

JAFFEE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 🝁 TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY



Prof. Cherif Bassiouni, of De Paul University, shakes hands with President Ezer Weizman during a meeting of the conference participants with the president. Looking on are Dr. Ephraim Kam, Deputy Head of JCSS (I.) and Prof. Zeev Maoz, Head of JCSS.

Regional Security and Arms Control in the Middle East An International Working Group

ne of the first regional projects of collaborative research and academic cooperation among research centers in the Middle East involves JCSS researchers. This project was launched in a seminar held at the National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES) in Cairo on April 6, 1995

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involving researchers from the Jaffee Center and research associates from the NCMES. A second conference took place in Siracusa, Italy on June 22-26, 1995. This conference brought together, in addition to members from JCSS and NCMES also a Jordanian delegation from the Institute for Disarmament and Security Studies in Amman, as well as an American delegation from DePaul University in Chicago. At the Siracusa conference, a decision was made to initiate a long-term collaborative study of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the framework of a regional security regime in the Middle East. The

four delegations met again in Tel-Aviv on January 7-11, 1996. This project represents one of the first collaborative research projects involving major research centers in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the United States. Participants in this project include, in addition to the research associates of the various centers, former diplomats, retired high ranking officers in the military forces of the various states, and academic and non-academic experts in these areas. Subsequent meetings of various working groups are planned for late February in the United States, in April in Amman, and in May in Siracusa.

In Memoriam - Col. (res.) Dr. Zeev Eytan

ol. (res.) Dr. Zeev Eytan joined the JCSS staff in 1980. He was a senior research associate at JCSS for the past fifteen years, during which he specialized in issues related to the military balance in the Middle East. He organized and administered the Center's extensive database on ME military forces and was the co-author of JCSS's annual Middle East Military Balance which has been published since 1983.

Zeev Eytan was born in 1929 in West Berlin, and in 1935 immigrated to Israel. In 1947 he joined the Palmach and a year later he fought as an infantryman with the Harel brigade in the critical battles for Jerusalem

Since the 1950s, he served in the Armored Corps and participated in all of Israel's wars, including the 1982 Lebanon War. In this last war he was nominated as the chief of staff of an armored division while serving as a colonel in the reserves.

Zeev Eytan served with the IDF from 1948-1969. In 1969 he left for Chicago where he completed his MA in International Relations followed by a PhD in Political Science at the University of Chicago. Following this, he returned to the IDF for another 3 years, from 1977-1980.

He published extensively on Israel's military affairs in *Ma'arachot-*IDF's monthly, and in other journals.

On December 22, 1995, Dr. Zeev Eytan passed away suddenly from cardiac arrest. JCSS sends its condolences to his wife, Ida,



his daughter, Tamar, and his sons, Aryeh and Udi.

One of Zeev's hobbies was playing the violin; the music of a man of knowledge, honesty and respect will be with us for ever.

The 1994-1995 edition of the *Middle East Military Balance* will be dedicated to Dr. Zeev Eytan.



Prof. Zeev Maoz, Head of JCSS

Dr. Ephraim Kam, Deputy Head of JCSS

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Peacekeeping in a Revolutionary World: An International Conference

n December 12-14, 1995 the Jaffee Center joined the National Center for Middle East Studies in Cairo, Egypt for a first-time cooperative international conference on international peacekeeping, JCSS Head, Prof. Zeev Maoz led the Israeli delegation to the conference that also included Maj. Gen. (res.) Abraham Tamir and Dr. Dore Gold. The Egyptian delegation was headed by the Director of the National Center, Major General (ret.) Ahmed Fakhr. Former deputy commander of the Jordanian Air Force, Maj. General Mohammad K. Shiyyab presented Jordan's perspective on the peacekeeping

Both Prof. Maoz and General Fakhr placed the peacekeeping issue into the wider context of the shape of the future Middle East. Prof. Maoz emphasized the theme of a future regional security system which could become increasingly responsible for some peacekeeping functions. General Fakhr spoke about the need for a regional culture of cooperation; he reviewed concepts of common security for the Middle East, concluding that the region was not yet ripe for this idea.

