

The EU's Nonproliferation Strategy: Iran as a Test Case

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Introduction

An Iranian nuclear capability would pose a grave threat to the international community, invariably lead to a structural change in regional as well as international power relations, and undermine the international community's efforts to halt nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

Notwithstanding the years of negotiations and four rounds of UN Security Council sanctions, vital questions about the scope and purpose of the Iranian nuclear program remain unanswered. Is Iran aiming to become a nuclear weapons state, is it aiming to become a virtual nuclear power,¹ or is it merely producing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes? Whereas the former option is forbidden and the latter is permitted under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the second option lies in a grey zone. As such, Iran's insistence on the legality of its program² combined with the continuing strategic incoherence of the EU-3+3³ has benefited the Iranian government, and over time the EU-3+3 have de facto conceded Iran's right to enrich uranium on its own soil. Through its acceptance of the Turkish-Brazilian initiative of May 2010, which was seen by most European states as a confidence building measure, Iran has further distracted the international community from the central issue: its ongoing uranium enrichment and its non-compliance with its obligations and commitments under the NPT. Iran has also ignored UN Security Council resolutions and has let slide every jointly negotiated deadline on proposals by the international community. At the same time,

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serious concerns about the military dimension of the Iranian nuclear program were raised in the latest IAEA reports, further supporting the longstanding suspicions among much of the international community. The severity of these developments reinforces the unpleasant message that time to halt Iran's nuclear program is running out.

The looming pessimism in regard to Iranian proliferation has not yet overtaken the optimism within the international disarmament community. When President Obama presented his vision of a world without nuclear weapons and expressed his administration's willingness to strengthen the international nuclear regime with the NPT at its core, Europeans in particular expressed high hopes of reaching an international consensus on nonproliferation issues and reshaping the NPT. The final outcome of the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 was thus widely hailed as a success, even though the conference failed to address serious proliferation concerns, particularly the Iranian nuclear program.

The severity of the current challenges demands that states examine the conceptual foundations of their approaches to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. This article assesses the European approach to nonproliferation, focusing on European nonproliferation strategy within an international and regional context.

The EU Strategy

Since EU membership comprises nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), NATO members and non-NATO members alike, the EU has been challenged to find a balanced and realistic approach towards the delicate issues of nonproliferation and disarmament at a difficult time marked by disagreement over Iraq. Interestingly, the EU put proliferation of nuclear weapons on top of the list of key security threats faced by its members, and in addition to other perils listed in the "European Security Strategy," adopted a separate document, "EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" (2003).⁴ Furthermore, the European Council adopted a nonproliferation clause, including trade and other economic measures, to be implemented in all agreements with third parties. To ensure the strategy's effective implementation and to underscore the priority given to WMD nonproliferation, numerous common positions, regulations,

joint actions, council decisions, and action plans, including the “New Lines for Action” (2008),⁵ were adopted.

The “EU Strategy” presents three main principles: effective multilateralism; promotion of a stable international and regional environment; and cooperation with partners. Conceptually the strategy assumes an interdependent relationship between disarmament and nonproliferation, implying that proliferation is inevitable as long as the nuclear weapons states maintain their nuclear arsenals, even in reduced numbers, and proscribing their acquisition by any other state. The EU’s overall commitment to the multilateral treaty system, with the NPT⁶ at the center of the nuclear order, is stressed. For its part, the NPT rests on three equal, interlocking, and mutually reinforcing pillars based on the commitments of the five official NWS⁷ to reduce and ultimately eliminate all their nuclear weapons while the non-nuclear weapon states abstain from pursuing nuclear weapons/explosives. As a bridge between the haves and have-nots, NWS and NNWS agreed on the “inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes....All State Parties to the Treaty agree to full exchanges of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”⁸

Measures Taken

Overall, the European approach has led to an alignment of EU policies and increased cooperation among member states in fields related to WMD proliferation. It further boosted the European stance vis-à-vis the United States, showing that Europeans, when agreeing on a higher objective such as nonproliferation of WMD, are able to coordinate and cooperate on the international level. In particular, the dedicated engagement of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, was critical to maintaining open channels of communications during the negotiations with Iran, even though the climate during the EU-3 negotiations was marked by severe ups and downs until they stalled following the June 2008 offer to Iran.⁹ With the election of President Obama and the resulting change in US policy towards Iran, the EU believed that playing “the US-Obama trump card” would lead to the desired political breakthrough in negotiations with Tehran.¹⁰ However, diplomatic solutions offered to Iran failed to secure progress.

