

The Civilian Front: From the Threat to the Response

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Five years have passed since the Second Lebanon War, a major turning point in the conceptual and practical development of the civilian front in Israel. The failure of the military and civilian systems to withstand the Hizbollah attacks in the summer of 2006 exposed fundamental gaps in the general understanding of the challenges facing the Israeli home front and lacunae in the necessary preparations to confront those challenges.¹ The Gulf War had exposed some of these challenges as early as 1991, but it was only after 2006 that Israel began to take significant steps at the state, military, and local levels to improve emergency preparedness and home front capabilities to meet these challenges successfully.

The question of how to assess the efforts of the past few years stands at the center of the discussion that follows. Given the growing nature of the threat, an integrated national strategic plan that covers all the organizations involved is essential. This chapter discusses to what extent the actions taken in recent years create an encouraging picture of preparedness of the Israeli home front for an emergency, or to what extent the reverse is true, and the gap between the threat and the response continues to grow.

The Threat

Most experts agree that for the foreseeable future, the leading threat to Israel's security is not symmetrical warfare between the IDF and other state militaries. There is a consensus that the primary danger to Israel comes from terrorism in all its guises, particularly that of high trajectory

weapons.² In the more distant future, this threat might be enhanced by a possible change in the nuclear balance, if and when Iran adds military nuclear capabilities to its broadening missile capabilities. The likely targets for attack are the civilian population, critical infrastructures, and the vital security installations of Israel. The indirect targeting strategy against “soft” civilian targets has been the preferred approach among Israel’s enemies since the 1991 Gulf War, given their awareness of the IDF’s superiority and consequently their inability to avert their own military defeat on the symmetric battlefield. More than a generation has passed since the traditional military front, where “big” wars were waged between regular armies, was superseded by the “civilian front,” where the enemy seeks to project a victory through offensive capabilities that are difficult to deny. Israel, for its part, has resorted to defense against this kind of threat using mostly offensive means.

Denying the enemy’s gains is a crucial if difficult Israeli objective. The purpose is not only to keep civilian damages and casualties to a minimum, in itself an important goal, but mainly to thwart the consequent societal chaos and demoralization of the public under attack. There is serious danger to public morale, social cohesion, and routine functioning of the communities in emergencies. In extreme cases such severe domestic circumstances might lead to a narrowing of the government’s freedom of action and maneuverability. When external political pressure is exerted on Israel to shorten the IDF counterattacks against enemy bases and to limit military operations seen as disproportionately damaging to the civilian population on the other side, there is particular importance in avoiding parallel domestic pressures.

The assumption that the civilian population will in every case weather any extensive attack is neither reasonable nor justified. The resilience the public demonstrates in the face of traumatic events is subject to many variables, including the scope, frequency, and duration of attacks, the resulting number of casualties, and the amount of damage sustained. The Home Front Command has made public the IDF’s scenarios and assessments of the expected scope of attacks in an extensive confrontation and the consequent damages.³ In a scenario of an all-out confrontation,⁴ Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Safed would each be targeted by hundreds of missiles

that would result in dozens of fatalities and hundreds of injured. Other urban centers would likely suffer dozens to hundreds of missiles and fewer casualties.⁵ It is unclear what is the IDF's assessment of the duration of such a confrontation or the assessment of results of a single front confrontation. Based on the figures published about Hizbollah and Hamas military buildup, particularly their high trajectory weapons, the daily average of missiles from each front would likely be at least four times what was experienced in previous single front confrontations (approximately 120 per day from Hizbollah in 2006, and some 30 per day fired at the Negev during Operation Cast Lead in 2008-9).

Table 1. Estimated Stockpiles of Enemy Rockets and Missiles

	Launchers	Rockets / Missiles	Precision (km)
Rockets			
Short range	thousands	approximately 50,000	1-2
Medium range	several dozen	thousands	0.5-1
Guided missiles			
Medium range	more than 20	200-300	0.1-0.5
Long range	more than 70	more than 800	0.2-2

Source: INSS Middle East Military Balance Project

The high trajectory weapons arsenals in the hands of Hizbollah, Hamas, Syria, and Iran (table 1) are growing steadily. The raw numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. Beyond the number of launchers and missiles, much weight must be given to the enhanced capabilities in three primary respects: expanded range, such that puts all the populated areas of Israel within weapon range; the magnified potential damage through advanced warheads, be they conventional or chemical;⁶ and most of all, precision. The latter element has far reaching implications, as this capability may enable the enemy to inflict widespread damage, not only statistically, but also on selected critical civilian and military installations.⁷ The enhanced ability to damage targets with pinpoint precision is also liable to result in more casualties and will allow the enemy to choose high quality targets of unique national significance. This threat will require specific and

expansive means of protection, according to a prioritized list of critical national infrastructures.