Professor Theodor Meron of the New York University School of Law spoke about the "unrealistic expectations, inevitably followed by a measure of disillusionment" that had been associated with recent UN peacekeeping operations. He noted that the UN had often been given tasks "that the UN forces had not been authorized, equipped or financed to fulfill." He added that when its mandate did not cover certain scenarios, like the atrocities that occurred in Srebrenica, Bosnia, the UN's credibility was further damaged. He called for more realistic peacekeeping: "limited, consent-based, low risk, observer, wire-trip type of operations, such as the MFO, remains a possibility for states in the Middle East."

Ambassador Dr. Fathi Marei of the National Center spoke about "searching

questions" that had to be answered regarding peacekeeping operations: is there a pressing need to dispatch peacekeepers? What are the exact terms of the mandate? Are the circumstances on the ground conducive to success? What is the duration of the mission? What is the estimated budget and what is the availability of funds? Unless such serious questions are asked in advance, Marei noted that the credibility of the international system could be affected by poorly conceived peacekeeping operations.

Prof. Alan James of Keele University in the UK presented a comparative paper on peacekeeping, looking at the dispatching and receiving ends. Prof. James tried to answer why states decide to take upon themselves the burden of peacekeeping. He noted that Canada's participation in UN peacekeeping forces "owed a good deal to its wish to emphasize its middle power role, distinct both from its Mother Country (the United Kingdom) and its overbearing neighbor (the United States)." During the discussion, the increasing role of Middle Eastern states in international peacekeeping was noted, particularly that of Egypt and Jordan in the Bosnian crisis.

Further contributions were made by Prof. Naomi Weinberger, of Columbia

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JCSS deeply

mourns the recent assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Mr. Rabin was a member of the honorary Editorial Board of the Center and throughout the years, he was an often invited guest speaker at JCSS international conferences. Mr. Rabin's vast experience in, and deep knowledge of defense and national security affairs will be sorely missed by JCSS.



lariv Conference The State of the Nation 1996

n January 18, 1996, JCSS held its annual one-day conference in memory of Maj. Gen. (res) Aharon Yariv, on the state of the nation. Speakers holding high government and military positions, and experts from the academic world were invited to share their views on a range of issues on Israel's national agenda in the area of security, society, and state.

The opening session, chaired by JCSS Head, Prof. Zeev Maoz, began with a tribute to the late Aharon Yariv by Haim Herzog, former president of Israel. Ya'acov Peri, former head of the General Security Services (Shabak), reviewed the central security aspects which characterize the relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Regarding the Hamas, he believes that the organization is stronger, that it still believes in terrorism, and that it continues to be strongly motivated to carry out spectacular terrorist acts. As to the Palestinian elections, Peri pointed out that Arafat acted with authority regarding the designation of constituencies and was supportive of candidates that provided true representation of different trends within the Palestinian population. The opposition realized that it had no chance of posing a serious candidate to challenge Arafat, and thus boycotted the elections. However, there are differences of opinion between the Hamas leadership outside the territories (radical positions), and the local leaders who tend to adopt a much more pragmatic stance.

Maj. Gen. Matan Vilnai, IDF Deputy Chief of General Staff, provided an overview of the developments within the Palestinian Authority, with particular attention to the successes gained in the period from May 1994 to January 1996. He emphasized the importance that Israel attributes to the Authority's war on terrorism. He then turned to examine Israeli-Jordanian relations, the sanctions against Iraq, and the developing negotiations with Syria all of which turn the option of a renewed "Eastern front" against Israel into a more and more remote possibility. However, the situation could still change, and there are not yet



JCSS head Prof. Zeev Maoz addresses the conference. Seated (l. to r.), Ya'akov Peri, former head of GSS, Maj. Gen. Matan Vilnai, Deputy Chief of Staff of IDF, and Haim Herzog, former president of Israel.

grounds for considering cuts in IDF strength. What brought Arab states to the negotiating table were Israel's economic and military strength, as well as its relations with the U.S. Vilnai spoke about the challenges facing the IDF, its unique role, and the qualities needed in military commanders. He then discussed Israel's need to find an appropriate response to long-range missiles. As the military industries are facing serious difficulties, Israeli research and development projects must be found and financed so that Israel's edge in this realm is not lost. Accordingly, Vilnai pointed to a government decision whereby up to the year 2000, the IDF will purchase equipment from the military industries at a level that will ensure their continued survival.