Over the years the Iranian government appeared unmoved by the economic and political benefits of cooperation with the EU-3+3, which could have included a relaxation of existing sanctions on private and governmental Iranian organizations as well as on selected individuals, with the broad intention of slowing missile and nuclear proliferation. In 2007, the EU adopted Common Position 2007/140, which implemented UN Security Council Resolution 1737 in the European states and banned all travel by certain specific individuals within the EU. Common Position 2007/246 amended 2007/140 and incorporated stronger sanctions by banning trade with Iran in all nuclear- and missile-relevant commodities contained in the control lists of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. It also restricted the provision of training and financing activities to support Iran's development of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities. Moreover, the EU froze the assets of corporate and governmental entities and individuals directly associated with Iran's sensitive nuclear activities and missile development programs, preventing EU members from making transfers of conventional weapons and military equipment to Iran, and banning member states from establishing new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to Tehran.

In 2008, the EU Council embraced further measures by adopting Common Position 2008/479, which identified additional persons and entities subject to travel restrictions and asset freezes. In August 2008 the EU adopted Common Position 2008/652, requesting that all member states exercise restraint when entering into new commitments to provide official financial support for trade with Iran, as well as continued vigilance over the activities of financial institutions with Iranian banks. It urged member states to inspect the cargoes to and from Iran of both aircraft and vessels at ports or airfields within their territories. Another restriction by the EU was visa bans on a number of senior Iranian officials and other individuals associated with the nuclear program. Similar to the case of UNSCR 1737, in June 2010 the European members of the Security Council supported Resolution 1929, which was followed by a European Council declaration initiating more punitive sanctions on trade with Iran, financial restrictions, and investment in the Iranian gas and oil industries.

However, when assessing the effectiveness of the European policies in regard to nonproliferation, it is clear that the EU's public front masks

internal disagreement and double standards that call for closer scrutiny in the political and economic sphere.

First, within the EU, member states have demonstrated that when it comes to Iran, individual interests dominate collective concerns. The Eastern and Central European countries have negligible economic relations with Iran and are generally skeptical about the efficacy of sanctions against autocratic regimes. Furthermore, in general, European states do not regard the Iranian nuclear program as a matter of “life or death” in the way that Israel does. Whereas Israel derives this threat directly from the Iranian president’s provocative rhetoric attacking Israel’s right to exist in combination with his public support for historians who deny the Holocaust, the prospect of a nuclear Iran is a distant threat for most European states. For instance, Polish and Czech policy toward the location of a missile defense shield indicates that Central and Eastern European states perceive a greater threat from existing Russian nuclear weapons than from the Iranian nuclear program.

Within Western Europe, however, the picture is more diverse when it comes to policy vis-à-vis Iran. In February 2009, Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Malta, Austria, and Sweden opposed a list of stricter sanctions proposed by the EU-3. Cyprus, Malta, and Greece oppose expanding the scope of UN sanctions against Iranian shipping lines, as their revenues from port services might be affected. Austria, Belgium, and Sweden are strong supporters of multilateralism and dialogue, generally resisting confrontational policies and punitive measures unless they emanate from the UN. Austria, for example, publicly opposed harsher EU sanctions against Iran in 2007 because of its wish to remain neutral on the nuclear issue. Sweden has even criticized the latest round of UN sanctions against Iran, pointing in part to their negative impact on the Iranian population. Furthermore, Sweden, a vigorous supporter of disarmament policies, argued that the nuclear weapons states would need to pursue disarmament if they sincerely wanted to halt proliferation.

Denmark, Spain, Italy, and Austria are less enthusiastic about additional sanctions that target the Iranian gas and energy sector because of their national energy companies’ reliance on Iran and long term interests in the Iranian market. Moreover, Germany, Austria, and Italy have very lucrative trade deals with Iran, making them a powerful lobby against sanctions. For example, business ties between Iranian companies

and German companies, especially small and medium-sized, have been good, with exports from Germany amounting to around \$4.5 billion in 2009. Imports to Germany from Iran, on the other hand, only amounted to \$600 million. Yet despite the comparatively low total value of exports to Germany, the German market remains the second most important market for Iranian goods after China.

