

Military and Strategic Affairs

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Opening Remarks

Gabriel Siboni

Although the writing was on the wall for several years prior, it appears that time will show that the first day of the Second Lebanon War marked a watershed. The war presented the public in Israel with a clear picture of a threat that has changed radically. Before the war, the IDF had focused on combating Palestinian terrorism and on attempting to construct an updated understanding of warfare against the classical military threat; the war, however, revealed the full force of the threat coming from high trajectory fire.

Immediately after the war, the public atmosphere in Israel resonated of anger, frustration, and embarrassment. The expectation of a crushing victory, in the style of the Six Day War, was unfulfilled, and the heavy toll the war took on the home front and the length of the war (34 days) amplified the bad feelings. In Israel's public consciousness, the war was seen as a failure. The government commission of inquiry appointed to investigate the war, headed by Judge Eliyahu Winograd, endorsed this view. As a result of the harsh public criticism of the IDF's performance, Chief of Staff Dan Haloutz resigned; Minister of Defense Amir Peretz subsequently followed suit. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert continued in his post for another three years, but the consequences of the summer of 2006 cast a shadow over the rest of his term in office. Nonetheless, the finger pointing and self-accusations rampant after the Second Lebanon War did not allow for a clear examination of the war, and to a large extent, made it difficult to draw important conclusions.

The Second Lebanon War was Israel's wake-up call, prompting it to realize that under its very nose, the Iranian octopus had sent its long tentacles deep into Lebanon and was also laying the groundwork to do

Dr. Colonel (ret.) Gabriel Siboni, senior research associate at INSS and head of the INSS program on Military and Strategic Affairs

the same in the Gaza Strip. The enemy had despaired of being able to conquer Israel or parts of it, and had therefore turned its energy toward constructing extensive high trajectory fire capabilities that put most of Israel's population within range.

World War II was conducted with great intensity on both the battlefield and the civilian front. Churchill's understanding of what the future held in store moved him to deliver the famous speech in which he sought to prepare the citizens of Great Britain for the difficult times ahead. The citizens of Israel, who for years had been used to wars limited to the military front alone, lacked this sort of preparation. Now, however, the cycle has run its course, and Israel has returned to the former type of war in which the civilian front is a legitimate – if not the main – target of the enemy. This is a strategic, tactical, and operational change among Israel's enemies with far reaching implications, from military doctrine to force buildup.

The enemy's new application of force is simple and clear cut, relying on its fixed strategic asset: depth and mass. Inherent here is the enemy's understanding that the IDF will not remain long in the areas in which it maneuvers. In addition, it recognizes that its own stamina is infinitely greater than that of the IDF.

The State of Israel embarked on the Second Lebanon War without sufficient understanding of the threat and its implications. The self-flagellation and disappointment covered widely by the media left no room for conducting an appropriate, professional discussion. Expressions such as "failure," "stinging defeat," "a clear miss," and "colossal blunder," were bandied about freely. The memory of that summer is still fresh, as are the glumness and frustration played up by journalists and former IDF commanders competing with one another to see who could criticize the military's conduct most harshly.

This trend peaked with the Winograd Commission. Without having undertaken an honest, professional investigation about the change in the threat to Israel and its significance, and without defining the terms "victory" and "decision" it used so freely in the report, the Commission stated that the IDF did not win the war, not even isolated rounds. It almost seems that the Commission made its determination as if the war was a sporting event.

The presentations compiled here examine what can be learned from the Second Lebanon War, with emphasis on military-strategic contexts

and dialogue between the military and the political echelon. The war revealed more than a few failures in terms of the IDF's preparedness to deal with a widespread confrontation against an undercurrent threat. These failures stemmed not only from the lack of appropriate resources to enable the construction of a proper force – though these were indeed lacking – but also, and perhaps primarily, from the lack of inherent understanding of and coming to terms with what it means to face a different threat. The IDF was not the only element surprised. The country's citizens discovered that the civilian front is an active, integral part of the battlefield.

Today the State of Israel faces a meaningful security challenge. The Second Lebanon War clearly revealed Iran's involvement as a central factor in leading the war against Israel. Iran's nuclear program is the strategic arm of the struggle, alongside Iran's drive to establish operational strongholds via Hizbollah in the north and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and possibly also in Judea and Samaria in the future. These present a conventional threat whose destructive force over time is no less potent than that of a nuclear threat.

Since the war more than a few lessons have been learned. The Israeli public now understands that the IDF cannot stop high trajectory fire only by damaging the enemy's numerous, decentralized, and scattered launch capabilities. The IDF can, however, damage many significant capabilities and thus remove many areas of Israel from the circle of threat, though the enemy will still have enough residual firepower to draw on until the last hours of fighting.

On the basis of this insight, a two-tiered model of response is developing, for the civilian front and military front.

1. On the civilian front, the construction of defensive and survival capabilities aimed at minimizing the damage from enemy fire as much as possible is underway. No less important is both the realization that the public must understand the philosophy guiding the army's response and the need to improve the public's level of preparedness to absorb fire until the end of the fighting.
2. On the military front, the IDF must attain two main achievements:
 - Shortening the time span and minimizing the damage of any future war. To this end, the army is training to operate the two primary tools at its disposal: the ground maneuver and firepower, used jointly.

- Rendering a destructive, painful fire blow that will leave the enemy occupied for years to come with costly and resource-greedy reconstruction, alongside the stinging memory of the price one pays for challenging Israel. One may assume that this will help postpone the next confrontation by some years. The Second Lebanon War supplied a small taste, both to us and to the enemy, of the IDF's capabilities to render such a blow.

Three years after the war, it seems that the public uproar about the war has subsided somewhat. The dust of the war has settled, and changes in personnel have been made in Israel's top ranks of the military as well as its political leadership. The IDF and the public as a whole have experienced a kind of corrective experience thanks to the achievements of the security services in Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in the Gaza Strip (December 2008-January 2009). Taken together, these elements allow a more sober examination of the Second Lebanon War – its consequences, ramifications, and – above all – lessons that may be learned from it.

Three years after, in a slow but steady process, the true picture of the war emerges. Despite the lack of preparedness, the opening conditions, and the shortcomings revealed in the army's performance, the IDF supplied the State of Israel with a strategic achievement of the highest order. The level of the army's functioning frustrated Israel's citizens, but was enough to attain a significant achievement. Alongside deterring Hizbollah, all the layers of the threat were revealed, and it was possible for the IDF to plan the future operational response against this threat.

The articles compiled here are based on presentations at a conference at INSS to mark three years since the Second Lebanon War. Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland presented his insights from the war, focusing on the strategic context relating to the decision making processes of that war compared to those we will have to use in future wars. The second presentation, by then-Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Moshe Kaplinsky, supplied a panoramic view of the processes experienced by the IDF before the war and the subsequent processes of learning the requisite lessons. Dr. Oded Eran then examined the diplomatic campaign, which culminated in Security Council Resolution 1701. Professor Eyal Zisser surveyed the path that Hizbollah took on its way to war, its conduct during the war, and the repercussions of the war for Hizbollah, including what has happened to the organization since the war. The final presentation

was by Lieutenant General Dan Haloutz, chief of staff during the Second Lebanon War.

Some of the authors participated in the war and in the decision making process that shaped the events, while others followed the war from the side as commentators and academics. Each of them presents a different aspect of the total picture, and together they construct a set of opinions, outlooks, and important lessons it behooves us to learn.

The Second Lebanon War: Lessons on the Strategic Level

Giora Eiland

The following article touches on seven points that are conclusions of sorts from three central military episodes of recent years: Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in April 2002, the Second Lebanon War, and Operation Cast Lead. A comparison of these events allows us to formulate general conclusions relevant to similar events in the future. Six of the issues refer primarily to the past and the present, but have ramifications for the future. The seventh is an attempt to assess what would happen should a Third Lebanon War break out, and from Israel's perspective, what the right response would be.

The first issue is linked to the type of war we experience in the 21st century in our region – though elsewhere too, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. In these contemporary wars there is a large inherent gap between expectations and capabilities. By “expectations” I mean the expectations of the political echelon, the media, and the public, and by “capabilities” I refer to the capabilities of the operational echelon to meet these expectations.

This gap is generally expressed in four ways. The first is the length of the battle. There is a logical assumption that says that because we are so much stronger than the other side, the battle has to be short. If we examine different examples from our history, such as the war of 1967, we are liable to ask: if in six days we managed to defeat so many Arab armies, why should it be so complicated to succeed quickly against an enemy so much weaker than we are in terms of conventional force.

The second element has to do with the number of casualties. If we are stronger and have more advanced technology than the enemy, then

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we should have fewer casualties because it would seem, at least on the surface, to be possible to conduct most operations from afar, using precision weapons and without endangering our troops. Therefore, there is the expectation of a sort of deluxe war in which we inflict heavy casualties but suffer few ourselves.

The third expectation concerns damage to civilian bystanders. We are fighting the bad guys – in this case Hizbollah, at other times Hamas – and therefore it is acceptable to kill them, but we are categorically unwilling to tolerate a situation in which we see pictures of dead women and children on TV. Therefore, the third expectation is: hurt the bad guys, but don't hurt those we don't have to.

The fourth point has to do with the expectation of victory. If this is a war, then – just like in a sports event – we want to see a victory; we expect the other side to surrender without preconditions or we expect the defeat to be so obvious that the answer to the question “who won” will be indisputably self-evident.

These four expectations are quite natural when undertaking a conventional situation assessment in which forces are compared in military terms alone. However, wars of the 21st century are usually not between states but between states and organizations. Most of the events take place within civilian populations, and this greatly limits the state in applying force with its utmost capability. Therefore, it is very difficult to meet the expectations of public opinion. In addition, the more the campaign is understood as a war of choice, the more we initiate it, and the more the political echelon aims to recruit support for its decision to act, so the threshold is raised for a suitable outcome, as expected by the public. The higher the expectations are at the beginning, the greater the gap between what we thought would happen and the reality afterwards.

This gap is natural and has been experienced by others. Nonetheless, it seems that Israel is especially characterized by the fragility of its systems, so that cracks appear in them very easily the moment we perceive the gaps between promises and reality. One of the problems of the Second Lebanon War was that it relatively quickly created fairly dangerous gaps in three dimensions: the first was within the army, between the different ranks. The war wasn't even over when the finger pointing began. This is very problematic for the IDF given its particular structure, especially the function of the reserves. The second gap was between the military

and the civilians. Given that in a war of this sort the home front is also under fire, a gap emerged between the impressive successes presented by the IDF, especially precision air strikes by the air force, and the fact that tens of thousands of citizens of the State of Israel were forced to stay in their bomb shelters for weeks at a time. This gap was tantamount to dissonance that caused pervasive dissatisfaction. The third gap, one that usually emerges sooner than the others, is the tension between the political echelon and the military, a tension we witnessed not only in this war but also in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the First Lebanon War in 1982.

In short, the first point we have to be aware of is the gap that exists between expectations and capabilities. Because this gap surfaces very easily, it is necessary to be careful, i.e., not to create expectations that exceed what we are capable of meeting, because this can backfire in a way that causes a great deal of damage without any relationship to the objective outcome of the war.

The second issue concerns the importance of defining goals. A military plan usually contains three sentences that form the core of every command and military undertaking. One is the goal, the second is the mission, and the third is the method. The goal is the answer to the question of what we want to accomplish, the purpose, why we are doing what we are doing; the mission answers the question of what we have to do in order to attain the goal; and the method is the answer to the question of how we have to carry out the mission. In military courses, students are graded on the level of cohesiveness or consistency between these three elements of goal, mission, and method. Usually when discussing tactical levels, even high tactical levels, it is not overly difficult to create a cohesive whole out of goal, mission, and method.

By contrast, it is very difficult to create this cohesiveness at the strategic level. When the goal is essentially political, which then somehow has to “match” a mission that spells out for the army what needs to be done and the method for doing it, the process of writing the operation order becomes more complex and less obvious. When matters are not clear enough or are not discussed thoroughly enough, as was the case in the Second Lebanon War (and to a certain extent also in Operation Cast Lead), problems will arise. When the starting point is not clear

to the upper echelons, it is very difficult to translate the goal into clear commands to the lower ranks.

If we go back to the meeting of the government on July 12, 2006, we can say that the government decided to go to war but did not carry out the requisite analysis with regard to the goals of the war, the chances for attaining them, and the connection between them and the missions delegated to the army. The correct way would have been the following: first, a short report about the event. (Usually a lot of time is wasted on a description of what happened, although most of the details have already been published by the media or are irrelevant to the political echelon. This is also the time when long-winded, unnecessary intelligence reports are presented.) In any case, after the short report, the government should have dealt with the real issue, at whose center lay the question: what is our goal. In this case, the goal could have been one of two (or more possibilities), and therefore it was important to clarify and decide what we really wanted to achieve.

The first possibility could have been a powerful retaliatory operation in Lebanon, and to this end, air force operations for two or three days. The cost to Hizbollah would at the initial stage have been steep, because on the first day high quality targets were exposed. An aggressive attack by the air force would also have caused some damage and destruction to Lebanon itself, Hizbollah's host. Two days after such an action, the whole world, including Hizbollah, would presumably have begged for a ceasefire – this is in fact what happened – and we would have agreed. True, such an operation would not have returned the captives and would not have sufficed to destroy Hizbollah, but it would have restored Israel's deterrence factor because of the high cost paid by the other side. Such an action would also have imposed new rules of the game and would have decreased the chances of such events recurring in the future. The goal of such an action would have been limited, and could have been defined as "restoring deterrence." Thus it is while the result would presumably have been limited, the cost we would have incurred would have been low, as the risk factor was low. That summarizes the first of the possible approaches.

The second possible approach argues that the problem was not the kidnapping itself but the very existence of Hizbollah as a strong, hostile, independent military organization, positioned along our northern border

and capable of harming the citizens of the state at any time. Therefore, the goal would have been more far reaching: to cause significant damage to Hizbollah's capabilities, at least in the south. Were this the goal, then we would have launched a very different type of operation, i.e., from day one, it would already have been necessary to call up three or four reserves divisions and carry out an operation that would last four to six weeks – not two days – and would consist primarily of a fairly extensive ground maneuver, e.g., as far as the Litani River. In this case, the goal would have been much broader and the achievement could have been much more significant, but the cost and the risk would naturally have been greater. In addition to these two possibilities, one may list two other goals or two different approaches that would translate into other types of military action; these lie beyond the scope of this analysis.

The focus of the discussion in the government on July 12 should have been the question of what we want to achieve: do we suffice ourselves with restoring our deterrence, or do we also want to slash Hizbollah's military capabilities. In practice, what emerged was, "Let's start by attacking Lebanon and see what happens." If this was the outcome of the discussion, there is no doubt that the goal was unclear. When it is unclear at the strategic level, it is very hard to translate it into operational objectives, from the level of the chief of staff down to the command echelon and from there to the division level, because the key sentence in every operation order, which is supposed to be the clearest – "what do we want to achieve" – was not straightforward. This is the locus of one of the central failures of the campaign in Lebanon.

Operation Cast Lead also lacked an optimal definition of goals. When the operation began and when the first strike by the air force was carried out – a strike that was very successful in and of itself – it was still unclear what it was we wanted to achieve. The definition given by the political echelon was a definition along the lines of "creating better security conditions." This is a vague formulation, which may be rephrased more simply as "we want things to be better." This is not a definition of goals that lends itself to translation into concrete military terms.