Prof. Asher Arian (University of Haifa, and director of the Project on Public Opinion and National Security at JCSS) lectured on the political system in Israel during times of critical decisions and elections. He presented three models for understanding the relationship between the people, elections, public opinion, and policy. Prof. Arian pointed to new trends in Israeli politics, such as the weakening of political parties and the change in the place of ideology in Israeli society: it is becoming weaker in the center and stronger at the periphery. In this context, he claimed that Israeli society is not divided; rather, there is a periphery of about 30% of the population at each end,



Maj. Gen. (res.) Ori Orr, Deputy Minister of Defense

and 40% that constitute a flexible middle, that fluctuates back and forth.

Prof. Ehud Shprinzak (Hebrew University) related to the radical and moderate political trends in Israeli society. According to him, late Prime Minister Rabin used language that humiliated and injured the population in the territories, and left them with a sense that they had nowhere to turn. Peres took action, after being appointed Prime Minister, that



יטת תל-אביב

Dr. Yossi Beilin, Minister at the Prime Minister's Office.

helped ease the tensions, and calmed the more radical elements on both sides of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, Sprinzak warned against radicals who might reinact acts such as the massacre in Hebron.

Prof. Ya'acov Frenkel, Governor of Israel's National Bank, reviewed the successes of Israel's economy, and analyzed the factors that account for them. He explained that following the peace agreements new markets opened up to Israel, although Israel's advantage is more in the realm of international trade. Frenkel noted the important contribution of the Russian immigrants that have been integrated into the work force. He emphasized that investments in Israel demand long range planning which the government must provide through prudent economic policy.

Following a luncheon which included the participation of Aharon Yariv's family, the third session of the conference began. Two speakers related to broader aspects of Israel's position in the Middle East: Mai. Gen. (res.) Ori Orr, Deputy Minister

of Defense, and Mr. Zalman Shoval, former Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. According to Shoval, a Likud government would acknowledge the Oslo agreements and the redeployment of the IDF in the Autonomy areas; however, with regard to Final Status agreements, such a government would adopt its own solutions. As to Syria, Shoval believes that they have not moved from their initial position, thus Israel should not alter its position on the Golan Heights.

Ori Orr looked at the Palestinian election situation and claimed that the most serious problem that Arafat now faces is cancelling the clauses in the Palestinian Convention that call for the destruction of Israel. Normalization of relations with the Palestinians depends on developing the means to strike at the hard core of the opposition organizations. Regarding Syria, Orr maintains that for Peres, as for the late Rabin, the extent of withdrawal will match the extent of peace. He added that Israel must seriously consider whether it should ask Syria for reductions in its armed forces -- a demand that was not put to Egypt.

The final lecture of the day was delivered

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Inaugurating the Yariv Boulevard

n October 12, 1995, a special ceremony was held in honor of the naming of the boulevard adjacent to the Intelligence Memorial Site in Glilot (Ramat Ha'Sharon) in memory of Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Yariv, founding Head of JCSS.

Speakers at the ceremony included Mr. Ephraim Hiram (Ramat Ha' Sharon mayor) who spoke about Yariv as one of the outstanding members of the community, and Maj. Gen. (res.) Meir Amit who looked back on Yariv's years of service in the Intelligence ranks, and described extensively his contribution to the Intelligence community in Israel. Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit, who was a senior research associate at JCSS for the last six years, and Yariv's colleague in the IDF, spoke about Yariv's years as Head of JCSS, highlighting his efforts to establish strong economic bases for the Center.