Until early 2010, the EU was Iran's major trading partner, accounting for almost a third of its exports.¹¹ Iran, however, ranks twenty-fifth among the EU's trading partners, accounting for 0.9 percent of all European imports and exports; in the energy sector Iran is sixth.¹² In the first two quarters of 2009, there was a slight decline in the EU's trade with Iran, which can be attributed mainly to the global economic crisis.¹³ Furthermore, harsh sanctions are not a popular policy choice when European economies are suffering through the global financial crisis, especially if the sanctions' efficacy is broadly questioned or if the burden is distributed unequally among states. Thus, some European companies have found ways to work around trade restrictions by relying on front companies in third countries or diverting their trade to new firms that are not yet subject to restrictions. An additional counterproductive factor is the fear of many Europeans that the vacuum created by stricter sanctions, especially when targeting the Iranian energy and gas sector, may be filled by Chinese companies. Already Chinese firms have signed multi-billion dollar agreements with Iran to develop oil and gas fields that were previously linked primarily to American and European companies.

Of the remaining EU States, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands have pushed for sanctions against the Iranian regime since mid 2009. British-Iranian relations, strained since the 1950s, have suffered, especially following Iran's aggressive rhetoric towards the UK. Britain has unilaterally adopted even further measures, such as freezing approximately \$1.59 billion of Iranian assets. France-Iran relations were severely damaged in the 1970s and worsened due to France-Iraq relations in the 1980s and 1990s. However, France's main objective in the Iranian nonproliferation case is political. Initially the issue facilitated France's self-perception as an important power on the international stage, especially after the fallout with the Bush administration over the Iraq invasion. It also gave President Sarkozy an opportunity to be seen domestically as a leader on par with Presidents Obama and Medvedev.

Second, as a leading exporter of nuclear energy and technology, France maintains an economic interest in ensuring that the Iranian case does not negatively affect its exports in this field, especially in the Middle East.

An additional consideration important to the EU is that punitive measures may be regarded externally as deflecting from the EU's soft power approach and as such, a contradiction to its image. Thus even though the EU members appear to be more determined than ever to increase the pressure on Iran, hardliners such as President Sarkozy are quickly balanced by others, for example, Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn of Luxembourg¹⁴ or his Swedish colleague Carl Bildt.¹⁵ Europeans, believing in the power of international law rather than the international law of power, are not inclined to question the right of Iran, as a member of the NPT, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes per se. Unlike Israel, the EU is primarily concerned about the non-compliance of Iran with its commitments and obligations as a NPT member, namely the regime's poor cooperation with the IAEA, especially in regard to its reluctance to ratify the Additional Protocol. The international community wants Tehran to explain its activities and treaty violations and credibly guarantee that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes and not intended for acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.

Furthermore, most European states believe in the concept of equality when it comes to nuclear questions, whereby all states are perceived to be equal in the face of nuclear proliferation and all must be held to the same standard. European public discussions about nuclear weapons have therefore increasingly raised the question of why Israel, not a member of the NPT, is presumed and allowed to have a nuclear capability that is not under any IAEA safeguard agreement. In sum, Europeans think that the best way for the international community to ensure that Iran remains a non-nuclear weapons state in the long term is to promote region-wide – to include Israel – nonproliferation and disarmament, in tandem with establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. This position was reiterated at the NPT Conference in May 2010, when 189 states adopted the Final Outcome document that includes an Action Plan on the Middle East, which calls for Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

