosive nature of the subject guaranteed that JCSS's findings would be perceived by the public–at–large, and the politicians, as controversial. Accordingly, in formulating the project extensive provisions were made to assure the study group's objectivity and academic freedom:

- The principal sponsor and fundraiser for the study, the American Jewish Congress, and the cosponsor, the Anti–Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, undertook to refrain from any intervention in the study process, and to recommend the study group's findings for public consideration, whatever they were.
- Distinguished Israeli and American Boards of Advisers were recruited to counsel the study group.
- Study group members were recruited solely on the basis of their expertise. An American contingent from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy added an international dimension.
- At several stages the team's findings were presented to additional outside panels—a workshop attended by representatives from all walks of Israeli public life, and JCSS's Scientific Advisory Board—for comment.
- The study group refrained from positing a hypothesis for investigation; it also avoided invoking any moral or ethical criteria in selecting and evaluating options.
- Finally, we did not make policy recommendations or offer peace plans. The ideas presented in *Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Toward a Solution* are just that: ideas.



In October 1988, in order to thrash out the final ideas of the "Options" project, public figures were invited to a special workshop.
above: JCSS Head Aharon Yariv discusses an idea with Yisrael Harel, Chairman of the Council of Settlers of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.
below: (l. to r.) Moshe Levy, former Chief of Staff, Haim Zadok, former Minister of Justice, and Avraham Ahituv, former Head of the General Security Services.

International Press Coverage

Official publication of JCSS's "Options Report" on March 8 brought an avalanche of publicity. Among the highlights: Israel's *Moked* prime time television interview program of March 8 was devoted to the report. JCSS Head Aharon Yariv and Project Coordinator Joseph Alpher appeared together with government ministers Mordechai Gur (Labor) and Ehud Olmert (Likud). Every daily Israeli newspaper devoted an entire page or more to the report, reprinting extensive excerpts. Several *(Ha'aretz, Ma'ariv, Jerusalem Post)* featured lead editorials on the report.

The *Washington Post* March 9, 1989 story presented a broad outline of the study's conclusions and the report's recommendations. Correspondent Glenn Frankel ventured that the report would be "certain to provide ammunition" to those wishing to move Prime Minister Shamir "away from his hard–line stance against any contact with the PLO."

The *Los Angeles Times'* March 9, 1989 article on the JCSS report noted that it was "less notable for its originality than for its attempt to graft Arab demands and Israeli concerns into a workable compromise for peace in the Middle East." The detailed summary of the JCSS report was accompanied by a box inset entitled "Peace for Israel: A New Proposal" which highlighted the main accommodations to be made by both sides during the period of confidence building. On March 16 the *LATimes* published an op–ed piece on the report by its coordinator and coeditor, Joseph Alpher.

The *Chicago Tribune* March 9, 1989



ch 1989, the Reports of a JCSS Study Group

ons for Peace

Of "Options" and Politicians

Hardly a day goes by in and around the Middle East without some politician proposing a "new" option for a Palestinian settlement. The days of early March 1989 that directly preceded publication of the JCSS options study were fairly typical. Prime Minister Shamir suggested comprehensive autonomy on one day, then promised annexation on the next; Labor's Shimon Peres called for federation; and another prominent Labor minister suggested unilateral withdrawal from Gaza for a starter.

Meanwhile the new American administration was assuring Israel that it would not support a Palestinian state solution; President Bush went on record supporting a Jordanian–Palestinian federation. And Yasir Arafat was captivating his many visitors in Tunis with detailed descriptions of Japanese–designed tunnels linking the West Bank and Gaza Strip—the two parts of the state he proposes.