Mr. Uri Savir, Director-General of the Foreign Ministry delivers a lecture on the peace process at a special seminar held in honor of former head of JCSS, Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Yariv, for the board of trustees of Tel Aviv University.

Profile of a Researcher



Anat Kurz

nat Kurz has been with JCSS since 1981. Her area of expertise is low intensity warfare, with a recent emphasis on organizational aspects of insurgency. She is currently the director of the Project on Terrorism and Low Intensity Warfare at JCSS, a position she has held since 1989.

Ms. Kurz took her BA in Psychology at Bar-Ilan University (1978), and her MA in

Social Psychology at Tel Aviv University (1985). She is currently working toward her doctorate in Political Science at Tel-Aviv University.

Ms. Kurz has published widely on subjects relating to terrorism in general and insurgent organizations in the Middle East in particular. She is coauthor of ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post and Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), editor of Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism (NY: Praeger/Greenwood, 1987), and editor and coauthor of Islamic Terrorism and Israel: Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Papyrus Pub. House, 1993). In addition, she has published articles on Palestinian insurgency, and has been a regular contributor to The Middle East Military Balance, JCSS's annual publication.

Ms. Kurz's interdisciplinary academic training, in social psychology and political science, provides her with a unique perspective on the nature of insurgency which finds expression in her current research efforts.

Ms. Kurz lives in Herzlia with her husband, Amos, and two daughters, Hila (15) and Aya (5).

Deal The

Research in Progress

r. Nahman Tal, a senior official at the Prime Minister's Office, is the first visiting fellow at JCSS in the framework of the center's new program for hosting a research associate from the defense establishment. He is conducting research on the strategies adopted by Arab governments in dealing with Islamic Fundamentalism. The backdrop for this research project is the threat that Islamic Fundamentalism poses for the regimes in the Middle East and especially for those neighboring Israel, like Egypt and Jordan. Moreover, political Islam poses a challenge for Israel as well, first and foremost due to the fact that it negates the very existence of Israel, and

Regional Security in the 1990s: JCSS - IDSA Seminar

n December 1995, JCSS hosted the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for a bilateral seminar on Regional Security in the 1990s. This marked the first institutional visit to Israel of the IDSA, India's premier strategic studies center. The IDSA delegation, led by its director, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, spent two days at the Jaffee Center discussing issues of regional security in the aftermath of the Cold War. IDSA and JCSS researchers presented papers on trends in international security, arms proliferation and narco-terrorism, and arms control and confidence-building measures. Representatives of the Indian



Seated (l. to r.) JCSS Head Prof. Zeev Maoz and Mr. Jasjit Singh, IDSA Director.

Embassy in Israel and the Israeli Foreign and Defense Ministries attended some of the sessions, and the IDSA delegation also held meetings with the Asian Department of the Foreign Ministry before returning home. The IDSA-JCSS seminar provided each side with an opportunity to learn about the specific concerns of the other and also to explore some commonalities in both the threat perceptions and modes of response of India and Israel. It is expected that these issues will provide the focus for an ongoing dialogue and interchange of ideas between the two institutes in the future.

ing With Fundamentalizm: Case of Egypt and Jordan



advocates waging against it a "jihad", or "blessed war". Islamic Fundamentalism is a challenge to the peace process as a whole, and to the gradual reconciliation of Arab states with the existence of Israel. Tal maintains that while all Islamic Fundamentalist groups advocate the supremacy of Islam as a doctrine, and are united in the goal of establishing an Islamic state, they have differences in approach that find expression in the existence of two major camps: one pragmatic, and the other radical. The former places emphasis on gradual steps toward the goal of a large Islamic state, such as education and action from within the political system; the latter advocates use of force and terrorism.

Arab regimes are making a serious effort to confront political Islam in all its forms. They have adopted a variety of approaches and have used various methods towards this end, including the use of force, sanctions, propaganda, education, and intelligence. They have also tried to improve social and economic conditions, as these are factors that often

encourage support of Fundamentalist groups.