On an international level, Iran has twisted the short term cost-effectiveness balance to its favor by playing for time. The sanctions imposed by the UNSC, the US, and the EU are unlikely to change Iranian nuclear policy if there is no clear and credible strategy laid out for consequential escalatory steps or if sanctions are circumvented. UNSC Resolution 1887, passed on September 17, 2009, led to mounting criticism from the non-aligned states (NAM), which complained about the focus on nonproliferation without an equal balance with NPT stipulations in the field of disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy.¹⁶ Hence NAM, especially Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, and Syria, have defended the right of NPT states to develop peaceful nuclear energy without accepting the Additional Protocol as the legally binding verification standard under the NPT or as a condition for new supply arrangements.¹⁷ Others have also joined Iran in blocking attempts to limit national fuel cycle options; for instance, Brazil expressed its concerns that Iran is a precedent for how disagreements on nuclear energy are handed over from the IAEA to the Security Council sanctions regimes. These tensions are exacerbated by the demand, expressed by Egypt in particular, that discussions on tightening the nonproliferation regime are contingent upon progress with respect to the Middle East resolution of 1995 and the goal of creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East.¹⁸ Israel, however, remains reluctant to discuss its nuclear status or any disarmament measures. Consequently, Tehran has found many willing partners who are variously motivated to impede efforts to make it more difficult to acquire near-weapons capabilities without breaking the rules.¹⁹

EU Policy Recommendations

For the EU as a global actor that strongly supports international law and wants to be taken seriously in matters of security policy, the prospect of a nuclear Iran undermining the NPT regime is unacceptable and should therefore weigh heavier in the minds of decision makers than any of the considerations discussed above. The language and the legal framework so paramount for European self-perception, whereby the EU wields instruments of soft power, have now been provided by the UN Security Council, implying that the EU no longer has a valid excuse not to act strategically. Indeed, with the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force on December 1, 2009, the EU now has the opportunity to overcome its “long-

standing reputation for being an organization” of “much talk but little action” in addressing security challenges and threats.²⁰ Furthermore, the responsibility of the EU to lead by example has never been greater, especially given its interest in a stable Middle East, its high moral standards, and its repeated commitment to a non-nuclear Iran.

Particularly in light of the failures of the negotiations with Iran over the past years and the weaknesses of the current strategy, the estimated costs for the EU as a global actor if Iran achieves nuclear weapons capability would be severe. The most visible lapse by the High Representative and the EU-3 initiative has been the lack of consistent negotiating positions. Whereas Solana treated the Iranian negotiations as the primary foreign policy issue on his agenda, most European states were not actively engaged. Unlike the West, Iran always had a long term agenda, using procedural issues to avoid short term solutions. While international experts have already estimated that Iran could build nuclear weapons in late 2010 or 2011 if its enrichment program continues at the current pace, the actions of the EU signaled that sufficient time remained to stop Iran. By now, the irony is that Iran does not have enough uranium for a civil nuclear energy program that would be – if Iran complied with its obligations under the NPT and abided by the UNSCRs – accepted by the international community, but it will soon have sufficient uranium for an unacceptable weapons program. A nuclear Iran may lead to a nuclear domino effect in the Greater Middle East. Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are regarded as likely nuclear aspirants should Iran obtain a nuclear weapons capability. If there are Iranian and Israeli bombs, there may soon be an Arab and a Turkish bomb as well. A nuclear Middle East is a serious threat to the stability and security of the international community because of a risk of nuclear terrorism and the even higher risk of a nuclear escalation. Israel has already stated that it will never accept an Iran with a nuclear capability. The NPT and the UN Security Council would then have failed in all their efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, leading to a nuclearized Middle East instead of to a nuclear weapons-free zone. Hence Europe’s commitment to fight WMDs by means of effective multilateralism, namely by strengthening international instruments, can only be upheld if the international instruments at its disposal are effective tools to address proliferation concerns.

Despite the theoretical “grand bargain” of 1968 and the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, the NPT suffers from many shortcomings in the realms of universality, verification, sanctions mechanisms, and withdrawal clauses. Addressing these shortcomings that have fed the loss of faith in the regime,²¹ experts were optimistic that the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 was a key opportunity. However, the Action Plan on Non-Proliferation within the NPT Final Document reaffirmed rather than strengthened the current nonproliferation regime. Other recent policy measures undertaken in the realm of nonproliferation and disarmament – such as the revival of the Conference on Disarmament, the re-emphasis of the thirteen steps towards nuclear disarmament,²² the massive Global Zero Initiative, and the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit – were mainly targeted at reviving the momentum for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in general, not for considering Iran in particular. The Iranian case, however, embodies the central challenges the international nuclear order is facing, namely, the spread of advanced technology, the need for nuclear energy, and geopolitical multi-polarity. Addressing these concerns of principle is important, yet the overall strength of the NPT regime is determined not by its principles but by its outcome in all three fields – disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Unfortunately, in its current state the treaty is not well suited to prevent proliferators from attaining nuclear threshold capability. Proliferators such as North Korea and Iran flout international conventions, and that might be sufficient to destroy the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Furthermore, the European approach to fight the spread of WMD by pursuing a comprehensive nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation agenda might help to prevent countries from pursuing nuclear weapons in the first place, but it cannot arrest proliferation when it is already on track. Looking at the Iranian case, there is no credible proof that the recently negotiated follow-up START treaty between the United States and Russia would have any effect on Iranian nuclear policy. Proliferators may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic, and other pressures, but certainly not stopped through the disarmament of others when these countries still maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, assigning high value to their nuclear arsenals in their security doctrines and possessing thousands of nuclear warheads.

