

published an official document of recommendations to other al-Qaeda affiliates in which it suggest a comprehensive strategy for action for seizing control of a territory and holding onto it.⁵³

The Yemeni arena has much to teach us about the dangers posed by al-Qaeda and the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies, such as comprehensive military attacks or assassination campaigns using drones. Nonetheless, the dynamics reviewed in this paper indicate that, even at its weakest, the state is still the most dominant and powerful element in its territory and that the radicalization in the attempts of subversive forces to damage its sovereignty can only be expected to be met with determined, forceful countermeasures.

Finally, Yemen—after the unification of the emirates—is the first Arab nation expected to take the federal route, a process that may be repeated in other countries as well, such as Syria, Libya and Iraq. Keeping an eye on the implementation and development of the federal process in Yemen may provide important insight on the effectiveness of this political configuration for creating governing stability and preventing widespread violence.

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Managing Intellectual Property in the Defense Establishment: Opportunities and Risks

Shmuel Even and Yesha Sivan

In Israel, there is a consensus on the value of all knowledge generated in the defense establishment and its contribution to the economy. But in the State Comptroller's report of March 2014, the management of intellectual property (IP) at the Ministry of Defense was described as an ongoing fiasco, with the blame ascribed to both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Finance. This essay seeks to contribute to the discourse on remedying the flaws and suggest some organizing principles in the management of IP, while considering both the needs of the defense establishment and those of the Israeli economy. The essay proposes that the IDF manage the IP under its purview as part of the organization's knowledge management, but not engage in financial IP transactions; a specially designated company should be established in the Ministry of Defense that would be responsible for this. At present, the chances of such a move succeeding seem low, but even if it results only in an improvement of the management of technological knowledge in the defense establishment, it would constitute an achievement. Knowing that the idea of commercializing knowledge has been seriously and thoroughly examined is important in and of itself.

Key words: knowledge management, commercialization of knowledge, defense establishment, Ministry of Defense (MoD), Israel Defense Forces (IDF), State Comptroller, defense budget, Israeli economy, high-tech, cyberspace

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The essay was written as part of the INSS Economics and National Security Research Program, supported by the Joseph and Jeanette Neubauer Foundation.

Introduction

Many technologies serving humankind started out as developments for the military, including the microwave, radio, digital camera, internet, GPS, and more.¹ All of these have vast economic value. The Israeli defense establishment (Ministry of Defense, IDF, etc.) develops and improves technologies that subsequently enter the civilian sector, but the knowledge travels from the defense establishment to the economy in an unsupervised, unmanaged way, without any compensation.

The fundamental question at stake is this: should a state deal with the management and commercialization of knowledge developed in its institutions in general and its defense establishment in particular? The analysis in this essay can help formulate an opinion on the matter. The essay's starting point is the State Comptroller's March 2014 report, according to which the Ministry of Defense (MoD) should manage its intellectual property (IP) in order to capitalize on it, or at least make a serious attempt to do so. The results would then either lead to a codification of the issue or to its being removed from the national agenda. Therefore, the essay will attempt to outline how best to meet this challenge while minimizing risks and maximizing opportunities.

The discussion on the management of IP in the defense establishment requires an understanding of several concepts:

- a. *Knowledge management* refers to the entire system of development, follow up, control and oversight in the context of the creation of internal knowledge (within the defense establishment), receipt of external knowledge (from outside the establishment), and transfer of the knowledge, including the distinction between existing knowledge and knowledge that has yet to be developed.
- a. *Intellectual property* is the general term for the rights to intangible goods and resources resulting from thought processes. IP includes inventions, technologies, work processes, patents, and any sort of information or knowledge having commercial potential (henceforth "information"). The rights of IP are protected by means of patents, copyrights, confidentiality clauses, and so on.
- a. *IP management* is the systematic management of knowledge defined as IP or likely to become such, including its production, registration, classification and commercialization. Management touches on knowledge created within the system and on the ways its commercialization affects

the organization (in our case, the defense establishment), the people in it, and even global and Israeli companies.

- a. *Commercialization of IP* is the range of actions involved in generating an economic return on IP. This may include the process of turning IP into something with commercial potential and then trading with it. Trade in IP can involve selling the rights to the IP or the products developed on its basis, or receiving royalties.

The Current State of Affairs

The Problem According to the State Comptroller's Report

In March 2014, the Israeli State Comptroller issued a report on the management of IP at the Ministry of Defense. The report states that the MoD's lack of management of IP is an ongoing fiasco and that "the MoD has, for many years, neglected the handling of Israel's defense IP assets under its purview and owned by the IDF."² According to the report, the MoD has no policy, suitable directives³ or central body handling the issue. As a result, the MoD does a poor job of managing, following up on, and supervising the assets of the IP developed on its watch or with its financing, including the military industries, and even following up on its subsequent uses. For example, the IDF has no current data on the quantity, type, and value of IP assets in its possession.

The State Comptroller's report indicates that from 2004 until 2012 nine different teams tackled the issue. All of them pointed to the many flaws in the management of IP at the MoD and formulated recommendations to deal with the issue and improve the situation. However, the ministry's conduct was characterized by "foot-dragging and a lack of resolve." The major flaws were lack of policy on managing the wealth of IP assets in the ministry and how to realize them economically, while not receiving any compensation for transferring ministry knowledge to third parties. "These failings cause real damage both to the ministry's ability to manage its IP and its ability to realize the economic potential inherent in its IP. The MoD must address these failings without delay."⁴

The report also noted that the Israeli Accountant General, as the executor of the Ministry of Finance responsible for handling the nation's assets including intangible ones, failed to fulfill his obligation. The report indicated his neglect when it comes to regulating IP in the Ministry of Defense, supervising the IP assets at the ministry's disposal and the use

that is made of them. Interestingly, the Accountant General stated that the ministry's IP assets have great inherent economic potential, and therefore recommended to institutionalize the field of IP in the Ministry of Defense.⁵

The Israeli State Comptroller's Office noted in the 2013 Annual Report (March 2014) that MoD Director General Maj. Gen. (res.) Dan Harel instructed that steps be taken to remedy the significant failings that emerged during the review.

Completing the assessment of what is happening in the government sector is the seminal study issued in April 2014 by the Haifa Center for Law and Technology at the University of Haifa, which examined the current state of affairs of the policy on the commercialization of government sponsored R&D in general. The study's findings also indicated the lack of a consistent policy on patent registration of products of research funded by the government and their commercialization. "This state of affairs does not serve the goals of government sponsored R&D and is at odds with the principles of good governance." The study's conclusions reveal that although it would be unwise to dictate a single policy for all forms of IP sharing, development and commercialization of government knowledge, it is necessary to create a unifying framework for defining the decision makers' and policy framers' considerations on these issues. The study therefore suggests a framework for defining and identifying the relevant concerns regarding the commercialization of products resulting from government sponsored R&D by means of patents.⁶

The Knowledge Created in the Defense Establishment and its Importance to the Economy

Managing knowledge in Israel's defense establishment represents a unique instance of knowledge management in public institutions. The knowledge created in the defense establishment is the result of the formulation of new ideas, development, manufacturing, generation of lab data, experiments, operational use, lesson learning, training and instruction, and more. The many challenges and the access to creative manpower render Israel's defense establishment unique. These advantages greatly affect the development of the Israeli economy, especially in the high-tech sector. The derived added value will increase as the need for new and innovative technologies surges. Israel's prominent position in the global cyber market is an excellent example of untapped IP assets.

The act of creating knowledge with commercial potential in the defense establishment occurs in several bodies: those in charge of planning and managing R&D in the MoD, the IDF, and the security industries, both government owned (Israel Aircraft Industries, Rafael, and Israel Military Industries) and private or semi-private ones acting on the government's behalf (Elbit Systems, mPrest Systems and others), research institutions and in academic settings where R&D is conducted for the Ministry of Defense. In addition, the Administration for the Development of Weapons and Technological Infrastructures is a joint body belonging to the MoD and the IDF. Quite a few projects were initiated by the army's branches and corps, following which they were executed by the defense industries. The engineers in the defense establishment characterize, provide advice and ensure that the weapons developed and manufactured meet the demands with a profound understanding of operational needs.⁷

Furthermore, IDF units create IP assets in fields such as technological developments for the sake of intelligence gathering and cyberspace; weapons, securing and fortification development; warfare doctrines; experimental data; and more. The State Comptroller's report also stated that an officer in Unit 8200 reported that the unit is brimming with IP assets that could be traded to the defense industries, but that there is no suitable mechanism for making it happen: "there is no strategic mechanism defining what may be released and what must be released."⁸

The knowledge created in the defense establishment feeds the economy by contributing to the GNP, investments, and employment. The high-tech sector directly employs close to 9.5 percent of the country's workforce and is a critical source for the GNP, income from taxes and exports. One must remember that increasing exports of Israeli goods and services is a prerequisite of growth, because Israel's own market is small and its economy is export oriented. This dependence forces Israel to maintain a high level of competitiveness and adapt itself to structural changes in the global market. Because Israel has no competitive advantage in terms of a cheap workforce, this is possible only if Israel remains a leader in the high-tech sector.