These and many additional "options" have in common one crucial drawback: those who propose them appear to have made no serious effort to investigate their strategic ramifications for Israel. That is what the Jaffee Center's comprehensive study—*The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace*—seeks to do. A team of over 20 generals, professors, ex–ministers and researchers—a membership whose diverse views represent around 75 percent of Israeli public opinion—labored for eight months to produce detailed scenarios of the consequences for Israel of adopting any of the options that are currently on its agenda. We asked ourselves: were an Israeli government to seek to implement a given option, what would be the ramifications for Israel—in terms of war risks, economic, demographic and geographic effects, the American and Soviet reactions, the danger of internal conflict among Israeli leftists and rightists, the reaction of Israeli Arabs (18 percent of its population) and of the Arab world and the Palestinians. We pondered, for example, whether an attempt by a rightist government to deport hundreds of thousands of Palestinians might not generate near civil–war between Israeli leftists and rightists. We assessed the reaction of Israeli soldiers upon receiving orders to remove by force tens of thousands of Israeli settlers from territory destined for a Palestinian state.

The results of our investigation are at once frightening and depressing: all of Israel's current options are either not feasible or not advisable. Annexation would catalyze war, isolation and civil strife; unilateral withdrawal would be perceived as weakness, and would produce an instant irredentist Palestinian state that owed Israel nothing in return; open–ended autonomy would find no Palestinians willing to collaborate; a Jordanian–Palestinian federation is no longer on Jordan's agenda (it never was on the Palestinians'); and a Palestinian state that came into being without extensive transition arrangements could catalyze war, terrorism and Israeli domestic strife. Israel, we concluded, remains "stuck" in a status quo that threatens escalating war risks, growing loss of American support, and rising domestic discontent. Yet our leaders seem alarmingly incapable of taking bold new initiatives.

Our own ideas for a more realistic peace process left many politicians predictably cold. The Likud and many in Labor did not like our call to talk directly with PLO–mandated Palestinians, or our suggestion that the possible eventual emergence of a demilitarized Palestinian state, surrounded by Arab states at peace with Israel, need not threaten Israel strategically. Labor also continues to long for a Jordanian solution, while many on the Left complained that the 10 to 15 year transition period that we propose is unrealistic. Palestinians argued that our demands upon them, such as the long transition period, and rehabilitating the refugees to prove they have renounced their claim to "return" to Israel—were exaggerated and evinced a lack of faith in their intentions.


Politicians in the Middle East were hardly expected to react otherwise to this academic intrusion into policymaking. But we are optimistic that with time, at least some of our ideas will filter through. Certainly among the Israeli public and the Washington policymaking community, our study moved the notions of a Palestinian state option and an Israeli dialogue with the PLO from the far left to the center of the political spectrum. It also succeeded in introducing several new concepts to the debate: our model for assessing the options; the need for a very lengthy transition period; the centrality of the Israeli

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edition provided a detailed summary of both the JCSS study and proposal with an emphasis on the economic aspects of the proposal for both sides. The London *Independent* emphasized the cautious tone of the JCSS recommendations in its March 9, 1989 story. The London *Financial Times* opened its March 10, 1989 story with Shamir's attack on the JCSS report, went on to give a brief outline of the report's proposals, and noted the timeliness of the publication of the two companion volumes shortly before Foreign Minister Arens' visit to the US.

All the major US television networks covered the JCSS press conference held on March 8; the March 13 *Nightline* was devoted to the report, and featured an extensive interview with coordinator and coeditor Joseph Alpher, and Nabil Shaath, chairman of the political committee of the PNC.

SATANIC VERSES 2



The Jerusalem Post, March 1989

Meet the Researcher



Shai Feldman

Shai Feldman, a fifth generation Israeli, is a senior research associate at the Center. Although only 39 years old, Feldman is one of the Jaffee Center's founding fathers: he was the first researcher hired when the Center was established eleven and a half years ago.

Shai Feldrnan completed his undergraduate studies with distinction at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1973. He earned his Masters degree and Ph.D. at the University of California at Berkeley. Having completed his graduate courses in 1976, Feldman accepted an appointment at the Embassy of Israel in Washington D.C. as assistant congressional liaison.

During his first four years at the Center, Dr. Feldman researched Israel's nuclear policy. His study produced a highly provocative book, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s*, published in New York by Columbia University Press and in Tel Aviv by HaKibbutz HaMeuchad. The book continues to serve as a point of departure for any discussion of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Dr. Feldman has also published a number of articles on the subject in the leading journals of the profession, including *Foreign Affairs*, *Survival*, and *International Security*.

