Responding to the Need for International Legitimacy: Strengthening the IDF Strike Force

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Introduction

The takeover of the Turkish ship *MV Mavi Marmara*, which prompted massive condemnation of Israel, demonstrated clearly the widening gap between how the IDF operates and how its actions are viewed by international public opinion. The IDF appears to have operated in accordance with international law in the face of explicit provocation intended to help a known terrorist organization under the guise of providing it with humanitarian assistance. The justification for the action was obvious, as was the manner in which the IDF acted, both in terms of the mode of action and in terms of the operational level, including the conduct of the fighters whose lives were in danger once they boarded the ship. Therefore, the world's harsh condemnation of Israel was nothing short of hypocrisy.

The *Mavi Marmara* episode did not occur in a vacuum. It was a direct continuation of a campaign waged against Israel in recent years, a campaign whose battles are conducted in the conventional realms – on land, in the air, and at sea – but whose objectives are directed at a different dimension entirely.

The *Mavi Marmara* phenomenon is an element in the asymmetry that characterizes "the new confrontations" between Israel and its enemies. Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Romm has called this phenomenon, which characterized the Second Lebanon War, "the rival strategies of Hizbollah and the IDF." He claims that while the IDF aimed to utilize its aerial superiority against

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Hizbollah's military deployment in Lebanon, Hizbollah launched its short range rockets out of civilian population centers towards the Israeli home front, with its strategic objectives being Israeli society on the one hand, and the international community on the other. Thus a situation is created in which both sides have in practice given up on destroying the other side's strategy, so that the war is conducted "like a football game between two teams playing against each other as if they were on separate playing fields, or like two ships passing each other in the night."[1]

One may draw a direct line from the Kafr Qana event during Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, to the allegations of a massacre in Jenin during Operation Defensive Shield (2002), the second Kafr Qana event during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Operation Cast Lead in 2008-9 and the Goldstone Report issued thereafter, to the *Mavi Marmara* episode in 2010: all are the result of a new strategy devised by Israel's enemies born out of their understanding that it is impossible to successfully overcome Israel's military power directly and therefore it is necessary to limit Israel's capability to wield that power. This new strategy targets two primary arenas where public opinion can affect the IDF's freedom to operate: Israeli society, known to be sensitive to the loss of human life, and the international arena, deemed as highly sensitive to human rights and civilian casualties, especially vis-à-vis those who are perceived as the weaker side in the conflict. This phenomenon thrives on already fertile ground marked by the extensive and multi-dimensional trend to delegitimize Israel's existence.

On the eve of the 2010 Herzliya Conference, the Reut Institute published a comprehensive report entitled "Building a Political Firewall against Israel's Delegitimization." The report claims:

> In the past few years, Israel has been subjected to increasingly harsh criticism around the world, resulting in an erosion of its international image, and exacting a tangible strategic price. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves as the "engine" driving this criticism, which peaked with and around the Goldstone report on Operation Cast Lead. In some places, criticism has stretched beyond legitimate discourse regarding Israeli policy to a fundamental challenge to the country's right to exist.

The report further claims that such phenomena are not chance events, rather the result of a "delegitimization network" that "tarnishes Israel's reputation, constrains its military capabilities, and advances the One-State

Solution," i.e., undermining the very legitimacy of the existence of the State of Israel as the Jewish state.[2]

During the early days of statehood, IDF thinking, organization, force buildup, and fundamental principles of force deployment were all designed to respond to wars of "no choice." Since the Yom Kippur War, however, the IDF has had to confront the challenge of internal legitimacy in order to gain the support of Israeli society. The initiated operations that became the central feature in the new confrontations demanded that the IDF find new solutions and modes of operation, particularly with regard to the need to reduce the number of casualties, considered one of the most influential factors in the support Israeli society shows for the army. In recent years another significant challenge has been added: international delegitimization, threatening to limit IDF freedom of action to operate force when undertaking its missions.

