

Hezbollah's Concept of Deterrence vis-à-vis Israel according to Nasrallah: From the Second Lebanon War to the Present

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“Lebanon must have a deterrent military strength...then we will tell the Israelis to be careful. If you want to attack Lebanon to achieve goals, you will not be able to, because we are no longer a weak country. If we present the Israelis with such logic, they will think a million times.”

Hassan Nasrallah, August 17, 2009

This essay deals with Hezbollah's concept of deterrence against Israel as it developed over the ten years since the Second Lebanon War. The essay looks at the most important speeches by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah during this period to examine the evolution and development of the concept of deterrence at four points in time that reflect Hezbollah's internal and regional milieu (2000, 2006, 2008, and 2011). Over the years, Nasrallah has frequently utilized the media to deliver his messages and promote the organization's agenda to key target audiences – Israel and the internal Lebanese audience. His speeches therefore constitute an opportunity for understanding the organization's stances in general and its concept of deterrence in particular.

Principal Messages

An analysis of Nasrallah's speeches, especially since 2011, shows that he has devoted them primarily to the war in Syria and internal Lebanese politics. Hezbollah's attitude toward Israel, including the element of deterrence, is mentioned in those speeches, but to a more limited extent than in the period preceding the regional upheaval and especially the civil war in Syria.

Hezbollah's narrative of victory over Israel in the Second Lebanon War has remained firmly intact over the years, and is used by the organization as justification for its ways. The narrative continues to be a source for consolidating Hezbollah's concept of deterrence against Israel. At the same time, it can be concluded that Hezbollah has no interest in reigniting the front against Israel on its own initiative. Nasrallah's statements about Hezbollah's military capabilities emerge in a purely deterrent context, and are designed to deliver the message that despite the organization's being mired in the Syrian theater, it continues to prepare for war against Israel – hoping to prevent it, and winning it, should a war break out.¹

Nasrallah's speeches indicate that mutual deterrence exists, both as a result of the Second Lebanon War and because of the regional situation: "There is deterrence on both sides of the border. No one can deny this. If the resistance decides to force a confrontation, it should be aware that Israel is a strong enemy. We are not visionaries, and the Israelis, when they try to do something concerning Lebanon, also know that the resistance is strong and capable."² As Nasrallah sees it, Israel's restraint results from its fear that a war with Hezbollah will open a Pandora's box and restore Israel to a prominent position on the regional agenda, particularly regarding the Palestinian issue, in contrast with the current situation, in which the Arab and Muslim world is busy with internal matters. Another reason for Israel's restraint cited by Nasrallah involves Israel's desire to avoid a war as long as a speedy victory is not assured: "The one thing that prevents Israel from launching a war...after the experience of the Second Lebanon War and the Winograd Commission...is its knowledge that a clear, decisive, quick, and uncontroversial victory is not assured...because of the resistance and the support of its people and the national army."³

As to Israel's deterrence against Hezbollah, Nasrallah has distinguished between deterrence resulting from a military campaign, which exists between the two sides, and deterrence stemming from the "soft campaign" Israel conducts against the organization. According to Nasrallah, a soft campaign

involves “applying political, public, and media pressure...and imposing a financial embargo and exhausting the organization’s financial resources in a way that will weaken it from inside following an embargo and isolation and erode popular support for it.”⁴ He asserted that Hezbollah has had to counter false accusations and demonization from both Israel and some Arab countries acting in its service. It appears that in contrast to the military narrative, Nasrallah is hard pressed to present an effective response to the type of threat posed by psychological and financial warfare, which is apparently effective in creating deterrence against the organization, and even restricting its freedom of action: “We are dealing with this slander through our credibility, morality, behavior, history...and most of all through achievements and victories.”⁵

Another area used by Hezbollah to deter Israel is the international arena. This mode of operation is not new; it has served as an additional form of deterrence for the organization for many years, along with the deterrence in the Israel-Lebanon physical arena. Hezbollah’s foreign activity, or the threat to take action in this sphere, is sometimes designed to preserve the organization’s deterrent capabilities in circumstances in which it has difficulty conducting operations, or as a result of strategic considerations requiring it to refrain from conducting operations in the local arena.