It was only three days after the beginning of Operation Cast Lead that a real discussion began at the political echelon and between the political echelon and the senior military echelon about what we wanted to achieve. Here three possible goals presented themselves: one, we want

to create deterrence for the future. Were this the goal, it would have been a fairly modest aim and there would have been no need to carry out a large action, certainly not a large ground maneuver, in order to attain it. There would simply have been no reason to continue the action. In the most extreme scenario, it might have been enough to start and complete the operation with the same first strike by the air force, since it seems that deterrence was achieved as early as that.

A second possible goal would have been to strike a severe blow to Hamas' military capabilities, i.e., to damage all its military capabilities, launchers, tunnels, and most of its fighters – not just to deter Hamas but also to make sure that the organization would not undertake any military operation against us for a long time to come. There were those who favored a third, even more ambitious option: toppling the Hamas government. Were this the goal, it would have been necessary to conquer all of the Gaza Strip in order to create a new reality wherein Hamas would be unable to govern.

What was the goal when Operation Cast Lead was embarked upon? It was not defined. The discussions about the goal only started three or four days into the operation, and continued for at least ten days, without any direct relationship to what was happening on the ground. Defense Minister Ehud Barak often states, "First think, then act." In this case, "first think, then act" means that there should have been a very clear definition of the goal before embarking on the operation.

Naturally, the government must appeal to the public. It is only proper that the government decision presented to the public be formulated in general terms and that its objective be to justify the very existence of the operation. Yet it is a mistake to assume that the explanation of the decision for public consumption would suffice for the army to translate it into a concrete battle plan. Thus it is necessary to distinguish between the government's announcement to the public and the definition of the goals of the operation (the war) as given to the army. It is imperative that there be no contradiction between them, but the level of detail must be different.

Thus both in the Second Lebanon War and in Operation Cast Lead the goals were unclear. In contrast, in Operation Defensive Shield (2002) there was a very pointed discussion about the goal of the operation. At least in this case, the army insisted that the political echelon discuss the

question of what we want to achieve. The straw that broke the camel's back, impelling Israel to embark on the operation, was Hamas' terrorist attack on the Park Hotel on the night of the Passover seder in April 2002. Consequently there were those who called for an uncompromising, all out declaration of war against Hamas. The chief of staff thought it would be impossible to fight Hamas while ignoring the presence of the Palestinian Authority and without hurting it or without undertaking actions that might cause it to collapse. As a result, not only did the question of the goal become more pointed but with it the question of whom were we fighting. The army pushed for a decision to wage a real war – though not a comprehensive one – also against the PA, including by means of damaging everything that may have served it as symbols: from the Muqata (Arafat's presidential compound in Ramallah) to the refugee camps. It is also important to note that the discussion about the goals occurred – appropriately so – at the beginning of Operation Defensive Shield and not several days or weeks afterwards.

The third issue is the question of how the political echelon and the military conduct their dialogue during a battle of this kind. Clearly, the dialogue must start before embarking on the action. In this context, it is important to stress an often overlooked point, namely, the political echelon's understanding of the army's capabilities. There is an exaggerated tendency on the part of the upper ranks of the political leadership, in particular those who are privy to intelligence reports, to focus on understanding the adversary. At times it seems that when a prime minister or a defense minister reads raw intelligence data he or she suddenly has a blazing revelation or tremendous insight. The importance of intelligence material is rather limited, if it exists at all, and is often liable to be downright harmful. It is much more important that the leadership know its army's capabilities, and if you prefer to put this in military terms: to know the ratios of forces, what we can do, and what they can do.

When this point is insufficiently addressed, not just by the government but by all decision makers in the executive branches – in the government and the cabinet – the result is a large gap not only between expectations and performance, but also between an understanding of what is achievable and what is not. Many have spoken about this phenomenon with regard to the Yom Kippur War, but not with regard

to the Second Lebanon War. In this context, a critical factor that was not considered when the government authorized the action was the army's level of preparedness.

The issue of the army's preparedness is directly linked to the IDF's budget. When the army formulated its multi-year situation assessment in 2003, it concluded that in order to provide a reasonable response to the threats faced by the State of Israel it needed a certain amount of money. The multi-year plan, based on this figure, was presented to the government and approved in principle. Between 2003 and 2006, the security budget was cut by 1-2 billion NIS a year compared with the sum determined by the plan. Incidentally, the height of the cuts came in May 2006, two months before the war, when I believe a sum of 1.5 billion NIS was cut from the army's budget.

In light of these budgetary constraints, the army was forced to decide where to invest more resources and where to invest fewer. Of all the topics examined, the army decided – and in my opinion, with a certain amount of justification – that the area worthy of receiving fewer resources was the level of preparedness. “Level of preparedness” means the scope of training, the level of inventory (of ammunition and spare parts), and technical fitness or competence. Why was this decision made over another? The answer is on the one hand the drive not to spare anything in fighting Palestinian terrorism, and on the other hand, the geo-strategic reality of that point in time in the Middle East. This included the American presence in Iraq and the understanding that the war between us and our neighbors could happen in only one of two situations: one – the occurrence of an essential strategic change, which it was safe to assume we would notice so that we would have a “strategic alert” of several months in which to improve our level of preparedness, and the other – were we to decide to embark on a previously planned action, in which case we would certainly have enough time to bring our competence up to snuff.

Whether or not the government understood this situation when it met on the fateful day of July 12, 2006, its decision to go war surprised itself and surprised the army. By the way, in the past a similar process occurred, but then the decision went the other way. That was in the summer of 1981, when the government made a strategic decision removed from the tactical level. At the tactical level, the government decided not to put its

decision into practice right away but to wait for the right opportunity. In the meantime, for an entire year, from the summer of 1981 until the summer of 1982, the army prepared and trained rigorously for battle. At the time, I was a battalion commander, and I can testify to the rigor of the exercises, models, and concrete training carried out before the operation. In clear contrast from 1981, the government decided on July 12, 2006 that the IDF would immediately embark on an operation without examining the possibility of distinguishing between the strategic decision (to embark on an extensive operation against Hizbollah) and the tactical one (when to do so).

Another example that demonstrates the nature of the dialogue that prevailed in the Second Lebanon War between the political echelon and the military was the prime minister's answer, some two or three weeks after the beginning of the war, to the question, "Why did you not authorize the army to conduct a ground maneuver?" Ehud Olmert's response was: "I didn't authorize? The army didn't present me with a plan. There is no action the army presented to me that I did not authorize." A strange phenomenon emerges here, whereby the dialogue between the political leadership and the army is such that the encounter between them happens only when the army needs authorization for a different or additional action than what is already authorized. In wars of the kind we are dealing with, in which almost every military action is likely to have political ramifications and every political action is likely to limit or expand the military's scope of operation, it is impossible to conduct a campaign without a real dialogue. A real dialogue means that once every two or three days a limited forum composed of the prime minister, the minister of defense, the minister of foreign affairs, the chief of staff, and another four or five people meets in order to coordinate their views of the situation and afterwards decide on what action to take.

Discussions of this sort did not take place during the Second Lebanon War, or certainly not in the way described here. Therefore, gaps emerged between the military and political echelon in terms of their respective understandings of reality and the decisions made. A short time after Operation Defensive Shield, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres said before a small forum of political and military leaders: "Eighty percent of the topics we touch on are not purely political or military issues. They have elements of both, and therefore we have no choice but

to meet frequently and make sure that we understand reality the same way.” In my opinion, this statement is true, yet this coordination was lacking in the Second Lebanon War.

An exaggeration in the opposite direction took place during Operation Cast Lead. As the result of the trauma whereby the political echelon was seemingly insufficiently involved, a plethora of forums was created; in the end, these did not allow the military to conduct the war properly. During Operation Cast Lead, the chief of staff’s daily schedule included a 4:30 P.M. situation assessment, a 6:00 P.M. meeting with the minister of defense, and an 8:00-10:00 P.M. meeting with the prime minister. The number of participants was not limited to six to eight people, but typically featured more than twenty. Usually, information transmitted in such forums is identical. This whole ritual would end in the wee hours of the night, though most of the information was not relevant to the prime minister, minister of defense, or even the chief of staff. Thus in my opinion, most of the day to day issues could have been dealt with at the level of the head of the IDF Operations Division. The net result was the existence of many forums, creating a workload that not only failed to contribute anything to the conduct of the campaign but also interfered with the operational echelons’ ability to carry out their jobs. In this context, there is no doubt that it is necessary to find a proper balance.

A fourth essential issue concerns warfare in the urban landscape and the degree of our willingness to accept the rules of the game the enemy tries to impose on us. One of the most common phenomena of asymmetrical warfare, i.e., a war between a state and a sub-state entity such as Hamas or Hizbollah, is the activity within urban areas and among civilian populations, on the basis of the understanding that a densely populated environment – a Lebanese village, a refugee camp or a Gaza neighborhood – makes it harder for the IDF to fight and thus presents the organization with many advantages. Moreover, because there is a large civilian population in the vicinity of the fighting, the greater the force the army uses, the more civilian casualties there will be and with that, greater external pressure to stop the action.

This understanding on the part of the terrorist organizations is correct up to a point, and depends primarily on our willingness to play by the rules of the game laid down by the other side or conversely, on our willingness to assume a military, political-propaganda risk and decide to

fight using the requisite level of aggression within those built-up areas. Our experience with all three events – Operation Defensive Shield, the Second Lebanon War, and Operation Cast Lead – teaches us that we are capable of conducting intensive fighting within urban areas. From our perspective, this kind of warfare contains two possible benefits. The first is attaining the military achievement we wanted, such as what happened in Operation Defensive Shield and also, to a very great extent, in Operation Cast Lead; and the second is linked to the population's support of the terrorist organization. Eventually, once the dust has settled, the great damage to life and property caused by fighting in urban areas makes the local population, whether in Lebanon or in the territories, start asking the terrorist organizations that set up shop in their midst some tough questions. These questions are a millstone around the necks of Hizbollah and Hamas, and greatly affect the level of these organizations' willingness to renew the fire against Israel. Fighting in populated areas was conducted properly in Operation Defensive Shield and Operation Cast Lead, but with a great deal of hesitancy in the Second Lebanon War, thereby becoming one of the problems of that war.

The fifth issue concerns the important question of international legitimacy. It is clear that the army's scope of action is affected not only by military capabilities but also by what is said and done in the UN, the United States, the EU, and elsewhere. At the same time, it should also be remembered that the effect of public opinion and the international arena is usually short lived. As part of our military campaign, we must be capable of tolerating international pressure and even anger, including from close friends such as the United States, not just because of the need to attain the goal for which we undertook the operation to begin with, but also because international legitimacy is fluid, and when you present successes there is a tendency, at least among friendly nations, to forgive and forget times of disagreement. As for the international media, after a short period of time they are back covering other topics.

So, for example, when Operation Defensive Shield began and our forces entered Palestinian towns in massive numbers, the question arose whether the Palestinian Authority would be able to continue functioning. This generated tremendous pressure from the United States, and I can testify firsthand to furious phone calls from Condoleezza Rice, then the head of the National Security Council, when she demanded that

the IDF withdraw from Palestinian towns within 48 hours. Afterwards, she displayed willingness to discuss a longer time frame, and finally agreements were reached with regard to specific locations eligible for operations or off limits. Israel's stance was that we embarked on the operation after living for years in an impossible situation, and we needed at least several weeks to attain the desired goal. In this we demonstrated determination, and in the end international pressure waned. To my mind, during the Second Lebanon War our decision makers were beset by exaggerated concerns bordering on anxiety regarding what was said around the world, and the army was not given enough time to do what we, at a certain point, understood needed doing.

This leads us to the sixth issue, the relationship between the outcome of a military action and the political achievement. The connection between the two differs from what we saw in the past. In World War II, for example, one side achieved a victory over the other side with no conditions, and accordingly was also in a position to dictate the political outcome, making it possible to describe what happened as an "unconditional surrender." This was likewise true of World War I and many other wars. In our region too, the nature of the military achievement – e.g., in the Yom Kippur War – to a large extent dictated the scope of the political accomplishment. Today the relationship between the military achievement and the political one is looser; the two may in fact differ greatly. In other words, there is no necessary link between the measure of success on the battlefield and the outcome of the political talks or the extent of one's ability to conclude the operation in the desired fashion.

Therefore, when it is clear that a campaign of this type is approaching, the political process must begin before the military one is launched. This did not occur in advance of the Second Lebanon War, even when it was clear that a confrontation with Hizbollah was only a matter of time. We did not present the Americans ahead of time with what was likely to happen. I am not referring to diplomatic manipulations here, rather a simple statement describing the factual situation, especially that once every few weeks or so Hizbollah carried out terrorist attacks along our northern border; that we could tolerate this as long as loss of life and damages to property were minimal; that a time might come when it would be impossible for us to tolerate it any longer and we would be forced to act in Lebanon; and when that happened, we would act in such a manner as to

damage not only Hizbollah but other elements as well in Lebanon. From our perspective, this is what ought to have been said to the Americans: that it was not a question of “if,” rather a question of “when.” In so doing, it would have been possible to coordinate the political conclusion with the Americans ahead of time, even before the outbreak of the war and without any direct correlation to its operational moves.

In April 2006, when newly elected Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was about to travel to the United States for his first official visit, a discussion was held about the topics to raise with the Americans. The Iranian issue and the Palestinian issue were obvious. There were those who said that this was an opportunity to present the reality of the Israeli-Lebanese border to the United States, just as I outlined above. Olmert felt that the issue was not a “burning” one and therefore need not be raised. The problem is that when a war breaks out it is already too late to enter into the sort of political discussions that can be effective earlier on.

In this sense Operation Cast Lead was a decided improvement over the Second Lebanon War, because not only were the army and the Israeli public prepared ahead of time, but so was the international community. This was clearly exemplified by the prime minister’s public and diplomatic statements that he was willing to give the residents of the Gaza Strip one more opportunity to stop the Qassam fire; otherwise we would have no choice but to put an end to the fire ourselves. The political consequences of this preparation were impressive, for the first time impelling all important European heads of state to fall in line with Israel a short time after the war began. Precisely because of this, it is important that the political initiative start before rather than after the military campaign.

The last essential issue relates to the question of what lies ahead. One may provocatively say that should the Third Lebanon War break out in the near future its outcomes would not be very different from those of the Second Lebanon War. True, impressive improvements have been made in the army’s preparedness. Many lessons have been learned and internalized, and very successful activity has also taken place in preparing the home front. One may assume that in everything concerning communication between the political echelon and the military, changes have been made that will make us more prepared and better suited to handle the next battle.

Nonetheless, the results of a war depend not just on one side but also on the other. When we examine Hizbollah over the past three years we see that that the organization too has improved. The number of rockets at its disposal has grown and exceeds its arsenal on the eve of the Second Lebanon War. More importantly, the range of its rockets has grown and their efficiency has increased. If in the Second Lebanon War a quick ground maneuver to the Litani line would have neutralized most of the launching areas, the new reality is that a similar move in the Third Lebanon War would not suffice. Moreover, Hizbollah has improved in other fields as well, including its deployment in urban areas and its expansion in underground complexes, giving it clear tactical advantages over its capabilities of the summer of 2006. Generally speaking, one may say that tactically, the advantages and improvements on both sides since 2006 more or less offset one another, and therefore the outcome of the next confrontation will be similar. In other words, the army may be able to cause more damage to Hizbollah, but Hizbollah will also be able to cause more damage to Israel, especially to its civilian front.

Nonetheless, in my understanding there is one element that is likely to change the outcome of the next battle fundamentally, and may even prevent its outbreak to begin with. This element has to do with defining the enemy. This definition is no less important than the definition of the goal. In Operation Defensive Shield, the question of the enemy's identify arose in full force; the debate that raged was complex and pointed. While politically speaking the Labor Party could not accept the definition of the Palestinian Authority as the enemy, from the moment the decision was made, the military scope of operations widened and presented a broader field than would have been possible had the enemy been defined only as Hamas, as it would have been impossible to damage the symbols, institutions, forces, or anything belonging to the PA.