Indeed, with the rise of the delegitimization campaign, the question of the IDF's use of military force, which was never simple, has assumed extensive and essential ramifications. Therefore, and because the current security and political challenges facing Israel are some of the most complex and significant the state has ever known, it is important to consider how military force can be constructed, prepared, and deployed so that the army will fulfill the missions assigned by the political echelon to defend the State of Israel and its citizens, without furthering the delegitimization attempt and limiting the political echelon's freedom to act.

This essay analyzes the main changes that have occurred in the strategic arena, especially the rising influence of the delegitimization campaign on the deployment of military force. The essay claims that in light of these changes the IDF must formulate a comprehensive strategy to coordinate force buildup and force deployment, and thereby allow an effective confrontation with the complex challenges facing the nation.[3]

A World in Flux: Processes of Delegitimization

Social phenomena, such as the devaluation of national idealism and its replacement by individualism, the loss of leadership authority (which makes it difficult for leaders to garner the consensus necessary for war), the anti-heroism of foreign policy that has become ingrained as the result of failures that have led to disappointments and skepticism regarding the capabilities of leaders to pave a path and lead, and the new media that brings war into people's living rooms and has changed the heroic image

of war in a fundamental way – all of these have constrained the necessary freedom of action for embarking on initiated wars that exact a fairly steep price tag,[4] thereby entrenching retention of the current world order as a value in international diplomacy.

These trends, which developed primarily in the second half of the twentieth century, were ripe once the Cold War ended. Indeed, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR were the signal that brought these trends to the forefront of the stage of Western diplomacy. The "new world" that had suddenly come into being allowed the West, and Europe in particular, to amplify the trend of retreat that began at the end of World War II and increased after the withdrawal from the various colonialist adventures. The tortured European conscience led to revulsion from armed conflict and growing involvement in the defense of minority rights, alongside an increase in the sympathy for freedom fighters struggling for national liberation. Diplomacy has become almost the sole legitimate tool for resolving problems on the international stage, as defense budgets have been slashed, armed forces have shrunk, and the status of the military has been eroded as the result of delegitimization. The emphasis on individual rights in the West has turned public opinion and international law into significant parameters in nations' abilities to express their military force. All these factors have been tremendously enhanced thanks to the development of the media, which has made it possible to transmit a huge amount of information in real time, greatly affecting the freedom of action of the other side (often in a manipulative manner).

The Name of the Game: International Legitimacy

Legitimacy has always been an essential part of war. However, the conditions created in the West in the second half of the twentieth century, particularly since the fall of the Berlin Wall, have made it a strategic objective in and of itself. The understanding by Syria, Yasir Arafat, and Hassan Nasrallah (as well as other enemies of Israel) that they lack the ability to confront Israel's military strength directly, together with their desire to maintain the struggle, led them to formulate a strategy that strives to limit Israel's ability to bring that military strength to bear.

The Yom Kippur War was a turning point[5] that generated a change in the enemy's strategy – from a direct approach, an attempt to bring about the physical destruction of the State of Israel by means of a military move

to conquer territory, to an indirect approach, by means of terrorist attacks against the civilian population, in an effort to undermine and break down Israeli society (seen as a central weak point), and to reduce Israel's freedom to apply force. Critical to this new enemy strategy were the absence of a political address and work from behind human shields. This approach was integrated into an extensive campaign aimed at undercutting Israel's image and the justness of its cause.

Adopting the Standoff Approach

Time and again, Israel, continuing to rely on the justness of its wars to defend its citizens against terrorist organizations and guerrillas and retain domestic public support by reducing the number of military casualties, found itself in a seemingly impossible strategic trap – caught between its duty to defend its citizens and protect its critical interests and the way these mandates were viewed by ever expanding sectors of the Western world. Thus it happened that while Israel was increasing its physical relative advantage in the tactical and operative realms (particularly as a result of technological improvements), to the point at which it seemed unreasonable for enemies to provoke Israel, the other side changed the rules of the game, identifying the weaknesses and limitations at work on the intra-Israeli arena as well as the on international stage in order to reduce Israel's freedom of action and prevent the IDF from fully realizing its military potential. When Israel nonetheless acted, it paid a high price on the international arena, accelerating the process of delegitimization, strengthening Israel's image as an aggressive pariah state, and further reducing its potential scope of action in future military rounds.