Many technological companies have been established in Israel by or via former members of technological units in the defense establishment, in part because of the knowledge base and experience they gained during their army service. The financial press has pointed to former members of

military intelligence's Unit 8200 as being involved in the founding of some internationally leading tech companies: Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., which deals with information security, valued at \$13.8 billion on the NASDAQ (November 2014); Verint Systems Inc., which deals with information gathering, retention and analysis for business intelligence, valued at \$3.5 billion on the NASDAQ; NICE Systems Ltd., which specializes in telephone voice recording, data security and surveillance, valued at \$2.8 billion on the NASDAQ; and more. The technological and operational knowledge emanating from the IDF also represents a critical resource for Israeli security companies. In 2013, Israel signed contracts for selling weapons and security equipment estimated at \$6.5 billion.⁹

The defense establishment is proud of its contribution to the economy. In December 2013, Maj. Gen. Orna Barbivai, then-head of the IDF's Manpower Directorate, said that, "if one takes a broad, national, systemic view, it is easy to see how the IDF and other security services are the engine pulling the country's economic growth and that its manpower is a competitive edge by any standard...One can see the correlation between the advanced startups, in Israel and abroad, and their roots in the army."¹⁰ In January 2011, then-Maj. Gen. Ami Shafran, head of the IDF's Teleprocessing Branch, said that "the IDF represents a key technological hothouse for the high-tech sector...One of the products of this technological hothouse is the human capital that assimilates into Israeli R&D, higher education and industry." According to Shafran, "from a market point of view, spending on developing technological human capital in the IDF in the field of teleprocessing, whose designation is primarily security, also represents an investment yielding significant economic returns for the economy and a central part of Israeli exports."¹¹

One could say that the defense establishment—because of investments, authority given to young people, and operational demands—has, in recent decades, served as a significant catalyst for the founding of new Israeli companies and has created a competitive edge for Israel on the global market. However, global trends in R&D and the founding of new companies are generating new challenges.¹² Global competition and the need to be the first to hit the global market mean an accelerated rate of development and the need for rapid availability of international contacts and capital. Entrepreneurs are therefore eager to reach investors and strategic contacts to finance the developments that can take them into new markets and issue

the companies on global stock markets as soon as possible. This gives rise to a question: will inventions whose origins lie in centers of knowledge in Israel, including the defense establishment, continue to create the same value for the Israeli economy in the future, or will they quickly find their way to international companies?

IP Movement from the Defense Establishment to the Business World

The IP generated by the defense establishment currently makes its way to the outside world via personal and institutional routes.

The Personal Route—Via Alumni

IP developed in the defense establishment technological units moves into the free market via the people who served in them. Officially, the Ministry of Defense's policy does not allow the transfer of information this way, but in practice this is not supervised by the ministry, as many companies employ former members of the MoD departments. However, as far as anyone knows, no concrete information has been published on the transfer of specific IP from the defense establishment, and no one has made any kind of assessment of the value of the IP that has moved into the free market via the personal route. It should also be noted that given the current state of affairs, it is difficult to isolate the contribution of protectable IP from the professional knowledge and experience accrued by graduates of the defense establishment and from the added value the IP accrues in the civilian business setting. The defense establishment is losing potential income from this IP, as noted by the State Comptroller, but as long as it is used in Israeli companies the local economy and the state are at least benefiting greatly, albeit indirectly. This is not the case when IP is realized in its early stages within foreign companies abroad.

The Institutional Route—the Military Industries

These are cases in which an idea, definition, performance testing and sometimes even development funding and manufacturing all happen within the defense establishment, whereupon the industries may use the information and products also on behalf of other clients. Sometimes, the MoD receives royalties for this use, should its rights be specifically noted in the work orders for projects that the military industries carry out as contractors.

It should be noted that the transfer of knowledge from the companies used (through sub-contractors or previous employees) is supposed to be handled in the setting of the commercial company interested in protecting the IP even if the information is affiliated with the defense establishment. When this happens in companies fully owned by the government, the state receives full compensation for the IP because the defense establishment and these companies have one single stockholder—the government. But when it happens in defense industries not owned by the government, the defense establishment is liable to lose potential income. The growing use made by the defense establishment of external companies is another reason for following up on what happens to the IP developed in the defense establishment or with its funding.

Institutionalizing the Management Of IP in the Defense Establishment—Opportunities and Risks

In changing the current situation by institutionalizing the management of IP of the defense establishment and commercializing it, as required by the State Comptroller's report, there are both opportunities and risks for the defense establishment and for the economy, as is demonstrated below.

Opportunities for the Defense Establishment in Managing IP

- a. *Contribution to the improvement of knowledge and organizational memory management.* Documenting and managing IP is a necessary component in improving the defense establishment's ability to attain its goals long before touching upon the issue of commercializing knowledge. Insufficient retention of technological knowledge in the defense establishment arouses some troubling questions: are time and resources being wasted in certain units as they redevelop technological products already developed in the past? Do certain units promote technological abilities already developed or being developed in other units due to a lack of central control of technological information? These questions are particularly pertinent for units in the IDF and the intelligence community. Compared to the IDF, the defense industries have an advantage in knowledge preservation because they make institutionalized efforts to retain accumulated knowledge over a long period of time by a cadre of permanent employees who do not end their service after three years or are transferred from one position to another, as is customary in the

- army. Nonetheless, even with regard to these companies, the question arises: is there sufficient documentation of knowledge and is there a sharing of knowledge among government owned companies?
- b. *Economic compensation for the defense establishment.* According to the State Comptroller, “maximizing the economic potential in IP assets may provide the MoD with many added financial resources that could significantly increase the state’s budget sources in general and that of the MoD in particular.”¹³ At stake is the compensation expected from the system’s income resulting from the commercialization of IP through products such as various types of communications devices, command and control systems, information security products, optics, drones, satellites, voice processing, picture processing, and so on.¹⁴ Additional income would be generated by means of equipment sale, rendering services, real estate, etc.
 - c. *Contribution to retaining personnel in technological units.* Currently, given the lack of management of IP, the possibility of extracting IP without compensation is liable to tempt the most outstanding personnel in the system to leave as soon as they can. In addition, if the IDF gives up on copyrights, its employees or those serving in it are discriminated against, compared to their cohorts who leave the system and use the knowledge for their own gain. By contrast, if there is informed management, the possibility that personnel serving in the technological units become partners in the creation of IP on the forefront of global technology could maintain a high level of motivation to enlist in these units and perhaps also reduce the numbers leaving the army during high-tech booms around the world. Furthermore, the possibility of recruiting new workers not subject to long service in the defense establishment—for example, 3-6 year stints—to be part of the system of knowledge development and experimentation as part of their own professional development should be examined. This would encourage knowledge to flow in the opposite direction: from outside the system inwards.
 - d. *Contribution to the defense establishment’s operational capabilities.* It is only reasonable to assume that in various units there are ideas that remain unrealized because of limited resources or lack of economic feasibility, especially if the unit would be the product’s only customer. By means of an orderly transfer of IP to businesses, it would be possible to develop more ideas at lower cost, thereby increasing the number

of products that IDF units could purchase from the industries. For example, it may be that somewhere in the IDF there is an idea for a new explosives detection device or one for conducting underground surveys. Orderly work with a business for joint development could allow the development of products for marketing to meet both the needs of the defense establishment and the global market.

- e. *Preventing operational harm.* Increasing command and control would reduce the rate of unsupervised leakage of classified IP leaving the system liable to fall into hostile hands.
- f. *Protecting the IDF's ability to use technology.* Situations are liable to arise in which IP originating in the defense establishment is patented by a civilian entity, which could limit the defense establishment and defense industries' ability to use it.
- g. *Improving the governance of national resources.* Meeting directives and procedures as noted in the State Comptroller's report.

Risks to the Defense Establishment in Managing IP

- a. *Risk of becoming overly preoccupied with IP for civilian needs.* At times, this could skew the priorities of the units away from dealing with the most important security needs.
- b. *Risk of financial loss.* The way to turn an idea into protected IP can be long and costly. Furthermore, conflicts about ownership of the IP that could lead to costly legal battles are liable to erupt. This could also damage the defense establishment's image. In any case, maximizing the income of information developed in the defense establishment is complex, and it is best not to develop higher than realistic expectations of the financial gains this route can represent. For example, if compensation takes the form of stocks the state receives from the sale of IP, it could deplete the funds raised by the company.¹⁵
- c. *Risk to human resources.* Strengthening the interface between civilian industries and the defense establishment is liable to increase the temptations for many talented personnel to leave the defense establishment, especially during high-tech booms. In addition, over-supervision of knowledge is liable to deter experts from working in the defense establishment.
- d. *Risk of establishing a mechanism that will only perpetuate itself.* One of the dangers is the establishment of a body that will fulfill its bureaucratic

objective but lack sufficient motivation to maximize the value of the knowledge because it will be part of the defense establishment structure whose performance is not tested on the basis of the results of knowledge commercialization.