Tal's research has two basic aims:

- Definition of Islamic Fundamentalism, its characteristics, modes of action, and the nature of the threat that it poses to the stability of Arab regimes.
- Description and characterization of the responses of government officials to the threat, and an assessment of their effectiveness.

The research program will focus on Egypt and Jordan, that border Israel and have concluded peace treaties with it, and are actively confronting Islamic groups. The study will focus on the past decade, with particular emphasis on the past five years (1990-1995) which have witnessed a number of significant developments regarding political Islam. The study will be based on primary and secondary sources including interviews with statesmen in the above-mentioned Arab countries.

Harmelin fellowship



The Jaffee Center received a new fellowship from the Company for Oil and Energy Services, in memory of the late Joseph Harmelin who twice headed the General Security Services. Joseph Harmelin was the Chair-Director of the board of directors of the Company for Oil and Energy Services.

The purpose of this feiiowship is to memorialize Joseph Harmelin by fostering scholarships on two subjects that reflect his interests and contributions: security and energy.

This year the fellowship will support a new project on energy and regional security. The project will be pursued by Dr. Shmuel Even, a defense economist who recently joined the Jaffee Center as a visiting research associate.

(l. to r.) JCSS Head Prof. Zeev Maoz, Ya'akov Peri, former head of GSS, Mr. Avi Dotan, Director-General of the Company for Oil and Energy Services, and Mrs. Sarika Harmelin.

New Books

Civil-Military Relations in Israel


Yehuda Ben Meir

Civil-Military Relations in Israel New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 235 pp.

he role of the military in Israel's society is a facinating and complex issue. In light of the level of intensity that characterizes civil-military relations in Israel, Dr. Yehuda Ben Meir (JCSS) examines the factors that have in fact prevented Israel from becoming a 'garrison state." The basic questions addressed in the book are how Israel manages to maintain civilian control of the military, and whether it can continue to do so in the future. As a former deputy minister for foreign affairs and longtime political analyst, Ben Meir is able to provide many insights into the intimate relations between Israel's civilian and military leaders.

In this book, Ben Meir examines the changing face of the Israeli military over the years, from an idealistic defense force to a professional army. He also views the great divisiveness in Israeli politics as a threat to the unified strength of purpose that in the past characterized the nation's civil authority, and examines present and future threats to continued civilian control of the military.

Additional perspectives developed in this book are the legal and constitutional foundations of Israel's civil-military relations, and the organization and role of the current defense establishment. Ben Meir also highlights the informal relationship between the key players in the political-military system.



Israeli Opinion on Peace and War

Asher Arian

Security Threatened: Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War Cambridge Studies in Political Psychology and Public Opinion, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 308 pp.


his study is one of the major products of Prof. Arian's project on Public Opinion and National Security that has been conducted at the Jaffee Center since 1984.

Public opinion has played a crucial role in the transition from war to peace in Israel since the 1967 Six Day War. Security Threatened is the first major analysis of the interactions among opinion, politics and policy in that period, based on opinion surveys of thousands of adult Jews carried out in the 33-year period between 1962-1994.

The author documents the public division during these years between militant hardliners and those maintaining more conciliatory security positions. Power either shifted between, or was shared by, the right-wing likud and left-of-center Labor parties. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the onset of the Intifada, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the American victory in the Gulf war, all segments of the Israeli public became more conciliatory.

Policy initiatives reflected shifts in political power which in turn magnified changes in public opinion. Leaders were constrained by public opinion and by perceptions of threat, but they could also alter policy if they had the will because opinion was rather equally divided; since most people had their minds made up, the opposition could not block their policy.

Prof. Arian's new book offers propositions, arguments, and data that contribute to the general understanding of mass opinion in democratic politics.



New Study

What Future for Jerusalem

Dore Gold

Jerusalem Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians.