Paradoxically, precisely the steps the IDF took to reduce the casualties among its soldiers by developing standoff fighting capabilities (which encouraged greater support among Israeli society for IDF freedom of action, especially since the IDF now initiated most of the operations), often led to a heavy cost in the legitimacy currency on the international arena. The new operations approach, founded on the rationale of disproportionate response ("the boss has gone wild"), was applied in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip out of the belief that Israel's withdrawal from those areas would earn it the legitimacy to operate there. While in a number of cases Israel did attain some positive results vis-à-vis leaders of terrorist organizations, thereby strengthening Israel's deterrence, this approach also led to steep

costs in terms of international legitimacy, capital whose reserves were dwindling from the state coffers.

In hindsight it seems that this approach, typified by IDF operations since the mid-1990s, played into the hands of Israel's enemies due to the extended length of the operations (while the Israeli civilian front was exposed to ongoing threats), the absence of a clear decision at the end of the fighting, the pictures of refugees from the war zones broadcast continually on TV screens, and operational errors (amplified by means of media manipulation). All of these created a sense in the world that the IDF was the bull wreaking havoc in the china shop without making any sort of real contribution to the nation's state of security.[6] Thus even Operation Cast Lead, viewed in Israel as successful in terms of its military operational achievements, became one of the major events that damaged Israel's international image in an essential way, undermined the nation's status, and imposed additional constraints on the Israeli government regarding future military operations and their goals.

The Need for a New Strategy

Given the current reality, in which it seems that the ability to achieve significant gains on the battlefield drops while the cost on the international arena for every military operation spirals ever higher, how the IDF deploys force is becoming a key question for Israel's national security. Attendant to it are fundamental issues, such as victory and decision, ground maneuver versus standoff fire, duration of fighting and preferred end states, weapons and technology, the relationship between the army and Israeli society, the function of reserve duty, authority between the command structure and organizations and government, and so on. All of these are critical questions in a coherent approach to Israel's ability to concentrate the potential of its power base against the challenges faced by the nation.

Some would argue that the time for the use of military force has passed, that whoever uses it in the current reality is bound to be defeated, or at best, to attain a Pyrrhic victory. Statements such as "terrorism cannot be defeated by military means," or "the problem is social/economic/political/ideological and therefore cannot be resolved by force," have become commonplace in the public discourse of the Western world. A short study of Clausewitz demonstrates the difficult of defining victory at the strategic level. Clausewitz claimed, "In strategy, there is no such thing as victory...

Strategic-political success can be discerned by means of measurements that lie outside the scope of the military, i.e., in political outcomes, by attaining an improved political position."[7] In other words, the function of military force is limited not to the attainment of a strategic victory, rather to creation of the conditions that allow political efforts to achieve political and security objectives. The relationship between military action and political action, never a simple one, becomes even more complex and significant in the current reality. This emphasizes the need for coordination between the two actions, together with sharp, effective management of the interfaces between them.

Creating a power base is perforce a necessary condition for confronting challenges, though in and of itself force is insufficient. Israel's national security doctrine includes a principle that describes comprehensive force as a product of force in practice and the freedom of action to operate it. In other words, investing in advanced capabilities and excellent manpower does not make an unequivocal contribution to security if the ability to use them is significantly limited by factors such as public opinion, leadership, or international legitimacy. Moreover, the military structure bears responsibility for the scope of action of the political echelon come the end of the fighting. That is, it is the military's obligation to ensure the attainment of the objectives of the war as its primary guideline, but at the very least it must ensure that the political echelon's freedom of action is not constrained once the fighting ends as the result of damage to the nation's international standing.[8] This freedom of action is required for the sake of future decisions to embark on a military operation; room for the political echelon to determine the objectives of the operations as it sees fit; the ability of the military echelon to pick the most appropriate modus operandi for the realization of these objectives; and the time frame and conditions necessary to complete the military move and attain the objectives. All are critical for ensuring the effective use of military force when it becomes necessary.

