# Warfare against Insurgencies: The Theory behind the Practice

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For most of its sixty years, the State of Israel has faced an ongoing confrontation generated by guerilla/terrorist movements.[1] After World War II, it became customary to call this phenomenon a war of revolution or insurgency, connoting confrontation launched by political-revolutionary movements whose goal is to attain governance through violent means and the politicization of the local population. This is not guerilla or terrorist warfare in the classical sense, rather a war that in the beginning uses guerilla tactics (rural or urban) and even terrorism, at the same time that it attempts to persuade the local population of the justness of the cause.[2]

The classical example of a war of revolution was the Chinese civil war between the forces of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party). At first Mao Zedong's soldiers fought with guerilla tactics against the superior forces of the government army, but as the Communists gained strength they built a larger army, with units at the brigade and division levels that brought about a comprehensive defeat of the government forces. An insurgency can also thus be a civil war, but is not a war between two states. After World War II, European nations, the United States, and the Soviet Union often found themselves intervening on behalf of one side or another in various places around the world. Research suggests that insurgencies then were an expression of the Cold War: the two superpowers were incapable of fighting one another because of their huge nuclear arsenals, and therefore fought wars by proxy.[3] The current military confrontations in Afghanistan and

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Iraq are contemporary insurgencies. The forces of the United States and its allies are facing semi-military revolutionary forces using principles similar to those formulated by Mao in the 1930s during the Chinese civil war.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the development of military theory in the context of a war against a revolutionary army, or counterinsurgency (COIN), with an emphasis on British and American thinking, and to contend that it is possible to find military theory for confronting insurgency, similar to other modes of warfare that are well grounded in military theory. Israel has developed military theories and doctrines for conventional wars, but has not formulated any military theory regarding confrontations based on guerilla activity and terrorism.[4] Shlomo Gazit claims that after the Six Day War, the Israeli army looked to the experience of foreign armies in its attempt to confront Palestinian terrorism in the territories,[5] but he does not elaborate.

In order to understand COIN theories it is first necessary to understand Mao Zedong's military theory in the late 1930s. This theory greatly affected guerilla movements all over the Third World, including Fatah. In simplified terms, Mao stressed the importance of the civilian population in the struggle and the use of guerilla warfare as a tool. The way to attain victory, according to Mao, is to expand the human and territorial support base, while the guerilla forces simultaneously convert into a regular army. The struggle is political rather than military. In other words, the military force is only one means in an array of ways to attain the political meta-goal. The purpose of the military force is to defend political achievements and to serve as political agents within the civilian population.

One may say that Mao's military thinking rests on one central basic principle: the long lasting war. This principle includes three political and military sub-principles that interact and affect one another. The first is attaining the support of the peasantry. The second is the establishment of base areas. The third is the construction of regular military forces that will achieve the final victory, but only on condition that the first two sub-principles are attained.

In other words, already at this stage a war against an organization that operates on the basis of Mao's principles cannot focus only on the organization's overt military force but must also attend to its political and

social aspects. Therefore, those who say that damaging the organization's military force will bring about its political eradication are simply wrong.

## British School of Thought

After World War II, Britain faced a broad-based Communist uprising in Malaya. It began in 1948 and continued until it was finally quelled in 1960.[6] Six years after the end of the war, Sir Robert Thompson, one of the most important figures in the suppression of the Communist uprising, published his experience and the lessons he learned in a book called *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*.[7] In this book, which can be read in context of Mao's military thinking, Thompson formulated five basic principles for the successful management of a counterinsurgency. In fact, this book makes it clear that Thompson was one of the most important military thinkers in the second half of the twentieth century, because his military theory was based on practical experience and affected the management of COIN in the years to come. In this, he differs from thinkers in the field of nuclear warfare, whose ideas have remained purely theoretical. Moreover, as we shall see, Thompson's principles are relevant today too.