- e. *Growing risk of exposing sensitive information.* The management of IP, the sharing of knowledge, and the establishment of knowledge bases are inherently liable to increase this risk, especially when more information is exposed to more people who will want to make use of it on global markets.

Opportunities for the Economy in Managing IP in the Defense Establishment

- a. *Improving the flow of information to the market.* It is reasonable to assume that the defense establishment currently suffers from loss of information because it never makes it to the market. For example, in March 2014, Brig. Gen. (res.) Prof. Chaim Eshed, chair of the military space committee in the National Council for R&D, said: “in cyber, we are breaking new ground...This is the field in which we’ve dealt for more than 20 years, even if we didn’t always call it cyber. Still, the defense establishment has greatly invested in turning military technologies into dual-purpose technologies that can be marketed in the civilian world, but we’re not there yet.”¹⁶
- b. *Giving priority to the use of IP to benefit Israel.* Globalization encourages routes in which IP moves directly abroad (also with the help of defense establishment alumni) without contributing to the Israeli economy. This route offers Israeli entrepreneurs the opportunity to work in places where there is access to capital, large markets and higher standards of living and working. In some cases, tempting offers come to Israeli entrepreneurs directly from abroad. In addition, many global companies, by means of their development centers in Israel, keep a watchful eye on new ideas emerging from Israel. This makes it possible for foreign companies and nations to enjoy the profits of IP developed with resources belonging to the State of Israel. Control of IP developed by the nation would allow it to give priority to using this IP for the good of the country and its economy (more on this below).
- c. *Institutionalizing the flow of information.* This would protect companies and other knowledge users from claims and lawsuits, and increase market equality in receiving information. The more uses there are for

the information, the more knowledge will expand, thereby multiplying the number of new opportunities in the encounter among entrepreneurs, consumers, financing and science.

- d. *Greater social equality.* The issue of economic inequality in Israeli society is at the heart of public discourse. Generally speaking, no one disputes the right of personnel exiting the public sector to maximize the knowledge and skills they acquired for creating economic wealth once they enter the private sector. However, in the future it will become more difficult to ignore the question of whether or not the public is entitled to this wealth, with so much IP originating with the defense establishment.

Risks to the economy in managing IP in the defense establishment

Damage to the Flow of Information

The State Comptroller's report does not relate to the question of how to ensure that the great economic potential inherent in IP assets of the MoD and the IDF will in fact be maximized on behalf of the Israeli economy. If the defense establishment keeps its IP to itself (a risk liable to arise from an extreme interpretation of the State Comptroller's report) as the result of rigid procedures and directives and without establishing a mechanism for the transfer and application of information, the damage to both the economy and the defense establishment is liable to be significant, because several technological developments with value to the defense industry, the super-technology industries, and the Israeli GNP in general could be prevented. Therefore meticulous registration of intangible assets and their safekeeping must occur in tandem with a solution for the application of the information. It is likely that the current state of affairs, in which information is transferred without compensation to the defense industries and the economy through personnel that served in technological units and are now working on the free market, is preferable to the state compared to a situation in which rigid procedures will prevent its use altogether.

Factors Liable to Turn this Risk into a Reality

- a. *The establishment of a rigid bureaucratic mechanism within the Ministry of Defense.* For example, for the defense establishment, which is not oriented by nature towards economic profits, it is very easy to delay and even prevent the release of information to the free market on the

basis of its being classified or restricted. Furthermore, in the fast-paced world of accelerated technological developments, such delays may decrease attractiveness of the IP created in the defense establishment and its competitive edge on the global market.

- b. *Failed intra-system cooperation.* It is clear that the subject under discussion is not likely to head the agenda of any commanding officer and may even be viewed as a nuisance. Former defense establishment personnel can bypass the system's ownership of the IP by making certain alterations. In extreme cases, there is a risk that some personnel within the defense establishment will prefer to keep certain knowledge with commercial potential to themselves rather than register it with the defense establishment in the first place.

Interim Summary

Proper IP management in the defense establishment can maximize opportunities and minimize risks. The following are suggested steps that can be taken to this effect.

First, regulation is needed for the sake of controlling and supervising the information. This stage should begin with an orderly registration of information. Second, it is necessary to institutionalize the sharing of information and knowledge within the system. Third, it is possible to begin to commercialize the knowledge. This stage must involve detailed planning, establishment of a mechanism, a survey and a pilot program before full-scale commercialization begins. These three stages require prior planning and risk management, mainly in order to prevent a situation in which information produced by the defense establishment that can be released, is not. The following section examines possible solutions for the commercialization of knowledge.

Existing Models of Commercialization of Knowledge

Assuming that the defense establishment is interested in the orderly application of the IP generated under its aegis, the following section will review the main models for realizing this goal.

Venture Capital Funds

These are bodies that raise money from investors (limited partners) for risky ventures such as startups. The many companies controlled by the

fund reduce the risk involved when an investor invests in a single company. The sources of IP in ventures capital funds vary; some funds invest in ideas at the very beginning, while others come in at a more advanced stage. The capital is usually foreign: 90 percent of the capital currently raised for the Israeli high-tech sector comes from foreign investors.¹⁷ As a result of the dramatic increase in raising venture capital for the Israeli market at the end of the 1990s, the defense establishment had the idea to use the assets to develop dual-purpose (civilian and security) technologies originating in the technological units of the IDF, and thereby help finance R&D in the security sector.¹⁸ This idea was never implemented and became less attractive after the high-tech bubble burst globally at the start of the new millenium. From time to time, funds and private companies specializing in the commercialization of dual-purpose technologies originating in the defense establishment are founded.

Technological Incubators and Accelerators (“Hothouses”)

These are settings designed to turn innovative technological ideas into startups and get them to the point where they can raise funds on their own. The hothouse provides new projects that are still in their early stages, with support such as an infrastructure for R&D, technological and business support, connections to investors and strategic partners, help in putting together suitable teams and administrative services for the company, etc. The technological hothouse program run by the chief scientist of the Ministry of the Economy allocates a certain budget to the projects that have been approved for participation; 85 percent of the funds are provided by the state as a grant to be paid back in the form of royalties on sales, and the entrepreneurs hold 15 percent of the stock of the company to be established thanks to the hothouse without having to invest any of their own money in the venture.¹⁹

Investment Companies

This is a general term for companies specializing in acquiring subsidiaries and working to upgrade them. The company’s profits come from the subsidiary’s dividends and from the income derived from the sale of the upgraded companies. Investors in an investment company are the company’s shareholders. RDC Ltd.,²⁰ for example, applies the idea of cooperation between the security and civilian sectors. This company is owned jointly

by Rafael Industries and Discount Investments. It is designed to combine technological IP from Rafael and receive capital and business knowhow from Discount Investments for the sake of establishing subsidiaries. The most successful of RDC's projects is Given Imaging Ltd., which manufactures and markets diagnostic products—pills with tiny cameras inside for the visualization and detection of disorders in the gastrointestinal tract. At the end of 2013, Given Imaging Ltd. was sold to the Covidian Group for \$820 million.²¹

Companies for the Commercialization of Knowledge at Universities, Research Institutes and Hospitals

These companies promote commercial applications based on inventions by researchers working in the organization, such as Ramot Ltd. at Tel Aviv University, Hadassit Ltd. at Hadassah Hospital, Yisum Ltd. at the Hebrew University, and so on.²² Isorad Ltd. is a government company manufacturing and commercializing developments made at the Soreq Nuclear Research Center. This company, for example, is involved in the development of nuclear catheters and other developments in the field of nuclear medicine.²³

The 8200 EISP Program

This is a non-profit organization established in 2010 by an NGO formed by Military Intelligence Unit 8200 alumni on behalf of the community. Its objective is to use the knowledge and experience of its members to help young entrepreneurs, not necessarily from Unit 8200, succeed in new ventures. By April 2014, 60 entrepreneurs in three rounds have participated in the program. Among the projects participating in the program were a company in the field of interactive advertising and a company in the field of information security.²⁴

The US Army IP Model

The US Army grants licenses to civilian companies to use patents under its registration. The army views this as a way to expand the use of various inventions that came about under its aegis. The license may be for non-exclusive, partially-exclusive or exclusive use, based on the army's considerations for any given invention. In any case, the US administration retains the nation's rights to use the military's inventions for its own needs.

Royalties are determined through negotiations and relate to the size of the potential market, exclusivity, and the need to develop additional technologies. The army's research labs may provide technological assistance for further development.²⁵ Obviously, when exclusivity is not granted, the particular IP becomes less attractive.

The Intellectual Ventures (IV) Model

Intellectual Ventures is a company based on the principle of knowledge sharing. One of the company's approaches is developing ideas while taking advantage of a network of some 4,000 inventors around the world. Inventors respond to a call for proposals, IV chooses the ideas for commercialization and finances the creation of patents. The inventors are eligible for some of the profits should IV sell its assets.²⁶

Principles for Handling the Management and Commercialization of IP in the Defense establishment

Given the situation and the various models presented above and in light of an analysis of the risks and opportunities, we now propose some principles for the management of IP in the purpose of commercialization.