The Response

Active Defense and the Conceptual Transformation

In light of the developing threat, Israel has long been forced to consider and produce the adequate response, but only this past year did it cross the Rubicon in terms of formulating and implementing the needed strategic response. After a very long period in which the IDF embraced a traditional concept that focused primarily on deterrence and offensive response to the missile threat, a clear conceptual change has emerged. In 2011, the concept of active defense received the official and operational stamp of approval. If in the past the air force and following it the military at large – and consequently the defense establishment as a whole – rejected the recommendations to introduce the defensive component as “the fourth leg” of Israel’s security concept⁸ and impeded the development of the defensive option,⁹ reality has overcome the reservations. The successful operational introduction of the Iron Dome system to the tri-layered active defense model that was submitted by the Minister of Defense represented the end of the lengthy debate.

This is a very significant and positive development. It neither cancels nor reduces the need for deterrence as the most important measure, and stresses that attacking terrorist bases is still the primary tool when deterrence fails. The combination of deterrence and offensive strategy remains the primary pillar of Israeli force buildup. However, it is now coupled by an active defense system that will require an extensive budget to create the capabilities that until recently were doubtful from both a technological and operational perspective.

What to a large extent made the difference is the public political pressure that was based on and stemmed from the very actual threat. A similar trend that pointed in this direction prompted the construction of the separation barrier in the West Bank during the second intifada, a decision made by the Sharon government after much hesitation and reluctance. The Second Lebanon War and the growing capabilities of Hamas in the Gaza Strip highlighted the evident need for a defensive posture. But it was not until


Rafael paired operational and technological assets with the organizational capabilities of the air force¹⁰ that the potential trend was translated into a reality. Israel now has the proven capability to defend itself actively against the varied threats to the civilian front. This capability will grow and become an integrated sustainable system providing appropriate coverage towards the end of the decade.

The defense establishment, challenged by the need to internalize the dramatic change in Israel's security concept, must now decide how to deploy the still very limited system. Thus far there are only two Iron Dome batteries; clearly they are insufficient to defend all targets under attack. Until the number of batteries increases, a comprehensive approach regarding priorities is needed to determine whether to cover the population and critical civilian installations, or to give preference to the defense of the IDF's offensive force bases.¹¹ At present, the latter assumes priority, in order to allow the IDF uninterrupted operations so that it can attack and reduce – if not eliminate – the threat from enemy bases. The Minister for Home Front Defense emphasized this in saying, "Iron Dome will be positioned on the basis of our considerations of what needs defending. We will first of all defend our force components, those that defend us by bringing the fighting to enemy territory. We will defend civilians afterward."¹² This position is readily shared by the IDF¹³ and the defense establishment in the ongoing debate with those who are directly exposed to the threat.¹⁴ In any case, this is not a purely operational question relegated to the IDF's backyard. It is also a value laden, political, and conceptual issue. As long as the IDF lacks the sufficient forces for active defense of both civilian communities and critical installations and its own bases, the dilemma is not likely to be resolved. Therefore, Israel is still facing the challenge of quickly increasing its active defense arsenal, despite its very high cost.

The Military Response

The IDF remains the leading agency shaping the fate of the civilian front. Over the past year, its primary contribution continued to be successful deterrence vis-à-vis Hizbollah in the north and Hamas in the south (figure 1). The quiet in the north has been more evident than in the south, where there were short flare-ups in April and August 2011 – including long

Figure 1. Rockets Fired against Israel, January 2010–August 2011



Source: “Terrorism and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict News” (May 9-17, 2011), Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, The Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center

range missiles fired towards Beer Sheva, Ashkelon, and Ashdod. This attack triggered the first operational use of the Iron Dome system, which successfully intercepted eight rockets¹⁵ and thereby, according to the Commander of the Air Force, made “world history.”¹⁶