Thompson's first principle is the construction of a political, economic, and social system that will oppose Communist ideology. Communism in East Asia developed in states that experienced political and economic crises, offering an ideological alternative that would effect economic and social improvements, as well as liberation from the yoke of Western imperialism.[8] Therefore, it is necessary to present a political system that at the end of the process would construct a politically and economically stable democracy.[9] The second principle is an operational mechanism for attaining the first principle. The state must undertake the process of democratization in the context of the state's legal framework and avoid taking brutal action toward the civilian population. Moreover, says Thompson, even the warfare against the guerilla fighters must occur within the setting of the laws of the state in which the confrontation is taking place.[10]

The third principle is action for all the relevant military and civilian elements on the basis of a previously defined modus operandi. This principle determines that it is necessary to balance between military and civilian efforts and coordinate all the systems working to contain the

insurgency.[11] By means of this principle, Thompson stresses the natural tension between military actions whose effect can be seen and assessed immediately (e.g., the number of guerrilla fighters killed or the weapons captured by the army) and civilian actions whose effect can be assessed only with the passage of time.[12] In essence, Thompson is warning against exclusive focus on military actions and determines that both efforts − military and civilian − must be given equal weight. Thompson adds that the balance must be achieved on the basis of the prevailing reality in the given arena: sometimes more weight must be given to the military effort and sometimes to the civilian. In any case, both forms of action must complement one another and the military effort must support the civilian one, and vice versa.[13]

According to Mao, an insurgency bears a political character, with the military efforts derived from it. Thompson too stresses this fact, and in his fourth principle he claims that the government must give precedence to defeating political subversion and not to defeating the guerilla fighters.[14] This activity must be undertaken together with isolating the guerilla fighters from the population. In essence, this principle stresses most prominently that Mao's teachings were properly understood. Mao claimed that the guerilla could not operate without the support of the civilian population. Therefore Thompson determines that the road to victory against the guerilla is through severing the connection between the guerilla and the civilian population. According to Nagl, this is the indirect approach to fighting against an insurgency, whereas the direct approach is military action directed against the guerilla fighters.[15] It is possible to eradicate the guerilla fighters only after cutting them off from the civilian population and isolating them.

The fifth principle too presents an understanding of one of Mao's most important principles: the base regions. Thompson claims that the government fighting subversion must safeguard its base region from the gradual wresting of control by the revolutionary guerilla. At the same time that the defensive process is taking place, the government must expand its base of support within the indigenous population and expand it bases of control until it controls the entire state.[16] Thus in this process civilian action is important and the task of the army is to defend the base regions, again similar to the function of the army according to Mao's doctrine. The offensive actions of the government military forces should take

place in the regions where the government has yet to establish control. Paraphrasing Mao, one may say that the army units that should operate in regions where control has yet to be established should be units that operate on the basis of the principles of guerilla. In other words, these are special forces. However, just as Mao's guerilla fighters had political-civilian tasks, the special forces must also operate in the civilian realm.[17] This is how the Green Berets, the American special forces, were used early in America's involvement in Vietnam.

An analysis of the British struggle against the Communist uprising in Malaya shows that the British, in conjunction with the Malayan government, understood that the most effective way of containing the insurgency would be to sever the guerilla from the indigenous population at the same time as classical military operations were underway. Thompson's book brings one to the conclusion that the people who formulated British policy and planning in Malaya understood Mao's philosophy of war and created a military theory designed to neutralize Mao's basic principles. So, for example, civilian activity was stressed more than the military effort and severing the fighters from the civilians prevented the Malayan communist guerilla from making progress on the basis of Mao's doctrine. Moreover, the war indeed proved long lasting because the British understood that the political struggle and isolation of the guerilla were long term processes and their impact could be felt only after the passage of time. The doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare was applied immediately at the start of the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya (1952), and Britain's quick response in implementing a counterinsurgency was one of the main reasons for the successful suppression of the revolt in Kenya.[18]