It seems that in light of existing and future threats to Israel, the discussion about the need to prepare for use of military force in different contours is superfluous, leaving behind one central question: what is the strategic approach Israel must adopt in order to be able to act effectively against any threat, attain the goals set by the political echelon, and do so without damaging the nation's legitimacy either at home or abroad?

Over the years, the IDF and the defense establishment have learned to adapt their capabilities to meet the challenges presented by the various arenas even in the thick of the fighting. In the period since the 1982 Lebanon War, and even more so since the outbreak of the second intifada, the defense establishment, standing shoulder to shoulder with the defense industry, has developed impressive capabilities for the operational echelons, in particular the tactical. These capabilities, when combined with vast operational experience and the ability to invent and improvise, have without a doubt bestowed on the IDF significant advantages. But this is no longer enough.

Improving the Strike Force and Ability to Operate: Strategy Guidelines

> The defensive plan must be directed not only at attaining victory against the enemy, but also at attaining a rapid victory with a minimum of losses to our side...Only by maximal improvement of the strike force and ability of each and every soldier and branch to operate can we achieve the double outcome required of us: to win in battle and minimize losses.[9]

Ben-Gurion's conclusions about the strategic approach required by the state's newly established army expressed in the clearest way possible the need to bridge the inherent tension between the need for a rapid victory and the need to keep losses to a minimum. He resolved this tension by coining the notion of quality – "improving the strike force and ability to operate" – that from then on became the backbone of Israeli military thinking. When the legitimacy factor is added to the principle of a rapid victory with a minimum of losses, three parameters are clearly required for any military operation:

a. Almost complete certainty that the desired political goals will be attained

b. Achievement of the objective at a bearable cost in terms of human casualties and property damage

c. Protection of the political echelon's freedom of action once the military moves have ended.

The actual goals of military operations vacillate between the maximal, wresting a decision against the enemy, and the minimal, foiling the enemy's strategy. Many arguments have been sounded about the relevance of

decision to present-day confrontations. Clausewitz defined decision as the situation in which we "deny the enemy the ability to actually fight in practice, or in which we bring the enemy to a point at which such a denial is imminent."[10] By contrast, foiling the enemy's strategy and moves is designed – in the case of guerrilla warfare – to result in erosion and attrition of the enemy over time (in the examples of the Second Lebanon War and the confrontations in the Gaza Strip – the firing of surface-to-surface missiles to the point of a ceasefire) in order to reach a state of victory through not losing.

It seems that today all agree that no matter what the war's goals, it is necessary to attain them rapidly. Therefore, today too, similar to Ben-Gurion's initial directive, the IDF must strive to shorten the duration of the battle. Ben-Gurion assumed that the economic cost of mobilization and the window of opportunity granted to Israel by international factors required a short campaign.[11] This principle is even more urgent today when the civilian and military rears are exposed to rocket fire from the moment the campaign begins.

Back to the Maneuvering Approach

Shortening the duration of the battle requires the IDF to return to the maneuvering approach, which was characteristic of the Israeli army in its early days. The maneuvering approach, unlike the ground maneuver, is an ingenious approach that manipulates the enemy by exploiting the enemy's weaknesses and strives to demolish its will, thereby causing its complete collapse. As an operational approach, it contrasts with the attrition approach, whose purpose is the destruction of the enemy by exhausting it to the breaking point. The attrition approach is usually considered more conservative, secure, and wasteful in time and means, while the maneuvering approach is considered to be risky and operates quickly and steadily to attain a rapid victory. The famous modern example of an enemy defeated by means of attrition is the war in Kosovo in the 1990s. It was a unique and non-representative situation in which a coalition, unlimited by time, legitimacy, or munitions stockpiles, pressed the Yugoslav dictatorship for eighty days until the latter surrendered. Such circumstances will almost certainly not present themselves to the IDF and Israel in the foreseeable future.