If in theoretical terms the idea of active defense has been implanted, then in practical terms what makes the difference is that the trend continue. The Israeli government decided as a first stage to equip the IAF with a third battery that will become operational before the end of 2011, and three additional batteries at a later point. Currently, the future plan is to deploy 10-15 Iron Dome batteries for what the Director General of the Ministry of Defense defines as “the central platform” of the defense establishment, and invest an additional \$1.2 billion in it.¹⁷ Large sums from the defense budget will also be invested in the Magic Wand system to intercept mid

range missiles, expected to become operational after 2012.¹⁸ At the same time, development of the improved Arrow system to intercept long range ballistic missiles continues. This means that despite the known limitations and high costs of Iron Dome, Israel is becoming one of the most advanced nations in development and deployment of active defense systems to intercept rockets and missiles of various ranges.

Far from the spotlight and at much lower cost, Israel is also developing other early warning capabilities against rocket and missile attacks. The assumption of the Home Front Command, which is spearheading this effort, is that if fewer people receive immediate warning of an imminent attack, more people outside the range of estimated impact are free to continue their daily routine. Alongside multiplying the number of alarm sites since 2006, selected and direct means of communication with the population in the high risk areas have also been developed and are presently being introduced. Already this year a new cellular warning system called Personal Message, based on a technology capable of circumventing a collapse of the cellular system, is slated to become operational, following a test incorporated into Turning Point 5, the 2011 annual national emergency exercise.

The Home Front Command and the Civilian Response

The Home Front Command also conducts several more challenging efforts in the neglected field of passive defense. The first is the distribution of personal protection kits, launched in April 2010 and progressing at a snail's pace, in part because of the indifference of the public, which may not understand the measure's necessity.¹⁹ The rest of the distribution has not been budgeted. Hence, it will not be possible to distribute the kits to more than 55 percent of the population; the insufficient budget apparently reflects the attitude of the skepticism of the decision makers to the chemical threat.²⁰

Physical, individual, public, and infrastructure protection is similarly insufficient. Over the past year, there has been little progress in closing gaps, both in the more threatened areas such as the Gaza Strip vicinity and in the heart of the country. Approximately one third of the public has no available safe space. The Home Front Command is developing plans in conjunction with local governments to map existing potential shelters,²¹

including shelters for critical services and the optional use of protected spaces, particularly underground garages in the center of large cities that could – budget permitting – be converted to mass shelters should the need arise. In the meantime, the plans are mostly on paper and the gap perpetuates. As the high trajectory precision weapons threat grows, critical civilian infrastructures will have to be properly protected at great cost. It appears that while the IDF is aware of this challenge and invests in it accordingly, local government has yet seen fit to relate to this threat. Overall, it appears that so far decision makers are reluctant to invest the necessary budget, beyond what is imposed upon them through local government pressure and Supreme Court intervention.

In addition to training its own special units, the Home Front Command serves as a leading partner in the exercises at the national and local levels. The drills are mostly designed to enhance the readiness of the various response agencies that operate in the civilian front, particularly the cooperation between them. The annual nation-wide Turning Point exercise is run by the National Emergency Authority (Hebrew acronym RAHEL), while the Home Front Command is the main trainee, along with the national agencies of first responders and the local governments.

The Organizational Dimension

In March 2011, the Knesset approved the establishment of the Ministry for Home Front Defense,²² headed by the former Deputy Minister of Defense Matan Vilnai, who was also in charge of the civilian front in his previous capacity. The establishment of the new ministry affords an opportunity to create a fresh foundation for a national system that will professionally administer the civilian front. The central issue is responsibility and accountability. The establishment of the National Emergency Authority following the 2006 debacle of the home front did not dispel the confusion over who runs the show and may have even exacerbated it. The uncertainty stems primarily from a lack of clear guidelines issued by the political echelon; from the Israeli heavily bureaucratic structure; and from the tension between a strong Home Front Command and a weaker civilian system. The attempts by RAHEL to create and assume operational responsibility and authority over the other agencies to position it as the

leading body have failed. In fact, the complex bureaucratic setting has caused numerous problems in communication between the agencies involved and has contributed to more entanglements, such as the inability to enhance legislation of the Home Front Law,²³ budget issues,²⁴ and the lack of coordination at the inter-ministry level.²⁵

Ideally the new ministry will be poised to enable progress in preparing the civilian front for future confrontations and improving capabilities for managing it in different emergencies. However, the current starting point is neither simple nor encouraging. Separation from the Ministry of Defense has both advantages and drawbacks, and it is important to find the right balance. It is still unclear to what extent the new ministry will survive future political upheavals. Any structure that is built will need stability and time in order to navigate the political and bureaucratic morass and create a new, constructive reality in light of the future risks and particularly the expected security circumstances.