## American Thinking

American military thinking in the context of COIN has been greatly influenced by the British experience in Malaya. The following examination of American theories is based on an analysis of documents of the American civilian administration (CORDS)[19] that operated in South Vietnam.[20] This was the meta-framework that organized and concentrated all civilian agency operations in South Vietnam under the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). CORDS was established in May 1967, replacing the Office of Civilian Operations

(OCO). Its first director was Robert Komer, who served as special advisor to President Lyndon Johnson on pacification. In November 1968 William Colby, formerly director of CIA operations in Vietnam, was appointed in Komer's stead. CORDS operated until the evacuation of American forces from Vietnam in late February 1973.[21]

The discourse in America starting in the second half of the 1950s on ways to fight guerilla was part of a much broader academic discussion about the essence of the limited war.[22] In this context, theories regarding COIN were included as a sub-category. The main incentive for the discussion was the Korean War. The most prominent research was that of Robert Osgood, who claimed that in a limited war the civilian echelon plays a decisive role in determining the outcome of the war, because the political echelon has a greater effect than the military on the management of the war and the determination of the strategic goals. If before Korea the political echelon defined the general political objectives of any given war but intervened little in military-strategic considerations, after World War II the political echelon started becoming involved also in military considerations. In the Korean War, President Truman limited the war and refused to allow the American forces to harm targets in China so as not to escalate the war, despite the fact that from a military perspective the operational logic of bombing Chinese targets that were assisting the effort of the Chinese forces in Korea was clear.

Political capability and strength are of greater importance in this type of war than the military resources of the state engaged in the fighting. The objectives of the war too are political-civilian rather than military, and there is no significance to destroying the enemy's force militarily.[23] This is in contrast to World War II where attaining political objectives, i.e., the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan, were totally dependent on comprehensive military activity. This claim made by Osgood led him to a far reaching conclusion: if the limited war must be fought with political tools, the army's place is secondary and the war must be fought by the civilian echelon.[24] For this reason, the civilian echelon estimated that its importance had increased in the prosecution of the new type of warfare – the limited war.

Before President Kennedy was sworn in, the Pentagon published two studies about the means necessary to defeat Communist subversion in Southeast Asia. The main line of these studies and others that followed

was that the key to successful COIN is the control of the indigenous population.

The first study, published in May 1960, represented the conclusions of the discussions at the senior levels of the American military and government about COIN methods of warfare in Laos and South Vietnam. According to the study, the indigenous population was minimally if at all interested in political events in the nations under discussion; it did not understand Communist ideology or even the concept of nationalism at all. One cannot claim that the authors of the study failed to understand the political literacy of the Vietnamese peasant. Many studies examined the political inclinations of the rural population and the grounds that caused it to enlist on behalf of one political goal or other. There studies determined unequivocally that the main reason – sometimes the exclusive reason – was the peasant's desire to bring about an improvement in the standard of living of his family and that peasants would support the stronger political side active in their region in order to protect their families and villages from harm.[25] Moreover, the Communists themselves explained to the peasants the essence of the socialist philosophy (called in Vietnamese Xa Hoi Hoa) using the traditional terms of maintaining the people's connection to the land as a sacred value (Xa).[26]

The second study was a report written by the assistant to the secretary of defense for special operations, General Edward Lansdale, who was considered an expert on guerilla warfare, especially in the East Asian arena, and was one of President Kennedy's most important advisors on these matters.[27] The report, compiled in August 1960, raised a number of critical points on why the peasant supported the Vietcong. The two main points were the fury at the government forces for having destroyed the economic infrastructure, which affected the indigenous population, and fear of the terrorism practiced by the Vietcong against the indigenous population. According to Lansdale, most of the indigenous population supported the Vietcong because they had no choice as a result of the terror tactics employed by the Communists.[28]

