Arms Control Conference (May 21-22, 2014)

Complex Nonconventional Deterrence Equations

Panel I: The Future of Nuclear Deterrence: Global Trends

Adjusting to a Multipolar Nuclear Reality

Yair Evron claimed that the present system is not a purely multipolar one, and suggested that today's world is a mix of multipolarity and unipolarity. The United States remains at the center of the global system. At the same time, a number of mid-level powers have emerged, including China, Russia, India and Brazil. Regional issues are becoming more important. Mid-level powers are not yet playing a global role – they are primarily regional powers (this includes China).

Nuclear weapons contributed to strategic stability under the bipolar system. It played a very important role in the stability of the strategic situation. It became necessary to build understandings between the United States and the Soviet Union, with socialization and agreements.

Nuclear weapons can and will continue to play a role in strategic stability, but conventional capabilities are playing a more important role. American conventional capabilities are becoming more significant. Today, conventional capabilities are more important in achieving political objectives. US power remains very credible and is capable of achieving its goals. US defensive alliances are an important component of US power.

Nuclear weapons in other regions will not stabilize relationships. There is the risk of a crisis escalating to a nuclear level, for example in the context of India-Pakistan. However, the situation is likely to remain stable because decision makers tend to be rational. A nuclear confrontation is not inevitable.

Israel's nuclear capability did not strengthen its deterrence. For Israel, its conventional strength is more significant than its nuclear capability. A nuclear capability has not enabled Israel to achieve its political objectives, and did not help it to reach peace with Egypt.

The Promise of "Global Zero": Whither?

Patricia Lewis claimed that 'global zero' is primarily about preventing nuclear war and not war as a whole. She maintained that nuclear disarmament is inevitable. Nuclear weapons are old and clumsy, and the damage they cause will affect everyone. Nuclear devastation is not only about radiation. It will also affect the climate and food production. One cannot conquer territory or change hearts and minds with nuclear weapons. It is not certain that mankind can rely on rationality. One can only hope that Iran will be rational if it develops nuclear weapons.

Lewis argued that other countries are encouraged to pursue nuclear weapons programs when others talk about them as a deterrent (for example, North Korea which also talks about them as a deterrent).

During the cold war, there were a number of near misses between the US and the Soviet Union. Stability cannot be absolute. While Lewis accepted that nuclear weapons can deter in certain circumstances, they can also fail to deter states that do not possess nuclear weapons. Even though Britain had nuclear weapons during the Falklands war, Argentina was not deterred.

There has been some progress. There have been some nuclear security conferences, and New START. However, it would be foolish to expect progress on the Conference on Disarmament, since the last forum took place in 1996. There are few incentives to disarm, particularly in Russia. The chemical weapons agreement over Syria has been an interesting development, with 90 per cent of the chemical weapons agents destroyed. The Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons initiative is noteworthy as it has raised attention on this issue. The key issue is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. As the world is unstable, we are likely to see more states acquiring nuclear weapons, and it is increasingly likely that they will be used in a regional conflict. We should head towards Syria, and take note of that example.

Deterring Rogue States

Mark Fitzpatrick claimed that deterrence can work. The Soviet Union was deterred during the cold war. There is no reason why it should not work with other regimes. Iran is no less rational. A nuclear-armed China has been rational. The historical record suggests that when Iran's national security is at stake, it acts rationally. Khomeini accepted a ceasefire during the Iran-Iraq war.

1. Who is to be deterred? We are referring to 'states of concern' such as North Korea, Iran and Syria.
2. What is to be deterred? In the cold war, deterrence was designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The deterrence of aggression worked imperfectly. We are not interested solely in deterring the use of nuclear weapons but also deterring nuclear development. The deterrence record vis-à-vis rogue states is very patchy. Nuclear use has been deterred, but nuclear development has not been deterred.
3. How should deterrence be applied? It is unlikely that any nuclear state would use its weapons to pre-empt the acquisition of a nuclear weapon. The United States can use conventional weapons to stop Iran. Threats to use nuclear weapons lack credibility because the adversary knows they will not be carried out.

President Obama seeks to dissuade Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Iran cannot be deterred from acquiring a nuclear capability – unfortunately, it has had this capability for some time now. One thing Iran does not have is sufficient time to produce nuclear weapons before these attempts are discovered. The idea behind the negotiations is to extend this time. Iran also lacks the political decision to produce these weapons. Western policy aims to keep things this way. Obama's strategy is about stopping Iran from crossing the line. Fitzpatrick told his audience that the declaratory measures taken by President Obama should undoubtedly be taken seriously. He had no doubt that Obama would employ military force to stop Iran from producing nuclear weapons if this was necessary. However, he advised caution, as the moment of nuclear break-out is not highly visible: deterring Iran from crossing the line to a nuclear break-out will be more viable if the line is

made more visible. The conditions for any deal, therefore, should require measures that will include an easily detectible tripwire that will signal a breakout.