Hezbollah first took action against Israel in the international sphere in 1992, following the killing of Sheikh Abbas al-Moussawi, Nasrallah’s predecessor as Hezbollah secretary general, and the attack two years later against a Hezbollah training camp in which 15 people were killed. In response, the organization conducted two deadly suicide attacks: one at the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992 (29 killed and 220 wounded), and the second at the Asociacion Mutual Israelita (AMIA) Jewish community building in Argentina in July 1994 (85 killed and over 300 wounded). Hezbollah thereby proclaimed an “eye for an eye” principle designed to signal to Israel that any strike against Hezbollah in Lebanon would give the organization a free hand to respond anywhere in the world it saw fit. For Nasrallah, the attacks against Israeli overseas targets demonstrated effective deterrence capability.

Evolution of Hezbollah Deterrence, 2000-2016

Highlighting the Inherent Advantages of Asymmetry (early years)

During the 1990s, violent non-state Middle East actors, as in the case of Hezbollah, became increasingly conscious of their technological inferiority

and the wide gap in their military capabilities vis-à-vis Israel.⁶ Consequently, a concept of warfare took shape based on the assumption that balance and equality between the two sides in other (non-technological) facets could be created, and even an imbalance in favor of the ostensibly weaker side. For example, the technologically inferior side can achieve an advantage in parameters such as size of territory and population, determination, endurance and resilience, willingness to take risks, and the degree of sensitivity to losses caused by a violent clash. This notion enabled Hezbollah to generate credible deterrence, first and foremost in order to prevent a large scale conflict with Israel, which is perceived as contrary to the organization's interests and capabilities. This capability also provides that if basic deterrence fails, the war will be conducted in spheres more comfortable for the ostensibly weaker side, thereby, without combat, offsetting some of the attacker's superior technological advantage.⁷

Nasrallah's statements during these years reflect his awareness of Hezbollah's technological inferiority and advantages as a guerilla organization. Later, during the Second Lebanon War, Nasrallah continued to base his deterrence against Israel on the inherent advantages in guerrilla warfare: "Our policy is not to hold any particular point in a given village and so forth. Our warfare is not warfare with a geographic dimension, because we are not an organized army, and we do not fight like an organized army. We are fighting a guerrilla war. It is therefore preferable for us to let [the IDF] advance and enter cities and villages, because that way we can fight them directly and cause them damages and casualties."⁸

The "New School of Warfare" (2006)

Complementing the recognition of the inherent advantages of guerrilla warfare to deterrence, Nasrallah began to develop another theme, reflecting his effort to acquire and develop more advanced military capabilities than those of a classic guerrilla organization. The principal change, as reflected in the new discourse, is the use of high trajectory ballistic weapons (rockets and surface-to-surface missiles). The great advantage of these weapons is their ability to penetrate the territory of an enemy that has not developed effective countermeasures, and the difficulty of detecting and attacking the ballistic missile launchers because of their low signature and large numbers: "The purpose of our rockets is to deter Israel from attacking Lebanese civilians. The fact is that Israel did not attack Lebanese civilians. The enemy fears

that every time he confronts us, whenever there are victims in our ranks among Lebanese civilians, this will lead to a counter-barrage of our rockets, which he fears.”⁹

This combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare capabilities was expressed even more forcefully in Nasrallah's comments during and after the Second Lebanon War. Syrian and Iranian support for Hezbollah enabled it to enjoy the singular combination of a terrorist organization with advanced military capabilities. At the start of the war, Hezbollah had a large stock (1,000) of long range (up to 250 kilometers) rockets, a large quantity (13,000) of short range rockets, an aerial array that included unmanned aerial vehicles for attack missions, a naval array that included anti-ship missiles, and a large ground force (approximately 10,000 soldiers). The ground force, which operated as a guerrilla force, was armed with advanced individually launched anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. In addition, Hezbollah established a military deployment in southern Lebanon that included anti-tank weapons, underground bunkers, and a logistics system designed for prolonged warfare. Part of this deployment was stationed within Shiite villages or on their outskirts.¹⁰

The organization's achievements in the Second Lebanon War, together with the critical discourse that developed in Israel concerning the limited achievements in the campaign against Hezbollah, led Nasrallah¹¹ to proclaim a more sophisticated concept of deterrence that highlighted the organization's ability to merge conventional forms of warfare with guerrilla warfare and terrorism, while blurring the boundaries between the front and the rear and between military and civilian, thereby further challenging Israel's military response: “From a traditional guerrilla war, the strategy of resistance has become a new, utterly unique school of warfare between the regular army and guerrilla warfare... the victory in the July war (and the achievements) following it have made the resistance very advanced in comparison with the enemy's capabilities before the next war.”¹²