In the Second Lebanon War, Hizbollah was defined as the enemy. The world, of course, accepted this formulation without question. By contrast, the Lebanese population, the Lebanese state, and the Lebanese government were defined as "the good guys." Therefore, it was forbidden to harm them. However, it is impossible to achieve victory over a guerilla organization such as Hizbollah under the following three conditions: one, the organization is on one side of the border and we are on the other; two, the organization receives full protection from the state in which it

operates, in our case Lebanon, where Hizbollah is an inseparable part of the political system; and three, that state's immunity protects it from any military response on our part. When these three conditions prevail, the guerilla organization cannot be defeated. In my opinion, this is precisely the locus of the biggest mistake made in the Second Lebanon War – defining the enemy narrowly and in nonrealistic terms.

The right thing to do now, especially in light of what has been said regarding the political campaign that must be conducted before the military battle, is to explain to the world, to Lebanon's friends – France, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and any other relevant party – that the next time Israel is forced into combat against Hizbollah, the Republic of Lebanon will no longer enjoy any immunity. It must be clear from our point of view that anything that serves Hizbollah, including the infrastructures of the state, is a legitimate target for attack. The war will not be between Israel and Hizbollah, but between Israel and Lebanon.

Maintaining the unity of Lebanon is a common interest of the Arabs, including Syrian and Iran, and the West. On the basis of this common interest it is possible to conduct a dialogue with friendly parties and transmit a message to the Lebanese government that the next war will not be limited to a confrontation against Hizbollah alone but will bring about the destruction of the Lebanese state. Only a political statement of this sort, made consistently over an extended period of time, will ensure that the war is postponed, or if it nonetheless erupts, that its outcome is radically different from the outcome of the Second Lebanon War.

Should we attempt to identify the most effective operation carried out by the IDF, it would not be the impressive strikes against rockets, rather the decision to attack the Dahiya quarter in Beirut with massive force. To this day Hizbollah is still feeling the significant aftershocks of that action. Hizbollah leaders too understand that there is a limit to the amount of destruction they can inflict on Lebanon's Shiites and the country's infrastructures without having to provide a reasonable explanation for why it is all necessary. If a war does break out, it is in Israel's clear interest to position itself against a state entity that can be deterred rather than against an organization that enjoys political protection.

This relates to an advantage we enjoyed in Operation Cast Lead given Hamas' takeover of Gaza. To a large extent, Hamas has become a state entity. Before it seized power and it fired Qassams at Israel, the

Palestinian Authority was the official governing body, and we were forced to fight Hamas with one hand tied behind our backs because we could not damage government infrastructures in Gaza. In 2007, once Hamas became the governing party in the Gaza Strip, it also became responsible for what happens within its territory. In other words, we have a state entity before us, one that can be threatened and harmed, and as we have seen since the conclusion of the operation, can also be deterred.

The IDF in the Years before the Second Lebanon War

Moshe Kaplinsky

It is very difficult to analyze and understand the Second Lebanon War without understanding how the IDF entered it. By this I am not referring to the moment the decision was made to attack on July 12, 2006, rather to the processes that occurred in the years leading up to the war. In this context, it is necessary to try to understand the fields where the military was focusing its endeavors, the topics with which the army was dealing, and the outlook of the IDF's leadership at that time. It is necessary to focus on two central, interrelated points. The first concerns the ongoing war on terrorism in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, and the question of how this warfare affected the IDF. The second point is the limited resources the army had to cope with in those years.

Though in the rush of events this is sometimes forgotten, it behooves us to remember that the IDF came to the war in Lebanon after unprecedented successes in the warfare against Palestinian terrorism in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. The wave of terrorism that started sweeping over Israel in September 2000, highlighted by suicide terrorism, caused senior army personnel, senior security services personnel, government members, and probably also the public at large to wonder if the traditional statement that terrorism is not an existential threat to the State of Israel still held true.

The answer to this question became clear very quickly. As the result of the increasing terrorism, the notion that should we fail to deal with the mounting wave of suicide bombers it might well constitute a threat to Israel's very existence slowly permeated our consciousness. In those years, the army did what was necessary to uproot the phenomenon. In

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this context, the leadership of the army, myself included, made the right decisions regarding priorities. Among other decisions, the bulk of the regular forces were diverted to continuous fighting against terrorism. It was also decided to divert resources in favor of this type of warfare at the expense of long term growth in power, and at the expense of neglecting the war reserve stores. So, for example, we moved equipment out of these depots in order to distribute it to forces operating daily in the alleys of Nablus, Jenin, and the Gaza Strip. According to these decisions, the most problematic sectors in terms of terrorism received higher priority when it came to allocation of resources than other sectors, including the Northern Command. As a result of the challenges faced by the army at this time, the Northern Command was, for the first time in many years, asked to adopt the *modus operandi* of a secondary front.

In 2002, 42 terrorist attacks were carried out against the civilian front in the State of Israel, and 260 civilians and soldiers lost their lives. By contrast, four years later, in 2006, there were only two terrorist attacks on the home front, with 17 civilians killed. This achievement was unprecedented in Israel and elsewhere in the world, but this achievement came with a steep price tag.

In response to the evolving challenges, the army changed its method of operation against Palestinian terrorism. In late 2002, when I was appointed commander of the Northern Command, we understood that it was critical to change fundamentally our manner of fighting in this region. Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) allowed us to generate the necessary change in our mode of fighting terrorism. We particularly emphasized the issue of intelligence and the ability of the smallest fighting framework to take in and synchronize information from all intelligence sources. Further, we stressed the importance of operations and surgical actions over large scale undertakings involving masses of large forces. This way, every fighting battalion, down to the simplest one, performed special operations at one level or another.

We also supported deliberations over the value of the mission. We insisted on carrying out missions only when all the conditions were ripe for them to be carried out. We insisted on checking if missions were still justifiable given the risks to our forces. In several instances we even decided to cancel missions as the result of such considerations. For example, given the reality of the time in Judea and Samaria, in most cases

it did not matter if we waited a day or two to arrest a certain terrorist. The army was focused on creating suitable conditions in which to carry out the arrest in a smooth and orderly fashion. We deliberately developed this culture, stressing, for example, that when the weather did not allow for an appropriate intelligence envelope the mission was to be postponed until the following day. All of this, of course, was the case as long as we did not have a ticking bomb scenario, a suicide terrorist on the way to carrying out an attack inside Israel.

As part of this operational culture, we also insisted that our brigade commanders remain in the rear. Perhaps this is where we created what later became known in the public as “the plasma commanders.” In my opinion, all of us did an enormous disservice to the brigade and battalion commanders in the war against terrorism, because they were never “plasma commanders,” but this is where we created the phenomenon: given the operational environment in Judea and Samaria at that time, it was indeed the proper procedure to place the commanders in the rear. Those who differ with me are welcome to revisit the public and military debate that arose regarding the commander’s placement in the war against terrorism in the wake of the death of the Hebron Brigade commander, Colonel Dror Weinberg. On Friday night November 15, 2002, Colonel Weinberg arrived at the path between Kiryat Arba and the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron in an attempt to find a cell that had carried out a shooting attack in the area. In that action, Weinberg was killed by terrorist fire.

It could be said with a great deal of justification that the IDF has always been fighting terrorism. For twenty years in Lebanon, we fought terrorism with characteristics particular to that sector. We have always tried to adapt ourselves to the enemy’s different patterns in order to deal successfully with any specific threat, and still this did not decrease the army’s capability of fulfilling missions and meeting challenges in other sectors. Nevertheless, what bridged the gaps created in the units’ fitness and in the fitness of the fighters and commanders and help prepare them for missions in other sectors was the training. Unlike the past, in the period of fighting suicide terrorism the army in practice halted training.

In order to demonstrate this point, I will mention that in my service as commander of the Golani Brigade there was a debate in the IDF whether, given budgetary constraints, to expand the cycle of three

months training followed by three months operational employment to four months training and four months operational employment. As the representative of the brigade commanders, I was sent to speak before various forums, including the chief of staff and the minister of defense at the time. I explained to them that four months of continuous operational employment would not allow us to keep up our units and maintain their level of training or their fitness to deal with other threats, and that we would also find it hard to maintain operational tension. There is no doubt in my mind that I was naive and innocent. The units that served in my command in the Central Command during the war on suicide terrorism sometimes served as many as twelve months of continuous operational employment; sometimes they served ten months of continuous operational employment, followed by a month or five weeks of something like training, which we called "a refresher" because it really was no more than that. All of this needs to be mentioned in order to place matters in the proper proportion and perspective.

In fact, we were also unable to bridge the gap that opened up in terms of unit training because of limited resources. In 2003, the IDF formulated a multi-year program called "Kela." This program involved many drastic budget cuts. So, for example, we suspended a large part of our tank reserves and grounded dozens of airplanes. In addition, we shut down some units altogether, and started dismissing some 6,000 standing army personnel. A month and a half after the government authorized Kela's budget at a certain sum, it imposed another half a billion NIS budget cut on the army. Therefore, the IDF had to slash many more millions of dollars beyond what it had defined as the line in the sand. We are talking about considerable sums of money.

Nonetheless, money was not the major problem in this context. The problem was the way in which the budget was cut. The sudden imposition of the cuts on the army created a situation in which the budgetary room for maneuvering on the part of the IDF's leadership was greatly constricted because long term programs were already underway. The army personnel who were fired still would still collect many more months of salaries. Therefore, the resources that we were still consuming and most available for cutting were days of reserve duty, training, and inventory maintenance. These were the three areas in which it was still possible to make budget cuts in the IDF at that time.

And thus, we cut the training budget: from 1 billion NIS in 2001, we invested only 0.5 billion NIS in 2006. Similarly, the reserves training budget went from about 0.5 billion NIS in 2001, to about 150 million NIS in 2006. In 2003, there was no training at all of the reservists, i.e., the reserves training budget for that year was zero.

The combination of these two elements – the war against terrorism and the repeated cuts in the defense budget and their effect on the IDF's training program – meant that the army came to Lebanon unprepared to fulfill its mission. Company commanders had not had concentrated training. Officers who since their enlistment had dealt with fighting terrorism in the territories suddenly found themselves in Lebanon for the first time, leading full size companies without having had organized training with their companies. Battalion commanders who had never led a tank battalion were sent to Lebanon, and there were reserve units that for six years had not trained under fire. All of these factors have already been discussed at length, but I think it is appropriate to mention them in order to understand the comprehensive picture of that war and understand the IDF performance.

Another phenomenon touches on the debate that developed in the army regarding a new operational approach. In my opinion, formulating a new operational approach in the army when the nature of the threat was changing was the right thing to do. An army must be an organization that learns, makes progress, improves, and revitalizes itself. In practice, several years before the summer of 2006, we dealt with the development of a new operational approach. Some of its ramifications and principles touched on strengthening firepower at the expense of maneuver in what we called "joint decision." That was the direction the army was taking at the time; that was its intention. At the same time, a new language with unique terminology developed in order to describe this new approach. Unfortunately, this field was not developed professionally or well enough. The language stayed within a small cadre in the army and did not succeed, because of our internal failures, to reach the rank and file or to become the language common to all the echelons.

The large general staff exercise held in 2004 dealt with a scenario similar to the Second Lebanon War. Already then there was a lot of writing on the wall, and the sharp-eyed among us saw it then. As early as that exercise, many weak points of the new operational approach became

apparent, such as the unsuccessful attempts to shape or wrest a decision from the other side only by application of firepower. It also became clear that the period of fighting was too long, and that there was insufficient attention paid to the number of casualties on the home front. In addition, the first signs of misunderstandings between the echelons due to unclear language emerged. Yet in hindsight it seems that in the years preceding the war it was difficult to expose the shortcomings of the new approach and the language describing it, both because of the lack of orderly training at the corps level and at the command level. This is how the IDF showed up for the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006.

Still, none of the above is an excuse or a justification for the way in which we proceeded. I think – I know in my bones – that even under such circumstances we were obligated to do better and conclude the campaign in a more decisive and much better manner. If this is the case, we need to ask where we went wrong. In my understanding, the mistake lay primarily in the way we used the tools at our disposal. The scope of this article is insufficient to describe all the issues relating to this point. Therefore, I will focus on five essential points, especially as we seek to prepare for the next round in Lebanon or prepare ourselves for challenges the State of Israel and the IDF will have to face in the future.

The first point in which we erred or failed as commanders was our inability to change the approach or the general mindset prevalent in the government, the public, and mostly within the army itself. We failed to clarify – perhaps we did not completely understand it ourselves – that the confrontation with Hizbollah was not a direct continuation of the ongoing operations we had carried out for the last six years in Judea and Samaria but was, rather, a war. One of the commanders, not a particularly senior one, a major, who fought both in the Second Lebanon War and in Operation Cast Lead, was recently asked his opinion of the difference between the two campaigns. He thought for a while, and finally answered: “In Lebanon, they kept telling us ‘you’re part of an operation.’ but when we left, they said, ‘This was a war.’ In Operation Cast Lead, they told us ‘war, war, war,’ but when we left, they said, ‘this was an operation.’” In my opinion, this is the best formulation for demonstrating the mindset of that war.

The entire spine of the army command did not understand and did not do enough to project and behave the way we should have in light

of the changing situation. True, there were attempts. In every situation assessment the chief of staff said, "Troops, we're at war; start thinking differently." Division 91 had the word "war" written on its wall. But this was not enough. We were also under the obligation to take concrete steps. Avigdor Kahalani in his book *The Heights of Courage: A Tank Leader's War on the Golan*, as I recall in the first chapter, talks about how the Syrian MiGs attacked the Golan Heights in 1973. He sent his tanks up the ramps, and one of the tank commanders asked him – even though he had already drawn fire – "Am I allowed to go on the blacktop?" i.e., on the road, since in routine times it is forbidden to take a tank on a paved road so as not to damage it.

In Lebanon too, it took us a long time to understand that we were allowed to go on the blacktop. Clearly, "getting on the blacktop" in this context included many other actions. We, the senior echelon of army commanders, should also have taken more concrete steps. So, for example, at the beginning of the war, a debate in the army developed about opening a supreme command post and whether it was significant or not in conducting the battle or the campaign in its early days. In hindsight, this discussion was totally beside the point, because the very fact that we did not open the post made us all think that the situation was more or less as always, i.e., we just had to do a little bit more than we had been doing till then. This sent a certain message downwards to the most basic ranks. Not calling up the reserves did not help us change the situation. We continued to follow the same work procedures we had always followed at all levels of the army.

Another expression of this mindset was the continued "operations and sorties discussions." These were totally irrelevant to the type of activity and decision we should have been engaged in. As far as I recall, these discussions continued until the advanced stages of the battle. Similarly, we should have divided the Northern Command into sectors. Further, the nature of the commands delegated downwards continued to resemble the commands we had issued for the six years leading up to the war and were, at best, relevant to fighting terrorism in Judea and Samaria.

It seems to me that even formally we did not define an emergency situation for the home front until the end of the war. Many discussions have been held on this issue, and many questions concerning the effect of such a declaration on the economy have also been debated. Again,

with the benefit of hindsight, this question and others like it seem less relevant. In practice, we missed many opportunities to use different tools to demonstrate to ourselves, our troops, and the public in general that we had now entered a different reality.

The implications of this blunder were varied: some of us stayed close to our plasma screens; we did not define missions the way we should have at the time, and this affected the presence or absence of certain values among the lower echelons. Take the value of “maintaining the mission,” for example: on the basis of close acquaintance with the command on the ground and how it operated, I am convinced that had we defined the missions correctly and had we been able to influence the general mindset, no division commander would have postponed an action he was supposed to carry out because of a weather problem. Perhaps this would have been the right thing to do in Nablus, but not in Lebanon. Many examples may be used in this context, but it seems to me that the point is clear enough.