Thus, the EU as an economic power must credibly raise the costs for proliferating states. Such a policy requires that the EU impose harsh sanctions on Iran as soon as possible and as comprehensively as necessary because of Iran's refusal to comply with IAEA and UN demands. At the same time, the EU should find ways to cooperate with Iran through mediators that maintain interdependent relations with Iran in order to pave the way to break the stalemate. However, using mediators is only a second best option since such an approach always implies a loss of negotiating influence. Indeed, the EU has laid out its conditions for constructive negotiations on many occasions. For example, the Turkish and Brazilian deal negotiated with Iran in May has not led to a mediating effect but rather to a diversion of opinions and to a time delay benefiting the Iranian regime. A sound strategy, therefore, would include offers to cooperate with Iran if it provides credible guarantees for the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. But if Iran is unwilling to provide these guarantees, the international community must act in order to uphold international pressure. Furthermore, the EU should take the lead to actively support the efforts of multilateral bodies like the Financial Action Task Force to prevent the Iranian government from financing its nuclear program through illicit activities.²³

More informal sanctions could also include issuing warnings of harsh consequences to the private sector by drawing attention to the risks of doing business with Iranian entities engaged in illicit conduct, denying Iran access to key technologies, developing a more systematic approach to deal with Tehran's efforts to transfer technology and arms to radical allies in the Middle East, and managing to severely restrict the Iranian banking sector from accessing the European financial sector.²⁴ In addition to the nonproliferation treaty clause adopted by the EU and the NSG guidelines, the EU should also define comprehensive standards and guidelines by laying out what is acceptable for the Union under the inalienable right of all NPT parties to carry out peaceful nuclear activities. Such standards and guidelines that prevent room for political interpretations on the side of the EU could serve as credible assurances for the EU, as an early warning mechanism, and as the trigger that sets in motion other, more effective responses by the EU if and when the need arises. Benign interpretations by EU countries – such as emerged in the Iranian case – could be avoided if measured against stringent standards

and guidelines; the pattern of the Iranian regime repeatedly breaking rules and contributing to the international community's credibility deficit could be avoided. Moreover, a comprehensive and standardized approach would help prevent future debates, especially among member states of the EU. Finally, a comprehensive and credible strategy would entail that the EU, in cooperation with the United States, also focus on a range of political-military strategies in the region that increase pressure on Iran. Such measures could include bolstering missile defense, building alliances with Arab states, and creating structures to reduce the risk of a nuclear domino in the Middle East.²⁵

Conclusion

Neither waiting longer to decide on action nor silently accepting Iran's nuclear policy is the kind of effective multilateralism the EU envisioned when formulating the EU's WMD strategy. If tough decisions such as unilateral sanctions were taken only when their consequences were certain, they would not be taken at all; and uncertainty is no excuse for paralysis or for weak, watered-down action.

The European Union is regarded as a promoter of peace and stability in its own and neighboring spheres, employing economic and political means. However, whether it is willing and able to take on this role in the realm of nuclear policy remains an open question. The implementation of the WMD Strategy and the New Lines of Action were certainly important steps to coordinate EU policy, but the challenge for the EU lies with making tougher and more credible threats, so as to isolate countries of concern politically and economically if they do not cooperate in clarifying suspicious behavior with respect to the WMD question.²⁶

Therefore, only an approach incorporating a smart mixture of sticks and carrots comprising economic and political measures will enable the EU to become a successful player within the realm of nuclear policy in the long term. In practical terms, this means that the EU must be prepared to apply sanctions and introduce political measures in order to convince the countries in question that the potential costs of moving ahead with suspicious activities will outweigh the expected benefits. With respect to Iran specifically, the EU would have to show its commitment to fight the country's proliferation attempts by imposing sanctions as comprehensively as necessary and as fast as possible, realigning

regional political strategies with the US, pressuring for a tightening of international instruments, and credibly emphasizing its support for all steps necessary to prevent Iran from obtaining the nuclear capability.