In recent years, it has become commonplace to speak of the limitations on IDF forces as a consequence of the methods adopted by Israel's enemies on various fronts. However, herein also lie weaknesses for the enemy, which can be exploited in an effective military move. These weaknesses are linked to three fundamental disadvantages of any guerrilla deployment: the inability to build contiguous deployments in the depth of the operational space, which is located almost entirely within a civilian area (especially urban); limits on the ability to extend mutual assistance and maintain an offensive defense; and of course, the limited flexibility in altering deployment to respond to developments on the battlefield because of relative inferiority in mobility and command and control structure.

In face of these weak points, the IDF can and must realize its advantages in operational mobility in all dimensions, in deep precision fire supported by intelligence capabilities, and most of all, in command and control, in order to create parallel rapid pressure on all of the enemy's centers of gravity. At the same time, the IDF must improve its ability to defend the forces maneuvering on the front as well as the strategic assets and the civilians in the home front. One may see the Iron Dome and Trophy systems as examples of defensive systems critical to this approach, though not as systems on which the approach rests in its entirety.

The highest priority among all the entities against which the IDF may need to act is regime preservation. Therefore, it is necessary to direct all efforts at creating a real threat to the continued existence of that regime. Presenting the enemy's leadership with a tough dilemma – the continued loss of assets devoted to maintaining the regime versus accepting difficult conditions for ending the military move and entering negotiations – is inestimably preferable to an attempt to create pressure by means of destroying infrastructures or directly targeting the leaders, attempts that lay at the heart of the operational intelligence efforts in the most recent confrontations between Israel and its enemies.

The move proposed herein comes with other marked advantages that have the potential to affect the question of legitimacy: a maneuvering move will always sow less destruction resulting from firepower than that used in the attrition approach, thanks to the maneuvering force's better ability to distinguish civilians from combatants. Furthermore, the ability to supply targets as the result of friction created during a maneuvering move together with intelligence and precision fire capabilities operating in

restricted circles may well reduce collateral damage significantly and result in greater effectiveness of the force brought to bear against the enemy. There is no doubt that maneuvering moves deep in enemy territory pose a greater risk to one's forces. This issue must be addressed in the force buildup processes, both in terms of its technological aspects and in terms of training and preparation.

The Media Challenge and Humanitarian Missions

The presence of forces deep in the heart of enemy territory would make it easier to practice media and humanitarian policies more effectively, two areas that seem to have become major weaknesses of the IDF and foundations of enemy strategy. The notion of bringing war to the urban sphere stemmed not only from the nature of the "popular resistance" as understood around the world, but also from a strategic choice based on the assumption that a military force operating in the civilian sphere would perforce cause damage to infrastructures and the civilian population that could easily be broadcast around the world in real time and stir up public opinion against the aggressor. The shelling of Kafr Qana, the death of the child Muhammad a-Dura in the second intifada, the operation in Jenin in 2002, the killing of the family of Dr. al-Ayash in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead, the *Mavi Marmara* affair, and the stories about the targeting of Sheikh Raed Salah – all located somewhere on the scale from operational error to media manipulation – had a strategic effect on operations as they unfolded. It appears that the combination of the basic camera, broadband access for transmitting information in real time together, and the standard positions of international public opinion creates essential risks in Israel's strategic environment that the state must confront.

One operating assumption vis-à-vis this question must be that a political system cannot effectively confront information and disinformation disseminated at an ever-increasing pace by the enemy or its proxies. The IDF spokesperson's bureau cannot put out a trustworthy announcement that will refute falsified statements distributed by the other side, because there is a clear asymmetry between a state entity and organizations lacking an address. A second operating assumption touches on how the term "proportionality" is understood by world public opinion. Here too, photographs of a destroyed home and an old woman picking through the ruins or of a child next to a tank or an F-16 fighter jet bombing homes in

retaliation for a Qassam rocket attack make it difficult for Israel to transmit the message about the justness of its cause to international public opinion.