Tehran knows that its use of nuclear weapons will mean the end of its regime. Deterrence must include incentives and disincentives.

Panel II: The Future of Nuclear Deterrence: Global Powers

Obama's Nuclear Posture Review

Noam Ophir claimed that while Obama's Prague speech in 2009 appeared to be a departure, and a new weapons employment strategy was signed by the US President in June 2013, the US nuclear strategy has not changed.

Obama's focus was originally to achieve a New START treaty with Russia. The Nuclear Posture Review Report of 2010 was not the revolutionary step that people were hoping for. The only meaningful change was the declaration not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear NPT states.

The fundamental role of nuclear weapons remains to deter attacks on the United States. Obama's PPD-24 strategy document has little that is different to the US strategy of 2002 under the Bush Administration. Terms such as "counterforce" and "deterrence" remain. Nothing much has changed.

China's Effort to Establish Strategic Stability with the United States

Yoram Evron stated that when a status quo power (the United States) faces a rising power (China), there are complications. China has invested efforts to maintain a second strike capability. For the last two and a half decades, it has invested great efforts to strengthen its nuclear deterrence. China's nuclear capability remains weak in comparison to the United States. China has around 250 nuclear warheads, compared to around 5000 US warheads. China's warheads can reach Russia but not the United States.

China seeks to prevent a US arms buildup in Asia, and is unhappy about US ballistic missile defense systems in East Asia. It is important for China to maintain a strategic balance in East Asia. This area will be the focus of future conflicts. In 2009, China

began to adopt a more proactive policy, and it became harder for the United States to obtain China's cooperation. The two powers are in conflict over China's role in the international system, and the situation is likely to deteriorate. Beijing accuses Washington of trying to undermine its development. China is aware that it cannot win a war against the United States, but it can extract huge costs in human casualties and capital. Beijing is strengthening its capabilities with this in mind. Beyond maintaining a nuclear arsenal of minimal effectiveness, China seeks to deter the United States from using force against it by building up its capabilities.

Russian Perspectives on Complex Deterrence

Alexei Arbatov claimed that there was a paradox in relation to nuclear weapons: theoretically, they are viewed in terms of deterrence. In practice, they are designed for war. There are dangers of strategic miscalculation. They are often designed for first use, and are difficult to control. All nuclear-armed states claim that their nuclear weapons are for deterrence (with the exception of Israel).

Nuclear deterrence contains the seeds of its own failure. The danger is exacerbated by the proliferation of nuclear weapons among rogue states. As long as nuclear weapons are with us, the threats will grow as proliferation rises. Nuclear deterrence is impotent in dealing with nuclear proliferation – if anything, it encourages proliferation. Deterrence cannot help against the threat of nuclear terrorism. If it were not for mutual nuclear deterrence, Russia would not worry about US ballistic missile defense.

The use of nuclear weapons is more probable at the regional level – for example, in the case of India and Pakistan. The growth of nuclear power will create problems for the NPT regime. Peaceful nuclear programs may be used to acquire military nuclear programs, such as in the case of North Korea.

There is a connection between nuclear disarmament and non proliferation. Nuclear disarmament is not sufficient to achieve non proliferation. However, without disarmament, the situation will be a lot worse. There were successes for a while in non proliferation during the 1970s and 1980s.

Each successive US-Russia disarmament agreement has resulted in fewer reductions. The United States and Russia are each developing their own ballistic missile defense

systems. The US BMD system will not be able to affect Russian missiles, and vice versa.

Reductions are possible where there is symmetric mutual deterrence (India and Pakistan), but not where there is asymmetrical mutual deterrence (US and China).

The expansion of ballistic missile defense and conventional capabilities (precision guided weapons) may undercut security and destroy arms control systems.

Panel III: The Future of Nuclear Deterrence: Regional Challenges

Extended Deterrence in Europe/NATO

Bruno Tertrais claimed that nuclear weapons are just one component of extended deterrence. Ballistic missile defense, a new component, matters as much if not more in terms of reassurance. Eastern European countries are reassured by a US presence. Deterrence of cyber attacks is also important. The role of junior partners such as Britain and France is significant. They play a broader role in the extended deterrence process, and complicate the planning of adversaries. The procedure of nuclear sharing should also be taken into consideration. Non-nuclear countries can play a role, even if they do not carry nuclear weapons.