At the opposite ends of the security spectrum are two types of organizations that must be treated very differently:

- a. *Security companies.* These commercial companies are supposed to manage their IP as any company doing business these days, including documentation, confidentiality and patent registration, under government guidance and supervision. The MoD and the Ministry of Finance must ensure that government owned companies use up-to-date procedures that protect the state's rights in general and particularly when they sign contracts. The best scenario would be the establishment of a knowledge sharing mechanism that would connect all government owned companies to increase efficiency and maximize the advantage of size. When it comes to non-government companies or providers to government owned companies, it is important to make sure that there is a contractual and follow-up system in place, so that IP developed with defense establishment funds remains under defense establishment ownership and supervision, even if those non-government companies use it on behalf of other customers.

b. *Military units*. In general, it is best that they do not focus on the business side of things but rather on the security purpose of their developments and on transferring the information that could be applied to commercial uses. The responsibility of the commanding officers would be to document the information created in the unit, use the information for the unit's needs, share the information with other units in the defense establishment for its security needs, preserve information security (so far, these are all tasks that serve the military's needs), and only then transfer the information regarding business needs to the body in the MoD authorized to deal with its commercialization. It should be noted that the task of preventing the leakage of information out of the unit based on information security considerations also serves the function of supervising the IP developed in the unit.

Most of the dealings with the commercialization of IP originated in IDF units would therefore occur within the MoD itself, but cooperation with the units is a prerequisite.

A Prerequisite is the Internal Management and Control of the IP

The defense establishment must engage in the registration, protection and regularization of ownership before patent registration. To that end, the defense establishment must undertake activities of a legal and organizational nature: procedures, directives, guidance, explanation, enforcement and supervision. The MoD must take steps to ensure that unreleased information does not leak into the market in an unsupervised way and that the flow of information takes place only via an authorized body. In any case, it is essential to ensure that application of this principle is in tandem with the regularization of the release of IP to the market so as to avoid a bottleneck in the defense establishment.

Taking a Broad View

Handling this complex issue requires the integration of representatives from different fields. It is best to put together a steering committee that would include representatives from the Ministry of Defense, the technological units in the IDF, the military industries, the Ministry of Finance, the Chief Scientist in the Ministry of the Economy, and the Patents Authority in the Ministry of Justice. Subordinate to this committee, there would be two groups charged with the essential components of the process: one

dedicated to gathering information from IDF units, sorting it, and releasing it for commercialization, and one dedicated to preparing the information for its commercialization and its actual commercialization.

Gathering and Sorting of IP and its Release for Commercial Use

This requires a professional body in the Ministry of Defense. It must be intimately familiar with the technologies in the defense establishment and be able to envision their civilian applications. It would be responsible for the active gathering, intake and preservation of information from the technological units. It is important that this body have expertise both in the technological side and in marketing, including an understanding of the needs of the civilian market, on the one hand, and the capabilities of the defense establishment, on the other. To this end the body would have to seek the help of consultants from the business world.

After gathering, sorting, and organizing the information, a committee will authorize the release of technologies from the defense, while undertaking a cost-benefit analysis. The committee would include representatives from the groups involved in the steering committee. The IP released for commercialization would appear in the Ministry of Defense's database.

The Realization of the IP for the Needs of the Civilian Market

Another body, such as a designated government company, would be established to realize the IP designated for the non-government business market. The company would be fully government owned or owned in partnership with the business sector. Initially, full government ownership is preferable given the complexity of founding and running a jointly owned company. In either situation, control would remain in the hands of the MoD and management would be handled by business professionals. The Ministry of Defense's representatives on the steering committee would be members of the company's board of directions, ensuring they were committed to its success. The Chief Scientist of the Ministry of the Economy would be involved in its establishment. It is best that this company be founded only after the professional body in the MoD has gathered 20-30 ideas from the units.

The designated company would handle the following: retrieving information from the database; documenting and researching the applicability of the IP for the business sector; protecting the preparation

of the information for commercialization (e.g., protecting the information with patents); and the commercialization of the information.

Commercialization of the Information for the Civilian Sector

This would occur via the designated company at least in the direct sales routes.

Direct Sales Route

The designated company would sell the rights to the knowledge to commercial companies, both military and civilian, under normal business terms, such as a lump sum payment, royalties,²⁷ and stocks with an anti-dilution mechanism. Conditions for limited use may be set: a prohibition on transferring the technology to another party, and commitment to use the IP within a set period of time. There may also be priorities in the selling of IP, such as giving preference to establishing and developing companies in Israel or foreign companies that are providers of security products to Israel or contribute directly to the development of Israel's economy, etc.

The Hothouse Route

This route's purpose would be to sell the IP at the stage where it is already applied at the small business level. This route, which is infinitely more complex, could make a significant contribution in other fields as well, such as the development of knowledge and management of manpower (more on this below). The designated company would stay in close contact with existing hothouses and/or establish a startup hothouse of its own. One could also consider the founding of startups whose knowledge base is classified, provided the final products are not restricted or would be channeled into use only within the defense establishment. Some of the projects could be developed in hothouses already active while others could be developed close to the technological units.

This interaction is likely to provide the defense establishment two additional advantages: on the technological side, the units would be able to test the applicability of the ideas to existing needs, and on the side of maintaining technological manpower, the project would represent an alternative to technological personnel who, in any case, want to leave the army without completely cutting themselves off from the system. In other words, in certain cases, the IDF would allow people to leave the units and develop their ideas in the hothouse. Because only a fraction of the projects

can be expected to succeed, as is the norm in the venture capital sector, the defense establishment would be able to reintegrate hothouse personnel. Alternately, personnel from the technological units would be able to work in the hothouse for a certain period of time as part of an extended service program, similar to personnel granted time to study at the university. The risk in this is that the route could also accelerate the rate at which certain personnel leave or overemphasize hothouse-related efforts at the expense of security goals.

Conclusion

The defense establishment has IP that can be developed for commercial use in both the military and civilian sectors. Some IP leaves the system in a disorganized fashion or remains in the system and is never fully realized. Generally, the prevalent situation in the MoD and the findings of other studies point to the need for a comprehensive policy on the management of IP belonging to the government into which the security sector would be integrated.

Proper management of IP in the defense establishment would take full advantage of the opportunities and minimize the risks inherent in the field. In any case, it is important to avoid overly rigid government involvement, which might damage the economy. It is therefore necessary to ensure that there are routes via which it is possible to transmit the information to the market so that the market could make use of it. Given the risks inherent to the process, it is best to implement the process gradually and to begin by undertaking a pilot program.

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And What If We Did Not Deter Hizbollah?

Yagil Henkin

The consensus in Israel is that Hizbollah was deterred as a result of the Second Lebanon War, that because of the damage sustained by the group and its supporters, it refrained from fighting against Israel, and that quiet that has reigned on the northern border was a result of the war. In fact, most of the arguments supposedly proving that Hizbollah was deterred are less clear-cut than they appear. The majority of Hizbollah's actions, both before and after the war, can be explained by other factors—domestic Lebanese and international—over which Israel has a very limited degree of control or influence. It is thus necessary to carefully examine the assumption of deterrence, and in particular, to avoid complacency based on this assumption.

Key words: Israel, Lebanon, Hizbollah, Nasrallah, deterrence, Syria, Iran

Was Hizbollah Deterred?

On August 1, 2006, in the midst of the Second Lebanon War, then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated that

Those who fired the missiles will not hurry to create friction which will instigate confrontation, since they know the price paid by them, the country in which they reside, the population whose support is the source of their strength, and everything around them.¹

Since then, Olmert's assertion was reinforced by his political supporters and opponents alike,² as well as army officials.³ Another layer was provided by the "Dahiya Doctrine," which states, in the words of then-Commander of the Northern Command Gabi Eisenkot in 2008, "the possibility of harm

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to the population is the main restraint on Nasrallah and the reason for the quiet."⁴ Because the northern border has been quiet since 2006, Olmert called the Second Lebanon War, seven years after the fact, "the most successful" of Israel's wars.⁵

In fact, there are different interpretations of Hizbollah's behavior that do not rely on the assumption that it was deterred by the war. It can also be argued that the results of the war actually served the organization's purposes and that since then it had refrained from a confrontation for internal or domestic Lebanese reasons, not because it was deterred by Israel. Such an interpretation indicates the possibility that the claim about deterrence is incorrect or that deterrence is not the only factor, although it does not prove the opposite, of course. Nevertheless, it requires that Israel examine its basic assumptions about Hizbollah and its behavior.

A Few Words on Deterrence

There have been many theoretical discussions on the issue of deterrence; as one scholar puts it: "When it comes to deterrence, there are more questions than answers."⁶ Deterrence can be defined as a threat (explicit or implicit) to use force intended to avoid the need to use it. Otherwise, the threat can be made in order to create a situation in which it will be clear to the enemy that the benefit of using force will be outweighed by the damage it will suffer as a result. In Israel, the term is also employed for using force in a limited fashion (for example, retaliatory acts) in order to cause the enemy to refrain from using force.