Those charged with shaping the new ministry will also have to consider the implications of the government's control over the different first response agencies. One example is the story of the national fire fighting authority, which was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Internal Security following its inadequate performance during the December 2010 Carmel fire. The massive fire, with the high number of casualties, created a window of opportunity to increase awareness regarding the significance of the first responders also to non-security risks, such as earthquakes, and to pave the way for what will probably be a long and difficult process of improvement. Indeed, it impelled the government to take a number of decisions²⁶ designed to improve the civil defense systems. Yet the organizational implications of these decisions point to added divisions of responsibility²⁷ between different government ministries, which have long demonstrated the need for better coordination. The creation of the new Ministry for Home Front Defense may generate comprehensive strategic thinking that will take into consideration security and civilian needs and examine the much needed option of establishing an integrative, coordinated government system that will be able to tackle future challenges with greater success.

The Community Level: Boosting Social Resilience

In Israel and around the world there is widespread understanding – at least at the declarative level – that local government represents the basic building block in preparing²⁸ the civilian front and managing crises when these occur.²⁹ In order to realize this vision, RAHEL and the Home Front Command continue their efforts to improve local government capabilities and enhance preparedness for future confrontations.³⁰ Beyond the preparations of each municipality by its own staff, assisted by the Home Front Command's Liaison Unit³¹ established in order to enhance coordination in the field in times of crisis, many localities are engaged in boosting the community resilience of the population.³² In this critical field there are also vast differences in the level of preparedness from one community to the next, usually as a result of economic and organizational strength, the level of local leadership, and the degree of exposure to threats. There are local governments with a high level of preparedness,³³ while more than a few are woefully under-prepared for an emergency.

Most community resilience programs are built on the premise that in addition to developing disaster prevention capabilities and immediate physical response capabilities to mitigate the impact of disasters, it is also critical to develop community and social resilience.³⁴ This would manifest itself in the community's ability to bounce back quickly and recover from traumatic events and return to normative systemic functioning in a short period of time.³⁵ Israel, with its extensive experience with security challenges, started dealing with the enhancement of community resilience already in the 1980s, particularly in the north, which sustained continuous terrorist attacks.³⁶ RAHEL and the Home Front Command, via its Population Department, are now working on two major projects to promote community resilience: one through the Cohen-Harris Resilience Center³⁷ and the other through the Israel Trauma Coalition.³⁸ The latter runs the five resilience centers established in the south, on the basis of a government decision and funding. These two organizations have formulated different models to develop community resilience and assist social coping with extreme crises at local levels.

The City Resilience Program³⁹ works to build community preparedness for emergencies by means of improving the capabilities of municipal and

ancillary systems (including volunteer groups), as well as empowering residents in general and children in particular in preparing for crises. A prominent feature in the program is the work with the Ministry of Education and the Educational Psychological Service to raise awareness and preparedness of school children. A study about implementation of an education resilience program in Ashkelon before and during Operation Cast Lead showed a 50 percent decrease in the occurrence of PTSD among children who participated in the program compared with children who did not.⁴⁰ This result underscores the significant contribution of the relatively limited investment in community resilience.

Still, notwithstanding the growing awareness of the need to develop social resilience and the success of the few programs already in place, there is a discouraging gap, particularly budgetary, between intent and action. Most local governments have a difficult time raising the necessary funds. The result is that existing programs do not cover many municipalities (e.g., Jerusalem is not included) and there is more than a shadow of a doubt about their sustainability, mostly because they are based on temporary staff of NGOs. Another impediment is the absence in this social project of the Ministry of Welfare, which was one of the first agencies to develop the professional skills to promote community resilience.⁴¹

Overall, then, the general trend is positive, but practical implementation is slow, limited, and ridden with obstacles. In addition, organizational divisions remain an issue, plans of action change constantly, and the continuation of existing programs over time is far from certain. The result is the ongoing gap between understanding the need at the theoretical level and the practical commitment to invest the required resources.

Conclusion: Is the Gap between the Needs and the Response Narrowing?