What can be done? The IDF must combine offensive elements (positive media) with defensive ones (barring media from the fighting zone). It cannot bar the media for long, but it can and must do so for the relatively short period of time during which it conducts the major operations. As far as time permits, the IDF must strive for media control in the given arena of operations, both by means of physical control that would prevent the uncontrolled entry of journalists and by means of developed capabilities for cybernetic control in the arena of operations that would allow monitoring, filtering, and delay of communications coming out of the arena by means of the various media. Once the force has gained control of the arena, the operations would have a lower communications signature, after which a controlled media policy would be required to deepen the gain over time. Without a doubt, this requires a response in the form of a force that has the necessary technological capabilities, but no less so in the creation of the organizational structures and the training of manpower of a scope and quality required to confront the potential threat inherent in this field.

Regarding the humanitarian realm, the approach must be to turn the weakness into an advantage, both because Israel is not interested in harming civilians and the principle of distinguishing civilians from combatants is a fundamental principle in IDF use of force, and because Israel can leverage the humanitarian question to its own advantage. To do so, the IDF must avoid damaging critical civilian infrastructures that have no direct link to the enemy's ability to fight. The attempt to pressure civilians to exert pressure on their governments so that they will in turn put pressure on the terrorist organizations not only fails to promote the objectives of the war, but also creates an excuse to accuse Israel of causing a humanitarian crisis. Moreover, the IDF must stabilize the civilian system as quickly as possible and work in full cooperation with the local humanitarian organizations. Establishing field hospitals near civilian population centers (or encouraging foreign organizations to do so) and ensuring the supply of humanitarian goods and enforcing proper distribution are critical to the differentiation of civilians from combatants, but to no less a degree to effective (even manipulative) use of the media in order to increase freedom of action in the operational arena.

Conclusion

David Ben-Gurion once stated:

> We possess moral advantages that have a decisive military value: the moral and intellectual superiority of the human element of our people, the recognition of the world of the justness of our undertaking and our ambition. With these two we can withstand any enemy if we prepare properly and equip the population…However, our matter will not be decided by force alone…Without force we are liable to be destroyed. But with force alone we will not implement the vision of redemption, nor will we establish a state.[12]

Since the rise of modern political Zionism, the justness of Israel's cause has been a cornerstone of the goals set by the leadership of the state-in-the-making and later, by the leaders of the State of Israel. It would seem that this element is currently put to a serious test, as Israel scores higher than only Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea on the popularity scale published by the BBC.

One may describe the system delegitimizing Israel as comprising two parallel and mutually fostering circles: one circle of delegitimization operates directly to undermine the legitimacy of Israel's existence as a Jewish state, while the second operates to expand the physical threats to Israel and reduce its freedom of action to operate its military force as a response to these threats. The strategic objective of both circles is identical – to eliminate the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish state in the region and thereby "correct" the "historical error" generated by the Zionist movement starting in the late nineteenth century.

The challenge now faced by the State of Israel – perhaps the most severe challenge since the War of Independence – requires action in two synchronized circles, both against the multi-dimensional threat to the state's legitimate right to exist (countered through what is erroneously called "public diplomacy") and against the circle of physical threats , based on the defense establishment's maintained ability to operate effectively. The difficulty the defense establishment must confront stems not only from the need to neutralize these threats, but also from the need to do so without feeding the first circle (as was the case with the Goldstone Report or the events of the *Mavi Marmara*).