Deterrence is not dichotomous; it is a broad spectrum of possibilities. One's actions may deter the enemy from acting in a certain way, but not another. For example, Israel's crushing victory in the Six Day War (1967) did not cause Egypt to refrain from launching the War of Attrition, and within a mere three weeks, firing was resumed along the Suez Canal. However, the victory did deter Egypt from attempting to engage in an all-out war. Even in the Yom Kippur War (1973), Egypt's objectives were relatively limited.⁷ In other words, the correct question is not "*did* Israel deter Egypt?" but "*from what* did Israel deter Egypt?"

Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that the quiet on the Golan Heights since 1975 indicates that Syria was deterred from launching an all-out war, even if it was deterred from targeting Israel through Lebanese elements. Another example is the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union

during the Cold War: Each deterred the other from launching an all-out war, but this did not prevent them from attempting to harm each other in indirect ways, through wars by proxy such as in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

In Israel, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's avoidance of public appearances since the Second Lebanon War is seen as proof of deterrence. Dan Haloutz, Chief of Staff during the war, stated in 2010 that killing senior terrorists provides "another layer of deterrence. There is a reason that Nasrallah is sitting in his bunker."⁸ In 2011, in response to threats from Nasrallah, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu commented that "the man hiding in the bunker should stay in the bunker."⁹ Yet Nasrallah's personal fear of assassination does not mean that Hizbollah as an organization has been deterred from acting against Israel. To give a different example, concern over the personal fate of Prime Ministers since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, reflected in a tremendous amount of security, has not prevented any of them from expressing willingness to make even more far-reaching political concessions than those which prompted Rabin's assassination.

Deterrence always depends on context and on cost-benefit considerations. It will cease working the moment the enemy thinks that the benefit of an attack exceeds the risk (or merely makes an error in calculation). For example, a lock that deters a burglar in a student apartment will not deter a break-in at the estate of a multimillionaire. When the benefit outweighs the risk, deterrence is weaker and requires more sophisticated means of protection.¹⁰

Successful deterrence is not necessarily a threat to exact the highest price. Thus, for example, it is a known fact that soldiers are more afraid of blindness or the loss of sexual potency than death, and therefore a German S-mine, which exploded at waist level, was a potent deterrent for even the bravest of soldiers.

Many theories of deterrence apply only to countries, and their relevance to groups such as Hizbollah, a non-state actor (even if it is integrated into one).¹¹ For example, an invasion is almost always a threat for states, but from the perspective of a non-state organization, an invasion could actually be an opportunity to draw the enemy into a conflict on favorable terms. However, since almost all organizations and movements have assets as well as a vested interest in self-preservation, the difference between states and non-state actors on the issue of deterrence is largely a practical one. The difficulty in finding *what* deters a non-state adversary does not mean

that *nothing* will deter it. Nevertheless, it is important not to assume that measures considered effective in deterring states will work against a non-state enemy.

Who Will Deter Whom?

At the beginning of the Second Lebanon War, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated that "Israel will not agree to live in the shadow of the threat of missiles or rockets against its residents ... Israel will not be held hostage."¹² However, the threat of missiles has only increased since the war. In June 2007, after a volley of rockets was fired at Israel, associates of Olmert declared that the responsible party "is interested in dragging Israel into a response."¹³ Following a rocket salvo fired at Kiryat Shmona in 2013, a senior officer in the Northern Command noted that the rockets were intended to draw Israel into a response against Hizbollah.¹⁴

Statements made by Hizbollah after the Second Lebanon War are often perceived as proof of deterrence, but in fact, the organization was making similar statements even before the war. After rockets were fired at Israel in 2007, Lebanon's Minister of Labor, who was Hizbollah's representative in the Lebanese government, declared that "we have no connection to this ... we refuse to accept the attempt by the enemy to take advantage of the attacks to turn the aggression against Lebanon."¹⁵ Four years earlier, in June 2003, Hizbollah made a similar statement after rockets were fired at an Israeli ship: "we are opposed to this action, which is inexcusable and was not planned in advance."¹⁶

Israel did not believe that Hizbollah was responsible for either instance of rocket fire, but only in 2007 did it interpret the remark as an indication of deterrence. It should be noted that even in the most serious terrorist attack on the northern border before the war, near Kibbutz Metzuba in 2002, Hizbollah used Palestinians in order to conceal its involvement and avoided taking responsibility.¹⁷

In addition, perception of threats as indicative of deterrence goes both ways. If Nasrallah's threats and Hizbollah's statements reflect weakness and are a consequence of Israeli deterrence, as many Israelis tend to assume, then Israel's threats against the organization may indicate that Israel is weak and has been deterred by Hizbollah as well.¹⁸

One Sentence, If at All

The assumption that Hizbollah was deterred in the Second Lebanon War relies largely on one quotation from Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, in an interview in August 2006, immediately after the end of the war. In the interview, Nasrallah claimed that “no one expected, not even a one percent chance” that Hizbollah’s abduction of Israeli soldiers would lead to war. “If I had known that the kidnapping would lead to such a result, we would never have carried it out.”¹⁹

It is very problematic to base a theory of deterrence on this one comment by Nasrallah. Hizbollah’s Secretary General is an expert propagandist who does not hesitate to lie when necessary.²⁰ Furthermore, this sentence is only a small part of a long interview given to a Christian television station, intended to reassure the target audience, many of whom are traditionally among Hizbollah’s opponents. In the same interview, Nasrallah claimed that “anyone who says that the two abductees are the reason for the war is mistaken ... we surprised Israel with the timing ... Israel would have declared war at the end of September or beginning of October with or without a pretext.” In other words, Nasrallah claims that Hizbollah would not have carried out the abduction if it had believed that it would lead to war, though it would have broken out in any case, and that in retrospect, it was good that the kidnapping was carried out because it forced Israel to attack before it was ready.

Nasrallah’s logic is reminiscent of the story of the man who, when asked to return a pot he had borrowed from his neighbor, replied: “firstly, I already returned it to you in one piece. Secondly, when I borrowed it, it was broken. And thirdly, I never borrowed a pot from you.”

Nasrallah had no qualms about telling bald-faced lies in that interview, including claims that Hizbollah had never used weapons against Lebanese citizens and that it had never taken Lebanese hostages. Nor was he averse to making promises he had no intention of keeping, such as saying that the Lebanese army could disarm anyone who was armed in southern Lebanon. Therefore, it is by no means certain that the only sentence that can be interpreted as admission of error, which Nasrallah apparently iterated only once, actually represents his opinion. On the other hand, one month before that interview, Nasrallah made the claim that Israel had planned the war in advance and that the abduction had only helped Lebanon, and he also repeated this claim in the following years.²¹

During the Second Lebanon War, Nasrallah explained that just as—in his view—Hizbollah had defeated Israel during Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, thereby preventing it from achieving its objectives, the same thing would happen this time as well: “when the resistance survives ... when Lebanon faces the cruelest military force [or the military superpower] with determination and does not agree to humiliating terms ... when we are not defeated militarily, that is victory.”²² We should consider the possibility that Nasrallah *really* believes this claim, which he repeated a number of times after the war.²³

Between Hamas and Hizbollah

Hizbollah is not just Nasrallah, and we can assume that the organization is not terrified of Israel, as Israel would have wished. Even if Hizbollah was deterred in the Second Lebanon War, it is likely that the events in the Gaza Strip in recent years are eroding this deterrence. After Operations Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense; following the “trickle” of rockets fired from Gaza at Israeli communities and the limited IDF response to the rocket fire from Lebanon (for which Hizbollah did not claim responsibility); and even after the extensive but limited destruction in Operation Protective Edge, it is difficult to believe that Hizbollah still thinks that Israel would respond uncontrollably to any action it took when it has not done so in Gaza. Furthermore, in October 2012, a senior IDF officer expressed the opinion that a Hizbollah attack abroad would be a *casus belli*, yet the Hizbollah attack on Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria a few months prior to that statement did not elicit such a response.²⁴ Hence, Hizbollah can make an assessment, at least for now, that sporadic firing of rockets at Israel will not lead to a third Lebanon war, and that even if this war were to take place, it would be subject to all the restrictions on the use of force that were in effect in the Gaza Strip.