After 1982, Dr. Feldman became interested in the impact of domestic politics on defense policy. He researched the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as a case study, producing (with Heda Rechnitz–Kijner) a monograph titled *Consensus, Deception, and War: Israel in Lebanon*.

In 1984, after a year in international banking with Bank Leumi, Dr. Feldman became director of the JCSS Project on U.S. Foreign and Defense Policies in the Middle East. He followed US–Israeli relations during the second term of the Reagan administration, and produced a number of policy memoranda and a monograph titled *U.S. Mideast Policy: The Domestic Setting*, summarizing an international conference which he organized.

During 1987–88 Dr. Feldman was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C. There, he began his current study of *Israel's Grand Strategy*. A paper he delivered at the end of his stay at the Wilson Center, titled "Israel's Grand Strategy: David Ben–Gurion and the Next Great Debate," led U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to invite Dr. Feldman for a private lunch to discuss his thoughts (see photo above).

Most recently, Dr. Feldman co–edited (with Joseph Alpher) the Center's landmark study: *The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace*, and *Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Toward a Solution*.

Shai Feldman is married to Yocheved ("Yochi"), and has a 13–year old son—Amos. The Feldmans live in Ramat Aviv, just off the Tel Aviv University campus.

Awards

- Prof. Aharon Klieman and Reuven Pedatzur received a research grant from the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities for their project on "Israeli Arms Procurement—A Strategy for the 1990s."
- The National Intelligence Center (NISC) in Washington has selected Dr. Efraim Kam's book *Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective* as one of the best books by a foreign author published in 1988. Kam's book was written under the auspices of JCSS and is published by Harvard University Press.
- Major–General (res.) Shlomo Gazit has been selected a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, for a year beginning September 1989.

Newsbriefs

THE JCSS INFORMATION CENTER:

At the request of ISLIC (Israel Society of Special Libraries and Information Centers), the JCSS Information Center organized a one day study session on February 6 designed to introduce Israeli information professionals to the computerized databases and services available at JCSS and the Dayan Center. Over fifty librarians and information specialists from a wide range of Israeli academic, government, industry and military libraries attended the session.

*

In the course of a trip to London early this April, JCSS librarian Alexandra Szilvassy visited the libraries of Chatham House, IISS and the Royal Naval Colleg : as well as the London headquarters of DataStar, a vendor of online information, and the BBC Monitoring Service in Reading.

*

This April, JCSS began working with *DataStar*, a Swiss–based online vendor. *DataStar* provides access to a wealth of online databases and will complement the online information already accessible to us through *Profile Information*, with whom JCSS has been working for the past three years.

*

In the course of a visit to Germany last year, Moshe Grundman toured INFOBASE 88. Held annually in Messe Frankfurt, INFOBASE is the world's largest exhibition and convention (140 exhibitors and four separate conferences) devoted to the international information industry. During the course of his visit, Mr. Grundman established working relations with a number of information vendors through whom JCSS should be able to widen the range of information sources available to the Center.

Confronting the Tactical Missile Threat: Prospects for Cooperation

Dr. Ariel Levite, Dr. Dore Gold, and Brig. Gen. (res) Aharon Levran represented JCSS at a trilateral American–Israeli–West German conference in Washington sponsored by the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) on October 11–12, 1988. The conference focused on tactical missile defense in Europe and the Middle East. The major underlying theme that emerged after two days of discussions was the growing mutual interest of both Israel and West Germany in developing missile defenses, possibly in the framework of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. This interest derives from the FRG's perception that the INF Treaty leaves it the sole NATO country whose homeland remains threatened by the Warsaw Pact's remaining short–range missile forces, while Israel confronts an increasing proliferation of ballistic missiles in the Middle East.

In this regard Maj. Gen. Jorg Bahnemann, Vice Chairman of the NATO Air Defense Committee, noted that Israel's extensive efforts in developing a workable Anti–Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) system could serve as a "practical example" to NATO of the feasibility of missile defenses in Europe against those threats not eliminated through arms control. The sensitivity of German opinion to association with the controversial US SDI program—out of concern for preserving the ABM treaty regime—was alluded to by several spokesmen, including Dr. Thomas Enders from the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik.