In early 1962, *Foreign Affairs* published an essay written by Franklin Lindsay, a prominent scholar of the phenomenon of insurgency and a theoretician in the field of developing doctrines of counterinsurgency.[29] Lindsay's thesis is that the key to guerilla warfare is complete control of the guerilla fighters in the indigenous population.[30] As evidence

for his thesis, he cites the factors leading to the defeat of the French in Indochina, an historical example with great relevance to the events of 1962. According to Lindsay, the French were defeated in Vietnam because they lost the support of the indigenous population, while the Viet Minh won because it succeeded in arousing anti-colonialist feelings and assimilating Communist ideology among the peasants.[31]

The necessary conclusion is that the foundation of any policy or strategy against guerilla must be the government's complete control of the villages.[32] Later in the essay Lindsay sketches out the program of action required in South Vietnam. Because the Vietcong imposes its rule on the peasants by means of terrorism, the government must construct secure villages and charge militias composed of the peasants themselves with the task of safeguarding them. Every such secure village would also have advisors, both military and civilian, belonging to the government forces. These advisors would be in charge of everything occurring in the village, be able to identify the Communist cadres, and be able to neutralize them. The government would have to invest great resources in the civilian field, such as constructing schools and clinics, improving the agricultural infrastructure, and at the same time undertake military actions against the Vietcong's strongholds. It would be necessary to ensure the guerillas are always on the move, without the ability to consolidate their control of the rural areas, and to prevent their access to food supplies, shelter, medical treatment, and means of warfare.[33] The American advisors, taken from the special forces, would come to the region to become experts in the customs and culture of the peasants, learn the local dialect, and study the special problems of each village.[34] In other words, the Green Berets, in addition to being experts in guerilla warfare from a military point of view, were also supposed to become experts in guerilla warfare from the civilian point of view.[35] The Green Berets were the spearhead of the array of American advisors during the Kennedy administration. These soldiers underwent intensive training in the practice of COIN, a kind of training not given to any other American army unit.[36]

In March 1962, a conference called "The US Army's Limited War Mission and Social Sciences Research" was held in Washington. The initiative for the conference came from the Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, while the conference organizer was the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), an

academic-military research group financed by the US military. Including presentations by American academics and by senior army officers, the central topic of the conference was the army's doctrines of COIN warfare and the connection to the military reality in Vietnam, and the most effective programs in providing an appropriate response to Communist guerilla warfare. In his presentation, General Clyde Eddleman, the Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army, claimed that the major front of the Cold War was the underdeveloped portion of the world, i.e., Asia, Africa, and Latin America, areas that are home to almost half of the world's population. In order to prevent these areas from falling to the Communists, it was necessary to establish a stable economic and social system that would study the needs of the indigenous populations and assist them in the long run.[37]

The function of the US army is to assist local armies in their efforts in the civilian realm. The military units sent to areas in danger of being overrun by the Communists should include professionals with civilian skills: medical teams, engineers, and agricultural experts. Their task would be to develop links between the isolated villages and the centers of the urban areas by improving roads and building bridges, constructing medical clinics, educating the indigenous populations about personal health, and improving agricultural practices. In guerilla-stricken areas, such as Vietnam, it would also be necessary to put together local militias to fight the guerillas and to provide them with the required logistical support, training, and weapons. At the same time, all of America's efforts would have to be presented as if the South Vietnamese government and army were executing the programs, while the Americans were there only as advisors.[38] According to General Eddleman, these are the most effective tools for fighting guerilla because conventional forces, especially America's nuclear arsenal, were intended primarily to provide deterrence with regard to the Soviet Union, and not vis-à-vis the Third World.[39]