Study No. 7, Tel Aviv: JCSS, 1995. 55 pp. (incl. maps).

ore Gold's study on Jerusalem is the seventh and final monograph released by the Jaffee Center in its series, Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians. After reviewing historical and religious claims to the city, the study describes the precise position of the parties regarding the future of the city held by the main parties—particularly, Israel, the PLO, Jordan, and the US.

Important nuances in each party's position are revealed by the study. For example, prior to the Oslo Agreement, while previous Israeli governments were willing to discuss assuring access to the holy sites in Jerusalem, no government had agreed to put Jerusalem on the negotiating agenda, in an unqualified manner. This was somewhat changed by Israel's 1994 Washington Declaration with Jordan which sought to obtain a religious solution to Jerusalem by recognizing Jordan's role in the Muslim holy shrines.


It also becomes clear from the analysis that the Palestinians maintain claims to western Jerusalem, and not just East Jerusalem. This is demonstrated through the statements of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat as well as the proposals of Palestinian academics with political standing. Palestinian claims to Waqf property are also noted in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City -- including the Western Wall itself. Also noted is the rejection of any form of internationalization by the PLO-appointed Mufti of Jerusalem, Sheikh Ekrima Sabri.

The study looks as three sorts of options for the future of Jerusalem: territorial, municipal, and religious. It concludes that a territorial division is impracticable: East Jerusalem resembles a checkerboard with Jewish, Palestinian, and even mixed neighborhoods intermixed. Moreover, the study cautions that any Israeli government that proposed such a division "would lose its legitimacy in the eyes of Jewish public opinion, both in Israel and abroad."

Looking at the municipal solution, the study warns that Palestinian strategists are already considering this option as a means of advancing a territorial division—what they call "creeping sovereignty". Thus the study concludes that Israel would be best advised to pursue a religious solution, that seeks to find an Islamic partner for the Muslim holy places, like the church serves as a partner for Christian holy places. Jordan, leading a group of Islamic countries, could serve this role.

While a religious solution will not solve the Jerusalem question, it might ameliorate it as a focal point for future dispute. The study notes that not all international problems are resolved in

The Egyptian weekly, October, of 19 November 1995, published a 1995 published a 1995 published a 1995 published a 1995 project of 2007 per 1995 per



short periods: Jerusalem is the type of international problem that might take decades to resolve. The study closes that Israel should seek peace arrangements that protect ultimate values upon which its society is based. Ultimately this distinction separates peace that is based on national consensus from peace that is sought at any price.



JCSS Bulletin

On the Agenda:

Defense treaty between US and Israel

n the context of a rapidly changing Middle East, the strategic environment in which Israel operates requires constant re-examination. A US-Israeli defense treaty had been considered an unlikely prospect in the past. At present it has become a real possibility, and as such it poses major dilemmas for Israel's policy and security community.

Two of our researchers present their views on the benefits and liabilities of a US-Israeli defense treaty. These views reflect the pluralism and diversity that characterize the Jaffee Center's research and scholarship.

Mark Heller

rom the Israeli perspective, the fundamental purpose of security arrangements should be to ensure the durability of any agreement based on land-for-peace, and it is in this context that guarantees as a form of security arrangement must be understood.



Guarantees cannot be substitutes for superior Israeli force, but they can, by supplementing that force, maximize the chances that it will not be tested. However, a guarantee will work only if it is both adequate

and reliable. This is why every serious discussion of this issue proceeds from the assumption that the United States will be directly involved and formally committed. Otherwise, the guarantee will not be seen as worthy of respect. Most proposals have focused on the stationing of American forces on the Golan as part of some multinational peacekeeping force. However, this idea fails two other critical tests of reliability: that the United States alone be responsible for activating the guarantee in the event of a challenge,

These two viewpoints appeared in an earlier version in the *Jerusalem Post* (December 8. 1995), JCSS thanks the *Jerusalem Post* for allowing their reprint here.

because any multilateral mechanism implies international consultation, which is an almost certain prescription for paralysis; and that the nature of the contingency and the response be explicitly defined, because ambiguity would invite testing and precipitate domestic consultation in the United States (and disagreements between the United States and Israel). The effectiveness of specific, easily recognizable contingencies cannot be overstated.