NIPP Director Dr. Colin Gray and his Deputy, Dr. Keith Payne presented American perspectives on the ATBM issue. Brig. Gen. Larry Capps of the US Army Missile Command explained the US concern with the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the Third World, and its potential for complicating American force projection in many regions in the near future. Capps also reviewed the threat of remaining Soviet missile forces in Europe to American bases in West Germany. Israel's contribution to the allied effort to meet the tactical ballistic missile threat was warmly praised by the Deputy Director of the SDI Organization in the Pentagon, Maj. Gen. Eugene Fox.

In the Israeli presentations to the conference, Dr. Levite placed the Israeli response to the Middle East missile threat into doctrinal perspective, stating that ATBM was only one of several answers the IDF was considering for dealing with the problem. Dr. Gold looked into the implications of different patterns of US–Israel cooperation for American compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. Besides Aharon Levran, who presented the Arab missile threat, also lecturing from Israel were Dr. Yosef Shapira of Rafael Industries and Dr. Dov Raviv, Arrow Project Director for Israel Aircraft Industries, who made an extensive commentary on the presentations.

Also addressing the conference were Congressman Jack Kemp and Dr. Edward Teller.

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history is also replete with examples of victorious armies that rested on their laurels and consequently stagnated. Levite argues that both tendencies are apparent today in the IDF: the former since the very inception of the Israeli military; the latter since the Six–Day War victory. Levite finds the combination of these two tendencies worrisome in view of the far–reaching changes that have occurred in the IDF's operational environment. The challenge facing those that bear responsibility for Israel's security is to reinvigorate military thinking in order to adapt it to changing circumstances. Problems of routine security must not be allowed to divert attention from what can and must be done in the realm of preparation for a war that could, unfortunately, erupt sometime in the coming years.

Offense and Defense in Israel's Military Doctrine is published and distributed in Hebrew by HaKibbutz HaMeuchad in its Kav Adom series. The English version, JCSS Study no. 12, will appear in late summer 1989.

On the Move

- JCSS Head *Aharon Yariv* returned in October 1988 from a six–month sabbatical leave at the US Naval War College, Rhode Island, USA.
- Dr. *Shai Feldman* completed a year (1987–1988) as a research fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC, where he began research on a new study of Israel's Grand Strategy.
- *Anat Kurz* participated in a conference on industrial security organized by an independent security consultant firm, L &M Partners. The conference took place in Torino, Italy, November 9–11, 1988.
- Responding to an invitation from the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London, Dr. *Ariel Levite*, Dr. *Mark Heller*, Dr. *Efraim Karsh*, and Brig.Gen.(res.) *Aryeh Shalev* participated in a two–day closed conference on possible solutions to the Palestinian problem. The conference, held in April 1989, included Palestinian participants Sari Nusseibah, Faisal Husseini, and Ahmad Khalidi, as well as a number of US and British experts such as Sir Anthony Parsons and Richard Murphy. Dr. *Zeev Eytan* and *Shemuel Meir* participated in the Second Panel of this conference, which took place in mid–April.
- Dr. *Mark Heller* participated in a conference held in Budapest, Hungary, during the week of October 1–7, 1988. The conference dealt with international conflict resolution, and was sponsored by the Center for International Understanding, St. Louis. More recently, Dr. Heller participated in a conference cosponsored by *Al–Fajr* and *New Outlook*, held at Columbia University, New York, from March 11–13, 1989. The conference was entitled: "The Road to Peace: Coexistence Between Israelis and Palestinians."
- *Shemuel Meir* attended the annual conference on international security organized by the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies (PSIS) of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, held in Geneva in July 1988.
- *Joseph Alpher* addressed a Policy Forum of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in Washington, DC, on March 20 on the subject of the JCSS Project on Options for a Palestinian settlement. Earlier in March, Alpher addressed the National Conference of Jewish Women in Washington, and appeared in an ABC *Nightline* dialogue with the PLO's Nabil Shaat, on the same subject.

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that the GCC states were pushed closer to both the US and USSR due to their fear of Iran and Iraq.