In my opinion, our failure to change the general mindset of the army grew even worse because of the approach that developed on the northern border since the withdrawal from the security zone in May 2000, at whose center lay the principle of “sit and wait.” The primary mission was simply to prevent kidnappings, and nothing more. The security of IDF soldiers was defined as of overriding importance. The combination of all these elements, together with our inability to say, “that was then – this is now. From this point onwards, the situation has changed,” was among the central causes – if not the central cause – for the manner in which the war was conducted.

The second way we erred was by not seeking to shorten the length of the campaign. True, the battles we have to enter these days are doomed to be long. The enemy we will have to face in the years to come is not the kind of enemy one can vanquish in one fell swoop. Sporadic attacks are not the answer, and their effectiveness is limited. This is also true of the Lebanese context: even should the IDF conquer the area up to the Litani River, the battle will remain undecided, and many stages will remain before it is concluded. Nonetheless, I think that we assumed too much freedom in extending that war. Looking back, we did not appreciate the cumulative effect that the missile and rocket attacks had on the civilian front. The other side understood better than we did what rockets could

do over time. Statements from mayors who declared that the home front was strong and would support the IDF, and that the army had to continue doing its mission heartened us. Indeed, we assumed too much freedom in everything concerning the length of the war.

Here it is also necessary to look at our assessment of the United States' reaction and the pressure we expected the United States to exert on us. We were all waiting for the administration in Washington to stop us. This approach was totally mistaken. We failed in analyzing their needs, their insights, and the understandings they were formulating at that time with regard to Hizbollah. In my opinion the Americans understood, just like we did, the importance of this battle not just for Israel alone but for the entire world and the *weltanschauung* it represents, and therefore they allowed us full freedom of action. We did not understand that this was how things stood, and we conducted ourselves according to a totally different political clock on the basis of the belief that American pressure to stop the campaign was around the corner and that very soon we would be forced to bring it to a halt.

Another issue linked to shortening the length of the campaign has to do with the exit mechanisms. These should have been defined at the beginning of the campaign. We should have defined precisely what we intend to do and what we want to achieve and formulated the desired exit mechanisms accordingly, i.e., if we suffice ourselves with a preventive blow or if we aim at a decision against Hizbollah, or any other goal. From that moment onwards we should have focused all our efforts in that direction and generally defined and formulated the exit mechanisms we wanted. We did not do so. In my opinion, it was possible to create these mechanisms immediately after the air force's successful strike against Hizbollah's long range rocket batteries on Wednesday night and Thursday, and accordingly at that point create the mechanisms that would have allowed us to shorten the duration of the campaign. In this context, for example, it is my understanding that we should have decided at a much earlier stage that we were embarking on a ground maneuver. At the same time, we should have demonstrated greater determination in performing the partial ground maneuvers we did decide on. In addition, we should have operated other anti-rocket means at our disposal much earlier. I am not referring here to any secret weapon, but rather to the

intelligent application of special forces we brought into the circle of warfare too late in the battle.

The third point relating to the failure in managing the campaign concerns the fact that the reserves were not called up immediately at the beginning of the war. It needs to be said again: when we decided on a large scale attack in response to the kidnapping, we, in the same breath, should also have decided whether to suffice ourselves with this attack or to prepare ourselves for an extended campaign. We made decisions that straddled the fence. We said, we were embarking on an attack; let's see what happens then. In hindsight, it is clear that that was not the correct way to operate and is not the way to prepare properly for the future. The situation was greatly exacerbated by the fact that as I described above, our reserve units lacked training and cohesion. The army had a plan to bridge some of the operational gaps created in reserve units due to a lack of training over years. While the plan was not perfect, its implementation would have allowed us to bring reserve units into the fighting better than we did. We simply gave up on implementing the plan. In any case, I think that even if in the end we had not brought the reserves to the front lines, the very fact that they were called up would have sent a message of deterrence indicative of our intentions, and may have served as a means of formulating the campaign exit mechanisms more quickly.

In any future campaign, we will have to face some dilemmas in terms of the reserves: when to call them up, how many to call up, the ramifications for the economy, the public's reaction should it be decided not to deploy them, and the responses of the reservists themselves if some are forced to sit around doing nothing. My opinion on the issue is clear. When a decision is made we should use the full array of resources at our disposal in order to turn that decision into reality; things should be done ahead of time and not incrementally.

The fourth point combines preparedness and management. We entered the fighting in the summer of 2006 without a prepared operational plan for fighting in this sector. To my mind, the operational plan is the keystone of an army. It is on the basis of such plans that resources are allocated, command level virtual training and exercises are conducted, deliberations are held, and command and control concepts are analyzed and formulated. Operational plans are the basis for developing know-how and accumulating experience, for focusing intelligence efforts

and planning training and exercises. This is the only way it is possible to prepare properly for the battle to come. Without operational plans, the dialogue between the different echelons in the army, and between the army and the political echelon, will necessarily be incomplete. In practice, the plan furnishes the common denominator of all the parties, and without one it is difficult to access that denominator, certainly in the course of fighting.

In the future too we are liable to become embroiled in a situation where we have to operate in some arena or other without a ready operational plan. Still, in the Second Lebanon War, we failed to conduct ourselves and command the troops the way we should have in light of the lack of an appropriate operational plan. It was indeed possible to have taken various steps that would have somewhat closed or even completely bridged this gap. For example, we could have changed the nature of the deliberations, delved more deeply into the discussions, and not focused on transmitting information, especially in everything relating to the dialogue with the political echelon but also within the army itself. We should have been very, very careful with the way we defined the commands and the way in which we transmitted them down through the command structure. We did not do any of these.

The fifth point is actually a combination and result of the four points enumerated thus far, and may be summarized under the title "initiative, assault, and maintaining the mission." We lacked these three components. In addition to all that has been said here, it seems that this is the most important lesson to take away from the war; it must not be forgotten in the next battle.

The Second Lebanon War also had many achievements, though this is not the place to discuss them. All of us can sense them for ourselves. To my mind, one of the most important elements about that war – and I know that this is compared to the many very bad aspects – was that it served as a wake-up call for the IDF and, I hope, for the country as a whole.

I had the privilege to serve as deputy chief of staff under Dan Haloutz when he charged me with the mission of leading the debriefings held in the army after the war. I had the privilege of transmitting the lessons we learned in these debriefings to Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi in order to fix what that needed fixing in the army. I think that these two moves merit recognition on the part of every citizen of Israel. The public

and media atmosphere that prevailed after that war generated many debates, some of them cynical, led by people who were looking for heads to roll. Still, other than this phenomenon, the process of learning the lessons was in fact impressive, even, as I understand it, unprecedented in the scope, depth, and maturity shown by the army, and most importantly in the lessons learned that would later on become working plans in use in the IDF today.

Many of the results of this process were visible in Operation Cast Lead. For the first time in many years, this was an operation I watched as a civilian at home on the TV screen. Besides the fact that we talk too much, I watched with pleasure and pride the systematic application of the many lessons we generated and the fact that this time, the military operation was conducted very differently, in a much better way. In contradistinction to the Second Lebanon War, this time the army entered the campaign in the Gaza Strip with prepared plans that had been drilled from the division and brigade levels down to the level of the solitary soldier. I think that the fitness of the equipment, the war reserves storehouses, the integration of all the systems to increase the degree of readiness, the joint efforts of elements applying force, the air and the ground forces, the integration and synchronization of intelligence, and many other points that had emerged as failures in the Second Lebanon War, this time emerged as noteworthy strengths.

I am not certain, so I say this with some caution, that all state systems have learned the same lessons the army did and have indeed fixed all that needed fixing. In Operation Cast Lead, I too felt that there was no essential change in the dialogue between the military and the political echelon. I too felt that the definition of goals was not clear, certainly not at the outset of the battle. Here too I felt that we were not doing everything in our power, especially in terms of the military political dialogue, to shorten the duration of the battle or maximize other issues related to the systems enveloping the army. It seems to me that this is our duty, precisely because of that war, to organize these systems better. There is no doubt that there remain many aspects in need of fixing or improvement.

At the same time, in the army too it is important to remember that in Operation Cast Lead the mass of shortcomings was fixed and the lessons applied. It was a unique operation under unique circumstances that will not prevail the next time. The challenge for the commanders, and I am sure

they are facing it, is to deal properly with the lessons of the operation and to make sure that the process of integrating and assimilating the lessons from the Second Lebanon War continues even after the success in Gaza. In this context, it is important to note that it is much more difficult to fix shortcomings and generate lessons after a success than after a failure. I am sure this is a familiar phenomenon.

In conclusion, in my opinion, as a result of the Second Lebanon War, the army and the country find themselves in a completely different situation, not only because of the current situation on the northern border and in Lebanon itself but also because of the lessons that were learned. I have no doubt that the army will perform even better next time. The challenge we face today is to prepare for the army's coming threats and challenges. These are difficult and complex indeed. The Iranian threat hovers in the background, and in my opinion one of the ways to deal with it is to know how to handle short time frames much more decisively and effectively than we did in the Second Lebanon War with regard to Iran's satellites – Hizbollah and Hamas. That is a genuine challenge for us all, including the IDF.

1701: A Worthless Security Council Resolution?

Oded Eran

Amos Gilad, the head of the Defense Ministry's political-security branch, testified before the Winograd Commission that the following conversation took place between him and Shalom Turgeman, the prime minister's political advisor, on August 11, two days before the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1701:

He called me in the morning at 8 A.M.; Turgeman, the political advisor calls me and says: "This is a disaster." I say, "What happened?" And he says, "I can't tell you on the phone." I say: "Come on!" [But he says:] "No, I can't. Get over here now, to the prime minister's." OK, he tells me to go, so I go. On the way over, I was upset. I'd never heard him talk like that. So I said to myself, I'll call the minister, the defense minister. So I call the defense minister, and they tell me, "He's at the party offices." So I said: "Get him out of there." That too was abnormal; I never did anything like that. So they got him out. I said to him: "Mr. Defense Minister, I have a bad feeling. Something's gone terribly wrong. I don't know, but I've never heard Turgeman – or anyone else for that matter – talk like that." ...I'm on the phone with him, in a panic, driving to Jerusalem like a maniac. And he says to me: "What do you think is going on?" I said to him: "In my opinion, I think all the agreements have fallen through. And yesterday I warned you that the Americans have become way too nice. And I don't know how to explain this to you, but I think this is a disaster." He starts to get stressed and says to me: "OK, keep me informed." I said: "OK, first let me find out." I got to Jerusalem, heard the details, the blood drained from my face. I felt as if the sky had caved in on me.

Dr. Oded Eran, director of INSS

These grim words do not describe any disaster in the military arena, rather the mindset and sense in Israel regarding the adoption of UN Security Resolution 1701. It seems that this testimony reflects to a large extent the lack of preparedness and thought characteristic of the political dimension – as well as the military level – in everything connected with the Second Lebanon War.

Israel shares political borders with five different Arab entities, but there is no line about which there are as many UN Security Council resolutions as the Israel-Lebanon border. The presence of international forces on Israel's borders is not a new phenomenon; it has been a fact of life since 1948. However, only in the case of Lebanon is it the result not of the actions of neighboring governments that are entities with a clearly defined address and bearing political responsibility, rather the result of sub-state, non-governmental entities with their own agendas, which are not necessarily congruent with the agendas of the sovereign governments from whose territories they operate.

The presence of international forces on Syrian and Egyptian borders, for example, might create the illusion that these forces are responsible for the quiet along the border. I would like to clarify this point, because the quiet that prevails along these borders is not a function of the efficiency of the international troops, rather the conscious decisions by the governments of these states. In the case of Jordan, the quiet has been maintained for dozens of years along its border with Israel, with no international forces deployed there.

As it is known, there is a significant gap between Lebanon's ethnic composition and the makeup of its political system. This also generates the gap that exists between the legitimate government and its ability to control the entire country. However, since 1978 Israel has reverted consistently to the same demands, which are based on two fundamental points: one, the control and sovereignty of the Lebanese government; and two, the presence of an international force on the Blue Line (the international border). It may be that this demand stems from the fact that we have no alternatives. At the same time, we should ask ourselves, especially with regard to the future, if it is in fact in Israel's best interest to continue to insist on these points.

If we look carefully at the wording of UN Security Council Resolution 425, drafted in the wake of Operation Litani in 1978, and at Security

Council Resolution 1559,¹ both decisions are based on the same two ideas: the imposition of the Lebanese government's sovereignty over all of its territory and the presence of an international force with the mandate to help the Lebanese government impose its sovereignty on its territory.

This article does not deal with the level of military preparedness for the war in the summer of 2006, rather, the many questions marks regarding the political aspects. It is unclear why it was impossible to prepare the political ground, as this did not entail the mobilization of reserves and there was no issue of budget cuts or training affecting the military performance. It was possible to prepare the international political environment in advance, as it was clear that an armed confrontation with Hizbollah would occur sooner or later.

If we are to believe and accept the investigation undertaken by the daily *Haaretz* published on October 1, 2006, already on the second day after the outbreak of the war the Foreign Affairs Ministry was hard at work preparing the exit strategy, i.e., the political product that would allow Israel to announce that it had achieved its goals for which it went to war. On the basis of the newspaper's investigation, the goals that the Foreign Ministry were:

1. Giving the UN force a mandate to open fire
2. Demilitarizing the region between the Litani River and the Israel-Lebanon border
3. Dismantling Hizbollah, with a supervisory mechanism overseeing the dismantling
4. Creating a mechanism for political-military coordination between Israel and Lebanon
5. Assisting international reconstruction of Lebanon, though in proportion to progress in the dismantling of Hizbollah (i.e., making assistance conditional on the dismantling)
6. Effecting a UN weapons embargo on non-governmental militias in Lebanon.

The Foreign Ministry team that drew up this document also recommended that Israel undertake the diplomatic activity to achieve these goals through the help of two Security Council permanent members – the United States and France.

All of this would have been well and good had the Israeli government actually discussed this proposal, made a decision, and acted accordingly.

Admittedly, it was late, and these discussions and actions should have been undertaken much earlier without regard to the date that the war broke out in 2006; but even two days after the start of the war should have given ample time to achieve the goals set by the Foreign Ministry. Yet no fewer than ten days had passed before the minister of foreign affairs even had a chance to meet with the prime minister! She met with him for the first time on July 23, when she presented him with the outlined proposal.

In the meantime, the initiative was left to the Lebanese and the international players – and in fact, this is clearly spelled out in the Security Council resolution. On July 26, 2006, Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora appeared before representatives of 15 nations assembled in Rome and presented his plan – the “Seven Point Program.” The central point of the plan, of course, was restoring full sovereignty to the Lebanese government. He also expressed willingness to accept an international force, albeit not on the basis of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter – and this is a most important point, as this chapter is one of the sources that Security Council Resolution 1701 relies on. The Ta’if agreement of 1989, which concluded the civil war in Lebanon, is also based on similar understandings, and calls for the restoration of sovereignty and the dismantling of the militias.

If we study all the accounts in the Winograd Commission report, we will see that there was Israeli initiative and involvement in the process of the adoption of Resolution 1701. There were ongoing conversations with the White House and with France, as well as with various elements in the UN. Yet all contact was at very low levels, whereas the senior political echelons such as the minister of foreign affairs or the prime minister were involved, at least outwardly, in a way that can only be described as “very loose.”

