

The UN Security Council, Israel, and “the Situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question”

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In February 2017, newly appointed US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley expressed disdain for the UN bias toward Israel in general and for the stance of the UN Security Council (UNSC) vis-à-vis Israel in particular.¹ The anti-Israel sentiment in the UN derided poignantly by Ambassador Haley is not a recent development. Haley’s predecessor, for example, claimed that for as long as Israel has been a member of the UN, “it has been treated differently from other nations.”² Although Israel has learned to adapt to this dynamic, the reality underscores the strategic importance of Israel’s standing with the UN’s most powerful actors.

With this in mind, the current paper seeks to answer two central questions. First, how do the most powerful actors in the UN Security Council perceive the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the resolution of the conflict, and what, if any, are the differences of opinion between them? Second, in the Security Council discussions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which issues attract the most debate and fiercest criticism from these actors? The paper begins with a short section relating to the working apparatus of the UN Security Council vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the methodology adopted in this research. Findings to the two questions are then fleshed out, followed by an assessment and policy recommendations.

The UN Security Council and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The UN Security Council is mandated by the UN Charter to help maintain international peace and security. To this end, it is authorized to impose

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sanctions and permit the use of force. The Council comprises fifteen member states, five of which are permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – commonly known as the P5) and ten of which become members for a two-year period. While each member state has one vote, the five permanent members have the ability to veto the Council's decisions – granting them additional influence and power.

The Council meets on a regular basis to address conflicts across the globe. In addition to meetings under the agenda item “the situation in the Middle East,” the Council also convenes on a monthly basis, and at times more frequently, to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under a special agenda item, “the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question.” These latter meetings follow a regular format, beginning with a brief by a high level UN official. In some meetings the floor opens for Council members to speak, vote on a resolution, or hold a discussion at the initiative of a Council member in reaction to a specific development.

The content of this paper is based on the analysis of seventy (n=70) UNSC meetings under agenda item “the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” over a five-year period, from 2012 to 2016. With the aim of focusing attention on the most powerful actors in the Council, rather than on the biased rhetoric from states that are “automatically” antagonistic toward Israel (and with whom Israel has no diplomatic relations), the analysis covers only messages voiced by the following key players: P5 state representatives; the EU representative;³ and the UN official who opens each meeting. The starting point for the analysis is the year in which Palestine's status was upgraded from Non-Member Observer Entity to Non-Member Observer State.⁴ The importance of this development is twofold: first, the new status enhanced the Palestinians' ability to internationalize the conflict and take legal steps against Israel; and second, the move, which was not unanimously supported by key actors, illuminates the differences between them.

Perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict among the Key Actors

While in the current international climate the two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been questioned by the new United States administration, every UNSC meeting reviewed was based upon the unshakable conviction of the key actors that “the two-State solution is the only viable scenario.”⁵ Throughout the period, key players noted that the “two-State solution...is the only way of bringing ...peace and security,”⁶

likewise noting that we are on the brink of a perilous situation in which “the two-State solution is on life support.”⁷

Two additional issues on which key players are unequivocally clear are that Israel has legitimate security concerns that must be addressed, and that direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are the best method to resolve the conflict.

As far as Israel’s security is concerned, the underlying principles that “there will be no progress if Israel’s legitimate security concerns are not addressed,”⁸ and that “Israel’s security...cannot be compromised”⁹ have been central to all discussions, with P5 states repeatedly noting that they “will never underestimate Israel’s security needs.”¹⁰ Israel’s security is discussed in Council sessions both with respect to Gaza, where “Israel’s right to self-defense...in responding to unacceptable rocket fire from Gaza”¹¹ is noted, and with respect to Palestinian terrorism and violence. The fact that Gaza is controlled by an “overtly anti-Semitic”¹² authority that “rejects peaceful solutions and aspires to the obliteration of Israel”¹³ has also been noted. In fact, in context of the international community’s awareness of Israel’s security concerns, two of the P5 states (United States and the United Kingdom) cited their “commitment to Israel’s security”¹⁴ as having propelled their vote in relation to UNSCR 2334.