Since World War II, the United States has been drawn into hostilities on many occasions, including Korea and Kuwait, precisely because of vaguely defined commitments which projected uncertainty about whether and how they would be honored. By contrast, the United States has never fought a war in defense of formal treaty obligations, because it has never had to. Thus, what is needed is not an impartial American guarantee of "the peace" or an amorphous commitment to "peacekeeping." That mission should be left to others -- perhaps the UN who will either enforce demilitarization agreements and other measures or at least not inhibit an Israeli response to Syrian violations. Instead, the American guarantee should be to Israel, and its purpose should be to compensate Israel for the loss of strategic assets on the Golan by directly reinforcing Israeli deterrent power through a high-resolution, high-visibility obligation to act militarily in the event of a military attack on Israel.

In short, the most effective security arrangement would be a formal mutual defense treaty, enshrined in American law through Senate ratification and made

manifest by the presence of American forces, not on the Golan but inside Israel itself. The American force need not be large, but its permanent presence will ensure that an attack on Israel will automatically engage the United States and therefore fail politically, as well as militarily. Critics sometimes suggest that a formal alliance may constrain Israel's ability to act independently, but Israel has in any case never been free to act without regard for American concerns. On the other hand, a treaty will enhance the strategic cooperation that already exists, encourage even more intensive ongoing consultation and joint planning, and permit access to development and procurement programs for which only allies are eligible, while preserving the role of Israeli strength in the maintenance of peace. Most importantly, a US-Israel Mutual Defense Treaty promises what a peace agreement and other security arrangements cannot: not just that Israel will win the next war, but that it will not have to.

Dore Gold

Minister Shimon Peres that Israel and the US upgrade their long-standing strategic relationship into an actual treaty of alliance does not seem to be a controversial one. Israel and the US have years of experience at "strategic cooperation" that has included visits of Sixth Fleet warships, joint military exercises and research on ballistic missile defense. This relationship began to be



codified in written understandings back in 1983, between the Shamir government and the Reagan adminstration. In short, Israel and the US have already been allies

without an alliance. Nonetheless, taking this relationship one stage further to a formal treaty raises several serious questions. First, why now? When the USSR threatened the Middle East, Israel was in particular need of a defense commitment against a superpower that it could not counter on its own. But these circumstances have changed following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The main development that might today justify a change in the strategic ties between the two countries are further developments in the negotiations between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights. This is one of the key problems with a new defense pact. True, if the Peres government has to market a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights to a wary Israeli public, having a new Israeli-American treaty of alliance ahead of time can help. But the treaty can also affect the course of the negotiations. The late Prime Minister Rabin wanted first to know what "security arrangements" he could obtain for a Golan withdrawal before agreement was secured in other areas. In certain respects, this followed the pattern set in 1978 by the Begin government, which hammered out most of the details of Sinai's "security arrangements" before the parties went to Camp David.

With the expected new broader format of negotiations being considered by the Peres peace team, agreement on security arrangements might be put off to a later stage. If it becomes clear that these hard security issues are blocking a peace treaty, it will be tempting for negotiators to make security concessions, since Israel, in any case, has an American guarantee. Why go through the arduous task of getting the Syrians to re-deploy their army away from the border with Israel, or cut their armor,

if there is an American commitment to come to Israel's defense?

The old strategic cooperation with the US against the Soviet Union did not undercut Israel's doctrine of self-reliance because Israel never had any pretentions of being able to defend itself against an extra-regional superpower. US-Israeli ties complemented the independent military

power of the IDF. But in the context of an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty, a new strategic relationship could evolve into a substitute for Israel's self-defense capability.