Indeed, after a critical lapse of several days at the political level in Israel, several deliberations finally took place among those who really should have been dealing with the final product, the political product of the war. Some discussions were held on July 30 and on July 31. These discussions reveal that there were significant gaps in the definition of the final objectives. On August 9, two days before the adoption of Resolution 1701, the cabinet held a meeting and made the decision that spoke about continuing the efforts to arrive at a political settlement that would include:

1. Returning the kidnapped soldiers at once, with no preconditions
2. Immediately ending all hostilities from Lebanon against Israel, including the launching of rockets
3. Fully implementing Resolution 1559 (the resolution that as early as September 2, 2004 called for the dismantling of the militias)
4. Deploying an effective multinational force in southern Lebanon, together with the Lebanese army, along the Blue Line
5. Preventing the reconstruction of Hizbollah's capabilities, in particular through preventing the transfers of arms and materiel from Syria and Iran into Lebanon.

Let us compare the cabinet decision two to three days before the Security Council adopted Resolution 1701 with the resolution itself. I am not claiming that Resolution 1701 represents the ideal, but it seems worthwhile to compare the cabinet decision of two days prior to the adoption of the Security Council resolution.

1. The return of the soldiers appears in an initial operational paragraph. Ultimately the soldiers were not returned at once. When they were returned it was on the basis of terms negotiated with Hizbollah.
2. There was an immediate end to all hostilities directed from Lebanon at Israel, including the firing of missiles and rockets.
3. Full implementation of Resolution 1559 was a non-starter. As it is well known, to this very day Hizbollah refuses to dismantle – either to dismantle itself as an organization or to disarm itself – and the Lebanese government has shown no signs that it intends to undertake any move that would attain this goal.
4. Deployment of an effective multinational force: I cannot tell you what the person who formulated this sentence meant by the word “effective.” This question will stay with us for years to come: what is the significance of the force currently deployed in southern Lebanon and on the Lebanese coasts? Is the outcome of relative quiet that we witness a result of the effectiveness of this force or the result of a decision on the part of the Lebanese players, be it the Lebanese government, or Hizbollah, or others such as Iran, not to escalate matters in the Israeli-Lebanese sector?
5. Preventing the reconstruction of Hizbollah's capabilities: we know that this paragraph was never fulfilled. Resolution 1701 did not create the apparatus to prevent reconstruction and growth. The paragraph

dealing with weapons transfers from Syria to Hizbollah has also never been enforced. In practice, the transfers of arms and materiel from Syrian and Iran to Lebanon has increased since the war and continues to this day.

In other words, were it necessary to give a grade to Israel's political achievements, that grade would be "barely passing." The Winograd Commission report attempted to present the Security Council resolution in a more positive light, but many question marks remained even there, such as the fact that the final formulation of the resolution was adopted after negotiations that were held primarily between the United States and France and outside Israeli control. This question remains with us, especially with regard to similar future circumstances: are these the ideal players on whom Israel ought to rely, assuming that we cannot dictate the resolutions that seem optimal to us? France is certainly questionable in this regard. Yet the biggest question that will follow us is: were war to break out while the new American administration led by President Obama is in office, would this administration be willing to go the same distance with Israel as the Bush administration did with regard to Resolution 1701?

Moreover, even the sympathetic Bush administration failed, for example, to prevent the mention of Shab'a Farms. From the very beginning of the war, Israel was opposed to all kinds of deals that were offered by various international elements whereby Shab'a Farms would be handed over to Lebanon in order to strengthen Prime Minister Siniora and bring about more effective control by the Lebanese government over all of its sovereign territory. Israel refused; still, the fact of the matter is that Shab'a Farms is mentioned in Resolution 1701. This is not a huge diplomatic disaster, and the significance of the matter should not be exaggerated. However, during the negotiations with the Americans, the Israelis presented this issue as a critical one and therefore it is important to mention it.

Lastly, we must consider the implications for the future. It may be that the next comparison will be an artificial one; it is certainly hypothetical, as it has not yet happened. However, Lebanon and Palestine, i.e., the future Palestinian state established, are liable to be very similar in the not too distant future: deeply riven countries, governments that cannot impose their control over all of their territories, countries with stronger political

and military neighbors having their own agendas, and countries where anti-Israel activity can take place under one pretext or another because of some parcel of land or another. When Israel will want to protect itself from hostile elements operating out of their territories, it will face the same problems and dilemmas it faced in July-August 2006.

Because of this, it is necessary, politically speaking, to start preparing, planning, and formulating the resolution Israel will want adopted should it face the same situation vis-à-vis a country called Palestine. It is possible that in such a situation there will be identical problems, if not even more severe ones.

In the case of Lebanon, Israel focused on three demands: imposing the sovereignty of the Lebanese government on all areas of Lebanon and on its borders; dismantling the militias; and oversight of the process by an international force with authority to open fire by virtue of Chapter 7. According to the UN charter, action on the basis of Chapter 7 for the sake of international peace and security is obligatory. Therefore, the Lebanese government demanded that international activity in its territory will not be authorized by virtue of Chapter 7, and its demand was accepted. The Winograd Commission report notes that there is an interpretation that says that the new UNIFIL force deployed after the war in Lebanon is in fact operating on the basis the spirit of Chapter 7, but since this is not mentioned in Security Council Resolution 1701, such an interpretation is neither valid nor binding.

Israel demanded the deployment of this force similarly on the Israeli-Lebanese border. I do not want to take a stand on the question of whether this is consistent with Israel's best interests and draw an analogy between this force in Lebanon and some force that may in the future be deployed on the Israeli-Palestinian border. Here at the Institute for National Security Studies we ourselves are divided over this issue of whether Israel wants an effective international force with power, or whether Israel's interests are better served by a weak force. There are those who claim that an international presence of this sort is very problematic for Israel and has the potential for generating tensions between Israel and some of its international allies.

In any case, these are the questions that should be asked. We should seek to learn the lessons not only regarding the Lebanese issue and Resolution 1701, but also for the entire period that effectively began

with Resolution 425 in the wake of Operation Litani in 1978, because the philosophy that has consistently guided states is that it is better that there be a government, even a weak one such as the Lebanese government, to provide an address and be held responsible for what is carried out from its territory. With regard to this issue, perhaps we should ask what really is the desirable entity for us to address, and if it is in fact useful and desirable for the State of Israel that the addressees in Lebanon and a state of Palestine are convenient from a political point of view. I am not at all sure about the answer to this question, especially in light of the events that occurred in Lebanon from 2000 onwards that show strong similarities with both prongs of the Palestinian entity. Similarly, it is hard to say with certainty that it is in Israel's best interests that an international force deployed on its borders act by virtue of Chapter 7 or that Israel's best interests require the presence of a weak force that would leave the IDF with greater room for flexibility. These are the questions facing us today. It is far better to consider them now, especially in light of Israel's conduct regarding Resolution 1701.

Notes

- 1 Security Council Resolution 1559 was adopted in September 2004 in the wake of the struggle of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and his supporters against the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The resolution called for honoring Lebanon's sovereignty, for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, and for the dismantling of the militias.

Hizbollah: The Battle over Lebanon

Eyal Zisser

At the height of the Lebanese parliamentary elections campaign, Hassan Nasrallah addressed a conference in the Beqaa Valley. In an impassioned speech, he sought to enlist support for Hizbollah's candidates by referring to the Israeli enemy:

Today Israel is following the Lebanese parliamentary elections worried and concerned. But it is also relaying threats, through leaks to *Der Spiegel* to manipulate the international committee investigating the murder of Rafiq al-Hariri [which reported that Hizbollah was involved in the murder of the late prime minister] and through conferences held at Tel Aviv University.¹

Without a doubt Nasrallah meant the conference about the Lebanese elections at the Institute for National Security Studies, which received advanced billing before the elections. I mention this because it shows that Nasrallah still purports to be able to read Israel, though it seems that he has come to understand that there is a difference between reading everything published and being able to grasp and fully internalize the information. After all, Nasrallah once claimed to be the one who could read Israel better than anyone else in the Arab world, whereas today it seems that he realizes that this is not the case.

This issue is linked to an interesting piece of information published by the Zogby Institute² in the United States about Nasrallah's popularity in the Arab world, which in the last year plummeted from 26 percent to a mere 6 percent.³ Thus Nasrallah is no longer the most popular leader in the Arab world. This indicates something about the one whom we in Israel had crowned as the omnipotent leader, the man with the Midas

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touch capable of turning anything into gold. The immunity we attributed to Nasrallah has been lifted; he is no longer the invincible leader. The Second Lebanon War made an important contribution to this process.

In this context, it is worthwhile comparing Nasrallah's standing in July 2009 to his standing of seven years prior. On October 18, 2002, Beirut hosted a conference of Francophone states; President Jacques Chirac and 55 other heads of state were in attendance. Suddenly, during the opening session while Chirac was delivering the introductory greeting to Lebanon's political and religious leadership, in front of a stunned French president, 55 presidents from all over the world, and the international media, Nasrallah slipped in and seated himself in the chair reserved for him between Lebanon's Sunni mufti and the Maronite patriarch Boutros Nasrallah Safir. This was one of the climaxes of Nasrallah's career, and a high point in Hizbollah history. The moment was evidence that at the end of a very long road, Nasrallah and his organization had not only captured Lebanon and the entire Arab world, but had also won recognition, prestige, and broad international standing. It seems that barely a shred of that is left today.

In any case, the rise of Hizbollah and its status in Lebanon should be understood in light of two central phenomena. The first is the rise of Shiite power in Lebanon. This community is on Lebanon's fringes, but in recent decades, because of its increasing demographic weight and additional processes, its political clout has grown. Thus members of the community seek a fair, equal slice of the Lebanese pie. The distribution of power after the Lebanese civil war (1975-89) according to the Ta'if agreement, however, discriminates against the Shiite community. In the Lebanese parliament, which is based on a sectarian division of representatives, Shiites are represented by only 15 percent of the members, 27 out of 128, whereas the community's actual representation in Lebanon is apparently double that percentage and perhaps even more. Until this issue is settled, Lebanon will not know any peace. While it is true that the Shiite rise would have happened without the involvement of Nasrallah and Iran, today Hizbollah is riding the wave of Shiite protest and the community's legitimate desire for a larger slice of the Lebanese pie, and has in practice become the communal leader and decision maker. Without understanding this point, it is impossible to fully comprehend Hizbollah's rise to grandeur.

The second phenomenon in understanding Hizbollah's power and standing in Lebanon is the Islamic regime in Iran and its strategic aspirations in the region. As early as the Safavid and Qajar dynasties, Iran had interests in the heart of the Middle East. In the 1970s the Persian shah maintained this tradition, as did the revolutionary regime afterwards. The interface between Iran's strategic interests and the Lebanese Shiites' ambitions was expressed in Hizbollah's ideological platform published in 1985. In fact, at the very outset the organization declared its goal as twofold: first, turning Lebanon into an Islamic republic along the lines of the Iranian Islamic Republic and creating an Islamic sea from Tehran to the shores of the Mediterranean. Hizbollah seeks to attain this goal through peaceful means and by consensus with the other communities in Lebanon rather than by coercion. The second aim concerns the struggle against Israel. This struggle is destined to continue until the liberation of Jerusalem and the eradication of the Zionist entity. These two aspirations, to which Hizbollah is still committed, reflect the two dimensions of its activity and its identity: the Shiite and the Iranian-Islamic.

In 2002 Nasrallah could certainly have looked back at the previous twenty years with a great deal of satisfaction. From a collection of cells or a small militia in early 1982, whose greatest achievement lay in carrying out terrorist attacks against the foreign forces on Lebanese soil, the organization evolved into a leading legitimate mass movement, which alongside its military wing operates an impressive civilian, political, and economic branch. This process was made possible by the organization's pragmatism and willingness to adapt to the changing reality in Lebanon. In 1989, Hizbollah accepted the Ta'if agreement, even though the accord discriminates against the Shiites and in fact subjects Lebanon to a Sunni-Druze-Maronite arrangement. Later on, Hizbollah decided to participate in the Lebanese elections and send its representatives to the parliament. All of these are expressions of the organization's pragmatism and its willingness to deal with a changing political and social reality.

At the center of the organization's achievements stands its transformation from a military-terrorist element to a force on the Lebanese political arena with economic, social, and political dimensions. For most Lebanese, certainly for most Shiites, these aspects are far more important than the military banner. So, for example, in the 1980s were a Shiite youth asked why he was joining Hizbollah, the answer would

usually be, "They came to the village, some fighters on a command car, with ribbons around their necks and a submachine gun, and it impressed the kids who were running around barefoot in the village alleyways. We wanted to be like them, to achieve something in our lives." Today, this is not the answer one hears from the young Shiites when asked why they support Hizbollah. Today the support is based on a desire to become a senior official or an attorney in one of Hizbollah's financial institutions. In fact, today the organization is the best networking tool by which one may find one's place in the Lebanese job market. Alternately, Shiites will tell you that Hizbollah is the entity that maintains their children's schools and their families' health and welfare organizations. This apparatus, established with Iran's generous assistance, is an important element in maintaining and promoting the organization's popularity among Shiites in Lebanon.

At its second stage, Hizbollah changed from a social, economic, and political movement operating in the Shiite sphere into the most important leading Shiite organization in Lebanon. It did so by taking advantage of Iranian financial backing and by using the competition's weakness, especially the personal weakness of Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal – the other Shiite organization operating in Lebanon.

In fact, over the years Hizbollah has become the biggest, most important organization representing the Lebanese Shiites. This rise in power is especially impressive since Hizbollah brought an unfamiliar religious concept and worldview to Lebanon; even now, it is unacceptable to many of the Shiite religious leaders there. In the 1990s only 30 percent of Shiites supported the organization, whereas in the decade that followed the rate of Shiite support reached 75 percent. In 1998, in the first municipal elections held in Lebanon after the civil war, Hizbollah won one quarter of the seats in Shiite towns and villages, whereas in the 2004 elections it already controlled 80 percent of the Shiite municipal sector. In other words, the organization became the most important leading element among the Shiites.

On the basis of this achievement, Hizbollah, starting in 2003, began to call for a change in the Lebanese system of government. These calls grew stronger especially after the United States exported democracy to Iraq following the invasion of the country. Thus Hizbollah now seeks to cancel the Ta'if agreement or at least introduce significant changes

and establish democratic elections and a power sharing system, which according to Hizbollah's assessments would turn the organization into Lebanon's main political force and the Shiites into the most important community in the country.

Against this background, one may say that from the internal Lebanese aspect, Hizbollah's path has been strewn with success. In the Israeli context, the picture was similarly rosy until the Second Lebanon War. Hizbollah reached the height of its success against Israel in May 2000 with Israel's withdrawal from the security zone. This achievement was expressed by Nasrallah in the "spider's web" speech he gave in Bint Jbail that same month:

A few hundred Hizbollah fighters forced the most powerful state in the Middle East to wave a white flag. The era in which the Zionists have intimidated the Lebanese and the Arabs is over. The Zionist entity lives in fear after the defeat of the occupation army at the hands of Islamic resistance fighters in Lebanon. This fear exists not only in northern Palestine but also in the heart of Tel Aviv, in the depth of occupied Palestine. Israel, which has nuclear weapons and the strongest air force in the region – this Israel is weaker than a spider's web.⁴

Indeed, Hizbollah managed to undermine the two basic assumptions underlying the existing relations between Israel and Arab states. According to the first assumption, no *muqawama* – armed resistance against Israel – is possible from or within a sovereign state. Arab states had to choose between resistance and sovereignty. This was the dilemma faced by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1956, and this was the dilemma faced by King Hussein of Jordan in September 1970 ("Black September") and the Syrians in 1974 on the Golan Heights. In all three cases, the states opted for sovereignty rather than terrorist organizations and resistance. According to the second basic assumption in Arab-Israeli relations, should an Arab state seek to recover territory lost in a war against Israel and should it seek to be accepted as a member of the Western world, it must make peace with Israel.