With respect to bilateral negotiations as the best means to solve the conflict, there is a full consensus among the key players that “any eventual agreement must be developed by the Palestinians and the Israelis themselves, and not imposed externally,”¹⁵ and that international action is “not a substitute for a genuine peace process, which will need to be negotiated between both parties.”¹⁶ In this respect the key actors relate to the fact that the Palestinian pursuit of “legal international routes to statehood” must be supported by a realization that “there can be no substitute for negotiations with Israel,”¹⁷ and that even international action designed to “establish the framework for negotiations”¹⁸ in no way intends to “impose a solution on the parties.”¹⁹

Regarding the framework to facilitate resolution of the conflict, the key actors advocate extensive international involvement. This is evident both in their calls for greater involvement (e.g., “China appeals to the Quartet to take substantive action with a view to restarting the peace talks”²⁰) and in their ability to rally behind other actors when they take the lead on an issue. States that do take the lead underscore support received from other international players so that the picture that emerges is of an international community strongly supportive of proactive efforts channeled toward

resolving the conflict, regardless of which actor leads it. For example, “diplomatic effort would not have been possible without strong international support. The Arab Peace Initiative...committee, the Quartet envoys...the Secretary-General, European partners and others around the world also weighed in with strong statements of support.”²¹

Furthermore, all key actors support increasing the involvement of regional actors in resolving the conflict, particularly Arab League states, e.g., “We continue to believe that...countries of the region have a role to play.”²² The potential contribution of regional states is noted specifically in two aspects: first, as offering an incentive to Israel, and second, in facilitating “intra-Palestinian unity on the platform of the Palestine Liberation Organization.”²³

In context of the turbulent Middle East, all key actors agree that other conflicts raging in the area should not deter the global community from acting on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, so that as “grave as the situation in Syria is,” for example, international actors “must not lose focus of the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”²⁴ In this respect, the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is conceptualized as “a key ...to normalizing the situation in the region.”²⁵ In fact, there is a widespread perception that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is central not only to the parties themselves, or to the “the longer term stability of the Middle East region,”²⁶ but also to “peace and stability in...Europe.”²⁷

The differences between the key actors’ perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appear to be limited to the methodological realm of how best to encourage the sides to take positive steps toward a peace agreement. In this respect the United States stands apart from other players in its vocal criticism regarding unilateral Palestinian acts that the US perceives will “neither improve the daily lives of Palestinians nor foster...trust...towards a two-State solution.”²⁸ In line with this policy, in 2012 the United States voted against the Palestinian bid in the General Assembly to upgrade Palestine’s status, and in 2014 voted against the Jordanian resolution tabled in the aftermath of Operation Protective Edge.²⁹

Closest to the United States in rhetoric and action is the United Kingdom, which has been critical of unilateral Palestinian action in the diplomatic arena and which abstained both on the vote in the General Assembly in 2012 and on the vote on the Jordanian resolution in the Security Council in 2014 – this despite the fact that the UK noted its support for “the idea of a Security Council resolution on the Middle East peace process.”³⁰

The remaining P5 states (China, France, and Russia) appear to support greater international action vis-à-vis Israel, and as such voted in support of the Palestinian bid in the General Assembly in 2012, and the Jordanian resolution in 2014. Each has proposed additional mechanisms in pursuit of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement – most notably, a French initiative aimed to have “the entire international community proposing a positive agenda to the two parties to encourage them to move towards...peace”,³¹ a “four-point proposal on the...question of Palestine”³² put forth by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 and “the five-point proposal for peace”³³ presented by China in 2014; and Russia’s proposals that the Council should work towards a draft resolution including “the parameters for a cessation of the occupation,”³⁴ a Security Council mission to the Middle East,³⁵ and the integration of Arab League states into the Quartet.

Criticism from the UN and Key Council Members

The grievances toward Israel among the key Security Council actors relate primarily to the following issues:

- a. *Settlements*: Criticism regarding Israel’s settlement policies encompasses two issues: the ongoing expansion of settlements, and settlement-related violence. In opening Council sessions UN officials regularly provide figures on additional housing units approved by the Israeli government since the previous Council meeting. Such criticism is analytical, detailed, and fact-based, e.g., “We are deeply disappointed by Israeli...tenders for the construction of...450 residential units in West Bank settlements.”³⁶ In this context settlements are referred to as “counter to Israel’s...obligations,”³⁷ and “contrary to international law and an obstacle to peace,”³⁸ and they are said to “threaten the possibility of a two-State solution.”³⁹ On the more general level, Israel’s policy of expanding settlements is perceived as “an affront to the Palestinian people”⁴⁰ and as casting doubt on “Israel’s commitment to a two-State solution.”⁴¹