It is commonly believed that the Second Lebanon War harmed public support for Hizbollah, and in particular, the support of the Shiite community in Lebanon, which is the organization’s power base. These assumptions are strengthened by Shiite leaders’ statements.²⁵ For example, Subhi Tufayli, the first Secretary General of Hizbollah, stated in November 2006 that “Israel had no preliminary plan for a war in Lebanon... Iran had an interest in causing turmoil.” He even hinted that Nasrallah was interested in a civil war in Lebanon.²⁶ These were not necessarily new ideas. As early as 2003,

Tufayli stated that “the Iranian leadership was, and still is, responsible for all of Hizbollah’s decisions” and claimed that the organization was Israel’s “border patrol.”²⁷

However, the assumption that the damage caused in the Second Lebanon War pushed the Shiite community to “understand” its results and pressure Hizbollah is problematic. Immediately after the war, some 70 percent of the Shiites in Lebanon believed that Hizbollah was the victor (compared to less than half of the Druze or Christians and about one-third of the Sunnis).²⁸ In public opinion polls in Lebanon during the four years following the war, Hizbollah won the support of an overwhelming majority of Shiites, generally more than 85 percent, and sometimes as high as 94 percent.²⁹ Furthermore, in the 2009 Lebanese elections, although the bloc to which Hizbollah belonged was weakened, Hizbollah’s candidates won the election in every district in which a Hizbollah candidate participated, including in southern Lebanon, which had suffered grave damage during the war.³⁰

If it was not deterrence that brought quiet to the Israeli-Lebanese border, how can we explain the fact that Hizbollah refrains from firing rockets? An answer can be found by comparing the organization’s method of operation between the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the Second Lebanon War, and between the end of the war and the present.

2000-2006: The “Resistance” Seeks Direction

Hizbollah, in Nasrallah’s words, is an organization with many aspects: “political, jihadi, administrative, and social.”³¹ His deputy, Sheikh Naim Qassem, declared that the group’s “primary objective is the struggle [jihad] against the Zionist enemy” but that “the clever and sagacious political jihad can and should be the buttress and pillar of this *jihadi* movement.”³²

Though it is a Shiite organization, Hizbollah is also influenced by Lebanon’s domestic politics; for years Nasrallah was careful to emphasize that he is the defender of all Lebanese citizens, not seeking to impose his religious beliefs. In 1992, the organization even decided to participate in Lebanese politics (with the approval of Iran’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei), and since then, it has collaborated with Christian leaders and made efforts to win the hearts of Christian Lebanese citizens.³³ This does not indicate a change in Hizbollah’s ideology, but rather, pragmatism in its actions and its path, and possibly also in its timetable and priorities.

Theoretically, Hizbollah's military strength contravenes the Taif Agreement of 1989, which ended Lebanon's civil war and provided for disarming all militias in the country. When the IDF was present in the security zone, Hizbollah (with the support of the Syrians, who at that time maintained de facto control of Lebanon, and the Lebanese government itself) justified the existence of its military wing by citing the need to oppose the Israeli occupation. An Israeli withdrawal, therefore, was supposed to lead to the disarming of Hizbollah. Sheikh Fadlallah, Hizbollah's spiritual leader, stated in 1995 that there would apparently be no place in Lebanon for the Islamic resistance once the land was liberated from the Israeli occupation.³⁴ In 1997, Nasrallah declared that "when the Zionist enemy withdraws from the occupied territories, we will not be responsible for security. We have a state and it will use its security forces in these territories."³⁵

These commitments were tested after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, when many Lebanese (including then-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri) believed that Lebanon must direct its resources to internal reconstruction and that Hizbollah's military role had ended.³⁶ In April 2001, the editor of Hariri's newspaper claimed that the organization's actions were not helpful to Lebanon, and another Lebanese commentator called on Syria and Hizbollah not to fight their battle with Israel from Lebanese soil.³⁷

Militating against this position was the clear fact that Hizbollah was the only Arab force to succeed in causing Israel to withdraw without an agreement and without receiving anything in return. The prestige this conferred on Hizbollah made it unlikely that the organization would be disarmed, even in the eyes of old adversaries such as Nabih Beri, head of the Shiite organization Amal.³⁸ However, an ongoing state of calm on the northern border could have convinced many Lebanese at that time that in fact, Hizbollah's role had ended. Contrary to the hopes of officials in Israel,³⁹ Hizbollah found other pretexts for continuing the fighting. It announced that it would continue until all Lebanese lands (that is, the Shab'a Farms) and Lebanese prisoners held by Israel are liberated.⁴⁰ In July 2001, Nasrallah even declared that "our struggle with the Zionist enemy is not a border conflict between two countries, but a confrontation with an entity whose aim is [the destruction of] our survival and future." While in the short term, there was little chance of achieving the "liberation of Palestine," this "requires neither nuclear weapons nor a strategic balance ... although there may be something of a dream here, there is also something

of reality.”⁴¹ This reality requires maintaining Hizbollah’s power and continuing clashes with Israel as perpetual justification for preserving its military force. The past few years have emphasized this need, since the status of the Shiites in Lebanon, who were traditionally far from the centers of power and suffered from discrimination, had been largely based on Hizbollah’s weapons arsenal.⁴²

Despite Syrian support⁴³ and considerable Lebanese support for Hizbollah on the issue of the Shab’a Farms, the expulsion of the Israeli occupying forces from an uninhabited area of twenty-five square kilometers was a rather weak justification for the existence of a private army. In fact, the Shab’a Farms issue is rather marginal for Hizbollah. Until 2002, the organization attacked IDF outposts on Har Dov almost every month.⁴⁴ However, after that, it slowed down the pace of attacks, and when it came under pressure on the issue within Lebanon, a conflict on that point was not enough to justify maintaining its military power.

In September 2004, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1559, which included a call to disarm all the militias in Lebanon. This resolution created pressure on both Syria (with growing calls for its withdrawal from Lebanon) and Hizbollah, which ultimately led to the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri shortly after his resignation from office. The murder proved to be a double-edged sword. It caused internal and external pressure that led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, in spite of demonstrations by Hizbollah supporters who supported the presence of Syrian forces and opposed disarming the organization. Many people in Lebanon, from Druze community leader Walid Jumblatt to Sunni Muslims, feared that Hizbollah was serving the interests of Iran and Syria rather than Lebanon, and that the weapons in its possession conferred dangerous power on the Shiite community and could lead to a new arms race. It was actually a pro-Syrian Lebanese commentator whose definition was quite precise: “Hizbollah’s rifle is ultimately Shiite.”⁴⁵ On the other hand, Hizbollah supporters claimed that the desire to disarm the organization was “treason” that served “only the interests of Israel.” Elias Saba, a veteran Lebanese politician, claimed that “the role of the resistance ... is necessary [even] after the liberation of the land and the prisoners [... since] how can we ensure that Israel will not reconquer the land?” Nasrallah attempted to calm the heated atmosphere by stating that “no one will succeed in bringing this weapon into the domestic arena.”⁴⁶

In July 2005, Hizbollah joined the Lebanese government for the first time. One of its representatives, Minister of Water and Energy Muhammad Fneish, stated that the Lebanese “have no reason to fear” Hizbollah’s weapons and that “if joining the government and the Parliament is a national duty, so is defending the country.”⁴⁷ The message was clear: Hizbollah would use its weapons only against Israel, but it would not consent to the demand to disarm. And in fact, in January 2006, then-Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Seniora promised that he would treat Hizbollah as a “national liberation group” and not as a “militia,” which removed the burden of resolution 1559 from Hizbollah.⁴⁸

It is therefore not surprising that Hizbollah escalated its operations on the northern border in 2005 and 2006. Abducting Israelis in order to bring about the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel was within the Lebanese consensus. It showed that Hizbollah was acting for all of Lebanon; it strengthened its position, which had been harmed by internal Lebanese disputes; reduced the fear that it would turn its weapons inward; and decreased the pressure to disarm it.

Despite all this, many Israelis saw the situation in Lebanon as unprecedentedly quiet, or alternatively, as a balance of terror intended to prevent an Israeli attack. “Never has there been quiet on the northern border such as the quiet that has existed since IDF soldiers have been guarding on the eastern side of the border,” wrote Yigal Tzhor of the Labor Party and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation, on the fifth anniversary of the IDF withdrawal from the security zone.⁴⁹ One year earlier, journalist and researcher Daniel Sobelman wrote:

From the beginning of 2003, stability was maintained on the Israeli-Lebanese border despite several upheavals [...] such as the war in Iraq, the Israel Air Force (IAF) attack in Syria, military operations inside Lebanon that were attributed to Israeli intelligence, destruction of Hizbollah anti-aircraft batteries by Israel, and the killing of Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin and his successor, Abd al-Aziz Rantisi.⁵⁰

Only one week before the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War, *Haaretz* correspondent Aluf Benn wrote that “a Nasrallah was needed in the Gaza Strip.” While he hates Israel, unlike the leaders of Hamas, who kidnapped Gilad Shalit and launch rockets, Nasrallah “has authority and responsibility, and therefore, his behavior is rational and reasonably predictable. In the

present conditions, this is the best that there is. Hizbollah is preserving quiet in the Galilee more than the pro-Israel South Lebanese Army did.”⁵¹

From 2006 Onward: Domestic Politics or Deterrence?