Joseph Alpher (JCSS) examined Israel's attitude toward the war. Until 1982, Israel maintained an actively pro–Iran stance. Even after Iran went on the offensive, this attitude did not change entirely until about 1987. Alpher traced the roots of Israel's support for Iran back to Ben–Gurion's perception of the importance for Israel of the peripheral Middle East countries. Alpher also discussed the causes for the reassessment of Israeli policy toward Iran in 1987 (including the fact that once US reflagging began, for Israel to be perceived as aiding Iran could have had serious ramifications for US–Israel relations). He concluded with a look at Israel's prospects vis–a–vis Iran and Iraq in the aftermath of the war.

In terms of the regional strategic balance, Dr. Geoffrey Kemp (Carnegie Endowment) assessed that the end of the Iran–Iraq War would put the Arab–Israel conflict on the "front burner" at a time when the superpowers have reached a new (albeit precarious) understanding on regional conflict. Aharon Levran (JCSS) focused on three strategic singularities of the Iran–Iraq War: 1) a clash between two belligerents with different intrinsic military strengths—one with striking power (Iraq) and one with staying power (Iran); 2) the use of surface–to–surface missiles; and 3) the first significant employment of chemical warfare since World War I. He pointed out that Israel's strategic problem is similar to that of Iraq—a country with striking power facing an enemy with staying power.

Other lectures included those of Dr. Mark Heller (JCSS) on superpower conduct in the Iran–Iraq war, and Prof. Eliyahu Kanovsky (Bar–Ilan University) on the economic implications of the war.

The proceedings of the conference, edited by Dr. Efraim Karsh, will be published by Macmillan in Summer 1989.

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Arab community; the need for genuine rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees as a condition for a stable peace; and Jordanian security concessions on the East Bank to support a Palestinian settlement.

On a deeper level we feel we have already provided everyone concerned with a better yardstick with which to measure proposals for a Palestinian settlement: a demand for more creative and responsible thinking on the Palestinian issue.

Current and Forthcoming Publications

1989 Subscription Series*

Study no. 13 — Abraham Ben–Zvi, *Between Lausanne and Geneva: International Conferences and the Arab–Israel Conflict*

Study no. 14 — Joseph Kostiner, *PDRY Revolutionary Strategy, 1970–1985: From Insurgency to Bloc Politics*

JCSS Conference Summary — Shai Feldman, *Technology and Strategy: Future Trends*

1989 Annuals*

Shlomo Gazit, Editor; Zeev Eytan, *The Middle East Military Balance 1988–89*

Anat Kurz with Maskit Burgin, Sofia Kotzer, Yoel Kozak, Tamar Prat, Orit Shahmon, David Tal, Yael Treiber, *InTer: International Terrorism in 1988*

Books

- Anat Kurz, ed., *Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism* (New York: Praeger/Greenwood, 1987)
- Yehuda Ben–Meir, *National Security Decisionmaking: The Israeli Case* (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuchad, 1987) (Hebrew)
- Ariel Levite, *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine* (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuchad, 1988) (Hebrew)
- Efraim Kam, *Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988)
- *The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace* ***
  and
- *Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Toward a Solution* ***
  Reports of JCSS Study Groups. Coordinator: Joseph Alpher

Memoranda**

No. 20, January 1988 — Abraham Ben–Zvi, *The International Conference as a Means for Resolving the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1973–1987: Models, Attitudes, and Prospects* (Hebrew)

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No. 23, July 1988 — Dore Gold, *The Shultz Initiative* (Hebrew)

No. 24, July 1988 — Aharon Levran, *Surface–to–Surface Missiles: The Threat to Israel* (Hebrew)

No. 25, August 1988 — Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari and Anat Kurz, *Foreign Hostages in Lebanon* (English)

No. 26, March 1988 — Ariel Levite with the collaboration of Emily Landau, *The Launching of the "Ofek I" Satellite and its Ramifications: Survey of Overt Reactions and Assessment of Significance for the Future of the Program (Hebrew—restricted circulation)*

Miscellaneous **

Henry S. Rowen, *Intelligent Weapons: Implications for Offense and Defense*. The Simon Syrkin Memorial Lecture. No. 4 (1988).

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