A second aspect of criticism relates to settlement-related violence. In earlier years, criticism related to bodily harm of Palestinians and Israelis alike, e.g., “46 Palestinians, including 12 children and one woman, were injured by settlers, while 11 settlers were injured by Palestinians”,⁴² as well as to the damage to Palestinian property and livelihood resulting from such violence, e.g., “Multiple incidents of settler attacks against Palestinian...orchards damaged over 1,080 trees

and saplings...concern given...olive-picking...livelihood for thousands of Palestinians."⁴³ In this respect, violence – both by Israeli settlers and against them – is perceived as being enabled “in the context of chronically inadequate law enforcement in the West Bank...created as a result of Israel’s decades-long policy of illegal settlement activities.”⁴⁴ More recently, settlement-related criticism drew attention to the perception that they are “the single-most damaging factor that contributes to the anger and frustration driving the violence”⁴⁵ against Israelis, both in the West Bank and in Israel proper.

- b. *Demolitions* are another issue drawing unabated criticism. UN officials regularly provide detailed statistics regarding the number of Palestinian structures demolished and the people who are displaced as a result, e.g., “33 residential structures were demolished...leading to the displacement of 176 Palestinians, including 78 children.”⁴⁶ Demolitions are particularly criticized regarding Israel’s policies in Area C, which limit Palestinian ability to “fair planning and zoning,”⁴⁷ leading to “the building of structures without an Israeli permit,”⁴⁸ which ultimately leads to their demolition.
- c. *Prisoners*: The issue of Palestinian prisoners in Israel surfaced particularly between 2013 and 2015, in relation to the detention of Palestinians without trial for prolonged periods. For example, “those held in administrative detention without charge should...face trial...in accordance with international standards, or be promptly released.”⁴⁹ In this context concern was repeatedly voiced regarding “the health of...Palestinian prisoners on ongoing hunger strike protesting their administrative detention.”⁵⁰
- d. *Search-and-arrest operations in the West Bank*: Until 2016, the number of Israel’s operations in the West Bank was reported regularly, including the consequent injuries and fatalities on both sides, e.g., “Israeli security forces conducted 477 operations in the West Bank...an increase from previous months, resulting in 185 Palestinians, including eight children, being injured, while two Israeli soldiers were...injured.”⁵¹ While such operations are noted, there is no explanation as to the rationale behind carrying them out. Occasionally there is mention that “Israeli security forces reported having foiled ...terrorist attacks... allegedly planned by individuals in the West Bank”,⁵² however such developments are not immediately linked to the search-and-arrest operations.

- e. *Israel's withholding of Palestinian tax revenues*: During the period assessed, Israel resorted to a freeze of Palestinian tax revenues in two instances in response to Palestinian unilateral action in the diplomatic arena. In 2012, the withholding of Palestinian tax revenues was in response to the Palestinian bid in the General Assembly, and in 2015 it was a reaction to President Abbas's signing "instruments of accession to 18 international treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court."⁵³ In both instances, Israel's policy of freezing tax monies received extensive criticism and was noted as casting "doubt upon Israeli compliance with Paris Protocol provisions."⁵⁴ This policy was particularly criticized in 2012 when the Palestinians faced "a dire fiscal situation," and Israel's withholding of the funds was considered to imperil "the considerable achievements made by the Palestinian Authority in recent years."⁵⁵
- f. *Rhetoric*: While this is a central grievance directed to the Palestinian side, inflammatory Israeli rhetoric is occasionally criticized by key players referring to both the Israeli leadership and grassroots levels. On the leadership level, for example, "Israel's Prime Minister portraying those who oppose settlement expansion as supporters of ethnic cleansing" was deemed "unacceptable and outrageous" by the Secretary General himself.⁵⁶ Other problematic rhetoric mentioned in Council meetings included that of Israeli ministers who "say publicly that there will be no Palestinian State."⁵⁷ With respect to grassroots elements, "the impact of social media and irresponsible rhetoric"⁵⁸ was said to play a "dramatic role in the escalation"⁵⁹ of events on the ground, for which "both sides have much to be blamed."⁶⁰
- g. *Legislation*: The introduction of changes to Israeli law was criticized in 2015 and 2016 on the following issues: "force-feeding of a hunger-striking prisoner" (2015);⁶¹ the amendment of Israel's penal code "to increase harsh punishments for throwing stones at moving vehicles" (2015);⁶² "the applicability of Israel's 1951 absentee property law to Palestinian property in East Jerusalem when the owner is in the West Bank" (2015);⁶³ "the NGO Transparency Law, which contributes to a climate in which...human rights organizations are delegitimized" (2016);⁶⁴ and "legalization...of outposts deep in the West Bank" (2016).⁶⁵ The legalization of outposts was also cited by the United States as a catalyst in abstaining on UNSCR 2334.⁶⁶