What happens in Europe affects other regions, such as Asia. We may be on the brink of a rejuvenated debate on extended deterrence in Europe. Russia has made intensive use of nuclear signaling. The NATO debate is just beginning, but the nuclear element in extended deterrence has been a secondary issue. The issue of a US withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe is no longer realistic. The NATO-Russia Founding Act and 'the Three Nos' are issues for reopened debate. We can no longer proceed in accordance with the notion of shared rationality. Merkel's comments on "Putin's madness" are not reassuring. They bring to mind the appalling situation in the Balkans. We may no longer have a grip on the situation. We thought we understood the Soviets, but did we?

Tertrais concluded that nuclear deterrence can work, but it has its limitations. Tertrais disagreed with Fitzpatrick's claim that deterrence has prevented the use of nuclear weapons, and maintained that deterrence can only be seen to have succeeded or failed if it was actually used.

Deterrence in East Asia: The Challenge of North Korea in the Six Party Context

Alon Levkowitz stated that the six party multilateral mechanism for resolving the issue of North Korea's nuclear program has advantages for Pyongyang. North Korea pays a relatively low price, it gains time and limits UN Security Council sanctions. Pyongyang knows how to use the balance of power for its interests. The six party talks failed to prevent North Korea's three nuclear tests on October 9 2006, February 25 2009 and February 12 2013. They also failed to prevent North Korea's nuclear proliferation.

The six party talks are meant to prevent nuclearization in North Korea. The optimists claim that this could have been prevented. The pessimists claim that North Korea cannot be trusted, and that there is no incentive for them to denuclearize. Pyongyang is a difficult case to predict and understand.

Disagreement is built into the six party talks. There is no 100 per cent consensus. Nevertheless, it is too early to declare the death of the talks. It serves North Korea to maintain the mechanism as a "bail out" option. A deterioration in its economy might bring it back to the talks. North Korea continues to engage in brinkmanship. This has led to an improvement in coordination between the United States and China - a regrettable development from Pyongyang's perspective. Washington and Beijing prefer a diplomatic solution.

There are now other factors to take into account. How strong is the US commitment to South Korea and Japan? Will Seoul consider the option of becoming a nuclear threshold state? The final failure of the six party talks might be another factor in the acceleration of this process.

The China-India-Pakistan Triangle

According to **WPS Sidhu,** regional nuclear deterrence dynamics are not isolated from global dynamics. There is always learning, cooperation and interaction between the regions. For example, the India-Bangladesh war of 1971 was influenced by the 1967 war.

The post-cold war period has seen the collapse of the cold war deterrence model. The Soviet Union collapsed. The quest for security led the United States to focus more on

defense than deterrence. There was the emergence of a number of nuclear-armed states (China, North Korea, India and Pakistan). This challenged the notion of strategic balance and strategic stability. Not all of these countries follow the classic East-West notion of strategic stability. The institution of a 'no war' concept has not been developed. There has been little engagement between them to prevent proliferation. There are no arms control agreements in South Asia.

Sidhu referred in his presentation to the 'three Nos':

- No 'no nuclear build up' policy. There is a large build-up of armaments. There is a global trend against the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. In South Asia, the opposite is the case. There are more tactical nuclear weapons. There is also sea-based nuclear deterrence. India is changing its nuclear deterrence posture.
- There are no arms control procedures.
- There is no regional architecture to manage relations and prevent nuclear war.

China has a DF25 medium-range ballistic missile which covers India. Nascent ballistic missile defense capabilities in Asia are weakening nuclear deterrence. There are new territorial conflicts such as in the South China Sea. Will there be more cooperation or confrontation? Sidhu concluded that a muddling-through approach with ad hoc agreements is the most likely scenario, but expressed doubt over whether. these agreements will work over the long term.

Panel IV: Middle East Dimensions

Compellence in Negotiations with Iran

Emily Landau claimed that Iran joined the NPT in late 1970s but has violated NPT provisions in developing a military program. Iran seeks to maintain its nuclear program, and achieve a military breakout.

Negotiations became a strategy of choice for the United States and Europe after the Iraq fiasco. The two strategies of inducements and pressure have been employed with Iran, but with little success. Europeans used inducements with Iran in 2003. More

recently, sanctions have been employed. Inducements and pressure were intended to bring about a change in Iranian behavior. Iran said no to the inducements in 2003 and 2005. This baffled the Europeans. The carrots were not sweet enough, it was claimed. The Europeans believed that security guarantees might have encouraged Iran to back down.