It is no coincidence that the progress made in Israel over the last year in improving the civilian front's preparedness for a security confrontation lies in prevention and protection in the technological/operational context. This phenomenon is typical of developments elsewhere. Nations still invest most of their resources in physical prevention when trying to cope with mass disasters, whether natural or manmade. A very small portion is invested in

preparation for rebuilding systems damaged in an event, i.e., infrastructure and social resilience. This is the case despite the fact that it has repeatedly become evident, including in recent major disasters such as in Fukushima, Japan in 2011 and in Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, that mass disasters are never completely preventable. In many instances the lesson has been that most of the damage caused by mass casualty events, beyond the immediate impact, could have been sharply reduced, and that systemic reconstruction could have occurred much faster had there been appropriate preliminary preparation. However, as in the world at large, Israel too has not implemented these lessons. In other words, even if it is appropriate to invest, to a reasonable and realistic degree, in defense and prevention, it is no less important to invest in developing infrastructure and social resilience, which requires far less resources and whose yield is relatively high.

In the past year, Israel has taken an important step in the field of active defense against what right now seems to be the immediate security threat. Much more needs to be invested in this field, but it seems that the die has been correctly cast with developing operational capabilities. This matter, which raised extensive public discourse (more than other topics with high price tags and many ramifications, such as, e.g., equipping the IAF with F-35 stealth planes), is of significance not only in terms of the decision to adopt active defense in principle, but also in terms of the policy of deployment. The discourse on the part of the political echelon is typically vague: it has tried to give the impression that active defense is intended to protect civilians, whereas in fact the intention is to use the limited arsenal primarily to protect IDF assets. This sort of obfuscation, which is also true of the distribution of the personal protection kits, tarnishes the credibility of the political leadership; this in turn might lead to impaired societal resilience, which to a large extent is supposed to rely on the credibility of the nation's leaders.

At any rate, the progress made in the realm of active defense, as well as in the field of selective early warning, reflects a positive trend. It provides a much needed factor in closing the gap between the threat and the response, particularly as long as the enemy does not make a qualitative leap in building its rocket arsenal, especially with regard to precision.

The trend is much less encouraging with regard to building the “soft” aspects of the system. A long and difficult road lies ahead before an integrated response that meets the nation’s needs is in place. Most of the successes in the field – and there are many – are still a smattering of actions and programs spread, sometimes randomly, across Israel, some without any sustainable budgets or staffing. These do not add up to a comprehensive, orderly strategic vision and action plan, formulated and agreed on by the agencies involved. Israel in 2011 has no strategic plan for building appropriate preparedness for the civilian front. The new Ministry for Home Front Defense may generate an orderly, long term strategy, which would also be backed by a multiyear budget and would clearly define both the goals, stages, and means to attain them, as well as those responsible for their implementation. Until then, the preparedness of the civilian front for a multi-front confrontation ranks as average at best. As such, it does not suffice to narrow significantly, let alone close, the gap between the threat and the response.

Notes

- 1 *The State Comptroller’s Report: The Rear’s Preparedness and Its Functioning During the Second Lebanon War*, July 2007, and Meir Elran, “The Civilian Front in the Second Lebanon War,” in Meir Elran and Shlomo Brom, eds., *The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives* (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007), pp. 103-19.
- 2 Some would question the inclusion of high trajectory weapons under the rubric of terrorism. Terrorism here includes all means intended to harm the civilian non-combatant population as a way to achieve political goals. In this regard, there is no difference between a suicide bomber and a Qassam rocket: both are deployed out of identical motivation against civilian targets with identical goals.
- 3 Yaron Elazar, “Home Front Command Assesses: In the Next War, Dozens of Fatalities in Tel Aviv, Hundreds of Missiles in Haifa,” *Bamahane*, March 25, 2010.
- 4 The scenario includes Syria but apparently not Iran. With regard to an Israeli military attack against Iran’s nuclear installations, Meir Dagan, former chief of the Mossad, said that “the Iranians have impressive capabilities and they can fire missiles at us for months on end at the rate of two or three a day.” Yossi Melman, “Ex-Mossad Chief Dagan: Military Strike against Iran would be ‘Stupid,’” *Haaretz*, May 8, 2011.