Another speaker at the conference was Robert Slover, deputy chief of the Plans and Doctrine Division, Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs, Department of the Army. His presentation dealt with civilian activities carried out by the army as anti-guerilla weapons. He too argues that the battlefield in the underdeveloped nations is within the indigenous population. General Slover pointed to three objectives of activities in the

civilian realm: recognition of the legitimacy of the local army on the part of the indigenous population; a strengthened connection between the local army and the peasants; and the acceptance of the central government by the people, with the army as its tool. The purpose of the army is not only to defend the country but also to construct it. The indigenous population must understand that its support of the central government and cooperation with its agents will perforce result in an improvement of their standard of living. In other words, the military dimension must also include civilian activity. If the indigenous population supports the army and the government, the guerilla fighters will be denied the support of the indigenous population, which is critical to the success of guerilla warfare. Withholding that support would eliminate the military infrastructure of the guerilla as well as their political success.[40] However, according to Slover, there is no substitute for military actions but these will be most effective only if there cooperation by the indigenous population.[41] Slover adds that in order to operate civilian programs most effectively it is necessary to study the way of life of the target population, their customs, social structures, and needs.[42]

From a survey of the presentations of two senior US army officers it is clear that the American army started to focus on a new aspect of warfare doctrines in the context of COIN, and even more so on non-military aspects in eradicating guerilla warfare in Southeast Asia in particular. In 1962, American involvement in Vietnam was growing steadily.[43] Military advisors were on the battlefield fighting alongside the South Vietnamese army, and American pilots provided aerial assistance to South Vietnamese army units fighting the Vietcong, which was becoming more and more entrenched within the indigenous population.[44] The people formulating policy at both the civilian and military levels clearly understood that destroying the Vietcong could not be done at the physical level but would have to take place by eliminating its popular infrastructure, in other words to make the Vietnamese peasantry support the government forces. "To win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people" became a popular slogan at that time. The knowledge that most of the population was supporting the Vietcong because of terrorism applied against the peasants made the military and civilian policymakers want to provide physical and economic security to the indigenous population so that it

would stop fearing the Vietcong and perhaps even turn against it, while transferring its support to the Vietnamese government.

## Conclusion

This essay sought to understand the theoretical basis required for a regular army fighting a revolutionary organization. COIN theories say that in a war against guerilla there must be elements of civilian activity and it is necessary to find the right balance with military activity. One of the ways to do so is to make the indigenous population, whose support is critical to the guerilla fighters, support civilian and military authorities fighting against the guerilla. It would be wrong to focus only on military action; rather, it is necessary to find the right balance between military and civilian (pacification) activities.

The American pacification programs during the war in Vietnam were constructed and executed in light of COIN theories developed in the United States before and during the American involvement there. Studying the lessons learned by the British in the suppression of the Communist uprising in Malaya also had an effect. The purpose of the military thinking was to find an operational mechanism that would damage the political and military infrastructures of the Communist guerillas organizations. Any guerilla or terrorist organization with a revolutionary orientation seeking the support of the civilian population is exposed to harm if COIN programs combining civilian and military activities are put into effect against it.

Thus, in fighting guerilla it is wrong to focus on military activity alone. Sometimes it serves as only one of a mix of political-social means that together can be effective in eradicating a revolutionary movement. The British case, and to a certain extent also the American one, presents us with an approach to fighting against a well founded theory, which has influenced many revolutionary movements around the world.

This essay has attempted to provide the historical foundation for understanding the way to create a theory of COIN. Just as a regular army must understand the principles upon which the enemy army operates and develop doctrines suitable to constructing a counter-force and putting it to work, so it must understand the doctrines guiding revolutionary organizations. The general COIN principles developed in the early 1960s must be studied and adapted to the political-social

realities of the contemporary era to find the theory most applicable to the relevant Israeli circumstances of time and place.