During the years of confrontation with Israel in the security zone culminating in May 2000, Hizbollah managed to undermine both of these assumptions to an extent. First, the organization proved that it is possible to conduct an armed struggle, *muqawama*, against Israel from

within a sovereign state without that state being harmed. Thus a situation was possible wherein the south was ablaze but life in Beirut continued as normal. Second, Hizbollah proved that it is possible to recover territory lost in war even without making peace with Israel. Moreover, it is possible to attain international prestige even without an agreement or recognition of the Zionist entity.

After the IDF withdrawal from the security zone, Hizbollah started to channel most of its energy towards a takeover of Lebanon itself. From 1992 to 1996, Hizbollah undertook 1030 attacks in the security zone. From 1996 until the withdrawal in 2000, that number rose to around 4060. From 2000 until 2007, the number of attacks dropped to about 27. In fact, from 2000, Hizbollah staged terrorist attacks only to remind the world it was still maintaining the armed struggle. In reality, its resources were diverted primarily to the intra-Lebanon arena. By creating deterrence based on its massive missile reserves, Hizbollah managed to foster a situation such that Israel was not standing in its way and was even expressing tacit support for the new rules of the game, whereby once every few weeks there would be a targeted terrorist attack against its soldiers stationed along the border.

Because of Hizbollah's missile arsenal, Israel asked itself time and again if it was necessary to respond to the killing of an Israeli soldier along the fence, when the risk of war, with hundreds of thousands of civilian Israelis living in bomb shelters, was hanging in the balance. The answer to the question was always no. Israel's leaders felt that this was not a price they were willing to pay in order to deal with the targeted attacks. Indeed, consider what Nasrallah himself said on the day of the abduction:

The Israeli leaders in government right now and those who are responsible are new. Olmert is a new prime minister and there is also a new minister of defense. Therefore, I would like to advise them, before they meet tonight at 8:00 P.M. to decide on Israel's response to the abduction, that they had better seek counsel from previous prime ministers and other former ministers about their experiences in Lebanon. When someone new is in charge it is still possible to mislead him. Therefore, in order not to be misled, they should ask, check, and make sure before they make any decisions.⁵

When the Israeli government took the decision to respond extensively to the July 12 abduction of the soldiers, some ministers may have known that Hizbollah had 12,000 missiles, but some certainly did not understand the significance of this fact.

As for the war itself, from day one I contended that Hizbollah was destined to be dealt a devastating blow and pay a steep price because a significant portion of its efforts had been focused on the intra-Lebanon arena and the construction of a stronghold within the Shiite population. All this did in fact play out. Nonetheless, from Hizbollah's perspective, its achievements in the war were several, as may be inferred from Nasrallah's "divine victory" address, on September 22, 2006:

Today, we celebrate a divine, historic, strategic victory. After all, is there anyone among us who imagined that a few thousand of your sons, members of the Lebanese resistance, would be able to stand firm for 33 days on the naked, open earth, exposed under the heavens to the strongest air force in the Middle East? to face 40,000 Israeli soldiers and officers, four elite brigades, and three reserve divisions? the best tank in the world? the strongest army in the region? Is there anyone among you who imagined that a few thousand of your sons would stand and fight an enemy under such difficult conditions, would manage to repel warships from our territorial waters, to destroy Merkava tanks, the pinnacle of Israel's industry, and Israel's helicopters, and finally turn the soldiers of the enemy's elite brigades into terrified, panicked rats? Did anyone imagine this at a time when the entire world, especially the West, had abandoned us, when Lebanon is divided and not lining up as one behind us?⁶

However, Hizbollah erred in its assessment of Israel's response to the abduction of the soldiers. Nasrallah even conceded this error: he did not think that the abduction would cause a war, he did not want a war, and he did not foresee a war. This war was forced on him. From his perspective, Israel's goals were far reaching, as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared in the Knesset during the war:

Only the return of the abducted soldiers will end the action. Israel will fight against Hizbollah for as long as it takes to bring the abducted soldiers back and implement Resolution 1559 fully, as well as implement the outline drafted by the G8 leaders – the unconditional return of the abducted sol-

diers, the dismantling of Hizbollah, and the termination of the risk of missile fire against Israel.

It may be that in internal documents different things were stated, but these were the prime minister's words in the Knesset. Therefore from Nasrallah's point of view, his organization survived what was seen as an Israeli threat to eradicate it or at least mortally damage it. Moreover, the literature, speeches, and articles written by Hizbollah members explain that the organization survived not only on the conceptual level, but also on the military one, and as proof pointed to the fact that its command and control system continued to function. In this context, we may recall that once as Nasrallah was speaking, the Hizbollah leader, with perfect timing, invited the residents of Beirut to look out their windows and see the damage to the Israeli naval vessel *Hanit*. There are many other examples attesting to the fact that the command and control structure continued to operate until the last day of the war.

Another important outcome is the fact that Hizbollah's propaganda apparatus was not impaired. On the first day of the American attack in Iraq in 2003, al-Jazeera's television station announced that it would broadcast Saddam Hussein's response to the American invasion. Iraq's national anthem was played, and Saddam's *kaffiyah*-clad head appeared on the screen. Following the opening sentence, "Bism Allah al-rahman al-rahim," the picture disappeared. Later on, the broadcast was interrupted four more times, making it clear that the Iraqi regime's ability to communicate its messages through its propaganda machine had been severely compromised. In the Second Lebanon War, Hizbollah's TV station, al-Manar, continued to operate throughout the war and broadcast messages to the Arab world as well as to Israel itself.

From Hizbollah's point of view, the missile fire was also a success. Some 4,000 missiles were fired until the last day of the war. From its perspective, as more time passed under the pressure of the fire that the IDF was incapable of stopping, the Israeli government started to lower its expectations of the war. As Nasrallah explained in one of his speeches:

At the beginning they said they would disarm Hizbollah; after that they said they would be satisfied with the destruction of our rocket capabilities rather than the destruction of all of our infrastructures. They lower their expectations of the war every day, and now they admit that they can't even destroy Hizbollah's military force. They only want to weak-

en and hurt us, and push us back some 10 or 20 km from the border.⁷

Without a doubt, even in Hizbollah's own estimation, it suffered a very harsh blow, but its stockpiling of 12,000 missiles proved itself, as Israel did in fact lower its level of expectations. From Hizbollah's perspective, the Israeli government blinked first, because it could not tolerate a situation in which one and a half million citizens were living in bomb shelters for 34 days. At least in this regard the missiles were effective.

Hizbollah and its Syrian allies also viewed the ground fighting as successful. On August 16, 2006, two days after the end of the war, Syrian president Bashar Asad communicated a threat and warning to Israel on the heels of what he perceived as a Hizbollah victory:

In 1982, Israel began a war against Lebanon. Its forces invaded that country and within a few days were already on the outskirts of Beirut, and they managed to take the city. By contrast, today, five weeks after the war broke out, Israel is still stuck in a war of attrition and is bleeding from its desperate attempt to take a few hundred meters here and there, and can't even do that. There is no doubt that the Israelis have become an object of ridicule. They've lost their credibility; it doesn't exist any more....The truth is that in 1982 the technological gap between Israel and the other side, whether the Lebanese or the Palestinians fighting against Israel, was smaller than the gap today. Today, Israel is much stronger but the difference lies in the will to fight, which we didn't have then but have now, as the last war proves.⁸

All of this, of course, is to be placed in the plus column. While Hizbollah suffered a harsh blow, in its own mind it had scored many successes, which it would naturally seek to emphasize when asking itself how to prepare for the next war.

At the same time, when we ask ourselves what has happened on the intra-Lebanon arena as a result of the Second Lebanon War and what has happened to Hizbollah since then, it is clear that the war joins a no less important event, the Cedar Revolution of February 2005, which was a turning point in Lebanon's history. That month, following the murder of the Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri and the finger pointing at Syria, large scale street demonstrations broke out, eventually leading to the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Since then, Syria has

not been able to play the leading role it had hitherto filled in Lebanon. In addition, a broad popular consensus arose among most of Lebanon's residents, which included the message: no to Hizbollah.

This is when Hizbollah's intra-Lebanon problems started. A major expression of this distress was the fact that for the first time various Lebanese officials were able to attack the organization in public. Nonetheless, the Cedar Revolution likewise created an opportunity for Hizbollah, because the Syrians, while having assisted Hizbollah, had also acted more than once to limit its power, especially as they did not want Hizbollah to take over Lebanon. Today, the Syrian glass ceiling has been largely removed.

Hizbollah's troubles on the intra-Lebanon arena worsened as a result of the events of the summer of 2006. The war cancelled Hizbollah's magic touch and damaged – and is still damaging – Nasrallah's image as immune from error and harm. Nasrallah's image as a leader capable of leading the campaign against Israel, a leader who has the definitive answers about Israel, and a leader who also promises security and stability to the Lebanese, has been shattered.

Moreover, the war exposed Iran's involvement in an unprecedented manner and underscored the danger that the armament of Hizbollah poses for all intra-Lebanon systems. In this sense, a new and problematic reality was created for Hizbollah, because whereas in the past it stood on two legs – the Lebanese arena and the struggle against Israel – today the second leg is shattered. In the last three years, Hizbollah has not operated along the border, and did not even respond to the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, the head of its military branch (February 2008), attributed by the organization to Israel. In addition, Hizbollah did not assist the Palestinians in Operation Cast Lead (December 2008–January 2009).

Still, at the end of the day, when we examine the organization's military capabilities, we see that they are stronger and better than before. In this sense, a question of another round is a possibility that definitely exists. Just as no one wanted the previous round and no one anticipated it, things might evolve unexpectedly in a future round as well.

As for the internal Lebanese arena, the struggle over Lebanon continues. An important stage in this struggle was the Lebanese parliamentary elections of June 7, 2009. At first glance the elections handed Hizbollah a defeat, but if one examines the number of votes for

the organization rather than the number of representatives it garnered – what in the United States is known as the popular vote – it becomes clear that Hizbollah and its supporters received almost 66 percent of the vote. Because of the Lebanese confessional system, these numbers translate into fewer than half the seats in the Lebanese parliament, 51 out of 128. Hizbollah's primary rival earned 33 percent of the vote but won 71 out of 128 representatives to parliament. This is possible because in various Maronite or Greek-Orthodox places such as Batroun, Koura, and elsewhere in Lebanon, a candidate needed only 4,000-5,000 votes to be elected, whereas in the south of Lebanon some of Hizbollah's candidates needed 200,000 votes to be elected. Therefore, this phenomenon – Hizbollah and its supporters' electoral power – must also be taken into account, reminding us that demography is still working in Hizbollah's favor and the legitimate ambitions of the Shiites are at once overt and suppressed.

In any case, the last elections and the intra-Lebanon reality in general, like the reality along the border, confront Hizbollah with a difficult problem: whether or not to renew the attacks and risk an Israeli response. More important: the primary project for which Hizbollah was established to begin with and on which it has focused its activity for the last 20-30 years is the takeover of Lebanon. The question from Hizbollah's perspective is: how does one proceed with this project? The Cedar Revolution of 2005 and the Second Lebanon War were viewed as delays, blips on the screen, but they did not deflect Hizbollah from its strategic goal.

Today, in light of this reality, the dilemma is growing more severe. At its center lies the question of whether to continue to play the Lebanese game grounded by the Ta'if agreement, a game that includes participation in the parliament and willingness to accept a sectarian-regional electoral system that discriminates against Shiites and does not allow them or their allies ever to achieve a majority in democratic ways, or attempt to challenge the existing system and thereby drag Lebanon to the brink of another civil war.

In May 2008, as a result of the Lebanese government's attempt to break up Hizbollah's independent communications system in Beirut, Hizbollah gave something of a preview of a civil war when its operatives took over West Beirut, and following this, via the Doha agreement, forced the Lebanese government to give the organization a third of the cabinet

seats, granting it veto power. Today, after the elections, the establishment of a new government is under discussion and we are at the very point where the victorious coalition vehemently insists, by virtue of its victory in the elections, that it can establish a functioning government and that therefore Hizbollah's ministers, should Hizbollah agree to join the government, will no longer have a blocking third. By contrast, Hizbollah is insisting on getting this third. Given Lebanese tradition, we are likely to witness some dramatic affair or episode.

At any rate, it seems that we are advancing towards two possible boiling points. The question is if it is possible to prevent them, or if their occurrence is only a question of time and what will come first: another confrontational round between Israel and Hizbollah or a conflagration on the intra-Lebanon arena. Regarding another confrontation in the north, it is clear that neither UNIFIL forces nor the fact that Hizbollah is not deployed along the border is preventing the renewal of rocket fire or terrorist attacks, rather Hizbollah's own decision not to undertake them because of Israel's deterrence. It is true that today Hizbollah is not deployed openly along the border, which has reduced the number of points of friction that prevailed from the time of the IDF's withdrawal until the outbreak of the war in 2006, but it bears remembering that Hizbollah is stronger than ever. Given this reality, some incident or other – such as the elimination of Mughniyeh or sporadic rocket fire by global jihadists – is liable to occur. At the same time, however, in a situation in which one side has an arsenal of some 50,000 missiles and both sides are asking themselves if and when the next round will break out, these questions might serve as self-fulfilling prophecies.

As for the internal Lebanon arena and a possible flare up there, it is necessary to ask how much longer the Shiites will be willing to live with the reality in which, despite their community's size, they are still politically marginal and do not enjoy the privileges commensurate with their size and their fair share of the loot. No less important is the question to what extent and for how long Hizbollah, which today leads the Shiite community, is willing to settle for this situation or instead come to the conclusion that this is the time to make a comprehensive, sweeping move and take over the Lebanese state by applying military force.

Notes

- 1 See Hassan Nasrallah's speech as broadcast on al-Manar's television station, May 25, 2009.
- 2 2009 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey, Zogby International.
- 3 See Zogby International's website at <http://www.zogby.com/News/Read-News.cfm?ID=1697>.
- 4 See Hassan Nasrallah's speech as broadcast on al-Manar's television station, May 26, 2009.
- 5 For Hassan Nasrallah's address, see al-Manar's television station, July 12, 2006.
- 6 For Hassan Nasrallah's address, see al-Manar's television station, September 22, 2006.
- 7 See Hassan Nasrallah's statements in an interview with al-Jazeera's television station, July 20, 2006.
- 8 For President Bashar Asad's speech, see the newspaper *Tishrin* (Damascus) of August 17, 2006.

The Second Lebanon War: Achievements and Failures

Dan Haloutz

In the three years since the Second Lebanon War there has been absolute calm on the northern border, the likes of which no one can remember since the 1970s. This reality was purchased with the lives of civilians and soldiers who fell in battle, with the pain of the injured, both soldiers and civilians, and with the cost of those whose lives were destroyed and who bear the scars and wounds of that war to this day. My heart goes out to them.

At the outset, I would like to make a personal comment on the disgraceful use some make of bereavement. The heroism of the soldiers is an indisputable fact. Linking it with the failures of the more senior echelons, most of whom are still serving in the IDF and some of whom are candidates for the most senior positions, is unacceptable. The heroism of IDF soldiers has been indisputable, from the War of Independence down to our own times. Anyone who has ever been in command is liable to be exposed to this type of low settling of scores, including the person who made the statement.¹

The Second Lebanon War generated masses of commentary and criticism, even an official commission of inquiry. The degree of satisfaction of those sitting on the sidelines at that time could not have been greater. Already in the course of the war, they were able – today we can say quite unsuccessfully – to foresee how things would develop. A national lesson that all of us ought to learn is a goodly dose of humility about our ability, as individuals and as a society, to assess the results of moves that are seen in one light while underway, but as time passes acquire different significance.