The “Open War”: Expanding Foreign Activity (2008)

The killing of Imad Mughniyeh in Damascus in February 2008, less than two years after the Second Lebanon War, was a turning point for Nasrallah, following which he declared an open blood feud with Israel. His subsequent speeches indicated that he regarded the international arena as a significant area for deterring Israel and for responses against it as revenge

for what Hezbollah regards as aggressive actions against the organization or a violation of “Lebanese sovereignty,” which, according to Nasrallah, is within Hezbollah’s mandate. The international arena thus became a venue for relaying to Israel that it “stepped over the line,” and signaling to it that even if Hezbollah has limitations in operating against Israel from Lebanon or Syria, the organization will not be deterred from attacking its targets elsewhere. This position was based on the precedent of the organization’s retaliation in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994.

Indeed, at Mughniyeh’s funeral on February 14, 2008, Nasrallah declared that Israel had “crossed the line,” and that from then on, the campaign was an “open war... considering such murder, its timing, its location and the method, if you Zionists want this kind of open war, let the whole world hear me now, it shall be an open war.”¹³ Immediately afterward, in the same spirit, Hezbollah’s foreign terrorist command began its efforts to carry out the threat. The same year, Hezbollah operatives attempted a series of terrorist attacks, sometimes in cooperation with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard al-Quds force, in Azerbaijan,¹⁴ Turkey, and Egypt.¹⁵ Hezbollah also continued to attempt terrorist attacks against Israeli (and Jewish) targets overseas, such as the attack against a vehicle with Israeli diplomats at the Allenby Bridge between Israel and Jordan.¹⁶

In 2011, in his annual speech on the anniversary of Mughniyeh’s death, Nasrallah reiterated that Mughniyeh’s blood would continue to haunt Israel, and Hezbollah’s response, which had not yet been carried out, would come at the appropriate time and place.¹⁷ About two months later, in May 2011, three Hezbollah operatives sent from Beirut unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the Israeli consul in Istanbul.¹⁸

Hezbollah also attempted a number of terrorist attacks in the international theater in 2012: on January 8, it was reported that in Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, a routine check revealed an explosive device that had been loaded in Turkey on a bus for Israeli tourists.¹⁹ This event took place after the Israeli media reported on January 5, 2012 that Hezbollah was planning a terrorist attack against Israeli tourist targets in Europe.²⁰ That same month, the Thai police arrested a Lebanese man with Swedish citizenship suspected of being linked to Hezbollah, after receiving information about “a threat of an immediate terrorist attack” in Bangkok.²¹ A terrorist attack in Azerbaijan aimed at the Israeli embassy there was also thwarted in January 2012. Then-IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz attributed the attempt to Hezbollah.

The event in Azerbaijan took place three weeks after the anniversary of the killing of Imad Mughniyeh.²²

On July 18, 2012, Hezbollah succeeded in its attempts to take revenge against Israel. The organization detonated a bomb on a bus carrying Israeli tourists in Burgas Airport in Bulgaria. The attack killed five Israelis and the Bulgarian driver, and wounded 36 Israeli civilians.²³

The overseas war continued following the December 4, 2013 killing of Hassan al-Laqqis, head of Hezbollah's communications and technology unit responsible for its advanced weaponry. Hezbollah blamed Israel, although a Kuwait newspaper hinted that Hezbollah itself was behind the killing, after having claimed that al-Laqqis was a spy for the Israeli Mossad.²⁴ In Nasrallah's statements (on May 25 and November 4, 2014), he avoided direct attribution of responsibility for al-Laqqis's death, but at the same time again threatened that Hezbollah would retaliate for any aggression at any time it saw fit.²⁵ On January 30, 2015, Nasrallah labeled the killing of senior Hezbollah leaders in Quneitra, including Imad Mughniyeh's son, Jihad, as a military operation in broad daylight – in contrast to the killing of al-Laqqis eight weeks prior, which was “a security operation which some may refer to as equivocal.”²⁶