More than ever, this challenge, along with the other security challenges faced by the State of Israel, requires the combination of matter and spirit demanded by Ben-Gurion. The changes that have taken place in recent years in the international arena, both in the way in which Israel's enemies act and in terms of the free world's negative attitude to the use of military force to solve conflicts in general, have created a reality thick with tension between Israel's need to defend its population and the international price it must pay to fulfill that task. This issue, amplified by trends of both change and normalization in Israeli society (instead of Israeli society being constantly battle-ready), without a doubt requires a Ben-Gurion-like act to extricate the nation from the tensions and traps ranging from the Winograd Commission Report about the Second Lebanon War to the Goldstone Report about Operation Cast Lead.

Israel must pursue a sphere where it can achieve the results expected by Israeli society and the international community, at a tolerable cost to Israeli society that is also one that Western society and moderate Arab states can live with. Obviously this requires much more than the simple use of force; military force alone cannot resolve the challenges Israel faces. Moreover, every time it is possible to promote Israel's strategic security goals without the obvious use of force (concealed operations, information warfare of various types, and so on) or even without the use of any force whatsoever (through diplomacy, etc.) it is right and proper to do so. However, when Israel is required to use its military force, it would be wise to be prepared to do so in a way that will promote its vital security interests, including those connected to its international standing. Such an achievement by the IDF will generate not only an improvement in the nation's security situation, but will also generate understanding by the other side that the path it has chosen is hopeless. The other side will then again be forced to choose between accepting the existence of the State of Israel in the region and finding a new strategy to destroy it.

Notes

1 Giora Romm, "A Test of Rival Strategies: Two Ships Passing in the Night," in Shlomo Brom and Meir Elran, eds., *The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives* (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007), p. 59.

2 Reut Institute, "Building a Political Firewall against Israel's Delegitimization," pp. 13-14, at http://reut-institute.org/data/uploads/PDFVer/20100310%20Delegitimacy%20Eng.pdf.

3   Military strategy combines the idea of the use of force against future threats with the construction of major capabilities.

4   Vietnam for the US and Afghanistan for the USSR were formative events that expressed the paradox of the rise of the power of the superpowers versus their inability to impose their authority on mid-sized and small nations by means of their power. The sense of a useless cost of war caused hesitation and even avoidance in the use of military means.

5   In this context, see *Military and Strategic Affairs* 2, no. 1 (2010), specifically, see Gadi Eisenkot, "A Changed Threat? The Response on the Northern Arena," pp. 29-40, at http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1289912280.pdf, and Gabi Siboni, "The Changing Threat," pp. 3-7, at http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1289912214.pdf.

6   Francisco Suárez and Francisco de Vitoria, sixteenth century jurists who dealt with the legitimacy of war, determined successful outcomes as one of the significant parameters for examining the justification of a military move. They claimed that "Even a reasonable chance that a war may have a successful outcome is necessary; without it, the benefits of the war will be canceled out by its cost, and the war, despite its justified grounds and good intentions, will only increase suffering." See Yehoshafat Harkabi, *War and Strategy* (IDF-Maarachot Press, Ministry of Defense Publications, 1990), p. 70.

7   Ibid., p. 593.

8   In a proposal for the document entitled "The Purpose of the IDF" by the Doctrine Department in the Doctrine and Training Brigade, the following was written about the army's functions: "Fulfilling all required actions in a war when it breaks out and attaining the required goals to a sufficient degree without losing territory and without incurring unbearable losses in terms of casualties, destruction, and other damage, as well as our standing on the international arena, especially with relation to our allies."

9   David Ben-Gurion, *Road to the State: From the Archives March-November 1947* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, The Society for the Dissemination of the Thought of David Ben-Gurion, 1994), p. 304.

10 Roger Ashley Leonard, ed., *A Short Guide to Clausewitz on War* (Ministry of Defense Publishers, 1977), p. 62.

11 In a war against guerrilla forces there is primarily a "major operation," i.e., a maneuver whose purpose is to attain the minimal goal of foiling the enemy's intentions. One may well imagine a situation in which this operation entails successive operations to attain damage to the enemy's capabilities in accordance with the goals to be set by the political echelon.

12 Ben-Gurion, *Road to the State*, pp. 494-95.