In the wake of the Iraq war, Iran became convinced that it would be attacked. However, Iran has also sought to deter the United States by threatening force, and this appears to have worked. Iran also claims that sanctions are illegal as it has done nothing wrong. Russia and China have said that Iran cannot be punished too harshly as there is no proof of a military program.

Israel's stepped up threats did not deter Iran, but they did compel the Europeans to agree to sanctions. The joint American and European sanctions forced Iran to come to the table. The United States is not pushing back against Iran's harsh rhetoric. An eagerness to reach a deal is weakening the US hand vis-à-vis Iran.

There is a need to secure an Iranian admission that it has been working on a PMD. Otherwise there is no u-turn for Iran to make. Iran needs to declare its guilt. What is the bottom line of the United States? Obama has said that no deal is better than a bad deal. What is a bad deal? This must be defined and made clear to Iran. How can Iran be deterred further down the line if it does acquire a nuclear capability? The p5+1 may need to think about this, but we hope it will not happen.

Deterrence in the Face of a Nuclear Iran

Avner Golov discussed the various forms that deterrence could take vis-à-vis a nuclear Iran. There is simultaneous deterrence where several leaders are addressed at the same time. The message needs to be heard by several adversaries. In extended deterrence, the US is projecting its power to reassure several allies. There is also relative deterrence: this could apply, for example, to a military confrontation between the United States and Iran, where Israel could offer to inflict additional damage. In the Gulf War of 1991, Israel was unable to threaten additional damage against Iraq.

There are opportunities in enhanced deterrence, whereby two states can act in cooperation. There is also deterrence by denial which denies the adversary the benefits originally sought. This applies in the case of ballistic missile defense. Third

party deterrence applies in an indirect manner. For example, this could be used with Turkey, China or Pakistan to deter the adversary. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 deterred Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. In multilateral deterrence against Iran, the US-Israel relationship is the main key for coping with risks and exploiting opportunities.

In Golov's view, deterrence against Iran should be multilateral and include extended deterrence models.

Will the Neighbors go Nuclear? Comparing Saudi Arabia and Turkey's Responses to Iran

Turkey's View of Iran's Nuclear Program

Gallia Lindenstrauss referred to the widely held assumption that if Iran becomes a declared nuclear state, others will follow. However, we are already seeing a ballistic missiles arms race. Turkey's view is that Iran has a right to enrichment, but not to a military nuclear program.

Turkey, a member of NATO, is highly dependent on energy imports. It believes that only a negotiated settlement will solve the issue of the Iranian nuclear program. Turkey is opposed to military action against Iran and supports a Middle East Nuclear-Free Zone. Nevertheless, Turkey is not calling for the removal of NATO B61 bombs.

Turkey has a civilian nuclear program. Its first reactor is being built by Russia. It signed a deal with Japan for a second reactor. It plans to have 20 reactors by around 2030. Turkey has a ballistic missile program. It has missiles with a range of 150 km, and in 2014, achieved a medium-range missile capability. It is also working on long-range missiles.

Will Turkey go nuclear? It is already under the NATO nuclear umbrella. If Iran remains a threshold state, Turkey is unlikely to go nuclear. If Iran were to become a declared nuclear state, Turkey could go nuclear.

Saudi Arabia's View of Iran's Nuclear Program

Yoel Guzansky addressed Saudi Arabia's perspective on Iran's nuclear program. There is a sense of inferiority and vulnerability. The Saudis have voiced public support for a negotiated settlement over the Iranian nuclear program.

What is Saudi Arabia doing? It has exerted pressure on the US and the international community. It is hedging and moving closer to Iran. There is also tactical (but tacit) cooperation with Israel. King Abdullah's call in 2009 to "cut off the head of the snake" was disclosed by Wikileaks.

There are preparations for the development of nuclear energy. Saudi Arabia intends to invest more than $100 billion in the construction of 16 nuclear reactors by 2030. The Saudis have also begun to purchase DF-21 medium-range missiles from China.

Will the Saudis go nuclear? The pursuit of a nuclear capability might happen if Iran were to break out to achieve a military capability. In the absence of this, Saudi Arabia will remain committed to the NPT and the enforcement of a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone.

Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia rely on US guarantees and nuclear umbrellas. They are looking for signs of US credibility in Syria. Civilian programs are moving ahead slowly. There is already a ballistic missiles arms race. In the long term, much depends on US pressures and its credibility regarding its determination to stop proliferation.