Hezbollah continued its attempts to stage overseas terrorist attacks against Israelis in 2014. On April 15, a Hezbollah terrorist cell gathering intelligence information and planning an attack against Israeli tourists was discovered in Thailand.²⁷ In October 2014, a young man of Lebanese origin was arrested in Peru on suspicion of starting a Hezbollah cell and planning terrorist attacks against Jewish sites (Chabad houses and Jewish community sites), places frequented by Israeli tourists, and the Israeli embassy in Lima.²⁸

A review of Hezbollah's broadened overseas operations since 2010 shows that despite Israel's deterrence against the organization on the northern front (Lebanon and Syria), the regional and internal dynamic has less of an effect on deterrence concerning its overseas activity. Hezbollah spokesmen also threatened to conduct an “open war” against Israel in 2015, i.e., to continue operations in the international theater in response to Israel's isolated attacks against the organization, mainly following the killings of Hezbollah operatives attributed to Israel.²⁹

Creating the Image of Strategic Parity (2011 onwards)

While Hezbollah's concept of deterrence in the first decade of the 21st century focused on the advantages of guerrilla warfare, combined with the organization's advanced military (mainly ballistic) capabilities, in the following decade, especially since 2015, there was a turning point in the threat and comments about deterrence. Nasrallah's rhetoric in recent years has striven to paint an image of an organization not only with the same advanced capabilities possessed by regular armies, but military capabilities equal to those of Israel, whereby Hezbollah is at least capable of responding to aggressive actions in equal measure.

Two main reflections of this attitude can be found. The first is Hezbollah's threat to conquer Israeli territories and communities in the framework of "the operational plan for conquering the Galilee" announced by Nasrallah on February 16, 2011, at the events marking the third anniversary of the killing of Imad Mughniyeh. In his remarks, Nasrallah instructed his soldiers to be ready to conquer the Galilee if Israel begins a war against Hezbollah.³⁰ Over subsequent years, Nasrallah threatened to "conquer the Galilee" several more times, and Hezbollah published a video clip explaining the operational plan for doing so.³¹ To a large extent this new element in the balance of deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah reflects the organization's involvement in the civil war in Syria. Hezbollah accumulated substantial combat experience there, improved its operational methods, and learned how to occupy territory, clear urban territory of enemies, and use tanks and artillery. The organization has also acquired Russian-made advanced weapons.

Another indication of the change in Hezbollah's discourse about deterrence can be seen by comparing statements by Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem in 2005 with remarks by Nasrallah in 2015. In 2005 Qassem said, "The function of the resistance is not necessarily to conquer any territory from the liberated lands, as in the case of the liberation of Sojod, Armata, and Devasha, where Hezbollah's flag was raised. A resistance operation is considered successful when it strikes and causes injury, death, or blows up the occupier's outposts, not necessarily one that conquers his outposts."³² In contrast, a decade later, Nasrallah claimed, "There is no precedent for the coordinated forces of the jihad resistance entering a city or occupying a large geographic area by military means. This attempt never existed in the past, The resistance has now gained this experience... The resistance is ready with its people, officers, and resources to enter the

Galilee. The resistance is ready to move the war to the enemy's territory, not just using rockets, but also through activity in the field.³³

A second reflection of the concept of responding in equal measure is Nasrallah's speech in February 2016, which became known as the "ammonia speech." Nasrallah then referred to a deterrence equation between Hezbollah's ability to cause the death of tens of thousands of people by firing precision guided missiles at the ammonia tank in Haifa Bay and Israel's ability to cause heavy damage to Dahiyeh (the southern suburb of Beirut) with its air force, in what he called the Dahiyeh doctrine. Nasrallah estimated the organization's new capability as equal in value to an "atomic bomb."³⁴

Although Hezbollah is drawn into the Syrian theater, it appears that its "open war" concept and continued readiness to operate against Israel in the international arena have not been affected. On January 30, following the January 18, 2015 killing of Jihad Mughniyeh and other senior Hezbollah leaders and members of the Revolutionary Guard force, Nasrallah delivered a speech stating that there was no doubt that an assassination was involved, and that the evidence pointed to Israeli responsibility. He reiterated that the resistance was entitled to respond to this assassination in any place and in any way.³⁵