- 5 Operations research commissioned by the IDF indicates there would be one death and a few dozens of badly wounded for every 100 missiles and rockets hitting the Israeli rear. Ron Ben Yishai, "Defending against Saddam's Successors: Push Off the War until 2015," *Ynet*, January 14, 2011.
- 6 The IDF continues to prepare for the chemical scenario, including with exercises that also incorporate civilian systems. See, e.g., the exercise conducted jointly by the Home Front Command, the Ministry of Health, Magen David Adom, the Israel Police, and firefighters on May 25, 2011 in Tel Aviv, that simulated an attack with chemical missiles, <http://www.idf.il/1133-11407-he/Dover.aspx>.
- 7 See data about the missile and rocket arsenals in Israel Missile Defense Association, at <http://imda.org.il/ImdaRoot/hebrew/index.asp>.
- 8 Alongside deterrence, early warning, and decision, as proposed, e.g., by the commission headed by Dan Meridor in 2006. See Shay Shabtai, "Israel's National Security Concept: New Basic Terms in the Military-Security Sphere," *Strategic Assessment* 13, no. 2 (2010): 7-18, at [http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1283413333.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1283413333.pdf).
- 9 Uzi Rubin, "From Irritant to Strategic Threat: The Rocket Attacks from the Gaza Strip against the South of Israel," *Studies in Middle East Security* No. 87, Begin-Sadat Center, January 2011, pp. 33-37.
- 10 Last year the IAF reorganized its air defense system to introduce a new wing of surface-to-air units that will accommodate Iron Dome and future active air defense systems. The new setup comprises surface-to-air missile units, anti-missile systems, missile testing units, and tactical units; it is headed by an officer with a rank of brigadier general who answers directly to the Commander of the IAF. The purpose of the aerial system is to intercept from the ground threats coming from the air and space.
- 11 See Anshel Pfeffer, "Air Force Estimates: Hundreds of Missiles at IAF Bases in the Next War," *Haaretz*, March 8, 2010.
- 12 Anshel Pfeffer, "IDF will Deploy Third Iron Dome in Next Half Year," *Haaretz*, April 13, 2011.
- 13 GOC Northern Command Gadi Eizenkot said: "Let the citizens of Israel harbor no illusions that someone is going to put up an umbrella over their heads... The systems have been designed to defend Air Force bases, Navy bases and recruitment bases, even if this means that in the first few days of battle things will be uncomfortable for the citizenry." No less interesting was the response of the Haim Yellin, the head of the Eshkol Regional Council: "I would like to remind us all that the government decided to develop the Iron Dome system at the cost of about one billion shekels in state budgets in order to protect the settlements

in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip.” See Shmulik Haddad and Ilana Curiel, “Gaza Envelope against Eizenkot,” *Ynet*, December 1, 2010.

- 14 The heads of the regional authorities in the Gaza envelope have long been engaged in this debate. See, for example, their intention to appeal to the Supreme Court to compel the government to deploy Iron Dome batteries for protection of the civilian population in Yanir Ygen and Amos Harel, “Gaza Area Communities will Petition the Supreme Court to Obligate the State to Finance the Iron Dome System,” *Haaretz*, April 26, 2010.
- 15 Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, April 2011, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/ipc_185.htm.
- 16 http://dover.idf.il/IDF/News_Channels/today/2011/04/0911.htm.
- 17 In an interview with Amos Harel, “Defense Ministry CEO: World is Interested in Iron Dome,” *Haaretz*, May 9, 2011.
- 18 The system will soon undergo systemic testing, and is expected to be introduced into operation over the next few years, according to Pini Yungman, the head of the Magic Wand project at Rafael, at Military & Aviation 2011 Conference, May 31, 2011, <http://www.idf.il/1133-11660-HE/Dover.aspx>.
- 19 In April 2011, it was reported that 31 percent of the public possess kits. Minister for Home Front Defense Matan Vilnai estimated that the probability of chemical weapons being used against civilians is not high. Amos Harel, “An Ongoing Scandal,” *Haaretz*, April 28, 2011.
- 20 For more on the topic the chemical threat and the response, see. Lt. Col. S. and Lt. Col. A, “Preparing for Chemical Terrorism,” *Maarachot* 432, August 2010, pp. 40-45.
- 21 “The Home Front Command Protection Systems Department, Guide for Preparing a Local Authority Defense Plan,” March 2010, at http://www.oref.org.il/sip_storage/FILES/1/1131.pdf.
- 22 On the basis of Government Decision #3048 of March 27, 2011.
- 23 Meir Elran, “A Home Front Law for Israel,” *Strategic Assessment* 13, no. 4 (2011): 51-60, at [http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1295870251.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1295870251.pdf).
- 24 As reflected by the failure to create a designated multiyear budget for the home front, consistent with the vision of the then deputy minister and also in the absence of sufficient budget funds to distribute personal protection kits, despite this being recommended by the Home Front Command.
- 25 This is manifested in particular in the rift between the Ministry of Defense/RAHEL and the Ministry of Welfare, where coordination is critical in connection to community resilience.
- 26 Government Decision #2699 of January 9, 2011, at <http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMO/Secretarial/Decisions/2011/01/des2699.htm>.