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Dan Haloutz, IDF chief of staff, 2005-2007

In the reality of the Middle East, the achievements of a war are measured first and foremost by the change in the situation that caused the war to break out, by an increase in the lapse until the next confrontation, and by the ability to take political advantage of military gains. In the Second Lebanon War, like in all other Israeli wars, there were achievements and successes, failures and flaws. All of these were thoroughly investigated by extensive, unprecedented, and searching analyses that examined everything down to the last detail and became the basis for a corrective working program for the IDF and the state. The systemic and personal failures have been discussed at length and I do not deny that these existed, but the achievements have received far less attention.

In this context, it was recently stated that while the northern border is calm the situation is explosive. There is calm – that is a fact. The question of explosiveness is one of assessment. I would go even further: the Middle East as a whole is explosive. This assessment, therefore, is subject to debate, as are many estimates on a whole range of issues made day in and day out by seemingly authoritative people. Here one could, for example, mention the assessment made by various experts just before the end of the war that predicted that the calm in Lebanon would last at most a month or two, or the forecast that Hizbollah would sweep the most recent Lebanese elections, held in June 2009.

The root causes of the war in Lebanon in 2006 are to be found in May 2000. The political decision, correct in my opinion, to withdraw unilaterally from Lebanon and to deploy along the international border without generating any deterrence lost its significance due to the policy of inaction adopted later on. This policy was expressed through fairly tentative responses to Hizbollah challenges and acts of terrorism along the border. From May 2000 until the war in Lebanon, the organization carried out 27 terrorist acts and attacks against our forces. From the very first test we faced, the abduction of three IDF soldiers in October 2000, the late Benny Avraham, Adi Avitan, and Omer Souad, our responses were weak, contradicting our declarations before the withdrawal when we committed ourselves to making Lebanon burn should Hizbollah act against us. From this point onwards, we adopted a policy of restraint, moderation, and symbolic response; this simply encouraged the other

side to push the envelope farther and farther towards the edge by repeated acts of terrorism.

Hizbollah studied our pattern of response. Indeed, in general Hizbollah is a learning organization. It continued to walk a fine line, just like its Iranian masters do on the nuclear issue, and in doing so managed to sedate us with a slow, continuous process lasting six years, until July 2006. During that time, a fortified, well equipped guerilla terrorist organization, entrenched at the doorsteps of our settlements on the line of confrontation, was constructed under our very noses. This was a guerilla terrorist organization that created its own equation of deterrence vis-à-vis our capabilities, holding our northern towns and our soldiers in their fortifications hostage, as it were.

The action I recommended on July 12, 2006, the day the war broke out, had been taking shape in my mind for a long time. It was not a spur of the moment idea that sprang up on the day that Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser were abducted. The idea behind my recommendation was to push Hizbollah over the line it was walking by taking an action that exceeded their expectations, an action that would make it clear to them that the cost we would extract from them would be much greater than the potential reward available to them.

In fact, it might have been possible to continue our ostrich policy of sticking our heads in the sand and imagine their missiles gathering rust. It might have been possible to propose a targeted response. It might have been possible to recommend a long waiting period and extensive preparation for action, which in all realism would likely have never been carried out. At the time, I felt differently. Today too, given the same circumstances, I would make the same recommendation for a response based on extensive firepower, with the possibility of a ground maneuver.

The decision made by the Israeli government to take action in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 was correct and justified. It reflected the understanding that the reality prevailing on the northern border was untenable and demanded change. Leadership is not measured by the ability to shirk fateful decisions. Rather, it is measured by the readiness to make recommendations and decisions, even unpopular ones, by the ability to stick to them while listening to other opinions and understanding other approaches, and by the willingness to bear responsibility and pay a personal price for these decisions, for good and for bad.

Does anyone really think that the recommendation to the political echelon to act the way we did was a decision that dawned the moment the soldiers were abducted on July 12, 2006? If so, I must say that that opinion is based on nothing but personal speculation, nonsense, even absurdity. My own philosophy regarding Lebanon had been formulated over a long period of time, before my appointment as chief of staff. It was based on an analysis of the situation undertaken with my colleagues, on the lack of success of the previous policy, and on a desire to change it. As I have said, the core of my recommendation consisted of a high intensity response, much beyond the scope expected by the enemy. This philosophy was founded on the belief that if we desire to live as an independent state in the Middle East, we must be able to generate deterrence, act decisively, and at times even act outrageously.

My recommendation was accepted and approved unanimously by the government of Israel, which as you may recall also included three former ministers of defense in addition to the minister of defense then in office. Use of military force is made when political means of handling a security or political problem prove ineffective. It is supposed to produce a new situation, one that political officials can use to reapply their political tools in order to solve the root problem.

Should we measure the achievements of the war in Lebanon by the length of the period of calm attained as a result of the war, we will find that this war is not inferior in its successes to other wars we have had to fight. However, that is not the sole criterion, and certainly not the decisive one. Today, when we seek to examine the results of the Second Lebanon War, we need to find a barometer that will allow as objective an examination as possible and a comparison with other wars. The problem is that no such index exists. Every war has its own unique features: the enemy, our political system, the enemy's political system, the international system, the means at our disposal, the type of enemy, and so on.

Therefore, the most significant test is the test of achievements compared with the goals that were defined for the Second Lebanon War, and the political and strategic outcomes of the war. One may criticize the goals – criticism is legitimate – but it is impossible to examine an action against goals that were never defined for it. The outcome of a war is examined not on the basis of alternatives that were never pursued, nor on the basis of hypothetical questions raised with the wisdom of hindsight.

The road not chosen will always be more attractive because it embodies all the theoretical advantages without having to face the test of reality that would reveal all of its practical disadvantages.

Since the Yom Kippur War, the nature of the threats Israel faces – from conventional military threats to complex terrorist threats, not to mention the developing nuclear threat, which is not the subject of this presentation – has changed radically. Instead of coping with the enemy's armored corps bearing down on us, Israel started having to deal with terrorist groups filled with blind hatred. Israel's home front has become the primary target through a variety of terrorist acts, which peaked with the suicide bombers and the rocket fire aimed at population centers. A war of terrorism is by nature a war of attrition, and coping with it requires unique abilities as well as an extended period of time.

The pattern of war in the modern era has changed. Today most of the world's confrontations involve nations waging war against terrorist or guerilla organizations. A quick glance at the current global map shows several decades-long conflicts involving the war on terrorism whose end does not seem to be in sight. We have the United States in Iraq, the American-led NATO war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the IDF's war in Lebanon and against Palestinians in the territories, and low intensity but nonetheless ongoing wars on terrorism elsewhere in the world. Here it is worth learning from others' experience, and in general, it is wise to frame things in their proper proportions when we discuss ourselves and others. In all the examples I mentioned, the wars have lasted many long years and no decisions are on the horizon. What is decision? This was also the question for us with the events that began in September 2000 and died down slowly in Judea and Samaria over six years of fighting and at the heavy cost of more than 1,100 dead, both soldiers and civilians.

From the outset, the Second Lebanon War had defined, limited goals. Not one of the goals defined the objective as destroying, crushing, or erasing Hizbollah from the map of Lebanese reality.² As Professor Eyal Zisser has noted, Hizbollah is not only a terrorist organization but also an ideological and social movement. Our experience shows that it is not a simple matter to try to change Lebanon's political reality. According to our assessment, the definition of achievements other and broader than these would have required an action of a completely different nature than that which was taken and would again have left us mired in Lebanon.

From day one it seemed to me that we have to view Lebanon as a single entity and as the address for our operational moves. My position on this was rejected. There were many times – this was by no means the only one – when I failed to mesmerize the political echelon with my positions.

Before referring specifically to the goals and the degree to which they were realized, I would again like to mention our most glaring weaknesses, errors, and failures, in no particular order of importance. I imagine that I will be repeating what my friend Moshe Kaplinsky said, but I feel compelled to mention them nevertheless:

1. We did not call up the reserves at the right time, thus threatening the other side with a ground maneuver much earlier. I say the threat of a ground maneuver, though not necessarily realizing the threat in practice.
2. There were failures in the dialogue between the various command echelons.
3. There was a longstanding neglect of the level of training and battle-worthiness of the field corps; I stress longstanding neglect.
4. The home front and the systems to attend to it by the official authorities responsible, including the IDF, were improperly prepared.
5. There were lofty expectations, stemming in part from a faulty set of explanations of the reality we were facing.

These were joined by failures, errors, and shortcomings that were located and defined in debriefings undertaken by the IDF. One of these, to which I shall return shortly, touches on the level of preparedness of our commands.

The strategic goals defined for the Second Lebanon War were formulated, presented, and approved in clear terms. I am quoting what was presented and approved: “expanding Israel’s deterrence in the sphere and stabilizing Israel’s inter-relations with Lebanon; stopping terrorism directed at the State of Israel from Lebanese sovereign territory.” In this context, no time frame was defined. Additional goals were: “significant damage to Hizbollah; forcing the Lebanese regime and the international community to fulfill their political responsibility, including control of security in southern Lebanon; applying pressure on Hizbollah to release the abducted soldiers.” I opposed the objective of “releasing the captives” because that was a mission doomed to failure from the outset. I did not think it was achievable by means of a direct military action. The last goal

articulated was “leaving Syria out of the campaign and reducing its link to the Palestinian arena.” These were the aims that were defined for the war.

The expectation of military blitz moves such as were seen in the Six Day War was created by others, not by the IDF. We knew full well that this was not warfare against armies and states, rather against terrorism located in and operating from urban areas under the protection of civilian populations, most of whom were completely uninvolved. Not every Shiite is an enemy of the State of Israel.

If we want to examine the success of the military campaign through the prism of time, it is necessary first to put the strategic aim I quoted and the extent to which it was achieved to a professional examination. I have no intention of seeing everything in rose-tinted glasses. I have no intention of using the word victory or evading criticism, which in part was justified, but I also have no intention of accepting indiscriminately every comment and critique. With all due respect to those who were sitting on the sidelines, not everything that was said was formulated on a professional basis. There were other reasons for some of the statements, but this is not the place to discuss them.

An examination of the achievements of the war in relation to the goals leads us to a number of conclusions: Israel’s deterrence in the sphere has grown stronger. Since the Second Lebanon War, certain operations attributed to us by foreign sources have gone unanswered by the enemy, and there is a reason for that.³ Hizbollah terrorism from Lebanese sovereign territory has ceased in the last three years. Hizbollah suffered an unprecedented, strong blow. Some 700 of its men were killed, and some 1,000 were injured in a single month of action. We too had losses. I enumerated them and talked about them at the beginning of this address. Hizbollah is no longer deployed along the Israeli border, although yes, it may be that in the future Hizbollah will return there. The organization’s center in the Dahiya neighborhood of Beirut was destroyed. The long range rocket batteries were destroyed and Hizbollah’s logistical rear in the Beqaa Valley was damaged. Moreover, the Lebanese regime is fulfilling its political responsibility according to its own interpretation. It has deployed more than 10,000 of its soldiers in southern Lebanon in addition to the multinational force of 12,000 operating in this sector.

As an aside, I would like to point out to Oded Eran, the head of INSS, that if unrealistic political goals are formulated, there is little wonder afterwards that they are impossible to attain. In general, we often tend to assume that we are playing by ourselves, so it is important to remember that every equation has two sides; hence the word “equation.” The expectation that the Lebanese government and army will fight against their own countrymen in order to serve our goals is one that has no chance of being realized, not now and not ever.

The pressure to bring back the abducted soldiers was at first unsuccessful; unfortunately, they were returned to us for eternal rest only two years after the war. Syria remained out of the battle, and no link was created between the Lebanese arena and the Palestinian one.

The Second Lebanon War also had strategic effects on other arenas. In Lebanon, Nasrallah, Hizbollah’s leader, is still living like a fugitive in the cellars of Beirut. According to his own statement, had he known ahead of time the price he would be forced to pay he would not have undertaken the abduction on July 12. The price for challenging Israel has been deeply etched into the minds of the Lebanese. The process of reconstruction has yet to be finished. Public opinion polls and various publications that I too read from time to time reflect remorse for Lebanon’s having joined the axis of evil. Hizbollah lost the elections recently held in Lebanon. Its loss stemmed from the Lebanese political system itself but it was also an expression of the Lebanese public’s understanding of the significance of the heavy damages incurred by the organization in the summer of 2006.

Since the war, Hizbollah has rearmed itself with tens of thousands of rockets. This fact must be noted, and later on in this address I will refer to the issue of armament in general, not just in Lebanon. In some scenarios, thousands of rockets are liable to be launched at the State of Israel, and in other scenarios they are liable to explode in Lebanon. Today it is clearer than ever that from our perspective the Lebanese government is the address for what is happening in that country and from that country.

In Operation Cast Lead, conducted against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009, Hizbollah avoided acting against us – this in contrast to Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002, when Hizbollah fired hundreds of rockets and mortar bombs at IDF settlements and outposts on the northern border.

Syria in certain respects has been deterred. Beyond the public bravado that praised Hizbollah and its conduct in battle, the Syrian regime understands the model of action we applied in the war in Lebanon and seems to fear it. Syria is looking for ways of fostering closer ties with the Western world. Just recently there was talk of a dialogue about a United States ambassador returning to Damascus at some point in the future. Perhaps this is an expression of the Syrian regime's having internalized the meaning of joining "the axis of evil."

Iran's involvement in Lebanon has been exposed much beyond what we knew in the past. Today Iran is asked to support the post-war reconstruction and Hizbollah's rehabilitation and rearmament, at tremendous cost. One cannot rule out the possibility that the uprising after the recent elections in Iran was an expression of the fact that many Iranians are sick of their government's policy of supporting the axis of evil, a policy that comes at the expense of improving the welfare of the Iranian people.

Much has been said about the moderate states. In brief, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other states are disgusted by Hizbollah and are doing everything possible to promote a different kind of Lebanon. They reject Hizbollah and its patron Iran, which poses a nuclear threat to the entire region. Consider Egypt's action and response against Hizbollah cells exposed recently within its borders and the resulting harsh messages exchanged between the sides. The Egyptian operation and the war of words that developed afterwards between Egypt and Iran because of it are proof of the organization's standing within the moderate Arab community. Professor Zisser supported this with data from a public opinion survey about the low rate of support for Hizbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, throughout the Arab world.

Another ramification of the war was the change in our own conceptual and behavioral worlds. Among ourselves the recognition grew that the defense budget can no longer be an automatic target for reduction and slashing. Furthermore, we have internalized the method of action beyond what the enemy expected. The Dahiya model as a model of action has become accepted. In addition, the fact that the civilian front is an inseparable part of the target and the cost of any future confrontation is also understood. Expressions that were roundly castigated during the war in Lebanon are now seen as truisms. Terms such as "there is no fell

swoop” in this type of warfare; “the resoluteness of the home front as a component of our comprehensive capabilities”; “rockets and missiles fired until the last day of fighting”; “time and patience are required”; and other quotations from statements made during the war that generated waves of criticism are today seen as all but self-evident. In addition, the media undertook some soul searching after the Second Lebanon War, and the IDF as well learned lessons and corrected the erroneous communications policy it used during the war. All of this was achieved by the IDF’s soldiers and commanders who, through their fighting and bravery, generated a change.

I will not wager the amount of time the current situation with the features I have described will last, but I am absolutely convinced that any decision on the part of our enemies to test our patience will be taken with a great deal of fear and trembling.