A Middle East WMD-Free Zone: Exploring Alternatives

Camille Grand addressed the reasons for the failure to convene the 2012 conference on a Middle East WMD-free zone:

- There was no agreement over Iran's nuclear program.
- Chemical weapons were used in Syria. On the one hand, a WMD-free zone in the region is now more relevant. On the other hand, the problem is more concrete.
- There was no progress in the peace process.
- Turmoil in the Middle East.

On the positive side, it is not completely unlikely that a meeting can take place in 2015. Israel has played ball, and the Arabs are interested. On the negative side, the Iranian nuclear program and Syria remain a problem. There is a lack of ownership at the local level and there are technical issues that need to be resolved. The process could collapse because of the lack of consensus.

Grand concluded that there are broader complications with implications for the NPT if no solution is found. If the process collapses, how do we save it? There is no alternative plan in place, and there is a danger that the non proliferation regime could be weakened if the problem is not addressed.

Panel V: Debate: Do Norms Deter?

Moderator: **Dr. Anat Kurz**

Anat Kurz asked the panelists whether treaties were needed to establish norms. What comes first? Norms or treaties? Do treaties establish norms?

Camille Grand claimed that treaties emerge from norms**.** This is a chicken and egg debate. The claims about Israel and the NPT are an example of this. The cluster bomb treaty is an example of an agreement that emerged from a norm. The creation of a treaty then resulted in a new norm. Norms can sometimes serve as a better deterrent than a treaty.

Cameron Brown argued that norms often follow treaties**.** Territorial integrity is a norm found in international law. The norm came after the treaty. The Syrians used chemical weapons. They didn't say we are not bound legally. It was the norm that influenced their conduct.

Amir Lupovici referred to deterrence as a practice that helps preserve international norms. Deterrence can be seen as a norm. In July 1996, the International Court of Justice recognized the norm of deterrence- it is one that many actors recognize.

Bruno Tertrais maintained that the power of norms lie behind the success of treaties. How much can norms help to prevent genocide and humanitarian disasters? Does putting someone on trial help to deter or does it mean that the person has nothing to lose? You cannot explain the success of the NPT among western liberal democracies, unless you can see the power of the norm. Imagine if there was no NPT. The trajectory of the Iranian nuclear program might have been different. Iran wants to be seen as abiding by the norm. The way western countries internalize norms shows that they do not do so only out of considerations of realism.

Amir Lupovici claimed that norms provide the context in which deterrence works. Policymakers may have to consider the consequences of not following the norm. This could lead to a public outcry.

Cameron Brown presented the question when can a norm be violated? Where there is a competing norm at work. An example is the case of Israel and proliferation. The United States and western countries are overlooking Israel's proliferation because of its self-defense requirements. Many countries have not made a fuss over Russia's annexation of Crimea because of the norm of self-determination.

Camille Grand concluded that dates matter. France proliferated before the taboo was strong. Israel is in a similar situation.

In his keynote address**, Uzi Arad** discussed the development of deterrence as a strategic concept in Israel. In his work at the Hudson institute in 1971, there was an assumption that deterrence could fail. The ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, where mutual assured destruction became enshrined in US policy.

In 1973, Israel was unable to deter Egypt and Syria from attacking it. Early warnings and deterrence collapsed. The three components of Israel's security doctrine, early warning, deterrence and decisiveness: none of them worked. Deterrence cannot be reduced to one element – it cannot be based simply upon nuclear deterrence. It depends also upon context. Deterrence is one of the most complicated and elusive concepts to comprehend, and there are tremendous difficulties in putting theory into practice.

In Israel, there is no discussion of nuclear deterrence, and there is no deterrence policy that is authoritative. Conventional deterrence, however, is discussed. Reprisals are one facet of this discussion. The purest form of deterrence is punishment (for example, the decapitation of Hamas). This did have some effect.

Deterrence today is a hybrid of offensive and defensive conduct. However, this concept is increasingly blurred. For example, it is claimed that Hizbullah is deterred because it is not firing at Israel. However, Israel is not firing at the organization either. So is this deterrence? The language of deterrence is used in Israel when it is needed least (conventional deterrence), and there is silence when it is needed most (nuclear deterrence).

There is room for creative and reenergized arms control arrangements of all kinds in order to 'cool the system' and slow down the arms race. There is a need for work on building new alliances including with non-state actors such as corporations.

Arad concluded that prevention should be given a chance through all means necessary while nuclear deterrence should be avoided and pursued only as a last resort. It would be best not to rush into nuclear deterrence, as it is very risky and expensive. Defense is back in fashion, and the emphasis should be placed on defensive means and de-escalation rather than punitive actions. Do not place the burden on nuclear deterrence: It is a fragile construct and must be handled with care and prudence.