The EU should measure its principles of effective multilateralism, promotion of a stable international and regional environment, and cooperation with partners by their outcome – in the field of disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Notes

- 1 Virtual nuclear power refers to states that theoretically possess a nuclear capability.
- 2 Until recently, there was no official evidence of a nuclear weapons program pursued after 2003. The IAEA February 18, 2010 report raises severe concerns about the extent of the military dimension of Iran's nuclear program, suggesting that Iran has conducted and is conducting undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.
- 3 For the purpose of this article, the P5+1 is referred to as EU-3+3 with the UK, France, and Germany labeled as the EU-3 and the US, Russia, and China as +3. France, Germany, and the UK commenced negotiations with Iran in 2003, and China, Russia and the US joined in 2006.
- 4 The complete text of the "EU Strategy" can be accessed at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=392&lang=EN>.
- 5 In December 2008, five years after the adoption of the "EU Strategy," the Council adopted the "New Lines for Action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems." The "New Lines for Action" are designed to increase the effectiveness of the EU's approach to nonproliferation and make it more operational by achieving greater coordination within the EU.
- 6 The NPT came into force in 1968 and today has 189 member states. India, Pakistan, and Israel are not parties to the treaty. North Korea withdrew unilaterally in 2003.
- 7 The NPT recognizes five nuclear weapon states, which are also the five permanent members of the Security Council: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China.
- 8 Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article IV, accessible at UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml>.
- 9 For further information on the June 2008 offer, see <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc730.pdf>.
- 10 The EU-3+3 statement of September 23, 2009 states that France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China warmly welcome the new US policy approach toward Iran.

- 11 According to an article published in *Financial Times*, China has overtaken the EU as Iran's top trade partner with \$29 billion in direct trade.
- 12 For detailed information on the EU's bilateral trade with Iran, see European Commission – Bilateral Trade Relations, Country Profile Iran "More Statistics," <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/iran/>.
- 13 Roni Sofer, "Document Reveals Scope of EU Trade with Iran," *Ynet*, January 28, 2010, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3840782,00.html>.
- 14 Global Security Newswire, "Iran Identifies Possible Enrichment Sites," February 22, 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/siteservices/print_friendly.php?ID=nw_20100222_1816.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Oliver Thraenert, "The Crisis of the NPT: Ahead of the 2010 Review Conference," CSS Analyses in Oliver Security Policy, No. 65, December 2009.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 The resolution was part of the decision of the state parties to the NPT in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely. The resolution "endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction." The resolution can be accessed through <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/1995dec.html#4>.
- 19 George Perkovich, "Dealing with Iran – the Power of Legitimacy," *Policy Outlook* No.50, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2009.
- 20 P. Dunay and Z. Lachowski, "Euro-Atlantic Organizations and Relationships," in "Armaments, Disarmament and International Security," *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 44.
- 21 The 2005 NPT Review Conference is considered the biggest failure in the treaty's history, with disagreement among the parties across all frontlines. Discussions were focused on procedural issues, whereas only four days out of four weeks were devoted to substantive issues. See Harald Mueller, "The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Reasons and Consequences of Failure and Options for Repair," *Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission*, 2005:1.
- 22 See Sharon Squassoni, "Grading Progress on 13 Steps Toward Disarmament," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009.
- 23 Matthew Levitt, "What Europe Can Do to Secure a Deal with Iran, Europe's World, Spring 2010," <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1425>.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 "A Strategy for Iran," Interview with David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security, February 23, 2010 for www.cfr.org.
- 26 Shannon N. Kile, "Final Thoughts on Iran, the EU and the Limits of Conditionality," *Europe and Iran: Perspectives on Non-Proliferation*, ed. Shannon N. Kile, , SIPRI Research Report No. 21, 2005, pp. 122-35.