h. *Gaza*: While key actors in the Council are sympathetic to Israel's security concerns, there is a broad consensus that Israel's policies with respect to Gaza must be substantially changed. In this respect key actors are "seriously concerned about the humanitarian situation in ...Gaza,"⁶⁷ and about "several United Nations relief projects...awaiting Israeli approval."⁶⁸ "Changing Israeli policy with regard to the Gaza Strip and ending the blockade"⁶⁹ are perceived as imperative for strengthening "support for peace among a population that...lives under the exclusive yoke of Hamas."⁷⁰ Particularly problematic to key actors is Israel's restrictions on the "import of goods defined as having a dual use."⁷¹ While this policy is understood in light of "Israel's legitimate security concerns,"⁷² it is nevertheless criticized, given that "the United Nations remains ready, with other Quartet partners, to help...define agreed modalities for the secure transfer and use of such materials."⁷³ While key actors display frustration at the situation in Gaza (e.g., "Why should the international community spend billions of dollars rebuilding Gaza when there is no guarantee that it will not be destroyed again within a few years?"⁷⁴), the ultimate ability to solve the situation is not thrust on Israel alone but also on the inability to restore Palestinian unity.

In relating to criticism aimed at the Palestinians, three primary issues can be pinpointed. The first is the situation in Gaza, which draws heavy criticism regarding internal governance issues on the one hand and violent conduct aimed at Israel on the other. The second is incitement, at both the leadership and the grassroots level. As such, the Palestinian leadership's failure "to condemn specific attacks or ...the praise heaped upon the perpetrators"⁷⁵ is emphasized. The UK and the US have voiced the most criticism in this field. The third issue is the absence of Palestinian unity, which is perceived as "central to realizing a two-State solution,"⁷⁶ to the point where "restoring Palestinian unity on the platform of the Palestinian Liberation Organization"⁷⁷ has been termed "the most important issue on the agenda."⁷⁸

Assessment and Policy Recommendations

The analysis shows that the P5 states, EU representatives, and high level UN officials share more points of agreement than points of contention with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although they differ in their perceptions regarding beneficial mechanisms needed to encourage the parties to the conflict to take positive steps on the ground, key outside

actors are in agreement regarding the preferred framework for solving the conflict; the importance of engaging in efforts to resolve the conflict despite other – far deadlier – conflicts in the region; and the positive impact that resolving the conflict will have on the region.

Israel can be assured that there is a sober awareness of the state's security concerns, which are fully legitimized; there is unanimous support for urging Arab League states to support more closely and participate in the political process; and there is a consensus that only a negotiated agreement between Israelis and Palestinians – and not a solution imposed by the international community – will bring an end to the conflict.

At the same time, a number of issues warrant Israel's attention. For example, the harsh rhetoric and international frustration elicited by Israel's detention of prisoners without trial for prolonged periods and its withholding Palestinian tax revenues should be factored in alongside any advantages these measures may produce. In addition, the international resonance of what Israel may perceive as domestic action, particularly inflammatory rhetoric and legislative changes, should be monitored. Indeed, during 2015 and 2016 alone, Israel was criticized about five laws, with the last of these – legalization of settlement outposts – cited by the Americans in their decision to abstain on UNSCR 2334.