## Notes

1 The two concepts – guerilla and terrorism – are joined here because it is impossible to come up with a definitive definition acceptable to most scholars that would distinguish a terrorist organization from a guerilla movement. Any definition that distinguished between the two would be individualistic and subjective, and depend on cultural, political, and social aspects of one nation or another. Therefore, the concepts of guerilla and terrorism will be used interchangeably in this essay. Alex P. Schmid, in *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature* (Amsterdam, 1987), pp. 152-55, presents numerous definitions from the leading literature on the study of terrorism. See also Robert Kennedy, "Is One Person's Terrorist Another's Freedom Fighter? Western and Islamic Approaches to 'Just War' Compared," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11, no. 1 (1999): 3-4. Brian M. Jenkins, *New Modes of Conflict* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1983), pp. 7-9, claims there is a chronological distinction, arguing that guerilla warfare became terrorism at the end of the 1960s when guerilla organizations despaired of this form of warfare and understood that they would be unable to attain their goals through conventional warfare.

2 For different types of revolutionary political protest see Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency," in Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (eds.), *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), pp. 12-48.

3 For a discussion of the essence of insurgency or war of revolution see John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 817-19.

4 To see the creation of conventional military thinking in Israel, see Haim Nadel, *Between the Two Wars* (Tel Aviv, 2006), pp. 47-67; and Hanoch Bartov, *Dado: 48 Years and 20 Days* (Tel Aviv, 2002), pp. 109-10. These references are examples of theoretical thinking that created a military doctrine, which in turn affected IDF force buildup and application. See also Israel Tal, *National Security: The Few vs. the Many* (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1996), pp. 68-84.

5 Shlomo Gazit, *Trapped Fools: 30 Years of Israeli Policy in the Occupied Territories* (Tel Aviv, 1999), p. 35.

6 For a discussion of the British moves and operations see Tal Tovy, *Like Eating Soup with a Knife: The American Experience in Vietnam 1959-1973* (Tel Aviv, 2006), pp. 54-61.

7 The book has been translated into Hebrew as *Shilton Umardanut: Likhey Malaya Vevietnam* (Tel Aviv, 1967). This essay uses the Hebrew translation.

8 W. M. Bull, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia* (Tel Aviv, 1954), p. 7.

9 Thompson, *Shilton Umardanut*, pp. 50-51.
10 Ibid., p. 51.
11 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
12 See also John S. Pustay, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 150-54.
13 Thompson, *Shilton Umardanut*, p. 54.
14 Ibid.
15 John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 27-28.
16 Thompson, *Shilton Umardanut*, p. 56.
17 To define the tasks that special forces need to carry out in the context of COIN see Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises* (Tel Aviv, 1981), p. 156. For information on the Special Air Service (SAS) and programs in the civilian field see Neillands, *In the Combat Zone – Special Forces since 1945*, p. 108.
18 For information about the Mau Mau revolt and its suppression, with emphasis on counterinsurgency, see Tovy, *Like Eating Soup with a Knife*, pp. 63-65.
19 Civilian Operations and Revolutionary (Rural) Development Support.
20 Records of the United States Forces in Southeast Asia, 1950-1975 (RG-472), Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Office of Civil for Rural Development Support (CORDS), College Park MD.
21 For an overview of CORDS, see James K. McCollum, "The CORDS Pacification Organization in Vietnam: A Civilian Military Effort," in *Armed Forces and Society* 10, no. 1 (1983): 105-22; Richard H. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 82-132.
22 For an overview of the development of theories in the United States during the 1950s see Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: The U.S. Doctrine and Performance* (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 22-51; D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988), pp. 104-32; Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, and Counter-Terrorism, 1940-1990* (New York: Pantheon, 1992), pp. 100-36; Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2006), pp. 131-71.
23 Robert Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 7.
24 Ibid., p. 14.
25 The phenomenon of peasants enlisting in revolutionary movements occupied sociological and anthropological research in the 1960s and 1970s because it was from the peasants that the revolutionary movements of East Asia, Africa, and Latin America derived their strength. See Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 453-83;