This shift has enormous implications beyond the peace process itself. While Israel is negotiating hard territorial

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Guest Researchers at JCSS



Mr. Daiji Sadamori

r. Daiji Sadamori, Deputy Foreign Editor of Japan's most authoritative Asahi Shimbun newspaper, is on sabbatical leave from his Tokyo office and spending one year (till the end of June 1996) at JCSS as a senior researcher of the Japan Foundation. His main research theme is: the Middle East regional security system after the Second Gulf War. More specifically, he is interested in analyzing elements of stability and instability with regard to the policy of dual containment vis a vis Iran and Irag.

Born in Hiroshima in 1947, he is also interested in the non-proliferation problems of the weapons of mass destruction. He has served as *Asahi Shimbun's* diplomatic correspondent both in Cairo (1983-86) and in Washington, D.C.(1989-93). With his stay at JCSS added to his journalistic career, he hopes to bring back to Tokyo new insights into Japanese Middle East policy.



Prof. Donald L. Losman

rofessor Donald L. Losman joined JCSS in August 1995 as a visiting fellow. He holds both MA and PhD degrees from the University of Florida, with international economics as his major and international relations his minor on both programs. He received his Doctorate degree in 1969.

Professor Losman taught graduate and undergraduate courses in several American Universities, then joined the staff of the U.S Army War College in 1978. Since 1982 he has been on the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. where he holds the J. Carlton Ward Jr. Distinguished Professor Chair.

Professor Losman was at JCSS for five months, returning to the US at the end of 1995. His research interests here covered US-Israel strategic cooperation, the Israeli economy, and the financing of Israel's security.

Peacekeeping in a Revolutionary World

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University, who noted the possible utility of peacekeepers in a future Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Col. Jacques Desroches, Chief of Operations and Liason of the MFO, spoke about how peacekeeping is actually implemented in the field, pointing to specific activities of the force in the Sinai peninsula. Major General Mukhtar al-Fayoumi addressed how new technologies might be incorporated into the monitoring function of peacekeeping, giving them far greater capabilities. Most of the Israeli and Egyptian analysts praised the work of the MFO and felt that it still had a vital function to play in the future.

Yariv Conference

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by Dr. Yossi Beilin, Minister at the Prime Minister's Office. He devoted most of his talk to the negotiations with Syria, and presented the factors that are likely to convince Syria to proceed with these negotiations. Syria understands, in light of the opinion polls published in Israel, that now is the time to push forward. He added that in contrast to the criticism directed toward it, the government is not rushing into an agreement with Syria.

Defense treaty between US and Israel

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concessions, the US has put into abeyance pressure in the sensitive area of nuclear arms control. But in the future, pressures in this field will be resumed; an effective worldwide regime for nuclear non-proliferation will remain a vital security concern of the US in the post-Cold War era.

The essence of a formal Israeli-American alliance is the recognition of an attack on Israel as an attack on the US itself. If that is the case, then it could be argued that such treaty reduces the need for an independent Israeli deterrent capability. Why not depend on the retaliatory power of American submarines in Mediterranean? Thus the alliance can become a useful instrument to get Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

A formal US-Israeli alliance touches on intangibles in the US-Israeli relationship, as well. Much of the secret admiration for Israel in the American public is related to the fact that Israel took care of itself. It didn't need American protection like Vietnam.

This image could easily be eroded after a formal treaty is signed and debated. In

September 1991, a hostile President Bush already pointed to Israeli dependence, during the Gulf War, on American-manned missile defense crews in his clash with the American Jewish community over loan guarantees for Israel. In Washington of 1996, it will be asked why the US continues to pay for new F-15s for the Israeli Air Force, if Israel's security is protected by a treaty.

Back in 1981, Moshe Dayan once stated: "I don't recommend that any one of us accept as a substitute (for Israel's positions in the territories) even entering NATO, international guarantees, or American soldiers." Yigal Allon wrote of military guarantees as an addition "to its defensible borders and in no way as a substitute for them."

Finally, Yitzhak Rabin also warned: "no army is a substitute for the IDF for the protection of Israel's security." The founding fathers of Israel's national security doctrine were extremely cautious about a formal Israeli-American alliance in the context of the peace process; their caution still ought to guide Israeli calcualtions today.



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