- 27 See, e.g., the establishment of the squadron of fire fighting airplanes (outsourced for operation by a private company) in the framework of the Air Force, while the new Fire Fighting Commission is established under the purview of the Ministry of Public Security.
- 28 Simon Hakim and Erwin A. Blackstone, eds., *Safeguarding Homeland Security: Governors and Mayors Speak Out* (Springer, 2009).
- 29 National Emergency Authority, "Basic Philosophy for Leading the Home Front in an Emergency," April 2010 (temporary).
- 30 The Home Front Command, Population Department, "Doctrine of Civilian Defense in the Local Government," May 2007.
- 31 The Home Front Command, Population Department, "The Local Government Liaison Unit Book," November 2008.
- 32 See, e.g., Tel Aviv's preparations at <http://www.tel-aviv.gov.il/Tolive/SecurityEmergency/Pages/EmergencyPrep.aspx?tm=2&sm=20&side=299>.
- 33 This is evident in the Gaza area communities and also, for example, in Haifa, where during the December 2010 fire it was clear that the management by the municipality together with other first responders, local and national, created a high level integrated capability that allowed the challenge to be met, including widespread evacuation of residents from their homes.
- 34 See, e.g. Stephen Flynn, *The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation* (New York: Random House, 2007); Douglas Paton and David Johnston, eds., *Disaster Resilience: An Integrated Approach* (Charles Thomas, 2006); Louise Comfort, Arjen Boin, Chris Demchack, eds., *Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010).
- 35 For definitions and discussion of the significance of social resilience in crises, see Meir Elran, *Israel's National Resilience: The Effect of the Second Intifada on Israeli Society*, Memorandum 81 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2006); Fran Norris, Susan Stevens, Betty Pfefferbaum, Karen Wyche, Rose Pfefferbaum, "Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capabilities, and Strategy for Disaster Readiness," *American Journal of Community Psychology* 41 (2008): 127-50; and John Plodinec, *Definitions of Resilience: An Analysis*, Community & Regional Resilience Institute (CARRI), November 2009.
- 36 See, e.g., Mashaabim Center, established by Prof. Mully Lahad, which initiated and developed the concept and system for northern Israel, at <http://www.icspc.org/>, as well as Mully Lahad and Udi Ben Neshet, "From Improvising under Trauma to Developing and Doctrine: Community Responses to Terrorism – Preparation, Intervention and Rehabilitation," in Eli Somer and Avid Bleich, eds., *Mental Health in Terror's Shadow: The Israeli Experience* (Ramat: Tel Aviv University Press, 2005), pp. 271-300.

- 37 Operated since 2010 by RAHEL in 18 local governments. See <http://www.childrenatrisk.co.il/Gallery.asp?PiD=0.2&id=8>.
- 38 Operated since 2007 by the Home Front Command in five resilience centers in the Gaza Strip region and in four localities in the north. See <http://israeltraumacoalition.org/>.
- 39 See summary of the City Resilience Program for emergency preparedness, Leon Charney Pilot 30, 2011, Cohen Harris Resilience Center.
- 40 <http://cms.education.gov.il/EducationCMS/Units/Shefi/YedaMiktzoeiHachshara/TochniotLeumiot/HosenHinuch.htm> and Mully Lahad, *Children Coping with Stress and War: The Civilian Front – Managing the Rear in Emergencies*, Broadcast University Library, Ministry of Defense Publishers, 2011, pp. 79-90.
- 41 <http://www.molsa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/EB2F2D3F-8FE4-4C6C-AAEF-91CDEDF5C5EF/7736/tzahi1.pdf>, and Miriam Shapira and Hagai Dafna, “A Model for Using Volunteers under the Threat of Terrorism: The Population Centers’ Emergency Teams,” in *Mental Health in Terror’s Shadow*, pp. 259-70.