Moreover, a thorough reassessment should be carried out regarding the three issues raised persistently throughout the entire period. The first is Israel's policy of settlement expansion. The corollary to key actors' perception that only a negotiated agreement will end the conflict is the expectation that neither side will take unilateral steps on the ground to undermine the prospects of a negotiated agreement. As such, key actors repeatedly express disappointment at Israel's conduct. The settlement policy is criticized not only because the regular approval of new housing units is seen to undermine the feasibility of the two-state solution, but also because of the related impact of settler-related violence and Israel's search-and-arrest operations in the West Bank. There is a gaping divide between the way Israel views its settlement policy and the way key international actors perceive it. If Israel cannot or will not change this policy, it needs to propose an alternative paradigm for solving the conflict in the face of ongoing settlement expansion.

The second issue is Israel's policy of demolitions in Area C, which is related to the dearth of building permits issued to Palestinians in this area. This policy is an ongoing source of international aggravation, as

it is perceived as inflicting collective and unnecessary suffering on the Palestinian population. As with settlements, the policy of demolishing structures in Area C contributes toward the international perception that Israel has no intention of making the necessary compromises needed to resolve the conflict.

The third issue is Israel's restriction on the transfer of goods to and from Gaza. While criticism on this latter point appears to be somewhat cushioned by the legitimization of Israel's security concerns on the one hand, and continued criticism of the Palestinian Authority, which has not succeeded in forming a unity government on the other – the fact that the situation in Gaza surfaces regularly in Council sessions raises two flags. First: the situation in Gaza is perceived as unsustainable. Second: it is Israel that is seen as having the ultimate ability to (at least partially) ease the situation in Gaza. Signs of frustration, owing in part to the recurrent need to provide international funding for reconstruction in Gaza, signify that should another full-scale round of violence between Israel and Hamas develop – even if clearly instigated by the Palestinian side – there will be less international tolerance for the eventual destruction that will be incurred by Israeli retaliation. Israel should thus seriously weigh alternative policies for the situation in Gaza.

Given Israel's conduct and the reaction of key actors in the Security Council, the question is whether Israel can produce an alternative paradigm to solve the conflict that will receive international – and Palestinian – backing. Unless and until such an alternative is clearly and publicly presented, policies that appear to undermine the internationally favored two-state paradigm will inevitably contribute to the erosion of Israel's international standing among its most important strategic partners.

Notes

- 1 Itamar Eichner, "US Ambassador to the UN Speaks Out on the Double Standard against Israel," *Ynet*, February 21, 2017, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4925452,00.html> .
- 2 US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, 7853rd meeting; December 23, 2016, p. 5, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7853.
- 3 Changes according to the EU's rotating presidency.
- 4 This status was approved by the General Assembly, a year after the Palestinian failure to obtain the status of a UN member state, which was vetoed by the United States in the UNSC.

- 5 Robert Serry, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, 7243rd meeting, August 18, 2014, p. 4, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7243.
- 6 EU, 7540th meeting, October 22, 2015, p. 13, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7540.
- 7 Nickolay Mladenov, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, 7490th meeting, July 23, 2015, p. 5, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7490.
- 8 Serry (UN), 6871st meeting, November 27, 2012, p. 2, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6871.
- 9 France, 7047th meeting, October 22, 2013, p. 20, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7047.
- 10 UK, 6847th meeting, October 15, 2012, p. 31, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6847.
- 11 UK, 7220th meeting, July 18, 2014, p. 15, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7220.
- 12 Mladenov (UN), 7792nd meeting, October 19, 2016, p. 3, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7792.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 UK and US Representatives in the vote on UNSCR 2334, 7853rd meeting, December 23, 2016; pp. 6, 10.
- 15 Russia, 7047th meeting, October 22, 2013, p. 15.
- 16 Serry (UN), 7339th meeting, December 15, 2014, p. 2, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7339.
- 17 UK, 7430th meeting, April 21, 2015, p. 24, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7430.
- 18 France, 7490th meeting, July 23, 2015, p. 19.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 China, 6906th meeting, January 23, 2013, p. 20, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6906.
- 21 US, 7007th meeting, July 23, 2013, p. 29, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7007.
- 22 France, 7360th meeting, January 15, 2015, p. 31, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7360.
- 23 Russia, 7047th meeting, October 22, 2013, p. 15.
- 24 UK, 6847th meeting, October 15, 2012, p. 30.
- 25 Russia, October 22, 2013, 7047th meeting, p. 15.
- 26 UK, January 23, 2013, 6906th meeting, p. 18.
- 27 France, 7360th meeting, January 15, 2015, p. 31.
- 28 US, 6847th meeting, October 15, 2012, p. 13.
- 29 The resolution called for an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territory occupied since 1967 within three years and for the parties to reach a