As for the challenges of the future, our ability to foresee the next confrontation is questionable. Nonetheless, it is important to consider one piece of information as a solid working assumption. Israel’s civilian front will continue to be the enemy’s preferred target in war. Therefore, the army must receive the appropriate resources to prepare and equip itself and be battle-ready within a very short period, in order to attain the tactical, operational, and strategic goals presented to it in the shortest time possible. From this aspect, it is important to strengthen and consolidate the stamina of Israeli society before future confrontations.

The component of defense against missiles and rockets – active defense in the form of interception systems, and passive defense in the form of fortification – is an inseparable part of the total reservoir of capabilities we have to build.

That said, it is necessary to stress that deterrence is not a means to prevent the enemy’s fortification. I am sure that there are many who remember that rearming after a war is a natural activity on the part of the other side. Such growth in strength can be dealt with either through political moves or through military operations.

Responding beyond the enemy’s expectations must be the basis for any future action. In the case of Lebanon, the Lebanese state is the address regarding any hostile act taken against Israel from its territory. The fact that Hizbollah is building up its forces and is deploying in the heart of Shiite towns and villages gives us operational, legal, and moral

legitimacy to stage extensive attacks there should it be necessary as a response to terrorist activity emanating from Lebanon, in the way we operated in the Dahiya neighborhood of Beirut in 2006. This requires us to undertake an entire range of prior actions that would reduce the risk of harm to innocent civilians.

In light of the war and its outcomes, we owe ourselves a thorough clarification of the concepts “victory” and “decision,” certainly when we talk about the type of warfare we are currently facing. Using these terms without clarifying what they stand for runs a great risk of creating an expectations gap and an erroneous assessment of achievements.

Finally, it should be noted that the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead became wars of the past the moment they ended, whose familiar form we will never encounter again. The lessons learned and the conclusions drawn must serve as a tool for progress. Preparing for the future entails the constant need to change and to thwart stagnation. If we can do that, we will cope successfully with scenarios that today are still part of the unknown.

Notes

- 1 Haloutz is referring to a statement made by Minister of Defense Ehud Barak, who at the official ceremony marking three years since the Second Lebanon War, declared: “Their [the soldiers’] courage made up for the mistakes of upper echelons more than once.” *Haaretz*, July 8, 2009.
- 2 Haloutz’s reference is to impassioned newspaper headlines in the first days of the war, including “The Target: Nasrallah,” *Yediot Ahronot*, and “Crush Hizbollah,” *Maariv*, both on Friday, July 14, 2006.
- 3 The attack on the Syrian reactor in September 2007, and the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, the head of Hizbollah’s military wing, in February 2008.

The Second Lebanon War as a Watershed

Gabriel Siboni and Amir Kulick

Wars are difficult and traumatic, and as such, their impact goes well beyond their immediate time frame and the people directly involved. In this sense, the Second Lebanon War is not unusual. In hindsight, and in light of the thoughtful analyses presented at this conference, it seems that the most prominent phenomenon about the Second Lebanon War is the fact that it was a watershed – a pivotal moment in which different processes ceased, accelerated, or significantly changed direction. This is true at the personal level regarding the people who took part in the war on the Israeli and Lebanese sides; at the organizational level regarding both the IDF and Hizbollah; at the state level regarding both Israel and Lebanon; and on the regional level regarding Iran and the various Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria.

At the personal level, there is no doubt that the war and its outcomes severely damaged the professional and political prestige of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Minister of Defense Amir Peretz. Those two, alongside Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, suffered mainly because of the gap between public expectations and declared promises on the one hand, and the actual outcomes of the war on the other. During the first days of the war, politicians, retired senior officers, and media figures presented a long list of public goals for the IDF that created an expectation among the Israeli public for a quick, devastating victory. On the fifth day of the war, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appeared before the Knesset and declared: “There are moments in the life of a nation when it must stare straight into the face of reality and say, ‘No more!’ This is such a moment of national

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truth and I say, 'No more!' Israel will not be held hostage. We will prevail." Binyamin Netanyahu, then the head of the opposition, lent his support, and from the Knesset podium on the same day called on the IDF to "fight them, get them, smash them. We're with you!" He added: "You don't start up with us. You don't shoot missiles at us. Israel will win."¹ In the first days of the war, the media broadcast messages in the same spirit; three days into the campaign, on Friday, July 14, the daily *Yediot Ahronot* published the headline "The Target: Nasrallah" while the daily *Maariv* called to the IDF, "Crush Hizbollah." The goals of the war, as defined for the IDF by the politicians in closed sessions, made no difference; in practice, for the Israeli public, the goals of the war were simple: to destroy Hizbollah or at least wrest from it an unconditional surrender. As the days passed, it became clear that the gap between these expectations and the outcome in practice was immeasurable. The public was bitterly disappointed, and the price for that disappointment was paid by Minister of Defense Amir Peretz, Chief of Staff Dan Haloutz, and finally, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. The latter resigned three years later because of the criminal investigations into his affairs, but there is no doubt that the war and its results severely damaged his prestige and the public's willingness to support him and his political party. In this sense, the war was indeed a painful watershed for these individuals.

At the same time, as is apparent from Professor Eyal Zisser's analysis, the war was also a personal watershed for Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbollah's leader. In the years since Israel's withdrawal from the security zone (May 2000), Nasrallah and his organization were seen as the only entities in the Arab world that had confronted Israel and emerged victorious. Thus their prestige was at an all-time high. Within the Shiite community, Nasrallah became the undisputed leading politician. In Lebanon's political system, Nasrallah was viewed as a national leader, and the "weapon of resistance" – Hizbollah's independent military apparatus – was deemed an asset helping to protect the Lebanese state from the Zionist aggressor. Among the masses in the Arab world, Nasrallah's personal popularity soared to new heights and to a large extent he became a pan-Arab leader. Accordingly, he earned the respect and appreciation of many on the inter-Arab arena. The war in Lebanon and its outcomes changed this state of affairs.

After the war, Nasrallah sought to present himself and his organization as the great victors of the campaign. Several weeks after the ceasefire went into effect the organization held victory celebrations in Beirut, and Nasrallah made his “divine victory” speech. In it, he extolled Hizbollah’s achievements in the confrontation with Israel. Nonetheless, as early as the first interview with the media, Nasrallah was forced to express regret and explain: “We did not estimate even a single percent of the extent of this war that was brought on by the abduction...Had we known that the abduction would lead to such a result, we would not have carried it out.”² In addition to the apology and admission of error, Nasrallah’s low key, diffident appearance was itself a marked change from the previous appearances of the arrogant, self-confident leader. Likewise, from this point onwards, Nasrallah’s personal popularity on the Lebanese internal arena and on the Arab street appeared to go into a steep decline.

The events on the Lebanese political stage emphasized this trend even further. Even during the battles, Hizbollah and its leader were subject to unprecedentedly harsh criticism. Saad Hariri, leader of the March 14 Alliance and head of the Future Movement (Tayyar al-Mustaqbal), called for “a reckoning with Hizbollah.” After the war, the calls for disarming Hizbollah grew louder. Accusations about the organization being a “state within a state” that was harnessing foreign interests – Iranian and Syrian – became common slogans of many Lebanese politicians and media officials. Nasrallah’s demand to establish a national unity government was denied, and the extensive popular protests held by the organization came to naught.

Tensions in the Lebanese political system climaxed in May 2008 when Fouad Siniora’s government sought to dismantle the independent communications system laid down by Hizbollah in Beirut and fire a Beirut airport security officer associated with the organization. In response, Nasrallah sent forth his fighters, who promptly took control of west Beirut. The battles between government supporters and Hizbollah lasted several days. At the end of the crisis, the Doha agreement was signed, which ensured Hizbollah and its ally, the Maronite politician Michel Aoun, major political gains. However, this victory proved to be a double-edged sword for Nasrallah and his supporters. As early as September 2006, Antoine Nadraous asked, “Will [Nasrallah’s] weapons be turned on the internal arena?”³ In May 2008, that question was answered.

As a result of the Doha events, public criticism of Nasrallah and his organization mounted again, and the “weapons of resistance” became a public burden.

The results of the public criticism of Hizbollah were evident in the June 2009 Lebanese parliamentary elections. While Nasrallah’s party, the March 8 Alliance, swept most of the Shiite representatives, Hizbollah and Aoun failed to establish a significant base of support among the other ethnic groups. Thus from being a pan-Arab Lebanese star, Nasrallah – at least for now – has become just another average politician wallowing in the mud of Lebanese politics. Hizbollah as an organization has for many ceased being a rising Arab-nationalist power and become a sectarian element in the service of Iran and Syria. In this sense, one may define the Second Lebanon War as a watershed also for large segments of the Lebanese public, a junction where many shed the illusion that it is possible to maintain an independent military force in Lebanon that is not subject to the government’s apparatus without considering the inherent risks to the nation’s stability. Thus one may assume that for many on the Lebanese street Hizbollah has ceased being a sacred cow and a myth of nationalism and heroism, and has instead turned into a concrete risk threatening the unity of Lebanon.

The events of the summer of 2006 were a watershed also for the organizations that participated in them – Hizbollah’s military wing and the IDF. For Hizbollah, the war was an operational success. Hizbollah’s military wing was constructed with the capability to fire at Israel’s home front throughout the fighting with the deployment of many launchers throughout Lebanon, supported by a ground force that could curb any Israeli attempt to end the fire by means of a ground maneuver. Hizbollah has likely learned many lessons from the war, but in principle it seems that the operational approach that formed the basis for the force buildup before the war was validated. This conclusion is supported when one looks at the organization’s processes of force buildup since the summer of 2006. At the center of the organization’s increased strength, special emphasis is placed on increasing the number of rockets, extending their range, and improving their accuracy. Israeli sources have estimated that the organization now has missiles that cover most of Israel’s territory and that the number of rockets at its disposal has grown from 20,000 before the war to 40,000 in the summer of 2009.⁴ Thus, one may conclude that

at least militarily the Second Lebanon War buttressed the *muqawama* (resistance) model brought to us courtesy of Hizbollah and Iran.

For the IDF, there is no doubt that the Second Lebanon War was a watershed in many ways. The most obvious, as is evident also from the analyses by former chief of staff Dan Haloutz and his deputy Moshe Kaplinsky, is understanding the nature of the threat and the need to formulate an appropriate response. The growth of Hizbollah did not come as a surprise to the army. In the years following the withdrawal from Lebanon, the Israeli media published much data about the organization's armament with rockets and missiles.⁵ Furthermore, as proven by the destruction of the long range missiles by the Israeli air force on the first two days of the war, the IDF had intimate knowledge of Hizbollah's military complex. Even so, even though the information was known, it seems that their significance was not internalized, or if it was internalized, it was not acted upon. From 2000 until 2006, Israel was deeply concerned with the war of terrorism in Judea and Samaria. As noted by former deputy chief of staff Kaplinsky, new operational models were developed in order to respond to that threat and a whole new operational culture developed in order to provide an appropriate response to the unique conditions that prevailed in the territories. The Lebanese arena and the threat that Hizbollah was steadily constructing were, from the army's point of view, not its top priority.

In this sense, the war in Lebanon was a major juncture for the IDF in understanding the nature of the threat, its force, its implications, and the operational response necessary to deal with it. It became clear to the army and to the security forces in general that the Israeli home front is an integral part of the battle and commands special attention. The army thereby came to the understanding that it is necessary to formulate a special response and a better tailored operational approach to the rocket threat, consisting of a balanced mix of ground maneuver and firepower, and that it was necessary to maintain the IDF's traditional capabilities.

After the American invasion of Iraq, the public – and apparently also the army – felt that the conventional threat against Israel had been reduced and that from now on it was necessary to deal primarily with a future nuclear threat and the various terrorist threats. Thus the defense budget was cut, training was reduced, and the basic battle-fitness of both the regular army and the reserves for fighting a conventional war

was compromised. There is no doubt that the events of the summer of 2006 proved that developing capabilities for combating terrorism cannot come at the expense of maintaining the traditional fighting abilities of IDF units. In this sense, the war was a wake-up call for the State of Israel in general and for the IDF in particular.

The Second Lebanon War also had regional ramifications, especially in redefining the rival camps in the Middle East. Tensions between different elements in the inter-Arab and regional scenes are common, and the existence of rival camps is a time-honored tradition. So, for example, in the 1960s the Arab world was divided between the Nasserites, those who supported Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the royalists, headed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Nonetheless, it seems that in the intervening years the Arab world did not witness so clear and extreme a division as that which emerged in the summer of 2006 between the moderate camp, headed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, and the axis of evil – Iran, Syria, Hizbollah, and Hamas.

Since President Bush defined the axis of evil in his famous 2002 speech, the Arab world has been divided clearly between those who support the United States and those who oppose it. The war in Lebanon brought this distinction to the surface for all to see. For the first time, Arabs were clearly and openly lining up against an Arab element fighting a war against Israel. Thus, senior Saudi clerics, including Sheikh al-Hawali and Sheikh Ben Jabrin, issued religious decrees saying it was forbidden to support Hizbollah. In one of these opinions, Hizbollah (which literally means “the Party of God”) was even called “the Party of Satan.” The Saudi government condemned the abduction of the Israeli soldiers and called Hizbollah’s actions “impromptu adventures.”⁶ In mid 2009, the dispute between the two camps reached its peak with Hizbollah’s attempt to establish terrorist cells on Egyptian soil and with Saudi Arabia’s active involvement in the Lebanese elections and attempt to help the Sunnis and their allies (the March 14 Alliance) against Hizbollah and its allies (the March 8 Alliance).

In addition to the inter-Arab dispute, the war in Lebanon demonstrated that the Middle East produced an historically unusual complex of forces in which Israel found itself lined up in one camp together with the major Sunni Arab nations – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan – against a rival regional camp, primarily Shiite, headed by Iran and its allies – Syria,

Hizbollah, and Hamas; “We are all in the same boat,” as King Abdullah of Jordan put it when he addressed the Israeli public. Our failure to stop the Shiites and the global jihadists, explained the king, was your failure too, and vice versa.⁷

In conclusion, one may say that the events of the summer of 2006 left a deep imprint on all participants: leaders, fighters, organizations, nations, and the regional system as a whole. In this sense, there is no doubt that the Second Lebanon War was a watershed, and its ramifications will continue to reverberate for years to come.

Notes

- 1 The quotations are taken from the Knesset’s website, “Weekly Summary of Knesset Plenum Events: The Fighting in the North, July 17, 2006,” <http://www.knesset.gov.il/AllSite/mark02/h0205558.htm#TQL>. See also *Haaretz*, July 18, 2006.
- 2 NTV, August 27, 2006.
- 3 *Al-Mustaqbal*, September 14, 2006.
- 4 “Senior Member of Northern Command: The Calm Liable to Blow up at Any Time,” Ynet, August 4, 2009, at <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3757275,00.html>.
- 5 See, e.g., Amos Harel “Iran Planning Rockets to Reach the Greater Tel Aviv Area from Lebanon,” *Haaretz*, November 26, 2003; Reuven Pedatzur, “IDF’s Horror Show,” *Haaretz*, August 1, 2004; Aluf Benn and Amos Harel, “Head of Military Intelligence: Hizbollah Capable of Launching Rockets to the Sharon – Perhaps Even to Tel Aviv,” *Haaretz*, July 27, 2004; Ze’ev Schiff, “Iran Ships Lebanon Rockets Capable of Reaching Beer Sheva,” *Haaretz*, May 29, 2006.
- 6 “Senior Saudi Sheikh: Hizbollah – the Party of Satan,” Ynet, August 5, 2006, at <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3286606,00.htm>.
- 7 “Listen to the King,” *Haaretz*, February 25, 2007.