Theodor Shanin, "The Peasantry as a Political Factor," *Sociological Review* 14, no. 1 (1966); Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); Pierre Gourou, *Men and Land in the Far East*, tr. S. H. Beaver (London: Longman, 1972); Eric R. Wolf, "On Peasant Rebellion," in Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.), *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare* (Chicago: Precedent, 1975); Richard K. Horner, "Agrarian Movements and Their Historical Conditions," *Peasant Studies* 8, no. 1 (1979); Christine P. White, "The Peasant and the Party in the Vietnamese Revolution," in D. B. Miller (ed.), *Peasant and Politics: Grass Roots Reaction to Change in Asia* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979); D. B. Miller, "Introduction: Peasant, Politics and the Study of Social Change in Asia," in *Peasants and Politics: Grass Roots Reaction to Change in Asia*; Scott E. Guggenheim and Robert P. Weller, "Introduction: Moral Economy, Capitalism, and State Power in Rural Protest," in Scott E. Guggenheim and Robert P. Weller (eds.), *Power and Protest in the Countryside: Studies of Rural Unrest in Asia, Europe, and Latin America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982).

26 The verb "hoa" indicates divine authority through people on earth. The meaning of the word "hoi" is union. Thus the idea of socialism is as that which unites man and the land, both of which are connected to and sanctified by divine authority. See White, "The Peasant and the Party in the Vietnamese Revolution," p. 26; Wolf, *Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century*, p. 189.

27 Walt W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 118-19; Cecil B. Curry, "Edward G. Lansdale: LIC and the Ugly American," *Military Review* 68, no. 5 (1988): 45-57.

28 For an overview of the two studies see Ron Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960* (New York: Viking Press, 1983), pp. 361-62. See also Francis J. Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971*, Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies (Washington D.C., 1973), p. 19. Here reference is made to a study that deals with the situation in Southeast Asia. The study, conducted in 1961, determined unequivocally that the Vietcong controls the entire hilly region of South Vietnam and that the efforts of the South Vietnamese army are ineffective. The study's conclusion was that effective use of locals could prevent the continuation of the spread of Communism. See also Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 287-88. For an additional discussion of Lansdale's military thinking see McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, pp. 197-213.

29 Franklin A. Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 40, no. 2 (1962): 264-74.

30 Ibid., pp. 264-66.

31 Ibid., p. 266.

32 Ibid., pp. 269-71.

33 Ibid., pp. 267-68.

34 As early as 1957, the Green Berets put into practice a program called the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) whose objective was to train the Degar mountain tribes (called the Montagnards by the French) to defend themselves and to go on small scale offensive operations against Vietcong units moving in the region or trying to cross into Vietnam from neighboring countries. For the stages of the CIDG program see Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971*, pp. 32-35.

35 Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," p. 274.

36 See Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971*, 6-18; Shalby L. Stanton, *Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1971* (Novato: Presidio, 1985), pp. 9-16, 35-41.

37 Clyde D. Eddleman, "Limited War and International Conflict," in: William A. Lybrand (ed.), *The U.S. Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research* (Washington D.C., 1962), pp. 27, 30-31.

38 Eddleman, "Limited War and International Conflict," pp. 35-36.

39 In his presentation, General Eddleman cites the Kennedy administration policy of flexible response as well as President Kennedy's view that the struggle against Communism is actually taking place in the developing nations.

40 Robert H. Slover, "Civic Action in Development Nations," in *The U.S. Army's Limited War Mission and Social Science Research*, pp. 70-72. See also Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*, pp. 116-18.

41 Slover, "Civic Action in Development Nations," p. 72.

42 Slover, "Civic Action in Development Nations," p. 77.

43 Towards the end of the Eisenhower administration there were 875 American army personnel in Vietnam. By 1962, there were already some 11,000 soldiers there. See Spencer C. Tucker, *Vietnam* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), pp. 97-98; Phillip B. Davidson, *Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 300-1.

44 Marilyn B. Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 69-88; Tucker, *Vietnam*, pp. 97-98.