- negotiated solution to the conflict within one year. It failed to secure nine votes needed for adoption. See UN Press Release, December 30, 2014, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11722.doc.htm>.
- 30 UK, 7354th meeting, December 30, 2014, p. 5, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7354.
 - 31 France, 7222nd meeting, July 22, 2014, p. 15, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7222.
 - 32 China, 7007th meeting, July 23, 2013, p. 28.
 - 33 China, 7281st meeting, October 21, 2014, p. 27, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7281.
 - 34 Russia, 7291st meeting, October 29, 2014, p. 14, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7291.
 - 35 Since 1964, UNSC visiting missions have been used as a tool for information gathering, support for peace operations and peace processes, conflict mediation, and preventive diplomacy. As of January 2017, the Council has undertaken 55 visiting missions to over 45 countries since the end of the Cold War (Security Council Report: Can the Security Council Prevent Conflict, Research Report, No. 1; 9 February 2017).
 - 36 Jeffrey Feltman, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, 7386th meeting, February 18, 2015, p. 3, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7386.
 - 37 Serry (UN), 6816th meeting, July 25, 2012, p. 3, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6816.
 - 38 Feltman (UN), 7140th meeting, March 18, 2014, p. 3, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7140.
 - 39 France, 7490th meeting, July 23, 2015, p. 18.
 - 40 Ban Ki Moon, UN Secretary-General, 7610th meeting, January 26, 2016, p. 2, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7610.
 - 41 Ibid.
 - 42 Serry (UN), 6969th meeting, May 22, 2013, p. 3, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6969.
 - 43 Feltman (UN), October 22, 2013, 7047th meeting, p. 3.
 - 44 Feltman (UN), 7506th meeting, August 19, 2015, p. 2, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7506.
 - 45 Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, 7536th meeting, October 16, 2015, p. 3, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7536.
 - 46 Serry (UN), 7032nd meeting, September 17, 2013, p. 3, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7032.
 - 47 Ibid.
 - 48 Ibid.
 - 49 Serry (UN), 6940th meeting, March 25, 2013, p. 3, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6940.
 - 50 Feltman (UN), 7140th meeting, March 18, 2014, p. 3.

- 51 Serry (UN), 6816th meeting, July 25, 2012, p. 4.
- 52 Feltman (UN), 7118th meeting, February 25, 2014, p. 2, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7118.
- 53 Serry (UN), 7360th meeting, January 15, 2015, p. 49.
- 54 Feltman (UN), 6894th meeting, December 19, 2012, p. 2, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6894.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 UN Secretary-General, 7772nd meeting, September 15, 2016, p. 2, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7772.
- 57 US, 7839th meeting, December 16, 2016, p. 17, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7839.
- 58 Zerihoun (UN), 7536th meeting, October 16, 2015, p. 3.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Feltman (UN), 7506th meeting, August 19, 2015, p. 3.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 UNSG, 7736th meeting, July 12, 2016, p. 2, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7736.
- 65 US, 7839th meeting, December 16, 2016, p. 17.
- 66 US, 7853rd meeting, December 23, 2016, p. 6.
- 67 US, 7096th meeting, January 20, 2014, p. 17, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7096.
- 68 US, 7164th meeting, April 29, 2014, p. 12, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7164.
- 69 France, 6950th meeting, April 24, 2013, p. 14, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6950.
- 70 France, 7007th meeting, July 23, 2013, p. 25.
- 71 Mladenov (UN), 7521st meeting, September 15, 2015, p. 3, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7521.
- 72 Feltman (UN), 7063rd meeting, November 19, 2013, p. 3, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7063.
- 73 Serry (UN), 7084th meeting, December 16, 2013, p. 3, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7084.
- 74 UK, 7281st meeting, October 21, 2014, p. 13.
- 75 US, 7853rd meeting, December 23, 2016, p. 7.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 Russia, October 22, 2015, 7540th meeting, p. 24.
- 78 Ibid.