One could argue that Hizbollah (almost) ceased to operate against Israel after the Second Lebanon War because it was no longer necessary and because it was dealing with other things which Israel had a very limited ability to influence. To many in Lebanon and even in the West,⁵² the fact that the war took place is proof that it was deliberate; in other words, the fact that Israel invaded Lebanon proved that it had planned in advance to do so. This is not a new idea: as early as 1972, Fadlallah stated that Israel was interested in invading Lebanon irrespective of the actions of the Palestinian organizations. To many people, the fact that Israel remained in parts of Lebanon after Operation Peace for Galilee (1982) was confirmation of his claim.⁵³ In October 2006, 84 percent of the Lebanese believed that the war had been planned in advance by the United States and Israel in order to reshape the region, and 78 percent thought that it would have broken out regardless of Hizbollah’s actions.⁵⁴ The similarity between these statistics and the claims by Nasrallah reinforce the assumption that he was not going to voice his regret for the abduction of Israeli soldiers but rather he intended to claim that it was only an excuse for Israel to undertake a planned invasion of Lebanon.⁵⁵ After the war, Hizbollah needed to “maintain” an active conflict with Israel less than it had in the past. The war and the destruction left in its wake clearly demonstrated the danger from Israel and the need for Hizbollah to grow stronger in order to prevent a similar war in the future. In August 2013, Nasrallah even declared that because of Hizbollah’s great strength, “the era of Israeli tourism on the Lebanese border has ended forever.”⁵⁶

Since the war, the denominational issue has continued to determine the attitudes of the various Lebanese groups to Hizbollah: the Shiites are enthusiastic supporters, the Sunnis have reservations, the Druze and Christians are suspicious and fearful.⁵⁷ However, a poll from October 2006 showed that only about one-fourth of the Lebanese wished to disarm Hizbollah, about one-half wished to incorporate it into the Lebanese army, and more than one-third (among them the vast majority of the Shiites) supported maintaining Hizbollah as an armed independent entity.⁵⁸ The non-Shiites apparently perceived Hizbollah as Lebanon’s most effective

protector, but they feared that it would use its armed power internally. Even at a low point in its popularity, in February 2007, only 20 percent supported forcibly disarming the organization, and 48.6 percent (among them, surprisingly, most of the Sunnis and Orthodox Christians) were in favor of allowing it to keep its arms, at least until the liberation of the Shebaa Farms or an Israeli-Lebanese agreement.⁵⁹

It is possible that the protracted negotiations for the return of the bodies of abducted IDF soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, which ended in mid-2008, also contributed to Hizbollah's lack of interest in heating up the sector again: the achievement of returning the Lebanese prisoners through diplomatic means was sufficient to justify avoidance of any action that could have harmed the deal.

At the same time, Hizbollah apparently believed that the war provided an opportunity to increase its political influence in Lebanon, and given the disparities in support for the group between the Shiites and other communities it may have estimated that the time was right for a more "Shiite" and less "Lebanese" line of politics. Hizbollah officials made increasingly blunt statements on this subject, to the point of explicitly supporting a Shiite country. Furthermore, in November 2006, all Shiite representatives resigned from the government, which caused paralysis (for constitutional reasons) following the proposal to establish an international tribunal to try Hariri's murderers and Hizbollah's desire to bring additional representatives into the government. A few days later, Shiite and pro-Syrian elements began a series of mass anti-government protests, and Nasrallah even declared (and in fact threatened) that Hizbollah's supporters should not fear "a new civil war."⁶⁰ The Lebanese police estimated that at the height of the demonstrations, Hizbollah brought some 800,000 people to the streets, about one-fifth of the country's population.⁶¹ The group also worked to prevent the establishment of an anti-Syrian government, which could have acted to disarm it and perhaps even reached tacit agreements with Israel.⁶² In addition, members of the March 14 Alliance, who opposed the Syrians and Hizbollah, continued to die under mysterious circumstances, including Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayal, whose funeral turned into a large-scale anti-Syrian (and implicitly, anti-Hizbollah) demonstration.

At the same time, Hizbollah continued its military buildup, even daring to demand that the Lebanese army return a truck of ammunition it had confiscated. (There was great support for the demand among the Shiites,

while the other ethnic groups, especially the Druze, took the opposite position.)⁶³ In November 2007, Hizbollah claimed it had held a large military exercise in southern Lebanon, thus making clear that it was in fact ignoring Security Council resolution 1701 and that there was no power in the country that could force it to disarm.⁶⁴ It continued to position itself as the defender of Lebanon against Israel, and as usual, employed various pretexts to maintain its military power.⁶⁵

At the same time, Hizbollah continued to cross Lebanese political boundaries: In January 2008, seven people were killed in exchanges of fire between Hizbollah operatives and the Lebanese police. In May of that year, in a protest over the government's disabling of Hizbollah's communications network and the dismissal of the official in charge of security at the Beirut airport, who was close to Hizbollah, fighting broke out throughout Lebanon and the organization used artillery and rockets while the army stood by. The Doha Agreement, signed on May 21, 2008, stated that the opposition would receive eleven (out of thirty) minister positions in the Lebanese government, therefore awarding Hizbollah veto power. Its communications network continued to operate, and even the official in charge of security at the Beirut airport got his position back. Several days later, Chief of Staff General Michel Suleiman was appointed president of Lebanon, and almost immediately, he praised the "resistance" and took a pro-Syrian stance.⁶⁶

"During the winter of 2007 and the spring of 2008," writes the American journalist and researcher Thanassis Cambanis, "it wasn't Israel but moderate Arabs who posed a serious existential threat to Hezbollah."⁶⁷ In other words, it may be that Hizbollah refrained from firing at Israel not because it had been deterred from doing so but because at that point, it had other more pressing matters to attend to. Israel's Prime Minister at the time, Ehud Olmert, claimed in July 2008 that since the Second Lebanon War, and because of its results, "Hizbollah is clearly reluctant to confront us militarily in the area of southern Lebanon. It is busy trying to rebuild its political position."⁶⁸ Given the events of spring 2008, it may be that it was not "clearly reluctant" but that it took advantage of its success, not to rebuild its position but to strengthen it.

Nasrallah's assurances that Hizbollah's weapons are "Lebanese" and that they would be directed only against Israel turned out to be empty. While the organization's position among the Shiites grew stronger, its political opponents and the other communities in Lebanon began to fear

and oppose it even more than they had prior to 2008.⁶⁹ If Hizbollah intended to strive toward an Islamic state in Lebanon,⁷⁰ the attempt was made too soon. Evidence of this came a year later, in the 2009 elections, when the strength of the Hizbollah camp was reduced, even if the organization itself won all the seats for which it ran candidates.⁷¹ In a Hizbollah manifesto from November 2009, the call to establish an Islamic state, which was central to its previous platform in 1985, was omitted.⁷² However, the group remained a member of the government, received veto power, and received the important position of Minister of Communications. The new Lebanese cabinet once again confirmed that Hizbollah was a “resistance” movement and not a militia that had to be disarmed.⁷³ The organization continued to enjoy tremendous support from the Shiites, and even among the general public, it had a small majority of supporters.⁷⁴ In southern Lebanon, control by the opposition in general and Hizbollah in particular remained absolute.⁷⁵ Some believed that Hizbollah was not interested in too large a victory in the elections because it was convenient to be a member of the government that could veto its actions, yet not be perceived as the responsible party.⁷⁶

What has been written until this point is sufficient to show that Hizbollah’s actions were not influenced only or perhaps even primarily by fear of Israel. Its involvement in recent years in the civil war in Syria and the fighting against Sunni organizations demonstrates this well. There are those who argue that Hizbollah is nothing but a servant of Syria or Iran, that the question whether to act against Israel would be settled primarily by them and would not be dependent on deterrence in Lebanon.⁷⁷ According to Shimon Shapira, “one of the main reasons for the quiet on the northern border is that at this time, Iran has no interest in heating up the sector. Hizbollah’s missile force was intended to create deterrence against Israel in order to prevent an Israeli attack on Iran.”⁷⁸ In another context, Subhi Tufayli claimed that the only reason for Hizbollah’s intervention in Syria was that Iran forced it to intervene.⁷⁹

Buildup and Deterrence

After the Second Lebanon War, Hizbollah began to rebuild its strength and repair the damage sustained. Within two years, the organization had tripled its weapons stockpile to some 40,000 missiles and rockets, some of them heavier and with a longer range than those it previously possessed,⁸⁰ and turned villages into fortified compounds. In July 2010, Israel mapped

the ammunition storage facilities, fortifications, and headquarters built by Hizbollah in the town of al-Hiyam in southern Lebanon.⁸¹ In September of that year, an ammunition storage facility belonging to the organization in al-Shahabiya in southern Lebanon exploded. The IDF spokesperson reported that documentation of the explosion was “a fact that embarrassed Hizbollah,”⁸² but it turned out that the embarrassment was rather limited (if at all). When an explosion took place in Tair Harfa about two years later, Hizbollah members openly blocked off the area and, according to reports, even prevented UNIFIL personnel from approaching it.⁸³ Israel, for its part, did not openly attack Hizbollah for its renewed buildup, but rather approached the United Nations.⁸⁴