The killing of Samir Kuntar on December 19, 2015, also widely attributed to Israel, drew a routine rhetorical response from Nasrallah on December 27, 2015 to the effect that Hezbollah was determined to respond to the attack near Israel's borders, inside them, and abroad.³⁶ Nasrallah mentioned Kuntar's killing again in his speech on January 3, 2016, in which he threatened that retaliation would come.³⁷ In his speech on the eighth anniversary of the killing of Imad Mughniyeh, on February 16, 2016, Nasrallah reiterated that the war with Israel was "open," and that revenge for the death of the organization's various commanders, including in the field, had not been forgotten.³⁸ These comments followed his remarks in an interview with the al-Mayadeen network, when he said that Hezbollah was not committed to any single principle, and had the right to retaliate for Israel's attacks at any time, in any place, and in any way or method.³⁹

The May 12, 2016 killing in Damascus of Mustafa Badreddine, Imad Mughniyeh's brother-in-law and his formal replacement as Hezbollah's supreme military commander,⁴⁰ drew aggressive initial responses in Hezbollah circles, but these faded with time. At a memorial ceremony for Badreddine in Beirut on May 20, 2016, Nasrallah declared that Hezbollah did not regard

Israel as responsible for the killing, saying, “when facts show the responsibility of the Zionist enemy in any operation we would not hide that,” but there was no proof that Israel was responsible here. Nasrallah also addressed allegations that Hezbollah had not accused Israel of the killing because that would have obligated Hezbollah to retaliate, saying that he “regrets that it was not the Israelis who said this, but Arabs and Lebanese...when we have data, even theoretical, indicating that Israel is responsible, we accuse it, as happened in the case of Imad Mughniyeh.” He warned Israel, “if you target any of our mujahedeen we will have a clear and direct response no matter what the consequences were, and it will be outside Shebaa Farms.”⁴¹

Hezbollah’s ongoing activity against Israel in the international theater indicates that the organization continues to regard Israel, its civilians, its official and other representative offices, and Jews throughout the world as legitimate targets. Nasrallah’s statements show consistently that Hezbollah will not hesitate to attack these targets when necessary, and that it possesses the tools needed to carry out these threats. At the same time, however, Hezbollah takes action in the international theater only after receiving approval from Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei; it is required to coordinate its actions with Iran, from which it sometimes receives assistance, and is affected by the restrictions applying to Iran. Another factor sometimes contributing to Hezbollah’s restraint overseas is the classification by several countries, including the United States and European countries, of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization (sometimes restricted to its military wing). This classification causes Hezbollah to take care to avoid being perceived as being responsible for bloody terrorist attacks.

Ramifications

This essay examines Hezbollah’s concept of deterrence against Israel, as it has developed over the past decade, based on selected speeches and statements by Secretary General Nasrallah. Analysis of his rhetoric indicates an evolutionary change in his concept of deterrence and its fundamental principles. This change reflects the internal and regional circumstances in which Hezbollah operates and the organization’s process of learning and force buildup in recent years.

Until early in the millennium, Hezbollah’s discussion of deterrence highlighted the inherent advantages of guerrilla warfare and Israel’s inability to cope with this type of threat. Starting in 2006, following Hezbollah’s

achievements in the Second Lebanon War, Nasrallah's speeches emphasized the organization's ability to merge conventional warfare with guerrilla and terrorist tactics, and portrayed this combination as a new concept of warfare even more challenging to the response capabilities of regular armies. Since 2008, following the killing of Imad Mughniyeh, much of Nasrallah's discussion of deterrence has dealt with Hezbollah's actions against Israeli and Jewish targets overseas in what he refers to as the "open war." The efforts to carry out attacks against Israel in the international theater have usually been due to the deterrence displayed by Israel in the regional theater and to internal considerations, principally the desire to avoid another direct conflict with Israel.

Nasrallah's speeches since 2010 bring to the fore his attempt to create the image of strategic parity with Israel – to portray Hezbollah's improved offensive capabilities as in no way inferior to Israel's military capabilities, combined with the organization's offensive efforts in the international theater. The reason for Nasrallah's use of the principle of responding in equal measure is the damage to the organization's deterrence against Israel as a result of its deep involvement in the fighting in Syria, which has led Hezbollah to halt its direct struggle against the IDF. Given this development, to a great extent Nasrallah's speeches deal with the operative advantages Hezbollah has gained from the war in Syria – advantages that give the organization offensive capabilities purportedly no less advanced than those attributed to Israel. Indeed, Hezbollah's accumulated experience and the development of its military capabilities since the beginning of the war in Syria heighten the threat it poses to Israel. Furthermore, although Nasrallah's references to Israel in his statements have been relatively mild since Hezbollah became involved in the fighting in Syria, the organization continues to regard the Second Lebanon War as a source of pride in its successes and as highlighting Israel's weakness. The mention of this war and its results continues to constitute a key element in Hezbollah's concept of deterrence.

Nasrallah's speeches indicate his acknowledgment that mutual deterrence exists between Hezbollah and Israel. The organization has no wish for another round of fighting against Israel, and in fact fears one, not only due to the damage it suffered in 2006, but also due to its recognition of the improvement in the IDF's offensive capabilities since the Second Lebanon War. The success of Israeli deterrence against Hezbollah is reflected first and foremost in Hezbollah's position that it does not favor a war in the current

circumstances, as repeatedly stated in Nasrallah's remarks. At the same time, despite the deterrence on Israel's northern front, Hezbollah's overseas operations, including the squads dispatched to commit acts of mass terrorism in South America and Southeast Asia and its efforts to avenge the killing of Mughniyeh, prove that Israel has no effective deterrent against Hezbollah in the international theater. The constraints on Hezbollah there are due mainly to instructions from Iran or internal organizational considerations.

The statements by Hezbollah about its lack of desire for a war against Israel, together with the considerable price in casualties that the organization is paying in the Syrian theater, are liable to give Israel's public and decision makers the feeling that the quiet on the Lebanese border may well last for a long time. Past experience shows that deterrence is a fluid concept, and that a single local violent incident or shifts in the regional or internal Lebanese environment are sometimes enough to change Hezbollah's assessment of the situation. The organization's internal problems, combined with its ideological and strategic vision of maintaining the resistance to Israel, are likely to turn the situation around and ignite a renewed conflict between the two sides. This possibility requires constant consideration and periodic validation for assessments of the security situation with respect to the existing lull on Israel's northern front.

Notes

- 1 Mohamed Salami, "Sayyed Nasrallah: Hezbollah Ready to Invade Galilee, beyond Galilee," *al-Mayadeen*, broadcast on *al-Manar*, January 15, 2015, <http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=190782>, and Hassan Nasrallah's speech on February 16, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZN5BT5_Gd8I.
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- 3 Nasrallah's speech on February 16, 2016.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 This was mainly a result of realizing the deadliness of precision guided weaponry and the change it created on the battlefield, as reflected in the military doctrines that developed during those years, with a focus on the revolution in military affairs (RMA).
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- 8 See Hassan Nasrallah speech, *al-Manar*, July 16, 2006, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjUyFhbeOzU>.
- 9 Hassan Nasrallah, *as-Safir*, May 17, 2006.
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- 11 Followed by Western researchers and military figures, who conceptualized this as the theory of hybrid warfare: for example, see Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," *Joint Force Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (2009): 34-40, <https://goo.gl/UghxwW>.
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- 20 "Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization."
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 David Cohen, "The Terrorists That Will Try to Attack You: 'Unit 400' in Iran," *Ynet*, September 6, 2012, <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4278015,00.html>.
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- 25 See Hassan Nasrallah's speech, May 25, 2014.
- 26 Syrian Free Press in al-Quds, "Sayyed Nasrallah's Full Speech in Honor of the Quneitra Martyrs," January 30, 2015, *The Real Syrian Free Press*, February 4, 2015, <https://syrianfreepress.wordpress.com/2015/02/04/report-41839/>.
- 27 Barak Ravid, "Thailand: Arrested Hezbollah Operatives Admit Planning Attack against Israelis on Passover," *Haaretz*, April 18, 2014, <http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/world/asia/1.2299728>.

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- 29 For example, Hassan Nasrallah's speech on January 30, 2015 following the killing of Jihad Mughniyeh; see Gibor, "Killings, Lack of Recruits, and Spies: Hezbollah's Troubles."
- 30 See Hassan Nasrallah's speech on February 16, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fkEdgrK5AdM>.
- 31 Nasrallah to *al-Mayadeen*, January 15, 2015.
- 32 Naim Qassem, *Hezbollah: The Story from Within* (London: Saqi Books, 2010).
- 33 Nasrallah to *al-Mayadeen*, January 15, 2015.
- 34 Nasrallah's speech on February 16, 2016.
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