Hizbollah’s reluctance to confront Israel during its rebuilding effort could be interpreted not as fear of Israel or as a result of deterrence but as a tactical measure intended not to disturb the buildup. While Hizbollah refrained from direct and open action against Israel until 2013, it is believed that the group was responsible for several incidents on the Israeli-Lebanese border during those years. In January 2009, during Operation Cast Lead, four Katyushas were shot at the Galilee (two of them fell in Israeli territory). Israel held Hizbollah responsible, but the organization denied involvement.⁸⁵ In July of that year, a group of unarmed civilians infiltrated an abandoned IDF outpost on Mount Dov and hung the flags of Hizbollah and Lebanon. The IDF responded with threats but decided not to take action because the civilians were unarmed.⁸⁶ In October 2012, Hizbollah sent a drone over Israeli territory, which was shot down in the area of the Yatir Forest,⁸⁷ and in April of the following year, Israel shot down a drone believed to have been sent by Hizbollah, although the organization denied responsibility.⁸⁸ In contrast, when four IDF soldiers were wounded near the border with Lebanon in August 2013, Hizbollah (for the first time since the Second Lebanon War) claimed responsibility and said that it had ambushed IDF soldiers operating in Lebanese territory.⁸⁹ In April 2014, Nasrallah claimed responsibility for an explosive device used against IDF soldiers on Mount Dov.⁹⁰

After the Second Lebanon War, Hizbollah increasingly resumed its international terrorist operations. In this context, some claim the group has been operating in Iraq since 2006⁹¹ and that it planned large-scale terrorist attacks, particularly against Israeli targets in Cyprus, Egypt, Thailand, and Europe, with a nearly total lack of success, until 2012, when it carried out

an attack in Burgas, Bulgaria that killed six people, including five Israelis.⁹² This is reminiscent of the actions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) after the ceasefire in 1981, when it believed it could act against Israel abroad without a response in Lebanon.

Of course, one could argue that Hizbollah's attempts to operate against Israel from locations other than the Lebanese border were the result of successful deterrence. However, it is possible that they stemmed from considerations of convenience and not deterrence. Even if it they were, in fact, a result of Israeli deterrence, they show its limitations. Thus, for example, in the 1990s, Hizbollah operated almost exclusively in the security zone in southern Lebanon, and it generally did not attempt to infiltrate Israel (in contrast to the Palestinian organizations). This was not a reflection of Israeli deterrence but of an understanding that targeting Israel in the security zone was no less effective than infiltrating into Israel, and much more convenient. An army's choice to attack at one point does not indicate that it is deterred from attacking in other places, but that it is seeking a more convenient point, which holds true for a terrorist organization as well.

Nasrallah himself has recently raised his profile. Although for the first five years after the Second Lebanon War, he appeared in public only twice (in January 2008 and December 2011), in the past two years, he has appeared in public at least four times (September 2012, August 2013, November 2013, and July 2014). His threats have not become more moderate. In 2011, he announced an operational plan to conquer the Galilee. In August 2012, Hizbollah reported a large exercise⁹³ and as befits a modern terrorist organization, even published an interactive presentation in broken English, ostensibly showing the next war, including occupation of northern Israel up to the Haifa-Afula-Bet She'an line.⁹⁴ Nasrallah also threatened to "turn the lives of millions of Israelis into hell" if Israel attacked Iran;⁹⁵ declared that the destruction of Israel is a Lebanese, Arab, and Muslim interest, and not just a Palestinian one;⁹⁶ and threatened to assassinate Israeli officials in revenge for the assassination of Hizbollah official Imad Mughniyeh.⁹⁷ In addition, he promised that "Israel would be punished" for killing another Hizbollah official, Hassan al-Lakis, in December 2013, even though a Sunni organization took responsibility (and some claimed that Hizbollah itself was responsible).⁹⁸

The conventional interpretation in Israel tends to be that Hizbollah's relative inaction against Israel is a result of deterrence. If this is in fact the

case, there are several questions: Why did Hizbollah send drones over Israeli territory? Why did Nasrallah, for the first time in several years, claim responsibility for attacking IDF soldiers, precisely when his organization had become deeply entangled in the civil war in Syria? And why is he appearing in public more frequently than in the past and making equally impassioned speeches?

In late 2013, Hizbollah claimed that its “presence in Syria is for defending Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and the resistance against all threats facing them.”⁹⁹ Following Operation Protective Edge (during which it made its regular threats), the organization explained that the call to intervene during the operation in support of Hamas was not serious and not official.¹⁰⁰ This shows that the absence of Hizbollah operations against Israel is not a result of Israeli deterrence but of different priorities, and that the most important thing for the group today is to fight in Syria. It appears that at this point, the extremist Sunni groups operating in Syria are more threatening to Hizbollah than Israel.¹⁰¹ A car bomb that exploded recently in one of Hizbollah’s strongholds indicates that this hypothesis has a basis.¹⁰² We should not conclude from the current situation that Hizbollah will not choose someday to defend Lebanon and the Palestinian cause more directly.

The Second Lebanon War serves as a vivid reminder that Lebanon needs Hizbollah in order to protect itself against Israel. The organization will maintain its hatred of Israel in the foreseeable future, but its priorities have changed since 2006, and not only because of the damage caused. If before the war, Hizbollah took advantage of clashes with Israel in order to gain support, today, it uses a supposed threat in order to achieve the same objective, but it does not see the need for extensive operations against Israel.¹⁰³ Furthermore, after the war, Hizbollah became much more involved and influential in the Lebanese government than it had been previously.

We should take into account that Hizbollah’s increasing willingness to openly carry out (small) operations against Israel could mark its return to the concept that guided it before the Second Lebanon War. In any case, this appears to be on a slightly smaller and more careful scale—friction with Israel for the purpose of helping Hizbollah’s standing within Lebanon. This is a gamble, and Hizbollah may be wrong yet again.

What about Mughniyeh?

The weak link in the assumption that Hizbollah has not been deterred is the fact that it has not responded directly to the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh or Hassan al-Lakis and did not come directly to the aid of Hamas in Operations Cast Lead or Protective Edge. However, Hizbollah actually did attempt to strike at Israeli targets in retaliation for Mughniyeh's killing. If the organization was planning large-scale reprisals, it is no wonder that it did not bother to fire rockets, and after those attempts failed, it is not surprising that it did not launch them: what type of organization shoots Katyushas in 2009 in response to a killing that took place in 2008?

The assumption of non-deterrence is undermined by Hizbollah's failure to launch missiles during Cast Lead and Protective Edge (in contrast to Operation Defensive Shield, when it fired hundreds of rockets and mortar shells and carried out a terrorist attack). If there is one thing that strengthens the theory of deterrence, this is it.¹⁰⁴ But in fact, even Hizbollah's behavior during Cast Lead and Protective Edge does not constitute definitive proof of deterrence, since its involvement in building up its strength and fighting in Syria, along with its meddling in Lebanese politics, may have made the timing of the two operations inconvenient: on the one hand, it had not yet completed preparations for another conflict, and on the other, it needed more time to correct the impression left by its use of weapons in the internal Lebanese arena.¹⁰⁵ If Hizbollah's buildup was also intended to deter Israel from acting against Iran, then perhaps from Iran's point of view, Cast Lead did not justify use of the organization. During Protective Edge, Hizbollah was entangled in Syria, more than at any time in the past.

Summary and Conclusions

This author hopes that Israel did, in fact, deter Hizbollah. However, the organization's behavior can be explained even without resorting to an assumption that it was deterred. What protects the Israeli-Lebanese border today may be not only the IDF's strength, but also Hizbollah's problems, its additional goals, and its other affairs. The organization will not reconcile itself to or accept Israel's existence, and if it is deprived of the existing reasons to fight Israel, it will likely find or invent others. However, it should be understood that Israel is not always Hizbollah's most pressing issue.

The question whether Hizbollah was deterred by Israel in the Second Lebanon War is not only theoretical. Israeli operational plans (against

Hizbollah or against other adversaries) that are based on the assumption that the devastation Lebanon suffered during that war is what led to the quiet and deterred Hizbollah could fail if it becomes clear that this was not the case.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, if Hizbollah's failure to act against Israel is influenced primarily by factors over which Israel has no control, then a belligerent action by the group may be closer than is commonly thought. Suffice it to mention that in early 1967, the Israeli military intelligence assessment was that war was not to be expected since the Egyptian army was entangled in Yemen, and that several months later, because of a chain of events that were largely not under Israel's control, the Six Day War broke out.

Finally, excessive faith in the power of deterrence could lead to complacency. Three months before the Yom Kippur War, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan believed that a major war was not to be expected in the coming decade. On the face of it, he had a basis for this assessment: the Egyptians appeared to have been deterred. They had failed to achieve their goals in the War of Attrition, and despite the Egyptian rearmament, it was never quieter on the Suez Canal—until the afternoon of October 6, 1973.

Notes

- 1 Prime Minister's Speech at the Commencement Ceremony of the 33rd National Security College Course in Gilot, August 1, 2006.
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